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HISTORY  OF  GREECE 
ABBOTT 


A 

HISTORY  OF  GREECE 


BY 

EVELYN  ABBOTT,  M.A,  LL.D. 

JOWETT  LECTURER  IN  GREEK  HISTORY  AT 
BALLIOL  COLLEGE 


PART  III. 


From  the  Thirty  Years  Peace  to  the  Fall  of 
the  Thirty  at  Athens,  445-403  B.C. 


New  York:  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
London:  LONGMANS,  GREEN,  &  CO. 
1900 

All  rights  reserved 


PREFACE 


In  the  first  five  chapters  of  this  volume  I  have  re- 
peated some  passages  from  my  Pericles  (1891)  with 
corrections  and  other  changes.  I  am  sorry  for  the  delay 
in  the  appearance  of  the  book,  but  owing  to  other  work 
I  have  been  unable  to  finish  it  sooner,  and  even  now 
I  am  conscious  that  the  labour  which  I  have  bestowed 
on  it  has  been  inadequate  to  the  subject.  Greek  History 
in  the  Fifth  Century  B.C.  has  an  interest  which  is  as 
inexhaustible  as  it  is  imperishable. 

I  am  greatly  indebted  to  Mr.  W.  H.  Forbes,  Tutor  of 
Balliol  College,  for  numerous  suggestions  and  improve- 
ments; to  Mr.  H.  W.  C.  Davis,  Fellow  of  All  Souls' 
College,  and  Mr.  H.  Williamson,  of  Balliol  College,  for 
their  kindness  in  reading  over  my  proof-sheets ;  and  to 
Mr.  F.  H.  Dale,  Fellow  of  Merton  College,  for  generous 
help  in  the  Index.  E.  A. 

Oxford,  December  1899. 


58963 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https  ://arch  i  ve .  o  rg/detai  Is/h  isto  ryof  g  reeceb03abbo 


/ 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

The  History  of  Athens  prom  the  Thirty  Years'  Peace  to 

the  Founding  of  Amphipolis,  445-437,  ....  1 

A.  — Athens  and  the  West :  the  Foundation  of  Thurii,    .  15 

B.  — The  Samian  Revolt :  Athens  and  the  East,      .       .  28 

C.  — Athens  and  the  North  :  the  Founding  of  Amphipolis,  37 

CHAPTER  II. 

Athens  in  445-432,        ........  49 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Causes  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,     .  67 
CHAPTER  IV. 

Greece  on  the  Eve  of  the  War,  94 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  War  down  to  the  Death  of  Pericles,  431-429,   .       .  Ill 
CHAPTER  VI. 

From  the  Death  of  Pericles  to  the  end  of  427,        .       .  155 
CHAPTER  VII. 

From  the  beginning  of  426  to  the  end  of  425,    .       .       .  189 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
From  the  beginning  of  424  to  the  Peace  of  Nicias,  421,    .  223 


viii 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PAGE 

From  the  Conclusion  of  the  Peace  to  the  Invasion  of 

Sicily,  421-415,   267 

CHAPTER  X. 

Affairs  in  Sicily,  422-413,   295 

CHAPTER  XI. 
From  the  end  of  the  Sicilian  Expedition  to  the  Fall  of 

the  Four  Hundred,  413-411,  365 

CHAPTER  XII. 
From  the  Fall  of  the  Four  Hundred  to  the  Fall  of  the 

Thirty,  411-403,  420 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Events  in  Sicily  from  the  Destruction  of  the  Athenian 

Armament  to  the  Peace  with  Carthage,  413-405,      .  476 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Literature,  Art,  Society,  etc.,  490 

APPENDIX  I. 

Expenditure  on  the  War,   •  530 

APPENDIX  II. 

The  Revolution  of  the  Four  Hundred,     ....  532 


INDEX,  541 

LIST  OF  MAPS- 
PLAN  of  the  Island  of  Sphagia  (Sphacteria)  and  the 

Harbour  of  Navarino,  206 

Syracuse  during  the  Athenian  Siege,        .       .       .  327 


CORRIGENDUM 


P.  105, 1.  7  from  foot : — For  "  That  the  cities  of  the  confederacy  made 
some  kind  of  contribution  is  stated  by  Thucydides,  and  the  state- 
ment is  confirmed,"  etc.,  read  "That  the  Sicilian  allies  of  the 
confederacy  were  expected  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  expenses 
of  the  war  is  stated  by  Thucydides,  and  the  statement  is  con- 
firmed in  regard  to  other  allies,"  etc.  I  may  add  that  the  Spartans, 
after  the  war  was  ended,  demanded  from  the  Eleans  their  share 
of  the  cost,  but  for  this  fact  we  have  only  the  authority  of 
Diodorus  (xiv.  17) ;  Xenophon  does  not  mention  it. 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE  HISTORY  OF  ATHENS  FROM  THE  THIRTY  YEARS  PEACE 
TO  THE  FOUNDING  OF  AMPHIPOLIS,  445-437. 

I.  By  the  terms  of  the  peace  of  445  Athens  was  deprived 
of  all  the  advantages  which  she  had  acquired  in  the  pre- 
ceding fifteen  years.  She  was  no  longer  the  Loss  of  Athens 
greatest  power  in  Central  Greece,  with  garri-  under  the  Peace 
sons  at  Pegae  and  Nisaea  to  secure  the  isthmus  of  445' 
of  Corinth ;  she  no  longer  held  points  of  vantage  in  Achaea 
and  at  Troezen,  from  which  she  could  keep  in  check  the 
most  enterprising  of  the  allies  of  Sparta — Sicyon,  Corinth, 
and  Epidaurus;  she  was  confined  within  the  limits  of  her 
own  territory,  between  two  sections  of  the  enemy.  It  is  true 
that  she  retained  Naupactus,  through  which  she  might  still 
hope  to  exercise  some  influence  in  Western  Greece ;  it  is  true 
that  Aegina,  the  "eyesore  of  the  Peiraeus,"  though  an  in- 
dependent, was  nevertheless  a  tributary  ally,  and  without  a 
fleet  of  her  own;  but  this  was  a  sorry  salvage  from  the 
wreck  of  a  land  empire,  which  enabled  Athens  to  employ 
Boeotian  hoplites  in  the  field  and  place  her  ships  in 
Megarian  harbours,  which  gave-  her  the  command  of  the 
Saronic  and  Corinthian  gulfs.  The  collapse  becomes  the 
more  remarkable  when  we  compare  the  present  and  the 
previous  conduct  of  the  Athenians.  In  456,  two  months 
after  the  defeat  of  Tanagra,  they  were  again  in  the  field, 
and  by  the  victory  of  Oenophyta  placed  the  Wantofvi 
whole  of  Boeotia  at  their  feet;  but  no  attempt  ous  policy  at 
had  been  made  to  retrieve  the  disaster  of  Athens- 
Coronea.  Thebes  gathered  the  cities  of  Boeotia  round  her 
in  a  close  and  hostile  confederation;  the  Phocians  and 

VOL.  ill.  A 


2 


CONDUCT  OF  SPARTA  IN  446. 


Locrians  threw  off  their  allegiance,  but  Athens  never  called 
out  a  single  soldier.  Since  449  there  had  been  no  war — 
either  Hellenic  or  foreign — to  exhaust  her  resources,  and 
but  a  small  part  of  her  army  had  been  engaged  at  Coronea. 
By  a  vigorous  dash  at  Tanagra,  which  lay  within  two  days' 
march  of  the  city,  she  might  have  secured  captives  to  hold 
as  hostages  for  those  Athenians  who  had  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  and,  the  balance  thus  restored,  a  second 
contest  would  have  been  possible,  but  she  preferred  to 
abandon  her  position  in  Central  Greece  without  a  struggle. 
In  the  peace  which  Cimon  concluded  with  Sparta  in  451 
(vol.  ii.  p.  338),  she  was  allowed  to  retain  her  acquisitions  in 
the  Peloponnesus  and  the  Megarid ;  but  now,  after  five  years 
of  undisturbed  possession,  she  is  called  upon  to  renounce 
them  all,  and  she  obeys  the  call  without  any  attempt  at 
resistance. 

The  conduct  of  the' Spartans  is  hardly  less  astonishing. 
The  invasion  of  Attica  by  Plistoanax  was  obviously  part  of 
a  prearranged  scheme,  in  which  Euboea  was 
?0Xndu°tdof  th£    deeply  concerned.  In  their  revolt  the  Euboeans 
Lacedae-  must  have  relied,  not  only  on  the  Boeotians, 

monians.  *  whom  they  had  helped  to  freedom,  but  even 
more  on  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  invaded  Attica  in  order 
to  divert  the  Athenians  from  active  operations  in  the  island. 
For  however  impregnable  the  walls  of  Athens  might  be, 
Pericles  could  not  venture  to  leave  the  city  while  the 
Lacedaemonian  army  was  in  Attica.  Yet  suddenly,  at  the 
most  critical  moment  in  the  fortunes  of  Euboea,  Sparta  throws 
her  over,  and  the  invaders  return  home.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  produce  instances  of  Lacedaemonian  treachery  when  the 
safety  of  Lacedaemonians  was  involved  (infra,  p.  197),  but 
in  the  present  instance  the  Lacedaemonians  were  in  no 
danger,  and  they  gained  no  advantage — at  least  none  to 
which  we  can  point — by  returning  home.  The  Lacedae- 
monians explained  the  mystery  by  the  commonplace  that 
Plistoanax  had  been  bribed ;  but  can  we  suppose  that  the 
ephors  of  Sparta  allowed  their  policy  to  be  so  easily  thwarted  ? 


I.  2.]  A  THEN  IAN  FOLIC  Y  A  FTER  CIMON. 


Arehidamus  was  at  Sparta,  and  he  at  least  was  above 
suspicion.  Why  was  the  experienced  soldier  left  at  home, 
and  a  mere  youth  placed  in  command  of  the  expedition? 
Why  was  no  effort  made  to  persist  in  the  policy  by  which 
Plistoanax  was  sent  into  Attica  ?  Why  was  Euboea  allowed 
to  fall  back  into  the  hands  of  Athens  ? 

2.  If  we  had  fuller  information  we  should  no  doubt  be 
able  to  explain  the  action  of  Sparta  and  Athens  in  this 
period ;  but  in  our  present  ignorance  we  cannot  go  beyond 
conjecture,  and  of  the  causes  here  suggested  it  is  impossible 
to  say  which  is  the  true  one. 

(a)  The  first  symptoms  of  a  decline  of  vigour,  or,  at  any 
rate,  of  a  change  of  policy,  at  Athens  are  seen  immediately 
after  the  death  of  Cimon.  The  Athenians 
were  victorious  at  Salamis ;  but  no  attempt  poHcyat* 
was  made  to  gain  Cyprus  for  the  Delian  Athens  after 
confederacy;  the  island  was  abandoned  to  its  Clmon's death- 
fate ;  war  with  Persia  was  dropped.  The  death  of  the  great 
soldier,  whose  life  had  been  dedicated  to  foreign  wars,  seems 
to  have  brought  with  it  a  cessation  of  warlike  enterprise. 
In  the  next  four  years  the  two  commanders  who  -stood  next 
to  Cimon  in  reputation  —  Tolmides  and  Myronides  —  also 
passed  away.  The  extension  of  Athenian  power  on  land 
had  been  largely  due  to  their  victories,  and  Tolmides  fell 
in  endeavouring  to  maintain  what  he  had  helped  to  win.1 
Their  places  were  taken  by  men  of  as  little  capacity  as 
ambition,  whom  the  citizens  distrusted  and  the  enemy 
despised.  Pericles  himself  was  by  no  means  a  distinguished 
general;  his  caution  amounted  to  timidity,  and  unless  in 
command  of  an  overwhelming  force,  he  shrank  from  the  risk 
of  an  engagement.  From  this  period  we  trace  a  decline  of 
the  Athenian  army,  of  which  the  last  stage  was  reached  on 
the  fatal  field  of  Delium  in  424 — a  decline  for  which  Pericles 


1  The  date  of  the  death  of  Myronides  is  unknown,  but  we  never 
hear  of  him  after  the  expedition  to  Thessaly  in  454,  Tolmides,  of 
course,  fell  at  Coronea, 


4 


ATHENS  AND  HER  ALLIES. 


was  himself  largely  to  blame.  But  without  an  efficient  army, 
carefully  trained,  and  led  by  able  generals,  Athens  could  not 
hope  to  maintain  her  position  in  Central  Hellas. 

(b)  In  Cimon  Athens  also  lost  the  citizen  who  was  most 
influential  at  Sparta.    It  was  he  who  concluded  the  peace  of 

451 ;  and  though  he  had  been  unable  to  prevent 

Change  in  the        ,       ,  ,     ,  . 

relations  of  the  breach  between  Athens  and  Sparta  after 
Athens  and       the  affair  of  Ithome,  and  had  shown  himself 

Sparta.  ,       ,       .  .... 

loyal  and  patriotic  in  the  conflict  which  followed, 
his  presence  at  Athens  was  at  least  a  guarantee  that  Lacedae- 
monian interests  were  not  overlooked.  After  his  death  there 
was  no  one  to  take  his  place  in  this  respect,  and  we  may 
conjecture  that  in  the  interval  between  449  and  445  a  spirit 
of  distrust  and  suspicion  arose  among  the  Lacedaemonians, 
who  might  suppose  that  Athens  abandoned  war  with  Persia 
merely  to  renew  the  war  in  Greece  with  greater  vigour. 
Under  such  circumstances  they  would  in  445  insist  on 
severer  terms  than  those  which  they  accepted  in  451. 

(c)  Other  and  more  important  causes  of  the  change  in  the 
spirit  and  policy  of  Athens  may  be  sought  in  the  attitude 
Attitude  of  the  of  tne  allies  and  tne  influence  of  Pericles.  The 
allies  towards  calamitous  reverse  which  overtook  Athens  in 
Athens.  Egypt  could  not  fail  to  have  an  effect  on  the 
cities  of  the  Anatolian  coast ;  those  which  were  discontented 
with  their  position  were  more  inclined  to  seek  aid  from 
Persia ;  and  the  Persian  satraps  began  to  renew  their  hopes 
of  collecting  the  tribute  at  which  the  cities  were  assessed  to 
the  Great  King.  In  450  there  had  been  troubles  at  Miletus, 
Erythrae,  and  Colophon,  which  could  only  be  composed  by 
the  presence  of  Athenian  garrisons  and  commissioners.  In 
446  followed  the  revolt  of  Euboea,  the  largest  of  all  the 
allied  islands,  the  nearest  to  Athens,  and  the  most  important 
for  the  supply  of  the  city.  In  this  period  also,  so  far  as  we 
can  draw  conclusions  from  the  quota-lists,  the  tribute  re- 
ceived from  the  allies  was  constantly  diminishing:  in  450 
the  total  amount  was  reduced  from  520  talents  to  470  or 
480 ;  and  by  440  it  amounted  to  454  talents  only,  of  which 


1.2.]  WAR  WITH  PERSIA  DISCONTINUED. 


5 


not  more  than  400  were  paid.  In  the  years  447-445  twelve 
cities  in  the  Carian  district,  two  in  the  Ionian,  and  two  in 
the  Thracian,  disappear  from  the  list  of  those  paying  tribute 
to  Athens.1  Such  indications  of  decline  were  not  lost  on 
Pericles,  for  even  if  he  did  not  anticipate  so  serious  an  out- 
break as  he  was  soon  to  experience  in  the  revolt  of  Samos, 
he  could  not  fail  to  perceive  that  if  the  Athenian  empire  was 
to  be  maintained,  Athens  must  keep  her  allies  well  in  hand ; 
she  must  concentrate  her  power  on  the  sea ;  she  must  be 
invincible  in  the  Aegean,  or  the  cities  would  rebel  and  the 
tribute  remain  unpaid. 

With  this  object  in  view  he  allowed  the  old  policy  of  war 
with  Persia  to  drop,  for  experience  had  shown  how  fatal  was 
a  reverse  in  the  east,  and  how  little  could  be  warwith 
gained  by  further  conquests.  A  maritime  ^eJi^g™pbpeed: 
power  could  inflict  no  serious  injury  on  the  comes  an 
territory  of  the  king,  while  the  occupation  of  emPire- 
Cyprus,  which  was,  perhaps,  possible,  would  involve  unceasing 
conflict  with  the  Phoenician  fleet.  The  revolt  in  Egypt,  if 
not  wholly  suppressed,  was  so  far  crushed  that  no  reasonable 
hope  of  success  remained,  and  it  would  be  the  worst  folly  to 
waste  the  resources  of  Greece  in  supporting  projects  so 
chimerical  as  the  resuscitation  of  the  Pharaohs.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  traditional  policy  of  the  Delian  League — 
the  object  for  which  it  had  been  founded — could  not  be 
abandoned  without  danger.  When  war  with  Persia  was 
discontinued,  the  allies  might  claim  that  their  contribu- 
tions should  be  discontinued  also.  Their  arguments  must 
be  met;  their  irritation  soothed,  or,  if  not  soothed,  sup- 
pressed. The  change  from  the  Delian  confederacy  to  the 
Athenian  empire  was  an  undertaking  which  might  well 
absorb  the  energies  of  the  statesman  and  the  resources  of 
his  city. 

At  the  time  of  the  defeat  of  Coronea,  Pericles  was  engaged 


1  Busolt  in  Philologus,  1882,  pp.  714,  710,  701,  684.  G.  G.  iii.  1. 
556. 


6 


THE  TWO  POWERS  IN  GREECE.  [I.  3. 


in  this  difficult  undertaking,  and  in  his  judgment  Athens 
was  unequal  to  the  double  task  of  maintaining  her  ground 
in  Boeotia  and  the  Aegean.  Athens  was  safer  without  her 
possessions  on  land,  which  were  not  so  much  strongholds  of 
her  power,  as  positions  inviting  attack  and  provoking  resent- 
ment. It  was  better  to  send  out  Athenian  citizens  to  hold 
the  allies  in  check  as  "cleruchs,"  than  to  waste  their  lives  in 
garrison  duty.  And  when,  owing  to  the  apparent  tameness 
of  his  policy,  Athens  was  attacked  by  a  general  conspiracy, 
Pericles  showed  that  he  was  prepared  for  still 

Pericles  secures    »      ,  ,  •Ti- 

the empire  of     lurther  concessions ;  he  was  willing  not  only 

Athens  by  the  to  withdraw  from  Central  Greece,  but  to 
peac"  abandon    the   Athenian    possessions   in  the 

Peloponnesus  also,  if,  by  so  doing,  he  could -secure  his 
principal  object  and  maintain  the  power  of  Athens  at  sea. 
In  this  policy  he  was  entirely  successful,  owing  to  the  selfish 
stupidity  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  were  content  that 
Euboea  should  be  subject  to  Athens,  if  only  the  Peloponnesus 
were  freed  from  the  presence  of  Athenians;  who,  regard- 
less of  Corinthian  interests,  allowed  ISTaupactus  to  remain  in 
the  hands  of  Athens,  and  regardless  of  their  own,  did  not 
even  stipulate  that  the  Messenian  garrison  should  be  removed, 
while  Aegina,  the  great  Dorian  island,  famous  alike  in  legend 
and  history,  so  far  from  being  rescued  for  the  Peloponnesian 
confederacy,  continued  to  be  a  helpless  ally  of  Athens,  paying 
tribute  which  went  to  increase  the  Athenian  fleet.  In  the 
calculations  of  Pericles  such  concessions  were  not  too  dearly 
bought  by  the  evacuation  of  Troezen  and  the  Megarian 
ports. 

3.  From  this  point  of  view  the  peace  of  445  becomes 
intelligible.  It  marks  the  end  of  an  old  policy,  and  the 
Greece  now  beginning  of  a  new  one.  Greece  is  now  divided 
divided  into  into  two  sections,  each  of  which  takes  its  own 
two  halves.  line;  the  Athenians  on  sea,  the  Peloponnesians 
on  land.  The  division  corresponded  roughly  with  the 
division  of  Dorians  and  Ionians,  a  division  which  had  long 
been  keenly  felt  in  the  colonies  of  the  east  and  west.  Such  a 


I.  4.]  DANGER  OF  COLLISION.  7 

partition  might  seem  to  offer  the  fairest  prospect  of  lasting 
peace.  The  Athenians,  by  renouncing  their  acquisitions  in 
the  Peloponnesus,  withdrew  into  the  circle  of  the  Delian  con- 
federacy, which  they  had  administered  for  more  than  thirty 
years,  with  the  tacit  acquiescence,  at  any  rate,  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians.  The  Lacedaemonians  by  abandoning  Euboea,  when 
she  was  struggling  for  independence,  made  it  plain  that 
they  were  not  prepared  to  look  beyond  the  Peloponnesus, 
or  enter  on  a  war  with  Athens  in  the  cause  of  the  oppressed 
allies.    The  prospect  was  delusive  ;  on  the  one  _„ 

r      r      .  .  ,      '  .    The  partition 

hand,  complete  partition  was  impossible,  and  imperfect,  and 
on  the  other,  Pericles  still  cherished  ambitions,  llkel,3f.t? lead  to 

•         •<•         t  -it  •  ■  1  a  collision. 

which,  if  realised,  made  a  collision  with  the 
Peloponnesians  inevitable.  Athens  still  retained  Naupactus, 
which  was  not  only  the  key  of  the  Corinthian  gulf,  but  an 
outpost  in  Western  Greece,  where  Corinth  traded  through 
her  numerous  colonies ;  and  she  garrisoned  the  town  with 
Messenians,  who  were  the  deadly  enemies  of  Lacedaemon. 
Among  the  cities  of  the  Delian  League  were  some  who  were 
bound  by  a  double  allegiance  to  rival  sovereigns,  such  as 
Potidaea,  which  was  not  only  a  Corinthian  colony,  governed 
by  officers  sent  from  Corinth,  but  a  subject  ally  of  Athens, 
engaged  to  the  payment  of  tribute.  Such  a  situation  was 
delicate,  if  no  more,  and  nothing  but  consummate  tact  could 
prevent  a  collision.  Worse  still,  for  the  hope  of  lasting 
peace,  was  the  infatuated  passion  for  Sicily,  which  haunted 
the  Athenians,  and  increased  in  violence  when  the  war 
with  Persia  no  longer  occupied  their  minds.  For  con- 
quest in  Sicily  meant  conquest  of  the  Dorians,  of  the 
colonies  of  Corinth,  which  were  closely  connected  with 
their  mother-city,  and  formed  the  foundation  of  her  pro- 
sperity. 

4.  In  this  new  policy  Pericles  had  the  support  of  the 
poorer  classes  in  the  city  and  Peiraeus,  whom  he  had  taught 
to  look  on  the  empire  as  a  convenient  source  of  subsistence 
(vol.  ii.  p.  405).  And  the  names  of  Callias  and  Andocides, 
who  are  mentioned  among  the  plenipotentiaries  for  conclud- 


8 


OSTRACISM  OF  TH  U  C  YD  I DES. 


[1.4- 


ing  the  peace,  indicate  that  some  of  the  oldest  and  richest 
families  in  Athens  followed  his  lead.  The  Cimonian  party 
took  another  view.  They  were  dissatisfied  at 
Athens.3  Os-  the  cessation  of  war  with  Persia,  with  which 
tracism  of  the  name  of  their  great  hero  was  so  inseparably 
Thucydides.  connected  j  and  still  more  dissatisfied  at  their 
own  position  in  the  city,  where  Pericles  was  carrying  all 
before  him.  The  party  had  been  organised  by  Thucydides 
as  it  had  never  been  organised  before,  but  the  result  was 
merely  a  deeper  cleft  between  the  aristocrats  and  the  demos. 
In  eloquence  Thucydides  was  no  match  for  Pericles,  and 
among  the  Athenians  eloquence  outweighed  argument ;  but 
the  disasters  of  the  last  few  years,  and  the  strong  feeling 
which  many  of  the  citizens  entertained  about  the  use  made 
of  the  contributions  of  the  allies,  inspired  the  oligarchical 
party  with  confidence.  Was  it  not  possible  to  throw  the 
blame  of  the  agitation  among  the  allies,  and  of  the  shameful 
peace,  which  the  agitation  had  made  necessary,  on  the  all- 
powerful  Pericles,  and  by  this  means  to  create  a  reaction  1 
On  these  grounds,  in  the  winter  of  445  ostracism  was  pro- 
posed in  the  city,  and  the  proposal  being  accepted,  the  usual 
arrangements  were  made  for  voting  in  the  following  spring. 
But  when  the  day  came  for  decision,  the  sentence  fell,  not  on 
Pericles,  but  on  Thucydides.1 

Plato  informs  us  that  Thucydides  was  "  of  a  great  family 
and  a  man  of  influence,  not  at  Athens  only,  but  throughout 
,     . .    Hellas."    He  belonged  to  that  class  to  whom 

Thucydides :  his  °  *. 

character  and  Athens  owed  so  much,  and  on  whom,  m  the 
policy-  days  of  extreme  democracy,  she  looked  back  as 

the  saviours  of  the  city.  To  call  him  an  oligarch  is  unjust, 
unless  we  limit  the  meaning  of  the  word,  for  he  was  not  an 
oligarch  in  the  sense  in  which  Antiphon  or  Pisander  were 
oligarchs.    He  was  an  oligarch  in  the  sense  in  which  men 


1  Vol.  ii.  p.  414 ;  Pint.  Per.  14,  15.  Curtius,  and  Grote  (more 
doubtfully)  support  the  view  that  the  ostracism  was  the  work  of  the 
oligarchical  party  :  Curt.  Griech.  Gesch.  ii.  186  ;  Grote,  iv.  160  (1862). 


I.  5.]  SUPREMACY  OF  PERICLES.  9 

are  oligarchs  who  believe  that  the  masses  require  leaders 
and  that  the  leading  spirits  in  any  community  at  any  one 
time  are  few.  He  was  an  oligarch  in  his  opposition  to 
Pericles  who  used  the  public  revenues  to  win  the  favour  of 
the  mob  for  his  own  purposes,  in  his  friendly  feeling  towards 
Sparta,  and  in  his  desire  to  preserve  something  of  a  paternal 
government  at  Athens.1  But  he  was  also  a  sincere  friend  of 
the  demos,  and  a  patriot,  who  endeavoured  to  establish  the 
greatness  of  Athens  on  the  only  basis  on  which  it  could 
endure,  by  treating  the  allies  with  strict  and  scrupulous 
justice. 

5.  With  the  ostracism  of  Thucydides  the  opposition  of 
the  oligarchs  was  silenced.  Pericles  was  now  supreme,  and 
could  carry  out  his  aims  with  a  free  hand.  He  had  cleared 
the  ground  on  every  side.  In  Hellas  he  had  secured  peace 
and  the  recognition  of  Athens  as  mistress  of  an  empire ;  war 
with  Persia  was  at  an  end,  at  any  rate  de  facto;  and  Athens 
was  united  under  one  party  as  it  had  never  been  united 
before. 

Pericles  occupied  a  unique  position.  He  wielded  an  almost 
absolute  authority  in  a  state  where  every  one  was  an  enthusiast 
for  civil  and  personal  freedom.  He  ruled,  but  Position  and 
it  was  by  the  will  and  with  the  support  of  the  aims  of 
people.  In  the  language  of  Aristotle  we  might  Pencles- 
say  that  he  was  superior  to  the  people,  and  therefore  their 
natural  king,  but  in  the  constitution  he  was  merely  a  magis- 
trate who  could  be  deposed  from  his  position  at  any  moment, 
dependent  on  the  popular  will,  and  on  his  own  power  to  control 
it.  He  administered  resources  far  greater  than  those  of  any 
other  city  in  Greece,  and  he  administered  them  as  he  pleased, 
if  he  could  persuade  the  people  to  support  his  measures. 
The  city  of  which  he  was  the  head  was  in  some  respects  the 
most  civilised  which  the  world  has  ever  seen.  Pericles  could 
avail  himself  of  the  services  of  Phidias  in  art,  and  of 
Sophocles  in  tragedy  ;  Anaxagoras  and  Herodotus  were 


1  Arist.  Athen.  Pol.  28,  and  Sandys'  note;  Plato,  Meno,  94. 


10 


PERICLES'  VIEWS  OF  EMPIRE. 


among  his  friends.  He  could  appreciate  all  that  was  excellent 
in  literature  ;  his  ideal  of  government  was  among  the  highest 
which  have  ever  been  proposed.  Fortunate  indeed  should 
we  be,  if  we  had  before  us  a  full  and  accurate  record  of  the 
years  during  which  he  ruled  Athens ;  we  should  then  under- 
stand what  were  his  aims  at  home  and  abroad,  and  by  what 
means  he  sought  to  realise  them.  Unhappily  we  possess 
nothing  more  than  a  record  of  a  few  isolated  facts,  mostly  of 
uncertain  date,  which  rest  on  indifferent  evidence,  and  stand 
in  doubtful  connection  with  one  another. 

6.  Pericles  is  often  spoken  of  as  a  man  of  wide  Panhellenic 
views,  who  sought  to  unite  Hellas  by  welding  the  various 
states,  Dorian  and  Ionian,  into  one  nation.  This  view  is 
only  true  to  a  very  limited  degree.  He  did  indeed  attempt, 
as  we  shall  see,  to  bring  the  Hellenes  together  in  various 
ways,  and  to  break  down  some  of  the  barriers  which  divided 
them,  but  these  attempts,  which  were  a  subordinate  part  of 
his  policy,  ended  in  failure.  His  chief  aims  were  not  Pan- 
^  .  t    .        hellenic  but  Panathenian.    He  wished  to  create 

The  Athenian  _  ,  . 

empire  as  con-  an  Athenian  empire  which  should  embody  as 
"ericfes7  *ar£e  a  Part  °*  Bellas  as  possible.  At  first  he 
may  have  dreamed  of  an  empire  by  land  and 
sea,  but,  if  he  did,  he  was  compelled  to  abandon  the  idea  as 
beyond  the  strength  of  Athens,  and  from  445  he  confined 
himself  to  the  sea,  as  we  have  shown.  He  had  no  intention 
of  going  back  to  a  confederacy,  or  of  governing  the  Athenian 
empire  on  the  old  basis  of  the  Delian  League.  Athens  was 
not  to  be  the  leader  of  a  number  of  equal  states,  but  an 
imperial  city  exacting  tribute  from  subjects,  and  using  the 
tribute  for  her  own  purposes.  With  the  exception  of  Lesbos, 
Chios,  and  Samos,  all  the  cities  which  had  once  enjoyed  the 
privilege  of  an  equal  vote  as  allies,  were  now  reduced  to  the 
condition  of  subjects,  who  paid  tribute  to  the  common  chest, 
but  had  no  voice  in  a  common  council ;  their  means  of  defence 
were  taken  from  them ;  their  walls  pulled  down.  Some 
were  allowed  to  manage  their  own  affairs;  in  others  there 
were  Athenian  garrisons  and  commissioners,  maintaining 


DIFFICULTY  OF  THE  TASK. 


11 


institutions  which  had  been  established  in  the  interests  of 
Athens ;  and  nearly  all  were  compelled  to  carry  their  most 
important  cases  at  law  to  Athens  to  be  decided  by  an 
Athenian  jury.  Such  a  political  condition  was,  from  a  Greek 
point  of  view,  little  better  than  slavery ;  and,  from  any  point 
of  view,  it  implied  a  loss  of  independence. 

The  Athenian  empire  was  an  outrage  on  Greek  political 
feeling ;  it  was  a  tyranny,  and  felt  to  be  a  tyranny,  though 
exercised  by  a  city  which  claimed  to  be  the  The  Athenian 
most  advanced  of  Greek  democracies.  Im-  empire  a 
perialism,  in  any  form,  was  inconsistent  with  tyranny' 
the  Greek  love  of  autonomy,  with  the  march  of  Greek 
politics;  and  Athens  was  detested  by  Greece  for  the  same 
reason  that  Pisistratus  was  detested  by  the  Athenians. 
When  she  deprived  the  subject  allies  of  their  means  of 
defence,  she  acted  as  the  tyrant  who  deprived  his  citizens  of 
their  arms  ;  when  she  thrust  her  institutions  upon  them,  she 
acted  as  the  tyrant  who  made  his  will  the  law  of  the  state  ; 
in  deciding  their  cases  in  her  courts  she  acted  as  the  tyrant 
who  constituted  himself  the  judge  of  his  citizens ;  and  the 
democratical  institutions  of  Athens  only  made  more  galling 
the  contrast  between  her  freedom  and  the  subjection  of  the 
allies.  The  problem  which  lay  before  Pericles  was  un- 
doubtedly one  of  great  difficulty — so  difficult,  indeed,  that  in 
the  world's  history  it  has  not  been  solved  more  than  three  or 
four  times.  To  combine  a  number  of  independent  communi- 
ties into  one  whole,  without  destroying,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
independence  of  the  several  cities,  or  limiting,  on  the  other, 
the  effective  force  of  the  combined  body,  is  perhaps  the 
highest  achievement  of  political  wisdom.  Our  own  states- 
men, and  our  own  generation,  are  deeply  conscious  of  the 
difficulties  which  attend  such  a  task,  and  in  the  Grecian 
world  the  difficulties  were  greatly  increased  owing  to  the 
intense  love  of  autonomy  which  prevailed  in  Greek  cities, 
and  the  jealousies  which  divided  them.  Pericles  did  not 
even  attempt  such  a  combination,  but,  on  the  contrary,  by 
suppressing  the  Delian  synod,  he  removed  the  means  through 


12 


THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE. 


[1.7. 


which  the  cities  might  have  been  brought  together  on  an 
equal  footing,  and  by  dropping  the  war  with  Persia  he 
destroyed  the  motive  which  made  union  possible. 

7.  Politically,  then,  and  as  a  step  in  the  development  of 
constitutional  history,  the  empire  was  a  blunder  on  the  part 
of  Athens,  and  it  was  a  blunder  which  the 
Defence  of  the    Qree^8  never  forgot.    What  can  be  said  on 

empire  :  it  0 

ensured  the  the  other  side  ?  The  empire  of  Athens  is 
security  of  the    often   defended,  even  by  writers   of  liberal 

Aegean.  '  J 

opinions,  on  the  ground  that  it  brought  to  a 
large  part  of  Greece  the  blessings  of  security  and  civilisation. 
It  is  argued,  and  with  truth,  that  under  the  rule  of  Athena 
the  Aegean  was  cleared  of  Persians  and  pirates ;  that  the 
cities  prospered,  and  trade  developed ;  that  the  mutual 
quarrels  and  jealousies  of  the  cities  were  held  in  check.  All 
this  is  true ;  but  the  same  may  be  said  with  equal  truth  of 
the  despot's  rule  over  his  slaves.  They  also  eat  and  drink 
and  sleep  in  security — from  every  danger  but  one.  A 
despotism  is  often  the  best  means  of  attaining  material 
comforts,  but  it  is  nevertheless  a  despotism  involving  the 
destruction  of  civil  growth  and  freedom.  It  is  no  support  to 
this  line  of  defence  to  show  that  the  contributions  which 
Athens  demanded  from  her  allies  were,  as  a  rule,  very  light — 
that  Byzantium  and  Miletus  paid  sums  to  the  Athenian 
treasury  which  would  not  have  sufficed  to  maintain  a  dozen 
ships  at  sea  for  a  summer's  cruise.  Slavery  may  be  cheaper 
than  freedom,  but  few  will  come  forward  to  defend  it  on 
that  ground.  The  amounts  paid  to  Athens  were  certainly 
small,  but  Athens  raised  or  lowered  them  much  as  she 
pleased,  and  was  strict  in  exacting  arrears. 

It  is  true,  too,  that  Pericles,  while  maintaining  the  empire 
for  the  benefit  of  Athens,  sought  to  give  the  allies  a  share  of 
The  em  ire  a  tne  S00^  tnmgs  whi°h  tne  Athenians  enjoyed, 
means  of  diffus-  Athens  was  to  become  a  centre  of  light  and 
ing  civilisation.  leading  throughout  Hellas ;  her  subjects  were 
to  be  attracted  to  her  by  splendid  festivals  ;  they  were  to  be 
instructed  and  amused  by  her  orators  and  poets  ;  they  were 


.  r-8-l  A  SOURCE  OF  SECURITY,  ETC.  13 

to  copy  Athenian  manners,  to  talk  Attic  like  Athenians  and 
win  the  adoration  of  their  countrymen  by  their  metro 
pol.tan  pohsh.  Athens  was  to  be  the  school  of  G«eS 
She  was  to  be  the  home  of  art,  poetry,  and  though!  the 
glonous  city  to  which  every  eye  in  Helli'  turned 3  pride 

acquisition  8         a  nofc  an 

empire  by  arguments  which  may  be^sS  in  he"lan 
defence  of  despotic  rule.    Shall  we  take  up  t^ZT* 
oner  ime,  paradoxical  perhaps,  but  Hellenic 

superiority. 

and  ckim  for  Athens  the  right  to  rule  her  allies,  because  she 
was  their  superior,  just  as  on  the  Aristotelian  theory  he 
best  man  ,n  the  city  is  the  natural  ruler  of  his  fellow-cTt^ 

ior  ever  bhall  we  deny  to  states  what  we  grant  to  law 
givers  and  philosophers  t  If  among  a  number  ofYommUn 
here  exists  one  community  which  is  supreme  in  civihsa t  on 
and  .dv.nood  beyond  the  rest  in  political  institutions  t ft 
th e  right  to  rule  over  them  |  Not  the  ^  .^^f 
peihaps,  ,„  cases  where  the  disparity  between  th    rul  ng 


1  Thjjc.  ii.  41  •  vii.  63. 


14  THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE.  [I.  8. 


city  and  the  subjects  is  overwhelming,  and  the  blessings 
which  her  rule  confers  are  indisputable.  But  between  Athens 
and  the  cities  which  sank  to  be  her  subjects,  there  was  no 
very  great  disparity  except  in  power.  Down  to  the  Ionian 
revolt  the  cities  of  the  Asiatic  coast,  and  the  islands  of  the 
Aegean,  were  far  in  advance  of  Athens,  or  any  other  city  of 
the  peninsula ;  and  though  they  never  fully  recovered  from 
the  disasters  of  the  Persian  war,  they  were  still  active  homes 
of  commerce  and  thought,  and  they  cherished  the  memory  of 
a  glorious  past.  Nor  was  Athens  chosen  by  her  subject 
allies  to  govern  them ;  she  often  forced  her  rule  upon  un- 
willing cities,  and  sought  her  own  advantage  in  doing  so. 

There  is  yet  another  plea  which  may  be  urged  in  support 
of  the  Athenian  empire.  It  may  be  said  that  Athens  was 
always  ready  to  support  the  cause  of  the  op- 
alupport t™6  pressed  against  the  rich  and  powerful.  There 
democracy.  was  not  a  down-trodden  "demos"  in  any 
allied  city,  however  insignificant  and  remote,  which  did  not 
feel  that  they  were  at  least  within  reach  of  help.  In  any 
struggle  with  the  oligarchs  they  could  count  on  the  sympathy 
and  support  of  Athens.  At  Mytilene  the  people  were  no 
sooner  in  power  than  they  placed  the  city  in  the  hands  of 
the  Athenians;  and  the  history  of  Samos  is  still  more 
striking  in  this  respect.  The  tyranny  of  Athens  was,  at  any 
rate,  a  refuge  from  a  tyranny  more  crushing  and  immediate, 
and' Athenian  ships,  even  when  they  came  with  the  tax- 
gatherer  on  board,  brought  to  many  a  message  of  hope;  To 
ardent  democrats  the  Athenian  empire  from  this  point  of 
view  will  be  more  than  justified.  But  democracies  are 
sometimes  as  selfish  as  they  are  inconsistent.  The  support 
which  Athens  gave  to  democracy  perpetuated  the  intestine 
strife  of  cities,  a  strife  which  she  used  for  her  own  purposes, 
and  some  of  the  most  cruel  scenes  in  the  Peloponnesian  war 
arose  out  of  her  ill-timed  intervention. 

So  we  may  argue  for  and  against  the  Athenian  empire 
without  coming  to  a  definite  conclusion.  The  empire  was 
raised  on  an  insecure  foundation ;  and  for  this  reason  it  was 


I.  9.]     IT  FAILED  TO  SATISFY  GREEK  FEELING.  15 


foredoomed  to  perish,  not  from  external  attack,  but  from  its 
own  internal  want  of  coherence.  "Politics,"  said  Burke, 
"ought  to  be  adjusted,  not  to  human  reasoning,  but  to 
human  nature,"  and  among  the  Greeks  both  reason  and 
nature  were  opposed  to  imperialism  in  any  form.  Yet  the 
blessings  which  the  empire  conferred  on  Greece  were  great : 
security,  humanity,  sympathy  with  the  oppressed — these  were 
not  common  qualities  in  ancient  Hellas,  but  at  least  they 
existed  at  Athens  in  a  larger  measure  than  elsewhere.1 

9.  In  the  ten  years  which  followed  the  peace,  of  445 
we  can  distinguish  three  important  events  in  the  history  of 
Athens— the  founding  of  Thurii,  the  revolt  of  Samos,  and 
the  colonisation  of  Amphipolis.  Of  these  I  will  now  give  an 
account,  including  in  the  story  some  details  of  the  relation 
in  which  Athens  stood  at  this  time  to  the  west,  the  east,  and 
the  north. 


A.— ATHENS  AND  THE  WEST:  THE  FOUNDATION  OF 
THURII. 

In  the  years  when  Athens  was  at  the  height  of  her  power, 
that  is,  in  the  years  from  459  to  451,  Pericles  had  striven 
to  acquire  the  command  of  the  Corinthian  gulf.  Att  m  tg  t 
The  Messenians  from  Ithome  had  been  placed  secure  the 
at  Naupactus,  which  commanded  the  entrance  ;  Corinthian  gulf. 
Achaea  had  been  received  into  alliance,  Athenians  had  been 
placed  at  Pegae,  at  the  head  of  the  gulf ;  repeated  attempts 
had  been  made  to  gain  possession  of  Sicyon,  and  Pericles 
had  himself  led  a  force  against  Oeniadae  in  Acarnania.  The 
object  of  these  acquisitions  and  attempts  is  not  difficult  to 
discern.    Through  the  Corinthian  gulf  lay  the  way  to  those 


1  In  Thucydides  the  Athenians  defend  the  acquisition  of  their 
empire  by  their  conduct  in  the  Persian  wars  ;  they  maintain  it  from 
motives  of  security"  and  interest :  fxaXiara  pev  vtto  deovs,  encirci  8e  /cat 
riprjs,  varepov  Kai  a>0eXtas  .  .  .  iraai  8e  dvenicpdopoD,  ra  ^vpcpepovra  ra>v 
lAeyiaTcovnepl  Kivbvvav  ev  TiOeaOai — i.  75  ;  cp.  vi.  82,  83.  The  extreme 
point  is  reached  in  Cleon's  speech,  iii.  37  f,  and  the  Melian  dialogue 
v.  85  f.  ~       '  ,  6 


16 


A  THENS  AND  THE  WEST. 


[I.  9. 


western  regions  in  which  Greek  enterprise  had  reached  a 
height  far  surpassing  the  prosperity  of  peninsular  and  even 
oriental  Greece.  In  the  first  third  of  the  fifth  century  the 
tyrants  of  Syracuse  and  Agrigentum  were  the  largest  figures 
in  the  imagination  of  the  Greeks.  In  the  west, 
oftheCwest  too,  the  difficulties  which  stood  in  the  way  of 
for  Athens.  fae  colonisation  of  the  Aegean  were  not 
present ;  there  was  no  Persian  monarch  animated  by  here- 
ditary hatred,  and  master  of  innumerable  forces,  which 
seemed  ■  to  rise  superior  to  every  disaster.  The  ancient 
enemies  of  the  Grecian  race,  the  Phoenicians  and  the 
Tyrrhenians,  had  been  beaten  back,  for  a  time,  and  confined 
within  narrow  limits,  and  the  greatest  danger  which  threat- 
ened the  Greek  cities  in  Italy,  the  advance  of  tjie  native 
tribes  of  the  interior,  was  not  yet  fully  perceived. 

The  quarrels  of  the  cities  of  Magna  Graecia  had  left  some 
of  the  most  fertile  sites  in  that  fertile  region  unoccupied. 
Croton  and  Sybaris  had  united  for  the  destruction  of  Siris, 
and  not  long  afterwards  Sybaris  herself  was  destroyed  by 
Croton.  The  land  thus  laid  waste  remained  unappropriated 
and  uncultivated,  and  in  480  Themistocles  quoted  an  oracle 
_    .  _  ,        which  commanded  the  Athenians  to  colonise 

Themistocles  m  ■ 

and  Magna  Siris,  a  command  which  he  threatened  to  obey 
Graecia.  by  sailing  thither  with  his  two  hundred  ships, 

if  the  Greeks  refused  to  fight  at  Salamis.  The  same  interest 
in  the  west  is  indicated  by  the  names  Sybaris  and  Italia, 
which  he  gave  to  two  of  his  daughters,  and  perhaps  it 
influenced  his  verdict  in  favour  of  the  Corcyraeans  in  their 
dispute  with  Corinth,  in  which  he  anticipated  the  policy  of 
a  later  day  (vol.  ii.  pp.  181,  268).  However  this  may  be, 
Athenian  commerce,  even  in  the  days  of  Themistocles, 
extended  along  the  Italian  coast  as  far  as  Campania,  and 
many  of  the  products  of  the  west  were  doubtless  to  be  seen 
in  the  market-place  of  Athens.1  In  the  years  which  followed, 
the  comparative  weakness  of  the  Greek  colonies  in  Italy, 


l  See  Busolt,  Griech.  Gesch.  in.  1.  519  f. 


I.  10.]  ATTEMPT  TO  RE- FOUND  SYBARIS. 


17 


owing  to  the  death  of  Anaxilaus  of  Khegium,  the  expul- 
sion of  the  Pythagoreans,  and  the  defeat  of  the  Tarentines 
in  473,  tended  yet  more  to  attract  ambitious  adventurers 
to  the  country;  and  it  was  about  this  time  that  the 
Athenians  were  seized  with  that  longing  for  enterprise 
in  the  west,  which,  in  the  end,  cost  them  so  dear.  In 
450,  envoys  from  Segesta  appeared  at  Athens  asking  for 
assistance  in  some  local  quarrel  (vol.  ii.  p.  468),  and,  four 
years  later,  if  we  may  trust  the  dates  of  Diodorus,  the 
descendants  of  the  old  inhabitants  of  Sybaris  came  to 
Hellas  asking  the  Greeks  to  take  a  part  in  refoundmg 
their  city. 

10.  After  the  destruction  of  Sybaris  by  the  Crotoniates 
in  510,  the  remnant  of  the  inhabitants  had  found  a  home  in 
Scidrus  and  Laus,  colonies  of  their  city.1  Here  they  dwelt 
for  fifty-eight  years,  during  which  a  new  generation  took  the 
place  of  those  who  had  seen  the  destruction  of  their  city,  and 
new  hopes  arose  in  the  younger  hearts.  In  453-452  the 
Sybarites  were  collected  by  Thessalus,  and  conducted  to 
the  site  of  the  old  city,  between  the  rivers  sybaris  re- 
Sybaris  and  Orathis.    A  new  town  was  built,  founded  and 

,  •  ,i  i.  v  x.        C  again  destroyed 

and,  owing  to  the  extreme  fertility  ot  the  by  croton, 
site,  the  inhabitants  prospered  as  of  old,  but  452-446. 
the  hatred  of  the  Crotoniates  was  not  satisfied  by  sixty  years 
of  desolation.    Five  years  after  its  foundation,  they  attacked 
the  new  city  and  destroyed  it.2 

After  this  expulsion,  the  Sybarites  abandoned  the  attempt 
to  found  a  city  for  themselves,  and  sent  to  Hellas  for 
assistance,  offering  a  share  in  the  colony  to  all  who  were 
willing  to  join.  The  Lacedaemonians  turned  a  deaf  ear  to 
the  appeal,  which  they  may  have  regarded  as  dangerous  to 
the  interests  of  their  own  colony  at  Tarentum;  but  at  Athens 


1  Herod,  vi.  21 ;  Hist,  of  Greece,  ii.  503. 

2  Diod.  xi.  90;  xii.  10  ;  in  the  first  passage  he  says,  GerraXos 
(Tvvayaycbv  tovs  v7ro\oi7rovs  rSav  IvfiapiT&v  a>Kt(re  rrjv  2vftapiv  ;  in  the 
second,  GerraXoi  avvcoKMrav, 

VOL.  III.  B 


18 


FOUNDATION  OF  THURII,  44$. 


[I.  10. 


che  project  was  warmly  taken  up,  especially  by  Lampon,  one 
of  the  numerous  prophets  of  the  day,  who  at  this  time  was 
very  influential  with  the  people,  and  in  favour  with  Pericles. 1 
The  god  of  Delphi,  when  asked  for  his  sanction,  defined  the 
site  of  the  new  colony  in  terms  as  alluring  as  they  were 
The  foundation  ambiguous.  It  was  to  be  planted  where  men 
ofThurii.  drank  water  by  measure,  but  ate  their  meal 

unmeasured  !  Colonists  came  forward  not  from  Athens  only 
but  from  various  parts  of  Peloponnesus ;  from  Elis,  Arcadia, 
and  Achaea •  from  Boeotia  and  Central  Greece,  and  even 
from  the  islands  of  the  Aegean.  Ten  ships  were  fitted  out 
at  Athens  and  despatched  under  the  guidance  of  Lampon 
and  Xenocritus,  with  whom  sailed  Dionysius,  known  as  the 
"Copper"  from  his  desire  to  introduce  copper  money  at 
Athens.  On  arriving  in  Italy,  the  emigrants  discovered,  at 
a  short  distance  from  the  site  of  the  ancient  town,  a  spring 
fitted  with  a  bronze  tube  which  the  inhabitants  called  the 
bushel.  This  seemed  to  indicate  the  measurement  of  water, 
while  the  well-known  fertility  of  the  region  promised  an 
inexhaustible  supply  of  grain.  The  conditions  imposed  by 
the  oracle  being  thus  fulfilled,  a  wall  was  built  round  the 
fountain,  and  a  new  city  arose,  called  Thurii,  from  Thuria 
(gushing),  the  name  of  the  spring  (443).2 

The  town  which  thus  arose  was  not  a  mere  collection 
of  houses,  each  built  as  the  fancy  of  the  owner  might 
The  new  city  suggest ;  it  was  carefully  laid  out  under  the 
built  by  Hippo-  supervision  of  the  most  famous  architect  of  the 
day.  Among  those  who  went  from  Athens  to 
Thurii  was  Hippodamus,  the  son  of  Euryphon,  of  Miletus, 

1  We  first  hear  of  Lampon  in  the  days  when  Pericles  and  Thucy- 
dides  were  in  opposition,  i.e.  before  the  ostracism  of  Thucydides  : 
Plut.  Per.  6 ;  infra,  p.  56. 

2  Diod.  xii.  10  ;  Plut.  Nic.  5.  For  the  fertility  of  the  region  see  . 
Metagenes,  Thuriopersae,  in  Kock,  Com.  Att.  Frag.  i.  706:  

6  p.ev  TTOTdfios  6  Kpadis  Tj/juv  Karacpepei 
fid^as  peylcrras  avrop-drovs  ixep.ayp.ev as, 
6  6°  erepos  thdel  Kvp.a  vacrrcov  na\  Kpecov 
i<fida>v  re  fiaTiftcov  el\vop,evu>v  avroae,  k.t.A. 


I.  10.] 


HIPPODAMUS  OF  MILETUS. 


19 


a  man  •  of  remarkable  powers,  speculative  and  practical : 
whose  eager  curiosity  no  department  of  knowledge  escaped. 
We  may  picture  him  to  ourselves  as  the  friend  of  his 
countrywoman  Aspasia,  and  brought  by  her  into  the  Peri- 
clean  circle.  In  the  next  century  he  was  remembered  as  a 
man,  whose  abundance  of  long  hair,  and  warm  clothing,  worn 
in  summer  no  less  than  in  winter,  had  drawn  on  him  the 
eyes  of  all ;  as  a  student  who  posed  as  an  authority  in  every 
department  of  natural  philosophy ;  as  a  theorist  who  wrote 
about  politics  without  being  himself  a  politician ;  and  as  an 
architect  who  set  a  mode  in  the  laying  out  of  a  city.  The 
account  which  Aristotle  gives  of  his  political  theories  has 
many  points  of  interest.  He  wished  to  establish  a  supreme 
court  of  appeal,  and  to  allow  juries  to  give  a  modified 
sentence — but  the  distinctive  feature  of  his  speculations  was 
a  certain  mathematical  precision.  Hippodamus  wished  to 
have  triplets  everywhere ;  in  his  ideal  -  city  the  land,  the 
citizens,  and  even  the  law-suits  fell  into  three  classes.  A 
similar  spirit  governed  his  architecture;  in  all  the  towns 
which  he  planned,  he  introduced  straight  streets,  running  at 
right  angles  to  each  other.  Before  he  left  Athens,  he  had 
"cut  up"  the  Peiraeus  in  this  manner,  and  he  now  applied 
his  principles  in  the  building  of  Thurii.  The  town  formed 
a  square  or  oblong ;  four  streets  ran  from  end  to  end  of  it — 
the  streets  of  Heracles,  Aphrodite,  Olympus,  and  Dionysus, 
which  were  crossed  at  right  angles  by  the  street  of  Heroes, 
the  Thuria,  and  the  Thurina.  The  whole  was  thus  composed 
of  twenty  blocks  of  houses,  conveniently  intersected,  and 
forming  a  striking  contrast  to  the  confusion  of  the  ordinary 
Greek  city.1 


1  For  Hippodamus,  see  Aristot.  Pol.  ii.  c.  8,  §  5  f.  ;  and  for  the 
Hippodamean  style,  ib.  iv.  (vii.)  c.  11  =  1330  b,  21  f.,  fj  de  t£>v  18l<ov 
oUrjo-eoiV  8id6e(Tis  fjdlcov  fiev  vomeral  Kai  xp^cri^corepa  7repi  ras  akXas 
Trpaijeis,  av  evrofxos  §  Kara  rbv  vewrepov  Kai  rbv  l\Tnrobap,eiov  rpoirov. 
This  "  mode,"  however  convenient,  was  thought  to  render  a  city  less 
defensible  in  case  of  attack. 


20 


CONSTITUTION  qF  THURIL  [I. 


II.  But  neither  convenience  of  plan  nor  fertility  of  soil 
could  save  the  new  colony  from  the  defects  which  arose 
inevitably  out  of  its  constitution.  In  founding  their  city  the 
descendants  of  the  Sybarites  had  attracted  settlers  by  lavish 
offers;  but  when  the  town  was  built,  and  its  existence 
assured,  they  showed  a  less  generous  spirit.  They  claimed 
to  be  the  rightful  owners  of  the  soil,  the  real 
^SThur"';  founders  of  the  colony;  the  rest  were  a  foreign 
expulsion  of  the  an(j  subordinate  class.  In  the  division  of  the 
Sybarites.  land  tney  took  tne  territory  adjacent  to  the 
town  for  themselves,  leaving  only  the  most  distant  parts  for 
others ;  the  most  honourable  offices  were  reserved  for  them, 
and  in  offering  sacrifice  to  the  gods,  their  women  had 
precedence.  Such  intolerable  pretensions  quickly  led  to  an 
outbreak,  in  which  the  new  colonists  slew  nearly  all  the 
Sybarites,  and  expelled  the  rest. 

This  new  victory  left  the  conquerors  in  possession  of  an 
abundance  of  fertile  land.  They  immediately  invited  a 
number  of  colonists  from  Greece  to  occupy  it 
rnvTted'cot18  on  terms  of  equality  :— an  invitation  widely 
stitutionof  accepted.  The  city  now  rapidly  increased  in 
the  city.  p0Wer:  the  Crotoniates,  after  the  expulsion 

of  the  Sybarites,  were,  for  a  time  at  least,  on  friendly  terms 
with  the  settlers,  and  a  popular  form  of  government  was 
devised,  in  which  all  the  inhabitants  had  a  share.  Ten  tribes 
were  established  as  at  Athens,  in  three  of  which  were  in- 
cluded the  colonists  of  the  Peloponnesus ;  these  were  the 
Arcadian,  Elean,  and  Achaean  tribes;  three  others  com- 
prised the  settlers  from  Boeotia  and  Central  Hellas ;  these 
were  the  Boeotian,  Amphictyonian,  and  Dorian  tribes.  In 
the  remaining  four  were  collected  the  colonists  from  Athens, 
Euboea,  and  other  Ionian  cities ;  these  were  the  Athenian, 
Euboean,  Ionian,  and  island  tribes.  Further  details  are 
unknown  to  us,  but  it  is  obvious  that  the  city  was  a 
Hellenic  colony;  a  settlement  designed  to  prove  that  the 
jealousies  of  race  and  city  could  be  forgotten ;  that  Dorian 
and  Ionian,  Athenian  and  Boeotian  could  dwell  together 


I.  12.] 


DORIANS  AT  THUR1I 


21 


in  unity.  And  in  founding  this  colony  Athens  had  taken  a 
leading  part.1 

12.  Whatever  were  the  views  with  whicti  Pericles  en- 
couraged the  foundation  of  Thurii — whether  he  saw  in  it 
the  realisation  of  some  Panhellenic  scheme,  or  regarded  it 
chiefly  as  a  centre  of  Athenian  influence  in  the  west — they 
were  doomed  to  disappointment.  In  a  very  few  years  the 
colonists  were  involved  in  wars,  which  arose  apparently  from 
their  own  aggressions.  With  Cleandridas,  the 
exiled  Spartan,  to  lead  them,  they  not  only  Thurii;  growth 
besieged  Terina,  a  colony  of  old  Sybaris,  on  the  of  the  Dorian 
western  coast  of  the  peninsula,  but  endeavoured 
to  acquire  the  fertile  territory  of  Siris,  a  step  which  led  to  a 
conflict  with  Tarentum.2  Each  city  ravaged  the  lands  of  the 
other  without  any  decisive  advantage,  but  indirectly  the  war 
was  damaging  to  Athenian  interests,  for  Cleandridas,  as  he 
rose  to  power,  favoured  the  Dorian  element  at  the  expense  of 
the  Ionian.  In  434  there  were  seditions  in  the  city,  and 
question  was  raised : — Who  was  the  true  founder  of  the 
colony? — a  clear  proof  that  the  colonists  were  no  longer 
loyal  to  the  Athenians.    An  appeal  was  made  to  Delphi ; 

1  Diodorus  marks  three  stages  in  the  foundation  of  Neo-Sybaris  or 
Thurii:  (1)  The  Sybarites  gather  together  and  found  a  city  on  the 
site  of  the  old  town  ;  this  is  in  the  archonship  of  Lysicrates,  453-452. 
(2)  Six  years  afterwards  this  city  is  destroyed,  and  envoys  are  sent 
to  Greece  to  invite  colonists,  who  are  established  at  Thurii.  (3)  The 
colonists  quarrel ;  the  Sybarites  are  expelled,  and  fresh  settlers  in- 
vited. The  last  two  events  are  placed  in  the  same  year — in  the 
archonship  of  Callimachus,  446-445.  But  it  is  very  improbable  that  the 
colonists  were  sent  out,  the  town  built,  the  Sybarites  expelled,  and 
additional  colonists  collected  in  one  year.  Nor  is  446-445  a  year  in 
which  the  Athenians  were  likely  to  give  much  time  to  Italian  affairs, 
at  any  rate  till  the  peace  with  Sparta  was  settled.  Moreover,  we  are 
told  in  Plut.  Vit.  Dec.  Or.  Lysias,  that  Thurii  was  founded  in  the 
archonship  of  Praxiteles,  444-443,  and  this  agrees  with  Dionysius, 
Lysias,  who  puts  the  foundation  twelve  years  before  the  outbreak  of 
the  Peloponnesian  war  (431  +  12  =  443).  Diodorus,  then,  has  put 
together  in  one  year  a  series  of  events  which  began  in  446,  but  were 
not  concluded  till  three  years  later.  See  Busolt's  exhaustive  note, 
Griech.  Gesch.  iii.  1.  523. 

2  Diod.  xii.  23. 


22 


THE  A  THENIANS  A  T  NEAP0L1S.  [I.  12. 


and  the  god  set  aside  the  claims  of  Athens  by  declaring  him- 
self and  no  other  to  be  the  founder.  This  was  a  gain  for  the 
Dorians,  and  a  still  greater  gain  was  the  settlement  of  the 
war  with  Tarentum  by  a  friendly  arrangement  under  which 
Thurians  and  Tarentines  united  in  planting  the  new  colony 
of  Heraclea  on  the  site  of  Siris,  which  was  now  for  ever  lost 
to  the  Athenians.1  With  the  ascendency  of  the  Dorians  the 
democratic  government  of  Thurii  was  changed  into  an 
oligarchy,  and  when  in  415  Athens  sent  her  fleet  to  the 
west,  the  city  was  closed  against  her.2 

The  last  remnant  of  the  unfortunate  Sybarites,  after  their 
expulsion  from  Thurii,  had  settled  on  the  Traeis,  a  river 
Advance  of  already  memorable  for  the  defeat  of  their 
the  native  ancestors.  Here  they  were  attacked  and  de- 
tribes°  stroyed  by  the  Lucanians,  who,  following  the 

example  of  the  Campanians  in  Central  Italy,  began  from  this 
time  forward  to  molest  the  cities  of  Magna  Graecia.  Thurii 
only  saved  herself  from  a  like  fate  by  hard  fighting  and  the 
skill  of  Cleandridas.3 

Some  scanty  notices  have  been  preserved  of  other  Athenian 
connections  with  Italy  besides  the  colony  at  Thurii.  In  413 
other  Athenian  Athens  renewed  "an  old  alliance"  with  the 
connections  king  of  the  Messapians,  and  as  such  an  alliance 
with  Italy.  would  be  useful  to  the  inhabitants  of  Thurii  in 
a  contest  with  Tarentum,  we  may  conjecture  that  it  was 
originally  formed  when  the  two  cities  were  at  war  for  the 
possession  of  Siris.4  There  was  also  a  settlement  of 
Athenians  at  Neapolis,  and  coins  were  issued  from  the 


1  Diod.  xii.  35,  36  ;  Strabo,  264. 

2  Aristot.  Pol.  viii.  (v.)  7,  6=1307  a,  27  ff.  Thuc.  vi.  44.  The 
anti- Athenian  party  was  subsequently  driven  out  by  a  revolution 
(Thuc.  vii.  33),  and  help  was  given  to  Eurymedon  and  Demosthenes, 
but  afterwards  Thurian  ships  joined  the  Lacedaemonians  in  Asia. 

3  Diodorus  places  the  rise  of  the  Campanians  to  power  in  440  (xii. 
31);  Cumae  fell  into  their  hands  in  423  at  the  latest.  For  the 
Sybarites,  see  Diodorus,  xii.  22,  who,  however,  calls  the  Lucanians 
Bruttii.    For  Thurii,  see  Polyaenus,  ii.  10. 

4  Duncker,  Oesch.  Alt.  ix.  277;  Thuc.  vii.  33. 


1. 13.] 


SCHEMES  OF  PERICLES. 


23 


Neapolitan  mint,  bearing  the  head  of  Pallas  with  a  helmet 
crowned  with  olive.  The  coins  and  the  colony  may  be  due 
to  commerce ;  it  is  more  difficult  to  account  for  the  presence 
of  Diotimus,  an  Athenian  admiral,  who  is  said  to  have 
sacrificed  to  Parthenope,  the  guardian  goddess  of  Neapolis, 
and  to  have  established  a  torch  race  which  the  Neapolitans 
afterwards  maintained  as  a  yearly  festival.1 

13.  We  have  spoken  of  the  colonisation  of  Thurii  as  due, 
at  least  in  part,  to  the  wish  of  Pericles  to  bring  the  Greeks 
together  under  the  lead  of  Athens,  and  perhaps  D   .  „  . 

'  r         r  Panhellenic 

we  may  tollow  the  unity  of  subject  so  far  as  to  sch  ernes  of 
mention  here  two  other  attempts  of  a  similar  Pericles- 
nature,  "Panhellenic  schemes,"  they  are  sometimes  called, 
which  owed  their  origin  directly  in  the  one  case,  and  in- 
directly in  the  other,  to  Pericles.  In  these  he  not  only 
endeavoured,  as  in  the  foundation  of  Thurii,  to  break  through 
the  division  into  Dorians  and  Ionians,  which  would  range 
the  Dorians  on  the  side  of  Sparta  in  any  contest  with  that 
city,  but  he  also  sought  to  regain  for  Athens  the  position 
which  she  was  losing  by  abandoning  the  war  with  Persia, 
and  to  attract  to  Attica  the  same  religious  veneration  which 
gathered  rouigd  Olympia  and  Delphi. 

,  Our  knowledge  of  the  first  of  these  schemes  is  derived 
from  Plutarch,  who  tells  us  that  at  the  time  when  the 
Lacedaemonians  were  beginning  to  be  greatlv 

j.  ,  1jLjL1        •         r    *   1  .  ,  Proposed  con- 

distressed  at  the  rise  of  Athens,  Pericles  en-  gressofthe 
couraged  the  people  to  aim  at  a  still  higher  Greeks- 
position.  With  this  object  he  brought  forward  a  decree 
that  all  the  Greeks,  whether  in  Europe  or  in  Asia,  should  be 
invited  to  send  envoys  to  a  conference  at  Athens  for  the  pur- 
pose of  discussing  some  questions  of  national  interest.  The 
temples  which  the  Persians  had  destroyed  were  still  un- 
restored ;  the  offerings  vowed  in  the  great  war  had  not  been 
fully  rendered  j  no  definite  arrangement  had  been  made  for 

1  Strabo,  p.  246  ;  Head,  Historia  Num.  p  32  ;  Timaeus,  Frag.  99 
M.  The  date  is  uncertain:  Aidrt/Mo?  he  els  NednoXiv  rjXdep,  ore 
o-rparrj-yos  kv  tS)V  'Adrjvaioiv  eVoXe/m  rots  2t*ceXoiy,  Tim.  loc.  cit. 


24 


THE  CONGRESS. 


[I.  13- 


the  control  of  the  sea  or  the  preservation  of  peace.  These 
were  matters  in  which  every  Greek  had  an  interest,  and  they 
could  only  be  discussed  in  a  Panhellenic  conference.  Twenty 
Athenians,  men  of  more  than  fifty  years  of  age,  were  chosen 
as  envoys,  of  whom  five  visited  the  Ionians  and  Dorians  in 
Asia,  and  the  islands  as  far  as  Lesbos  and  Rhodes ;  five  more 
were  sent  to  the  Greeks  in  the  Hellespont,  and  in  Thrace 
as  far  as  Byzantium.  Other  five  went  to  Boeotia,  Phocis,  and 
the  Peloponnesus,  whence  they  passed  through  Locris  to 
Acarnania  and  Ambracia ;  the  remainder  visited  the  Oeteans 
of  the  Maliac  gulf,  the  Achaeans  of  Phthiotis,  and  the 
Thessalians.  But  the  scheme  fell  to  the  ground;  nowhere 
was  there  any  response  to  the  invitation ;  not  a  single  envoy 
appeared  at  Athens,  and  the  attempt  to  make  the  city  a 
centre  of  Hellas  completely  failed.  We  cannot  satisfactorily 
explain  the  collapse,  because  we  do  not  know  at  what  date 
the  proposal  was  made ;  but  if  it  is  rightly  placed  after  the 
peace  of  445,  the  Lacedaemonians  must  have  received  with 
some  amusement  a  project  in  which  Athens  claimed  to  take 
a  leading  part  in  Hellenic  affairs,  and  to  resuscitate  for  her 
own  interests  that  national  antipathy  to  the  barbarians, 
which,  when  her  own  interests  seemed  to  demand  it,  she 
had  so  readily  allowed  to  subside.  The  Thebans  also,  who, 
after  many  years  of  decline,  were  again  becoming  a  power  in 
Greece,  were  very  unlikely  to  support  a  scheme  which  would 
place  their  past  conduct  in  an  unfavourable  light,  while  the 
allies  of  Athens  were  aware,  from  their  experience,  that  no 
project  of  national  unity  would  lighten  their  subjection  to  the 
imperial  city.  If  the  Athenians  were  in  earnest  in  asking 
their  advice,  why  had  they  allowed  the  Delian  synod  to 
perish  ] 1 


1  Plutarch,  Per.  17,  is  our  only  authority  for  this  scheme,  which 
lie  represents  as  a  decree  proposed  by  Pericles.  He  explains  the 
failure  of  it  by  the  opposition  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  AaKe8ai[xovicov 
vnevavTiooOevTGiV,  a>s  Xeyerat,  Kai  to  TrpwTov  iv  Tle\o7rovvr)cr(p  rrjs 
netpas  eXeyxOeiarjs.  Duncker,  on  general  grounds,  puts  the  date  at 
444-443. 


a 

I.  I4.] 


THE  ELE  US  INI  A  N  MYSTERIES. 


25 


14.  The  second  scheme  was  a  project  for  associating  the 
Greeks  more  closely  with  the  sanctuary  at  Eleusis.  In  spite 
of  traditions  which  spoke  of  it  as  an  alien,  or  even  a  hostile 
community,  Eleusis  had  long  been  cherished  Eleusis 
by  the  Athenians  as  a  sacred  place,  the  home 
of  those  holy  goddesses  whose  mysteries  were  revered 
throughout  Hellas.  In  the  sixth  century  the  Athenians  seem 
to  have  fallen  peculiarly  under  the  influence  of  mysticism 
(vol.  i.  p.  463) ;  Musaeus,  Orpheus,  and  other  soothsayers 
became  at  that  time  equal  authorities  with  Homer  on  religious 
doctrines,  or  even  superior  authorities,  because  they  dealt 
with  subjects  which  do  not  find  a  place  in  the  Homeric 
poems,  and  they  also  claimed  to  be  of  greater  antiquity.  The 
interest  in  mystical  lore,  the  curiosity  about  a  future  life, 
and  the  desire  for  purification  from  this  "  muddy  vesture  of 
decay,"  were  still  further  developed  by  the  Pythagorean 
doctrines,  which  began  to  spread  in  Greece  during  the  first 
half  of  the  fifth  century  (vol.  ii.  p.  488).  Legends  also  glorified 
the  part  which  the  deities  of  Eleusis  had  taken  in  the  struggle 
against  Persia  •  and  it  was  in  the  precinct  of  Demeter,  both 
at  Plataea  and  Mycale,  that  the  barbarians  were  finally 
defeated.1 

In  the  years  which  followed  the  Persian  war,  the  popularity 
of  the  mysteries  seems  to  have  greatly  increased.  In  an 
inscription  which  is  certainly  anterior  to  the  popularity  of 
Thirty  Years'  peace,  we  find  traces  of  elaborate  the  mysteries- 
arrangements  for  the  reception  of  foreigners  at  Athens 
during  the  mysteries.  From  the  full  moon  of  Metageitnion 
to  the  10th  of  Pyanepsion  (August  -  October)  a  sacred 
truce  prevailed,  of  which  any  city  might  avail  herself 
whose  citizens  wished  to  share  in  the  holy  rites;  and 
while  the  truce  lasted,  the  benefits  extended  equally  to 
aliens  at  Athens  and  Athenians  dwelling  in  alien  cities. 
To  receive  the  visitors  a  great  temple  was  planned  at 
Eleusis,  which,  though  unfinished  in  the  lifetime  of  Pericles, 


1  Vol.  ii.  pp.  192,  233,  and  Herod,  ix.  65,  101. 


26 


OFFERINGS  OF  CORN  AT  ELEUSIS.  [I.  14. 


ranks  next  to  the  Parthenon  among  the  buildings  with  which 
he  adorned  Attica.  Hence  the  poet  Sophocles  in  his  Antigone 
could  speak  of  the  vale  of  Eleusinian  Deo  as  a  place  where 
all  found  a  welcome.1 

But  the  mysteries  were  not  the  sole  attraction  of  Eleusis; 
not  through  them  only  had  blessings  been  conferred  upon 
Eleusis  the  Greece  by  the  holy  goddesses.  It  was  in  the 
home  of  adjacent  Pharian  plain  that  corn  had  first 

agriculture.  "been  sown ;  it  was  from  Eleusis  that  Demeter 
sent  forth  Triptolemus  to  till  the  earth,  and  teach  mankind 
the  art  of  agriculture.  This  legend  was  treated  by  Sophocles 
in  the  Triptolemus,  one  of  the  three  plays  with  which 
in  469  he  had  obtained  a  victory  over  the  veteran 
Aeschylus,  and  it  was  a  subject  peculiarly  gratifying  to 
Athenian  pride.  The  Greeks  with  instinctive  wisdom  saw 
in  agriculture  the  foundation  of  law  and  civilisation ; 
Demeter,  the  earth-mother,  was  to  them  Demeter  Thesmo- 
phoros,  Demeter  the  founder  of  ordinances,  the  protector  of 
house  and  home,  married  life  and  society.  All  the  Hellenes, 
therefore,  owed  a  debt  to  Eleusis,  and  Pericles  was  not  slow 
to  remind  them  of  their  obligation.2 

The  scheme  was  supported  by  the  Delphian  .god,  who 
commanded  the  Athenians  to  bring  thankofferings  from 
their  harvests  to  the  goddesses  at  Eleusis — a  request  which 
was  afterwards  extended  to  all  the  Greeks.  Such  oracles 
could  not,  of  course,  be  neglected,  and  a  commission  was 
issued  to  report  on  the  best  means  of  giving  effect  to 
them.  This  report  and  the  proposals  which  followed  the 
publication  of  it  have  been  preserved  in  the  following 
inscription 3 : — 


1  Hicks,  Inscript.  British  Mus.  i.  2  ;  G.  I.  A.  i.  1 ;  iv-  1.  I J  and  iv. 
3.  1.  Kirchhoff  puts  the  inscription  before  456.  For  the  temple, 
see  Baumeister,  Denkindler,  Eleusis;  Duncker,  G.  A.  ix.  254  ;  Busolt, 
G.  G.  iii.  1.  473.    Soph.  Ant.  1120. 

2  Cp.  Isocrates,  Pauegyr.  §  29  f. ;  Dionys.  Halicarn.  i.  12. 

3  For  the  oracles,  see  Isocr.  I.e.  ;  Aristides,  i.  167,  Schol.  3. 

65- 


1. 14.] 


REPORT  ON  THE  OFFERINGS. 


27 


"  The  Athenians  are  to  make  offerings  of  their  fruits  to  the  two 
goddesses  as  their  fathers  have  done,  and  as  the  response  from 
Delphi  commands  :  not  less  than  one-sixth  of  a 
bushel  from  every  hundred  bushels  of  barley,  and  f^ngs^t  6 
not  less  than  half  a  sixth  from  every  hundred  Eleusis. 
bushels  of  wheat— and  this  proportion  is  to  be  kept 
throughout,  whatever  the  yearly  produce  may  be,  whether  less  or 
more.  These  offerings  the  demarchs  must  collect  in  the  demes,  and 
deposit  them  with  the  ministers  at  Eleusis.  Three  pits  must  be  built 
at  Eleusis  in  the  manner  of  our  fathers,  wherever  the  ministers  and 
the  architect  think  fit,  out  of  the  funds  belonging  to  the  goddesses  ; 
and  in  these  pits  the  corn  received  from  the  demarchs  is  to  be 
placed.  The  allies  must  also  bring  offerings  in  the  same  manner,  and 
the  cities  must  choose  collectors  of  the  corn  in  whatever  manner  will, 
in  their  opinion,  help  the  collection  of  it ;  and  when  collected  they 
must  send  it  to  Athens,  and  those  who  bring  it  must  deposit  it  with 
the  ministers  at  Eleusis.  .  .  .  The  Council  must  elect  heralds  and  send 
them  to  the  cities  to  announce  the  resolutions.  ...  At  these  mysteries 
the  Hierophant  and  the  Torchbearer  must  call  on  the  Hellenes  to 
make  offerings  of  their  fruits  as  their  fathers  have  done,  and  as  the 
oracle  from  Delphi  commands.  .  .  .  With  all  the  rest  of  the  cities  of 
Greece  the  Council  must  communicate  as  it  finds  opportunity,  telling 
them  how  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  are  making  offerings  of  their 
fruits,  and  inviting  them  to  bring  offerings  in  the  manner  of  their 
fathers,  and  according  to  the  oracle  from  Delphi — but  inviting  only 
and  not  commanding.  The  contributions  from  these  cities,  if  any 
are  brought,  are  to  be  collected  by  the  minister  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  rest." 1 

This  report  was  adopted  on  the  motion  of  Lampon,  and 
written  on  two  stone  pillars,  of  which  one  was  placed  in  the 
temple  at  Eleusis,  the  other  at  Athens  in  the  acropolis.2 

To  what  extent  the  Greeks  who  were  not  allies  of  Athens 
responded  to  this  invitation  we  cannot  say.  In  the  next 
century  Isocrates  asserts  that  the  majority  of  the  cities  of 
Greece  sent  yearly  to  Athens  some  memorial  of  the  benefits 
received  in  ancient  days  by  the  gift  of  agriculture ;  those 


1  The  remainder  of  the  inscription  refers  to  the  use  which  is  to  be 
made  of  the  offerings. 

2  Dittenberger,  ISylloge,  13.    The  date  is  after  446  (?  439). 


28 


SAMOS. 


[I.  IS 


cities  which  neglected  to  do  so  were  often  commanded  by  the 
oracle  at  Delphi  to  send  fruits  as  their  fathers  had  done 
.  in   old   days.     Yet  Eleusis  seems   to  have 

Eleusis  never  J 

became  a  suffered  much  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  for 

sacred  place  for  it  jay  on  fcne  high  road  of  invasion,  and  the  in- 

all  the  Greeks.  "!  °  ' 

vaders  were  not  debarred  by  any  sense  of  piety 
or  obligation  from  laying  waste  the  harvests  from  which 
the  resources  of  the  temple  were  drawn.  For  the  eight  or 
nine  years  during  which  Agis  was  encamped  at  Decelea 
(413-404)  the  procession  from  Athens  to  Eleusis,  which  was 
a  conspicuous  part  of  the  celebration  of  the  mysteries, 
was  entirely  suspended,  with  the  exception  of  one  year, 
when  it  was  conducted  under  the  protection  of  an  armed 
force.  We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  sacred  asso- 
ciations which  the  Athenians  connected  with  Eleusis  were 
but  slightly  felt  by  the  rest  of  the  Greeks,  and  the  attempt 
to  create  in  Attica  a  holy  place,  which  might  rank  with 
Olympia  and  Delphi,  met  with  little  success. 

B.—THE  SAMIAN  REVOLT:  ATHENS  AND  THE  EAST. 

15.  In  the  midst  of  his  schemes  for  consolidating  the 
power  of  Athens,  and  raising  the  city  to  a  higher  position, 
Pericles  found  himself  engaged  in  a  conflict  which  threatened 
the  existence  of  the  Athenian  empire. 

During  the  years  which  followed  the  expulsion  of  the 
Persians  from  Samos,  an  oligarchical  government  was  in 
internal  fac-  power,  but  their  rule  was  not  acceptable  to  all 
tions  at  Samos.  tne  samjans  .  tnere  wag  a  strong  democratical 
party  in  the  state,  who  were  only  waiting  fur  a  favourable 
opportunity  to  overthrow  the  government  with  the  help  of 
the  democracy  of  Athens.  Such  an  opportunity  came  in  the 
Quarrel  with  spring  of  440.  In  the  sixth  year  of  the  peace, 
Miletus.  Thucydides  tells  us,  the  Samians  and  Milesians 

went  to  war  about  Priene,  and  the  Milesians  were  de- 
feated. The  cities  were  not  on  good  terms ;  they  were  rivals 
in  trade,  and  such  near  neighbours  that  each  seemed  to 


I.  is] 


QUARREL  WITH  MILETUS. 


29 


prosper  at  the  expense  of  the  other.  What  gave  rise  to  the 
quarrel  about  Priene,  or  what  object  each  city  had  in  view, 
is  not  recorded  ;  we  do  not  even  know  which  of  the  two  was 
the  aggressor  in  the  contest.  Priene,  though  a  comparatively 
unimportant  city,  was  charged  with  the  maintenance  of  the 
Panionian  festival,  which  was  held  on  the  northern  slopes  of 
Mycale,  and  it  is  possible  that  Samos  wished  to  attain  this 
privilege  for  herself.  Or  the  Samians  may  have  sought  to 
plant  a  firmer  foot  on  the  mainland,  and  in  fact  they  had 
already  gone  to  war  with  Priene  for  the  possession  of  some 
towns  in  the  neighbourhood.  Whatever  the  cause,  it  is 
surprising  to  find  two  cities  of  the  Delian  League  going  to 
war  about  a  third,  without  consulting  the  wishes  of  the 
imperial  city  ;  and  as  Samos  still  retained  her  independence, 
while  Miletus  was  a  subject  city,  we  must  suppose  that  Samos 
was  the  aggressor.  Her  action  threatened  the  liberty  of 
Priene,  which  Miletus  strove  to  protect.1 

The  Milesians  repaired  to  Athens,  where  their  complaints 
were  listened  to  with  eagerness.  The  cities  were  on  excellent 
terms,  and  we  know  of  two  Milesians  at  least  who  were 
members  of  the  Periclean  circle — Aspasia  and  Hippodamus. 
And  with  the  Milesian  envoys  came  a  number  The  Milesians 
of  the  Samian  party,  who  wished  to  get  rid  of  apply  to 
the  oligarchical  government  in  their  city.  Such  ens' 
overtures  would  be  received  with  the  greater  readiness 
because  the  Athenians  were  not  satisfied  with  the  position 
of  affairs  in  Samos  and  the  neighbouring  continent.  Ever 
since  the  defeat  of  the  Egyptian  expedition  Athenian  power 
had  been  declining  in  the  east,  especially  in  Caria.  Between 
454  and  441  the  Carian  tribute,  so  far  as  it  can  be  calculated 
from  the  lists,  fell  from  about  75  talents  to  53  talents;  and 
the  'number  of  cities  wThich  paid  it,  from  60  or  more  to  43 — 
"  a  certain  proof  how  varying  even  before  the  Samian  revolt 


1  In  450  Miletus  was  occupied  by  an  Athenian  garrison,  and 
Athenian  interests  were  represented  by  an  iiriarKOTTos,  This  may 
have  been  the  case  in  440  also, 


30 


REVOLT  OF  SAMOS,  440. 


[I.  IS 


was  the  dominion  of  the  Athenians  in  a  large  part  of  the 
Carian  district."  1 

The  Athenians  at  once  despatched  forty  ships  to  Samos, 
under  the  command  of  Pericles.  What  steps  were  taken 
Pericles  at  w^  reSard  to  Priene  and  the  quarrel  with 
Samos:  a  Miletus  we  are  not  told;  these  were  matters  of 
democracy        little  importance  :  in  sending  a  fleet  across  the 

established.  r  '  ° 

Aegean  the  Athenians  had  other  objects  in 
view  than  the  settlement  of  a  local  dispute.  The  oligarchy 
at  Samos  was  suppressed,  and  the  obedience  of  the  party 
was  secured  by  a  hundred  hostages,  fifty  men  and  fifty  boys, 
who  were  placed  in  Lemnos ;  a  democratical  form  of  govern- 
ment was  established  and  protected  by  a  garrison  of  Athenian 
soldiers ;  after  which  the  fleet  returned  to  Athens.2 

Samos  was  not  inclined  to  submit.  She  could  not  forget 
that  she  had  once  ruled  the  eastern  Aegean,  and  that  her 

Reaction  at  ^eet  W£lS  a  great  Power  ]  ner  Walls  Were 

Samos :  the  strong,  and  help  might  be  expected  from  Persia, 
overthrow^  Of  the  deposed  oligarchs,  some  had  sought  refuge 
on  the  continent,  others  remained  in  the  city. 
The  fugitives  communicated  with  their  friends  in  the 
island,  and  with  Pissuthnes,  the  satrap  of  Sardis.  Collecting 
a  body  of  700  mercenaries,  they  crossed  over  to  Samos  in  the 
night,  and  attacked  the  demos,  most  of  whom  fell  into  their 
power.     They  also   captured  the  Athenian  garrison  and 

1  Busolt,  Philol.  xii.  683,  who  enumerates  twelve  cities  which  paid 
for  the  last  time  in  447-445.  Diodorus,  xii.  27,  goes  so  far  as  to  say 
of  the  Samians  :  SpaiVTss  tovs  '  Adrjvaiovs  rats  evvo'iais  8ta<pepovTas  wpos 
MiXrjaiovs,  i.e.  the  Athenians  preferred  the  subject  to  the  independent 
city.  That  they  watched  Samos  seems  implied  by  the  words  of 
Aristoph.  Vesp.  282,  \eycov  eos  (pCka6r}vaios  rjv  Kai  rav  2a/x<a  irpurros 
KareiVoi.  The  subsequent  action  of  the  Samian  oligarchs  justified  the 
Athenian  suspicions. 

2  Thuc.  i.  115;  Plut.  Per.  25;  Diod.  xii.  27.  Plutarch  asserts 
that  the  Athenians  before  resorting  to  force  called  on  the  Samians  to 
submit  to  arbitration,  which  they  refused.  Thucydides  does  not 
mention  Pericles  in  connection  with  this  first  visit  of  the  Athenians 
to  Samos,  but  Diodorus  and  Plutarch  agree  that  he  was  in  command. 
Diodorus  further  speaks  of  a  fine  of  80  talents  which  was  imposed  on 
the  Samians.    Plutarch,  25,  adds  some  gossiping  details. 


I.  16.] 


PERICLES  AT  SAMOS,  440. 


31 


officers,  and  recovered  the  hostages  from  Lemnos.  Their 
fetters  thus  broken,  they  openly  renounced  their  allegiance 
to  Athens. 

Athens  now  found  herself  face  to  face  with  the  revolt  of  a 
powerful  ally.  The  danger  was  great ;  greater  even  than  at  the 
revolt  of  Euboea.  The  war  with  Persia  might  Revolt  of 
break  out  again,  and  Athens  might  be  alone  in  Samos- 
the  contest :  Sparta  certainly  would  not  join  her,  and  who 
could  tell  whether  the  allies  would  remain  faithful  1  Samos 
was  doing  her  utmost  to  strengthen  her  position ;  the  Athenian 
captives  were  placed  as  hostages  in  the  hands  of  Pissuthnes  ; 
the  aid  of  the  Peloponnesians  was  invoked.  To  cut  off  any 
assistance  from  Miletus,  an  expedition  was  sent  against  that 
city ;  if  they  could  defeat  the  Milesians  or  capture  Miletus 
before  the  arrival  of  the  Athenians,  such  a  signal  success 
might  induce  all  the  cities  of  Asia  Minor  to  join  in  the 
revolt.  Byzantium  had  come  in  already,  and  much  might  be 
hoped  from  the  cities  of  Caria.1 

16.  The  whole  policy  of  Pericles  was  at  stake ;  if  the 
revolt  was  not  suppressed,  the  Athenian  empire  was  at  an 
end.  Sixty  ships  at  once  left  Athens  for  Samos,  and  all  the 
generals  of  the  year,  with  Pericles  at  their  head,  were  in 
command.2  Part  of  the  fleet  was  sent  towards  Defeat  of  the 
Caria  to  watch  for  the  Phoenician  ships,  which  Samians- 
were  reported  to  be  coming  up  from  the  south,  part  to  bring 
reinforcements  from  Lesbos  and  Chios — which  would  also 
serve  as  hostages  for  the  fidelity  of  those  islands.  With  the 
remaining  vessels  (forty-four  in  number)  Pericles  attacked  the 
Samians,  who  hurried  home  from  Miletus,  off  the  island  of 


1  Time.  i.  115,  116;  Plut.  Per.  25,  who  says  that  Pissuthnes 
stole  away  the  hostages.  For  the  appeal  to  the  Peloponnesians,  cp. 
Thuc.  i.  41. 

2  Thuc.  i.  116  :  Uepackeovs  deKarov  avrov  (TTpaTrjyovvTos.  Eight  of 
the  ten  generals  of  the  year  were  Socrates,  Sophocles  (the  poet), 
Andocides  (grandfather  of  the  orator),  Creon,  Pericles,  Glaucon, 
Callistratus,  Xenophon  ;  see  Androt.  in  Muller,  F.  H.  G.  iv.  645. 
The  ships  were  sent  out  before  July  440,  for  afterwards  we  have  a 
new  set  of  generals,  who  would  come  into  office  in  that  month. 


32 


THE  CITY  BLOCKADED,  440.  [J.  16. 


Tragia,  to  the  south  of  Samos.  The  Samian  fleet  was  the 
more  numerous,  but  after  a  severe  engagement  the  Athenians 
defeated  it  and  gained  possession  of  the  harbour.1 

The  Samians  at  once  sent  to  summon  the  Phoenician 
fleet  to  their  aid.  Meanwhile  Pericles  was  reinforced  by 
Blockade  of  twenty-five  ships  from  Chios  and  Lesbos, 
Samos.  perhaps   under   the   command   of  the  poet 

Sophocles,2  and  by  forty  from  Athens,  with  which  he  was 
able  to  land  on  Samos,  and  drive  the  Samians  into  their 
walls.  He  now  built  three  forts,  and  blockaded  the  city 
strictly  by  land  and  sea.3  The  ships  which  had  been  sent 
towards  Cam  returned  with  the  news  that  the  Phoenician 
fleet  was  approaching.  Pericles  sailed  to  intercept  it  with 
sixty  ships,  for  it  was  better  to  call  off  half  his  forces  from 
the  blockade  than  to  engage  with  the  Phoenicians  off  Samos, 
where  the  Samians  would  be  at  hand  to  take  part  in  the 
battle.  The  alarm  was  false ;  the  Phoenician  fleet  did  not 
appear,  but  in  the  absence  of  Pericles,  the  Samians  were  able 
to  break  through  the  blockade,  and  for  a  fortnight  they  were 
masters  of  the  sea — a  respite  which  they  used  to  carry 
into  the  city  whatever  provisions  they  required.  Then 
Pericles  returned.  The  Samians  attempted  to  cut  him  off 
from  the  island,  but  in  vain ;  they  were  defeated,  and  the 
city  was  once  more  closely  invested  by  land  and  sea.4 

It  was   now  July  440,  and  the  generals  for  the  year 


1  Thuc.  i.  116  ;  Diod.  xii.  27;  Plut.  Per.  26,  5/ia  8e  rfj  vUrj  koi 
rfj  diwgei  tov  Xt/xevos  Kpar^aas.  For  the  situation  of  the  island  of 
Tragia  or  Tragaeae  (Strabo,  635),  see  Pfiugk-Hartung,  PeriUes  als 
Feldherr,  Excursus. 

2  See  Ion,  Frag.  1  ;  Athen.  xiii.  603. 

3  If  we  count  the  sixteen  ships  which  had  been  sent  to  Caria,  etc., 
Pericles  had  now  60  +  40  +  25,  i.e.  125  vessels  at  command,  or, 
without  these,  109. 

4  Thuc.  i.  117  ;  Diod.  xii.  28.  Why  the  Phoenician  fleet  did  not 
appear  we  do  not  know.  We  may  suppose  :  (1)  that  the  news  of  its 
coming  was  but  a  ruse  to  call  offPeiides  from  Samos;  (2)  that  it 
remained  off  the  Carian  coast,  encouraging  the  cities  on  the  mainland 
to  revolt,  but  leaving  Samos  to  her  fate.  It  is  not  mentioned  again 
in  our  authorities.  c 


I.  16.] 


SAMOS  CAPITULATES,  439. 


33 


came  into  office.  Pericles,  being  re-elected,  remained  with  the 
fleet,  but  the  rest  of  the  commanders  at  Samos  were  replaced 
by  new  officers,  who  brought  out  large  reinforcements. 
Thucydides,  Hagnon,  and  Phormio  sailed  with  forty  ships, 
and  were  quickly  followed  by  Anticles  and  Tlepolemus  with 
twenty.  Chios  and  Lesbos  also  added  thirty  triremes  to 
those  already  sent.  The  total  amount  of  the  Athenian  fleet 
was  more  than  two  hundred  ships.  It  was  apparently  an  over- 
whelming force,  yet  the  Samians  defied  it.  samos  at  length 
Their  walls  were  strong;  their  city  well  caPltulates- 
supplied  with  provisions ;  they  might  still  hope  that  assistance 
would  come  from  Persia  or  Peloponnesus.  So  they  held 
out,  month  after  month.  The  Persians  failed  to  seize 
the  opportunity ;  the  Peloponnesians  decided,  on  the 
motion  of  the  Corinthians,  that  they  would  not  interfere ; 
every  city  must  be  allowed  to  punish  her  own  revolted 
allies.  Nine  months  had  passed,  and  the  supplies  in  Samos 
were  exhausted,  when  the  city  agreed  to  capitulate.  The 
terms  were  severe ;  all  the  triremes  of  Samos  were  to  be 
given  up  to  Athens ;  the  walls  of  the  city  were  to  be  thrown 
down ;  the  cost  of  the  war  was  to  be  defrayed  by  the 
Samians ;  and  hostages  placed  with  the  Athenians  as  sureties 
for  good  behaviour.  The  oligarchs,  to  whom  the  revolt  was 
due,  were  expelled  from  the  city — we  find  them  afterwards 
at  Anaea  on  the  mainland — and  a  democracy  was  estab- 
lished 1  (439). 

1  Diodorus,  xii.  28,  says  explicitly,  ttjv  &r)fxoKpaTiav  KaracrTrjaas,  but 
Thucydides  does  not  mention  this  change  ;  it  is,  however,  unlikely  that 
the  Athenians  should  have  left  the  oligarchs  in  power,  and  we  know 
that  the  extreme  oligarchs  were  established  at  Anaea  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war  (Thuc.  iii.  19,  32  ;  iv.  75).  Frankel,  De  Condicione,  etc., 
p.  27,  contends  that  a  democracy  was  not  established,  and  of  course  we 
find  an  oligarchy  at  Samos  in  412.  See  also  Holm,  Hist.  Greece,  ii.  192, 
E.  T.  ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  Duncker,  G.  A.  ix.  212  ;  Busolt,  G.  G. 
iii.  1.  553.  Ephorns  states  that  Pericles  was  assisted  in  his  attack  by 
the  siege-engines  devised  for  him  by  Artemon  of  Clazomenae,  this  siege 
being  in  fact  the  first  in  which  "rams"  and  "tortoises"  were 
brought  into  use.  By  their  help  the  walls  were  broken  through 
and  the  city  taken.    But  as  Artemon  appears  to  have  been  a  con 

VOL.  III.  C 


PERICLES  AS  A  GENERAL.  [I.  17. 


The  cost  of  the  war  had  been  enormous.  For  eight  full 
months  after  the  second  investment  of  the  city,  more  than 

cost  of  the  war.  tw0  hundred- triremes  had  been  engaged  at 
Samos.  So  far  as  we  can  judge  from  a 
mutilated  inscription,  1276  talents  were  paid  out  of  the 
accumulated  treasure  of  Athens  for  the  war,  and  the  total 
cost  is  put  at  1400  talents.  An  indemnity  of  even  half  this 
amount  would  be  a  crushing  burden  on  the  island  for  many 
years.1 

17.  The  first  visit  of  the  Athenians  to  Samos  probably 
came  as  a  surprise  on  the  oligarchs  ;  and  to  this  cause  we 
may  attribute  the  ease  with  which  the  democratical  revolu- 
tion was  carried  out.  Deceived  by  their  success,  the 
Athenians  allowed  many  of  the  oligarchs  to  remain  in  the 
city,  the  hostages  were  placed  in  hands  which  could  not 
Conduct  of  the  protect  them,  and  an  insufficient  garrison  was 
war  by  Pericles.  leffc  behincL  pericleg  altogether  mistook  the 
situation,  and  his  work  was  undone  as  quickly  as  he  had 
done  it.  The  news  of  the  revolt  showed  him  the  true  nature 
of  the  forces  opposed  to  him,  and  the  measures  which  he 
took  were  rapid  and  clear-sighted.  The  attempts  to  cut  off 
the  Samians  on  their  return  from  Miletus,  and  to  intercept 
the  Phoenician  fleet,  were  strokes  of  sound  strategy.  Yet  we 
must  allow  that  he  was  highly  favoured  by  fortune.  Had 


temporary  of  Anacreon,  who  resided  at  Samos  in  the  days  of  Poly- 
crates,  and  as  the  city  was  not  taken  by  storm  but  compelled  to 
capitulate  by  famine,  the  statement  of  Ephorus  is  probably  errone- 
ous. The  siege  of  Plataea  is  the  first  occasion  on  which  "  rams  "  are 
mentioned ;  and  the  "  tortoise  "  was  not  known  till  after  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war.  Diod.  xii.  28  ;  Plut.  Per.  27 ;  see  Droysen,  Die  Griech. 
Krieg Salter thiXmer,  p.  208. 

1  Thuc.  i.  117;  cp.  G.  I.  A.  i.  177.  Diodorus,  xii.  28,  puts  the 
indemnity  at  200  talents,  which  is  far  too  little  ;  Nepos,  Timoth.  1  at 
1200;  Isocrates,  Antid.  Ill,  at  1000  talents.  We  cannot  fix  the  amount 
of  the  instalments  by  which  the  sum  was  paid  ;  see  Duncker,  G.  A. 
ix.  215,  n.  3;  Beloch,  Rhein.  Mus.,  1888;  Busolt,  G.  G.  iii.  1,  559, 
note.  The  Samians  never  appear  in  the  Quota-lists,  but  Thucydides 
calls  them  tributaries,  vii.  57.  Hill,  Sources  for  Greek  History 
p.  104  f. 


1. 17.] 


THE  "  C A  A/AN  DISTRICT." 


35 


the  Persians  taken  up  the  cause  of  the  Samians,  as  it  was 
their  interest  to  do  ;  had  the  Chians  and  Lesbians  joined  in 
the  revolt,  or  even  refused  to  send  ships  to  subjugate  an  ally; 
had  the  Corinthians  been  less  short-sighted  in  their  advice  to 
the  Peloponnesian  confederacy,  the  issue  of  the  war  would 
probably  have  been  different.  It  is  interesting  to  know  that 
the  defence  of  Samos  was  conducted  by  a  man  whose  name  is 
remembered  in  another  sphere.    Melissus,  who 

A  Melissus. 

defeated  Pericles,  and  defied  his  forces  so  long, 
was  a  philosopher  of  the  Eleatic  School — who,  like  Par- 
menides  and  Zeno,  pondered  over  the  problem  of  the  many 
and  the  one,  striving  to  find  beyond  and  behind  the  change 
of  all  visible  things  a  reality  which  was  always  and  every- 
where the  same.1 

With  the  fall  of  Samos,  Byzantium  also  came  in  and 
resumed  her  place  as  a  subject  state  of  Athens.2  But  a 
number  of  Carian  cities  broke  away  from  Effect  of  the 
Athenian  control  at  this  time,  and  were  never  revolt  of  Samos 
recovered.  In  436  the  Ionian  and  Carian 
districts,  which  had  been  divided  in  442,  were  again  united, 
but  while  forty-three  Carian  cities  pay  tribute  in  440,  the 
total  of  Carian  and  Ionian  cities  in  436  cannot  have 
amounted  to  more  than  forty-six,  of  which  not  more  than 
thirty  were  Carian.  The  rebellious  towns  were  those  which 
lay  at  some  distance  from-  the  sea,  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Mylasa,  and  in  the  valley  of  the  Indus.  There  is  also  reason 
to  suppose  that  the  Rhodian  cities,  Lindus  and  Ialysus, 
refused  their  tribute  at  the  time  of  the  revolt ;  and  in  the 
Thracian  district  difficulties  arose,  which,  though  composed 
for  the  present,  were  a  source  of  disquiet  and  eventually  of 
disaster  to  Athens.3 

1  For  Melissus,  see  Isocr.  Laud.  Hel,  3  : — Mekiaraov,  6s  dnelpoiv  rb 
7r\rjBo<;  ne<pvKQT<jiV  to>v  npaypaTcov,  a>s  evos  ovtos  tov  iravTos  €TT€^eLpr](T(P 
a.7ro8€L^LS  evpia-Keiv.  Plut.,  Per.  26  : — MeXtcrcros  6  'Wayevovs,  dvi)p 
(pi\6(ro<pos,  crrpar-qycov  ro're  ttjs  2dpov. 

2  Byzantium  paid  tribute  in  438. 

3  Busolt,  Philol.  xli.  685  j  G.  G.  iii.  1.  554;  O,  I.  A,  I  239,  24*r 
For  Thrace,  infra,  p.  41. 


36  WALLS  OF  THE  ALLIES  DESTROYED.        [I.  17. 


Pericles,  on  his  return  to  Athens,  was  at  the  height  of 
his  reputation  as  a  general.  For  the  second  time  he  had 
Return  of  saved  Athens  at  a  dangerous  crisis.  Agamem- 
Pericies ;  his  non,  he  said,  had  spent  ten  years  in  reducing 
funeral  speech.  »proy,  but  in  ten  months  he  had  brought 
the  greatest  of  Ionian  cities  to  submission.  When  the 
last  rites  were  paid  to  the  dead  who  had  fallen  in  their 
country's  cause,  he  was  chosen  to  pronounce  the  funeral 
oration  over  them.  He  dwelt  on  the  immortality  of  the 
illustrious  dead ;  on  the  fair  promise  of  the  lives  that  were 
ended :  "The  loss  of  the  young  was  as  the  loss  of  the  spring- 
time of  the  year."  But  they  had  fallen  in  a  noble  cause,  and 
their  glory  was  great.  When  he  descended  from  the  tribune, 
widows  and  orphans  crowded  round  him  with  flowers  and 
garlands;  but  Elpinice,  the  now  aged  sister  of  Cimon, 
turned  away,  saying  bitterly,  "  Why  these  flowers  and 
crowns  1  Not  in  war  against  Medes  and  Phoenicians,  as  my 
brother,  but  in  conflict  against  a  friendly  and  allied  state,  has 
Pericles  led  our  citizens  to  death."  1 

The  long  resistance  which  Samos  had  offered  to  the  whole 
force  of  Athens,  the  great  danger  into  which  that  resistance 
had  brought  the  empire,  were  lessons  not  to  be  forgotten. 
The  resistance  was  chiefly  due  to  the  fortifications  of  the 
.    .        city,  which  defied  the  skill  and  bravery  of  the 

Athens  insists  V  .  J 

on  the  destmc-  besiegers,  bimilar  difnculties  had  been  ex- 
tion  of  the  wails  perienced  in  the   reduction  of  Thasos  and 

of  the  allies.  „.    ,      .  . 

Aegma,  and  so  long  as  the  allied  cities  re- 
tained their  walls,  Athens  would  find  it  necessary,  in  case  of 
revolt,  to  employ  her  ships  and  men  in  the  slow  process  of 
reducing  them  by  famine.  She  resolved  to  prevent  this  evil, 
and,  by  a  single  stroke  of  tyrannical  power,  to  bring  the 
cities,  or  at  least  those  of  Ionia  and  the  adjacent  islands,  to 
her  feet.     She  decreed  the  destruction  of  their  walls,  and 


1  Plut.  Per.  28  ;  Pericles  retorted  with  a  quotation  from  Archi- 
lochus  (ovk  av  /Jivpoicri  ypavs  cover'  r)\ei(peo),  which  gives  us  a  poor 
idea  of  the  manners  of  himself  and  his  time.  Aristot,  Khet.  i,  7.  34 ; 
iii.  10.  7. 


I.  18.] 


ATHENS  AND  THE  NORTH. 


37 


the  decree  was  executed.  The  precise  date  is  unknown,  but 
about  the  fact  there  is  no  question.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
fifth  century  the  Ionic  cities  were  protected  by  walls;  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  "Ionia  is  unforti- 
fied."1 The  change  can  only  have  been  carried  out  at  the 
command  of  the  Athenians,  for  the  allies  were  not  likely  to 
destroy  their  own  walls,  and  there  was  no  other  power 
which  could  compel  them  to  do  it.  This  was  the  last  and 
greatest  step  in  the  tyrant's  progress,  by  which  Athens  made 
herself  undisputed  mistress  of  the  subject  cities.2 


C—  ATHENS  AND  THE  NORTH.    THE  FOUNDING  OF 
AMPHIPOLIS. 

l8.  At  the  time  when  Athens  was  engaged  in  conflict 
with  Samos,  her  allies  in  the  Thracian  district  of  the  League 
were  a  cause  of  some  anxiety,  and  she  found  it  necessary  to 
make  considerable  changes,  both  in  the  amount  of  tribute 
paid  by  the  cities,  and  in  the  manner  of  payment.  But  in 
order  to  explain  the  position  of  affairs  in  the  north,  we  must 
go  back  in  the  narrative  and  review  the  changes  which  had 
taken  place  in  Macedonia  and  Thrace  since  the  Persian  wars. 

When  the  Persian  attempt  to  subdue  Greece  was  finally 
wrecked  at  Plataea,  Alexander  of  Macedon,  who  succeeded 
his  father  Amyntas  in  498,  was  once  more  an 

.  ,  .  .  Alexander's 

independent  prince,  and  he  sought  to  turn  to  conquests  after 
his  own  advantage  the  mischief  which  the  480^  his  relation 
Persian  invasion  had  wrought.  It  was  far 
easier  to  consolidate  his  power  when  such  a  wave  of  desola- 
tion had  rolled  over  the  country.  Herodotus  tells  us  how 
the  king  of  the  Bisaltians  and  Crestonice  retired  before  the 
Persians  into  Mount  Ehodope,  strictly  forbidding  his  six 


1  dreix^Tov  ovarjs  rrjs  'lama?,  Time.  iii.  33,  and  the  same  is  said 
in  detail  of  a  number  of  cities. 

2  In  the  case  of  Samos  and  Thasos  we  know  that  the  Athenians 
caused  the  walls  to  be  destroyed.  Cp.  also  the  demand  made  on 
Potidaea,  infra,  p.  82.  The  Chians  were  forbidden  to  rebuild  these 
walls  ;  Thuc.  iv.  51. 


38 


ALEXANDER  OF  MACEDON. 


[I.  18. 


sons  to  follow  Xerxes.  They  disregarded  his  wishes,  and, 
joining  the  king,  they  were  fortunate  enough  to  return 
home  in  safety,  but  the  savage  father  put  out  the  eyes  of 
every  one  of  them  in  punishment  of  their  disobedience. 
After  this  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Macedonian  monarch 
was  able  to  annex  the  Crestonaeans  and  Bisaltians,  conquests 
which  brought  him  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Strymon,  and 
put  him  in  possession  of  those  mines  near  Lake  Prasias,  from 
which  he  received  a  talent  of  silver  a  day.1  Alexander  was 
more  than  a  successful  conqueror  at  the  head  of  a  barbarian 
host.  He  claimed  to  be  descended  from  Greek  ancestors, 
from  the  Heraclids  of  Argos  (vol.  i.  p.  312),  and  as  a  Greek  he 
was  allowed  to  compete  in  the  Olympian  games.  In  the 
Persian  war  he  showed  himself  a  warm  friend  of  Athens — 
whenever  he  could  do  so  with  safety.  It  was  he  who  warned 
the  Greeks  to  retire  from  Tempe,  and  leave  a  post  where 
they  must  be  trampled  underfoot  by  the  myriads  of  the 
enemy;  who  advised  the  Athenians  to  save  themselves  by 
accepting  the  terms  of  Mardonius ;  who  at  Plataea  en- 
couraged the  Greeks  to  persevere  in  resistance,  and  informed 
them  of  the  Persian  plans.  For  these  services  he  received 
the  title  of  "  proxenus,"  and  "  benefactor  "  of  Athens.2  After- 
wards his  relations  with  the  city  were  less  cordial.  The 
formation  of  the  Delian  League  was  a  fatal  blow  to  his  hopes 
of  annexing  the  Greek  cities  of  the  coast,  for,  though  he 
succeeded  in  acquiring  Therma  and  Pydna,  Methone  and  the 
cities  of  Chalcidice  were  saved  from  his  clutches.  The  con- 
quest of  Eion  and  the  attempts  to  colonise  Amphipolis  and 
the  neighbouring  region  brought  Athens  and  Macedon  into 
so  close  a  rivalry  that  a  collision  of  interests  was  inevitable. 

1  Herod,  viii.  116;  v.  17.  For  Bisaltia  see  Herod,  vii.  115,  and 
for  the  Crestonaeans  who  lay  on  the  sources  of  the  Echidorus,  vii. 
124,  127. 

2  Herod,  vii.  173  ;  viii.  136  ;  ix.  44  ff.  For  the  title  cp.  Xen. 
Hell.  vi.  1.  4,  where  Polydamas  of  Pharsalus,  in  speaking  to  the 
Lacedaemonians,  says  :  irpo^evos  vpeov  &>i>  koX  cvepyerrjs  e<  ttcivtcov  S>v 
pepvrjpeOa  irpoy6va>v.  It  often  occurs  in  inscriptions.  See  Dittenb. 
Syll.  33. 


I.  19.]  THE  MACEDONIAN  KINGDOM.  39 


If  he  did  not  aid  in  the  destruction  of  the  Athenians  at 
Drabescus  (464)  Alexander  made  no  effort  to  save  them,  and 
on  their  part  the  Athenians  expected  Cimon  to  crown  his 
victory  over  Thasos  by  acquiring  a  portion  of  Macedonia.1 
From  464  onwards  the  Athenians  and  their  "benefactor"  must 
have  regarded  each  other  with  suspicion;  on  the  one  hand 
Alexander  might  tamper  with  the  allies  of  Athens ;  on  the 
other  it  was  certain  that  Athens  intended  to  plant  a  foot  on 
the  lower  Strymon,  and  control  the  passage  from  Macedonia 
into  Thrace. 

19.  Alexander  died  in  454,  leaving  four  sons — Perdiccas, 
Philip,  Menelaus,  and  Alcetas.    Which  of  the  four  was  the 
eldest  is  uncertain,  and  we  do  not  know  what  D  th  f 
partition   of   his   kingdom  Alexander   made  Alexander: 
among  them,  if  indeed  he  made  any.    When  partition  of 

&  .         '  J  his  kingdom. 

we  begin  to  see  our  way  clearly,  we  find  a 
triple  division  of  the  Macedonian  dominions.  Derdas,  the 
nephew  of  Alexander,  is  sovereign  of  the  Elimiotae;  the 
land  east  of  the  Axius,  adjacent  to  the  Strymon  and 
the  Greek  cities  of  Chalcidice,  is  governed  by  Philip;  and 
Perdiccas  is  ruler  of  Macedonia  in  the  narrower  sense,  of 
the  territory  between  the  Haliacmon  and  the  Axius.2 

1  Plut.  Gim.  14. 

2  In  a  matter  so  obscure  we  must  expect  a  difference  of  opinion. 
Abel,  Makedonien,  p.  166,  confesses  that  his  account  is  merely  con- 
jectural, and  Duncker,  G.  A.  ix.  225,  note,  is  not  convincing.  The 
dates  given  for  the  reign  of  Perdiccas  vary  from  23  to  41  years ;  and 
Abel  considers  that  this  is  best  explained  by  supposing  that  in  one 
calculation  the  whole  period  from  the  death  of  Alexander  to  the 
death  of  Perdiccas  is  reckoned ;  in  the  other,  the  time  duriDg  which 
Perdiccas  was  actually  king  of  the  whole  country.  Perdiccas  died 
in  413  ;  but  413  +  41  =454,  the  date  of  the  death  of  Alexander  ;  and 
413  +  23  =  436,  a  probable  date  for  the  expulsion  of  Philip  by  Per- 
diccas. Theopompus  puts  the  reign  of  Perdiccas  at  35  years,  i.e.  it 
began  in  413  +  35  =  448,  which  may  have  been  the  date  of  a  division 
of  the  kingdom  between  Philip  and  Perdiccas.  But  what  happened 
in  454-448  ?  Abel  thinks  that  in  this  period  Alcetas  may  have  been 
king  of  all  Macedonia,  for  in  Plato,  Gorg.  471  A,  Perdiccas  is  said  to 
have  taken  the  kingdom  from  Alcetas.  By  promising  him  a  share 
in  the  kingdom,  Perdiccas  induced  Philip  to  join  him  in  deposing 
Alcetas,  and  having  obtained  his  object,  set  about  depriving  Philip 


10 


THE  ODRYSIANS. 


[I.  19. 


By  this  division  of  the  Macedonian  monarchy  the  position 
of  affairs  was  greatly  altered.  For  the  moment  the  Mace- 
Macedonia  and  Ionian  power  was  paralysed  ;  the  Greek  cities 
the  chaicidic  had  nothing  to  fear  from  their  neighbour.  If 
Philip  attempted  to  extend  his  borders,  the 
aid  of  Perdiccas  could  be  invoked  against  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Greeks,  freed  from  the  fear  of  attack  by 
Macedon,  were  less  subservient  to  the  Athenians,  and  their 
position  became  more  independent. 

The  situation  was  complicated  by  the  growth  of  the 
Odrysian  empire  in  Thrace.  The  Thracians,  no  less  than 
the  Macedonians,  had  regained  their  liberty  on 
ofthe  OdrysUn1  the  retreat  of  the  Persians,  and  in  Thrace,  as 
empire.  jn  Macedonia,  the  invasion  made  it  easier  for  an 

Teres. 

ambitious  prince  to  extend  his  power.  Teres, 
the  king  of  the  Odrysians,  who  lay  in  the  valley  of  the 
Artiscus,  seized  the  opportunity.  He  began  with  subjugating 
the  Thracian  tribes  as  far  as  the  Haemus,  from  which,  by  the 
conquest  of  the  Getae,  he  pushed  his  borders  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Danube.  Beyond  the  river  lay  the  vast  territory 
of  the  Scythians,  which  extended  to  the  Cimmerian  Bosphorus, 
the  mouth  of  the  Sea  of  Azov.  Teres  secured  himself  from 
attack  in  this  direction  by  marrying  his  daughter  to  Aria- 
pithes,  the  king  of  Scythia,  and,  recrossing  the  Haemus, 
advanced  his  kingdom  towards  the  east,  till  he  almost 
touched  the  gates  of  Byzantium.1  At  the  death  of  Teres  in 
440  this  great  empire  seems  to  have  been  divided  between 
his  two  sons,  Sitalces  and  Sparadocus,  and  though  Sitalces  in 
a  short  time  united  the  whole  power  in  his  own  hands,  there 
was  a  period  during  which  Thrace,  no  less  than  Macedon, 
was  distracted  by  the  claims  of  rival  monarchs. 


of  his  share,  in  which  he  was  at  length  successful.  Duncker  thinks 
that  Alexander  divided  his  kingdom  between  two  of  his  sons,  Per- 
diccas and  Philip,  but  cannot  give  any  reason  why  the  others  were 
passed  over.  Alcetas  and  Menelaus  are  mentioned  in  O.  I.  A.  i.  42, 
43  as  sons  of  Alexander.  Abel,  however,  regards  Amyntas  as  the 
fourth  son,  but  only  on  the  authority  of  Syncellus  (p.  262). 
1  See  Thuc.  ii.  29,  96,  97  ;  Infra,  p.  148. 


I.  20.] 


THE  "  THRA  CI  AN  DISTRICT." 


41 


20.  Thus  the  cities  of  Chalcidice  and  Thrace  were  re- 
lieved from  any  danger  on  the  side  of  the  tribes  of  the 
interior,  at  the  very  time  when  Athens  was  Difficulties  in 
engaged  in  suppressing  the  revolt  of  Samos.  Strict  of  the 
A  spirit  of  rebellion  arose  among  them.  By-  Athenian 
zantium,  as  we  know,  joined  Samos  (though  emPire- 
she  does  not  seem  to  have  taken  any  active  part  in  assisting 
her) ;  and  from  an  examination  of  the  Quota-lists  of  440-436 
it  appears  that  a  number  of  cities  in  the  Thracian  district 
refused  to  pay  tribute  in  those  years.1  Athens  endeavoured 
to  meet  the  resistance  by  various  changes.  From  the  year 
437  onwards  we  find  in  the  lists  a  number  of  cities  which, 
with  one  or  two  exceptions,  appear  there  for  the  first 
time,  ranged  separately  as  cities  "which  tax  themselves," 
and  "which  private  citizens  have  enrolled  to  pay  tribute"; 
and  of  the  twenty-four  cities  in  these  lists,  seventeen  are 
situated  in  the  Thracian  district.  The  inference  has  been 
drawn  from  this,  and  with  probability,  that  a  number  of 
small  towns  which  had  hitherto  paid  as  tributaries  to  larger 
cities,  such  as  Aenus,  Potidaea,  and  others,  were  now 
detached,  and  not  only  allowed  to  pay  tribute  independently, 
but  to  fix  their  own  tribute  in  the  one  case,  or,  in  the  other, 
to  be  enrolled  at  the  wish  of  some  of  their  citizens  in  the 
Athenian  empire.2 

What  was  far  more  important  than  these  changes  and 


1  The  number  of  cities  which  paid  tribute  in  454-442  is  about  45  ; 
but  in  441  we  have  spaces  for  35  only,  and  in  440  for  37  only.  In 
438  the  cities  of  Aenus,  Argilus,  Galepsus,  Scapsa,  and  Stolus  do  not 
appear;  in  436  eight  cities  are  missing.  Between  the  years  439-436 
the  tribute  was  raised  at  Spartolus,  Potidaea,  Scabala,  Mecyperna, 
Sane,  Mende,  Scione,  Aegae,  Aphytis,  cities  lying  close  together  on 
the  west  coast  of  Chalcidice,  and  in  Pallene. 

2  See  Busolt,  Philol.  xli.  667,  etc.  ;  G.  I.  A.  i.  239-244.  The 
new  headings  in  437  are  :  (1)  IIoAeis  avrai  ra^dpevai,  (2)  irokeis  as  oi 
Ibicorai  eveypd\jravTo  (popov  (pepeiv.  Busolt's  explanation  of  these 
headings  is  conjectural,  but  it  is  probable.  He  also  points  out  that 
some  of  the  cities  which  were  called  upon  to  pay  a  higher  tribute— 
Potidaea,  Spartolus,  Scione,  Mende,  Stolus — rebelled  in  432,  or  sub- 
sequently joined  Brasidas.    Cp.  vol.  ii.  Appendix  iii.  9. 


42 


THE  LOWER  STRYMON. 


[I.  20. 


redistributions  of  tribute,  Athens  seized  the  opportunity  of 
the  disaffection  among  the  Greek  cities  and  the  division  in 
Macedonia  to  secure  the  prize  for  which  she  had  so  long 
striven.  About  three  miles  above  its  mouth  the  Strymon 
widens  into  a  broad  lake,  the  Lacus  Cercinitis,  which,  along 
its  whole  length,  effectually  prevents  communi- 
strymon?  cation  between  the  two  banks  of  the  river, 
value  of  the  North-east  of  the  lake  stretches  the  valley  of 
region.  the  Angites,  through  which  runs  a  road,  skirt- 

ing Mount  Pangaeus  on  the  landward  side ;  other  roads  also 
converge  on  the  river  at  the  point  where  it  issues  from  the 
lake ;  and  the  bridge  by  which  the  Strymon  is  there  crossed 
is  the  key  of  the  communication  by  land  between  Thrace  and 
Macedonia.  The  whole  region  abounded  in  timber,  always 
a  rare  commodity  in  Greece ;  the  plains  of  the  Angites  and 
the  Strymon  were  fertile,  and  through  them  were  brought  the 
products  of  the  interior.  But  what  gave  a  peculiar  value  to 
the  district  was  the  abundance  of  gold  and  silver  which  was, 
procured  from  Mount  Pangaeus  and  other  mines  in  the 
neighbourhood.  From  the  produce  of  these  mines  the 
Thasians  had  derived  their  ample  resources,  and  as  we  have 
seen,  Alexander  lived  to  receive  a  talent  a  day  from  his 
mines  near  Lake  Prasias.1 

Athens  had  long  been  in  possession  of  the  mouth  of  the 
Strymon,  and  since  464  she  had  worked  the  mines  of  the 
Thasians  on  the  mainland.2  But  all  attempts 
attempts  to  to  secure  the  territory  between  Lake  Cercinitis 
colonise  the  and  the  sea,  the  valley  of  the  Angites,  and  the 
region.  inland  slopes  of  Mount  Pangaeus,  had  ended  in 

failure.  The  story  of  Athenian  hopes  and  disappointments 
has  been  preserved  by  the  Scholiast  on  Aeschines,3  who 
enumerates  nine  disasters  which  had  befallen  the  Athenians 
in  this  region;  and  there  are  few  calamities  in  Athenian 


1  When  Alexander  conquered  the  Bisaltians  he  took  over  their 
coinage.    See  Head,  Hist.  Num.  Introd.  xlv.,  and  pp.  178,  180. 

2  Thuc.  i.  101. 
8  Aesch.  2.  31. 


I.  20.  J 


FOUNDING  OF  AMPHIPOLJS,  437. 


43 


history  more  disastrous  than  the  slaughter  of  10,000  colonists 
at  Drabescus  in  464  (vol.  ii.  p.  314).1  In  464  Alexander 
and  Teres  were  still  alive,  and  their  kingdoms  were  un- 
divided; by  437  the  situation  was  changed.  Athens  had 
also  brought  her  struggle  in  the  east  to  an  end,  though  at 
the  cost  of  resigning  a  number  of  Carian  cities,  and  the 
action  of  the  Greeks  in  Thrace  made  it  clear  that  a  strong 
centre  was  needed  from  which  to  control  them.  Philip  of 
Macedon  could  not  offer  serious  opposition  from  beyond  the 
Strymon,  owing  to  his  relations  with  his  brother  Perdiccas, 
who  would  readily  join  the  Athenians  against  him ;  and  the 
Odrysians  were  too  much  occupied  with  the  contentions  of 
their  rival  monarchs  to  render  him  assistance,  even  if  they 
wished. 

In  437  a  new  colony  was  sent  out  under  Hagnon,  the  son 
of  Nicias,  who  had  held  command  in  the  war  against  Samos.2 
Of  the  constitution  of  the  city  nothing  is  re-  Foundingof 
corded,  beyond  the  statement  that  the  colonists  Amphipoiis  in 
were  partly  Athenian  citizens,  and  partly  col-  437' 
lected  from  the  neighbouring  towns.3    The  new  city  was 
called  Amphipoiis,  a  name  apparently  derived  from  the 
situation.    It  lay  on  the  slope  of  a  hill,  visible  from  the  sea, 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  which  is  diverted  from  its 
course  so  as  to  circle  round  three  sides  of  the  hill.  Where 
the  river  ran  no  fortifications  were  needed,  but  a  wall  was 
built  from  bank  to  bank  across  the  slope.    At  some  distance 
from  the  city  lay  the  bridge  over  the  Strymon.4 

1  The  region  was  known  as  Phyllis,  a  name  derived  in  legend  from 
Phyllis,  the  wife  of  Demophon,  the  son  of  Theseus,  with  whom,  it 
was  believed,  the  country  came  as  a  dower  to  her  husband.  Phyllis 
is  said  to  have  visited  the  Strymon  nine  times,  hence  the  name 
"Nine  Ways,"  to  meet  her  lover,  who  failed  to  come,  and  in  her 
anger  she  pronounced  upon  the  Athenians  the  curse  that  they  should 
suffer  disaster  nine  times  in  that  region. 

2  Diodorus,  xii.  32,  who  gives  the  date  435,  but  cp.  Thuc.  iv.  102. 

3  Thuc.  iv.  106  ;  Diod.  I.e. 

4  For  Hagnon,  whose  father  was  Nicias  of  Steiria,  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  Nicias,  the  statesman  and  general,  see  Thuc.  v.  11. 
The  district  is  described  in  Leake,  Northern  Greece,  iii.  181  ff.  It 


44 


SCYLES  OF  SCYTHIA. 


[I.  21. 


21.  With  a  view  of  securing  their  position,  the  Athenians 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  Perdiccas,  from  whom  they  had 
Athens  and  for  the  time  nothing  to  fear,1  but  in  a  few  years 
Macedon.  Perdiccas  succeeded  in  expelling  Philip  and 
uniting  Macedonia ;  the  territory  east  of  the  Axius,  as 
far  as  the  Strymon,  was  added  to  his  own  dominions,  and 
he  became  the  neighbour  of  Athens  on  the  Strymon,  at 
hand  to  help  the  Chalcidian  cities  !  His  brother  was  driven 
to  seek  refuge  with  Derdas  the  prince  of  the  Elimiotae. 

In  Thrace  also  the  kingdom  of  the  Odrysians  was  by  this 
time  united  in  the  hands  of  Sitalces.  The  king  of  Scythia, 
Ariapithes,  had  been  treacherously  murdered  by  Sparga- 
pithes,  king  of  the  Agathyrsi,2  probably  in  the  attempt  to 
annex,  by  force  or  by  fraud,  the  territory  of  his  neighbour 
towards  the  Danube.  He  left  three  sons :  Oricus,  by  his 
native  wife  Opaea ;  Octamasades,  by  the  daughter  of  Teres ; 

and  Scyles,  by  a  Greek  woman  of  Istros.  Scyles 
Scytw'af  his  °f  succeeded  his  father,  and  with  the  throne  he 
love  of  Greek  a}s0  received  his  father's  Scythian  wife.  He 
was  half  a  Greek  by  birth,  and  this  natural 
bent  had  been  strengthened  by  education.  From  his  mother 
he  learned  the  Greek  language  and  letters,  thus  imbibing  a 
love  of  Greek  manners  and  life  which  proved  his  ruin. 
When  he  ascended  the  throne,  he  found  the  barbarous 
Scythian  customs  intolerable ;  his  Scythian  wife  was  odious 
to  him ;  and  whenever  he  could,  he  stole  away  to  indulge 
his  Hellenic  inclinations.  As  often  as  he  visited  Olbia,  the 
Milesian  colony  on  the  Borysthenes,  he  left  his  Scythian 
retinue  in  the  suburbs,  and  entered  the  city,  attended  by 

seems  to  be  doubtful  whether  the  bridge  lay  above  or  below  the 
wall  which  Hagnon  built ;  that  it  did  not  lie  within  it,  is  clear  from 
Thucydides,  iv.  103.  Leake,  I.e.  p.  196,  considers  that  the  ancient 
bridge  was  probably  in  the  same  situation  as  the  modern  one,  i.e.  just 
below  the  lake,  and  above  the  city,  but  Grote  places  it  below,  vol. 
iv.  p.  547.  The  present  bridge  is  300  yards  long.  For  the  device 
by  which  Hagnon  was  supposed  to  have  driven  away  the  Edonians, 
see  Polyaen.  Strateg.  vi.  53. 

1  Thuc.  i.  57  says  of  Perdiccas  :  avfifiaxos  rrporepov  <ai  (pikos. 

2  Herod,  iv.  78. 


I.  21.] 


HIS  LOVE  OF  GREEK  CUSTOMS. 


45 


his  Greek  bodyguard  only.  The  gates  were  then  closed  and 
securely  kept  that  no  native  Scythian  might  watch  the 
conduct  of  his  king.  Scyles  laid  aside  his  Scythian  dress, 
and,  clad  in  Hellenic  garments,  mixed  with  Hellenes  in  the 
market-place,  living  a  Hellenic  life  among  Hellenes,  and 
sacrificing  to  Hellenic  gods.  These  habits  he  would  indulge 
for  a  month  at  a  time,  after  which,  resuming  the  native 
dress,  he  left  the  city.  He  even  built  himself  a  magnificent 
palace  in  Olbia,  surrounded  with  sphinxes  and  griffins  of 
white  marble,  and  brought  home  an  Olbian  Greek  as  his 
wife.    In  time  this  modest  indulgence  failed  e  ,    .  . 

....  .  Scyles  is  in- 
to satisfy  him;  he  insisted  on  initiation  in  itiatedinthe 
the  orgiastic  mysteries  of  Dionysus.  His  ^ionysiac  rites, 
palace  was  struck  by  lightning  and  burned  to  the  ground, 
but  the  evil  omen  was  sent  in  vain :  Scyles  was  not  to 
be  diverted  from  his  purpose.  He  joined  the  sacred  pro- 
cession, and  hurried  round  the  city  in  the  Bacchic  rout. 
As  these  orgies  were  a  common  subject  of  reproach  on  the 
part  of  the  Scythians  against  the  Greeks,  a  citizen  of  Olbia 
revenged  himself  by  taunting  the  Scythians  with  the  conduct 
of  their  king,  and  finding  them  incredulous,  he  led  them 
to  a  tower  whence  they  could  see  the  procession.  They 
reported  what  they  had  seen  to  the  Scythians  in  the 
suburbs  of  the  city,  and  no  sooner  had  Scyles  returned  to 
his  kingdom  than  a  rebellion  broke  out,  by  which  Octa- 
masades,  his  half-brother,  was  raised  to  the  „  .  . 

'  '  He  is  deposed, 

throne.  Scyles  sought  refuge  at  the  court  of  and  seeks  refuge 
Sitalces.1  Meanwhile,  Sitalces  had  succeeded  with  Sitalce^ 
in  expelling  his  brother  Sparadocus  from  his  share  of  the 
kingdom,  and  Sparadocus  had  taken  refuge  in  Scythia  with 
his  nephew  Octamasades.  When  Octamasades  who  surrenders 
marched  to  the  Danube  with  the  intention  of  himinexchange 
invading  Thrace,  and  recovering  Scyles  by  force  for  sParadocus- 
of  arms,  he  was  met  by  Sitalces  with  the  proposal  that  the 
fugitives  should  be  exchanged;  he  would  surrender  Scyles 


i  Herod,  iv.  78-80. 


46 


SITALCES. 


[I.  21. 


on  condition  that  Octamasades  gave  up  Sparadocus.  The 
proposal  was  accepted.  What  treatment  Sparadocus  met 
with  we  do  not  know,  but  his  son  Seuthes  lived  at  the  court 
of  Sitalces,  and  succeeded  to  the  Odrysian  throne.  Scyles 
was  at  once  put  to  death.1 

Sitalces  was  now  without  a  rival— the  undisputed  master 
of  an  empire  second  only  to  that  of  the  Scythians.  On  the 
sea  coast  his  dominions  reached  from  Abdera  to  the  Danube, 
and  towards  the  interior,  from  Byzantium  to  the  source  of 
The  Odrysian  the  Strymon.2  In  this  region  were  included 
kingdom.  not  only  the  rude  barbarians  of  Thrace,  but 
the  Hellenic  cities  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Euxine,  and 
tribute  was  exacted  from  both  by  the  Odrysian  king.  The 
amount  paid  to  Sitalces  is  not  recorded,  but  in  the  reign  of 
his  nephew  and  successor  Seuthes,  who  raised  it  to  the  highest 
sum  ever  reached,  it  amounted  to  400  talents  (£80,000). 
This  was  by  no  means  the  whole  of  the  king's  revenue ;  at 
least  as  much  more  was  derived  from  the  presents  made  to 
him  in  gold  and  silver,  in  addition  to  which  he  received  gifts 
of  furniture  and  "smooth"  and  broidered  cloth.  Similar  gifts, 
though  of  less  value,  were  made  to  the  powerful  princes  who 
stood  next  in  rank  to  the  king,  for  in  Thrace  it  was  more 
honourable  to  receive  than  to  give,  and  one  who  refused  to 
grant  a  request  incurred  greater  disgrace  than  one  who  failed 
to  obtain  what  he  desired.  Nothing  indeed  could  be  done 
without  a  liberal  outlay  in  presents. 

These  changes  in  Thrace  and  Macedonia  brought  about  a 
change  in  the  policy  of  Athens.  She  had  nothing  to  fear 
from  Philip,  who  was  no  longer  her  neighbour  at  Amphi- 
polis,  but  a  fugitive  in  Elimia,  beyond  Macedonia.  It  was 
from  Perdiccas  and  Sitalces  that  danger  was  to  be  appre- 


1  Herod.  I.e.  ;  Thuc.  ii.  101  ;  iv.  101.  Herodotus  does  not  mention 
Sparadocus,  but  we  never  hear  of  any  other  brother  of  Sitalces. 

2  Thuc.  ii.  97.  Measured  in  Kiepert's  map  of  the  Turkish  empire 
the  distance  from  Abdera  to  the  Danube  is  a  little  less  than  400 
miles  ;  and  from  the  Strymon  to  Byzantium,  a  little  less  than  350 
miles. 


I.  22.]       A  the  Ms  AMD  Western  geeece.  ii 

hended.  Perdiccas  was  not  likely  to  regard  the  founding  of 
Amphipolis  with  satisfaction,  and  the  Odrysians  would  look 
with  suspicion  on  the  advance  of  the  Athenians  beyond  the 
Strymon,  or  into  the  interior.  If  Macedonia  and  Thrace 
were  to  combine,  the  position  of  Athens  in  Chalcidice  would 
be  shaken.  From  the  sea  she  might  retain  her 
hold  on  those  cities  which  lay  upon  the  coast,  ^afd^Mace!8 
but  those  which  lay  inland  could  rely  on  the  donia  and 
protection  of  their  neighbours.  Athens  then  Thrac6, 
must  weaken  Macedonia,  if  possible;  above  all  she  must 
prevent  Thrace  and  Macedonia  from  entering  into  combina- 
tion. With  the  first  object  in  view  she  resolved  to  support 
the  claims  of  Philip,  and  aid  him  in  recovering  his  kingdom ; 
with  the  second  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  Odrysians.  It 
was  easy  enough  to  break  with  Perdiccas  and  give  a  "moral 
support"  to  Philip,  but  to  win  the  Odrysians  was  a  more 
difficult  task.  At  this  time,  i.e.  about  435,  Sitalces  was 
under  the  influence  of  Nymphodorus,  a  Greek  of  Abdera, 
whose  sister  he  had  married,  and  unfortunately  for  Athens, 
Nymphodorus  was  far  from  friendly  to  the  city.  For  the 
moment  nothing  could  be  done,  but  in  a  few  years,  by 
personal  attentions  to  Nymphodorus,  and  perhaps  by  remis- 
sion of  tribute  to  Abdera,  Athens  was  able  to  overcome  this 
hostile  feeling,  and  secure  the  Odrysian  alliance.  But  her 
position  in  the  north  continued  to  be  a  cause  of  grave 
anxiety.  Perdiccas  was  an  enemy — if  for  the  time  a  con- 
cealed one — the  Odrysians  were  uncertain,  and  the  Greek 
cities  were  far  from  contented.1 

22.  About  the  time  that  she  sent  out  the  colony  to  Am- 
phipolis, Athens  found  an  opportunity  of  extending  her 
influence  in  Western  Greece.     On  the  shore  The  Athenians 
of  the  bay  of  Ambracia  lay  the  city  of  Amphi-  in  Western 
lochian  Argos,  so   called  from  the  founder,  Amphliochian 
Amphilochus  of  Argos,  who,  according  to  a  Ar&os- 
tradition  preserved  by  Thucydides,  founded  the  city  on  his 


1  Thuo.  ii.  29  ;  infra,  p.  123. 


48 


A  MPHIL  O  CHI  A  N  ARGOS. 


[I.  22. 


return  from  Troy.  It  was  the  most  important  city  of  that 
region.  At  a  date  which  we  cannot  fix,  the  Amphilochians, 
being  in  great  distress,  invited  the  inhabitants  of  the  neigh- 
bouring town  of  Ambracia  to  join  in  the  settlement.  The 
Ambraciots  came,  and  after  a  time,  finding  themselves 
superior  in  power,  they  drove  out  the  Argives  and  took 
possession  of  the  city.  The  Argives  sought  the  protection 
of  the  Acarnanians,  with  whom  they  appealed  to  the 
Athenians.  Athens  responded  by  sending  out  a  fleet  of 
thirty  ships  under  the  command  of  Phormio,  who  had 
recently  served  as  a  general  in  the  war  against  Samos. 
Argos  was  taken  by  storm,  and  the  Argives  and  Acarnanians 
were  established  together  in  the  city.  This  was  the 
beginning  of  the  alliance  between  Athens  and  Acarnania, 
which  we  find  subsisting  at  the  time  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war.1 

Unfortunately  for  Athens,  the  attempts  which  she  made  to 
extend  and  strengthen  her  power  in  the  north  and  west 
brought  her  into  closer  proximity  with  the  most  enterprising 
of  the  cities  of  Peloponnesus  — with  Corinth,  whose  deadly 
hatred  had  already  been  once  roused  by  the  conduct  of 
Athens  towards  Megara  in  460.  The  animosity  had  slum- 
bered in  the  meantime,  and  in  the  Samian  war  Corinth  with 
a  short-sighted  policy  had  prevented  Sparta  from  sending 
help  to  the  rebels,  but  the  sleep  was  light  and  could  be 
broken  by  a  touch.  Interference  with  the  west,  where  her 
trade  chiefly  lay,  or  in  the  north  at  Potidaea,  could  not  fail 
to  excite  her  suspicions,  and  it  was  in  these  regions  that  the 
quarrels  began  which  led  to  the  Peloponnesian  war. 


1  Thuc.  ii.  68. 


CHAPTER  II. 


ATHENS  IN  445-432. 


I.  The  peace  of  445  had  divided  Greece  into  two 
halves,  and  the  failure  of  the  schemes  of  Pericles  had 
made  it  clear  that  this  division  could  not  be 

Position  of 

healed  by  sentimental  appeals  to  the  feelings  Athens  in 
of  the  Greeks.  Neither  as  the  leader  in  the 
conflict  with  the  barbarian,  nor  as  a  source  of  culture  and 
civilisation  was  Athens  to  receive  the  homage  of  the  Greeks. 
If  she  were  resolved  to  be  the  foremost  city  of  Greece,  she 
could  only  gain  that  position  by  another  conflict;  and  if  she 
was  to  be  victorious  in  another  conflict,  she  must  consoli- 
date her  power,  and  put  an  end  to  political  strife  at  home. 
The  forces  of  the  empire  must  be  the  forces  of  the  city  and 
within  her  absolute  control ;  there  must  not  be  a  Laconian 
party  to  limit  and  weaken  her  action.  Athens  must  follow 
a  line  of  policy  which  would  promote  unity  in  the  city,  and 
that  policy  must  carry  with  it  opposition  to  Sparta.  This 
was  as  much  as  to  say  that  Athens  must  be  more  democratical 
than  she  had  ever  been.  It  was  the  aristocratical  party 
who  clung  to  old  traditions  and  saw  in  Sparta  the  leader  of 
the  Hellenes;  so  long  as  this  party,  or  anything  like  it,  had 
influence  in  Athens,  the  city  would  not  be  unanimous  in 
support  of  Pericles.  The  party  must  be  rendered  powerless. 
By  the  ostracism  of  Thucydides  it  had  been  deprived  of  its 
leader,  but  more  was  needed  than  merely  to  cut  off  the  tallest 
heads ;  the  citizens  must  be  made  to  feel  that  the  new  order 
was  in  every  way  as  good  as  the  old.  Cimon  had  been  rich 
and  successful ;  he  had  brought  back  large  spoils  from  his 
victories  ;  much  had  been  spent  on  public  buildings,  and  his 
VOL.  ill.  D 


50 


THE  POLICY  OF  PERICLES. 


[II.  2. 


own  personal  expenditure  was  lavish.  Pericles  was  not  in- 
clined to  a  profuse  outlay  of  his  own  means;  if  he  gave 
The  aims  of  money  away,  he  did  it  in  a  manner  more  useful 
Pericles.  than  ostentatious.   Yet  money  must  be  spent  if 

the  people  were  to  be  brought  over  to  his  side.  So  long  as 
the  war  with  Persia  lasted,  the  soldiers  and  sailors  of  Athens 
had  found  employment,  and  received  good  pay,  but  when, 
on  the  advice  of  Pericles,  the  war  was  dropped,  this  source  of 
income  was  dried  up,  and  unless  others  were  opened,  the 
discontent  at  Athens  would  be  great.  The  authority  of 
Pericles  would  be  shaken  and  his  policy  condemned. 

2.  At  this  crisis  he  was  urged  by  his  friend  Damon,  the  cele- 
brated musician,  and  as  some  thought  the  equally  celebrated 
Payment  for  "sophist"  of  the  time,  "  to  give  the  people 
service.  what  was  their  own,"  or,  in  other  words,  to 

spend  the  contributions  of  the  allies  in  paying  the  Athenians 
— not  for  military  service,  as  had  been  done  on  foreign 
expeditions — but  for  political  service  rendered  at  home.1 
This  advice  Pericles  followed ;  he  boldly  converted  the 
revenues  of  the  Delian  League  to  domestic  purposes;  and 
thus  supplied  with  funds,  he  was  not  only  able  to  recom- 
pense many  services,  which  previously  had  been  rendered 
gratuitously  (vol.  ii.  pp.  398-409),  but  even  to  create  occasions 
for  employing  the  people.  He  adorned  Athens  and  Attica 
with  the  great  buildings  which  have  won  the  admiration  of 
the  world  ;  he  also  arranged  to  keep  sixty  ships  at  sea  for 
some  months  every  year,  thus  improving  the  seamanship  of 
the  Athenians  at  the  same  time  that  he  provided  pay  for  the 
The  "festival  sailors.  Nor  was  this  all.  Plutarch  vaguely 
money."  observes  that  Pericles  bribed  the  people  by 

giving  them  money  for  festivals  and  service  in  the  courts, 
and  by  payments  of  various  kinds,  thus  inducing  them  to 
support  his  attacks  on  the  Areopagus.2  On  this  evidence  it 
is  commonly  asserted  that  Pericles  introduced  the  payment 
of  festival  money,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  he  did 


l  Ath.  Pol.  c.  27  (Damonides).  2  Plut.  Per.  9. 


II.  2.] 


PA  YMENT  OF  THE  JURIES. 


51 


so ;  it  was  part  of  his  policy  to  make  the  public  festivals  a 
sort  of  education  to  the  Athenian  citizens,  and  he  would 
certainly  wish  to  remove  any  hindrance  which  prevented 
them  from  enjoying  to  the  full  what  he  was  at  so  much  pains 
to  provide.1 

By  all  who  were  opposed  to  Pericles  and  his  policy  such 
measures  as  these  could  only  be  regarded  as  a  shameless 
bribing  of  the  people  with  funds  which  were  Criticism  of 
supplied  for  quite  different  purposes.  The  Pericles' 
view  is  certainly  tenable,  but  we  must  also  measures- 
allow  that  Pericles,  if  he  bribed  the  people,  had  ulterior 
views  in  doing  so.  When  he  paid  the  jurors  to  attend  the 
law-courts,  he  also  made  the  law-courts  an  instrument  by 
which  he  could  govern  the  subject  allies.  Their  lawsuits 
were  brought  to  Athens  to  be  settled  by  Athenian  juries, 
who  by  this  means  came  to  have  a  direct  interest  in  tighten- 
ing the  grasp  of  Athens  on  her  empire,  and  securing  the 
revenues  from  which  they  were  themselves  paid.  The  pay- 
ment of  the  jurors  had  also  another  effect,  which  helped 
Pericles  to  maintain  his  position.  It  brought  to  the  city  all 
those  who  preferred  the  juror's  fee  to  wages  for  other  work; 
the  old,  the  inactive,  the  idle  nocked  to  Athens  from  the 
country  demes,  and  from  their  numbers  and  their  irre- 
sponsible powers  they  became  of  importance.  In  the  law- 
courts  they  were  supreme,  and  they  formed  no  inconsiderable 
part  of  the  Assembly.  Pericles  could  count  on  their  votes, 
and  on  ordinary  occasions,  when  there  was  nothing  before  the 
assembly  of  sufficient  importance  to  bring  up  the  people  from 
the  country,  their  votes  decided  the  question.  The  same  was 
the  case  with  the  rest  of  the  public  expenditure  of  Pericles. 
Large  sums  were  spent  on  the  public  buildings  of  Athens,  but 

1  If,  however,  this  "  festival  money  "  is  the  same  as  the  "two-obol 
fee'; — dioo/3eXi'a — and  two  obols  was  at  one  time  the  price  of  a  seat 
in  the  theatre — there  is  clear  evidence  that  the  payment  does  not  date 
from  Pericles,  but  was  first  introduced  after  his  death  by  Cleophon, 
an  extreme  demagogue,  who  rose  to  power  towards  the  end  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war.  Ath.  Pol.  c.  28  :  KXeocpmv  6  Xvpoiroios,  bs  <a\ 
tt]v  diafieXiav  eVdotcre  irp&Tos.    Infra,  c.  xii. 


52 


PERICLES  RULES  ATHENS. 


[II.  2. 


the  Parthenon  and  the  Propylaea  were  not  built  merely  to  find 
employment  and  wages  for  the  artisans  and  masons  of  the 
city.  They  were  the  visible  embodiment  of  the  greatness  of 
Athens,  and  intended  to  impress  the  Grecian  world,  and  above 
all  the  allies  of  Athens,  with  a  sense  of  her  power.  In  all  that 
Pericles  did  the  ideal  and  the  practical  were  united ;  while 
establishing  his  own  position,  he  sought  to  strengthen  the 
supremacy  of  Athens ;  the  citizens  who  received  pay  from 
the  city  were  to  be  improved  and  ennobled  by  their  work ; 
and  if  the  empire  was  to  be  the  mightiest  power  in  Greece, 
it  was  also  to  be  a  centre  of  civilisation,  and  admired  of  all. 

From  the  ostracism  of  Thucydides  down  to  the  year 
430,  when  he  was  deposed  from  his  command,  Pericles  was 

Pericles  ruler 

the  ruler  of  Athens.  This  position  he  owed 
of  Athens.  mainly  to  the  measures  of  which  we  have  just 
spoken,  but  also  in  a  considerable  degree  to  his  gift  of 
eloquence.  Eupolis,  the  comedian,  said  that  "Persuasion 
sat  on  his  lips,  and  alone  of  the  orators  of  his  time,  his  words 
left  a  sting  behind  them  in  the  ears  of  those  who  heard  him." 1 
Others  spoke  of  him  as  the  Olympian  who  bore  upon  his 
tongue  a  terrible  thunderbolt.2  With  this  weapon  he  over- 
came all  opposition  in  the  assembly,  and  bent  the  people  to 
his  will.  Elected  every  year  to  the  office  of  general,  he  was 
the  foremost  executive  magistrate  in  the  city,  and  of  the  two 
bodies  in  which  the  sovereign  power  resided,  the  Assembly 
was  carried  away  by  his  eloquence,  and  the  jurors  were 
indebted  to  him  for  their  pay. 

The  success  which,  with  very  few  exceptions,  attended 
his  enterprises,  confirmed  him  in  his  position.  His  ad- 
ministration of  the  empire  left  nothing  to  be  desired— from 
an  Athenian  point  of  view.  In  spite  of  his  large  expenditure, 
he  could  point  to  a  surplus  of  ready  money  stored  in  the 
Acropolis,  larger  by  many  times  than  the  public  fund  of  any 
other  city  in  Greece.     This  was  also  an  answer  to  those 

1  Frag.  {Demi)  94  K. 

2  Plut.  Per.  8  :  deivov  5e  Kcfjavvov  iu  yXaxrar]  <f>epciv :  cp.  Arist. 
Ach.  504. 


II.  3.] 


OPPOSITION  TO  PERICLES. 


53 


who  complained  that  the  money  of  the  allies  was  wasted. 
Athens  could  at  any  moment  declare  war,  not  only  on  a 
rebellious  subject— though  this  was  painfully  apparent  to  the 

allies  but  on  any  power  which  attempted  to  injure  an  ally. 

The  Aegean,  under  Athenian  rule,  was  free  from  pirates  and 
Persians.1 

3.  Of  the  internal  history  of  Athens  from  the  fall  of 
Samos  to  the   outbreak  of  the   Peloponnesian   war,  few 
details  have  come  down  to  us.    We  can  trace  Internal 
a  gradual  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  people  history  of 

0  _     .  ,  .  ,  1  •  Athens. 

to  Pericles,  answering  to  a  change  in  nis 
attitude  to  them.  Their  thoughts  were  of  present  enjoy- 
ment ;  he  had  ulterior  views  in  all  his  measures ;  and  it  was 
inevitable  that  a  point  should  be  reached  when  the  people 
and  their  ruler  were  no  longer  in  harmony.  He  used  his 
high  authority  to  check  their  wishes;  they  submitted,  not 
without  resentment.  The  life  which  he  led,  the  associ- 
ates whom  he  gathered  round  him,  also  tended  to  separate 
him  from  the  Athenian  multitude  quite  as  much  as  the  line 
which  he  pursued  in  politics  separated  him  from  the  party 
to  which  by  birth  he  belonged. 

In  his  youth  he  had  married  the  wife  of  the  wealthy 
Hipponicus,  by  whom  he  had  two  sons,  Xanthippus  and 
Paralus.  By  what  arrangement  the  marriage  periciesand 
was  brought  about  we  do  not  know,  but  the  Aspasia. 
harmony  of  the  two  great  families  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  in  any  way  disturbed.  In  such  matters  Athenian 
feeling  was  widely  different  from  our  own.  The  connection 
thus  formed  did  not  prove  lasting.  Whether  Pericles  failed 
to  engage  the  affections  of  his  wife  as  Hipponicus  had  failed 
before  him,  or  whether  he  was  overcome  by  a  new  passion — 

1  If  in  435  there  was  a  surplus  of  9000  t.  in  the  Acropolis,  this 
amounts  to  an  average  annual  saving  of  450  t.  for  twenty  years. 
The  sums  paid  by  the  allies  were  not  enough  to  account  for  such 
a  total,  even  if  preserved  intact,  and  Inhere  is  no  doubt  that  Pericles 
spent  the  money  of  the  allies  on  his  public  buildings  and  in  paying 
the  Athenians,  before  435.  Did  the  savings  come  from  Laurium  and 
the  mines  opposite  Thasos? 


54 


PERICLES  AND  ASPASIA. 


[II-  3 


they  separated,  and  the  high-born  Athenian  lady  consented 
to  become  the  wife  of  a  third  husband.  Pericles  was  now 
free  to  bring  to  his  home  the  celebrated  Aspasia,  a  Milesian 
lady,  who  seems  to  have  come  to  Athens  shortly  before  the 
Samian  war.  She  belonged  to  the  class  of  "  companions,"  but, 
by  general  consent,  she  was  the  first  of  her  class.  All  ancient 
writers  agree  about  her  beauty,  her  genius,  and  her  accom- 
plishments ;  and  when  she  became  associated  with  Pericles, 
her  circle  was,  in  some  respects,  the  leading  circle  at  Athens. 
Socrates  listened  eagerly  to  her  conversation ;  Anaxagoras, 
an  Ionian  like  herself,  entered  into  discussion  with  her  on 
subjects  religious  and  philosophical  ;  and  the  friends  of 
Pericles  even  brought  their  wives  to  listen  to  the  wise 
sayings  of  the  Milesian.1 

It  has  been  suggested  that  Pericles,  in  forming  this 
connection  with  Aspasia,  was  endeavouring  to  establish  a 
better  position  for  women  in  Athenian  society.2  The 
Woman's  life  Athenian  wife  was  the  mistress  of  a  house, 
at  Athens.  the  mother  of  children,  treated  with  the 
greatest  respect,  and  influential  in  her  own  sphere,  but  she 
was  restrained  within  narrow  limits.  She  was  taught  to 
read  and  write,  and  instructed  in  all  manner  of  household 
duties,  but  she  seldom  ventured  beyond  the  precincts  of  the 
house,  or  was  seen  in  any  society  but  that  of  her  relations. 
In  the  country  the  wives  of  neighbours  visited  each  other ; 
in  the  city  it  was  only  on  some  public  occasion,  a  festival  or 
a  funeral,  that  a  woman  of  position  left  her  home.  Mixed 
society  was  unknown  among  women  of  reputation;  they 
were  rigidly  excluded  from  all  entertainments,  and  for  a 


1  See  Plat.  Per.  c.  24.  That  she  ever  became  the  wife  of  Pericles  is 
neither  proved  nor  credible.  By  his  own  law,  Pericles  had  made 
marriage  between  an  Athenian  and  a  Milesian  impossible;  and  her 
son,  Pericles  the  younger,  was  regarded  as  illegitimate. 

2  Holm,  Hist,  of  Greece,  ii.  344,  E.  T.  "  Is  it  likely  that  a  serious- 
minded  and  highly  educated  man  like  Pericles  would  not  have  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  his  own  example  ought  to  be  generally  followed 
in  Athens,  if  the  social  life  of  so  gifted  a  people  was  to  be  placed  on 
a  satisfactory  basis  ?  " 


II.  4-]       RELIGIOUS  FEELING  OF  THE  GREEKS, 


55 


man  to  enter  the  house  of  a  friend  in  his  absence  was 
contrary  to  custom. 

It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  any  general  rules  in  such 
matters,  or  to  judge  of  the  motives  which  induced  Pericles 
to  take  Aspasia  into  his  house.  But  if  Athenian  society 
stood  in  need  of  reformation,  he  did  not  go  the  right  way  to 
reform  it.  He  was  not,  indeed,  the  man  to  undertake  such 
a  task.  He  was  by  no  means  delicate  in  his  relations  to 
women,1  and  though  we  need  not  give  credit  to  scandal,  we 
must  allow  that  he  laid  himself  open  to  attack  by  this  new 
connection,  while  he  lost  the  sympathy  of  what  was  soundest 
and  best  at  Athens.  Those  who  lived  the  life  which  Xenophon 
has  described  in  his  Oeconomicus,  whose  sons  were  trained  in 
the  education  which  Aristophanes  has  sketched  in  the  Clouds, 
could  not  fail  to  regard  with  horror  Aspasia  and  her  circle. 

4.  This  was  not  the  only  point  at  which  Pericles  came 
into  conflict  with  the  prevailing  sentiment  at  Athens.  We 
are  apt  to  regard  the  Greeks  as  audacious  Religion  at 
thinkers,  whose  minds  wandered  freely  over  Athens, 
every  department  of  human  thought,  and  this  is,  to  a  great 
extent,  true  of  Greek  literature,  but  it  is  by  no  means  true 
of  Greek  life.  The  Greek  was  religious  to  an  extraordinary 
degree ;  in  every  action  he  felt  himself  dependent  on  the 
gods,  whose  support  he  was  therefore  anxious  to  obtain  in 
all  his  plans  and  purposes.  He  appealed  to  the  oracles  about 
the  most  trivial  matters :  about  a  purchase,  about  a  strayed 
sheep,  or  a  stolen  ox;  nothing  monstrous  or  uncommon 
occurred  but  it  was  regarded  as  a  portent,  having  an  influence 
on  human  life.  Athens  was  filled  with  diviners  who  inter- 
preted signs  and  omens  of  every  kind ;  oracles  were  collected 
from  every  source — not  only  from  Delphi  or  Dodona,  but  from 
local  prophets  in  Boeotia  or  Acarnania,  from  Bacis,  or  Glanis, 
"the  elder  brother  of  Bacis."  An  earthquake  caused  an 
adjournment  of  an  important  assembly,  and  a  formal  cere- 
mony delayed  an  execution. 


l  Plat.  Per.  10,  13,  28. 


56 


NATURAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


[II.  4- 


With  such  modes  of  thought  the  emancipated  circle  of 
Pericles  had  nothing  in  common.  Early  in  life  he  seems 
to  have  fallen  under  the  influence  of  Anaxagoras  of 
Clazomenae,  a  philosopher  of  the  Ionian  school,  from 
whom  he  is  said  to  have  acquired  the  stately  reserve  which 
was  so  remarkable  a  trait  in  his  character.  From  him 
he  learned  to  differ  from  the  common  opinion  of  his  day, 
and  to  substitute  natural  causes  for  supernatural.  In  the 
teaching  of  Anaxagoras  the  world  is  the  work  not  of  chance 
or  necessity,  but  of  an  organising  intellect  which,  out  of  a 
preceding  chaos,  brought  together  similar  particles  capable 
of  combination,  and  thus  formed  the  world  as  we  know  it.1 
Such  a  philosophy  could  not  fail  to  come  into  collision  with  the 
religious  beliefs  of  the  Greeks.  There  was  no  room  in  it  for 
that  variety  of  powers  with  which  they  had  peopled  earth 
and  sea  and  sky.  The  sun  in  the  eyes  of  the  Greeks  was  a 
holy  god,  a  living,  personal  deity,  who  traversed  the  heavens 
daily  from  east  to  west  in  his  bright  chariot,  but  Anaxagoras 
openly  affirmed  that  the  sun  and  stars  were  red-hot  stones 
and  nothing  more.  Such  views  were  regarded  not  merely  as 
impious ;  they  were  dangerous,  and  would  offend  the  gods, 
whose  vengeance  would  fall  on  the  city.  For  of  course 
Pericles  and  his  friends  were  quite  unable  to  move  the 
convictions  of  the  common  people  on  these  matters.  Before 
the  ostracism  of  Thucydides,  a  ram  with  one  horn  was 
brought  to  Pericles,  and  Lampon  at  once  interpreted  the 
portent :  it  signified  that  the  whole  power  of  the  city  would 
pass  into  the  hands  of  one  man.  It  was  in  vain  that  Anaxa- 
goras had  the  head  opened,  and  pointed  out  that  the  single 
horn  was  due  to  a  malformation.  Thucydides  was  ostracised, 
and  Pericles  became  sole  ruler  of  the  state,  and  Lampon's 
prophecy  was  confirmed.  Plutarch,  who  records  the  incident, 
though  strongly  in  favour  of  natural  philosophy,  is  driven  to 


1  Plut.  Per.  4:  roty  oXois  Tvpoiros  ov  rvyr]v  ovd'  avayicqv  BtaKoaprjaecos 
dpxrjv,  dXka  vovv  eneaTtjcre  nadapbv  nai  atcparov  iv  /ae/uy/ueVois  navi  rots 
a'XXois  dnoKpivovTa  ras  6/ioio/iepeiay.    Infra,  a  xiv. 


n.  s] 


GROWTH  OF  ENQ UIR Y. 


57 


confess  that  the  cause  and  the  meaning  of  a  portent  may 
differ.1 

5.  In  the  new  movement  two  elements  were  combined — 
the  philosophy  of  Ionia  and  the  rhetoric  of  Sicily.  For  more 
than  a  century  the  phenomena  of  nature  had 
been  made  a  subject  of  inquiry  in  the  Ionian  intellectual 
cities  of  Asia  Minor,  and  Anaxagoras  was  one  movement- 
of  the  last  and  greatest  representatives  of  this  school  of 
inquiry.  The  negative  results  of  such  philosophy  were,  of 
course,  more  cogent  than  the  positive ;  no  two  thinkers 
agreed  in  their  explanation  of  the  universe,  but  they  were  all 
of  one  mind  in  denying  truth  and  reality  to  the  changing 
phenomena  of  the  outward  world.  The  same  criticism  was 
in  time  applied  to  ethics  and  politics.  The  various  forms  of 
government  were  discussed,  and  with  them  the  object  and 
purpose  of  all  government ;  a  distinction  was  drawn  between 
nature  and  ordinance,  between  universal  and  particular  laws. 
It  was  but  a  short  step  to  pass  on  to  ethics,  and  ask  :  What 
is  the  measure  of  right  and  wrong  %  What  is  the  value  of 
custom  %  What  weight  should  be  given  to  authority  1  Is 
truth  the  same  for  all,  or  does  it  vary  according  to  circum- 
stances and  temperament? 

This  spirit  of  inquiry  passed  from  the  extreme  east  to  the 
extreme  west  of  the  Grecian  world.  The  speculations 
current  at  Miletus  and  Ephesus  were  repeated  in  the  cities 
of  Magna  Graecia  and  Sicily,  but  owing  to  peculiar  circum- 
stances politics  became  of  more  importance  than  physics  in 
the  Sicilian  cities,  and  philosophy  tended  to  pass  into 
rhetoric.  Not  only  were  these  cities  constantly  engaged  in 
"setting  their  house  in  order,"  in  reconciling  the  claims  of 
various  settlers,  and  harmonising  the  customs  of  various 


1  Plut.  Per.  6.  In  Nicias  23  he  gives  a  short  account  of  the 
progress  of  natural  philosophy  in  Greece.  Of  Anaxagoras  he  says  : 
o  yap  7rpwTos  cracpfiTTaTov  re  tto.vt(ov  kol  OappaXecorarov  nepi  ae\rp>r]s 
Karavyao-pwv  kcu  aKias  \6yov  (Is  ypacprjv  nuraOepevos  'Avutjuyopas  o#r' 
avros  r]v  naXaios  ovt'  6  \6yos  evbo^os  aXX'  airopp-qTos  ert  kui  81  oXiyatv 
Kai  per'  ev\a(3eias  tivos  T)  nlaTeeos  /3a£i£a)i>. 


58 


THE  "SOPHISTS; 


[II.  6. 


tribes,  but  more  especially  on  the  expulsion  of  the  tyrants 
and  the  restoration  of  the  old  inhabitants  to  their  homes  and 
possessions,  numerous  questions  arose  which  could  only  be 
settled  in  the  law-courts.  It  was  by  the  art  of  speech  that 
men  hoped  to  regain  their  lost  position.  Often,  no  doubt, 
the  claims  put  forward  were  of  a  very  uncertain  kind,  and 
there  was  a  great  temptation  to  "make  the  worse  the  better 
cause."  This  had  not  been  the  attitude  of  the  older  inquirers, 
Philosophers  but  now  philosophy  and  sophistry  parted  com- 
and  sophists.  pany ;  they  stood  as  far  asunder  as  the  student 
of  jurisprudence  and  the  successful  pleader.  While  Anaxa- 
goras  was  in  danger  of  starvation,  had  not  Pericles  come 
to  his  help,  and  Socrates  lived  on  less  than  the  laziest  citizen 
could  earn,  the  new  teachers,  such  as  Protagoras  of  Abdera 
and  Gorgias  of  Leontini,  were  well  paid  for  their  instruction. 
The  wandering  life  of  these  sophists,  who  went  from  city  to 
city  as  lecturers,  emancipated  them  from  civic  traditions, 
and  thus  a  prejudice  was  raised  against  them  in  cities  where 
morality  came  to  men  through  the  state  and  was  bound  up 
with  state  institutions.  Among  them  were  men  of  great 
ability  and  knowledge,  who  played  a  useful  part  in  stimu- 
lating the  minds  of  their  pupils,  and  imparting  to  them 
knowledge  which  was  new  and  valuable ;  but  even  the  best 
of  them  hardly  perceived  the  true  effect  of  his  teaching,  and 
the  second-rate  were  mere  intellectual  gladiators,  ready  to 
maintain  any  thesis  for  the  sake  of  display  and  profit. 

6.  The  appearance  of  the  "sophists"  and  the  spread  of 
"  sophistical  "  teaching  seems  for  a  time  to  have  revolutionised 
education  at  Athens.  In  more  than  one  play  the  comic  poet 
Aristophanes  contrasts  the  old  and  new,  the  young  man  as 
he  was  when  moulded  by  the  best  traditions  of  Athens,  and 
as  he  became  in  the  hands  of  sophists.  In  mind 
Schi°ng.1StS  an(i  body  the  change  was  for  the  worse ;  digni- 
Scenefrom        fie(j  obedience  and  decorous  self-control  were 

Aristophanes.  ,    ,    ,  .  ...  ., 

succeeded  by  a  noisy  argumentative  conceit, 
which  claimed  to  be  infallible  on  every  subject.  "I  will  tell 
you  how  our  quarrel  began,"  says  Strepsiades  in  the  Clouds, 


II.  6.] 


EFFECT  OF  "  SOPHISTRY. 


59 


speaking  of  his  son ;  "  we  were  at  dinner,  and  I  asked  him 
to  take  his  lyre  and  sing  me  Simonides'  song  about  the  combing 
of  the  ram.  He  at  once  replied  that  it  was  not  the  fashion  now 
to  play  the  lyre  and  sing  over  one's  wine,  '  like  an  old  wife 
grinding  parched  barley.'  'Yes  ! '  rejoins  Phidippides ;  '  and 
did  you  not  deserve  to  be  kicked  and  beaten  for  asking  your 
guest  to  sing,  as  if  you  were  entertaining  grasshoppers  % ' 
Just  so,"  Strepsiades  continues,  "that  is  the  language  he 
used,  and  he  said  that  Simonides  was  a  bad  poet.  With 
much  ado  I  kept  my  temper,  and  asked  him  to  take  a  branch 
of  myrtle  and  repeat  some  lines  of  Aeschylus.  He  replied  : 
'Aeschylus  is  bombastic,  harsh,  immature,  and  rugged.' 
How  my  heart  went  pit-a-pat ;  still  I  curbed  myself  and 
said  :  '  Well !  well !  sing  me  one  of  these  smart  songs  which 
are  in  fashion.'  Forthwith  he  chanted  a  lay  from  Euripides, 
God  help  us  all !  about  the  incest  of  a  brother  and  sister.  1 
broke  out  at  this  and  roundly  abused  him.  He  retorted, 
and  word  brought  up  word,  till  at  last  he  sprang  upon  me 
and  beat  me." 1 

This  scene  is  of  course  intended  to  be  a  caricature  of  the 
effect  of  "sophistic"  teaching,  but  of  the  hold  which  that 
teaching  obtained  on  the  minds  of  the  younger  citizens  there 
is  no  doubt.  We  have  no  reason  to  suspect  exaggeration  in 
the  description  given  in  the  Protagoras  of  Plato  of  the  excite- 
ment caused  by  the  visit  of  an  eminent  sophist  to  Athens. 

"Last  night,  or  rather  very  early  this  morning,  Hippocrates,  the 
son  of  Apollodorus  and  the  brother  of  Phason,  gave  a  tremendous 
thump  with  his  staff  at  my  door  "  ; — it  is  Socrates  who  is  speaking — 
"some  one  opened  to  him,  and  he  came  rushing  in  and  bawled  out, 
'  Socrates,  are  you  awake  or  asleep  ? ' 

"I  knew  his  voice,  and  said,  'Hippocrates,  is  that  you?  and  do 
you  bring  any  news  ? ' 

"  '  Good  news,'  he  said  ;  '  nothing  but  good.' 

"'Delightful,'  1  said  ;  'but  what  is  the  news  ?  and  why  have  you 
come  Hither  at  this  unearthly  hour  1 ' 


1  Aristoph.  Clouds,  1354  ff.  Cp.  also  the  well-known 
950  ff. 


60 


PRO  TA GORAS  AT  A THENS. 


[II.  7. 


"  He  drew  nearer  'o  me  and  said,  '  Protagoras  is  come.' 

"'Yes,'  I  replied  :  'he  came  two  days  ago  ;  have  you  only  just 
heard  of  his  arrival  ? ' 

" '  Yes,  by  the  gods,'  he  said  ;  1  but  not  till  yesterday  evening.' 
At  the  same  time,  he  felt  for  the  truckle-bed,  and  sat  down  at  my 
feet,  and  then  he  said  :  '  Yesterday,  quite  late  in  the  evening,  on  my 
return  from  Oenoe,  whither  I  had  gone  in  pursuit  of  my  runaway 
slave,  Satyrus,  as  I  meant  to  have  told  you,  if  some  other  matter 
had  not  come  in  the  way,  when  we  had  done  supper  and  were 
about  to  retire  to  rest,  my  brother  said  to  me,  "  Protagoras  is  come." 
1  was  going  to  you  at  once,  and  then  I  thought  that  the  night  was 
far  spent.  But  the  moment  sleep  left  me  after  my  fatigue,  I  got 
up  and  came  hither  direct.' 

"  I,  who  knew  the  very  courageous  madness  of  the  man,  said, 
'  What  is  the  matter  ?    Has  Protagoras  robbed  you  of  anything  1 ' 

"  He  replied,  laughing,  '  Yes,  indeed,  he  has,  Socrates,  of  the 
wisdom  which  he  keeps  from  me.' 

"  'But  surely,'  I  said,  'if  you  give  him  money,  and  make  friends 
with  him,  he  will  make  you  as  wise  as  he  is  himself.' 

" '  Would  to  heaven,'  he  replied,  '  that  this  were  the  case.  He 
might  take  all  that  I  have,  and  all  that  my  friends  have,  if  he 
pleased.  But  that  is  why  T  have  come  to  you  now,  in  order  that 
you  may  speak  to  him  on  my  behalf ;  for  I  am  young,  and  also  I  have 
never  seen  nor  heard  him  (when  he  visited  Athens  before  I  was  but  a 
child)  ;  and  all  men  praise  him,  Socrates;  he  is  reputed  to  be  the 
most  accomplished  of  speakers.  There  is  no  reason  why  we  should 
not  go  to  him  at  once,  and  then  we  shall  find  him  at  home.  He 
lodges,  as  I  hear,  with  Callias,  the  son  of  Hipponicus  ;  let  us 
start.' » 1 

7.  The  older  men  at  Athens  watched  this  movement  with 
anxious  eyes.  More  especially  were  the  young  orators 
regarded  with  suspicion — striplings  who  came  forward  with 
the  new  equipment  of  logic  and  dialectic.  They  were 
thought  to  be  entirely  without  moral  principles  ;  and  an 
Pericles  and  the  orator  of  the  new  school  was  at  once  assumed 
new  movement,  to  be  a  man  of  bad  character.  With  Pericles 
and  his  friends  the  sophists  and  their  doctrines  found  a 
welcome.     Aspasia  herself  was  known  as  a  composer  of 


1  Plato,  Protag.  p.  310,  Jow7ett's  translation. 


II.  7.] 


PERICLES  BECOMES  UNPOPULAR. 


61 


clever  speeches ;  and  Pericles  is  said  to  have  spent  a  whole 
day  in  arguing  with  Protagoras  the  case  of  a  competitor  in 
the  Pentathlum,  who  was  accidentally  killed  by  a  spear. 
Who  was  really  to  blame — the  thrower  of  the  spear,  or  the 
spear,  or  those  who  arranged  the  contest?  In  the  new 
enthusiasm  for  discussion  such  absurdities  may  have  oc- 
curred ;  at  any  rate  they  were  believed,  and  Pericles  brought 
on  himself  a  part  of  the  dislike  which  the  plain  Athenian 
felt  for  intellectual  hair-splitting.1 

Even  in  his  conduct  of  the  city,  he  inevitably  became  the 
object  of  a  good  deal  of  criticism.  By  taking  the  manage- 
ment of  everything  into  his  own  hands,  he  made  himself  the 
common  mark  for  discontent.  If  any  interest  was  harassed, 
or  any  scheme  went  wrong,  Pericles  was  to  blame.  We  have 
seen  that  his  expenditure  on  public  works  brought  upon  him 
the  severe  reproaches  of  his  political  opponents,  who  con- 
sidered, not  without  reason,  that  Athens  was  thereby  placed 
in  a  false  relation  to  the  allies,  and  though  Pericles  knew  how 
to  deal  with  such  criticism,  his  position  was  slowly  shaken. 

The  change  was  inevitable.     Pericles  himself  no  longer 
showed  the  same  conciliatory  temper  towards  the  people.  In 
his  conception  of  democracy  there  was  always 
the  reservation  that  it  must  be  under  control.  Attitude  of  F^ri- 
He  meant  to  rule,  not  to  be  ruled.   He  refused  cles  towards 
to  accede  to  the  wishes  of  the  people  when  the  people" 
their  wishes  did  not  coincide  with  his  own.     A  man  of 
aristocratic  birth  and  temperament,  when  he  attempts  to  lead 
a  mob,  is  always  in  a  difficult  position.    He  has  broken  from 
his  natural  supports,  and  yet  he  is  not  wholly  in  sympathy 
with  his  new  clientele.     At  first  he  can  make  concessions 
without  endangering  those  restrictions  which  he  knows  to  be 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  state,  but  in  time  the 
democratic  spirit,  evoked  by  him  in  his  own  interests,  as  well 


1  Cp.  Plut.  Per.  36  ;  Aristoph.  Clovds,  1073  ff.  Compare  the  pro- 
cedure at  the  Prytaneum  desciibed  in  DemostLenes,  23.  76.  At  the 
Buphonia  the  Athenians  solemnly  passed  sentence  on  the  axe  by 
which  the  px  wag  slain  ;  Paus.  i.  24.  4. 


62 


CHARGES  AGAINST  PHIDIAS. 


[II.  8. 


as  in  those  of  the  state,  demands  more  than  he  can  give. 
So  it  was  with  Pericles ;  he  was  willing  that  the  money  of 
the  allies  should  be  spent  on  Athens  and  on  Athenian  institu- 
tions, but,  as  we  have  said,  he  had  ulterior  aims  in  view  in 
this  expenditure ;  he  allowed  the  rich  to  be  heavily  fined 
for  public  purposes,  and  took  his  part  in  such  payments; 
but  he  did  not  wish  the  finance  of  Athens  to  pass  into  the 
control  of  demagogues,  who  would  use  the  funds,  as  he  had 
done,  to  win  the  people,  but  without  those  aims  by  which  he 
justified  his  own  course.  The  demagogues  could  not  be 
expected  to  make  such  fine  distinctions;  they  sought  to 
gain  for  themselves  the  authority  which  seemed  to  be 
slipping  from  the  hands  of  Pericles.  They  wished  to 
lead  the  people  against  him  if  they  could,  and  cared  little 
about  the  means  which  they  employed  in  attaining  their 
object.  Foremost  among  them  was  Cleon,  the  son  of 
Cleaenetus,  a  man  of  low  birth  and  vulgar  manners,  but  of 
great  energy  and  ability,  whose  appearance  and  occupation 
(he  was  a  tanner)  made  him  the  favourite  butt  of  Aristo- 
phanes. 

8.  In  this  manner  a  combination  was  formed  against 
Pericles,  and  parties  which  usually  stood  far  apart  were  united, 
not  indeed  in  a  common  policy,  but  in  the  attempt  to  put  an 
The  attack  on  enf^  to  tne  domination  of  their  rival.  The  first 
Phidias.  attack   seems   to  have  been  made  through 

Phidias.  He  was  the  chief  adviser  of  Pericles  in  the  adorn- 
ment of  Athens,  and  he  was  therefore  peculiarly  obnoxious  to 
those  who  were  opposed  to  expenditure  on  such  objects. 
That  Phidias  had  failed  in  the  charge  entrusted  to  him  could 
not  be  maintained.  Nothing  existed  in  Greece  more  beauti- 
ful than  the  temples  which  rose  under  his  direction,  and  the 
statues  executed  by  him  and  his  school.  But  it  was  easy  to 
insinuate  that  all  the  sums  which  had  passed  into  his  hands 
had  not  been  spent  honestly.  Some  years  previously  he 
had  constructed  the  great  statue  of  Athena  in  ivory  and 
gold  for  the  Parthenon,  and  he  was  now  charged  with  keep- 
ing back  part  of  the  money.    Fortunately  he  was  able  to 


II.  8.] 


ANAXAGORAS. 


63 


repel  this  accusation.  On  the  advice  of  Pericles,  the  statue 
had  been  so  constructed  that  the  gold  could  be  removed 
without  injury  to  the  work.  It  was  now  taken  off  and 
weighed,  and  no  deficiency  was  found.  The  charge  of  dis- 
honesty was  thus  conclusively  disproved,  but  the  accusers 
were  not  to  be  shaken  off.  The  public  mind  was  already 
disquieted  on  the  subject  of  religion,  and  a  charge  of  impiety 
might  succeed  where  a  charge  of  peculation  had  failed.  In 
the  figures  which  he  had  depicted  on  the  shield  of  Athena, 
it  was  found  that  Phidias  had  introduced  portraits  of  himself 
and  Pericles.  This  was  declared  to  be  an  offence  against  the 
majesty  of  the  goddess.  Phidias  was  at  once  thrown  into 
prison,  and  all  the  efforts  of  Pericles  to  procure  his  release 
were  in  vain.  Before  the  day  of  trial  arrived  he  was  found 
dead  in  his  cell.1 

The  next  attack  was  directed  against  Anaxagoras.  A  pro- 
posal was  made  by  Diopithes,  a  friend  of  Nicias,  who  was  the 
most  orthodox  and  religious  of  Athenians,  that  Attack  on 
those  who  disbelieved  in  divinities,  and  passed  Anaxagoras. 
their  time  in  discussing  the  nature  of  the  heavenly  bodies, 
should  be  impeached  before  the  Assembly.  The  proposition 
was  accepted,  but  whether  Diopithes  carried  the  matter 
farther,  and  personally  attacked  Anaxagoras,  is  not  known. 
A  late  writer  informs  us  that  Oleon  brought  a  charge  of 
impiety  against  him;  others  said  that  Thucydides,  who 
had  now  returned  from  ostracism,  accused  him  of  treason. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  precise  nature  of  the  charge, 
it  seems  certain  that  Anaxagoras  was  condemned,  and  was 
thrown  into  prison.  In  a  short  time  he  escaped,  or  was 
allowed  to  go  free,  and  a  few  years  later  he  died  at 
Lampsacus.2  Protagoras  was  also  banished  from  the  city 
about  this  time;  and  Damon,  who  was  the  chief  political 


1  Plut.  Per.  31  :  o  pev  ovv  Qabias  eis  to  deo-pcorrjpiov  aira^Sui 
ereXevTrjo-e  voo-rjaas,  ccs  Se  (paaiv  evtoi,  (pappaKois,  eVt  diaftoXg  jov 
TlepiicXeovs  tcov  i^6pa>v  7rapao~K€vacrdvT(0v.  Ap.  Schol.  Aristoph.  Pax, 
588.  According  to  Philochorus,  Phidias  was  exiled,  and  retired  to 
Elis,  where  he  was  subsequently  executed.  2  Plut.  Per.  32. 


n: 


04 


A  CCUS A  TIONS  A  GAlttST  PERICLES.  [II.  g. 


adviser  of  Pericles,  was  ostracised,  but  neither  the  date  nor 
the  cause  of  his  ostracism  can  be  fixed  with  certainty. 

For  some  years  the  comedians  had  amused  themselves  at 
the  expense  of  Aspasia.  She  was  the  "new  Omphale," 
the  " concubine  of  the  Olympian  Pericles,"  the  "child  of 
Lewdness."  And  now  Hermippus,  a  comedian  whose  power 
lay  in  the  coarseness  of  his  satire,  weary,  perhaps,  of  his  own 
abuse,  or  believing  that  the  ground  had  been  well  prepared, 
ventured  to  bring  a  public  charge  against  her.  She  also  was 
accused  of  impiety,  a  subject  on  which  the  Athenians  were 
easily  roused,  but  in  her  case  impiety  was  only  the  cover  for 
a  still  more  odious  imputation.  She  was  brought  before  the 
court  as  an  atheist  and  procuress.  As  an  alien  she  could 
not  appear  at  the  trial ;  her  cause  was  left  in  the  hands  of 
Pericles,  and  the  Athenians  looked  on  with  delight,  while 
their  great  statesman,  overcome  with  emotion,  pleaded  for 
his  mistress  with  the  entreaties  and  tears  which  Athenian 
custom  permitted  in  a  court  of  law.    Aspasia  was  acquitted.1 

9.  The  enemies  of  Pericles  were  baffled,  but  his  victory 
did  not  strengthen  his  position.  The  acquittal  of  Aspasia 
was  merely  a  concession  to  his  personal  influence.  It  was 
charges  brought  clear  that  he  had  felt  the  attack ;  and  his  op- 
against  Pericles,  ponents  now  ventured  on  a  direct  accusation. 
Dracontides  proposed  in  the  Assembly  that  Pericles  should 
give  before  the  fifty  Prytaneis  an  account  of  his  expendi- 
ture of  the  public  money,  and  that,  in  this  case,  the  judges 
should  give  their  votes  before  the  altar  in  the  Acropolis. 
The  proposal  was  subsequently  altered  on  the  motion 
of  Hagnon,  a  friend  of  Pericles,  and  the  case  was  to  be 
brought  before  a  court  of  1500  jurors,  voting  in  the  usual 
way,  by  dropping  pebbles  into  an  urn,  as  a  charge  of  bribery 
or  maladministration.2  Nothing  came  of  the  proposal ;  the 
case  appears  never  to  have  been  brought  into  court,  unless 
indeed  it  was  subsequently  revived  in  the  year  430.  The 

1  Pint.  Per.  32.  „,,',, 

2  Pint.  Per.  32  :  ei're  k\ott?i$  kcu  hvapGuv,  eiV  dbtKiov  fiov\oiTo  nj 

OVO^xd^LV  TTjV  bloij-iv. 


II.  9-J  PERICLES  PREPARES  EOR  WAR. 


65 


attention  of  the  Athenians  was  drawn  away  by  the  impend- 
ing war  with  the  Peloponnesians,  which  also  created  a  new 
division  of  parties  in  the  city.  The  iniquities  The  approach 
of  Phidias,  Anaxagoras,  and  Aspasia  were  for-  of  war- 
gotten  in  the  question  whether  Athens  should  go  to  war, 
and  what  were  her  chances  of  success.  To  Pericles  war  was 
certainly  an  advantage ;  in  war  a  leader  is  needed,  and  he 
was  undoubtedly  the  leader  of  Athens.  By  some,  indeed, 
he  was  thought  to  have  forced  the  points  at  issue  between 
Sparta  and  Athens  to  a  climax  in  order  to  recover  his 
lost  position,  and  we  may  at  least  allow  that,  convinced 
that  war  must  come,  he  wished  it  to  come  while  he 
was  still  able  to  direct  the  Athenian  state.  He  was  well 
aware  that  his  monopoly  of  power  had  been  such  that  he 
would  leave  no  successor.  And  for  years  he  had  been 
looking  forward  to  a  great  struggle,  which  should  place  the 
empire  on  a  still  firmer  foundation.  With  war  in  view  he 
had  so  organised  the  empire  that  all  the  resources  of  it  lay 
at  the  disposal  of  Athens ;  by  the  law-courts,  before  whom 
the  cases  of  the  allies  were  tried,  by  the  sixty  ships  which 
year  by  year  he  put  in  commission,  by  garrisons  and  wardens 
established  in  every  city  where  there  were  signs  of  disloyalty, 
by  destroying  the  walls  of  the  cities,  by  accumulating  an 
enormous  treasure,  he  had  secured  Athens  against  the 
greatest  danger  which  could  overtake  her  —  the  revolt  of 
her  allies.  On  land  she  was  not  a  match  for  the  forces  which 
could  be  brought  against  her,  but  this  difficulty  Pericles  was 
prepared  to  meet  by  allowing  the  enemy  to  do  their  worst ; 
the  loss  of  the  crops  and  cattle  of  Attica  could  easily  be 
replaced  so  long  as  Athens  was  mistress  of  the  sea. 

So  Pericles  "  watched  war  coming  from  the  Pelopon 
nesus."  Parties  were  divided  on  the  question.  There  were 
still  many  who  wished  that  their  city  should  party  opposed 
be  on  good  terms  with  Sparta,  and  were  op-  towar- 
posed  to  any  action  which  rendered  this  impossible.  Such 
were  Nicias  and  his  following,  men  absolutely  loyal  to 
Athens  and  democracy,  but  also  friendly  to  Sparta,  partly 

VOL.  III.  E 


66 


PA  R  TIES  AT  A  THENS. 


[II.  9- 


as  the  inheritor  of  great  traditions,  partly  as  a  pattern  of 
military  organisation.  Such,  too,  were  those  Athenians  who 
lived  in  the  country — rich  men  who  owned  fine  houses  and 
large  estates ;  poor  men  who  cultivated  a  few  ancestral  acres, 
on  which  they  lived  in  comfort,  holding  in  much  contempt 
the  city  and  the  ways  of  the  city.  They  remembered  that 
in  445  Plistoanax  had  marched  without  opposition  as  far  as 
Eleusis.  They  knew  that  war  meant  invasion.  The  pleasant 
houses,  the  orchards,  olive-groves,  and  highly  cultivated  farms, 
the  growth  of  two  generations  of  peaceful  possession,  would 
then  be  destroyed,  and  they  would  have  to  find  such  shelter 
as  they  could  within  the  city  walls.  In  Aristophanes  we  have 
pictures — instructive  if  exaggerated — of  these  country  folks 
in  Dicaeopolis,  Strepsiades,  and  Trygaeus.  They  are  rough 
yeomen,  gross  in  their  tastes  and  enjoyments,  yet  not  with- 
out a  homely  goodness,  a  love  of  simplicity,  and  an  inborn 
appreciation  of  what  is  beautiful  in  art  and  literature. 
They  are  men  of  sound  sense,  cherishing  a  lively  hatred 
of  the  new  culture  and  its  special  product,  the  youthful 
orator,  who  always  had  them  at  an  advantage,  and  took  a 
peculiar  delight  in  exhibiting  his  smartness  at  their  expense. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  inhabitants  of  the  city,  with  Cleon 
to  lead  them,  were  eager  for  war.  They  were  not  moved  by 
Party  favour-  the  prospect  of  the  disasters  which  would  fall 
able  to  war.  on  Attica  —  they  would  not  share  in  them. 
They  were  pleased  with  the  excitement  of  war,  and  confi- 
dently expected  a  solid  result  in  additions  to  the  empire. 
There  would  be  more  land  to  occupy  as  colonists,  more 
tribute  to  spend  on  amusements.  In  any  case,  there  would 
be  a  large  outlay  from  the  public  funds,  which  would  go 
into  the  pockets  of  those  who  served  the  city.  The  risks 
they  disregarded;  and  indeed  there  was  little  risk  at  sea, 
and  on  land  Athenian  generals  were  careful  not  to  expose 
their  fellow-citizens,  to  whom  they  were  responsible,  to  un- 
necessary danger.  On  this  question,  therefore,  the  influence 
of  Cleon  was  thrown  on  the  side  of  Pericles,  who,  with  this 
support  was  able  to  turn  the  scale  in  favour  of  war. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  PELOPONNESI AN  WAR. 

I.  Thucydides,  who,  as  a  contemporary  writer,  is  most 
competent  to  judge  of  the  motives  which  guided  his  own 
generation,  informs  us  that  the  real  cause  of  Thucydides' 
the  Pelopounesian  war  was  the  growing  fear  of  viewofthe 
the  Athenian  power.  "The  real  reason,"  he  Peioponnesian 
says,  "which  led  to  this  great  conflict,  though  war- 
it  was  rarely  mentioned,  was,  I  believe,  that  the  power  of  the 
Athenians  alarmed  the  Peloponnesians,  and  forced  them  to 
go  to  war;  but  the  causes  commonly  put  forward  on  either 
side  were  two  " :  the  part  which  the  Athenians  took  in  the 
Corinthian  war,  and  their  treatment  of  Potidaea.  The  same 
view  is  repeated  in  other  passages.  "In  deciding  to  go  to 
war,  the  Lacedaemonians  were  influenced  not  so  much  by  the 
arguments  of  their  allies,  as  by  the  fear  of  the  Athenians, 
and  of  their  increasing  power." — "The  Athenians  were 
growing  too  great  to  be  ignored,  and  though  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  unwilling  by  nature  to  go  to  war  if  they  could 
help  it,  they  could  remain  inactive  no  longer.  Their  allies 
were  suffering  from  the  aggression  of  the  Athenians,  and 
therefore  they  had  no  other  course  but  to  do  their  best  to 
destroy  the  Athenian  power." 1 

The  Greek  mind  was  not  satisfied  with  this  general  pre- 
disposing cause.    Careful  as  the  Greeks  always  were  to 
assign  to  the  right  author  the  guilt  of  the  first  other  causes- 
step  in  wrongdoing,  they  naturally  asked,  not  the  Megarian 
what  was  the  general  or  the  remote  cause  of  decree- 
the  war,  but  what  was  the  immediate  and  particular  cause — 


JThuc.  i.  23,  88,  118. 


68 


ATHENS  AND  MEGA R A. 


[III.  I. 


what  was  the  precise  act  which  brought  about  hostilities, 
and  who  was  guilty  of  it  %  To  this  question  various  answers 
were  given. 

A  quarrel,  of  which  the  exact  nature  is  obscure,  had 
broken  out  between  Athens  and  Megara.  The  Athenians 
charged  the  Megarians  with  tilling  the  sacred  land,  which, 
as  forming  the  boundary  between  the  two  states,  was  no 
man's  land,  and  might  not  be  cultivated.  They  sent  a 
herald,  by  name  Anthemocritus,  to  complain,  but  the 
Megarians  slew  him,  in  defiance  of  the  sacred  and  universal 
law  of  nations.  The  anger  of  the  Athenians  knew  no  bounds. 
Charinus  proposed  in  the  Assembly  that  there  should  be 
"truceless  and  unproclaimed "  hostility  between  the  two 
cities ;  that  any  Megarian  found  on  Attic  soil  should  be  put 
to  death ;  and  that  the  generals,  when  taking  the  customary 
oath  on  their  admission  to  office,  should  further  pledge 
themselves  to  invade  the  Megarian  territory  twice  a  year.1 

Whether  these  details,  which  come  to  us  on  late  authority, 
are  true  in  every  particular,  we  cannot  say,  but  in  some 
important  points  they  are  confirmed  by  Thucydides.  He 
tells  us  that  the  Athenians  had  passed  a  decree  — supported, 
certainly,  by  Pericles,  if  not  proposed  by  him — by  which  the 
Megarians  were  excluded  from  the  market  of  Athens  and 
the  ports  of  the  Athenian  empire ;  and  when  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  demanded  the  cancelling  of  this  decree  under  a 
threat  of  war,  the  Athenians  replied  that  the  Megarians  had 
tilled  the  border  land,  and  received  fugitive  slaves.  And 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  Athenians  invaded  the 
Megarid  every  year  till  the  capture  of  Nisaea.  Thus,  even 
on  the  evidence  of  Thucydides,  the  "Megarian  decree"  was 
the  immediate  pretext  of  the  war.  The  demand  that  it 
should  be  cancelled  was  put  forward  in  such  a  manner  that 
if  the  Athenians  had  yielded,  the  outbreak  of  the  war  would 
have  been  deferred.  But  what  was  the  real  cause  of  the 
decree  and  of  the  attitude  of  Pericles  towards  it  % 2 


1  Plut.  Per.  30. 


2  Thuc.  i.  139  ;  ii.  31. 


III.  I.] 


OTHER  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR. 


69 


The  contemporary  comedians  dwell  on  neither  of  the  two 
reasons  given  by  Thucydides,  though  the  motive  which  they 
ascribe  to  Pericles  may  rest  on  a  perversion  of  The  Megarian 
the  incident  of  the  "fugitive  slaves."  In  their  decree :  account 
view,  the  real  grievance  was  the  theft  by  ofArist°Phanes- 
the  Megarians  of  two  women  belonging  to  Aspasia.  This 
insult  Pericles  felt  himself  compelled  to  punish  ;  hence  his 
refusal  to  make  any  concession.  "In  his  fury  the  Olympian 
thundered  and  lightened,  turned  Hellas  upside  down,  and 
passed  laws  after  the  style  of  catches,  that  the  Megarians 
must  not  in  the  land  abide,  nor  on  the  sea,  nor  in  the 
markets,  nor  the  continent."  1 

In  the  Pax,  a  play  written  four  years  after  the  Acharnians, 
Aristophanes  gives  another  reason  for  the  attitude  of  Pericles 
towards  the  Megarian  decree.  "The  mischief  The  war  due  to 
began  with  the  ruin  of  Phidias,  for  Pericles,  ^p^^10"5 
fearing  to  be  involved  in  that  disaster,  set  the  Aristophanes, 
city  in  a  blaze  with  the  tiny  spark  of  the  EPhorus- 
Megarian  decree;  and  blew  up  such  a  war  that  the  eyes  of 
all  the  Greeks  were  filled  with  tears  owing  to  the  smoke." 
This  account  of  the  true  cause  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  is 
regarded  as  a  revelation  from  Hermes,  and  it  comes  as  a 
surprise  to  the  Chorus  and  Trygaeus,  who  had  never  heard 
that  Phidias  was  in  any  way  connected  with  it.  In  the  next 
century  it  was  regarded  as  historical.  Ephorus  tells  us 
that  Alcibiades,  who  was  brought  up  in  the  house  of 
Pericles,  once  found  his  uncle  in  great  distress ;  and  on 
inquiring  the  cause,  was  informed  that  he  had  been  asked 
for  an  account  of  the  money  which  he  had  spent,  and  was 
at  a  loss  how  to  give  it.  "  Would  it  not  be  better,"  observed 
Alcibiades,  "to  invent  some  reason  for  giving  no  account 


1  Aristoph.  Acharn.  504  ff.  In  the  words  "in  the  style  of 
catches,"  there  seems  to  be  an  allusion  to  the  "catch"  or  scolion  of 
Timocreon : — 

a)(f)e\ev  a',  2)  rvcj)\e  TlXovre, 
firjr  iv  yf],  ixi)T  ev  daXdrTfl 
/xtjr'  ev  r)7reipa)  (^avr^xev,  jc.t.A. 


70      PERICLES  AND  THE  MEG  ART  AN  DECREE.     [III.  2. 


at  all  % "  Pericles  took  the  hint,  and  being  at  the  time 
greatly  harassed  by  the  prosecutions  of  his  friends  Phidias 
and  Anaxagoras,  he  decided  to  give  the  Athenians  something 
to  occupy  their  minds ;  they  would  be  less  critical  in  time  of 
war.  For  this  reason  he  insisted  that  the  Megarian  decree 
should  not  be  cancelled.1 

That  Aristophanes  was  serious  in  attributing  the  Megarian 
„   decree  to  the  theft  of  Aspasia's  women,  or  to 

Pencles  object      ..        1  .     1      .        .  ; 

in  supporting  the  dishonesty  of  Pericles,  is  highly  impro- 
ve Megarian  To  the  come(iian  all  IS  ffrist  that 
decree.  .  ° 

comes  to  the  mill,  and  why  should  he  be 
more  just  to  Pericles  than  to  Socrates  ?  In  the  Acharnians 
he  may  have  merely  parodied  the  cause  which  was  supposed 
to  have  brought  about  the  great  war  of  Grecian  legend,2  and 
in  the  Pax,  as  we  have  seen,  he  hints  that  he  is  giving  a  new 
and  paradoxical  account  of  the  conduct  of  Pericles.  Yet  the 
historians  of  the  next  century,  though  they  had  Thucydides 
before  them,  accept  these  grotesque  stories,  and  make  history 
out  of  them.  It  was  to  their  minds  unintelligible  that 
Pericles  should  havj  insisted  on  such  a  trifling  point  as  the 
Megarian  decree  at  the  cost  of  a  great  war;  and  we  may 
share  in  their  astonishment  while  disregarding  their  explana- 
tions, We  need  not  suppose  that  Pericles  was  guilty  of 
peculation,  or  the  obsequious  slave  of  Aspasia;  we  know 
that  he  was  over-logical,  and  would  not  listen  to  a  com- 
promise, when  a  principle  was  involved.  He  believed  that 
the  demand  for  the  cancelling  of  the  Megarian  decree  was 
merely  intended  to  test  the  tenacity  of  the  Athenian 
purpose — that  if  any  concession  were  made,  other  demands 
would  follow,  and  in  that  belief  he  resolved  to  make  a  firm 
stand  at  the  very  outset. 

2.  If  the  immediate  cause  of  hostilities  was  the  refusal 


1  Aristoph.  Pax,  588  ff.  Plut.  Ale,  7.  Diodorus,  xii.  38-40;  cp.  ibid. 
41  :  aiTiai  pev  ovv  tov  Uekoirovvqa-iaKOV  irokcpov  Toiavral  rives  vnrjp^av, 
a>s"E<popos  aveypafye.  So  Thucydides  suggests  that  Cleon's  knaveries 
would  be  detected  in  a  time  of  peace,  v.  16. 

2  Cp.  Herod,  i.  1  ff. 


III.  2.] 


THE  CORINTHIANS. 


71 


to  cancel  the  Megarian  decree,  and  the  immediate  author 
of  the  refusal  was  Pericles,  the  chief  part  in  Parttakenby 
bringing  the  hostile  feeling  of  the  Pelopon-  the  Corinthians 
nesians  to  a  head  was  taken  by  the  Corinthians.  £eb^ing  on 
It  was  they  who  impressed  on  the  Lacedae- 
monians the  dangerous  growth  of  the  Athenian  empire; 
they  were  the  allies  whom  that  growth  most  nearly  touched. 
Before  the  Athenians  and  the  Corinthians  met  in  the  waters 
of  the  Ionian  sea,  war  was  still  in  the  future  ;  it  might  have 
been  deferred,  if  not  prevented;  but  after  that  collision  the 
Corinthians  felt  that  their  only  hope  lay  in  a  general  attack 
on  the  Athenian  empire.    In  old  days,  before  the  Persian 
wars,  Corinth  and  Athens  had  been  on  such  friendly  terms, 
that  when  Athens  needed  ships  to  enable  her  to  meet  Aegina 
on  the  sea,  Corinth  was  ready  to  supply  them  (vol.  ii.  p.  103)  ; 
and  though  in   the  great  war  of  480  there  was  some 
jealousy  between  the  cities— for  Adimantus,  the  Corinthian 
leader,  was  a  bitter  enemy  of  Themistocles,  and  the  Athenians 
had  strange  stories  to  tell  of  the  cowardice  of  the  Corinthians 
—though  the  Corinthians  followed  the  lead  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians in  retiring  from  Byzantium,  and  doubtless  saw  with 
displeasure  the  building  of  the  walls  of  Athens  and  the 
growth  of  her  fleet— the  cities  continued  to  be  on  friendly 
terms  till  the  revolt  of  Megara  in  460  (vol.  ii.  p.  324). 
The  action  of  Athens  in  receiving  the  rebellious  Megarians 
into  her  protection  laid  the  foundation  of  a  fierce  hatred 
between  the  cities,  which  could  not  fail  to  be  increased  by 
the  attempts  of  Pericles  to  acquire  the  control   of  the 
Corinthian   gulf.     The  settlement  of  the  Messenians  at 
Naupactus,  the  attacks  on  Oeniadae  and  Sicyon,  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  Megarian  harbours  of  Pegae  and  Nisaea, — all 
these  threatened  the  position  of  Corinth  in  Western  Greece. 
Her  fears  were  shared  by  others,  and  under  the  terms  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  truce,  Pericles  was  compelled  to  withdraw  from 
every  position  which  Athens  held  in  the  Peloponnesus.  For 
a  time  Corinth  was  pacified,  but  her  suspicions  were  after- 
wards roused  by  the  policy  which  Athens   pursued  in 


72 


THEIR  QUARREL  WITH  CORCYRA.         [III.  2. 


Northern  and  Western  Greece,  and  an  incident  now  occurred 
which  showed  only  too  clearly  what  the  intentions  of  the 
Athenians  were. 

Corcyra  had  been  colonised  by  the  Corinthians  in  the 
eighth  century.  The  island — the  modern  Corfu — enjoyed 
Corcyra  and  &  most  fortunate  situation.  It  was  suffi- 
Corinth.  ciently  distant  from  Greece  to  lie  outside  the 

currents  which  disturbed  the  politics  of  the  peninsula.,  and 
yet  it  formed  a  convenient  station  on  the  route  from  Greece 
to  the  west.  For  a  generation  after  the  founding  of  the 
city,  Corcyra  and  Corinth  were  on  the  usual  terms  of  colony 
and  mother-city ;  but  as  the  colony  grew  in  power,  quarrels 
arose  between  them,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  seventh 
century,  Corcyra  had  shaken  off  her  allegiance,  and  defeated 
the  Corinthians  in  a  great  naval  engagement  (vol.  i.  p.  345). 
It  was  in  vain  that  Cypselus,  the  first  tyrant  of  Corinth,  strove 
to  bring  the  island  into  subjection ;  the  utmost  that  he  could 
do  was  to  check  the  extending  commerce  of  the  Corcyraeans 
by  establishing  maritime  colonies  on  the  shores  of  Acarnania. 
His  son  Periander  was  more  successful;  he  brought  the 
rebels  back  to  their  allegiance,  but  on  his  death  they  estab- 
lished their  independence  once  more.  These  conflicts  left 
bitter  memories  behind  them.  In  their  festivals  and  sacri- 
fices the  Corcyraeans  would  not  allow  the  Corinthians  the 
customary  privileges  of  founders.  Such  conduct  on  the  part 
of  a  daughter-city  towards  her  "metropolis"  was  considered 
contumacious  ;  it  was  a  renunciation  of  the  bond  which  linked 
her  to  the  old  home. 

At  the  time  of  the  Persian  invasion,  the  Corcyraeans  pos- 
sessed a  navy  of  sixty  ships,  while  the  Corinthians  had  but 
forty ;  in  the  next  fifty  years  they  had  increased  the  sixty 
to  one  hundred  and  twenty,  a  number  far  in  excess  of  any 
navy  in  Greece  but  that  of  Athens.  When  called  upon  to 
assist  in  the  deliverance  of  Greece,  they  had  played  a  double 
game — promising  assistance  to  the  patriotic  side,  but  delaying 
to  send  it,  and  waiting  for  the  event  (vol.  ii.  p.  144).  In 
the  subsequent  quarrels  between  Athens  and  Sparta  they  had 


III.  3.] 


E  PI  DAMN  US. 


73 


taken  no  part ;  they  were  allies  of  neither  side.  They  con- 
sidered that  their  position  enabled  them  to  stand  alone  ;  and 
it  was  not  to  their  interest  to  favour  one  party  more  than 
the  other.  In  the  thirty  years  which  elapsed  between  the 
flight  of  Themistocles  to  Corcyra,  and  the  outbreak  of  the 
"  Corinthian  war,"  nothing  is  recorded  of  the  island. 

3.  From  Corcyra  a  colony  had  been  sent  out  (626)  with 
a  Corinthian  founder,  to  Epidamnus,  a  valuable  site  on  the 
Illyrian  coast,  through  which  the  Corcyraeans  The  Corcy. 
secured  a  trade  with  the  interior  (vol.  i.  p.  raean  Colony 
347).  The  new  colony  rapidly  grew  into  a  atEPldamnus- 
wealthy  and  populous  town.  The  original  settlers  appear  to 
have  kept  both  the  government  of  the  city  and  the  trade  with 
the  neighbouring  barbarians  in  their  own  hands.  We  hear 
of  a  supreme  council,  formed  out  of  the  heads  of  the  tribes, 
of  whom  one  was  chosen  to  be  the  "Administrator"  of  the 
city  (StoiKryTrJs),  and  of  a  "  Poletes,"  whose  duty  it  was  to  con- 
trol the  traffic  with  the  Illyrians.  The  artisans  were  slaves. 
This  constitution  was  subsequently  modified  by  the  creation 
of  a  less  exclusive  council;  and  finally,  about  the  year  435, 
the  people  succeeded  in  driving  the  oligarchs  out  of  the 
town,  and  establishing  a  thoroughgoing  democracy.1 

The  exiled  oligarchs  at  once  joined  the  neighbouring  bar- 
barians, and  with  th6ir  aid  plundered  the  property  of  their 
opponents.    So  serious  were  the  injuries  which  Faction  at 
they  inflicted,  that  the  Epidamnians  were  at  Epidamnus. 
length  compelled  to  send  to  Corcyra  for  assistance.  Their 
request  was  received  witli  the  greatest  apathy ;  the  Corcy- 
raeans had  no  inclination  to  enter  into  the  domestic  quarrels 
of  Epidamnus.    After  this  repulse,  the  Epidamnians  sought 
the  advice  of  Delphi :  Should  they  give  up  Epidamnus  and 
their  city  to   Corinth,  the   home   of  their  Corinth- 
founder  Phalius,  and  ask  there  for  the  help  which  Corcyra 
refused  ?    The  response  was  favourable,  and  to  Corinth  they 


1  Cp.  Aristot.  Pol.  ii.  7=  1267  b  18;  hi.  16=1287  a  7  ;  viii.  (v.) 
1  =  1301  b  21  ;  and  for  the  Pt  letes,  Plutarch,  Quaeut,  Grate.  29. 


74 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR. 


[III.  3- 


went,  repeating  the  command  given  at  Delphi,  and  offering 
to  place  the  city  in  the  hands  of  the  Corinthians.  Their  over- 
tures were  warmly  received.  The  Corinthians  were  not 
inclined  to  forego  any  claim,  however  slight,  which  they  had 
on  Epidamnus ;  they  wanted  the  colony ;  they  hated  Corcyra. 
They  at  once  invited  any  Corinthian  who  pleased  to  settle  at 
Epidamnus,  without  any  regard  to  the  claims  of  Corcyra; 
and  a  force  of  troops  was  sent  to  protect  them  in  the  city. 

Upon  this  the  oligarchs  went  to  Corcyra,  and  begged  to 
be  restored  to  their  home.  The  appeal  came  at  the  right 
moment.  When  the  Corcyraeans  found  that  the  colony  had 
gone  oyer  to  Corinth,  and  had  received  Corinthian  troops 
and  settlers,  they  were  highly  indignant.  Taking  the  exiles 
with  them,  they  set  sail  for  Epidamnus.  The  city  refused 
to  receive  them ;  and  they  at  once  began  to  invest  it  with 
the  aid  of  the  exiles  and  neighbouring  barbarians.1 

The  Corinthians  were  not  less  active;  they  no  sooner 
heard  of  the  investment  of  Epidamnus  than  they  proclaimed 
c  raand  a  new  c°l°ny  to  ^ne  town.  Any  Corinthian 
Corinth :  pre-  who  chose  might  go,  and  he  would  be  an  equal 
parationsfor  among  equals  in  the  new  city ;  those  who  did 
not  wish  to  leave  Corinth  at  once  could  secure 
a  place  by  depositing  a  sum  of  money.  Appeals  were  also 
sent  round  to  friendly  cities  for  money  and  ships.  A  large 
force  must  be  despatched,  and  a  large  fleet  would  be  required 
as  a  convoy.  The  Corcyraeans  now  appeared  at  Corinth  with 
loud  complaints.    The  Corinthians,  they  said,  had  nothing 

1  It  is  difficult  to  say  with  certainty  what  was  the  form  of  govern- 
ment at  Corcyra  at  this  time.  Grote  and  Duncker  regard  it  as  a 
democracy,  but  we  may  observe :  (1)  that  the  demos  of  Epidamnus  was 
repelled  at  Corcyra,  the  oligarchs  were  accepted  ;  (2)  that  in  the 
subsequent  battle,  out  of  more  than  1000  Corcyraeans  who  were 
captured,  800  were  slaves,  and  250  are  described  by  Thucydides  as 
bvvdfiei  oi  irXeiovs  Trp&Toi  ovrcs  rrjs  TroXecos.  They  must  therefore  have 
commanded  or  served  in  the  fleet ;  (3)  that,  in  their  appeal  to  Athens, 
the  Corcyraeans  say  nothing  of  any  similarity  of  government;  (4)  that 
the  Epidamnian  oligarchs  appeal,  when  at  Corcyra,  to  the  tombs  of 
common  ancestors,  which  seems  to  imply  that  they  were  addressing 
oligarchs  like  themselves. 


III.  4.] 


BATTLE  OF  A CTIUM,  435. 


75 


to  do  with  Epidamnus.  Let  them  choose  any  Peloponnesian 
state  as  arbitrator,  or  refer  the  matter  to  Delphi.  The 
Corinthians  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  the  Corcyraean 
troops  from  Epidamnus  as  a  condition  of  further  negotia- 
tions ;  the  Corcyraeans  replied  with  a  similar  request.  But 
negotiations  were  useless;  the  Corinthians  were  resolved  upon 
war,  and  sent  their  fleet  to  sea.  A  great  battle  was  fought 
off  Actium,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ambracian  gulf,  seventy-five 
Corinthian  ships  against  eighty  Corcyraean,  in  which  the 
Corinthians  were  severely  defeated,  with  a  loss  of  fifteen 
vessels.  On  the  same  day  Epidamnus  was  The "  Corin- 
compelled  by  the  besieging  force  to  capitulate.  thianwar"; 

o     i    t      ;  1  \     •  ,    1         ,     defeat  of  Cor- 

buch  disasters  were  overwhelming,  and  though  inth.  Epidam- 
hostilities  went  on  for  the  rest  of  the  year  nus  capitulates. 
(435),  the  Corinthians  did  not  venture  on  a  second  naval 
engagement.1 

4.  The  old  quarrel  had  broken  out  once  more;  once  more 

the   mother- city  had  been   defeated   by  the  ungrateful 

daughter.     The  humiliation  was  intolerable;  Newprepara- 

the  Corinthians  were  bursting  with  desire  for  tions :  434-433- 

mi        1    1      ii^i  .   .  The  Corey- 

revenge,    lhrough  the  whole  of  the  year  434  raeans  at 

they  went  on  building  ships,  and  preparing  to  Athens  433. 

renew  the  struggle.      The  Corcyraeans  became  alarmed. 

They   were  without   allies,  while   the   Corinthians  were 

members  of  a  great  confederacy.    It  was  necessary  to  seek 

assistance  from  the  second  great  power  in  Greece.    In  433 

Corcyraean  envoys  appeared   at  Athens,  asking  that  the 

island  might  be  admitted  into  the  Athenian  alliance.  Their 

position  was  difficult,  for  they  had  to  clear  themselves  of 

two  charges  to  which  their  conduct  was  open.    Was  it  not 

inconsistent  for  a  city  which  had  refused  to  join  others  to  be 

now  seeking  an  alliance  1     Was  it  not  ungrateful  for  a 

colony  to  be  engaged  in  war  with  her  mother-city  ?  They 

confessed  that  their  policy  of  isolation  had  been  a  mistake, 

but  a  mL.ake  was  pardonable  when  it  proceeded  from  no  bad 


1  Thnc.  i.  24-31. 


76 


THE  CORCYRAEANS  AT  ATHENS,  433.       [III.  4- 


motive.  It  was  now  impossible  to  adhere  to  a  policy  which 
left  them  alone,  for  the  Corinthians  could  bring  all  Pelopon- 
nesus against  them.  The  war  with  Corinth  had  been  forced 
upon  them  in  spite  of  their  appeal  to  arbitration,  and,  though 
it  was  the  duty  of  a  colony  to  treat  her  mother-city  with 
all  proper  respect,  she  could  not  submit  to  injustice.  The 
colonists  were  the  equals  of  those  who  remained  at  home, 
and  claimed  to  be  treated  as  such. 

The  Athenians  were  not  greatly  concerned  with  the  con- 
duct of  the  Corcyraeans  ;  for  them  the  all-important  question 
at  the  present  moment  was  this  :  Would  they  be  guilty  of 
a  breach  of  the  treaty  with  Lacedaemon  in  receiving  the 
Corcyraeans  as  allies  1  So  far  as  the  letter  of  the  treaty 
went,  it  was  undoubtedly  open  to  either  side  to  receive  as 
allies  states  which  were  as  yet  the  allies  of  neither.  But  the 
Corcyraeans  wanted  something  more  than  a  mere  alliance ; 
they  wanted  help — help  against  a  city  now  bound  by  the 
Thirty  Years'  Peace  to  Athens ;  and  how  could  the  Athenians 
help  them  without  coming  into  collision  with  the  Corinthians, 
and  through  the  Corinthians  with  the  Spartan  confederacy  1 
This  question  the  Corcyraeans  could  not  meet  with  a  direct 
answer ;  they  made  light  of  treaty  obligations,  and  professing 
to  believe  that  war  between  Athens  and  Sparta  was  inevitable 
and  imminent,  bade  the  Athenians  choose  whether  they  would 
enter  into  it  with  the  navy  of  Corcyra,  the  second  largest 
navy  of  Greece,  as  an  ally  or  an  enemy.  At  the  same  time, 
they  pointed  out  that  Corcyra  was  a  most  convenient  station 
for  controlling  the  route  to  Sicily,  if  it  should  be  necessary 
to  send  ships  thither,  or  intercept  those  which  came  from 
the  west. 

In  reply  to  these  arguments,  the  Corinthians,  who  had  at 
once  sent  envoys  to  Athens  to  oppose  the  request  of  their 
Reply  of  the  enemies,  had  much  to  say  of  the  iniquity  of 
Corinthians.  Corcyraeans,  both  in  their  general  conduct 

and  in  their  treatment  of  their  mother-city.  They  had,  of 
course,  to  veil,  as  they  best  could,  their  own  refusal  to  submit 
the  dispute  to  arbitration ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  had 


III.  5.]       THE  CORINTHIANS  AT  ATHENS,  IjSS.  11 

no  difficulty  in  showing  that  an  alliance  between  Corcyra 
and  Athens  must  lead  to  a  breach  of  the  peace  between 
Athens  and  Corinth.  They  could  not  deny  the  great  advan- 
tage which  Athens  would  derive  from  the  acquisition  of  the 
Corcyraean  fleet,  but  the  war  in  which  these  ships  were  to  be 
of  such  signal  service  was  still  in  the  future,  and  it  might  not 
come  at  all.  Would  it  not  be  wiser  for  the  Athenians  to 
diminish  the  suspicion  which  they  had  incurred  by  their 
previous  conduct  about  xMegara,  than  to  take  a  step  which 
must  turn  the  ill-feeling  of  Corinth — now  undefined — into  a 
real  and  active  hostility  1  In  old  days,  when  Athens  had  need 
of  help  against  Aegina,  Corinth  had  lent  ships  to  her,  and  it 
was  owing  to  her  action  that  Sparta  had  not  sent  aid  to 
Samos.  The  Corinthians  at  that  time  maintained  that  each 
sovereign  power  must  be  allowed  to  punish  her  own  revolted 
subjects,  and  they  asked  that  the  same  principle  might  be 
applied  in  the  present  case.  Whatever  the  balance  of  im- 
mediate advantage  might  be,  a  consistent  and  honest  policy 
would  be  found  to  be  the  best.1 

5.  Opinions  at  Athens  were  divided.    The  wise  counsel  of 
the  Corinthians  could  not  fail  to  impress  their  hearers;  and 
every  one  must  have  felt  that  an  alliance  with  Corcyra  was 
a  step  towards  war  with  Peloponnesus.    On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  clear  that  no  real  friendship  with  Corinth  was  possible. 
On  the  advice  of  Pericles,  therefore,  we  may 
assume,  the  Athenians  resolved  to  admit  the  Jchceid^nians 
Corcyraeans  to  a  defensive  alliance  ;  they  would  defensive 
not  join  them  in  any  attack  on  the  Corinthians,  co"^with 
for  that  would  involve  a  breach  of  the  treaty 
of  445,  but   if  the   Corinthians   attempted  to  land  on 
Athenian  or  Corcyraean  territory,  each  was  bound  to  assist 
the  other.     By  this  measure  the  Athenians  hoped  to  gain 
three  advantages.     In  the  first  place,  without  any  formal 
breach  of  the  treaty,  they  secured  the  friendship  of  the 
Corcyraeans;  in  the  second,  they  acquired  a  station  on  the 


»  Thuc.  i.  32-43. 


78 


ATHENS  ALLIED  WITH  CORCYRA,  433.      [III.  5. 


way  to  Sicily ;  in  the  third,  they  hoped  to  see  the  navies  of 
Corcyra  and'  Corinth  destroying  each  other,  and  thus  leaving 
the  control  of  the  sea  more  completely  in  the  hands  of 
Athens.  For  in  spite  of  her  great  fleet,  Athens  was 
not  a  power  in  the  western  seas  of  Greece ;  the  navies 
of  Corinth  and  Corcyra,  if  united,  would  prove  a  serious 
obstacle  to  any  operations  in  the  Ionian  sea,  in  Sicily 
or  Italy.  And  if  these  navies,  or  even  the  Corinthian  navy, 
were  joined  by  the  fleets  of  the  Dorian  colonists  in  Italy  or 
Sicily,  the  resources  of  Athens,  great  as  they  were,  would 
hardly  be  equal  to  the  double  task  of  engaging  them,  and 
retaining  a  strong  hold  on  the  allies  in  the  north  and  east. 
To  keep  these  navies  apart,  and  wear  them  out,  one  upon 
the  other,  was  clever  policy — too  clever.  And  to  suppose 
that  a  merely  defensive  alliance  with  Corcyra  could  continue, 
or  that  the  Corinthians  would  fail  to  see  the  true  meaning  of 
an  arrangement,  which,  if  it  kept  the  letter,  certainly  broke 
the  spirit  of  the  treaty,  was  only  possible  to  those  who  be- 
lieved what  they  wished.  The  Corinthians,  at  any  rate,  re- 
garded the  decision  of  the  Athenians  as  a  step  towards  war. 

In  accordance  with  the  resolution  ten  ships  were  sent  to 
Corcyra  under  the  command  of  Lacedaemonius,  the  son  of 
Cimon,  and  two  others.  The  generals  received  instructions 
to  take  no  part  in  any  engagement  with  the  Corinthians, 
unless  an  attempt  were  made  to  land  on  Corcyra  or  any 
place  belonging  to  the  Corcyraeans.  Soon  afterwards,  think- 
ing this  detachment  insufficient  for  any  effective  purpose,  the 
Athenians  despatched  twenty  more  ships  under  the  command 
of  Glaucon  and  Andocides.1 


1  Thuc.  i.  45-52,  G.  I.  A.,  i.  179  and  suppl.  iv.  part  i.  Forbes, 
Thuc.  i.  p.  125  notes.  The  names  of  the  leaders  of  the  second  ex- 
pedition are  given  differently  in  Thucydides  (Glaucon  and  Audocides) 
and  the  (emended)  in>cription  (Glaucon,  Metagenes,  and  Dracontides). 
The  first  expedition  was  sent  out  in  the  first  prytany  of  the  year  of 
Apseudes,  July-Aug.  433  ;  the  second  later  in  the  same  Attic  year. 
See  Holzapfel,  Beitrdge  zur  Griech.  Gesch.  p.  175  ;  Forbes,  Thuc.  i. 
p.  32  notes  and  p  125  ;  Hicks'  Manual  of  Greek  Hist,  Ins.,  No.  41  ; 
Freeman's  Hist,  of  Sicily,  iii,  619  ff. 


III.  6.]       THE  POLICY  OF  THE  CORINTHIANS.  79 

What  induced  the  Athenians  to  send  out  so  •  small  a  con- 
tingent as  ten  ships  was  a  puzzle  to  antiquity  and  is  a 
puzzle  to  us.  Plutarch  gives  a  foolish  explanation  :  that 
Pericles  purposely  sent  out  the  son  of  his  old 
opponent  Cimon  with  an  inadequate  force,  in  Xthenfan^send 
order  that  he  might  fail,  and  fall  into  contempt.  so  sma11  a 
Pericles  never  sank  to  such  a  device  as  this.  force? 
It  is  more  natural  to  suppose  that  the  Athenians  were  at 
first  very  doubtful  about  their  policy,  and  wished'  to  keep 
strictly  within  the  limits  of  a  defensive  alliance,  but  when 
they  learnt  more  of  the  preparations  of  Corinth,  and  the 
inequality  of  the  fleets,  the  danger  of  the  situation  impressed 
them.  Half-measures  were  impossible.  If  the  Corcyraean 
fleet  were  destroyed  the  chief  advantage  of  the  new  alliance 
would  be  lost;  they  would  have  incurred  the  enmity  of 
Corinth  for  nothing.  A  second  and  larger  contingent  was 
therefore  sent  in  the  hope  of  saving  the  Corcyraean  fleet 
from  destruction. 

It  was  unfortunate  for  Hellas  that  no  Hermocrates  arose 
at  this  moment  to  point  out  the  disastrous  effects  of  the 
policy  on  which  Corinth  and  Corcyra  had  em-  Mistaken  policy 
barked.  If  the  Corinthians,  the  most  far-  of  the  Corinth- 
sighted  of  the  Greeks,  had  not  been  blinded  by  ians* 
passion,  they  would  have  perceived  that  a  union  with 
Corcyra  was  the  best  means  of  restraining  the  aggression 
of  Athens.  A  conflict  was  fatal.  Every  ship  which  they 
lost  was  a  ship  gained  by  Athens.  But  all  far-sighted  policy 
was  forgotten  in  the  exasperation  of  the  moment.  To 
punish  the  rebellious  city,  which  had  so  long  defied  them, 
which  competed  with  them  in  every  western  port,  and  con- 
trolled the  route  to  Sicily,  was  so  dear  an  object  that  they 
forgot  their  usual  wisdom.  In  old  days  they  had  acted  the 
honourable  part  of  peacemakers  between  Agrigentum  and 
Syracuse,  between  Athens  and  Plataea,  but  now  they  were 
prepared  to  plunge  all  Hellas  in  war  to  satisfy  their  hatred. 

6.  When  their  envoys  returned  with  the  intelligence 
that  Athens  had  decided  to  support  Corcyra,  the  Corinthians 


80  THE  BA  TTLE  OF  SYBOTA,  433-2.  [111.6. 


prepared  far  the  renewal  of  the  war.  Collecting  a  fleet 
of  150  vessels  they  sailed  to  Chimerium,  a  promontory 
preparations  in  Thesprotia  near  the  mouth  of  the  Cocytus. 
for  battle.  Qn  hearing  of  their  approach  the  Corcyraeans 
advanced  with  110  vessels  to  one  of  the  islands  off  the  coast 
of  Epirus,  known  as  Sybota;  and  with  them  were  the  ten 
Athenian  vessels.  Both  fleets  were  supported  by  a  force  of 
infantry:  the  Corinthians  by  an  army  of  the  barbarians  of 
the  mainland,  who  were  at  all  times  their  friends;  the 
Corcyraeans  by  their  own  infantry  and  some  Zacynthians, 
stationed  on  the  promontory  of  Leucimne,  in  the  south  of 
the  island  of  Corey  ra. 

When  their  preparations  were  completed,  the  Corinthians 
set  sail  in  the  night  from  Chimerium,  and  as  morning 
The  battle  of  broke  they  discovered  the  Corcyraeans  in 
sybota.  ^Q  0pen  sea  bearing  down  upon  them.  The 

battle  was  the  greatest  which  had  yet  taken  place  between 
two  Hellenic  fleets.  It  was  not  a  sailor's  battle,  but  a 
"conflict  of  landsmen  at  sea."  The  decks  of  the  ships  were 
crowded  by  soldiers,  heavy  and  light  armed,  and  when  ship 
joined  with  ship  the  two  crews  fought  together  as  if  on  land. 
The  Athenian  vessels,  without  taking  any  part  in  the  fight- 
ing, rowed  up  wherever  they  saw  the  Corcyraeans  in  diffi- 
culties, hoping  by  their  presence  to  scare  away  the  enemy. 
The  Corinthian  right  wing  was  defeated  by  the  Corcyraeans, 
who  pursued  them  to  the  mainland,  and  even  went  ashore 
Defeat  of  the  to  burn  and  plunder  the  tents  in  the  camp, 
corcyraeans.  ^us  wasting  precious  moments,  when  their 
help  was  needed  elsewhere.  For  on  the  left  the  Corinthians 
put  the  Corcyraeans  to  flight,  and  pressed  them  so  hard  that 
the  Athenians,  forgetting  their  orders,  joined  in  the  battle  and 
engaged  with  the  Corinthians,  who  in  their  fury  cared  neither 
to  capture  men,  nor  tow  away  disabled  ships,  but  sailed 
through  the  wrecks,  cutting  down  every  one  upon  them.  When 
they  had  driven  the  Corcyraeans  to  land  they  collected  their 
damaged  ships,  and  the  dead,  and  conveyed  them  to  Sybota 
— not  the  island,  but  a  deserted  harbour  on  the  mainland ; 


III.  7] 


ATHENS  AND  CORINTH;  438-482. 


81 


after  which  they  returned  to  the  conflict.  The  Corey raeans 
advanced  to  meet  them,  and  the  signal  had  already  been 
given  for  a  second  attack,  when  the  Corinthians  suddenly 
retired.  Twenty  vessels  were  seen  approaching,  which 
proved  to  be  the  second  squadron  from  Athens.  These 
joined  the  Corcyraean  fleet.1 

Though  they  had  destroyed  seventy  of  the  enemy's  ships, 
and  lost  but  thirty  of  their  own,  the  Corinthians  did  not 
venture  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  following 

P    The  Athenians 

day.  Enough,  if  they  could  convey  their  prevent  a 
prisoners  home  in  safety.  In  order  to  ascer-  ^Tement 
tain  what  opposition  would  be  offered,  they 
sent  a  few  men  in  a  boat,  without  a  flag  of  truce,  to  the 
Athenians,  upbraiding  them  with  their  action  and  calling  upon 
them,  if  they  were  at  war  with  Corinth,  to  take  the  crew  of 
the  boat,  and  deal  with  them  as  enemies.  The  Athenians 
replied  that  they  were  merely  defending  their  allies  ;  if  the 
Corinthians  sailed  against  Corcyra,  resistance  would  be  offered, 
but  not  otherwise.  The  Corinthians  then  sailed  home,  and 
on  their  way  Anactorium  was  betrayed  to  them.  Among 
their  captives,  who  numbered  more  than  a  thousand,  were 
two  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  most  influential  men  at  Corcyra. 
These  they  treated  with  the  greatest  respect,  in  the  hope 
that  by  their  influence  the  city  might  yet  be  won  over ;  the 
remainder,  who  were  slaves,  were  sold. 

"  Thus  the  war  ended  to  the  advantage  of  Corcyra,  and  the 
Athenian  fleet  returned  home.  This  was  the  first  among  the 
causes  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  Corinthians  alleging 
that  the  Athenians  had  taken  part  with  the  Corcyraeans, 
and  had  fought  against  them  in  defiance  of  the  treaty."2 

7.  A  second  cause  of  hostilities  soon  arose,  and  in  this 
case  also  it  was  the  Athenians  and  Corinthians  who  came 


1  The  date  of  the  battle  is  uncertain ;  Holzapfel,  I.e.  p.  75,  86  f. 
gives  May  11-13,  432.  In  that  case  ten  months  or  thereabouts  were 
occupied  in  preparations.  See  svpia,  p.  78  n.  The  account  of 
Diodorus,  xii.  33,  differs  in  some  respects  from  Thucydides. 

2  Thuc.  i.  46-55. 

VOL.  III.  F 


82         POTIDAEA  REVOLTS  FROM  ATHENS,  432.     [III.  7. 


into  collision.  Potidaea,  a  Corinthian  colony  on  the  isthmus 
of  Pallene,  was  a  tributary  ally  of  Athens,  but  governed  by 
Athens  and  officers  sent  annually  from  Corinth.  The 
Potidaea.  Athenians,  aware  of  the  hostile  spirit  now  pre- 

vailing in  that  city,  were  afraid  that  the  Potidaeans  might  be 
induced  to  revolt.  They  had  the  greater  reason  for  alarm, 
because  Perdiccas,  the  king  of  Macedonia,  their  former  ally, 
had  now  become  their  enemy,  eager  to  bring  about  war  be- 
tween Athens  and  Sparta,  and  was  entering  into  negotiations 
with  Corinth  and  the  Chalcidian  Greeks  (supra,  p.  44).  Under 
such  circumstances  the  revolt  of  Potidaea  would  be  followed 
by  the  revolt  of  Chalcidice.  To  prevent  this  disaster,  the 
Athenians  demanded  that  the  Potidaeans  should  send  away 
the  Corinthian  officers,  and  refuse  to  receive  them  for  the 
future ;  raze  their  city  wall  towards  Pallene ;  and  also  give 
hostages  for  their  good  behaviour.  They  happened  at  the 
time  to  be  sending  a  fleet  to  act  against  Perdiccas,  and  the 
generals  in  command  were  ordered  to  put  in  at  Potidaea  and 
see  these  demands  carried  out.1 

The  Potidaeans  in  their  distress  sent  envoys  to  Athens 
to  obtain,  if  possible,  some  remission  of  the  sentence,  but 
Revolt  of  as  tne  Athenians  proved  inexorable,  other 

Potidaea,  envoys  were   taken   by  the  Corinthians  to 

July  432.  Lacedaemon.    Here  they  received  a  promise 

that  if  the  Athenians  attacked  Potidaea,  the  Peloponnesians 
would  invade  Attica.  Upon  this  the  Potidaeans  resolved 
to  revolt.  They  were  joined  by  the  Chalcidian  Greeks,  and 
their  neighbours  the  Bottiaeans.  Perdiccas  also  supported 
them,  and  on  his  advice,  the  Chalcidians  abandoned  their 
settlements  on  the  coast,  and  established  a  common  centre 
at  Olynthus. 

The  Athenian  fleet,  on  arriving  off  the  coast,  found  it 


1  Thuc.  i.  56,  57.  The  text  has  rpiaKovra  vavs  dnoo-TefcXovTes  ml 
XiXi'ov?  SnXiras  eVi  rfjv  yrjv  avrov,  'Apv6crrparoi»  rov  AvKOfirjSovs  per 
aXkoiv  8eKa  aTparrjyovuTos.  If  the  numeral  is  right  we  have  here 
eleven  generals,  not  to  mention  the  four  who  were  subsequently 
sent  out  (c.  61),  but  see  Forbes,  ad  loc. 


III.  J.I  BATTLE  OF  POTIDAEA. 


impossible  to  make  a  combined  attack  on  Perdiccas  and  the 
revolted  c.ties  in  Chalcidice.  For  the  moment  they  left  the 
cities  to  themselves,  and  in  concert  with  their  allies  Philip 
the  brother  of  Perdiccas,  and  his  cousins,  the  brothers  of 
Derdas  (see  supra,  p.  39),  they  made  war  on  Perdiccas 

™\Cormthians  W6re  much  alarmed  hy  the  movements  of 
the  Athenians,  and  at  once  took  steps  to  counteract  them. 
-By  the  exertions  of  Aristeus,  the  son  of  Adim- 
antus,  a  warm  friend  to  Potidaea,  a  volunteer  SSX"** 
force  was  enrolled,  and  mercenaries  were  hired  p°tidaea- 
from  the  Peloponnese,  amounting  in  all  to  a  force  of  2000 
men,  who,  with  Aristeus  in  command,  arrived  at  Potidaea 
for  y  days  after  the  revolt  of  the  city.     The  Athenians 
replied  by  sending  out  an  additional  force  of  2000  heavy 
armed.     The  previous  army,  which  was  still  engaged  in 
Macedonia,  had  captured  Therma  and  was  besieging  Pydna 
when  it  was  joined  by  the  reinforcements.     Terms  were 
arranged  with  Perdiccas,  for  it  was  now  impossible  to  remain 
longer  in  Macedonia,  and  the  two  armies  marched  overland 
to  (xigonus,  a  town  not  far  from  Potidaea.     Aristeus  in 
expectation  of  their  arrival,  had  taken  up  a  position  on  'the 
neck  of  the  isthmus  between  Potidaea  and  Olynthus  He 
was  aided  by  a  detachment  of  cavalry  under  Perdiccas',  who 
when  he  had  got  the  Athenians  out  of  his  country,  at  once 
broke  faith  with  them,  and  by  allies  from  the  Chalcidian 
cities.    He  divided  his  forces  into  two  parts ;  Bat,ie„f 
-Perdiccas  and  the  allies  were  stationed  at  p°«<w 
Olynthus,  while  he  remained  with  his  own  troops  on  the 
isthmus    By  this  means  he  hoped  to  bring  the  Athenians 
under  a  double  attack.    But  Callias,  the  Athenian  general 
met  the  manoeuvre  by  sending  a  force  to  keep  Perdiccas  in 
check,  while  he  marched  on  Potidaea.    In  the  battle  which 
followed,  Aristeus  and  his  wing  were  completely  victorious 
breaking  the  enemy's  line  and  pursuing  them  for  a  conside^ 
able  distance  but  the  rest  of  the  army  was  defeated  and 
driven  into  the  walls  of  the  city.    When  Aristeus  returned 
he  found  himself  cut  off  from  Potidaea ;  but  by  gathering  his 


84 


EXCITEMENT  AT  CORINTH,  432. 


[III.  8. 


forces  into  as  small  a  compass  as  he  could,  he  succeeded  in 
making  his  way  along  the  breakwater  into  the  town,  though 
with  difficulty  and  some  loss  of  men.  The  forces  at  Olynthus 
took  no  part  in  the  battle;  and  on  neither  side  were  the 
cavalry  brought  into  action. 

Immediately  after  this  victory  the  Athenians  built  a  wall 
across  the  isthmus,  cutting  Potidaea  off  from  the  mainland  ; 
Blockade  of  and  when  a  new  contingent  arrived  from 
Potidaea;  Athens  under  the  command  of  Phormio,  a 
Aristeus,  second  wail  was  built,  severing  the  city  from 

Sep.  432.  the  peninsula.    Potidaea  was  now  completely 

invested,  and  Aristeus,  seeing  that  there  was  little  hope  of 
saving  the  town  without  reinforcements,  after  a  vain  attempt 
to  persuade  the  larger  part  of  the  garrison  to  join  him  in  an 
effort  to  escape  by  sea,  slipped  himself  through  the  Athenian 
lines,  and  opened  negotiations  with  the  Peloponnesus  for  the 
relief  of  the  city.1 

The  Athenians  and  Corinthians,  though  allies  under  the 
truce  of  445,  had  met  in  battle.  They  were  practically  at 
war  with  one  another.  But  as  the  Corinthians  had  sent  out 
their  forces  independently  of  the  Peloponncsian  confederacy 
— they  were  in  fact  mainly  volunteers  or  mercenaries — the 
rest  of  the  Peloponnesians  were  not  bound  by  their  action ; 
nor  were  the  Spartans  compelled  to  regard  the  hostilities  as 
a  breach  of  the  peace  between  themselves  and  Athens. 

8.  The  excitement  at  Corinth  was  great;  it  was  un- 
fortunate for  the  peace  of  Hellas  that  of  all  the  cities  of  the 
confederacy  it  was  Corinth  who  felt  herself  injured,  for  in 
energy  and  capacity  she  was  quite  the  leading  city  of  the 
Peloponnesus.  Aegina  and  Megara  had  felt  the  weight  of 
Athenian  oppression,  but  they  had  taken  no  active  steps  to 
The  Corinthians  obtain  redress,  and  might  have  taken  none, 
at  Sparta.  jia(j  nofc  the  Corinthians  set  the  example  by 
inviting  the  injured  allies  to  meet  them  at  Sparta.  There 
they  attacked  the  Athenians  sharply,  declaring  that  they 


i  Time  i,  58-65, 


III.  8.]        THE  ALLIES  AT  LA  CE  DAE  A/ON,  432. 


85 


had  broken  the  treaty  by  their  proceedings  at  Corcyra  and 
Potidaea.  They  called  on  the  Lacedaemonians  to  rescue  the 
cities  of  the  confederacy,  which  looked  to  them  for  help. 
Sparta  herself  had  no  special  reason  for  going  to  war;  Athens 
had  not  in  any  way  injured  her,  or  shown  the  least  inclination 
to  attack  the  Peloponnesus.  But  it  was  impossible  to  turn  a 
deaf  ear  to  the  complaints  of  so  important  a  city  as  Corinth. 
Any  other  members  of  the  confederacy  who  had  similar 
charges  to  make,  were  requested  to  appear  at  Sparta  to  state 
their  case  before  the  Lacedaemonian  assembly.1  Among  others 
the  Megarians  came  forward,  declaring  that  The  allies 
they  had  been  excluded  from  Athens  and  the  Present  at  an 

.  ,       assembly  of  the 

ports  ot  the  Athenian  empire  contrary  to  the  Lacedae- 
provisions  of  the  Thirty  Years'  Truce.  The  monians- 
Aeginetans  also,  though  they  did  not  venture  to  send  envoys 
to  the  conference  openly,  complained  bitterly  in  secret  of 
their  lost  independence.  Others  followed  with  the  story  of 
their  wrongs,  and  last  of  all,  the  Corinthians,  relying  on  the 
indignation  which  these  tales  of  oppression  had  excited, 
came  forward.  In  the  speech  which  Thucydides  has  put 
into  their  mouths  on  this  occasion,  they  severely  reproach 
the  Lacedaemonians  for  their  supine  and  in-  speech  of  the 
active  policy.  Athens  had  been  allowed  to  Corinthians- 
enslave  one  Grecian  community  after  another;  her  aims 
were  no  secret,  yet  no  measures  had  been  taken  to  counteract 
them.  She  had  been  allowed  to  gain  Corcyra  by  fraud  and 
retain  it  by  force,  and  to  besiege  Potidaea  ;  yet  Corcyra  would 
have  brought  a  larger  number  of  ships  into  the  confederate 
navy  than  any  other  city,  and  Potidaea  was  the  most  con- 
venient base  for  operations  in  Thrace.  Such  was  Sparta's 
way ;  ever  since  the  Persian  war  she  had  allowed  Athens  to 
advance,  step  by  step,  even  though  her  own  allies  fell  beneath 
the  yoke.     A  city  which  had  the  power  to  prevent  the 

1  Thuc.  i.  66,  67.  The  Corinthians  napeKakovv  evOvs  eg  rr\v  Aa/ce- 
daijxova  rovs  £vp,[j.dxovs  :  then  the  Lacedaemonians  irpoairapaKakeo-av- 
res  tS>v  i;viifxaxG>v  kcu  ei  Tis  xi  ak\o  e<pr]  rjSiKrjaQai  vtto  'Adrjvalav, 
£v\\oyov  crcpwv  avrSau  noirjaapres  top  eluOoTa  \eyeiv  eteXevov. 


86  COMPLAINTS  OF  THE  CORINTHIANS.       [HI.  9- 

enslavement  of  her  allies  and  failed  to  do  so,  was  in  truth 
guilty  of  their  slavery,  and  the  more  so  if  she  invited  con- 
fidence as  the  champion  of  freedom.  "  At  last  we  have  met, 
but  even  now  you  do  not  seem  to  recognise  the  danger ;  you 
alone  are  inactive ;  you  do  not  crush  an  evil  in  the  bud,  but 
allow  it  to  develop  and  increase.  You  are  regarded  as  a 
tower  of  strength,  but  your  conduct  belies  your  reputation. 
When  the  Persian  invaded  Greece,  he  was  allowed  to  advance 
as  far  as  the  Peloponnesus  before  he  met  with  any  serious 
resistance,  and  as  he  perished  by  his  own  blunders,  so  it  is 
by  the  mistakes  of  the  Athenians,  rather  than  by  any  help 
received  from  you,  that  we  have  hitherto  escaped,  Hope  in 
you  is  a  delusion  which  has  already  proved  the  ruin  of 
some. 

"  A  power  like  that  of  Athens  needs  constant  watchfulness, 
constant  innovation  and  improvement  in  army  and  fleet. 
Changes  must  be  made  when  necessary,  for  a  state  which  is 
never  changing  cannot  meet  one  that  is  always  progressing. 
So  let  there  be  an  end  to  your  inactivity.  Do  not  compel  us 
to  seek  a  new  alliance,  which  we  must  do,  if  you  abandon  us 
—and  we  can  do  it  without  offence  before  God  or  man  ;  for 
the  real  truce-breakers  are  those  who  fail  to  fulfil  their 
obligations."1 

9.  Some  Athenian  envoys,  who  happened  to  be  at  Sparta 
on  other  business,  requested  permission  to  come  forward  and 
Reply  of  the  address  the  meeting.  They  did  not  wish  to 
Athenians.  make  any  reply  to  the  charges  which  had  been 
made  against  their  city,  but  rather  to  point  out  the  gravity 
of  the  situation,  and  by  calling  to  mind  the  past  history  of 
Athens  to  moderate  the  prevailing  eagerness  for  war.  They 
spoke  of  the  services  which  their  city  had  rendered  to  Hellas 
at  Marathon  and  Salamis.  In  that  great  struggle  they  had 
sacrificed  everything  in  the  cause  of  freedom,  leaving  their 
lands  and  houses  to  be  wasted  by  the  enemy.  Had  they  gone 
over  to  the  Persians,  an  engagement  at  sea  would  have  been 


1  Thuc.  i.  68-72. 


III.  9.] 


THE  ATHENIAN  DEFENCE. 


87 


impossible,  and  Greece  would  have  fallen  without  a  struggle 
into  the  hands  of  the  invader. 

If  any  city  could  have  a  claim  to  empire,  Athens  had  such 
a  claim,  and  she  acquired  her  position,  not  by  force,  but  as  a 
gift — a  prize  which  the  Lacedaemonians  deliberately  aban- 
doned. Once  placed  in  this  position  Athens  had  no  choice 
but  to  remain  in  it ;  security,  honour,  profit,  all  pointed  in 
one  direction,  for,  as  time  went  on,  some  of  her  allies  became 
alienated,  others  had  been  reduced  after  revolt ;  and  Sparta, 
no  longer  friendly  as  before,  was  ready  to  receive  the 
rebels. 

It  is  the  fate  of  those  who  govern  to  be  disliked ;  and  had 
she  become  an  imperial  city,  Sparta  herself  would  not  have 
escaped  censure.  She  also  would  have  found  it  necessary  to 
rely  on  force.  It  is  human  nature  to  keep  what  we  have  got ; 
it  is  an  universal  law  that  the  weaker  must  submit.  Sparta 
had  been  willing  to  allow  the  claims  of  Athens  until  her 
interests  induced  her  to  talk  about  justice — an  argument  by 
which  no  one  was  ever  restrained,  when  he  had  power  on  his 
side.1  The  outcry  against  Athens  was  due  not  so  much  to 
her  violence  as  to  her  moderation.  The  allies  were  allowed 
so  much  equality  that  they  resented  the  slightest  exercise  of 
authority ;  they  forgot  their  privileges,  which  were  many,  and 
thought  only  of  their  losses,  which  were  few.  Wrongs  done 
to  equals  cause  more  bitterness  than  the  open  violence  of 
oppression.  The  rule  of  another  is  at  all  times  burdensome ; 
and  the  Lacedaemonians  would  soon  lose  their  popularity  if 
they  were  in  the  position  of  Athens,  and  even  more  so 
because  they  were  less  fitted  to  deal  with  strangers.  A 
Lacedaemonian,  when  away  from  home,  lost  his  native  virtues 
and  could  not  acquire  new  ones. 

"  Do  not  let  yourselves  be  driven  into  a  war  of  which  the 
end  is  uncertain.  No  one  knows  what  course  events  may 
take  in  a  long  struggle.  Let  discussion  come  first;  action 
last.    Do  not  break  the  existing  treaty,  but  rather  let  our 


Cp.  what  is  said  in  the  Melian  Dialogue,  Thuc.  v.  89  f. 


88 


A  R  CHf DA  M  U S. 


[III.  10 


quarrel  be  settled  by  arbitration  as  our  agreement  pro- 
vides."1 

10.  When  the  Athenians  had  spoken,  all  strangers  were 
bidden  to  withdraw  while  the  Lacedaemonians  discussed  the 
Parties  and  matter  among  themselves.  The  ecclesia  had 
party  traders  been  summoned  to  take  note  of  the  complaints 
at  Athens,         Q£  ^e  anjeSj  not  to  decide  on  peace  or  war; 

there  was  no  formal  meeting  of  the  allies,  many  of  whom 
were  not  represented.  At  Sparta  there  were  two  parties 
in  the  state :  those  who,  though  aware  of  the  danger,  and 
anxious  to  save  their  allies  from  Athens,  were  not  less 
aware  of  the  advance  which  Athens  had  made  during  the 
last  fifty  years  in  comparison  with  Sparta;  and  those  who, 
regarding  Spartan  institutions  as  perfect,  considered  her 
the  foremost  power  in  Greece.  The  first  party  were  repre- 
sented by  Archidamus,  who  had  now  been  on  the  throne 
about  forty  years,  and  had  rendered  the  state  signal  service 
at  a  time  of  imminent  danger  (vol.  ii.  pp.  266,  317),  a 
man  who  could  look  beyond  the  Peloponnesus,  and  was 
indeed  on  intimate  terms  with  the  leading  men  at  Athens, 
with  Thucydides,  the  son  of  Melesias,  no  less  than  with 
Pericles.  The  leader  of  the  Tories,  if  so  they  may  be  called, 
was  Sthenelaidas,  one  of  the  ephors  of  the  year. 

Archidamus  spoke  with  the  experience  of  age.  He  knew 
what  war  was,  and,  so  far  as  he  could  judge,  the  war  which  was 
Speech  of  now  impending  would  be  as  great  or  greater 
Archidamus.  than  any  in  the  past.  The  Athenians  were  not 
neighbours  within  easy  reach ;  they  lay  at  a  distance ;  they 
were  sailors,  not  landsmen,  with  a  great  experience  of  mari- 
time warfare,  and  possessed  of  ample  resources.  "  We  cannot 
rely  on  our  ships,"  he  said,  "for  they  are  too  few;  nor  on 
our  wealth,  for  in  this  we  are  even  more  deficient." — "Yes! 
but  we  are  superior  in  numbers,  and  we  can  ravage  their 
territory."    "  To  what  purpose,  when  they  can  draw  supplies 


1  Thuc.  i.  73-78.  On  the  historical  value  of  the  speeches  of  Thucy- 
dides, see  the  Essay  of  Prof.  Jebb  in  Hellenica. 


III.  10.] 


S  THENELA  IDA  S. 


89 


from  their  empire?" — "But  we  can  induce  their  allies  to 
revolt."  "  Even  for  that  a  fleet  is  necessary.  And  do  not 
suppose  that  the  Athenians  will  yield  when  they  see  us  in 
their  territory.  Far  from  it;  an  invasion  will  only  exasperate 
them  into  more  stubborn  resistance.  If  we  rely  upon  inva- 
sion for  success,  we  are  likely  to  bequeath  the  war  to  our 
children." 

"  Yet  we  must  not  let  their  conduct  pass  without  notice. 
We  must  send  envoys  to  demand  satisfaction,  and  in  the  mean- 
time push  on  our  preparations  and  procure  money  or  ships 
from  any  source,  Greek  or  barbarian,  for  there  is  no  dishonesty 
in  that.  In  a  year  or  two,  if  they  will  not  listen  to  us,  we 
can  attack  them ;  but  when  they  see  that  we  are  ready,  they 
will  probably  give  way,  and  save  their  land  from  injury. 
To  many  this  may  seem  a  new  instance  of  our  slow  and 
dilatory  policy.  But  let  us  not  be  shamed  out  of  our  habits. 
'  The  more  haste,  the  worse  speed,'  is  at  times  a  true  saying. 
To  what  do  we  chiefly  owe  the  greatness  and  glory  of  our 
city  \  We  owe  it,  without  doubt,  to  that  national  slowness, 
which  acts  prudently  and  deliberately,  which  neither  praise 
can  beguile  nor  reproach  can  sting  into  precipitate  conduct — 
to  that  orderliness  and  self-respect  which  teach  us  to  rise 
above  dishonour,  but  to  obey  the  laws.  In  war,  criticisms  and 
comparisons  are  of  little  use ;  it  is  wise  to  assume  that  one 
nation  is  as  good  as  another;  and  that  chance  is  beyond 
calculation. 

"Let  us,  then,  follow  the  example  of  our  fathers;  and 
instead  of  being  hurried  into  war  after  a  short  day's  debate, 
let  us  consider  the  question  quietl}7,  and  meanwhile  send 
to  the  Athenians  to  remonstrate.  This  it  is  our  duty  to  do, 
as  they  offer  to  settle  the  matter  by  arbitration." 

Such  were  the  arguments  of  Arrhidamus.  Foreseeing  the 
future,  and  estimating  the  struggle  at  its  true  magnitude,  he 
sought  to  defer  the  momentous  decision.  But  Sthenelaidas 
was  of  another  temper. 

"  The  lengthy  speech  of  the  Athenians  passed  my  compre- 
hension," he  said ;  "  they  spent  a  world  of  words  in  praise 


90 


THE  DECISION  OF  SPARTA.  [III.  II. 


of  themselves,  but  they  could  not  deny  the  wrongs  which 
they  were  doing  to  our  allies  in  Peloponnesus.  If  they  were 
Speech  of  so  virtuous  in  their  conduct  in  the  Median 
stheneiaidas.     wai<)  an(j  now  ac^  \]^e  r0gUeSj  they  deserve  a 

double  punishment ;  they  have  lost  a  good  character  and  got 
a  bad  one.  We  at  least  have  made  no  such  change ;  and  if 
we  are  true  to  ourselves,  we  shall  not  allow  our  allies  to  be 
injured,  or  delay  to  help  them,  for  there  is  no  delay  on  the 
other  side.  Other  nations  may  have  ships  and  money,  but 
we  have  brave  allies,  and  we  must  not  abandon  them.  Why 
discuss  outrages,  of  which  no  one  disputes  the  reality  1  We 
must  put  forth  our  strength  at  once.  It  is  not  for  us  who  suffer 
to  deliberate,  but  those  who  plot  iniquity  may  well  take  time 
about  it.  I  call  on  you,  Lacedaemonians,  to  vote  for  war — 
for  immediate  war — the  only  vote  worthy  of  you.  Do  not 
allow  the  Athenian  power  to  increase ;  do  not  abandon  your 
allies ;  let  us  help  the  injured,  and  God  will  help  us." 

The  question  was  now  put  to  the  Assembly,  whether  the 
Athenians  had  broken  the  treaty  or  not.  It  was  the  custom 
Decision  of  the  a^  Lacedaemon  to  decide  by  acclamation,  but 
Spartan  on  this  occasion,  under  the  pretence  that  he 

Assembly,  COuld  not  distinguish  which  was  the  louder  cry, 
Stheneiaidas  divided  the  Assembly,  directing  those  who  said 
"  Aye  "  to  go  to  one  side,  and  those  who  said  "  No  "  to  go  to 
the  other.  The  result  was  thus  placed  beyond  doubt.  A 
large  majority  voted  that  the  treaty  had  been  broken.  The 
decision  was  at  once  communicated  to  the  allies,  who  were 
then  dismissed  to  their  cities.1 

II.  After  passing  this  vote,  the  Lacedaemonians  consulted 
the  oracle  at  Delphi,  where  they  received  a  favourable 
response  :  "If  they  did  their  best  in  the  war,  they  would  gain 
the  day;  and  the  deity  would  himself  take  their  part,  invited 
or  uninvited."  They  now  formally  summoned  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  confederacy  to  Sparta,  and  put  the  question  of 
peace  and  war  before  them.    On  this  occasion,  as  before,  the 


1  Thuc.  i.  79-87. 


III.  II.]   FORMAL  MEETING  OF  THE  ALLIES,  432. 


91 


Corinthians  were  most  energetic;  they  did  their  utmost  to 
excite  their  allies,  and,  when  all  the  rest  had  spoken,  they 
came  forward  themselves,  insisting  that  im-  General 
mediate  war  was  necessary  to  put  an  end  to  2Sm Sf Sparta- 
the  growing  power  of  Athens.  Those  who  had  speech  of  the 
been  brought  into  contact  with  the  Athenians  Corinthians, 
need  not  be  warned  against  them,  and  those  who  supposed 
that  their  inland  position  placed  them  beyond  the  reach  of 
danger  must  remember  that  on  the  control  of  the  seaboard 
rested  the  free  export  and  import  of  commodities ;  if  they 
were  negligent  now,  their  own  turn  would  soon  come.  True, 
they  were  now  at  peace,  but  war  was  to  be  preferred  to 
peace  if  it  secured  permanent  freedom ;  better  war  with  the 
prospect  of  victory  and  peace,  than  peace  with  the  risk  of 
war  and  subjection.  The  present  was  a  favourable  oppor- 
tunity for  taking  up  arms,  and  the  grounds  were  adequate. 
There  was  a  good  chance  of  success.  On  land  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  confederacy  had  greater  numbers,  superior  skill  and 
organisation;  and,  though  the  Athenians  had  money  and  ships 
in  abundance,  the  Peloponnesians  could  contribute  to  the 
expense  of  the  war,  or  borrow  funds  from  Olympia  or  Delphi. 
When  they  had  money,  it  would  be  easy  to  build  ships,  and 
buy  up  the  foreign  sailors  who  rowed  in  the  Athenian  fleet. 
Or  the  allies  of  Athens  might  be  induced  to  revolt.  At  any 
rate,  the  risk  must  be  run,  for  submission  simply  meant 
slavery. 

The  Lacedaemonians,  having  heard  what  their  allies  had  to 
say,  called  on  each  of  those  present  to  give  his  The  allies 
vote,  and  the  majority  were  in  favour  of  war.  declde  for  war- 
But  so  ill  prepared  was  the  confederacy,  so  unwilling,  we 
may  perhaps  add,  were  the  Spartans  themselves,  or  at  least  a 
considerable  party  among  them,  to  take  any  active  measures 
— for  no  wrong  had  been  done  to  them  by  the  Athenians — 
that  nearly  a  year  elapsed  before  they  invaded  Attica.1 


1  Thuc.  i.  119-125.  opens  he  KaOiarapevois  fov  ehu  eviavros  pev 
oi  bierplfir),  eXaaaov  8e,  nplv  eo-(3a\elv  is  rfjv  'Attikyjv  kcu  top  ivoXepov 
apaa0ai  (pavepcos.    This  second  Assembly  at  Sparta  must  have  taken 


92 


DEMANDS  OF  SPARTA 


[III.  12. 


12.  In  the  interval,  embassies  went  to  and  fro  between 
Sparta  and  Athens  in  the  hope  that  war  might  be  averted, 
or,  if  this  were  impossible,  that  the  Athenians  might  be 
Demands  of  clearly  put  in  the  wrong.  The  Lacedaemonians 
the  Lacedae-  first  called  on  the  Athenians  to  banish  the 
monmns  on       it  accursed,"  by  whom  were  meant  the  Alcmae- 

Athens.  "*  J 

onidae,  who  had  been  guilty  of  sacrilege  in  the 
matter  of  Cylon  (vol.  i.  p.  296).  Had  the  Athenians  agreed 
to  this  demand,  Pericles  must  have  gone  into  exile,  and  the 
greatest  obstacle  to  peace  would  have  been  removed.  But 
so  far  from  yielding,  the  Athenians  retorted  by  bidding  the 
Lacedaemonians  expel  the  "curse  of  Taenarus,"  and  the 
"  curse  of  Athena  of  the  Brazen  House"  (vol.  ii.  p.  261).  In 
a  second  embassy  the  Athenians  were  requested  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Potidaea,  and  restore  Aegina  to  independence.  They 
could  reply  that  the  allied  states  of  Sparta  had  already  agreed 
to  the  principle  that  each  confederacy  should  deal  as  it  chose 
with  its  own  subject  allies ;  and  in  the  position  of  Aegina 
there  had  been  no  change  whatever  since  the  peace  of  445 
was  concluded.  Once  more,  the  Lacedaemonians  insisted 
that  the  decree  which  excluded  the  Megarians  from  trading 
in  the  markets  of  Athens  and  the  Athenian  empire  should  be 
cancelled ;  if  this  were  done,  there  would  be  no  war.  To 
this  the  Athenians  answered :  first,  that  the  Megarians  had 
tilled  the  border  land  between  the  two  countries  and  sheltered 
fugitive  slaves ;  and  secondly,  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
in  the  habit  of  expelling  strangers  from  their  own  city. 
If  they  would  admit  strangers  to  Lacedaemon,  the  Athenians 
would  admit  the  Megarians  to  their  markets;  but  in  the 
truce  there  was  no  stipulation  on  these  matters.  A  final 
embassy  came  with  a  demand  which  swept  away  all  these 
minor  differences  in  one  general  request.  The  Lacedae- 
monians, they  said,  desire  peace,  and  peace  there  will  be  if 


place  soon  after  the  previous  meeting,  not  later  than  October  432, 
and  if  the  invasion  took  place  about  the  beginning  of  June  431, 
infra,  p.  117,  the  "somewhat  less  than  a  year  "  is  equivalent  to  only 
eight  or  nine  months.    See  Forbes,  ad  loc. 


III.  12.] 


REFUSED  BY  ATHENS,  $32. 


93 


you  will  restore  the  Hellenes  to  independence;  if  not,  there 
will  be  war — a  broad  condition,  which  commanded  universal 
sympathy.  It  was  one  thing  to  go  to  war  for  the  interests  of 
Aegina  and  Megara,  or  for  the  deliverance  of  Poticlaea,  and 
quite  another  to  come  forward  as  the  champion  of  freedom 
throughout  Greece.  The  Athenians  replied,  on  the  advice 
of  Pericles,  that  they  were  willing  to  settle  the  matters  in 
dispute  by  arbitration,  as  was  provided  in  the  terms  of  the 
treaty,  but  they  would  do  nothing  upon  compulsion.1 


i  Thuc.  i.  126,  139,  144,  145. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


GREECE   ON   THE   EVE   OF  THE  WAR. 

I.  In  the  Peloponnesian  war  two  states  were  brought 
into  collision,  which  stood  in  sharp  contrast  to  each  other  at 
every  point.  Ionian  was  matched  with  Dorian,  a  maritime 
power  with  a  land  power,  the  mistress  of  an  empire  with  an 
ill-organised  confederacy ;  Athens  was  a  democracy,  Sparta 
was  an  oligarchy  ;  Athens  was  progressive,  Sparta  held  to  the 
past  and  resisted  innovation  in  every  form ;  Athens  trusted 
to  the  free  impulses  of  her  citizens  for  the  fulfilment  of  civic 
duty,  Sparta  never  allowed  her  citizens  to  be  out  of  train- 
ing; Athens  is  the  pattern  of  development,  Sparta  of 
"regimentation." 

What  was  implied  in  the  contrast  of  Dorian  and  Ionian 
we  cannot  fully  appreciate.  Dorian  differed  from  Dorian, 
and  Ionian  from  Ionian.  The  Dorians  of  Sparta  and  Crete, 
trained  in  peculiar  institutions,  and  to  a  great  extent 
Contrast  of  sntlt  °^  fr°m  intercourse  with  other  nations, 
Dorian  and  were  very  unlike  the  Dorians  of  Corinth  or 
loman,  Megara,  who  were  maritime  nations,  living  by 

commerce  and  trading  in  every  port  of  Greece.  The  Ionians 
of  Athens,  though  they  acknowledged  kindred,  with  the  Ionic 
cities  of  Asia  Minor,  occupied  a  unique  position,  and  attracted 
an  admiration  which  was  not  granted  to  the  citizens  of 
Miletus  or  Samos.  Yet  in  spite  of  these  differences  the  con- 
trast between  the  two  tribes  was  so  deeply  felt  throughout 
Greece  that  they  were  regarded  as  natural  enemies.1  Each 
had  distinct  customs  (vo/xifxa)  by  which  they  ordered  their 


1  Time.  vi.  82. 
94 


IV.  2.] 


DORIANS  AND  fON/ANS. 


95 


lives.  The  Dorians  were  the  harder  race,  and  the  more 
capable  of  discipline ;  their  ordinary  habits  were  severe,  and 
they  were  thought  to  make  better  soldiers,  because  they  did 
not  shrink  from  laborious  training.  The  Ionians  were  less 
solid,  and  less  sombre.  Theirs  was  a  pleasure-loving  nature  ; 
they  delighted  in  festivals  ;  their  habits  tended  to  be  luxuri- 
ous, as  their  clothing  was  delicate.1  Even  at  Athens,  in 
spite  of  the  development  of  democratic  sentiment,  the  luxuri- 
ous style  and  dress  of  the  old  Ionians  continued  to  be  in  use 
long  after  the  time  when  Sparta  had  adopted  simpler  habits ; 
and  of  the  Athenians  of  his  own  time  Pericles  proudly  says : 
"We  have  not  forgotten  to  provide  ourselves  with  many 
relaxations  from  toil :  we  have  regular  games  and  sacrifices 
throughout  the  year ;  at  home  the  style  of  our  life  is  refined, 
and  the  delight  which  we  daily  feel  in  all  these  things  helps 
to  banish  melancholy." 2  For  these  reasons  the  Ionians 
were  regarded  as  unwarlike,  without  any  real  force  of 
character,  and  incapable  of  supporting  toil  or  privation.3 
Yet  such  judgments  must  have  been  founded  on  partial 
evidence.  The  Ionian  sailors,  when  on  duty,  at  any  rate  in 
the  Athenian  fleet,  submitted  to  severe  training,  and  the 
Corinthians  describe  the  Athenians  as  the  most  energetic  of 
men,  who  made  the  performance  of  duty  a  kind  of  festival. 
Pericles,  also,  when  comparing  the  Spartans  with  the 
Athenians,  claims  for  his  countrymen  that  they  discharge  the 
duties  of  citizenship  as  fully  as  the  Spartans,  though  they  do 
not  oppress  themselves  with  the  same  laborious  training.  4 

2.  A  contrast  more  easily  realised  is  that  between  Athens, 
as  the  mistress  of  an  empire,  a  single  city  with  all  her  forces 

1  Thuc.  i.  6.  *  Thuc.  ii.  38.  s  Cp.  Hdt.  vi.  12. 

4  The  common  Greek  opinion  of  the  Spartans  is  given  in  Thuc. 
iii.  57  ;  cp.  ri.  80 ;  in  v.  105  the  Athenians  criticise  this  view  ;  cp. 
Aristoph.  Acharn.  289,  oicriv  ovre  (3a>fji6s  ovre  it'icttis  ovG'  op<os  fievei, 
and  Pax,  623  f.  Thucydides  describes  the  Spartans  as  the  most  con- 
venient enemies  whom  the  Athenians  could  have  had,  i.e.  the  least 
capable  of  taking  advantage  of  their  mistakes,  yet  there  are  no 
Athenians  who  can  be  compared  for  efficiency  and  resource  with 
Brasidas,  Gylippus,  and  Lysander 


96 


THE  POWER  OF  ATHENS. 


[IV.  2. 


under  her  own  control,  and  Sparta,  the  head  of  an  ill- 
organised  confederacy,  comprising  a  number  of  cities,  with 
The  Athenian  Yer^  var^0usj  an(^  at  times  conflicting,  interests, 
empire;  its  Before  war  could  be  declared,  the  Lacedae- 
!?!fn\a  monians  must  be  persuaded  to  summon  the 

difficulty.  r 

allies,  and  the  allies,  or  a  majority  of  them, 
must  be  persuaded  to  agree.  At  Athens,  a  vote  in  the 
Assembly  was  enough  to  set  all  the  forces  of  the  empire  in 
motion.  Here  Athens  would  seem  to  have  had  greatly  the 
advantage  of  Sparta ;  yet  many  circumstances  concurred  to 
diminish  her  superiority.  The  great  extent  of  her  empire 
made  it  difficult  to  concentrate  her  forces  at  any  one  point, 
and  in  the  Peloponnesian  war  this  difficulty  was  increased 
by  the  revolt  of  Potidaea,  by  which  the  forces  of  Athens 
were  divided  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.  The  danger 
of  revolt  in  the  Asiatic  cities  could  never  be  left  out  of  sight; 
the  entrance  to  the  Corinthian  Gulf  must  be  kept  in  Athenian 
hands,  and  the  Euripus  carefully  watched ;  other  ships  were 
required  to  collect  the  tribute,  and  keep  piracy  in  check. 
But  the  resources  of  Athens  were  ample,  and,  if  they  had 
been  at  the  disposal  of  one  man,  they  would  have  been  more 
than  sufficient  for  the  demands  made  upon  them.  This, 
however,  was  not  the  case,  even  in  the  days  of  Pericles. 
The  Athenian  The  great  administrative  power  at  Athens  was 
Assembly.  ^he  Assembly,  and  not  even  Pericles  could 
always  carry  the  Assembly  with  him.  He  had  opponents  who 
attacked  him  from  all  sides,  and  when  he  had  carried  his 
measures  about  the  war,  and  the  plan  of  campaign,  he  was  still 
liable  to  be  outvoted  in  matters  of  detail.  After  his  death  the 
evil  increased  tenfold ;  no  clear  and  consistent  plan  of  opera- 
tions was  ever  formed  ;  at  one  moment  there  was  an  inclina- 
tion to  peace at  another,  to  recover  power  in  central  Hellas ; 
at  another,  ships  were  sent  to  Sicily.  Worse  still  was  the 
publicity  which  attended  discussions  in  the  Assembly ; 
unless  large  powers  were  delegated  to  the  generals,  who 
could  then  form  and  carry  out  some  scheme  of  their  own, 
the  plans  of  the  Athenians  were  known  to  their  enemies 


IV.  2.]      THE  GENERALS  AND  THE  ASSEMBLY.  97 


almost  as  soon  as  they  were  formed.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
large  powers  were  granted  to  one  man,  however  capable,  the 
people  became  suspicious  that  he  might  use  them  for  his  own 
purposes,  and  the  cry  of  "tyranny"  was  at  once  raised. 
Even  in  the  Assembly  itself  a  patriotic  Athenian  had  to 
encounter  the  greatest  difficulties.  If  the  picture  drawn  by 
Thucydides  in  the  speeches  of  Cleon  and  Diodotus  is  to  be 
accepted  {infra,  p.  170),  it  was  almost  impossible  for  a  man 
to  come  forward  honestly.  His  motives  in  speaking  were 
always  suspected,  and  a  sound  proposal  could  only  be  carried 
by  deception.  At  the  same  time  the  Athenians  were  strict  in 
their  ideas  of  responsibility ;  though  the  whole  meeting  was 
unanimous  in  supporting  a  proposal,  the  mover  of  it  was  held 
responsible,  and  if  by  any  accident  the  result  was  unfortunate, 
the  Assembly  were  ready  to  visit  the  failure  on  the  head  of 
the  adviser,  who,  if  he  had  opposed  their  wishes,  would  have 
been  suspected  of  treachery  to  the  state.1 

Worse  still  was  the  relation  of  the  general  to  the  Assembly. 
In  the  days  of  Cimon,  the  general  and  the  "orator"  were 
one  and  the  same.  The  general  came  before  The  pOSition  of 
the  Assembly  and  explained  his  views  ;  if  the  the  Generals  at 
Assembly  voted  in  his  favour,  he  carried  out  Athens- 
what  he  had  proposed.  But  as  time  went  on,  the  general 
was  rarely  a  leader  in  the  Assembly.  Younger  men,  without 
experience  of  war,  and  men  of  the  people,  who  neither  wished 
to  be  generals  nor  were  qualified  for  the  post,  became  promi- 
nent in  the  Assembly,  while  the  generals  were  more  and 
more  confined  to  their  official  duties.  Hence  they  were  often 
employed  to  carry  out  plans  of  which  they  were  not  the 
authors,  and  which,  perhaps,  were  not  even  practicable. 
More  especially  was  a  general  in  danger  when,  like  Demo- 
sthenes, he  had  sacrificed  Athenian  lives  in  vain.    The  office 


1  See  Time.  iii.  43,  vvv  8e  irpos  opyrjv  f\vTivu  rv^rjTe  ecrrtv  ore 
(TCpaXevres,  rrjv  tov  Treiaavros  ptav  yvd>pr)v  fypLiovre,  Kai  ov  ras 
vfierepas  avToav,  el  rroXXal  ovcrai  ^vvc^rjpaprov  :  viii.  1,  ^aXervoi  fxev 
rjaav  rols  ^vpTvpo6vp,t)6ei(Ti  to>v  p-qropodv,  axrirep  ova  avrol  ^(piaafxevoi : 
cp.  also  ii.  64. 

VOL.  III.  G 


SPARTA  AND  HER  ALLIES. 


[IV.  3. 


was,  in  truth,  one  which  could  not  be  undertaken  without 
risk.  Even  Nicias,  who  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  his 
citizens  as  no  other  general  did  after  the  death  of  Pericles, 
was  unable  to  act  freely  in  Sicily,  for  fear  of  the  trial  which 
he  knew  would  await  him  on  his  return  ;  and  when  the 
wisest  course  open  to  him  was  to  save  the  remnant  of  the 
forces  under  his  command,  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  do 
what  he  knew  to  be  his  duty  as  a  general  and  a  citizen,  for 
fear  of  the  trial  which  would  await  him  before  judges 
unacquainted  with  the  facts,  and  influenced  by  every  passing 
breath  of  oratory.1 

3.  Thus,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  empire,  and  the  form 
of  her  constitution,  Athens  could  not  exercise  to  the  full 
the  advantages  which  she  derived  from  her  imperial  position. 

The  Spartan  The  difficulties  with  which  Sparta  had  to  COn- 
confederacy.  ten(}  were  0f  another  kind.  The  Peloponnesian 
confederacy  was  made  up  of  a  number  of  cities,  some  mari- 
time and  some  inland,  whose  interests  and  policy  could 
not  be  the  same;  and  Sparta's  authority  over  them  was 
not  easily  defined  or  enforced.  Being  essentially  a  land 
power,  she  stood  in  a  different  relation  to  Corinth  and 
Megara  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  Arcadia  and  Elis  on  the 
other.  She  could  prevent  the  Mantineans  from  extending 
their  dominion  over  the  neighbouring  Arcadian  tribes,  but 
she  could  not  save  Potidaea  for  Corinth.  The  constant 
dread  of  a  rising  of  the  helots — the  memory  of  Ithome — 
sank  even  deeper  into  the  minds  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
than  the  memory  of  Samos  into  the  minds  of  the  Athenians, 
and  made  them  unwilling  to  send  out  their  best  troops  in 
large  numbers  on  distant  service.  When  Brasidas  marched 
to  Thrace  he  took  with  him  1700  heavy-armed,  of  whom  700 
were  helots,  men  of  whom  the  Spartans  wished  especially 


1  Thuc.  vii.  48.  Nicias  says  :  ev  yap  ddevai  on  'Adrjvaioi  acpcov 
ravra  ovk  anode  £ovrai  coarre  p.r)  avT&v  -^rjcpiaapevav  aTrekOeiv.  <a\  yap 
ov  tovs  avrovs  yj/rj^pielaSai  re  rrepl  a(pa>v  kai  ra  irpdypara,  (locnvep  na\ 
avrol,  opoovras  /cat  ovk  aWcov  lit  ir  ipr)o- ei  aKovovras  yvaaeadai,  aXK'  i£ 
hv  av  Tis  cv  \eya>v  diaftuWy,  e/c  tovtcov  avrovs  neiataOai. 


IV.  3  ] 


SPARTAN  KINGS  AND  ADMIRALS. 


99 


to  be  rid;  the  remainder  were  collected  from  the  rest  of 
Peloponnesus,  but  none  were  Spartans.1 — The  conduct  of 
war,  when  once  war  had  been  declared  by  a  vote  of  the 
Spartan  people  and  the  allied  cities,  rested  chiefly  with  the 
ephors,  who  could  call  out  the  forces  and  send  them  whither 
they  chose,  under  the  command  of  the  Lacedaemonian  kings. 
This  was  a  gain  in  the  direction  of  rapidity  and  concentra- 
tion of  movement,  but  though  at  Sparta  there  was  no 
discussion  of  details  in  the  Assembly,  and  certainly  no  public 
discussion  in  the  Gerousia,  there  were  parties  jealousies  and 
there  as  well  as  at  Athens ;  jealousies  and  enmities  at 
enmities  often  fettered  the  action  of  success-  Sparta- 
ful  generals.  The  energetic  policy  of  Brasidas  was  not 
acceptable  to  those  in  authority.  "  They  would  not  second 
his  efforts  because  their  leading  men  were  jealous  of 
him."2  The  same  feeling  is  shown  in  the  treatment  of  the 
admirals.  The  kings  were  not  allowed  to  command  the 
fleet,  and  therefore  precautions  were  taken  to  prevent  an 
admiral  from  obtaining  too  much  power.  His  office  was 
annual,  and  the  same  man  could  not  be  sent  out  twice ;  and 
though  in  the  case  of  Lysander  this  difficulty  was  overcome 
by  appointing  him  second  in  command  to  an  admiral  of  no 
ability,  even  Lysander  was  taught  that  he  must  not  enter 
into  rivalry  with  the  kings. 

The  Spartan  commanders,  whether  admirals  or  kings,  were 
allowed  great  freedom  of  action  in  the  field.  The  king,  at  any 
rate,  could  lead  the  army  whither  he  chose,  per-  spartan 
haps  in  secret  understanding  with  the  ephors ;  commanders, 
he  could  make  peace  without  reference  to  the  authorities  at 
home ;  and  when  Agis  was  stationed  at  Decelea,  he  acted 
almost  as  an  independent  power.  Unlike  the  Athenians, 
the  Spartans  were  very  unwilling  to  condemn  their  officers 
for  incompetence.  Of  the  admirals  in  office  during  the  early 
years  of  the  war,  Cnemus  failed  disgracefully  on  sea  and  land 
in  the  west  of  Greece  ;  and  Alcidas  not  only  failed  to  aid  the 
Mytilenaeans,  but  behaved  with  such  cowardice  and  cruelty 

J  Thuc.  iv.  78.  80.  2  Thuc.  iv.  108. 


100 


THE  ALLIES  ON  EITHER  SIDE. 


[IV.  4. 


that  there  was  no  further  attempt  at  revolt  among  the 
Athenian  allies  till  Brasidas  had  produced  a  different  im- 
pression. Yet  both  were  retained  in  their  command,  com- 
missioners being  sent  out  to  advise  and  support  them.  At 
Athens  such  failures  would  have  been  punished  by  death 
or  banishment,  but  in  the  mind  of  the  Spartans  a  soldier 
was  a  carefully  prepared  instrument,  which  was  not  to  be 
destroyed  or  thrown  aside.1 

4.  The  allies  on  either  side  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  were 
as  follows : — The  Lacedaemonian  confederacy  included  all 
the  nations  within  the  Isthmus  except  the  Argives  and 
Achaeans.  These  were  friendly  but  neutral ;  and  from  the 
first  the  Achaeans  of  Pellene  took  part  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians ;  afterwards  their  example  was  followed  by  the 
rest  of  the  nation.  Beyond  the  limits  of  the  Peloponnese, 
the  Megarians,  Phocians,  Opuntian  Locrians,  Boeotians,  the 
Acarnanians  of  Oeniadae,  Leucadians,  and  Ambraciots  were  on 
their  side.  Of  these  allies  the  Corinthians,  Megarians,  Sicj^on- 
ians,  Pellenians,  Eleans,  Ambraciots,  and  Leucadians  provided 
a  navy ;  the  Boeotians,  Phocians,  and  Locrians  furnished 
cavalry;  the  other  states  infantry  only.  The  allies  of 
Athens  were  Chios  and  Lesbos,  members  of  the  old  Delian 
League,  who  still  retained  their  independence,  Plataea,  the 
Messenians  of  Naupactus,  the  greater  part  of  Acarnania, 
Corcyra,  Zacynthus.  Besides  these  were  the  subject  cities  in 
the  following  regions  : — The  seaboard  of  Caria,  the  adjacent 
Dorian  peoples,  Ionia,  the  Hellespont,  the  Thracian  coast, 
and  the  islands  which  lay  north-east  of  a  line  drawn  from 
Peloponnese  to  Crete,  except  Melos  and  Thera.2  Chios, Lesbos, 
and  Corcyra  furnished  ships,  the  rest  soldiers  and  money.3 

1  See  Thuc.  v.  54,  60,  63,  for  the  position  of  Agis  as  commander  of 
the  army,  and  for  Agis  at  Decelea,  viii.  5.  ' '  While  he  was  with  his 
army  at  Decelea,  Agis  had  the  right  to  send  troops  whithersoever  he 
pleased,  to  raise  levies,  and  to  exact  money."  There  must  have  been 
far  abler  and  more  experienced  naval  officers  at  Corinth  and  other 
maritime  cities  than  could  be  found  at  Sparta,  but  owing  to  old 
tradition  the  command  of  the  fleet  was  retained  by  Sparta. 

2  Thera  paid  tribute  in  427  or  426.  3  Thuc.  ii.  9. 


IV.  4.] 


THE  FLEETS. 


101 


Unfortunately  Thucydides  has  not  followed  up  this  list  of 
the  allies  on  either  side  with  a  comparative  statement  of  their 
respective  armaments.    He  tells  us  what  were  Forces  on 
the  resources  of  Athens  as  estimated  by  Pericles,  either  side- 
and  what  expectations  the  Peloponnesians,  or,  at  any  rate, 
the  Corinthians,  formed  of  success,  but  he  never  gives  any 
clear  account  of  the  forces  which  Sparta   and  her  allies 
could  bring  into  the  field.    In  regard  to  ships,  Athenian  fleet< 
the  Athenian  fleet  is  put  at  300  vessels,  a 
number  which  can  be  reached  by  the  total  sum  of  the  ships 
in  service  in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and  is  never  exceeded.1 
The  Peloponnesians  amused  themselves  with  the  fancy  that 
they  would  be  able,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Dorian  cities  in 
the  west,  to  put  on  the  sea  a  fleet  of  500  ships.2    But  they 
never  reached  anything  near  this  amount ;  the  peioponnesian 
Corinthians  in  their  great  struggle  with  Corcyra  fleet- 
were  able  to  get  together  150  ships,  of  which  90  were  their 
own;  but  the  united  fleet  of  the  Peloponnesians  amounts  to 
100  ships  only  in  430.    No  more  than  42  ships  are  sent  to 
Lesbos;  and  60  is  the  largest  number  sent  to  Corcyra,  and 
also  the  number  surrendered  at  Pylus  in  425,  after  which 
the  Lacedaemonians  built  no  more  ships  till  413.  Even 
with  the  assistance  of  the  Persians  they  found  it  difficult  to 
match  the  numbers  of  the  Athenians.3 

In  the  army,  of  course,  the  preponderance  was  very  largely 
in  favour  of  Sparta.  Athens  is  credited  with  29,000  heavy- 
armed,  of  whom,  perhaps,  3000  were  resident  . 

'  '  1  1  Athenian  army. 

aliens.    Of  the  number  of  troops  furnished 

by  the  allies  we  have  no  statement.    When  he  went  to 

Pylus,  Cleon  took  with  him  no  citizens  from  Athens  at  all, 


1  In  Time.  ii.  23,  100  ships  are  sent  round  Peloponnesus  ;  in  c.  24, 
100  are  set  apart  with  their  trierarchs  ;  in  c.  26,  30  are  sent  to  Loci  is, 
and  70  are  at  Potidaea  (i.  61)  =  300.  In  iii.  17  the  distribution  is 
different,  and  the  total  only  250.  The  Lesbians  and  Chians,  who 
send  50  ships  in  430,  send  none  in  431,  and  Pericles  does  not  mention 
their  contingents.  (Xenophon)  Rep.  Ath.  iii.  1  speaks  of  400  trier- 
archs as  appointed  each  year  at  Athens. 

2  Thuc.  ii.  7.  3  Thuc.  i.  46  ;  ii.  66  ;  iii.  26  ;  iv.  2. 


102 


THE  ARMIES. 


[IV.  5. 


but  only  "the  Lemnian  and  Imbrian  forces  who  were  at 
Athens  at  the  time,  the  auxiliaries  from  Aenus,  and  400 
archers  from  other  places";  and  of  the  total  of  5100 
hoplites  who  went  to  Syracuse  in  415  only  2200  were 
Athenians.1  Whatever  the  number  was  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  it  was  greatly  diminished  towards  the  close. 
At  the  siege  of  Potidaea  there  were  7000  Athenians  under 
arms  at  one  time ;  but  3400  is  the  number  sent  out  in  both 
the  expeditions  to  Sicily;  and  we  know  from  Thucydides 
that  4400  perished  in  the  plague.2 

The  number  of  the  Peloponnesian  army  which  invaded 
Attica  is  given  by  Plutarch  3  at  60,000.  But,  even  if  the 
Peloponnesian  light-armed  are  included,  this  number  is  exces- 
army-  sive.    At  the  battle  of  Tanagra  the  allies  had 

furnished  a  force  of  10,000  men ;  Sparta  could  furnish  about 
5000  in  round  numbers,  and  Boeotia  about  8000.  This 
amounts  to  23,000,  and  if  we  add  15,000  for  the  light-armecT 
Boeotians,  and  the  helot  who  accompanied  every  Spartan,  we 
get  38,000  only.  This  is  perhaps  too  low  an  estimate,  and 
we  may  suppose  that  Sparta  could  count  on  the  support  of 
about  45,000  troops.4 

5.  The  Athenians  availed  themselves  of  the  services  of 
bowmen  and  cavalry  to  support  their  infantry,  but  they  had 


1  Thuc.  ii.  13,  31  ;  iv.  28  ;  vi.  43.  The  Lemnians  and  Imbrians  were 
however  Athenians  who  had  settled  as  Kkx)povyoi  in  those  islands. 

2  Though  Alcibiades  asserts  that  "Hellas  has  been  singularly  mis- 
taken about  her  heavy-armed  infantry,"  we  may  presume  that  Thucy- 
dides could  obtain  an  accurate  account  of  the  number  of  heavy-armed 
at  Athens.  Yet  his  statements  are  hardly  credible.  The  military 
age  extended  from  20  to  60,  but  the  numbers  given  are  13,000  for 
those  of  military  age,  and  16,000  for  those  over  or  below  military 
age  (and  the  resident  aliens).  If  from  this  sum  we  deduct  3000  for 
resident  aliens,  we  have  as  many  men  from  the  two  years  19,  20  and 
the  years  over  60  as  for  the  years  21-60  !  3  Per.  33. 

4  At  the  battle  of  Delium  (424)  the  entire  Athenian  force  of  heavy- 
armed  is  put  at  7000 — a  striking  contrast  to  the  estimate  of  Pericles. 
See  Delbrlick,  Die  Strntegie  des  Pericles,  p.  82.  Duncker,  Gesch.  Alt. 
ix.  405.  Beloch,  Griech.  Gesch.  i.  524,  puts  the  invading  army  of  the 
Peloponnesians  at  20,000-25,000  heavy-armed.  This  was  two-thirds 
of  the  whole  force.    (See  also  his  Bevolkerung,  p.  151.) 


IV.  5-]  STRATEGY,  MERCENARIES,  ETC. 


103 


no  organised  light-armed  force.  The  Spartans,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  a  force  of  light-armed  ready  to  hand  in  their 
helots,  but  they  had  no  cavalry.  For  these  they  trusted  to 
the  Boeotians,  until  the  year  425,  when  they  organised  a 
body  of  400  horse  for  the  protection  of  Laconia.1 

In  their  mode  of  warfare  the  two  armies  differed  greatly. 
The  Spartans,  trusting  to  their  admirable  skill  and  organisa- 
tion, sought  a  fair  field  in  which  to  fight  the  Mode  of 
struggle  out,  and  were  able  at  Mantinea  to  warfare- 
retrieve  even  so  great  a  disaster  as  a  breach  of  their  line.  The 
Athenians  displayed  more  versatility.  Demosthenes,  for 
instance,  won  the  battle  of  Olpae  by  an  ambuscade,  and  the 
battle  of  Idomene  by  a  surprise,  marching  through  the  night, 
and  attacking  the  enemy  while  still  asleep.  The  greatest 
confusion  often  prevailed ;  at  Delium  the  Athenians  slew  one 
another  by  mistake,  and  it  frequently  happened  that  one 
part  of  an  army  drove  the  enemy  cff  the  field,  only  to  find  on 
their  return  that  the  rest  of  their  forces  had  been  irretriev- 
ably defeated.  The  combination  of  different  nationalities  in 
the  same  army  also  gave  rise  to  difficulties.  In  the  night 
attack  on  Epipolae  the  Athenians  were  in  terror  of  their  own 
Dorian  allies,  whose  war-cry,  given  in  Doric,  resembled  that 
of  the  enemy.  At  Argos  we  find  the  nucleus  of  a  standing 
army  in  the  select  thousand  "whom  the  city  had  long 
trained  at  the  public  expense  in  military  exercises"2;  and 
in  the  course  of  the  war  the  use  of  mercenaries  became 
more  common  ;  even  the  Athenians,  when  they  found 
out  by  experience  the  value  of  light-armed  troops,  did  not 
hesitate  to  take  into  their  pay  the  "most  bloodthirsty 
of  barbarians."3 

When  addressing  the  allies  at  Sparta  before  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  the  Corinthians  claimed  for  the  Peloponnesians 
a  superiority  over  the  Athenians  in  courage,  but  acknow- 
ledged their  inferiority  in  seamanship.    This  inferiority, 


1  Time.  iv.  94,  55.  2  Thuc.  v.  67. 

3  Thuc.  vii.  29.  Eor  light-armed  troops,  cp.  ii.  79  ;  hi.  98 ;  iv.  33  f. 


104 


THE  WEALTH  OF  ATHENS. 


[IV.  6. 


they  predict,  will  be  removed  by  practice.1  If  we  compare 
the  position  of  the  Athenian  navy  at  the  beginning  and  the 

Decline  of  c^ose  °*  tne  war'  we  tnat  tne  Corinthians 
Athenian  skill  were  right.  In  the  sea  fights  of  429  the  skill 
atsea  of  Phormio  was  irresistible,  and  the  arrange- 

ments which  Cnemus  made  to  defeat  the  dreaded  manoeuvres 
of  the  Athenian  ships  were  rendered  entirely  useless.  With 
the  progress  of  the  war  the  balance  passes  over  to  the  other 
side.  The  Corinthians  show  far  greater  genius  in  adapting 
themselves  to  the  new  conditions  of  naval  warfare  than  the 
Athenians,  who  did  not  perceive  when  they  entered  the 
harbour  of  Syracuse  that  they  were  throwing  away  all 
opportunities  of  displaying  their  seamanship.  Still,  even  after 
the  destruction  of  her  best  ships  and  her  best  sailors,  Athens 
held  her  own ;  the  victories  of  Cyzicus  and  Arginusae  were 
greater  than  any  previously  gained  in  the  war,  and  it  was 
owing  to  treachery  or  to  the  foolish  self-confidence  of  his 
enemy  that  Lysander  was  able  to  seize  the  entire  Athenian 
fleet  at  Aegospotami. 

6.  In  financial  resources  the  Athenians  had  greatly  the 
advantage  of  their  opponents.  We  cannot,  indeed,  say  that 
Finance  Athens  was  the  only  city  in  which  there  was 

Athenian  any  systematic  finance,  for  we  do  not  know 

resources.  how  the  navies  of  Corinth  were  supported,  but 
from  the  time  that  the  management  of  the  Delian  League 
passed  into  her  hands,  and  still  more  from  the  time  when 
the  League  became  the  Athenian  empire,  her  position  was 
quite  different  from  that  of  any  other  city  in  Greece.  In  the 
year  435,  before  the  outlay  on  the  Propylaea  and  the  siege  of 
Potidaea,  a  sum  of  9700  talents  had  been  accumulated  in  the 
Acropolis,  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  6000  t.  were  still 
at  the  disposal  of  the  city.  The  income  from  the  allies  is" 
put  by  Thucydides  at  600  t.,2  and  if  Xenophon  is  right  in 


1  Time.  i.  121. 

2  This  perhaps  includes  more  than  the  mere  (f)6pos  ;  cp.  Time.  iv. 
108,  who  says  that  Amphipolis  was  useful  to  the  Athenians  xprHJL^TbiV 
7rpoa6d(o,  but  Amphipolis  paid  no  tribute. 


IV.  6] 


FINANCE  IN  THE  PEL OPONNESE. 


105 


placing  the  total  income  of  Athens  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  at  1000  t.,  there  was  a  further  sum  of  400  t.  coming 
in  from  tolls,  dues,  mines,  and  other  sources.1  Considerable 
sums  could  also  be  obtained  by  borrowing  from  the  temples, 
which  had  incomes  of  their  own,  distinct  from  the  public 
revenues.  When  necessary,  a  property-tax  could  be  levied, 
and  though  the  Athenians  were  averse  to  taxing  themselves 
directly,  this  particular  burden,  as  it  fell  mainly  on  the  rich, 
was  regarded  as  tolerable  by  the  sovereign  Many.2  A  good 
deal  of  the  cost  of  war  was  met  by  private  expenditure.  To 
every  ship  was  attached  a  trierarch,  whose  business  it  was 
to  keep  the  vessel  in  repair,  and  pay  a  large  part  of  the 
maintenance  when  in  service.  TJie  knights  also  spent  money 
on  their  horses  in  addition  to  the  allowance  made  by  the 
state.  There  was  an  honourable  and  even  extravagant  spirit 
of  emulation  among  the  richer  Athenians  in  these  matters, 
which  was  stimulated  by  the  reflection  that  a  wise  . expendi- 
ture was  the  best  means  of  winning  popular  favour.  The 
Athenian  was  taught  in  a  severe  school  that  property  has 
its  duties  as  well  as  its  rights  and  pleasures. 

Against  these  large  resources  the  Spartans  and  their  allies 
had  little  to  set — at  least  in  public  funds.  That  the  cities 
of  the  confederacy  made  some  kind  of  contri-  peioPonnesian 
bution  is  stated  by  Thucydides,  and  the  state-  finances- 
ment  is  confirmed  by  an  inscription,  but  no  details  have 
been  preserved.3  The  amount  was  probably  inconsiderable. 
Pericles  says  distinctly  that  *  the  Peloponnesians  had  no 
money,  either  in  private  fortunes  or  in  public  treasuries. 


1  See  Xen.  Anab.  vii.  1.  27.  Aristoph.  Wasps,  657  ff.  enumerates 
the  sources  of  Athenian  income.  He  puts  the  total  at  2000  t.,  but 
this  is  probably  exaggerated,  and  in  any  case  the  Wasps  was  written 
after  425  when  the  tribute  was  raised. 

2  The  rich  suffered  most  in  a  war ;  Thuc.  viii.  48. 

3  Thuc.  ii.  7.  Hicks,  Historical  Inscriptions,  43.  Plut.  Reg.  et 
Imperial.  Apopliih.,  ' Ap^t'da^oy  iv  ra>  HekoTTOvvrjo-iaKcp  noXefxco,  ra>v 
^v^jxax^v  d^iovvTcov  Spicrai  tovs  Cpopovs  avrols,  elnev,  6  7rokep.os  ov 
reray/jLeva  aiTelrai.  The  same  is  said  of  a  younger  Archidamus,  the 
son  of  Agesilaus,  {rjrel  being  substituted  for  o-irelrai. 


J  06 


THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 


[IV.  7. 


Even  the  Corinthians,  who  as  a  mercantile  nation  must  have 
had  a  clear  eye  for  finance,  allow  that  the  confederacy  is 
without  public  funds ;  the  deficiency  must  be  met  by 
borrowing  from  Delphi  or  Olympia.  What  amount  of 
treasure  was  to  be  found  in  these  temples  is  unknown,  but 
they  were  banks  to  which  money  was  taken  for  safety,  and 
Elis  was  certainly  a  wealthy  country,  with  little  or  no  public 
expenditure.  In  Thebes,  also,  there  were  rich  men,  from 
whom  contributions  might  be  received ;  but  the  smallness  of 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  which  depended  on  such  sources, 
shows  that  Pericles  was  right  in  saying  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  would  be  more  ready  to  risk  their  lives  than  their 
money.  Another  source  from  which  funds  might  be  obtained 
was  the  King  of  Persia ;  but,  apart  from  the  difficulty  of  send- 
ing envoys  to  Susa  while  the  Athenians  had  command  of 
the  sea,  it  was  quite  uncertain  which  side  the  Great  King 
would  take.  Till  the  year  412  nothing  was  received  from 
his  satraps,  but  from  that  time  forward  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  was  chiefly  maintained  at  the  expense  of  Persia,  and  it 
was  by  the  gold  of  Pharnabazus  and  Cyrus  that  it  was  enabled 
to  recover  from  the  defeats  of  Cyzicus  and  Arginusae. 

7.  Thus  Athens  was  rich  and  powerful  at  sea ;  her  fleet 
was  beyond  comparison  superior  to  any  force  which  could 
Plan  of  cam-  ^e  Drougnt  against  it,  and  she  had  the  means 
paign— what      of  supporting  it  for  years.    Her  army  was  also 

was  possible  ?      larger  than  that  of  any  other  Qreek  ^  Qn 

the  other  hand  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy  could  bring 
into  the  field  a  greater  number  of  soldiers,  the  majority  of 
whom  were  as  good  or  better  material,  and  better  trained 
than  the  Athenian.  That  they  had  very  little  money  to 
expend  on  war  was  not  of  much  importance,  so  long  as 
operations  were  restricted  within  narrow  limits,  for  their 
army,  when  in  the  field,  was  to  a  large  extent  self-supporting.1 
Between  belligerents  so  dissimilar,  what  plan  of  campaign 

1  Thuc.  ii.  23  :  xpovov  eufxdvavres  ev  rfj  'Attikt}  oaov  el)(ov  rot 
iiriTr)ha,a,  if  this  means  "  so  long  as  they  could  draw  supplies  from  the 
country  "  (cp.  iv.  6). 


IV.  7-] 


THE  PLAN  OF  PERICLES. 


107 


was  possible  ?  In  previous  wars  the  Athenian  army  had 
engaged  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  partly  in  the 
region  of  the  Isthmus,  and  partly  in  Boeotia — and  the  final 
result  was  the  disaster  of  Coronea,  and  the  renunciation  of 
empire  in  Central  Greece.  But  her  fleet  had  sailed  un- 
challenged round  the  Peloponnesus ;  she  had  burnt  the 
Lacedaemonian  docks  at  Gytheum,  and  established  herself 
at  Naupactus — a  point  from  which  she  could  exercise  great 
influence  in  Western  Greece.  The  Lacedaemonians,  on  the 
other  hand,  by  the  mere  threat  of  invading  Attica,  had 
compelled  Athens  to  withdraw  from  the  positions  which  she 
held  in  the  Peloponnesus,  and  they  had  seen  the  Athenian 
empire  severely  shaken  by  the  revolt  of  Samos.  From  the 
experience  of  the  past,  plans  were  formed  for  pian  of 
the  future.  Pericles  entirely  abandoned  the  Pericles- 
attempt  to  meet  the  enemy  in  the  field.  "  They  are  more  in 
number  than  we  are,"  he  said  ;  "  if  we  defeat  them  they  will 
come  again  in  undiminished  numbers,  and  if  we  are  defeated 
our  allies  will  break  into  revolt." 1  What  was  worse  still,  the 
loss  in  every  engagement,  whatever  the  event,  would  fall  wholly 
on  Athens  and  her. subject  allies,  while  in  the  allied  army,, 
it  would  be  divided  among  the  various  states.2  The  Athenians 
must  not  enter  into  the  war  with  any  hope  of  recovering  their 
lost  position  in  Central  Greece ;  on  the  contrary,  they  must 
be  prepared  to  sacrifice  Attica  itself  and  remain  within  the 
walls  of  the  city,  while  their  lands  were  being  laid  waste  and 
their  houses  destroyed.  "If  only  we  were  islanders," 
Pericles  said,  "we  should  be  impregnable;  and  we  must 
feel  as  much  like  islanders  as  we  can."  By  this  means  the 
invasion  of  Attica,  the  most  formidable  instrument  in  the 
power  of  the  enemy,  would  be  rendered  ineffective.  The 
fleet  was  to  be  used  with  vigilance  and  caution.  Athens 
must  be  supplied  with  food  ;  the  allies  must  be  kept  well  in 
hand,  the  coasts  of  the  Peloponnesus  harried,  but  there  must 

1  This  actually  happened  after  the  battle  of  Delium. 

2  Cp.  Thuc.  iv.  73,  where  the  Athenian  generals  refuse  to  enter 
into  an  engagement  on  this  ground. 


108 


THE  PLAN  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIANS.      [IV.  7. 


be  no  attempt  to  enter  on  distant  expeditions — no  enter- 
prise that  would  distract  the  city  from  her  immediate  object, 
or  waste  her  strength.  He  even  persuaded  the  Athenians  to 
set  aside  1000  t.  and  withdraw  100  ships  from  active  service 
to  form  a  reserve  against  any  great  emergency,  thus  robbing 
the  city  of  a  large  part  of  her  resources  at  the  very  moment 
when  he  was  entering  on  war.  He  trusted  to  the  deficiencies 
of  the  enemy  rather  than  to  any  active  measures  on  his  own 
part.  The  Peloponnesians  had  no  money,  and  without  money 
they  could  have  no  ships,  and  without  ships  they  could  not 
reach  the  allies  of  Athens.  So  long  as  her  empire  and 
revenue  were  safe,  the  city  was  really  invulnerable.  For 
war  was,  above  all,  a  matter  of  money.  If  the  Athenians 
clung  to  this  principle,  they  could  look  with  contempt  on  the 
operations  of  the  enemy.  If  the  Peloponnesians  invaded 
Attica,  the  Athenians  would  attack  the  coast  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus; the  attempt  to  establish  a  city  which  should 
control  the  supplies  of  Athens  could  be  met  by  a  counter- 
stroke — a  fortress  which  should  control  Laconia.  "It  is  a 
greater  calamity  to  them  to  have  a  portion  of  Laconia 
ravaged  than  it  is  for  us  to  have  the  whole  of  Attica  laid 
waste,  and  no  frontier  fortress  of  theirs  can  prevent  us  from 
sailing  out  where  we  please,  and  inflicting  damage  on  them. 
A  naval  force  can  do  more  in  attacks  on  land  than  a  land 
force  can  do  in  engagements  at  sea."  1 

The  Peloponnesians  trusted  chiefly  to  their  large  and  well- 
organised  army.  With  the  help  of  their  allies  in  Boeotia, 
Plan  of  the  they  could  invade  Attica  whenever  they  chose. 
Peloponnesians.  Archidamus,  indeed,  though  he  did  not  suppose 
that  the  Athenians  would  sacrifice  their  empire  to  save 
Attica,  hoped  to  the  last  that  the  threat  of  invasion 
would  bring  them  to  listen  to  terms,  as  had  been  the  case 
in  445.  Others,  less  familiar  with  the  Athenian  spirit, 
could  not  believe  that  they  would  submit  to  invasion 
year  after  year,  and  hoped  by  this  means  to  bring  the 


1  Thuc.  i.  142. 


I  V.  8  ] 


CRITICISM  OF  PERICLES. 


109 


war  to  a  speedy  issue.  Beyond  this  the  Peloponnesians 
had  no  clear  plan  of  campaign.  They  expected  to  get  ships 
from  the  west,  and  they  would  build  others  for  themselves, 
which  they  would  man  with  sailors  tempted  from  the 
Athenian  service  by  superior  pay.  With  these  they  would 
aid  the  Athenian  allies  to  revolt  and  cut  off  the  revenues  of 
the  city.  They  spoke  of  establishing  cities  or  fortresses 
which  should  be  a  constant  source  of  annoyance  to  Athens, 
but  these  were  schemes  only,  for  which  the  means  and  the 
opportunity  had  yet  to  come.1  Happily  for  them  a  great 
soldier  and  a  great  traitor  came  forward  at  Sparta,  who  saw 
where  the  blow  must  be  struck  and  how  to  strike  it. 

8.  We  cannot  but  ask  ourselves — Was  Pericles  right  in 
his  view  %  The  conduct  of  the  war  down  to  his  death,  with 
the  exception  of  the  victories  of  Phormio,  is  Criticism 
on  the  whole  a  pitiable  record.  Would  it  of  Pericles' 
not  have  been  better  to  have  risked  a  little  strategy- 
more  %  Between  the  seizure  of  Plataea  and  the  invasion 
of  Attica  there  was  an  interval  of  nearly  three  months ; 
in  which,  had  the  Athenian  army  been  what  it  was  in 
the  days  of  Cimon,  a  blow  might  have  been  struck  at 
Boeotia,  or  measures  taken  to  secure  the  passes  over  the 
isthmus  of  Corinth.  Pericles  did  not  bring  the  siege  of 
Potidaea  to  an  end  before  engaging  in  the  great  struggle ; 
and  instead  of  dividing  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  he  allowed 
his  own  to  be  divided.  Even  of  his  fleet  he  did  not  attempt 
to  make  the  full  use :  he  set  aside  a  large  portion  of  his 
available  force.  If  with  every  ship  at  his  command  he  had 
destroyed  the  commerce  of  Corinth,  captured  Cythera,  and 
burned  the  docks  at  Gytheum,  the  war  would  have  been 
finished  almost  as  soon  as  it  was  begun.    There  was  no 


1  Cp.  Time.  i.  122,  where  we  see  how  vague  the  plans  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians were:  iirireixio-pbs  rfj  X^Pa'  T€  °o~a  ovk  av  ris  vvv  irpoidoi. 
■qKLara  yap  noXepus  eVt  prjTols  ^copei,  avros  Se  dcp'  avrov  ra  7roAAa 
rexyaTai  rrpbs  to  naparvyxavov.  The  Spartans  threatened  Euboea 
by  colonising  Heraclea  in  426,  but  Athens  replied  effectively  by  taking 
Pylusin425. 


110 


HIS  WANT  OF  ENERGY. 


[IV.  8. 


reason  whatever  why  Athens  should  not  have  stood  at  the 
end  of  the  first  year  of  the  war  in  the  position  which  she 
occupied  at  the  beginning  of  424;  but,  in  the  hands  of 
Pericles,  the  greatest  Athenian  fleet  which  ever  sailed  round 
Peloponnesus  returned  after  devastating  a  miserable  hamlet. 
In  his  infatuated  belief  that  Athens,  owing  to  her  wealth, 
could  wear  out  the  enemy,  he  forgot  that  ships  rapidly 
decay ;  that  Athens  was  carrying  on  war  at  enormous  cost 
with  little  or  no  result,  while  the  Spartan  operations  were 
comparatively  inexpensive.  The  invasion  of  Attica  in  the 
spring,  when  the  Peloponnesians  had  nothing  else  to  do,  was 
little  more  than  an  excursion  bringing  a  pleasant  variety 
into  life,  at  little  expense  and  less  risk.1  In  war  delays 
are  dangerous — Kaipol  ov  fievcroi — and  with  every  year 
that  passed  it  was  more  probable  that  some  "accident 
would  happen " :  a  powerful  ally  might  revolt ;  the  Great 
King  might  interfere ;  or  a  Spartan  of  genius  find  a  weak 
point  in  the  Athenian  panoply.2 


1  In  the  busy  season  of  the  year  the  Peloponnesians  were  unwilling 
to  invade  Attica  :  Thuc.  iii.  15. 

2  On  the  strategy  of  Pericles,  see  Duncker,  Gesch.  Alt.  ix.  417  ff. ; 
Pfiugk-Hartung,  Perikles  als  Feldherr.  Delbruck,  op.  cit.t  defends 
him. 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  WAR  DOWN  TO  THE  DEATH  OF  PERICLES 
431-429. 

I.  The  Thebans  had  taken  no  part  in  the  dispute  which 
had  arisen  between  Athens  and  the  Peloponnesus,  but  they 
were  allies  of  the  Spartans,  and  for  three-  Thebes  and 
quarters  of  a  century  they  had  been  on  bad  Plataea.  £09? 
terms  with  the  Athenians.  About  the  time  when  the  Pisis- 
tratidae  were  expelled  from  Athens,  the  inhabitants  of 
Plataea,  the  city  on  the  northern  slopes  of  Cithaeron,  had 
applied  to  Cleomenes,  the  king  of  Sparta,  for  protection 
against  Thebes.  Afraid  of  their  neighbour's  growing  power 
— Thebes  is  six  or  seven  miles  to  the  north  of  Plataea, 
beyond  the  Asopus — they  wished  to  break  loose  from  the 
Boeotian  confederation,  of  which  Thebes  was  the  head,  and 
attach  themselves  to  Sparta.  Cleomenes  pointed  out  that 
his  city  lay  at  a  great  distance  from  Plataea ;  before  assist- 
ance could  arrive  from  Peloponnesus  the  Thebans  would 
have  time  to  lay  waste  the  Plataean  territory,  and  enslave 
the  city.  He  recommended  the  Plataeans  to  apply  to  Athens, 
their  nearest  neighbour,  who  could  render  effectual  help. 
On  this  advice  the  Plataeans  placed  themselves  under 
Athenian  protection.  A  quarrel  with  Thebes  followed,  and 
though  the  Corinthians,  who  were  called  in  to  settle  the 
matter,  decided  that  Plataea  should  be  allowed  to  choose  her 
own  alliance,  the  Thebans  never  acquiesced  in  the  arrange- 
ment. They  looked  on  Plataea  as  a  Boeotian  city,  and  only 
waited  for  an  opportunity  to  enforce  her  allegiance  to  the 
Boeotian  confederacy.1 


1  Hdt.  vi.  108.    See  vol.  i.  p.  442;  infra,  p.  177. 


Ill 


112 


THE  THEBANS  Al  PLATAEA,  431.  [V.  2. 


2.   Such  an  opportunity  seemed  now  to  have  arrived. 
At  the  beginning  of  spring,  in  the  year  431,  a  force  of 
.   a     more   than   three  hundred  Thebans,  under 

Plataea  seized        ,  ,  7 

by  a  party  of  the  command  of  two  of  the  Boeotarchs, 
Thebans.  entered  Plataea  by  night.     No  watch  had 

March  431.  .  *1  ° 

been  set,  tor  war  had  not  yet  been  openly 
proclaimed,  and  the  Plataeans  had  no  reason  to  apprehend 
an  attack.  But  the  Thebans  did  not  stand  cn  cere- 
mony when  their  interests  were  at  stake,  and  here,  as  was 
only  too  often  the  case  in  Greece,  treachery  had  been  at  work. 
There  was  a  party  in  Plataea  which  hoped,  by  detaching 
the  city  from  Athens,  to  get  the  chief  power  into  their  own 
hands.  With  this  view  they  negotiated  with  Eurymachus, 
the  son  of  Leontiades,  an  eminent  Theban,  for  the  despatch 
of  the  force,  and  when  it  arrived,  they  opened  the  gates  and 
received  it  into  the  city.  Their  wish  was  to  cut  down  their 
enemies  at  once,  and  so  clear  the  ground  for  their  own 
advancement ;  but  the  Thebans  took  a  more  conciliatory 
course.  Grounding  their  arms  in  the  market-place  of  the 
city,  they  called  on  those  who  wished  to  return  to  the 
ancient  constitution  of  Boeotia  to  join  them,  and  become 
their  allies.  It  was  not  in  the  interest  of  a  party,  but  in 
order  to  consolidate  Boeotia,  that  they  wished  to  recover 
Plataea.1 

The  delay  was  fatal.  At  the  first  entrance  of  the  Thebans, 
in  the  darkness  of  night,  the  Plataeans  were  panic-stricken ; 
they  could  form  no  estimate  of  the  number  of  the  enemy,  and, 
Repulse  of  the  believing  them  to  be  far  more  numerous  than 
Thebans.  they  really  were,  they  listened  to  their  pro- 

posals. By  degrees  they  discovered  that  the  force  was 
not  so  overwhelming,  and,  as  the  Plataean  people  were 

1  Time.  ii.  2-4.  For  Leontiades  see  Hdt,  vii.  233.  The  date  of  the 
attack  is  fixed  by  the  words  tcXcvtcovtos  tov  iirjvos — there  was  a  new 
moon  on  March  9,  and  again  on  April  7  in  431— and  the  date  of  the 
invasion  of  Attica,  which  was  eighty  days  after  the  attack  on 
Plataea,  tov  depovs  Kai  tov  o~ltov  aKfAa^ovTos  (c.  19).  As  the  harvest 
in  Greece  falls  about  the  beginning  of  June,  the  new  moon  of  March 
must  be  preferred  to  that  of  April. 


V.  2.]  MASSACRE  OF  THE  CAPTIVES,  431.  113 


strongly  attacked  to  Athens,  they  determined  to  attack  the 
invaders.  They  reflected  that  the  Thebans  were  strangers 
in  the  city,  of  which  every  street,  house,  and  gateway  was 
familiar  to  themselves.  It  was  easy  to  surprise  them  if  the 
attack  was  made  in  the  dark.  The  plan  was  carried  out. 
Just  before  daybreak  a  furious  onset  was  made,  and  though 
for  a  short  time  the  Thebans  were  able  to  resist,  they  were 
soon  driven  in  confusion  along  the  streets,  seeking  their  way 
out  of  the  city.  The  only  gate  open  was  that  by  which  they 
had  entered,  and  even  this  was  quickly  closed.  The  Plataeans 
met  them  at  every  turn ;  even  the  women  threw  down  tiles 
and  stones  from  the  roofs  of  the  houses;  the  largest  and 
most  compact  body  of  the  whole  force  rushed  blindly  into  a 
great  room  adjacent  to  the  city  wall,  mistaking  the  door  for 
one  of  the  city  gates,  and  were  thus  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Plataeans.  When  day  returned,  one  hundred  and  eighty 
Thebans,  including  Eurymachus,  the  chief  author  of  the 
plot,  had  been  taken  captive ;  of  the  rest  the  majority  had 
been  killed. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  the  main  body  of  the  Theban 
army  should  march  out  to  support  the  attack.  But  in  the 
night  a  heavy  storm  of  rain  had  caused  the  The  Plataeans 
Asopus  to  rise,  and  the  river  could  not  now  put  their  prison- 
be  crossed  without  difficulty.  Before  the  ersto  eat 
Thebans  reached  the  Plataean  territory,  they  were  met  with 
the  report  of  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  their  country- 
men. They  pressed  on,  hoping  to  seize  men  and  property  as 
a  compensation  for  their  own  citizens,  who  were  in  the 
hands  of  the  Plataeans ;  the  Plataeans,  however,  warned 
them  by  a  herald  that,  if  any  damage  were  done  to  their 
property,  the  Theban  captives  would  be  put  to  death;  if 
they  retired,  the  captives  would  be  given  up.  On  this  the 
Thebans  went  back  into  their  own  country.  The  Plataeans 
at  once  brought  in  their  property  from  the  fields,  and  when 
all  was  secured,  they  slew  the  whole  of  their  prisoners. 

News  of  the  surprise  of  Plataea  had  been  conveyed  to 
Athens,  and  a  second  messenger  had  reported  the  capture  of 

VOL.  III.  H 


114  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR,  431-  [V.  3. 

the  Thebans.  The  Athenians  at  once  issued  an  order  for 
the  arrest  of  every  Boeotian  who  happened  to  be  in  Attica, 
and  despatched  an  envoy  to  Plataea,  requesting  that  the 
prisoners  should  be  kept  for  further  instructions.  The 
request,  unhappily,  came  too  late.  The  prisoners  had 
already  been  put  to  death  when  the  envoy  arrived,  and  the 
Plataeans  were  preparing  the  city  against  attack. 

Such  was  the  first  act  of  the  great  drama.  It  forms  a 
striking  instance  of  the  insecurity  of  Greek  life,  and  the 
furious  passions  to  which  this  insecurity  gave  rise.  In 
Plataea  there  is  a  party  of  traitors  waiting  for  an  oppor- 
tunity to  destroy  their  opponents  with  the  help  of  the 
Thebans;  the  Thebans  attack  a  city  secured  by  treaty 
without  waiting  for  any  formal  declaration  of  war;  the 
victorious  Plataeans,  in  spite  of  the  promise  by  which  the 
Theban  army  is  induced  to  retire,  put  all  the  captives  to 
death.  The  question  was  indeed  debated  whether  the  promise 
was  or  was  not  confirmed  by  an  oath.  Their  cruelty  and 
perfidy  the  Plataeans  could  not  deny,  but  they  resented  the 
accusation  of  perjury;  a  refinement  which  merely  proves 
the  superstition  and  sophistry  in  which  the  Greeks  of  the 
time  were  sunk.  A  hundred  years  had  yet  to  pass; 
Plataea  had  twice  to  be  levelled  to  the  ground,  before  this 
neighbourly  quarrel  was  finally  settled  by  the  utter  destruc- 
tion of  Thebes  at  the  hands  of  Alexander.1 

3.  The  thirty  years'  truce  had  now  been  openly  broken. 
Had  the  Plataeans,  instead  of  acting  with  more  folly 
if  possible  than  cruelty,  preserved  their  prisoners  alive, 
Preparations  the  Thebans  might  have  been  brought  to 
for  war.  terms ;  Sparta  might  have  disowned  the  action 

of  her  ally  in  violating  the  treaty.  But  the  murder  of 
one  hundred  and  eighty  Thebans  made  it  impossible 
to  draw  back.  On  both  sides  preparations  were  now  made 
for  immediate  war.  There  were  doubtless  many  who 
hailed  the  outbreak  as  a  relief  from  intolerable  tension ; 


1  Thuc.  ii.  2-6.    Diodorus,  xii.  41,  differs  in  some  points. 


V.  3-]         ARCHIDAMUS  AT  THE  ISTHMUS,  481. 


115 


many  more  who,  from  mere  ignorance  and  love  of  change, 
were  weary  of  peace.  All  Hellas  thrilled  with  excitement 
at  the  impending  contest  of  the  greatest  of  Hellenic  cities. 
Prophecies  and  oracles  passed  from  mouth  to  mouth,  and  the 
ingenuity  of  diviners  was  tasked  to  the  uttermost.  Every 
uncommon  phenomenon  of  nature  was  noticed  and  recorded. 
Quite  recently  for  the  first  time  in  the  memory  of  man  the 
island  of  Delos  had  been  "shaken."  Public  feeling  was 
strongly  on  the  side  of  the  Spartans;  they  were  looked  on 
as  the  liberators  of  Hellas,  while  Athens  was  hated  and  feared 
as  an  aggressive  and  tyrannical  city.1  In  their  enthusiasm, 
men  allowed  their  judgment  to  be  swayed  by  their  sym- 
pathies. "At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  prevailing 
opinion  in  Hellas  was  that  the  Athenians  would  not  be  able 
to  hold  out  more  than  two  or  three  years  at  the  most,  if  the 
Lacedaemonians  invaded  Attica  year  by  year."2 

The  Athenians  had  not  taken  an  active  part  in  the  inci- 
dent of  Plataea ;  no  additional  complaint  could  be  brought 
against  them  on  this  ground,  except  the  arrest  The  Peiopon- 
of  the  Boeotians  in  Attica,  which  was  merely  nesian  troops 

,  -  a  assemble  at  the 

a  measure  of  precaution.  feparta  was  still  isthmus, 
without  any  clear  and  well-defined  casus  belli,  -June  43L 
so  far  as  she  herself  was  concerned.  But  the  spirit  of  war 
had  been  aroused,  and  even  those  who  regretted  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  were  compelled  to  go  with  the  stream. 
Immediately  after  the  affair  of  Plataea,  the  ephors  of  Sparta 
sent  round  to  the  allies,  bidding  them  furnish  troops — two- 
thirds  of  their  whole  force — equipped  for  a  foreign  expedi- 
tion :  and  at  the  time  appointed,  some  time  before  mid- 
summer, the  contingents  assembled  at  the  isthmus  of  Corinth, 
for  the  invasion  of  Attica.  Each  contingent  was  commanded 
by  its  own  generals,  but  the  whole  expedition  was  under  the 
command  of  Archidamus,  king  of  Lacedaemon. 

Archidamus  had  endeavoured  to  dissuade  the  con- 
federacy from  immediate  war ;  and  even  now  he  cherished 


l  Thue,  ii.  7,  8. 


2  Thuc.  vii.  28. 


116         THE  A  THENIANS  ABANDON  ATTICA,  431.      [V.  3. 

the  hope  that  the  last  and  irrevocable  step  might  be  avoided. 
He  impressed  his  army  with  the  necessity  of  caution  in 
Archidamus       attacking  so  powerful  an  enemy,  who  might  at 

negotiation^1161  the  kst  moment  be  stung  int°  desperate  resist- 
ance ;  and  even  despatched  a  Spartan  envoy 
to  Athens  in  the  hope  that  some  concession  might  still  be 
made.  The  Athenians  stood  firm.  The  envoy  was  not  even 
admitted  into  the  city,  for  Pericles  had  induced  the  citizens 
to  refuse  to  listen  to  any  overtures  as  long  as  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  in  the  field.  He  was  denied  a  hearing,  and 
bidden  to  cross  the  frontier  before  sunset;  if  the  Lacedae- 
monians wished  to  negotiate  with  the  Athenians,  they  must 
disband  their  army.  When  he  arrived  at  the  frontier  and 
was  about  to  take  leave  of  the  escort  which  had  accompanied 
him,  the  envoy,  impressed  with  the  greatness  of  the  war 
which  was  now  inevitable,  uttered  these  words  of  melancholy 
prophecy  :  "This  day  will  be  to  the  Hellenes  the  beginning 
of  great  calamities."  On  learning  that  no  concessions  would 
be  made,  Archidamus  prepared  to  enter  Attica.1 

Meanwhile,  in  accordance  with  the  plans  of  Pericles,  the 
country  people  of  Attica  left  their  pleasant  homes  and 
The  Athenians  cultivated  farms,  and  came  to  Athens  with  their 
leave  the  wives  and  children  and  household  goods.  They 

the  town?*  brought  with  them  even  the  woodwork  of  their 
houses,  which  in  Attica  was  of  far  greater  value 
than  stone  or  brick.  The  removal  was  not  accomplished  with- 
out much  discomfort  and  vexation.  Many  families  had  lived 
in  the  country  for  generations  ;  they  were  leaving  the  tombs 
of  their  race,  and  the  shrines  where  they  worshipped,  for  a 
strange  city  where  they  had  no  home.  When  they  arrived 
in  Athens,  there  were  no  houses  to  receive  them.  They  had 
to  obtain  such  shelter  as  they  could  in  vacant  spaces,  or 
temples,  or  in  the  turrets  of  the  walls.  The  sudden  immi- 
gration of  so  large  a  population  was  naturally  a  cause  of  the 
greatest  disorder,  and   the  sanitary  conditions  which  it 


1  Thuc.  ii.  10-12. 


V.  4  ] 


A  R  CHI  DA  MUS  AT  OENOE,  J&l. 


117 


created  must  have  been  revolting.  That  Pericles  should 
have  contemplated  the  removal  of  such  numbers  into  the 
city  without  making  due  provision  for  them  was,  of  course, 
a  gross  oversight,  of  which  no  practical  man  would  have 
been  guilty.  He  could  discuss  physical  phenomena  with 
Anaxagoras,  and  arrange  with  Phidias  and  Ictinus  for  the 
construction  of  beautiful  buildings,  but  the  prosaic  details 
of  life  were  forgotten.  The  day  of  vengeance  was  not  long 
in  coming.1 

4.  On  leaving  the  Isthmus,  Archidamus  led  his  forces 
over  Mount  Geranea  into  the  territory  of  Megara,  where 
two  routes  lay  before  him  :  he  might  turn  to  Archidamus  in- 
the  right  and  pursue  the  coast  road  to  Eleusis  ;  vades  Attica, 
or  he  might  continue  his  march  in  a  north-  June431- 
easterly  direction  till  he  reached  the  confines  of  Boeotia,  and 
then  strike  into  the  direct  road  which  connects  Thebes 
and  Athens.  He  chose  the  second,  and  when  we  next  hear 
of  him,  he  is  besieging  Oenoe,  the  fortress  which  severed 
the  communication  of  Athens  and  Plataea.  In  taking  this 
course  he  may  have  been  influenced  by  his  Boeotian  allies, 
for,  if  this  fortress  were  in  his  hands,  the  Thebans  would 
not  only  be  able  to  pass  in  and  out  of  Attica  as  they  pleased, 
but  Athens  would  be  prevented  from  coming  to  the  aid  of 
Plataea.  At  the  same  time  he  would  open  a  more  convenient 
route  between  the  northern  and  southern  sections  of  the 
Peloponnesian  alliance  than  the  usual  road  by  Aegosthena 
and  Creusis. 

The  fortresses  which  guarded  the  passes  into  Attica  were 
held  by  garrisons  formed  chiefly  of  young  men  in  the  earliest 
years  of  their  military  service.  Of  the  fortifi-  He  is  repulsed 
cations  of  Oenoe  we  know  nothing,  but,  what-  at  °enoe- 
ever  they  were,  they  sufficed,  with  the  natural  strength  of 
the  place,  then  held  by  such  troops,  to  bid  defiance  to  the 
whole  strength  of  the  Peloponnesian  army.  After  a  delay 
which  brought  on  him  the  suspicion  of  intentional  lingering, 


1  Time,  ii.  14-17  ;  Aristoph.  Knhjh/s,  789  ff. 


118 


ARCHIDAMUS  AT  ACHARNAE,  431. 


[V.  4. 


Archidamus  was  compelled  to  leave  the  fortress  in  his  rear. 
Eighty  days  had  already  elapsed  since  the  Thebans  entered 
Plataea.  Descending  down  the  valley  of  the  Eleusinian 
Cephisus,  he  ravaged  Eleusis  and  the  Thriasian  plain,  from 
which  he  advanced  over  the  ridge  of  hills  to  Acharnae,  the 
largest  of  the  "  demes  "  of  Attica,  and  barely  seven  miles  from 
Athens.  Here  he  encamped  for  some  time,  devastating  the 
immediate  neighbourhood,  but  not  entering  the  central  plain. 

In  thus  holding  his  hand  while  within  sight  of  the  city,  he 
sought  to  draw  the  Athenians  out  of  the  walls.  He  had 
Archidamus  at  hoped,  though  in  vain,  that  they  would  come 
Achamae.  out  ^0  meet  him  at  Eleusis,  and  when  he 
encamped  within  sight  of  Athens,  in  a  town  which  furnished 
a  large  proportion  of  the  heavy-armed  soldiers  in  the 
Athenian  army,  he  confidently  expected  to  reap  one  of  two 
advantages.  Either  he  would  exasperate  the  enemy  into 
fighting  in  the  open  field,  or  the  Acharnians,  knowing 
that  their  own  property  was  destroyed,  would  be  less  eager 
to  fight  for  that  of  others,  and  Archidamus  would  be  at 
liberty  to  ravage  Attica  as  he  pleased. 

His  plans  were  not  ill-laid,  but  they  were  frustrated  by  the 
great  personal  ascendency  of  Pericles.  So  long  as  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  army  lay  at  Eleusis,  the  Athenians  still  cherished 
the  hope  that  the  rest  of  the  country  would  escape.  Those 
who  knew  the  history  of  the  past  were  aware  that  Cleomenes 
of  Sparta  had  once  led  an  army  as  far  as  Eleusis,  only  to  see 
it  disperse.  And  many  would  remember  that  fourteen  years 
before  the  present  invasion,  Plistoanax  had  reached  the 
Thriasian  plain  and  then  retired.  But  when  the  invaders 
were  actually  in  sight,  and  the  fairest  lands  in  Attica  were  at 
Discontent  at  their  mercy,  the  situation  seemed  intolerable. 
Athens.  «  The  whole  people,  and  especially  the  younger 

men,  were  eager  to  go  out  and  put  a  stop  to  it."  The  sight 
was  new  to  them ;  they  had  no  experience  of  the  Spartan 
soldiers'  courage  and  skill.  Men  gathered  in  the  streets, 
abusing  Pericles  and  his  cowardly  policy ;  the  excitement 
was  increased  by  oracles,  remembered  or  invented  for  the 


v.  S-J 


MEASURES  OF  PERICLES,  431. 


119 


occasion.  The  Acharnians,  as  was  natural,  were  in  the  last 
stage  of  exasperation.  They  were  a  hardy  race,  the  colliers 
of  Attica,  who  got  their  living  by  manufacturing  charcoal, 
"hearts  of  maple,"  tough  as  the  logs  which  they  burned. 
Forgetting  all  the  counsels  of  Pericles,  the  whole  people 
called  on  him  to  do  his  duty  as  a  general.  The  situation 
was  difficult,  but  Pericles  was  equal  to  it.  He  appears  at 
this  time  to  have  exercised  an  extraordinary  Action  of 
degree  of  authority,  by  which  he  was  enabled  Pericles- 
to  prevent  any  public  meeting  at  which  the  popular  excite- 
ment might  find  expression.  He  did  what  he  could  to  soothe 
the  prevailing  irritation  ;  and  meanwhile  he  sent  out  parties 
of  horse  to  restrain  the  invaders  from  coming  too  close  to  the 
city  walls.  The  Thessalians,  true  to  their  old  alliance,  had 
sent  cavalry  to  the  aid  of  Athens,  and  these  with  the  native 
horse  proved  themselves  at  least  a  match  for  the  Boeotians 
in  the  Peloponnesian  army. 

These  measures  seem  to  have  had  some  effect  upon  Archi- 
damus.  It  is  at  any  rate  remarkable  that  when  he  broke  up 
from  Acharnae  on  finding  that  the  Athenians  Archidamus 
would  not  come  out  against  him,  he  directed  his  retlres- 
course  to  the  north,  and  contented  himself  with  devastating 
the  country  between  Mount  Parnes  and  Mount  Brilessus. 
Here  his  provisions  began  to  fail,  and  he  found  it  necessary 
to  retire.  Passing  through  the  coast  land  near  Oropus  to 
the  north-east  of  Parnes,  and  wasting  the  country  as  he 
went,  he  entered  Boeotia  by  this  route,1 

5.  The  Athenians  suffered  severely  by  the  invasion,  but 
Pericles  found  means  in  the  course  of  the  year  to  compensate 
them  in  some  degree.  In  spite  of  opposition  he  held  on  his 
way.    His  plans  for  the  war  were  still  accepted  as  the  best, 


1  Thuc.  ii.  18-23.  Thucydides  says  plainly  (c.  22)  that  Pericles 
eKKKrjalav  ovk  eVot'ei  avrcov  ov8e  ^vXAoyoi/  oideva.  As  a  general  he 
could  summon  an  extraordinary  meeting  through  the  Prytaneis — and 
therefore  he  could  omit  to  summon  it :  but  how  he  could  prevent  the 
people  from  giving  expression  to  their  discontent  in  the  ordinary 
meetings  of  the  Assembly,  I  do  not  understand. 


120 


THE  ATHENIAN  FLEET,  431. 


[V.  5. 


and  in  the  conviction  that  Athens,  and  not  Attica,  was  the 
vulnerable  part  of  the  state,  a  decree  was  passed  that  a 
Plans  for  the  thousand  talents  should  be  set  apart  out  of 
protection  of  the  reserve  in  the  treasury,  and  a  hundred  of 
Athens.  ^ne  ^es^  triremes  selected  every  year,  with 

trierarchs  appointed  for  each,  to  be  ready  for  instant  use,  if 
an  attack  was  made  by  sea  on  the  Peiraeus.  So  earnest 
were  the  people  in  the  matter,  that  it  was  made  a  capital 
offence  to  propose  to  use  the  money  or  ships  for  any  other 
purpose.  Measures  were  also  taken  for  securing  the  safety 
of  the  country  from  unexpected  attack  by  establishing  guards 
on  the  frontiers.1 

While  the  Lacedaemonians  were  still  in  their  country,  the 
Athenians  sent  out  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  vessels  to  ravage  the 
,    shores  of  the  Peloponnesus.    Fifty  ships  were 

Movements  of  in 

the  Athenian  also  sent  by  Corcyra,  and  the  combined  fleet 
fleet  in  the         attacked  Methone,  a  fortress  on  the  coast  of 

west  of  Greece.  .  J 

Messenia,  a  little  to  the  south  of  Pylus 
(Navarino),  which  in  the  days  of  Tolmides  had  been  captured 
and  soon  afterwards  abandoned  by  the  Athenians.  Had  the 
attack  succeeded,  the  Athenians  would  have  anticipated  the 
position  which  they  gained  six  years  later  by  the  capture  of 
Pylus.  They  would  have  established  a  place  of  refuge  in 
Messenia  for  any  helots  who  could  find  an  opportunity  of 
joining  them,  and  a  convenient  station  for  the  union  of  the 
contingents  coming  from  *  east  and  west.  But  the  attempt 
failed.    In  this,  their  very  first  landing  on  the  shores  of  the 


1  Thuc.  ii.  24  :  (pvXaicas  Karea-T^aavTo  Kara  yr\v  kcu  Kara  OdXaaaav, 
axmep  brj  efieWov  did  tvclvtos  tov  noXepov  (pvKd^eiv.  In  iii.  17  we  are 
told  ttjv  re  yap  'Attiktjv  k&\  Evfiotav  koi  2a.XafXi.va  itcardv  (vrjes) 
ecpvXaaaov.  Previotisly  the  Peiraeus  was  dcpvXaKros  /cat  anXyaTos, 
eiKorcos,  did  to  enLKpareiv  ttoXv  t<o  vavriKcp  (ii.  93),  and  again,  ibid. 
ovtc  vavriKov  rjv  7rpo(f)vXdaaov  iv  avrat  ov8ev,  and  on  the  promontory 
of  Salamis  towards  Megara  there  was  a  fortress  (q^povpiov)  and  a 
guard  of  three  vessels  only.  One  would  like  to  know  much  more 
about  these  measures  of  precaution.  Where  were  the  hundred 
vessels  employed  ?  What  was  gained  by  the  qyvXanai  Kara  yrjv,  when 
it  is  clear  that  the  Peloponnesians  marched  in  and  out  of  the  country 
as  they  pleased  ? 


V.  SO 


BRAS  IDAS  AT  METHONE,  431. 


121 


Peloponnesus,  they  were  met  by  a  Spartan,  whose  courage 
and  genius  proved  more  than  a  match  for  the  plans  of 
Pericles  and  the  power  of  Athens — Brasidas,  the  son  of 
Tellis.  He  was  on  guard  in  the  neighbourhood — for  the 
Spartans  sent  out  parties  of  their  citizens  to  keep  watch  on 
the  outlying  districts  of  their  dominions — and  knowing  the 
weakness  of  the  place,  he  hastened  up  with  a  hundred  men, 
broke  through  the  scattered  troops  of  the  Athenians,  and 
secured  the  town  for  Sparta.  The  Athenian  fleet  sailed  on 
to  Elis,  where  it  was  joined  by  a  few  ships  from  Naupactus. 
Some  successes  were  gained  at  Phea,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Alpheus,  but  on  the  approach  of  the  Elean  army,  the 
Athenians  re-embarked.  More  important  by  far  was  the 
conquest  of  Sollium,  a  Corinthian  town  in  Acarnania,  and  the 
acquisition  of  the  whole  of  the  island  of  Cephallenia  as  an 
ally  of  Athens.  This  success  was  achieved  without  a  single 
blow,  and  not  long  afterwards  the  fleet  returned  home.  No 
attempt  appears  to  have  been  made  by  the  Peloponnesians 
to  intercept  the  progress  of  tjie  Athenians,  or  to  meet  them 
on  the  seas ;  but,  after  their  return,  the  Corinthians  ven- 
tured out  as  far  as  Astacus  in  Acarnania.  The  town  had 
been  captured  by  the  Athenians,  who  had  expelled  Evar- 
chus,  the  reigning  tyrant,  and  added  it  to  their  alliance.  It 
now  fell  back  into  the  hands  of  Corinth,  and  Evarchus  was 
restored  to  his  throne.  An  attempt  to  recover  Cephallenia 
failed  completely.1 

While  thus  engaged  on  the  shores  of  the  Peloponnesus, 
the  Athenians  sent  a  smaller  fleet  into  the  Euripus,  to  cruise 
off  Locris  and  keep  watch  over  the  island  of  ,  . 

-r,   ,  mi  .  ,  ,  The  Athenian 

-huboea.    Ine  expedition  was  successful;  the  fleet  in  the 
Locrian   coast    was   ravaged,   the   town   of  EuriPus- 
Thronium  was  captured,  and  the  Locrians  defeated  in  an 
attempt  to  relieve  it.     To  secure  their  good  behaviour,  a 
number  of  hostages  were  taken,  and  the  island  of  Atalanta, 
hitherto  uninhabited,  was  fortified  and  held  by  an  Athenian 


Thuc.  ii.  23,  25,  30,  33.   Brasidas  received  public  commendation. 


i22 


AEGINA  AND  MEGARA,  431. 


[V.  6. 


garrison.  By  these  measures,  any  designs  which  the  Locrians 
or  Phocians  may  have  had  upon  Euboea  were  entirely 
frustrated,  and  a  check  was  put  upon  their  piracy.1 

6.  These  successes  were  accompanied  by  others  nearer 
home,  from  which  the  Athenians  reaped  a  more  tangible 
.    .  advantage.    Soon  after  the  return  of  the  Pelo- 

The  Aeginetans  t  ° 

expelled  from  ponnesian  army  from  Attica,  the  Athenians 
Aegma.  crossed  over  to  Aegina,  and,  on  the  ground  that 

the  Aeginetans  had  been  the  main  cause  of  the  war,  entirely 
expelled  the  inhabitants  from  the  island.  The  long  quarrel 
between  the  cities  was  drawing  to  a  close,  though  unhappily 
even  this  severe  punishment  did  not  satisfy  Athenian  hatred. 
Most  of  the  Aeginetans  were  received  by  the  Lacedaemonians 
and  settled  in  the  Thyreatis — the  beautiful  coast  land  on 
the  western  bay  of  the  shore  of  Argos,  which  so  long 
formed  a  bone  of  contention  between  that  city  and 
Sparta.  The  farms,  houses,  and  other  property  in  the 
island  the  Athenians  divided  among  their  own  citizens, 
who  now  occupied  Aegina  as  colonists  ("  cleruchs  ").2  Later 
in  the  summer,  Pericles  led  out  the  entire  force  of  the 
city  into  the  territory  of  Megara  to  lay  waste  the  country. 
Devastation  of  The  army  was  joined  by  the  fleet,  which  had 
Megara.  jus^  re turned  from  Western  Greece,  and  thus 

the  largest  force  which  Athens  ever  had  in  one  place  was 
occupied  in  devastating  the  territory  of  an  unresisting  and 
insignificant  adversary,  already  reduced  to  semi-starvation 
by  the  decree  which  excluded  all  Megarians  from  trading  in 
the  ports  of  the  Athenian  empire.  The  same  display,  though 
on  a  smaller  scale,  was  repeated  twice  a  year  for  the  next 
seven  years.  The  exasperation  of  Athens  against  Megara 
was  extreme,  passing  even  the  measure  of  neighbourly 
hatred  in  Greece.  In  addition  to  more  recent  causes  of 
hostility,  it  was  vexatious  to  find  so  small  a  state  so  obstinate 
in  its  attachment  to  the  Peloponnesian  cause ;  the  more  so 
as  Megara  had  once  been  the  friend  of  Athens.    Her  forts 


»  Thuc.  h\  26,  32. 


2  Thuc,  ii.  27, 


V.  6.]  POT  I  DAE  A  AND  SITALCES,  Jfll. 


123 


had  been  garrisoned  by  Athenian  soldiers ;  her  Long  Walls 
had  been  built  by  Athenian  citizens,  even  before  Athens  had 
Long  Walls  of  her  own.  While  Megara  was  the  ally  of 
Athens,  the  direct  route  from  the  Peloponnesus  into  Attica 
had  been  closed,  and  Pericles  was  not  likely  to  forget  that 
in  the  hour  of  danger  Megara  had  deserted  Athens  and 
opened  the  isthmus  to  Plistoanax.  She  must  be  made  to 
feel  how  powerless  Sparta  was  to  aid  her,  and  coerced,  if 
possible,  into  becoming  once  more  an  ally  of  Athens.1 

In  addition  to  these  expeditions  Athens  had  been  sustain- 
ing for  a  whole  year  the  burden  of  the  siege  of  Potidaea, 
where  no  fewer  than  three  thousand  of  the  The  siege  of 
citizen-soldiers  were   permanently  encamped,  Potldaea- 
besides  a  large  additional  force,  subsequently  despatched 
under  the  command  of  Phormio.    In  spite  of  the  invasion  of 
Attica,  the  Athenians  had  not  withdrawn  a  single  soldier ; 
yet  the  besieged  city  held  out,  and  in  fact  not  one  of  the 
revolted  Ohalcidic  towns  returned  to  its  allegiance.    In  these 
circumstances  it  was  tempting  to  try  what  could  be  done  by 
negotiation  with  the  princes  of  the  barbarian  nations  in  the 
neighbourhood.     Could  they  be  induced  to  Alliance  with 
assist  the  Athenians  against  their  rebellious  s,talces- 
subjects  1     With   this   object,  Nymphodorus   of  Abdera, 
whose  sister  Sitalces,  the  king  of  the  Odrysian  Thracians, 
had  married  (supra,  p.  47),  was  not  only  appointed  by  the 
Athenians  to  be  their  representative  at  Abdera,  but  invited 
to  Athens  with  a  view  to  an  alliance  with  his  brother-in-law. 
Sitalces  was  not  unwilling  to  avail  himself  of  the  support  of 
the  Athenians  in  extending  and  strengthening  his  kingdom  ; 
the  Athenians  were  not  less  willing  to  obtain  his  alliance 
against  Chalcidice.    Their  expectations  were  fulfilled.  Nym- 
phodorus not  only  brought  about  the  desired  alliance,  but 
also  set  on  foot  a  peace  between  Athens  and  Perdiccas,  the 
king  of  Macedonia,  to  whom,  on  his  persuasion,  the  Athenians 
restored  Therma.    For  some  time  past  Perdiccas  had  been 


1  Thuc.  ii.  31  ;  cp.  supra,  p.  68  f. 


124  PERICLES'  FUNERAL  ORATION,  431-430.       [V.  7. 


at  war  with  the  Athenians,  but  now  he  joined  Phormio,  the 
Athenian  general,  in  fighting  against  the  Chalcidians.  That 
the  alliance  might  be  the  more  lasting,  the  Athenians  gratified 
Sadocus,  the  son  of  Sitalces,  by  making  him  a  citizen  of  their 
city.  Other  and  more  brilliant  promises  which  Nymphodorus 
held  out  during  his  stay  at  Athens — that  Sitalces  would  send 
forces  to  Chalcidice  and  bring  the  war  to  an  end — were  only 
partially  fulfilled.1 

7.  So  ended  the  first  year  of  the  conflict  in  which 
Pericles  had  involved  his  city.  The  Athenians  had  acquired 
The  first  year  some  distant  and  uncertain  allies  ;  they  had 
of  the  war:  repulsed  the  Peloponnesian  army  at  Oenoe  ; 
loss  and  gain.  they  had  acquired  Cephallenia  for  the  alliance, 
and  they  had  gained  some  successes  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Corinthian  gulf.  On  the  other  band,  the  Peloponnesians 
had  defeated  the  attack  on  Methone ;  they  were  in  as  good 
a  position  at  the  end  of  the  year  as  they  had  been  at  the 
beginning ;  and  they  had  laid  waste  a  great  part  of  Attica. 
We  can  imagine  with  what  bitterness  the  country  people 
revisited  their  ruined  homes  and  desolate  fields.  Their 
vexation  became  greater  when  they  reflected  that  the  same 
thing  would  happen  from  year  to  year.  What  was  gained, 
they  asked,  by  such  a  sacrifice  1  The  empire  must  be  main- 
tained, no  doubt,  but  why  force  matters  to  such  an  extremity 
with  Sparta  1  The  two  cities  had  drawn  together  in  old 
days ;  why  should  there  not  be  concessions  now  ?  Sparta 
had  shown  a  great  desire  to  avoid  war ;  why  should  Athens 
be  so  obdurate  ? 

In  previous  speeches  Pericles  had  explained  his  plans  of 
war,  and  stated  the  reasons  which  led  him  to  hope  for  success. 
Pericles  chosen  He  had  now  an  opportunity  of  inspiring  his 
to  pronounce  fellow-citizens  with  a  higher  idea  of  their  duties 
oration  on  the  to  the  city.  It  was  the  custom  at  Athens  to 
dead-  bring  home  the  bones  of  those  who  perished 

in  the  service  of  their  country  and  bury  them,  at  the  public 


1  Thuc.  i.  59,  61,  64  ;  ii.  29.    Aristoph.  Acharn.  141-150. 


V.  7.]       THE  IDEAL  CITY  OF  PERICLES,  481-430.  125 


expense,  in  the  Ceramicus,  or  Potter's  Field,  the  most  beautiful 
suburb  of  the  city.  A  day  was  appointed  in  the  winter,  when 
military  operations  were  over,  for  the  funeral ;  the  strictness 
of  Athenian  habits  was  somewhat  relaxed  on  the  occasion;  the 
funeral  procession  was  accompanied  by  any  one  who  chose, 
whether  citizen  or  stranger,  and  the  female  relatives  of  the 
dead  were  present  at  the  sepulchres  to  make  lamentation. 
When  the  remains  had  been  laid  in  the  earth,  some  man  "  of 
known  ability  and  high  reputation  "  was  chosen  by  the  city 
to  pronounce  an  oration  over  those  who  had  fallen  in  her 
cause.  In  accordance  with  this  custom,  Pericles  was  chosen 
to  speak  over  those  who  fell  in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and 
he  availed  himself  of  the  opportunity  to  put  before  the 
Athenians  a  picture  of  their  life  and  institutions,  which  was 
to  them  a  proof  that  they  were  suffering  in  a  worthy  cause, 
and  to  the  world  has  become  an  ideal  description  of  demo- 
cratic society  and  government. 


"  Our  institutions,"  he  said,  "  are  not  borrowed  from  those  of  other 
cities  ;  they  are  our  own,  the  creation  of  Athenian  statesmen.  We 
are  called  a  democracy,  because  with  us  the  people 
govern,  and  there  is  one  law  for  rich  and  poor.    But  pe^es  ^  °f 
we  are  also  an  aristocracy ;  not  of  birth,  nor  of 
wealth,  but  of  merit ;  a  state  in  which  every  one  who  can  benefit 
the  city  may  do  so  without  hindrance. 

"  Such  is  the  freedom  of  our  political  life,  and  in  society  we  are 
equally  without  constraint.  Every  one  does  what  he  pleases,  with- 
out suspicion  or  offence  ;  we  do  not  banish  a  man  from  our  company 
because  his  ways  are  different  from  our  own.  But  along  with  this 
unconsti  ained  liberty  there  goes  a  spirit  of  reverence  which  per- 
vades every  act  of  our  public  life  ;  authority  is  maintained  ;  the  laws 
are  obeyed,  not  from  any  fear  of  punishment,  but  from  principle  ; 
and  of  all  ordinances  the  most  sacred  in  our  eyes  are  those  which 
protect  the  injured,  who  cannot  retaliate  ;  and  the  unwritten  laws, 
which,  though  enforced  by  no  legal  penalty,  bring  reproach  to  the 
transgressor. 

"  First,  then,  we  have  striven  to  be  free,  and  next  we  seek  to  be 
happy.  We  have  provided  ourselves,  to  a  greater  degree  than  any 
other  city,  with  festivals  and  public  games,  to  be  a  rest  and  refresh- 
ment after  toil ;  in  our  own  homes  we  are  surrounded  by  elegance 


126 


SECOND  INVASION  OF  A  TTICA,  430.  [V.  8. 


and  refinement,  as  a  charm  against  melancholy;  and,  owing  to  the 
greatness  of  our  city,  to  which  the  produce  of  ail  the  earth  is  brought, 
we  are  as  familiar  with  the  gifts  of  the  most  distant  regions  as  we  are 
with  the  fruits  of  Attica. 

"  In  the  same  spirit  we  approach  the  severer  duties  of  the  citizen's 
life.  Our  resources  are  not  a  mystery  to  be  concealed  from  every 
eye,  but  any  one  may  visit  our  city  and  learn  from  us  what  he  can. 
We  do  not  afflict  ourselves  with  laborious  training,  and  yet,  in  the 
hour  of  trial,  our  courage  does  not  fail.  Free  and  light  of  heart, 
trusting  to  habit  rather  than  law,  we  are  yet  as  ready  for  action  as 
those  who  spend  their  lives  in  anticipating  danger  and  preparing  to 
meet  it.    So  much  the  greater  is  our  gain. 

"  Once  more  :  we  dare  to  think  as  well  as  act ;  we  live  for  ourselves, 
while  living  for  the  state.  With  us  a  love  of  what  is  beautiful  is 
consistent  with  economy,  and  a  man  is  a  man  though  he  cultivates 
his  mind.  Yet  we  do  not  separate  the  citizen  from  the  statesman  ; 
when  a  man  has  no  time  to  give  to  public  affairs,  we  do  not  merely 
say  that  he  is  minding  his  own  business,  but  we  call  him  an  unprofit- 
able servant.  If  we  cannot  always  set  a  policy  on  foot,  we  can  form 
a  good  judgment  about  it,  for  we  look  on  discussion  as  the  best  pre- 
paration for  action  ;  our  courage  is  not  due  to  ignorance  or  stupidity, 
but  we  go  into  danger  with  our  eyes  open,  and  counting  the  cost. 
Yet  our  policy  is  not  a  mere  calculation  of  self-interest.  More 
than  any  other  nation,  we  have  drawn  our  friends  to  us  by  kindly 
actions,  and  we  have  assisted  others,  without  hope  of  advantage, 
in  the  confidence  of  freedom.  From  such  a  city  the  Hellenic  world 
may  take  a  lesson.  Of  all  men  the  Athenian  citizen  is  the  most 
accomplished  and  versatile ;  his  parts  are  many,  and  he  is  admirable 
in  each.  Of  all  cities,  Athens  alone  is  greater  than  her  fame.  She 
needs  no  poet  to  sing  her  praises  ;  every  land  and  every  sea  can 
furnish  proofs  of  her  enterprise  and  success.  Her  enemies,  when 
defeated,  are  not  disgraced ;  her  subjects  confess  that  she  is  worthy 
to  rule  them." 1 

8.  With  the  return  of  spring  (430)  the  Peloponnesians 
were  again  in  Attica.  After  desolating  the  central  plain, 
Second  inva-      they  passed  on  towards  Sunium,  laying  waste 

sion  of  Attica.      tne  coagt  Jand  Qn  either  ^  Qf  ^  prom()n. 

tory ;  but  before  many  days  had  passed,  they  were  informed 


1  Thuc.  ii.  34  ff. 


V.  8.] 


THE  PLAGUE  AT  ATHENS,  4$0. 


127 


that  the  plague  had  broken  out  at  Athens,  and  it  is  said  that 
their  invasion  was  cut  short  on  this  account.  However  this 
may  be,  they  remained  not  less  than  forty  days,  the  longest 
stay  they  ever  made,  and  ravaged  the  entire  country.  During 
the  whole  of  the  time  the  'plague  was  raging  in  the  ill-fated 
city.1 

This  new  and  terrible  disease  was  imported,  as  is  commonly 
the  case  with  such  disorders,  from  the  east.  From  Ethiopia 
and  Egypt  it  was  brought  to  Persia  and  Greece.  The  plague  at 
It  first  appeared  in  the  Peiraeus,  from  which  it  Athens- 
spread  rapidly  to  the  upper  city.  For  a  time  it  was  thought 
that  the  Peloponnesians  had  poisoned  the  water-tanks  and 
wells,  but  the  disease  was  soon  discovered  to  be  of  an  in- 
fectious nature,  entirely  unknown  to  the  Greek  physician, 
and  beyond  the  reach  of  help,  human  or  divine. 

Athens  was  ill  prepared  for  such  a  visitation.  The  city 
was  crowded  with  the  inhabitants  who  had  been  brought  in 
from  the  country,  and  as  they  had  no  houses  of  their  own, 
the  new  comers  were  closely  packed  together  in  stifling  huts, 
among  which  the  disease  raged  with  terrible  effect.  The 
dead  lay  in  heaps;  the  dying  wallowed  in  the  streets,  or 
crawled  round  the  fountains,  consumed  with  an  unquench- 
able thirst.  The  very  temples  were  filled  with  corpses. 
There  was  no  organised  service  for  the  removal  of  the  dead ; 
each  man  buried  his  own  as  he  could,  and  often  the  survivors, 
owing  to  the  number  of  the  corpses,  made  use  of  burial- 
places  not  their  own,  or  threw  the  dead  on  funeral  pyres 
which  were  burning  for  others. 

In  the  Peloponnesus  the  plague  did  little  harm.  That  it 
appeared  there  we  know,  but  we  do  not  hear  of  it  in  any  of 
the  great  cities.  Only  in  the  remote  town  of  The  plague  at 
Phigalea,  in  the  south-west  corner  of  Arcadia,  phi£alea« 
have  we  any  record  of  its  presence.  There,  in  the  glen  of 
Bassae,  surrounded  by  rocks  and  old  knotted  oaks,  stands 
the  temple  of  Apollo  the  Helper,  the  most  perfect  ruin  in 


1  Thuc.  ii.  47,  55,  57. 


128 


ATTACKS  ON  PELOPONNESUS,  430. 


[V.  8. 


Greece  next  to  the  "Theseum"  at  Athens,  which  was  built 
as  a  thankoffering  for  the  assistance  rendered  by  the  god 
when  the  plague  raged  at  Phigalea.1 

The  horrors  which  surrounded  him  did  not  turn  Pericles 
from  his  purpose.  Even  in  the  early  days  of  the  invasion, 
The  Athenian  before  the  Peloponnesians  had  left  the  central 
fleet*  plain  for  the  coast,  he  had  equipped  a  fleet  of 

one  hundred  vessels,  carrying  an  army  of  no  fewer  than 
four  thousand  Athenian  hoplites.  A  number  of  old  ships 
were  also  converted  into  transports  for  the  conveyance  of 
three  hundred  horses,  a  new  feature  in  the  naval  equipment 
of  Athens.  This  armament  was  then  joined  by  fifty  ships 
from  Chios  and  Lesbos.  At  the  head  of  this  imposing  force, 
Pericles  set  sail  for  the  Peloponnesus  to  make  reprisals  for 
the  damage  done  to  Attica.  From  the  coast  land,  into  which 
they  now  moved,  the  Peloponnesians  would  see  the  fleet 
standing  across  the  bay,  a  convincing  proof  that  Athens  was 
not  yet  crushed  by  her  misfortunes. 

Arriving  off  the  coast  of  Argolis,  the  fleet  attacked 
Epidaurus,  but,  though  the  country  was  laid  waste,  the 
Descents  on  the  town  C0UW  not  be  taken.  Similar  descents 
Peioponnesian  were  made  at  Troezen,  Halieis,  and  Hermione, 
coast  cities  on  the  same  coast,  which  were  allies  of 

Sparta,  and  with  a  similar  result.  At  Prasiae,  an  insignifi- 
cant place  on  the  coast  of  Laconia,  the  expedition  was  so 
far  successful  that  it  took  and  plundered  the  town,  but  no 
attempt  at  a  permanent  occupation  seems  to  have  been 
made.  The  fleet  then  returned  to  Athens,  whence  it  was 
immediately  sent  out  again,  under  the  officers  who  had 
served  with  Pericles,  to  take  part  in  the  siege  of  Potidaea. 
It  had  hardly  arrived  at  its  destination  before  the  plague 
broke  out  among  the  troops,  spreading  from  the  new  comers 
to  the  soldiers  previously  engaged  in  the  siege.  Every 

1  For  the  plague,  see  Thuc.  ii.  47  ff;  Jowetfc,  Thu«.  ii.  143  ff. 
For  the  temple  at  Bassae,  Paus.  viii.  41,  §  7  f. ;  Leake,  Morea, 
ii.  1  ff.,  etc.  The  architect  of  the  temple  was  Ictinus,  who  built  the 
Parthenon  at  Athens. 


V.  9-]      INDIGNA  TION  AGAINST  PERICLES,  430.  129 


attempt  to  take  the  city  failed,  and  the  fleet  returned  to 
Athens,  after  a  stay  of  forty  days,  with  a  loss  of  more  than 
a  fourth  of  the  four  thousand  hoplites.1 

g.  A  change  came  over  the  spirit  of  the  Athenians.  In 
the  city  the  plague  was  raging,  and  no  one  could  deny  that 
its  effects  were  greatly  increased  by  the  crowd-  Change  of 
ing  of  the  Athenians  within  the  walls.  Had  feeling  at 
they  been  scattered  over  Attica  in  garrisons,  Athens- 
the  danger  of  infection,  at  any  rate,  would  have  been  less. 
Outside  the  walls,  the  whole  of  Attica  from  Athens  to 
Simium,  from  Sunium  to  Marathon,  from  Marathon  to 
Eleusis,  was  utterly  laid  waste.  Every  proprietor  and 
farmer  was  deprived  of  the  income  which  his  lands  brought 
him.  At  the  same  .lime  the  richer  men,  on  whom  the  chief 
burdens  of  the  navy  and  cavalry  fell,  had  been  called  upon 
to  furnish  a  large  force.  The  fleet  had  sailed  round  Pelopon- 
nesus, and  visited  Potidaea,  and  what  had  been  accomplished? 
A  few  patches  of  coast  land  had  been  ravaged  in  Argolis, 
a  Laconian  hamlet  had  been  captured.  At  Potidaea  the 
expedition  had  not  only  failed,  but  the  plague  had  been 
carried  into  a  healthy  army,  and,  we  may  suppose,  into  the 
homes  of  Athenian  allies  in  Chios  and  Lesbos. 

The  first  effect  of  the  change  of  feeling  was  seen  in  the 
despatch  of  envoys  to  Sparta  with  proposals  for  peace.  But 
the  Spartans,  who  probably  believed  the  plague  Proposals  for 
to  be  worse  than  it  was,  would  listen  to  no  peace- 
overtures.  They  thought  that  Athens  would  soon  be  driven 
to  submission.  Or  they  may  have  distrusted  proposals  which 
did  not  come  to  them  with  the  authority  of  Pericles.  What- 
ever the  reason,  the  envoys  entirely  failed  in  their  mission. 
The  greater  was  the  exasperation  against  the  author  of  the 
war;  Pericles  became  the  most  unpopular  man  in  Athens. 
He  had  hitherto  prevented  the  people,  so  far  as  he  could, 
from  meeting  for  the  discussion  of  public  affairs,  but  he  now 
summoned  an  Assembly,  in  the  hope  of  bringing  them  into 


»  Time.  ii.  56,  58. 
VOL.  III. 


I 


130 


THE  ATHENIAN  EMPIRE,  430. 


[V.  9. 


a  better  mood.  He  had  no  confessions  of  error  to  make ;  it 
was  the  people,  not  himself,  who  had  changed;  with  the 
Speech  of  exception  of  the  plague,  which  was  beyond 
Pericles.  human  foresight,  nothing  had  happened  of 

which  they  had  not  been  forewarned.  If  they  had  been  right 
in  deciding  for  war,  they  were  wrong  now  in  wishing  to  dis- 
continue it.  The  change  was  unworthy  of  them,  and  more 
unworthy  still  was  the  determination  to  make  one  man 
responsible  for  a  policy  to  which  all  were  pledged.  War 
was  a  great  evil,  which  no  city  would  bring  upon  herself  if 
it  could  be  avoided,  but  loss  of  independence  was  a  greater 
evil  by  far,  and  when  the  choice  lay  between  the  two,  there 
was  no  room  for  hesitation. 

Pericles  then  pointed  out  that  the  evils  which  had  over- 
taken the  Athenians,  however  disastrous  to  individual  citizens, 
had  left  the  strength  of  the  city  unimpaired.  Their  chances 
of  victory  were  as  good  as  ever.  Their  navy  was  still  the 
greatest  in  the  world ;  they  were  absolute  masters  of  the 
sea  •  and  not  even  the  Great  King  could  prevent  them  from 
sailing  wherever  they  chose.  What  was  the  loss  of  houses 
or  lands  to  men  who  possessed  such  a  power  1  So  long  as 
they  preserved  their  freedom,  they  could  quickly  recover 
what  was  lost ;  but  if  they  became  the  servants  of  others, 
they  would  lose  everything.  Their  ancestors  had  won  a 
great  empire ;  were  they  unable  even  to  maintain  it  1  That 
would  be  an  intolerable  disgrace. 

It  was  the  possession  of  this  great  empire  which  made  the 
position  so  critical.  "Do  not  imagine,"  Pericles  said,  "that 
The  Athenian  you  are  fighting  for  a  simple  issue — freedom  or 
empire.  slavery.    You  have  an  empire  to  lose  ;  you  are 

exposed  to  the  hatred  which  your  imperial  policy  has  brought 
upon  you.  Your  empire  is  a  tyranny,  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Greeks,  has  been  unjustly  acquired,  and  which  you 
cannot  safely  surrender.  It  is  too  late  to  play  the  honest 
man ;  and  those  who  advise  such  a  policy  will  bring  the 
state  to  ruin.  ...  To  be  hateful  and  offensive  has  ever  been  at 
the  time  the  fate  of  those  who  have  aspired  to  empire. 


V.  10.]       PERICLES*  DEPOSED  AND  FINED,  430.  131 


But  he  judges  well  who  accepts  unpopularity  in  a  great 
cause." 

We  cannot  but  admire  the  undaunted  spirit  of  the  man, 
who  in  the  teeth  of  a  powerful  opposition,  amid  the  desola- 
tion of  Attica,  and  the  horrors  of  the  plague,  could  present 
such  a  front  to  his  enemies.  Yet  throughout  this  speech — 
the  last  recorded  of  Pericles  —  there  breathes  a  love  of 
domination  which  was  dangerous  to  the  freedom  of  Greece ; 
it  nourished  the  most  selfish  passions  of  the  Athenian  people. 
They  had  long  been  taught  to  regard  the  money  of  the 
allies  as  their  own,  and  the  Delian  confederacy  had  been 
reduced  to  submission  by  the  contributions  which  were  made 
to  ensure  its  freedom.  Now  they  were  taught  that  Athens 
was  a  tyrant  city,  hated  like  a  tyrant,  and  compelled  like  a 
tyrant  to  rely  on  force  for  protection.  Not  only  were  the 
interests  of  Hellas  regarded  as  subordinate  to  the  interests  of 
Athens,  but  honesty  was  confessed  to  be  a  dangerous  policy. 
Such  was  the  "bad  eminence"  to  which  Athens  had  been  raised 
by  Pericles ;  and  great  indeed  is  the  contrast  between  this 
declaration  of  foreign  policy  and  the  ideal  picture  of  social 
and  political  equality  sketched  for  us  in  the  Funeral  Speech.1 

10.  The  Athenians  were  so  far  moved  by  the  advice  of 
Pericles  that  they  sent  no  more  embassies  to  Sparta,  and 
resolved  to  go  on  with  the  war.  Their  private  feelings 
towards  him  were  not  so  easily  satisfied.  Rich  and  poor 
alike  regarded  him  as  the  author  of  their  mis-  Fail  of 
fortunes,  and  combined  for  his  overthrow.  pericies. 
When  the  time  arrived  for  electing  the  generals  for  430-429, 
he  was  not  re-elected,  and  subsequently  he  was  condemned  to 
pay  a  fine  of  50  t.  on  a  charge  of  embezzlement  of  the  public 
funds.  The  condemnation  was,  of  course,  a  party  stroke, 
for  embezzlement  was  of  all  offences  the  one  which  could 
not  be  proved  against  Pericles.  But  it  was  an  offence  readily 
believed  in  all  public  men  at  Athens,  and  that  was  enough.2 

1  Thuc.  ii.  60  ff ;  see  Jowett's  translation  of  c.  64. 

2  Thuc.  ii.  65.  It  is  not  quite  certain  whether  Pericles  was 
deposed  from  his  office  (diro)(€tpoTovr)6€Ls)  or  not  re-elected.    Nor  ig 


[32 


ZACYNTHUS  AND  ARGQS,  430.  [V.  II. 


For  the  first  time  for  fifteen  years,  Pericles  was  without 
office  as  general ;  he  was  compelled  to  look  idly  on  while 
The  sons  of  fche  management  of  the  state  passed  into  the 
Pericles.  hands  of  others.    The  bitterness  of  his  fall  was 

rendered  more  acute  by  the  private  misfortunes  which  now 
overtook  him.  Of  his  two  sons,  Xanthippus  and  Paralus 
(supra,  p.  53),  Xanthippus  had  long  been  on  bad  terms  with 
his  father,  owing  to  his  own  worthless  character,  and  that  he 
fell  a  victim  to  the  plague  was  perhaps  no  reason  for  regret. 
So  much  the  deeper  was  the  affection  lavished  on  Paralus, 
and  when  he  also  was  carried  off  by  the  remorseless  pesti- 
lence, Pericles  was  entirely  crushed  by  the  blow.  The 
Athenians  were  touched  by  his  calamities,  and  passed  a 
decree,  under  which  his  son  by  Aspasia,  Pericles  the  younger, 
was  made  an  Athenian  citizen,  and  his  house  saved  from 
extinction.1 

II.  The  war  went  on  as  before.  The  extreme  democrats, 
who,  though  opposed  to  Pericles,  were  in  favour  of  the  war, 
western  proved  stronger  than  the  oligarchical  party, 

Greece :  who  would  have  combined  his  overthrow  with 

zacynthus.  negotiations  for  peace ;  and  the  inhabitants 
of  the  country,  who  were  the  worst  sufferers, 
seem  to  have  been  unable  to  turn  the  scale.  The  operations 
were  chiefly  in  Western  Greece.  This  was  no  doubt  mainly  due 
to  the  Corinthians,  who  were  anxious  to  destroy  the  Athenian 
power  in  those  regions,  and  make  the  new  alliance  between 
Corcyra  and  Athens  of  no  effect,  while  the  Lacedaemonians 
gladly  embraced  an  opportunity  of  revenging  themselves  for 
the  recent  Athenian  expedition  round  the  Peloponnesus.  A 

Attack  on 

hundred  ships  were  sent  against  Zacynthus,  the 
Amphiiochian  ally  of  Athens,  but  though  the  island  was 
Argos,  ravaged,  the  Zacynthians  could  not  be  brought 

to  terms.  Later  in  the  year  the  Ambraciots  summoned  a 
force  of  Chaonians  and  other  "  barbarians  "  to  aid  them  in 

it  clear  whether  he  was  out  of  office  for  a  whole  year,  or  for  a  shorter 
time. 

1  Pint  Per.  24,  36,  37. 


V«.  12.]       PHORMIO  SENT  TO  NAUPACTUS,  430.  133 

an  attack  on  Amphilochian  Argos,  with  which  they  had 
been  on  bad  terms  for  years,  but  in  this  case  also  the  city 
could  not  be  taken,  and  after  laying  waste  the  country  the 
army  dispersed.1  The  Athenians  may  have  expected  that  the 
Corcyraeans  would  support  their  interests  in  the  west,  but  in 
this  they  were  deceived.  No  help  came  from  Corcyra  to 
Zacynthus  or  Argos,  perhaps  none  could  come  after  her 
heavy  loss  in  the  battle  with  Corinth ;  and  it  was  clear 
that  Athens  must  have  a  force  of  her  own  in  those  regions, 
or  the  Ionian  sea  would  be  closed  against  her.  At  the 
end  of  the  summer  twenty  ships  were  sent  to  Naupactus, 
under  the  command  of  Phormio,  one  of  the  phormio 
generals  of  the  year.  The  appointment  was  sent  to 
a  most  happy  one.  Phormio  had  already  NauPactus- 
delivered  Argos  from  the  aggression  of  the  Ambraciots 
(supra,  p.  48) ;  he  was  well  known  in  the  west,  and  was  soon 
to  prove  himself  the  ablest  naval  officer  at  Athens.2 

At  the  same  time,  six  triremes  were  sent  to  Caria,  under 
Melesander,  to  collect  arrears  of  tribute,  and  put  an  end 
to  the  piracv  of  the  Peloponnesians  in  those 

™       .         n  ™        i  •     •     T      •         i-i  Eastern 

waters.    The  city  of  Phasehs,  m  Lycia,  which  Greece: 
was  a  subject  ally  of  Athens,  was  the  centre  Melesander 
of  the  trade  from  Phoenicia  and  Cyprus  to  the 
Aegean.     On  their  way  to  and  from  this  port,  Athenian 
vessels  were  seized  by  Peloponnesians  who  issued  from  con- 
venient positions  on  the  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  The 
expedition  was  a  failure.     Melesander  fell  in  battle  while 
attempting  to  penetrate  into  the  interior  of  Lycia.3 

12.  In  the  north  all  went  well  with  the  Athenians.  A 
number  of  envoys  from  the  Peloponnesus  with  Aristeus  of 
Corinth  at  their  head,  whom  the  Athenians  regarded  as 
the  main  cause  of  their  troubles  in  Chalcidice,  had  been 
despatched  to  Asia  in  the  hope  of  persuading  the  Great  King 
to  take  part  in  the  war.     On  their  way  they  visited  the 


1  Time.  ii.  68.    See  also  Oberhummer,  Akarvai.ien,  p.  97. 

2  Thuc.  ii.  69.  3  Thuc.  ii.  69. 


134 


SITALCES:  POTIDAEA,  430. 


[V.  iz 


court  of  the  Odrysian  king,  Sitalces,  thinking  that  he  might 
be  brought  to  abandon  the  Athenians,  or  at  least  to  convey 
Northern  the  envoys  across  the  Hellespont.    The  visit 

Greece:  proved  a  fatal  mistake.    Two  Athenians  who 

seizure  of  ^ 

Peioponnesian  happened  to  be  with  Sitalces  at  the  time  per- 
envoys.  suaded  his  son  Sadocus  to  seize  the  envoys 

as  they  were  about  to  cross  the  straits,  and  deliver  them  into 
their  hands.  The  captives  were  at  once  carried  to  Athens, 
where  they  were  put  to  death  on  the  very  day  of  their 
arrival,  without  any  trial,  and  their  bodies  thrown  down 
precipices.  This  savage  act  was  justified  as  a  retaliation  on 
the  Lacedaemonians,  who,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
slaughtered  all  their  captives  at  sea,  whether  allies  of  the 
Athenians  or  neutrals.  And  at  this  time  Athenian  feeling 
was  much  excited  against  Persia.  The  "Medising"  party 
in  Colophon,  with  the  aid  of  the  satrap  of  Sardis,  had 
recently  seized  the  city  for  the  King,  compelling  the  patriots 
to  take  refuge  in  the  harbour  of  Notium.  A  bad  act  cannot 
justify  a  worse,  but  it  was  certainly  a  gain  to  the  Athenians 
to  have  got  rid  of  Aristeus,  and  to  have  given  a  check  to 
Spartan  negotiations  with  Persia.  The  alliance  with  Sitalces 
was  beginning  to  bear  fruit.1 

More  important  was  the  surrender  of  Potidaea,  which  took 
place  towards  the  end  of  the  year.  For  more  than  two  years 
Surrender  the  heroic  defenders  had  successfully  defied  the 
of  Potidaea.  utmost  efforts  of  Athenian  skill  and  energy. 
But  the  invasions  of  Attica,  from  which  so  much  had  been 
expected,  had  brought  no  relief,  and  at  last  supplies  ran 
short.  Still  the  city  held  out,  and  it  was  not  till  the  ex- 
tremity of  famine,  "even  to  the  eating  of  human  flesh,"  had 
been  endured,  that  the  final  overtures  were  made.  The 
besiegers  had  suffered  much,  and  they  had  before  them  the 
prospect  of  a  third  winter  in  their  exposed  situation,  while 
the  expenses  of  the  siege  had  run  up  to  about  £400,000  of 
our  money.    On  both  sides  there  was  an  eagerness  to  bring 

1  Thuc.  ii.  67  ;  iii.  34.  The  seizure  of  Colophon  took  place  about 
the  time  of  the  second  invasion  of  Attica. 


v.  lW  ARCHWAMmATPLATAE^^ 

fli-i  tn  an  end   and  the  terms  proposed  were 
1116  7!  Tthe  2  h  "ian  generals.     The  Potidaeans,  with 

XCXJ^CU  find  a  home,  and  Potidaea 

^tiX^  SJtk  -ice  invaded  Attica  in 
ine  of  salg  a  Corinthian  colony;  the  Peloponnesian 
tethad    en  I  nt  into  the  Ionian  sea  to  support  Corinthian 
fnterest  but  f  or  Boeotia  nothing  had  been  done.    The  war 
wan  with  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Thebes  to  seize 
PlSaea  an  attempt  which  failed,  and  after  two  years  of 
war  the  Thebans  were  as  far  from  attaining  them  object  as 
Tver    They  wonld  wait  no  longer,  and  at  them  request,  » 
h   Spr in    of  the  following  year  (429),  Archidamus  instead 
of  iSng  Attica,  led  his  forces  into  the  Plataean  territory 
He  2  about  to  ravage  the  country  when  he  was  met  by 
envoys  from  the  city,  who  reminded  him  that  TnePe 
after  the  great  battle  which  finally  broke  he  nesian^ae 
Bower  of  the  Persians  m  Greece,  Pausamas,  putaea 
L  Lacedaemonian,  had  offered  sacrifice  m  ^ 

their  liberties  (vol.  m  p.  232)    Keg «£\  id  the 

Archidamus  was  now  invading  ^ ritory 

Thebans,  the  worst  enemies  of  the  city,  in  oring  g 

"^Srurachnowledged  the  justice  of  the  Piataean 
seller  deelares  that  Cleon  has  reeled  10  tat ™  ^  were  dis. 


136 


PLATAEA  FAITHFUL  TO  ATHENS,  429. 


[V.  13. 


claim,  but  professed  to  believe  that  their  actions  did  not 
correspond  to  their  words.  Their  independence  had  indeed 
been  guaranteed  to  them,  and  he  was  willing,  as  he  was 
bound,  to  respect  it ;  but  the  Plataeans  had  put  themselves 
in  a  false  position.  While  claiming  the  help  of  all  the 
Hellenes  in  securing  their  own  independence  and  freedom, 
they  had  deserted  their  former  allies,  and  joined  the 
Athenians  in  enslaving  Hellas.  It  was  to  emancipate  the 
enslaved  Greeks  that  the  war  had  been  undertaken ;  let 
them  join  in  it,  or  at  least  remain  neutral,  aiding  neither  side 
but  receiving  both  as  friends — a  course  already  once  pro- 
posed to  them.  The  Plataeans  replied  that  they  could  do 
nothing  without  the  Athenians;  their  wives  and  children 
were  now  at  Athens,  and  under  the  proposed  terms 
the  Athenians  might  come  as  friends  and  compel  them 
to  remain  in  their  alliance ;  so,  too,  the  Thebans  might 
come,  taking  advantage  of  the  peace  as  before,  and  renew 
their  attack.  Archidamus  offered  to  be  surety  for  Plataea 
and  everything  in  the  city,  or  in  the  territory :  let  the  Plataeans 
go  where  they  chose,  and  on  the  return  of  peace  they  should 
receive  their  own;  meanwhile  the  Lacedaemonians  would 
till  the  ground  and  pay  rent  for  it.  These  proposals  the 
Plataeans  were  willing  to  put  before  the  Athenians,  and 
with  their  permission  they  would  do  as  Archidamus  wished. 
Archidamus  then  granted  a  truce  for  the  negotiations.  The 
envoy  returned  from  Athens  with  a  message  calling  on  the 
Plataeans  to  stand  firm;  the  Athenians  never  had  abandoned 
them  in  the  past,  and  they  would  aid  them  now  to  the  utmost 
of  their  power.  Upon  this  the  Plataeans  resolved  to  remain 
true  to  their  alliance,  and  let  the  Lacedaemonians  do  their 
worst :  answer  was  made  from  the  walls  to  this  effect.  Archi- 
damus, after  a  solemn  appeal  to  the  gods  to  favour  his  enter- 
prise, which  was  justified  because  the  Plataeans  had  not  only 
deserted  the  Hellenic  alliance  for  that  of  Athens,  but  had 
refused  to  accept  his  overtures,  began  the  siege.1    All  the 

1  Thuc.  ii.  71-74.  Diodor.  xii.  47  merely  says:  fxeXkovTov  tfavrcov 
drjoiip  rfjv  %a>pav,  /cat  irapaKakovvTW  rovs  IlXaraiets  airoarrjvai  rwv 


V.  i3-] 


PLATAEA  BESIEGED,  1#9. 


137 


resources  of  engineering  skill  were  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  city,  but  in  vain ;  when  a  huge  mound — the  work  of 
seventy  days — had  been  raised  against  the  siege  of 
wall,  in  order  to  capture  the  town  by  this  Piataea- 
primitive  method  (x^/xa),1  the  Plataeans  rendered  it  useless, 
partly  by  raising  the  wall,  partly  by  removing  the  earth 
through  a  mine,  but  most  of  all  by  building  a  second, 
crescent-shaped  wall  within  that  part  against  which  the 
mound  was  raised,  so  that  if  this  were  captured,  the  besiegers 
would  still  have  another  wall  to  surmount,  and  at  the  same 
time  be  exposed  to  a  cross  fire.  Engines  of  assault  were 
also  brought  up,  among  them  battering-rams,  but  the 
Plataeans  broke  off  the  heads  of  these  by  dropping  heavy 
beams  upon  them.2  The  Peloponnesians  then  attempted  to 
set  the  town  on  fire,  but  the  plan  failed  of  success  owing  to 
the  stillness  of  the  weather  and  an  opportune  storm  of  rain. 
Finding  his  efforts  useless,  Archidamus  was  driven  to  invest 
the  city ;  a  double  wall  was  built  round  it,  and  garrisoned 
partly  with  Peloponnesian,  partly  with  Boeotian,  soldiers.3 

These  operations  occupied  the  Peloponnesians  .from  May 
to  October.  During  the  whole  of  this  time  Athens  took  no 
steps  whatever  to  deliver  those  who  had  shut  themselves  up 
in  their  city  and  allowed  their  country  to  be  ravaged  in 
reliance  on  promises  of  Athenian  help.  For  these  promises 
Pericles,  if  it  is  right  to  assume  that  he  was  not  now  in 
office,  was  not  himself  responsible,  but  those  who  gave  them 
must  have  been  aware  that  they  could  not  now  assist  the 
Plataeans  without  meeting  the  Boeotians,  at  least,  in  the  open 

'Adrjvalcov,  cos  ov  Trpoaelxov  avrois,  enopOrjae  ttjp  ^copai/.  Duncker, 
G.  A.  ix.  474  n.,  thinks  it  impossible  that  Archidamus,  as  the  ally  of 
Thebes,  can  have  offered  neutrality  to  the  Plataeans,  or  security  for 
their  possessions.  This  part  of  the  story  he  regards  as  an  invention 
of  the  Spartans,  who  wished  to  justify  their  action  as  far  as  possible. 

1  See  Herod,  i.  162  :  alpee  ras  noXias  x&>p.a(ri. 

2  This  is  said  to  be  the  first  occasion  on  which  engines  were  used  ; 
see  supra,  p.  33  and  note :  Droysen,  Die  Griechischen  Kriegsalterthumer, 
pp.  208,  209,  and  notes. 

3  Thuc.  ii.  75-78.  For  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  siege, 
see  below. 


138  SPARTOLUS:  PERICLES  RESTORED,  429.      [V.  14. 


field,  a  policy  which  had  been  renounced  at  the  very  beginning 
of  the  war.  The  abandonment  of  Plataea  to  her  fate  was  the 
inevitable  result  of  the  line  taken  by  Pericles  since  the  peace 
of  445.  Nothing  but  an  effective  army  could  have  saved  the 
town,  and  the  Athenian  army  in  the  hands  of  Pericles  became 
eminently  ineffective.  Some  years  later,  the  Athenians  tried 
their  strength  against  Boeotia  in  the  battle  of  Delium,  but 
only  to  meet  with  a  most  disastrous  defeat. 

14.  About  the  time  of  the  attack  on  Plataea,  the  Athenians 
sent  out  an  expedition  of  2000  heavy-armed  and  200  cavalry 
Defeat  of  the  *°  Thrace.  They  were  anxious  to  follow  up 
Athenians  at  their  successes  there,  and  put  an  end  to  the 
Spartoius.  revolt  of  the  Chalcidians  and  Bottiaeans. 
From  Potidaea,  where  they  disembarked,  the  troops  marched 
to  Spartoius,  hopirj  that  the  town  would  be  given  up  to 
them.  In  this  they  were  deceived ;  aid  arrived  at  Spartoius 
from  Olynthus,  and  an  engagement  took  place  under  the 
walls,  in  which,  though  the  Chalcidian  heavy-armed  were 
defeated,  their  cavalry  and  light-armed  gained  some  advan- 
tage over  those  of  the  Athenians,  who  had  been  joined  by  a 
small  body  of  targeteers  from  the  neighbourhood.  Further 
reinforcements  having  arrived,  the  light-armed  troops  of 
Spartoius  were  encouraged  to  renew  the  attack  on  the 
Athenians.  They  drove  them  back  to  their  baggage,  and 
finally,  aided  by  their  cavalry,  routed  them  with  severe  loss. 
All  three  generals  perished  and  a  fifth  of  the  force;  the 
rest  escaped  to  Potidaea,  and  returned  home.1 

The  news  of  this  defeat  seems  to  have  caused  a  reaction  at 
Athens  in  favour  of  Pericles.  At  the  next  election  of  generals, 
Reaction  in  May  429,  he  was  replaced  in  his  old  position, 
favour  of  "and  everything  was  put  into  his  hands." 

~ Ci  1  c  '  The  reaction  came  too  late.    At  the  time  when 

he  returned  to  office  (J uly)  he  was  already,  perhaps,  stricken 

1  Thuc.  ii.  79.  Cp.  Diod.  xii.  47,  who  reduces  the  Athenian  forces 
to  1000.  The  generals  were  Xenophon  and  Phanomachus,  who  had 
been  in  command  in  the  previous  year,  and  Calliades  (Diod.  I.e.  ; 
Plut.  Nic.  6). 


v.  i5.] 


A  TTA  CK  ON  A  CARNANIA ,  429. 


139 


with  the  disease  which  in  three  or  four  months  brought 
him  to  the  grave.  Under  such  circumstances,  he  can  hardly 
have  taken  any  very  active  part  in  public  affairs,  but  his  last 
days  were  cheered  by  reports  of  the  most  brilliant  exploits 
ever  achieved  by  the  Athenian  fleet. 

15.  Though  the  Ambraciots  had  failed  to  capture  Amphi 
lochian  Argos  in  the  preceding  summer,  they  had  not 
abandoned  their  designs  on  the  city.  They  Attack  on  Acar 
now  came  forward  with  a  plan  for  subjugating  nania,  which  is 
the  whole  country  of  Acarnania,  and  detaching  defeated- 
it  from  the  Athenian  alliance.  A  combined  attack  was  to  be 
made  by  land  and  sea,  so  that  the  Acarnanians  might  be 
unable  to  unite  their  whole  forces  for  resistance.  With  this 
view,  the  Ambraciots  requested  the  Lacedaemonians  to  send 
a  fleet,  with  a  thousand  hoplites  on  board.  On  their  own 
part  they  would  bring  into  the  field  their  army,  and  also 
obtain  the  help  of  the  barbarian  tribes  of  Epirus,  with  whom 
they  had  a  large  and  extensive  connection.  If  the  plot 
succeeded,  and  Acarnania  were  conquered,  Zacynthus  and 
Cephallenia,  and  perhaps  even  Naupactus,  would  fall  into 
the  hands  of  Sparta,  and  it  would  no  longer  be  easy  for  the 
Athenians  to  cruise  round  the  Peloponnesus. 

This  scheme,  attractive  in  itself,  and  warmly  supported  by 
the  Corinthians,  was  readily  taken  up  at  Sparta.  Cnemus, 
the  admiral  who  had  conducted  the  attack  upon  Zacynthus 
in  the  previous  year,  was  at  once  despatched  with  a  thou- 
sand hoplites  in  a  few  vessels,  and  the  fleet  was  ordered  to 
assemble  at  Leucas.  Cnemus  succeeded  in  crossing  to  Leucas 
unobserved  by  Phormio,  the  Athenian  officer  stationed  at 
Naupactus,  and  was  there  joined  by  the  ships  from  Leucas, 
Ambracia,  and  Anactorium.  With  these  he  sailed  to  Am- 
bracia,  expecting  that  the  contingents  of  ships  which  were 
coming  from  Sicyon  and  Corinth  would  overtake  him  there. 
On  his  arrival,  he  found  a  large  force  of  Chaonians  and  other 
Epirotes  ready  to  obey  his  orders ;  even  Perdiccas,  the  king 
of  Macedonia,  though  ostensibly  at  peace  with  Athens, 
secretly  sent  a  thousand  soldiers  (who  arrived  too  late  to  be 


140 


BA  TTLE  OF  STRA  TUS,  4%9. 


[V.  16. 


of  service),  and  an  equal  number  came  from  Antiochus,  the 
king  of  the  Orestae.  Feeling  himself  sufficiently  strong  to 
open  the  game  without  waiting  for  the  ships  from  Corinth 
and  Sicyon,  Cnemus  at  once  began  his  march  to  the  south. 
The  route  lay  along  the  eastern  edge  of  the  Ambracian  gulf, 
through  the  territory  of  Argos  to  Stratus,  o»  the  Achelous, 
which  was  the  largest  city  of  Acarnania. 

The  Acarnanians,  on  hearing  of  the  threatened  invasion, 
had  at  once  sent  to  Phormio  for  help ;  but  as  he  was  daily 
expecting  to  see  the  Corinthian  ships  sail  down  the  gulf, 
he  could  not  leave  Naupactus.  Meanwhile  the  combined 
forces  were  approaching  Stratus.  They  advanced  in  three 
divisions,  of  which  the  barbarians  formed  the  centre.  The 
Hellenic  soldiers  marched  in  good  order  as  they  had  been 
trained  to  do,  but  the  barbarians  rushed  on  at  full  speed, 
thinking  that  they  had  only  to  be  first  on  the  scene  to 
capture  the  town.  The  Stratians  saw  their  opportunity ;  if 
they  could  destroy  the  barbarians  before  the  Greeks  came 
up,  the  whole  expedition  would  receive  a  very  sensible 
check.  They  placed  some  of  their  forces  in  ambuscades 
outside  the  city,  and  when  the  assailants  were  close  to  the 
walls,  a  combined  onset  was  made  from  the  city  and  from 
the  ambuscades.  The  Chaonians  were  at  once  seized  with  a 
panic ;  many  were  slaughtered  ;  the  rest,  carrying  the  other 
barbarians  with  them,  rushed  back  to  the  Greeks,  who 
received  their  first  news  of  the  disaster  from  the  defeated 
fugitives.  Here  a  stand  was  made  for  the  remainder  of  the 
day,  but  when  night  came  on  Cnemus  withdrew  to  the 
Anapus,  and  from  thence  to  Ocniadae,  where  he  disbanded 
his  army.1 

l6.  This  was  not  the  worst.  Almost  on  the  very  day  of 
the  engagement  at  Stratus,  the  fleet  from  Corinth,  which 
should  have  co-operated  with  Cnemus  and  the  land  army, 
was  utterly  defeated  by  Phormio  at  the  mouth  of  the  gulf. 
From  his  station  at  Naupactus  the  Athenian  commander  saw 


1  Thuc.  ii.  80-82  ;  Diod.  xii.  47. 


V.  i6.] 


PHORMIO' S  VICTORY,  429. 


141 


the  ships  moving  along  the  Peloponnesian  shore.    They  had 

no  intention  of  attacking  him,  and  no  fear  that  he  would 

attack  their  forty-seven  vessels  with  his  twenty, 

when  they  suddenly  saw  the  Athenian  ships  peioponnesian 

off  the  opposite  coast  of  Aetolia,  and  when  in  fleet  by 

the  dim  light  of  morning  they  attempted  to 

cross  over  from  Patrae  in  Achaea  towards  Acarnania,  they 

were  met  by  Phormio,  who  bore  down  upon  them  from  the 

mouth  of   the   Evenus.     It  was  impossible  to  avoid  an 

engagement. 

The  Corinthian  commanders  knew  that  their  seamen  were 
not  a  match  for  the  Athenians  in  point  of  skill.  To  be  forced 
into  battle  was  bad  enough  ;  to  be  attacked  outside  the 
strait,  where  there  was  room  for  every  manoeuvre,  was  still 
worse.  They  resolved  to  arrange  their  fleet  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  ordinary  tactics  of  sailing  through  the  line  of  vessels 
and  then  charging  from  the  rear  would  be  impossible.  With 
this  object  they  drew  up  their  ships  in  a  circle,  turning  the 
prows  outward,  and  keeping  them  sufficiently  close  to  avoid 
any  inlet.  The  smaller  craft  were  collected  in  the  central 
space,  where  also  were  placed  five  of  their  swiftest  triremes, 
ready  to  run  out  at  any  point  where  the  enemy  attacked. 

On  seeing  this  formation,  Phormio  at  once  arranged  his 
plan.  Placing  his  vessels  in  a  single  line,  he  bade  them  pass 
round  the  enemy's  fleet  in  ever  narrowing  circles.  By  this 
means  he  brought  their  ships  into  the  smallest  possible 
compass,  and  kept  them  in  constant  expectation  of  an  attack. 
He  continued  this  movement  till  the  time  at  which  the  morn- 
ing breeze  from  the  Corinthian  gulf  made  it  impossible  for 
the  Peloponnesian  ships  to  remain  steadily  in  their  position. 
Ship  began  to  dash  against  ship ;  the  attention  of  the  sailors 
was  occupied  in  keeping  them  clear  of  each  other,  the  more 
so  as  the  rough  water  made  it  difficult  for  unpractised  rowers 
to  manage  their  oars.  Then  Phormio  gave  the  signal  for 
direct  attack.  The  first  vessel  sunk  was  one  of  the  admirals', 
but  the  havoc  soon  became  universal ;  no  resistance  could  be 
made  -f  in  wM  disorder  the  whole  fleet  ran  for  the  Achaean 


142 


CNEMUS  AND  BRASIDAS,  429.  [V.  17. 


coast,  hotly  pursued  by  Phormio,  who  captured  twelve  vessels 
with  most  of  their  crews.  The  rest  escaped  to  Cyllene  in 
Elis,  where  they  were  joined  by  Cnemus  and  the  ships  from 
Leucas.1 

17.  At  the  news  of  this  disaster,  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
highly  indignant.  They  could  not  understand  how  a  few 
commissioners  ships  could  defeat  so  many,  or  recognise  that 
sent  to  Cnemus.  their  own  fleet  was  so  vastly  inferior  to  the 
Athenian  as  it  had  been  proved  to  be.  They  did  not  indeed 
recall  their  admiral  and  fine  or  banish  him,  as  the  Athenians 
would  have  done  under  similar  circumstances,  but,  while 
sending  him  orders  to  fight  again,  they  also  sent  three  com- 
missioners, one  of  whom  was  Brasidas,  to  advise  with  him. 
Supported  by  their  help,  Cnemus  sent  round  to  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  allies  for  more  vessels,  and  refitted  those  which  had 
been  damaged  in  the  engagement. 

Intelligence  of  these  preparations  was  brought  to  Phormio, 
who  at  once  sent  to  Athens  for  reinforcements;  a  battle 
Reinforcements  might  take  place  any  day,  and  he  would  have 
sent  to  Phormio.  to  meet  the  whole  Peloponnesian  fleet  with  no 
more  than  twenty  vessels.  From  Corcyra,  whose  fleet  was 
to  be  of  such  advantage  to  Athens  in  her  operations  in 
Western  Greece,  not  a  single  ship  had  been  sent  to  aid 
Acarnania  or  Phormio,  who  was  thus  left  entirely  to  his  own 
resources  or  help  from  Athens.  The  greater  is  our  astonish- 
ment to  find  that  the  reinforcement  voted  at  Athens 
amounted  to  twenty  vessels  only,  and  that  even  these, 
though  every  day  was  of  the  greatest  importance,  were 
bidden  to  sail  to  Crete  before  they  joined  Phormio  !  Who 
was  responsible  for  this  extraordinary  order  we  do  not  know; 
the  Athenians  could  have  gained  nothing  by  the  most  bril- 
liant success  in  Crete — which,  so  far  as  we  know,  they  never 
revisited  in  the  course  of  the  war  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  position  of  Athens  in  Western  Greece  was  in  peril.  It 


1  Thuc.  ii.  83,  84 ;  Diod.  xii.  48.  For  details,  see  Grote,  iv.  313, 
notes. 


SECOND  ENGAGEMENT,  429. 


143 


was  a  grave  blunder,  and  nothing  but  the  skill  and  bravery 
of  Phormio  saved  Athens  from  irretrievable  disaster.1 

When  all  was  ready,  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  left  Cyllene 
for  Panormus  in  Achaea,  where  the  land  forces  were  assem- 
bled to  support  it.    Phormio,  meanwhile,  who  _ 

z  n  Engagement  in 

was  resolved  not  to  fight  in  the  narrow  channel,  the  Corinthian 
sailed  from  Naupactus  to  the  promontory  of  gulf* 
Antirrhium,  anchoring  outside  it.  The  Peloponnesians, 
who  were  as  anxious  to  fight  in  the  gulf  as  Phormio  was 
to  fight  outside  it,  met  him  by  moving  to  a  point  exactly 
opposite,  but  just  inside  the  gulf,  where  the  distance  from 
shore  to  shore  was  not  more  than  a  mile.  The  number  of 
their  vessels  had  been  raised  to  seventy-seven,  while  Phormio 
had  no  more  than  his  original  twenty.  For  six  or  seven  days 
the  two  fleets  lay  opposite  each  other,  until  at  length  Cnemus 
and  Brasidas,  finding  that  Phormio  would  not  enter  the 
strait,  determined  to  draw  him  into  it.  Before  going  into 
action  they  thought  it  necessary  to  raise  the  courage  of  their 
sailors,  —  who,  in  spite  of  the  disparity  of  The  Pelopon 
numbers,  were  far  from  confident  of  success,  nesians  encour- 
— partly  by  dwelling  on  the  increased  chances  agetheirsai,ors 
of  victory,  and  partly  by  hinting  that  any  want  of  courage 
would  be  noticed  and  punished.2 

Phormio  also,  though  he  had  hitherto  trained  his  sailors  to 
the  belief  that  no  superiority  of  forces  on  the  enemy's  side 
could  justify  a  retreat  on  theirs,  on  seeing  them  dispirited  by 
the  odds  which  they  had  now  to  face,  gathered  them  together 
and  encouraged  them  in  a  brief  address.  He  pointed  out  that 
the  enemy  had  assembled  in  such  force  because  they  were 


1  Time.  ii.  85.  The  force  was  sent  to  Crete  at  the  request  of 
Nicias,  a  citizen  of  Gortys  and  proxenus  of  the  Athenians,  ostensibly 
to  conquer  the  hostile  city  of  Cydonia,  but  really  to  interfere  in  some 
neighbourly  quarrel  between  Polichna  and  Cydonia.  It  did  nothing 
beyond  ravaging  the  territory  of  Cydonia,  and  was  delayed  by  con- 
trary winds  on  its  return.  Nicias  was  a  friend  of  the  Polichnitae, 
and  Arnold,  ad  loc,  suggests  that  the  AtheDians  would  naturally  be 
ill-disposed  towards  the  Cydonians,  who  were,  in  part,  colonists  from 
Aegina.  2  Tlluc<  {i  87> 


i4i 


PIIORMIO  AGAIN  VICTORIOUS,  4%9-         [V.  18. 


afraid  of  defeat,  and  their  courage  was  due,  not  to  experi- 
ence at  sea,  but  to  experience  on  land.  It  would  fail  them 
when  they  saw  that  the  Athenians  were  ready  to  attack  in 
spite  of  the  disparity  of  numbers.1 

l8.  Forming  their  vessels  four  abreast,  the  Peloponnesians 
now  fronted  north-east  or  east,  and  sailed  along  the  shore  of 
Achaea  into  the  gulf,  twenty  of  their  fastest  vessels  leading  the 
way.  Phormio  at  once  saw  the  danger ;  he  had  left  Naupactus 
unprotected,  for  even  the  Messenians  of  the  town  had  followed 
him  on  shore  to  support  his  vessels,  and  if  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  got  ahead,  they  would  reach  the  place  before  he  could 
save  it.  He  embarked  at  once,  and  bidding  the  Messenians 
follow,  sailed  in  single  file  along  the  coast  with  all  speed 
for  Naupactus.  This  was  exactly  what  Brasidas  wished  ; 
the  Athenian  ships  had  now  no  room  for  any  exhibition  of 
their  dreaded  skill.  Changing  front,  he  suddenly  brought 
his  whole  line  four  deep  upon  the  flank  of  Phormio's  vessels. 

It  was  an  excellent  manoeuvre,  and  well  carried 

mentolTau-  oufc  '>  bufc  owing  to  the  superiority  of  the 
pactus :  Phor-  Athenians  in  rowing,  it  was  only  partially 
mio's  victory.  succesBfui#  Eleven  of  Phormio's  vessels  escaped 
the  swiftest  Peloponnesian  ships ;  the  remaining  nine  were 
forced  aground ;  one  ship  was  taken  with  its  crew,  others 
were  being  towed  away,  when  the  Messenians  dashed  into 
the  water  and  saved  them. 

So  far  the  victory  was  on  the  side  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
who  might  reasonably  have  thought  that  they  had  redeemed 
their  previous  failure.  But  half  the  Athenian  fleet  remained. 
Of  the  eleven  ships  which  escaped  the  attack,  ten  reached 
Naupactus,  and  ranged  themselves  in  a  position  of  defence, 
should  the  enemy  attempt  to  force  them  ashore.  One  re- 
mained behind  the  rest,  unable  to  keep  up  in  the  race.  In 
their  wake  came  the  twenty  Peloponnesian  vessels,  of  which 
one,  a  Leucadian,  far  in  advance  of  the  rest,  was  chasing  the 
Athenian  laggard.    In  the  line  of  pursuit  lay  a  merchantman, 


i  Time.  ii.  89. 


V.  19- ]  PHORMWS  SECOND  VICTOR  Y,  429. 


145 


anchored  in  the  det,p  water  off  Naupactus.  The  Athenians 
saw  their  opportunity.  At  full  speed  they  rowed  round  the 
anchored  vessel,  and,  bearing  down  on  the  ship,  by  which 
they  were  themselves  pursued,  struck  her  amidships,  and  so 
injured  her  that  in  a  short  time  she  sank.  Timocrates,  one 
of  the  Peloponnesian  admirals,  who  was  on  board,  seeing 
that  his  ship  was  sinking,  drew  his  sword  and  slew  himself. 
The  Peloponnesians  were  dismayed ;  they  had  come  on  in 
loose  order,  singing  the  paean  of  victory,  but  their  temper 
changed  in  a  moment,  and  checking  their  pursuit,  they 
waited  for  the  body  of  the  fleet  to  come  up.  The  delay  was 
fatal;  the  Athenians,  cheered  by  the  brilliant  success  of 
their  ship,  and  seeing  the  disorder  of  the  enemy,  sailed  out 
and  fell  upon  the  Peloponnesians,  who  were  without  any 
settled  plan  of  battle.  After  a  short  resistance  they  fled  to 
Panormus,  whence  they  had  started,  pursued  by  the  Athen- 
ians, who  captured  six  of  the  enemy's  vessels,  and  recovered 
the  eight  of  their  own  which  had  been  driven  on  shore.  On 
the  following  night  the  Peloponnesians  stole  away  to 
Corinth.1 

19.  The  attempt  to  acquire  control  of  the  Corinthian  gulf 
had  entirely  failed,  but  before  the  ships  dispersed  from 
Corinth,  the  Peloponnesian  commanders  re-  Proposed  attack 
solved,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Megarians,  to  on  the  Peiraeus. 
make  an  attack  in  another  direction.  The  harbour  of 
Peiraeus  was  neither  closed  nor  guarded,  and,  though  forty 
ships  of  war  lay  in  the  port  of  Nisaea,  the  Athenians,  secure 
in  the  mastery  of  all  the  adjacent  seas,  considered  that  three 
ships  of  war  stationed  at  Budorum  on  the  promontory  of 
Salamis  which  looks  toward  Megara,  were  sufficient  to 
keep  them  in  check.  Here  was  an  opportunity  for  a  sudden 
surprise,  an  attack  on  the  very  centre  of  the  Athenian  power. 
Preparations  were  at  once  begun ;  the  sailors  were  bidden  to 
take  the  rowing  tackle  out  of  their  own  ships,  and  march  by 

1  Thuc.  ii.  90.  How  the  fifty-seven  ships  of  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  which  had  forced  Phormio'snine  ships  aground  were  put  to 
flight  is  not  clear. 

VOL.  III.  K 


146         THE  PEL0P0NNES1ANS  IN  SAL  AMIS,  429.     [V.  19. 


night  across  the  isthmus  from  Corinth  to  Nisaea.  On  their 
arrival,  they  at  once  launched  the  forty  vessels,  as  had  been 
arranged,  but  at  this  point  their  courage  failed  them;  the 
risk  seemed  too  great,  and  changing  their  course,  they  sailed 
to  Salamis,  where  they  captured  the  three  ships  before  the 
Athenians  had  time  to  man  them,  and  ravaged  the  island,  of 
which  for  nearly  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  the  Athenians 
had  been  in  secure  possession. 

Fire  signals  at  once  conveyed  information  of  the  attack  to 
Athens.  The  excitement  was  intense.  The  inhabitants  of 
the  upper  city  thought  that  the  enemy  had  already  sailed 
into  the  harbour;  the  inhabitants  of  Peiraeus  feared  that 
Salamis  was  captured,  and  an  attack  on  the  harbour  immi- 
nent. At  daybreak  the  Athenians  rushed  to  the  shore, 
manned  their  vessels  in  all  haste,  and  crossed  to  Salamis, 
while  others  remained  on  guard  in  the  Peiraeus.  The 
Peloponnesians  had  no  intention  of  risking  an  engagement ; 
the  memory  of  their  defeat  was  too  recent,  and  the  ships  in 
which  they  put  out  from  Nisaea  were  old  and  unseaworthy. 
With  their  captives  and  spoil,  including  the  three  ships 
from  Budorum,  they  returned  to  Megara  and  dispersed. 
The  Athenians  also  returned  home,  but  the  lesson  was  not 
lost  on  them;  from  this  time  onwards  the  mouth  of  the 
harbour  was  closed  and  a  strict  watch  kept.1 

In  defence  of  their  conduct,  the  Peloponnesians  asserted 
that  they  were  prevented  by  adverse  winds  from  entering 
Peiraeus ; 2  but  in  the  judgment  of  Thucydides,  this  was  a 
mere  excuse,  and  there  was  nothing  in  the  weather  to 
prevent  resolute  men  from  entering  the  harbour.  It  is, 
however,  doubtful  whether  an  unsupported  attack  in  forty 
unseaworthy  ships  on  the  harbour  of  Athens,  even  if  success- 
ful at  first,  could  have  ended  in  anything  but  disaster ;  and 
as  Brasidas  was  one  of  the  commanders  of  the  Peloponnesian 


1  Thuc.  ii.  93,  94. 

2  "  Phalerum,  they  say,  is  the  right  harbour,  because  it  is  so  hard 
to  tack  into  Peiraeus." — Clough,  Life  and  Letters,  p.  248. 


V.  20.]  LAST  DAYS  OF  PR0RMI0,  429-4^8. 


147 


fleet,  we  must  suppose  that  other  reasons,  and  not  a  want  of 
courage,  determined  the  abandonment  of  the  plan. 

A  few  weeks  later,  Phormio  sailed  with  a  considerable  force 
from  Naupactus  to  Astacus,  which,  in  spite  of  the  restora- 
tion of  Evarchus  in  431, 1  seems  now  to  have  Phormioin 
been  favourable  to  Athens,  and  marching  into  Acamania. 

i    His  return  to 

the  interior,  he  expelled  from  btratus  and  Athens  and 
Coronta  and  other  towns  any  citizens  who  death- 
were  likely  to  oppose  Athenian  interests.  Oeniadae  was 
unapproachable  owing  to  the  floods  of  the  Achelous,  and 
Phormio  returned  to  Naupactus  for  the  winter.  In  the 
following  spring  (428)  he  sailed  to  Athens,  taking  with  him 
his  ships  and  captives ;  but  such  is  the  vexatious  reticence 
of  Grecian  historians,  that,  in  spite  of  his  brilliant  services 
to  his  country,  we  never  hear  of  this  officer  again  ;  we  con- 
clude that  he  died  soon  after  his  return  home,  or  he  would 
certainly  have  been  sent  out  in  the  following  summer  to 
take  the  command  at  Naupactus,  a  post  which  was  given 
to  his  son  Asopius.2 

20.  Meanwhile  the  whole  of  Northern  Greece  had  been 
terrified  by  a  gathering  of  the  tribes  of  Thrace.    Two  years 
previously,  in   the   summer  of   431    (supra,  Movements 
p.  123),  Sitalces,  the  king  of  the  Odrysians,  in  Thrace: 
had  become  an  ally  of  the  Athenians,  who  Sltalces- 
wished  to  obtain  his  assistance  in  reducing  the  revolted  cities 
in  Chalcidice.    About  the  same  time  Perdiccas  had  prevailed 
upon  him  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between  himself  and 
the  Athenians,  and  to  abandon  the  idea  of  restoring  Philip  to 
his  kingdom.    In  the  interval,  Perdiccas,  having  obtained  his 
object,  forgot  his  promises,  while  Sitalces  took  no  steps  towards 
assisting  the  Athenians.    This  neglect  was  now  brought  to 
his  notice  by  some  envoys  sent  from  Athens  for  the  purpose, 
who  also  would  not  fail  to  remind  him  that  Perdiccas  had 
treacherously  sent  1000  Macedonians  to  operate  against 

1  Time.  ii.  33. 

2  Thuc.  ii.  102,  103.  Phormio  was  one  of  the  heroes  of  Athenian 
gtory  :  cp,  Aristoph.  Knights,  560 ;  Lysistr,  804. 


148 


THE  POWER  OF  SITALCES,  429.  [V.  20. 


Athens  in  Acarnania.  Sitalces  resolved  to  put  forth  his  whole 
strength.  Perdiccas  was  to  be  deposed  from  the  throne  of 
Macedon,  and  in  concert  with  Hagnon,  the  Athenian  general, 
whose  name  was  well  known  in  Thrace  as  the  founder  of 
Amphipolis,  a  combined  attack  on  Chalcidice  was  planned,  in 
which  the  Athenians,  according  to  their  agreement,  were  to 
take  part  with  as  large  a  force  as  possible.1 

The  empire  of  Sitalces  has  been  described  (supra,  p.  46).  It 
was  the  greatest  power  between  the  Ionian  Sea  and  the  Euxine. 
The  levy  of  The  tribes  included  in  it  were  numerous  and 
Sitalces.  warlike,  and  only  required  competent  leaders 

to  make  them  a  formidable  army.  These  tribes  Sitalces 
now  called  out.  He  first  summoned  those  adjacent  to  his 
own  territory — the  Thracians  who  dwelt  between  Mount 
Haemus  and  Mount  Ehodope,  extending  to  the  shores  of  the 
Euxine  and  Hellespont ;  then  the  Getae  from  beyond  the 
Haemus,  and  other  tribes  as  far  as  the  Danube — nations 
which,  like  their  Scythian  neighbours,  fought  in  battle  as 
mounted  archers.  He  paid  or  persuaded  a  number  of  Dii 
from  the  heights  of  Rhodope,  the  most  warlike  of  all  the 
Thracians,  and  armed  with  their  native  dirks,2  to  join  his 
ranks,  though  they  did  not  acknowledge  his  supremacy. 
From  the  banks  of  the  Strymon  he  summoned  the  Agrianes 
and  Laeaei,  and  other  Paeonians ;  from  the  northern  slopes 
of  Mount  Scombrus  the  Treres  and  Tilataei.  This  mighty 
host  was  still  increased  by  many  independent  tribes  who 
joined  it  in  the  hope  of  plunder,  until  it  reached  a  total  of 
150,000  men,  of  whom  one-third  were  mounted  soldiers.3 

In  a  previous  expedition  against  the  Paeonians,  Sitalces 
had  cut  a  road  over  Mount  Cercine,  and  by  this  he  now 
Invasion  of  advanced  to  Doberus,  from  which  he  could 
Macedonia.  descend  the  valley  of  the  Axius,  into  Mace- 
donia.4 As  he  carried  with  him  Amyntas,  the  son  of  Philip, 
who  was  now  dead,  intending  to  make  him  king  of  Macedonia 


1  Thuc.  ii.  95,  96.  2  Thuc.  vii.  27.  3  Thuc.  ii.  96,  98. 

4  For  the  geography,  see  esp.  Abel's  Mab  donien,  p.  60  f. 


V.  20.] 


SITALCES  IN  MACEDONIA,  429. 


149 


in  the  room  of  Perdiccas,  he  purposely  led  his  forces  into 
the  district  on  the  left  of  the  Axius,  the  part  of  the  kingdom 
over  which  Philip  had  previously  ruled.  The  banks  of  the 
river  were  defended  by  a  number  of  walled  cities,  founded 
by  the  races  which  had  held  the  country  before  the  Mace- 
donian conquest.  Of  these  Eidomene  was  taken  by  storm, 
but  others  opened  their  gates  to  Amyntas,  whom  they 
regarded  as  their  legitimate  king,  and  it  was  not  till  they 
reached  Europus  that  the  invaders  met  with  a  resistance 
which  they  could  not  overcome.  Even  this  did  not  put 
an  end  to  their  depredations ;  they  ravaged  Mygdonia, 
Crestonaea,  Anthemus,  and  all  Macedonia  to  the  left  of 
Pella  and  Cyrrhus.1 

The  resources  of  Macedonia  were  unequal  to  repelling 
such  a  host.  The  country  had  not  yet  been  provided  with 
the  numerous  strongholds  and  excellent  roads  by  which 
Archelaus  subsequently  strengthened  his  kingdom — doing 
more  for  Macedonia  in  his  single  reign  than  all  the  kings 
before  him.  The  people  made  the  best  of  their  position, 
retiring  into  their  castles,  and  keeping  up  a  series  of  attacks 
on  the  Thracians  with  their  excellent  and  well-armed 
cavalry.  Their  best  hope  lay  in  the  numbers  of  the 
invaders;  it  was  impossible  for  such  a  horde  to  remain 
long  in  one  place,  or  risk  the  dangers  of  a  winter  campaign ; 
and  when  on  reaching  Chalcidice,  Sitalces  found  that  the 
Athenians  did  not  appear  according  to  their  agreement, 
he  decided  to  return  home.  He  had  already  The  Athenians 
entered  into  negotiations  with  Perdiccas,  who  fail  to  meet 
had  won  over  Seuthes,  the  nephew  of  Sitalces  retire^and*10 
and  next  in  power  to  the  king  himself,  by  the  makes  terms 
promise  of  the  hand  of  his  sister  Stratonice.  wlth  Perdlccas- 
The  cause  of  Amyntas  was  abandoned,  and  after  a  raid 
into  Chalcidice  and  Bottice  the  Thracian  withdrew  his  army. 
Nothing  important  had  been  achieved.    The  Chalcidic  cities 


1  "Left,"  that  is,  of  the  Axius;  they  did  not  enter  Pieria  and 
Boltiaea.    For  Bottiaea  and  Bo'tice,  see  Forb<  s,  Thve.  i.  51 


150 


DEA  TH  OE  PERICLES,  429. 


[V.  21 


had  not  been  reduced,  and  Perdiccas  was  in  a  better  position 
than  ever.1 

The  movement  of  so  great  a  host  filled  the  neighbouring 
nations  with  alarm.  The  Thessalians,  on  the  south,  prepared 
to  meet  invasion,  and  on  the  north  the  Thracian  tribes  who 
were  still  independent  feared  that  they  would  have  to  fight 
for  their  freedom.  All  the  enemies  of  Athens,  aware  of  the 
alliance  between  that  city  and  the  Thracian  king,  expected 
to  see  the  hosts  of  the  north  launched  upon  their  territory. 
The  alarm  was  not  unnatural.  Had  the  Athenians  kept 
their  promise,  the  skill  and  energy  necessary  to  conduct  so 
great  an  undertaking  might  have  been  supplied;  and  a 
larger  army  would  have  been  brought  against  the  rebellious 
cities  in  Thrace  than  had  been  seen  since  the  Persian 
invasion.  In  their  absence  the  invasion  of  Macedonia  was 
conducted  without  any  definite  aim  or  fixed  purpose,  and 
though  the  hosts  of  Sitalces  seemed  powerful  by  their 
numbers,  it  was  their  numbers  which  formed  the  chief 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  success.2 

21.  At  the  time  when  these  events  were  taking  place  in 
the  west  and  north  of  Greece,  Athens  was  mourning  the 
The  death  of  loss  of  her  great  leader.  In  September  429, 
Pericles.  two  years  and  a  half  after  the  outbreak  of  the 

war,  Pericles  died.3  He  sank  under  a  lingering  disease, 
which  Plutarch  regards  as  an  insidious  form  of  the  plague, 
unaccompanied  by  the  violent  symptoms.  The  mind  sym- 
pathised with  the  body ;  and  so  low  was  he  brought  that 
to  a  friend  who  visited  him  in  his  sickness,  he  showed  the 

1  Thuc.  ii.  100,  101.  See  also  Abel,  Makedonien,  p.  179.  The 
Macedonian  cavalry  were  redcopaKiapivoi. 

2  See  Aristoph.  Acharn.  148  ff.  (425) : 

6  6'  a>pocre  (Sitalces)  anevhoav  (3or)0r}(reiv,  e^ow 
(rrpaTiav  rocravr-qv  war  ' AOrjvalovs  epdv, 
oa-ov  to  xprjpa  Trapvoncov  npoaep^eTai. 

3  Thuc.  ii.  65  :  enel  re  6  noXepo?  Kareo-TT)  .  .  .  erre^iat  bvo  cttj  kci'i 
e£  prjvas.  The  date  is,  however,  uncertain,  because  We  do  not  know 
whether  Thucydides  reckons  from  the  affair  of  Plataea,  or  the 
invasion  of  Attica — in  the  latter  case  the  death  of  Pericles  must  be 
put  in  November. 


V.  21.] 


INFLUENCE  OF  PERICLES. 


151 


amulet  which  he  had  allowed  the  women  of  his  household 
to  hang  about  his  neck.  Yet  something  of  the  old  Pericles 
remained :  a  few  days  before  his  death,  when  the  friends 
who  gathered  round  him  praised  his  greatness  and  his  ' 
victories — the  nine  trophies  which  he  had  erected  over  the 
enemies  of  the  city — believing  him  to  be  quite  unconscious 
of  their  presence,  Pericles,  who  had  followed  their  words, 
found  voice  to  express  his  wonder  why  they  selected  for 
praise  what  was  partly  due  to  fortune,  and  had  fallen  to  the 
lot  of  many  other  generals,  while  they  left  unrecorded  his 
best  and  greatest  claim  to  renown.  "  No  action  of  mine," 
he  said,  "  has  ever  caused  an  Athenian  to  wear  the  garb  of 
a  mourner." 1 

To  the  sickness  and  death  of  Pericles  we  may,  without 
hesitation,  ascribe  the  unsteadiness  of  plan  and  weakness  in 
execution  which  marks  Athenian  policy  during  The  death 
the  second  half  of  the  year  429.    Had  he  ofPericies: 
retained  his  old  vigour,  the  ships  sent  to  aid  ^Athenian 
Phormio  would  not  have  been  allowed  to  visit  policy. 
Crete,  when   their   presence  was   so  urgently  needed  at 
Naupactus.  Nor  would  the  Athenians  have  failed  to  perform 
their  part  of  the  compact  with  Sitalces,  and  appear  on  the 
coast  of  Ohalcidice,  with  an  adequate  fleet,  when  the  Thracians 
were  ravaging  the  interior.    And  we  cannot  but  hope,  for  the 
honour  of  Athens  and  her  leader,  that  in  spite  of  his  disin- 
clination to  take  the  field,  Pericles  would  have  made  some 
attempt  to  relieve  Plataea,  whose  condition,  in  the  summer 
of  the  year,  was  as  great  a  proof  of  Athenian  incompetence 
and  ingratitude  as  it  was  of  the  devotion  of  her  allies. 

His  death  was  a  calamity  to  Athens.  From  the  first  his 
influence  had  been  personal.  He  had  not  built  uj>  a  structure, 
social  and  political,  which  would  continue  to  exist  when  the 
creating  spirit  had  passed  away  ;  he  had  not  launched  Athens 
on  a  new  line  in  which  she  could  move  forward  without  his 


1  Plut.  Per.  38.  The  first  story  is  taken  from  Theophrastus,  the 
scholar  of  Aristotle,  circ.  300  ;  for  the  second  no  authority  is  given. 


152 


POLICY  OF  PERICLES. 


[V.  21. 


guiding  care ;  he  had  not  even  left  a  party  behind  him.  He 
ruled  alone,  and  when  the  reins  dropped  from  his  hand, 
no  one  else  could  take  them  up.  A  democracy  ruled  by  a 
great  man  is  an  admirable  form  of  government;  but  a 
democracy  with  rulers  absorbed  in  maintaining  their  own 
position  is  incapable  of  governing  itself  or  others :  at  home 
it  is  distracted  by  parties ;  abroad  it  is  inconsistent  or 
tyrannical.  The  Athenian  empire  was  an  outrage  on 
the  autonomous  rights  of  the  allies,  and  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign with  which  Pericles  entered  into  the  war  was  not 
likely,  under  any  circumstances,  to  lead  to  a  final  settle- 
ment between  Athens  and  Sparta;  but,  however  true  this 
may  be,  in  his  views  on  the  position  of  Athens  towards 
her  allies,  and  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  Pericles  displays 
the  great  quality  of  moderation.  He  did  not  oppress  the 
subject  cities  as  they  were  oppressed  after  his  death ;  he  did 
not  seek  to  aggrandise  Athens  in  the  war.  He  dreamed,  not 
of  an  empire  stretching  from  Crete  to  Carthage,  but  of  an 
impregnable  Athens,  a  city  so  strong  that  her  enemies  would 
desist  for  very  weariness  from  attacking  her.  To  this  policy 
he  would  have  clung,  and  neither  defeat  nor  success  would 
have  drawn  him  from  it.  Those  who  came  after  him  were 
of  another  temper;  they  used  every  success  as  a  basis  for 
new  demands,  and  when  defeated  they  were  in  despair. 
There  were  times  when  the  war  was  carried  on  better  after 
his  death  than  during  his  life,  but  it  was  carried  out  without 
a  settled  plan.  Nicias  hoped  for  one  result,  Cleon  for  another; 
and  the  policy  of  Athens  varied  as  one  or  other  was  in  the 
ascendant.  The  mischief  which  showed  itself  in  the  last  two 
years  of  Pericles'  life  became  fixed  and  constant.  In  the 
internal  politics  of  the  city  we  see  a  rapid  decline.  Cleon, 
if  an  unworthy  successor  of  Pericles,  was  at  least  a  man  of 
energy,  with  a  clear  eye  to  the  point  at  issue.  When  he 
died,  the  influence  of  Nicias  became  paramount  till  he  met 
with  a  rival  in  Alcibiades,  and  the  management  of  the  state 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  two  men,  who  in  opposite  ways 
were  equally  a  source  of  disaster  to  Athens. 


V.  21.] 


IDEALS  OF  PERICLES. 


153 


Pericles  died,  and  the  glory  of  Athens  died  with  him; 
in  part,  through  him.  He  has  no  claim  to  be  counted  amon^ 
the  statesmen  who  have  put  new  life  into  their  nation. 
He  was  neither  a  legislator  like  Solon,  nor  a  constitutional 
reformer  like  Clisthenes.  Yet  we  feel  that  by  universal  con- 
sent of  friend  and  enemy,  he  was  the  foremost  man  of  his  day, 
to  whom  all  turned  in  the  hour  of  distress.  Persuasion  sat 
on  his  lips,  not  merely  because  he  was  a  great  orator,  but 
because  he  was  as  wise  as  he  was  eloquent,  and  as  honest  as 
he  was  wise.  We  must  also  allow  that  he  cherished  nobler 
ideals  than  any  other  Greek  before  or  after  him.  In  the  State 
of  Plato  the  higher  life  is  confined  to  a  few  of  the  citizens ; 
little  or  nothing  is  done  for  the  "working  classes"  as  we 
should  call  them.  Even  in  Aristotle's  State,  this  class,  though 
more  clearly  recognised  than  in  Plato,  is  shut  out  from  the 
true  life  of  the  citizen.  Pericles  sought  to  bring  all  within 
the  influence  of  the  state  ;  all  were  to  share  in  the  blessings 
which  it  had  to  bestow;  all  were  to  be  inspired  and  ennobled 
by  its  influence.  If  we  ask  what  the  state  can  do  for  the 
individual,  hardly  any  other  answer  can  be  given  but  the 
answer  of  Pericles.  A  state  cannot  equalise  property,  or 
efface  personal  distinction,  and  the  attempt  to  do  so  is  fatal. 
It  can  secure  to  every  one,  at  least  in  a  large  measure,  the 
power  to  shape  a  life  and  character,  and  the  sense  of  this 
power  is  the  best  possession  of  a  man. 

The  practical  result  formed  a  melancholy  contrast  to  this 
noble  ideal.  When  Pericles  died,  a  large  part  of  the  citizens 
were  pauperised  by  the  means  which  he  had  taken  to  provide 
them  with  leisure.  Their  hereditary  interest  in  their  fields 
and  farms  was  broken,  and  it  was  not  replaced  by  anything 
better.  Their  thoughts  were  absorbed  in  a  struggle  which 
was  anything  but  ennobling;  a  struggle  which  embittered 
existing  hostilities,  destroyed  the  hope  of  any  national 
union,  and  fixed  the  interest  of  Athens  on  the  maintenance 
of  her  empire.  The  Persian  war  had  been  the  highest 
impulse  of  the  fifth  century  in  Greece;  it  sent  a  thrill 
through  the  nation,  and  in  the  years  which  follow  we  reap 


154 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.     [V.  21. 


a  harvest  of  the  best  which  Greece  could  give.  The 
Peloponnesian  war  destroyed  Hellenism.  The  delicate 
bloom  faded ;  it  became  more  and  more  clear  that  Hellenic 
politics  were  a  failure,  and  that  new  forms  of  union  must  be 
devised.  With  these  new  arrangements  and  altered  con- 
ditions of  life,  the  old  Hellenic  feeling,  so  intimately  bound 
up  with  the  city-state,  could  not  co-exist. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  PERICLES   TO  THE   END  OF  427. 

I.  In  the  next  summer,  immediately  after  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  had  made  their  usual  invasion  of  Attica,  Athens 
was  startled  by  the  news  of  the  revolt  of  Lesbos  revolts 
Lesbos  (428).  The  island  had  been  one  of  the  from  Athens- 
first  to  join  the  alliance  after  the  battle  of  Mycale  in  479 ;  it 
had  remained  faithful  to  Athens  when  Samos  broke  into  revolt, 
and  amid  the  general  subjugation  of  the  cities  of  the  league, 
it  still  retained,  like  Chios,  an  independent  position.  Since 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  had  furnished  a  contingent  to  the 
Athenian  fleet;  and,  indeed,  at  the  moment  of  revolt,  ten 
Mytilenaean  ships  were  lying  in  the  harbour  of  Athens.  But 
a  secret  discontent  had  long  been  spreading  through  the 
island.  Before  the  war,  overtures  had  been  made  to  Lacedae- 
mon,  and  though  these  were  rejected,  owing  no  doubt  to 
the  inadequacy  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  the  design  was 
not  abandoned.  The  Mytilenaeans,  who  led  the  movement, 
set  about  filling  up  the  mouths  of  the  harbours  of  their  city, 
strengthening  or  restoring  the  walls,  and  building  ships; 
vessels  were  despatched  to  the  Euxine  for  supplies  of  corn ; 
and  a  force  of  Scythian  bowmen  was  hired.  In  the  island 
they  attempted  to  centralise  the  administration  of  the  island 
at  Mytilene,  hoping  by  this  means  to  put  an  end  to  internal 
dissension.  Negotiations  were  opened  with  the  Boeotians, 
who,  as  Aeolians,  were  akin  to  the  Lesbians,  and  a  second 
appeal  was  made  to  Lacedaemon. 

The  Athenians  were  at  once  informed  of  these  movements. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  adjacent  island  of  Tenedos,  owing  to 

155 


156 


REVOLT  OF  MYTILENE,  428. 


[VI.  2. 


a  quarrel  with  the  Lesbians,  were  only  too  ready  to  betray 
them  ;  the  city  of  Methymna,  which  ranked  next  to  Mytilene 
in  Lesbos,  was  opposed  to  the  policy  of  consolidation,  and 
retained  her  loyalty  to  Athens  ;  and  even  in  Mytilene  itself 
domestic  strife  had  arisen,  which  rendered  united  action 
impossible.1 

The  Athenians  were  at  first  incredulous.  They  were  un- 
willing to  believe  that  a  new  disaster,  calling  for  prompt 
The  Athenians  acti°n  m  a  distant  part  of  the  empire,  was 
send  an  expedi-  added  to  their  domestic  calamities  —  to  the 
tion  to  Lesbos.  p]agUe  anc[  the  desolation  of  Attica.  Envoys 
were  sent  in  the  hope  of  persuading  the  Mytilenaeans  to 
abandon  their  plans  and  preparations,  but  in  vain ;  Mytilene 
would  yield  to  force,  and  force  only.  Nothing  remained  but 
immediate  action.  Forty  ships,  which  had  been  equipped 
to  sail  round  Peloponnesus,  were  despatched  to  Lesbos. 
It  was  known  that  a  festival  would  shortly  be  held  at 
Mytilene,  at  the  temple  of  Apollo  Maloeis,  outside  the  walls 
of  the  city,  and  this  appeared  to  offer  a  favourable  oppor- 
tunity for  seizing  the  place  in  the  absence  of  the  citizens. 
If  this  plan  failed,  the  Athenian  commander  was  instructed 
to  call  on  the  Mytilenaeans,  under  a  threat  of  war,  to 
surrender  their  fleet  and  dismantle  their  walls.  Meanwhile 
the  ten  Mytilenaean  ships  which  were  at  Athens  were 
detained,  and  the  crews  thrown  into  prison.2 

2.  Had  the  Athenians  arrived  unexpectedly  at  Mytilene, 
they  might  have  succeeded  in  surprising  the  town,  but  in 
little  more  than  two  days  their  plans  were  made  known  to  the 
Lesbians.  The  festival  was,  of  course,  abandoned;  the  Myti- 
lenaeans began  to  barricade  and  guard  the  unfinished  parts 
of  their  harbour-defences  and  walls,  and  when  the  Athenians 
appeared  their  demands  were  refused.  But  the  Mytilenaeans 
were  not  in  a  condition  to  resist  an  Athenian  fleet ;  "  a  show 
of  fighting"  which  they  made  in  front  of  the  harbour  was 


1  Thuc.  iii.  2;  cp.  Arist.  Pol.  v.  4  =  1304  a  4  ff. 

2  Thuc.  iii.  3. 


VI.  2.]    THE  MYTILENAEANS  HARD  PRESSED,  428. 


157 


at  once  repulsed,  and  without  waiting  for  a  second  defeat, 
they  made  proposals  to  the  Athenian  generals,  in  the  hope 
of  procuring  the  recall  of  the  fleet  for  a  time.  The  Athenians 
The  Athenians  were  conscious  that  their  force  at  Mytiiene. 
was  too  small  to  reduce  the  island  if  driven  to  extremities, 
and  a  cessation  of  arms  was  agreed  upon,  during  which  the 
Mytilenaeans  were  allowed  to  send  one  of  the  informers, 
who  had  repented  of  his  action,  and  other  envoys  to  Athens. 
They  offered  to  abandon  their  revolutionary  designs  if  the 
Athenians  would  withdraw  their  ships,  but  their  hopes  of 
success  were  slight;  and  while  these  negotiations  were 
going  on,  they  thought  it  prudent  to  send  envoys  secretly  to 
Lacedaemon  for  assistance.  As  the  Athenian  fleet  lay  at 
Malea,  to  the  south  of  the  city,  the  envoys  slipped  out  to 
the  north,  and  after  a  difficult  voyage  across  the  open  sea, 
they  reached  their  destination.1 

As  was  expected,  the  Mytilenaeans'  envoys  failed  to  per- 
suade the  Athenians  to  withdraw  their  forces,  and  on  their 
return  hostilities  were  resumed,  Mytiiene  being  supported 
by  the  whole  of  Lesbos  except  Methymna,  which  aided 
Athens.    The  Mytilenaeans  were  still  without  any  real  con- 
fidence in  their  enterprise ;  and  after  a  general  attack  on  the 
Athenian  camp,  in  which  they  were  certainly  not  defeated, 
they  retired  into  the  city  to  wait  for  the  assist-  The  M 
ance  which  they  hoped   would   come   from  aeans  appeal 
Peloponnesus.     In  this  attitude   they  were  toSpartafor 
confirmed   by   Meleas    of    Lacedaemon  and 
Hermaeondas  of  Thebes,  who  had  just  succeeded  in  entering 
the  city,  and  on  their  advice  a  second  trireme  with  envoys 
was  sent  to  Sparta.2    Such  inaction  naturally  encouraged 
the  Athenians,  and  many  of  the  allies,  who  may  have  been 
watching  the  event,  when  they  saw  the  weakness  of  the 
Lesbian  resistance,  came  readily  to  their  help.    They  now 
brought  up  their  ships  from  Malea  and  anchored  round  the 


1  Thuc.  iii.  3,  4.  The  words  npos  ftopeav  rrjs  TToXews  are  to  be 
taken  with  dnoo-reWovai.  2  Thuc.  iii,  5. 


158 


THEIR  ENVOYS  AT  OLYMPIA,  428.  [VI.  3. 


south  side  of  the  city,  establishing  two  camps,  one  on  either 
side,  and  blockading  both  the  harbours.1 

3.  Meanwhile  the  envoys  who  had  left  Mytilene  in  the  first 
ship  arrived  at  Lacedaemon.  It  was  close  on  the  time  of  the 
The  Olympic  games  and  they  were  bidden  to  repair 

Mytiienaeans  to  Olympia,  in  order  that  they  might  the  more 
at  oiympia.  easily  make  their  case  known  to  all  the 
members  of  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy.  When  the 
games  were  over,  a  meeting  was  arranged,  at  which  they 
came  forward.  Like  the  Corcyraeans  at  Athens  in  432, 
they  had  to  defend  their  conduct,  and  clear  it  from  the 
stain  of  unprovoked  rebellion.  They  insisted  that  in  desert- 
ing Athens  they  had  not  forsaken  an  equal  in  the  hour  of 
danger;  they  had  risen  against  a  tyrant  at  a  favourable 
moment.  The  blame  rested  with  the  Athenians,  who  had 
been  false  to  their  principles  in  the  management  of  the 
Delian  Lea  rue.  That  League  was  founded  to  preserve  the 
freedom  of  Hellas,  but  it  had  been  perverted  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  it,  and  no  member  could  continue  faithful  to  the 
dominant  city  without  betraying  the  liberty  of  their  allies. 
It  was  true  that  the  Lesbians  occupied  a  favoured  position 
in  the  alliance ;  they  were  still,  as  they  had  been  at  the  first, 
free  and  independent,  supplying  ships  by  agreement,  and 
paying  no  tribute  ;  but  this  position  was  better  in  appear- 
ance than  in  reality.  By  allowing  one  or  two  allies  to  re- 
main independent,  the  Athenians  gave  a  colour  of  justice  to 


1  Thuc.  iii.  6.  Mytilene  was  originally  built  on  an  island,  and, 
therefore,  like  Syracuse,  the  city  possessed  two  harbours*  one  on  the 
north,  the  other  on  the  south.  The  northern  harbour,  which  was 
probably  MaXoet?,  was  the  harbour  for  ships  of  war,  of  which  it 
would  contain  fifty  ;  it  could  be  closed  if  necessary.  The  southern 
harbour  was  larger  and  deeper,  and  defended  by  a  mole  (Strabo, 
p.  617).  The  strait  which  divided  the  island  and  city  is  called 
Euripus  by  Pausanias,  iii.  30  (Smith,  Diet.  Geog.  s.v.  Mytilene). 
The  promontory  of  Malea  is  seventy  stades  distant  from  the  city  to 
the  south,  and  if  by  it  is  meant  the  Malea  at  which  the  Athenians 
had  their  "docks  and  market,"  we  must  suppose  that  they  retired 
there  while  negotiations  were  going  on,  See  Jowett,  Thucydidks9 
ad  loc, 


VI.  4-] 


REASONS  FOR  THE  REVOLT,  428. 


159 


their  conduct,  of  which  it  was  greatly  in  need,  and  they 
wisely  left  the  strongest  allies  to  the  last,  when  there  would 
be  no  one  to  help  them.  Even  this  favoured  position  was 
retained  by  a  subservience  almost  slavish  to  the  Athenian 
people  and  their  leaders.  All  real  equality  was  gone;  the 
alliance  rested  on  fear,  and  fear  only;  the  Lesbians  were 
afraid  of  the  Athenian  power ;  the  Athenians  were  afraid 
that  Lesbos  might  combine  her  fleet  with  another  and 
become  a  centre  of  disaffection.  On  these  grounds  the  city 
resolved  to  meet  the  danger,  and  secure  whatever  advantages 
might  be  gained  by  those  who  made  the  first  move.1 

In  revolting  from  Athens,  Mytilene  had  followed  the  advice 
of  the  Boeotians,  and  if  the  revolt  was  premature,  there  was 
the  more  reason  that  assistance  should  be  sent.  No  better 
opportunity  would  occur.  The  Athenians  were  prostrate 
with  the  plague;  their  ships  were  occupied;  their  funds 
were  exhausted.  A  second  invasion  of  Attica  could  not  fail 
to  create  a  diversion  of  their  forces.  Let  no  man  think  that 
in  fighting  for  Lesbos  he  was  risking  his  life  in  another  man's 
quarrel.  The  interests  of  Lesbos  and  the  Peloponnesians 
were  the  same,  and  Athens  could  be  injured  more  deeply 
in  Lesbos  than  elsewhere.  Not  Attica,  which  had  been 
harried  over  and  over  again,  but  the  countries  from  which 
Attica  drew  her  resources,  were  the  real  support  of  the  war. 
Strip  Athens  of  her  allies,  and  her  power  was  ruined.  Pro* 
vide  Peloponnesus  with  ships,  and  her  efficiency  was  doubled. 
"Think,"  they  concluded,  "think  of  the  hopes  which  the 
Hellenes  repose  in  you ;  think  of  Zeus  Olympius,  in  whose 
temple  we  appear,  not  otherwise  than  suppliants,  and  receive 
us  into  your  alliance.  We  are  risking  our  lives  in  a  great 
struggle ;  if  we  win,  all  will  share  in  the  gain ;  if  we  lose, 
the  loss  will  be  felt  by  all."2 

4,  The  appeal  was  not  without  effect.  The  Lesbians  were 
received  into  alliance  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  to  divert  the 
Athenian  fleet  from  Mytilene,  the  Lacedaemonians  requested 


1  Thuc.  iii.  8-12. 


2  Thuc.  iii.  13,  14. 


160 


ENERGY  OF  ATHENS,  428. 


[VI.  4. 


their  allies  to  assemble  at  the  Isthmus  for  a  second  in- 
vasion of  Attica.  They  were  themselves  most  energetic,  and 
The  Lesbians  arrived  first  at  the  rendezvous,  where  they 
^Hance^ro  ^eoan  preparations  for  the  transport  of  ships 
posed  invasion  from  the  Corinthian  to  the  Saronic  gulf;  but 
of  Attica.  the  allies  were  less  forward,  being  busy  with 

their  ingathering.  Meanwhile  the  Athenians,  by  a  display 
of  their  force,  made  it  clear  that  they  could  meet  the  danger 
at  home  without  recalling  a  single  ship  from  service.1 
Manning  a  hundred  vessels,  with  sailors  taken  from  every 
class  of  citizens  except  the  two  highest,  and  even  from  the 
resident  aliens,  they  stood  out  to  sea  along  the  Isthmus  and 
made  descents  upon  the  coast.  The  Lacedaemonians,  finding 
that  the  Lesbians  were  mistaken  in  their  estimate  of  the 
.      .         Athenian  strength,  and  that  their  own  allies 

The  invasion  °  ' 

of  Attica  did  not  assemble,  returned  home,  where  their 

abandoned.  presence  was  needed  to  protect  their  own 
territory  against  the  depredations  of  an  Athenian  fleet,  which 
had  been  sent  out  earlier  in  the  year.  Yet  they  did  not  wholly 
forget  their  pledges  to  the  Lesbians,  for  they  called  upon 
their  allies  to  furnish  forty  vessels  for  service  at  Mytilene, 
When  the  Athenians  saw  that  the  invasion  was  abandoned, 
they  also  recalled  their  ships.2 

Meanwhile  the  Mytilenaeans  made  an  attack  upon  Me- 
thymna,  the  only  city  in  Lesbos  which  had  not  joined  them. 
Movements  The  attack  was  unsuccessful,  but  the  Myti- 
in  Lesbos.  lenaeans  were  able  to  strengthen  their  position 
in  the  other  cities  of  Lesbos,  and  it  was  clear  that  the 
Athenian  blockade  was  ineffective ;  a  larger  force  was 
Paches  sent  necessary  to  prevent  the  rebels  from  marching 
to  Mytilene.  to  and  fro  in  the  island  as  they  pleased.  At 
the  beginning  of  autumn  the  Athenians  despatched  Paches 
with  1000  Athenian  hoplites.    He  at  once  surrounded  the 


1  Thuc.  hi  15.  The  tcaprrov  %vyKOfxibr)  cannot  have  been  the  corn 
harvest,  which  had  long  been  over,  but  refers  to  the  vintage,  fruits, 
etc.,  or  possibly  millet,  and  other  grain  of  that  kind  ;  see  Leake, 
Northern  Greece,  iv.  158.  2  Thuc.  iii.  16. 


VI.  5-]  THE  GARRISON  AT  PL  A  TAEA,  $8.  161 


city  with  a  wall,  thus  cutting  off  all  communication  by  land 
as  well  as  sea.1 

5.  The  revolt  of  Lesbos  carried  the  centre  of  operations  to 
eastern  Greece.    In  the  west  little  was  done.    Early  in  the 
summer  Asopius,  the  son  of  Phormio,  was  sent  out,  at  the 
request  of  the  Acarnanians,  with  a  small  fleet,  Asopius  in 
but  the  greater  part  of  his  ships  returned  home  Western 
after -ravaging  the  coast  of  Laconia.    With  the  Greece- 
remainder  he  sailed  to  Naupactus,  and  resumed  the  plans  of 
Phormio  by  an  expedition  against  Oeniadae.    He  was  sup- 
ported by  the  whole  force  of  the  Acarnanians,  who  attacked 
the  city  by  land  and  devastated  the  country  round,  while  he 
brought  his  ships  up  the  Acheloiis.     But  Oeniadae  could 
neither  be  seduced  nor  coerced,  and  Asopius  was  compelled 
to  retire.    A  subsequent  attack  on  Leucas  cost  him  his  life 
and  the  loss  of  a  large  part  of  his  force.    The  remainder 
seem  to  have  returned  to  Naupactus. 

A  memorable  incident  marked  the  close  of  the  year.  Since 
September  429  the  garrison  at  Plataea  had  been  closely  shut 
up,  and  nothing  had  been  done  by  Athens  to  Plataea .  part 
relieve  the  distress  of  her  brave  allies.  When  of  the  garrison 
supplies  began  to  fail,  the  besieged  resolved  to  escape- 
force  their  way  if  possible  over  the  wall ;  and  though  about 
half  the  number  withdrew  from  the  enterprise,  220  men 
were  found  willing  to  risk  the  danger.  The  first  necessity 
was  to  provide  scaling  ladders  of  a  sufficient  length  to  reach 
the  top  of  the  wall.  By  counting  the  layers  of  bricks  in  a 
part  which  had  not  been  plastered  over,  a  tolerably  correct 
calculation  of  the  height  was  made  (the  bricks  being,  no 
doubt,  of  a  standard  and  familiar  size).  When  the  prepara- 
tions were  complete,  the  garrison  waited  for  the  advantage  of 
a  dark  and  stormy  night ;  for  it  was  the  custom  of  the  be- 
siegers to  pass  the  night  when  fine  on  the  battlements,  and 
when  wet,  to  retire  for  shelter  into  the  towers,  of  which  there 
was  one  at  every  tenth  battlement  extending  to  the  inner  and 
outer  face  of  the  double  wall,  but  with  a  passage  through  it, 

1  Thuc.  iii.  18. 

VOL.  III.  L 


162 


THE  ESCAPE  FROM  PLA1 A E A,  428. 


[VI.  5- 


the  intervening  spaces  being  then  unprotected.  In  darkness, 
wind,  and  rain  the  gallant  band  set  out  on  their  forlorn  hope. 
They  successfully  crossed  the  ditch  round  the  town,  and  arrived 
at  the  wall.  Their  armour  had  been  lightened  in  order  to 
impede  their  movements  as  little  as  possible,  while  the  right 
foot  was  left  unshod  to  gain  a  firmer  hold  on  the  slippery  mud 
of  the  ditches.  The  ladders  were  no  sooner  planted  in  a  space 
between  two  towers  than  they  were  mounted  by  soldiers 
armed  with  dirks  and  corslets,  who  immediately  parted  right 
and  left  to  the  towers  at  either  end.  After  these  came 
others  armed  with  javelins  only,  their  shields  being  carried 
by  their  comrades  behind.  A  considerable  number  had 
ascended  when  the  noise  of  a  falling  tile  aroused  the  enemy. 
The  alarm  was  at  once  raised,  and  the  besieging  army  rushed 
out  on  the  wall.  They  did  not  know  what  had  happened, 
and  their  attention  was  distracted  by  an  attack  which  the 
Plataeans  in  the  city  made  from  the  opposite  side.  No  one 
moved  from  his  post  lest  he  should  abandon  the  place  where 
he  was  most  needed ;  only  the  body  of  Three  Hundred,  who 
had  been  set  apart  for  emergencies,  ventured  to  march  along 
outside  the  wall  to  the  place  where  the  alarm  had  been  given. 
Fire  signals  were  at  once  raised  to  give  information  to  the 
Thebans,  but  they  were  rendered  useless  by  the  beacons 
which  the  Plataeans  lighted  on  the  wall.1 

Meanwhile  the  Plataeans  had  slain  the  guards  of  the 
towers  at  either  end  of  the  space  where  they  had  mounted 
the  wall,  and  not  content  with  occupying  the  passages 
through  the  towers,  they  planted  their  ladders  against  these 
and  sent  a  body  of  men  to  the  top.  From  the  towers  and 
from  the  wall  they  kept  up  a  constant  discharge  of  missiles, 
while  their  comrades  planted  more  ladders  against  the 
intervening  space,  cleared  off  the  battlements,  and  passed 
over  the  wall  to  the  outer  ditch.  Each  man,  as  he  reached  the 
further  side,  halted  and  shot  arrows  or  javelins  against  any  of 

1  Thuc.  iii.  20-22.  It  has  been  urged  that  signals  from  Plataea 
could  not  be  visible  at  Thebes,  but  they  might  be  very  well  seen  at 
some  place  where  the  Thebans  were  watching. 


VI.  5-]  THE  ESCAPE  FROM  PLATAEA,  428. 


163 


the  enemy  who  came  in  sight.  When  all  had  crossed,  those 
in  the  towers  descended  and  advanced  to  the  ditch.  They 
were  at  once  attacked  by  the  Three  Hundred  who  had  pro- 
vided themselves  with  torches,  a  precaution  of  doubtful 
advantage,  for  the  Plataeans,  standing  on  the  further  edge 
of  the  ditch,  saw  the  enemy  by  the  lights  which  they  carried, 
and  could  discharge  their  missiles  with  effect,  while  they 
themselves  were  in  darkness.  But  the  crossing  of  the  outer 
ditch  was  a  difficult  task;  for  owing  to  the  rain  it  was  filled 
with  water,  and  the  frost  had  spread  a  film  of  ice  on  the 
surface,  thick  enough  to  be  an  impediment  without  affording 
a  safe  pathway.  The  difficulties  were  successfully  overcome, 
and  out  of  the  whole  number  one  archer  alone  was  captured 
by  the  enemy.  After  crossing  the  ditch,  the  fugitives  took 
the  road  to  Thebes,  on  which  pursuit  was  least  likely  to  be 
made — and  in  fact  they  could  see ,  the  enemy  hurrying  along 
the  road  up  Cithaeron  to  the  pass  which  led  to  Athens. 
When  they  had  gone  about  a  mile,  they  turned  sharply  round 
and  made  for  the  hills,  and  so  escaped  to  Athens.  Of  the 
220,  212  had  made  good  their  escape,  seven  had  abandoned  the 
attempt,  and  one  was  captured.  The  Plataeans  in  the  city, 
hearing  from  those  who  turned  back  that  their  comrades  had 
been  cut  down  to  a  man,  sent  a  herald  in  the  morning  to  ask 
for  the  bodies  of  the  slain.1 

In  the  autumn  of  428  the  war  had  gone  on  for  three 


1  Thuc.  iii.  23,  24.  Those  who  doubt  the  veracity  of  Thucydides' 
account  of  the  siege  of  Plataea  point  to  the  fact,  among  others,  that 
while  the  historian  dwells  on  the  difficulties  created  by  tlie  water  in 
the  ditch  outside  the  wall,  he  says  nothing  of  any  water  in  the  ditch 
round  the  town.  If  there  was  water  in  the  one,  there  would  be 
water  in  the  other.  Under  certain  conditions  of  soil  and  situation, 
the  objection  would,  no  doubt,  be  serious  ;  but  as  we  know  nothing 
of  the  situation  of  the  ditches  at  the  point  where  the  wall  was  crossed, 
we  cannot  ascribe  much  weight  to  the  objection.  In  any  case  the 
area  of  rainfall  inside  the  wall  would  be  less  than  the  area  outside, 
and  it  is  easy  to  imagine  conditions  in  which  there  would  be  a  good 
deal  of  water  in  the  outer  ditch  and  little  or  none  in  the  inner.  On 
the  position  of  Plataea,  see  Forbes,  Thuc.  I.  xcvii.  f.;  G.  B.  Grundy, 
The  Battle  of  Plataea* 


164  A  PROPERTY-TAX  AT  ATHENS,  428.         [VI.  6. 


years  and  a  half,  and  already  the  pressure  of  the  expense 
began  to  be  felt  heavily  at  Athens.  For  the  first  time  a  tax 
Financial  was  imPose(i  on  the  property  of  the  citizens, 
difficulties  which  realised  200  talents  (about  £40,000),  a 
at  Athens.  gum  eqUaj  one-third  of  the  annual  receipts 
from  the  Delian  confederacy.  At  the  same  time  twelve 
ships  were  sent  out  under  Lysicles,  a  demagogue  who  had 
obtained  some  transient  power  after  the  death  of  Pericles, 
to  collect  money  from  the  cities  in  Caria  and  the  adjacent 
region,  cities  of  whose  loyalty  the  Athenians  were  at  no  time 
very  secure.  The  expedition  ended  in  disaster.  Lysicles 
fell  in  battle  against  the  Carians,  aided  by  the  Samians  of 
Anaea,  and  a  large  number  of  his  soldiers  with  him.1 

In  the  course  of  the  winter  a  Lacedaemonian  envoy, 
Salaethus  by  name,  who  had  been  despatched,  after  the 
meeting  at  Olympia,  with  intelligence  that  Attica  was  to  be 
invaded  and  a  fleet  sent  to  the  relief  of  Lesbos,  succeeded  in 
making  his  way  into  Mytilene.  He  encouraged  the  Myti- 
lenaeans  to  persevere  in  their  plans,  and  any  thoughts  which 
they  had  entertained  of  coming  to  terms  with  the  Athenians 
were  now  entirely  abandoned.2 

6.  With  the  spring  of  427  began  a  year  which  was  the  most 
terrible  of  the  whole  ten  years  of  the  war  which  preceded 
the  peace  of  Nicias — a  year  marked  on  both  sides  by  excesses 
of  savage  cruelty,  indicating  too  truly  the  passions  which  the 
war  had  let  loose. 

After  despatching  the  forty  vessels,  under  the  command 
of  Alcidas,  to  Lesbos,  the  Peloponnesians  made  their  usual 
Prolonged  invasion  of  Attica.  They  were  no  longer  led 
invasion  of  by  Archidamus,  who  was  either  dead  or  in  his 
Attlca-  last  illness,  but  by  Cleomenes,  who  was  regent 

for  his  nephew,  king  Pausanias.  Expecting  to  hear  of  some 
success  gained  by  their  fleet  at  Mytilene,  and  with  the  hope 


1  Thuc.  iii.  19.  For  Lysicles  see  Aristoph.  Knights,  132,  762; 
Plut.  Per.  24.  After  the  death  of  Pericles  he  married  Aspasia,  and 
became  a  successful  orator 

2  Thuc.  iii.  25.    For  the  Samians,  infra,  p.  166. 


VI.  6.]    PELOPUNNES/ANS  IN  THE  AEGEAN,  427.  165 


of  preventing  the  Athenians  from  sending  any  additional 
force  to  Lesbos,  the  Peloponnesians  remained  in  Attica  as 
long  as  they  could,  carrying  their  devastations  into  the 
remote  districts  which  had  escaped  in  former  invasions,  and 
destroying  all  that  had  grown  up  since  the  previous  spring. 
But  the  expected  news  did  not  arrive,  and  when  their 
supplies  were  exhausted,  they  returned  home.1 

Meanwhile  the  Peloponnesian  ships,  instead  of  sailing 
directly  to  Lesbos,  wasted  time  off  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus, 
and  then  slowly  passed  across  the  Aegean  to  Aicidas  in  the 
Delos,  which  they  reached  before  the  Athenians  Aegean, 
in  the  city  were  aware  of  their  movements.  From  Delos 
they  put  in  at  the  islands  of  Icarus  and  Myconus,  where,  to 
their  astonishment,  they  were  informed  that  Mytilene  had 
fallen.  At  first  they  were  incredulous,  but  on  reaching 
Embatum,  in  the  territory  of  Erythrae,  they  found  the  news 
confirmed.  Mytilene  surrendered  a  week  before  their  arrival 
on  the  Asiatic  coast.2 

Supplies  had  run  short  in  the  unhappy  city,  and  when  all 
hope  of  the  ships  promised  from  Peloponnesus  died  away,  it 
became  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  desperate  measures. 
With  the  intention  of  making  an  attack  on  the  Athenian 
lines,  Salaethus  gave  shields  and  spears  to  the  populace,  who 
hitherto  had  served  as  light-armed  soldiers  only.3  They  were 
no  sooner  in  possession  of  arms  than  they  refused  to  obey  their 
officers,  and  gathering  together  in  knots,  demanded  that  all  the 
corn  in  the  city  should  be  brought  out  and  divided  equally ; 
if  the  demand  were  refused,  they  would  give  surrender  of 
up  the  city  to  the  enemy.  Eeflecting  that  they  Mytilene- 
were  quite  unable  to  prevent  the  action  of  the  people,  and 
that  their  own  position  would  be  one  of  great  danger  if  they 
were  excluded  from  any  agreement  made  with  the  Athenians, 
the  magistrates  of  the  city  joined  with  the  people  in  coming  to 

1  Thuc.  iii.  26.  Tlmcydides  here  speaks  of  forty-two  ships  in  the 
fleet  of  Aicidas,  though  previously,  c.  16  and  25,  he  has  mentioned 
forty  only,  and  so  in  c.  29. 

2  Thuc.  iii.  29.  3  Thuc.  iii.  27. 


166 


MYTILENE  SURRENDERS,  427.  [VI.  7. 


terms  with  Paches.  They  placed  themselves  unconditionally 
at  the  mercy  of  Athens,  and  agreed  to  receive  the  army  into 
the  city ;  merely  stipulating  that  they  should  be  allowed  to 
send  envoys  to  Athens  to  plead  their  cause,  and  that  till  they 
returned  Paches  should  not  imprison,  nor  enslave,  nor  put  to 
death  any  of  the  citizens.  Those  who  had  taken  a  leading 
part  in  the  negotiations  with  Lacedaemon  sought  the  pro- 
tection of  the  altars,  but  on  receiving  an  assurance  that  they 
should  suffer  no  injury,  they  also  put  themselves  into  the 
hands  of  Paches,  who  placed  them  in  Tenedos.1 

7.  When  the  Peloponnesians  found  that  Lesbos  was  indeed 
taken,  a  council  of  war  was  held  to  decide  on  their  move- 
Aicidas  off  the  ments.  Teutiaplus  of  Elis  urged  an  immediate 
coast  of  Asia.  attack  on  Mytilene  ;  the  enemy  were  not  aware 
of  their  presence,  and  by  a  sudden  descent  they  might  take 
them  off  their  guard  in  the  careless  confidence  of  their  recent 
victory.  Such  vigorous  action  was  quite  beyond  Alcidas. 
Nor  would  he  listen  to  the  advice  of  the  Ionian  exiles  and  the 
Lesbians  in  his  fleet,  who  suggested  that  he  should  seize 
some  city  of  Ionia,  or  Cyme  in  Aeolis,  as  a  base  of  operations 
from  which  to  excite  a  revolt  in  Ionia,  an  attempt  in  which 
he  could  rely  not  only  on  the  feeling  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks, 
but  on  the  help  of  Pissuthnes,  the  satrap  of  Sardis.  His 
only  wish,  now  that  Mytilene  had  fallen,  was  to  return 
whence  he  came.  Sailing  from  Embatum  he  put  in  at 
Myonnesus,  where  he  slaughtered  most  of  the  captives  taken 
on  the  voyage,  a  barbarous  and  foolish  act,  which  could  only 
alienate  those  whom  he  was  sent  to  assist,  and  damage  the 
Spartan  cause.  As  he  lay  off  Ephesus,  the  Samian  oli- 
garchs, who  had  established  themselves  at  Anaea,  on  the 
mainland,  after  their  expulsion  from  the  island  {supra,  p.  3 3), 2 
protested  against  his  conduct,  declaring  that  he  had  an  ill 
way  of  liberating  Hellas,  if  he  put  to  death  men  who  made 
no  resistance  and  were  not  even  enemies,  but  allies  of  Athens 


1  Thuc.  iii.  28. 


2  Thuc.  iv.  75. 


VI.  70 


A  LCI  DAS  AND  PACHES,  #B7. 


167 


under  compulsion.  Alcidas  then  set  at  liberty  ail  the  sur- 
viving Ghians  in  his  hands,  and  some  others.1 

Before  arriving  at  Ephesus,  he  had  been  sighted  by  the 
Salaminia  and  Paralus,  the  two  state  galleys  of  the  Athen- 
ians. Pursuit  was  now  inevitable,  and,  indeed,  information 
of  his  presence  had  already  been  conveyed  to  Paches. 
Alcidas  had  no  intention  of  being  caught ;  from  Ephesus  he 
struck  across  the  open  sea,  "  not  wishing  to  touch  on  any 
land  till  he  reached  Peloponnesus,  if  he  could  help  it." 
Paches  followed  as  far  as  Patmos,  without  coming  in  sight  of 
the  fleet ;  upon  which  he  returned  to  Notium  near  Colophon, 
while  Alcidas,  fleeing  far  to  the  south,  was  carried  by  a 
storm  to  Crete,  whence  his  vessels  straggled  home.2 

If  Alcidas  was  cowardly,  Paches  was  treacherous.  In  the 
spring  of  430  there  had  been  a  revolution  at  Colophon,  in 
which  the  oligarchical  party,  aided  by  Itamenes  Paches  at 
and  a  number  of  Persians,  drove  out  their  Notlum- 
opponents,  and  seized  the  upper  city  for  themselves.  The 
exiles  settled  in  Notium,  which  was  the  port  of  Colophon, 
where,  in  a  short  time,  a  second  faction  broke  out.  A 
new  Persian  party  was  formed,  which,  of  course,  had  the 
support  of  the  similar  party  in  Colophon,  and  a  number  of 
Arcadian  and  barbarian  mercenaries  were  sent  to  their  aid 
by  Pissuthnes.  They  were  now  able  to  drive  their  opponents 
out  of  Notium,  and,  to  secure  their  position,  the  mercenaries 
were  placed  under  the  command  of  one  Hippias,  in  a  part  of 
the  town  which  was  walled  off  into  a  fortress.  The  Athenian 
party  summoned  Paches  to  their  assistance,  who  induced 
Hippias  to  visit  him,  on  the  assurance  that,  if  terms  were 
not  arranged,  he  should  be  sent  back  uninjured.  But  no 
sooner  had  Paches  got  him  in  his  power  than  he  made  an 
unexpected  attack  on  the  fortress  and  slew  all  who  were  in 


1  Thuc.  iii.  30-32.  His  captives  were  the  more  numerous  because 
the  Ionians,  far  from  attempting  to  escape,  came  to  his  ships  under 
the  impression  that  they  were  Athenian.  No  one  in  the  eastern 
Aegean  expected  to  see  Peloponnesian  vessels  in  those  waters,  so  long 
as  the  Athenian  empire  lasted.  2  Thuc.  iii.  33,  69. 


168 


P ACHES  AT  MYTILENE,  427. 


[VI.  8. 


it.  He  then  took  Hippias  back  into  the  fortress,  as  he  had 
promised,  and  caused  him  to  be  slain.  The  Persian  party 
were  of  course  expelled  from  Notium,  and  not  long  after- 
wards the  Athenians  sent  out  a  number  of  commissioners  to 
establish  the  town  as  a  colony  under  Athenian  laws.  Any 
Colophonian  who  might  be  in  exile  among  the  neighbouring 
cities  was  recalled,  if  he  were  of  the  democratic  party,  and 
enrolled  in  the  new  settlement.  Owing  to  its  situation  on 
the  shore,  Notium  was  in  the  range  of  Athenian  protection ; 
Colophon,  on  the  other  hand,  which  lay  on  a  hill  at  some 
little  distance  inland,  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Persians.1 
8.  From  Notium  Paches  returned  to  Mytilene.  He  lost 
no  time  in  acquiring  the  two  cities  of  the  island,  Pyrrha  and 
The  Mytiien-  Eresus,  which  were  still  independent,  and  then 
aeans  sent  to  he  despatched  to  Athens  the  Mytilenaeans 
Athens.  whom  he  had  placed  in  Tenedos,  and  any 

others  who  seemed  specially  implicated  in  the  revolt,  in- 
cluding Salaethus.  The  disturbance  was  now  so  utterly 
crushed  that  he  was  able  to  dismiss  the  larger  part  of  his 
forces.2 

When  the  captives  arrived  at  Athens,  Salaethus  was  at 
once  put  to  death.3  The  fate  of  the  Mytilenaeans  was  then 
cieon's  brought  before  the  Athenian  Assembly.  Cleon, 

proposal.  who  by  this  time  had  completely  won  the  ear 

of  the  people,  pressed  for  an  extreme  penalty.  He  proposed 
to  execute,  not  only  the  prisoners  who  had  been  brought  to 
Athens — who  were,  in  fact,  the  ringleaders  in  the  revolt — 
but  all  the  grown-up  citizens  of  Mytilene,  and  to  sell  the 
women  and  children  into  slavery.  To  this  atrocious  sentence 
he  brought  the  people  to  consent  by  dwelling  on  the  unpro- 
voked nature  of  the  revolt — for  Lesbos  was  not  a  subject 
state,  but  an  equal  ally — and  pointing  out  the  unexpected 
and  unparalleled  circumstance  that  a  Peloponnesian  fleet 


1  Thuc.  iii.  34 ;  Xen.  Hell.  i.  2.  4.  2  Time.  iii.  35. 

3  He  endeavoured  to  save  himself  by  offering  to  get  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  withdrawn  from  Plataea,  but  the  offer  was  rejected. 


VI.  8.] 


CLEON'S  PROPOSAL,  4,27. 


169 


had  crossed  the  Aegean  to  support  the  revolt.  Such  audacity 
was  thought  to  imply  an  extensive  plan  for  the  alienation  of 
the  Asiatic  cities — a  plan  which  must  be  repressed  by  the 
most  vigorous  measures.    At  the  close  of  the  „  r 

°  .  Cruel  decree  of 

meeting  a  trireme  was  sent  to  Paches,  an-  the  Athenians : 
nouncing  the  resolution,  and  bidding  him  "^J^j™66*" 
execute  it  without  delay.  But  when  the 
citizens  had  retired  to  their  homes,  and  the  excitement  of  a 
public  meeting  had  subsided,  a  change  came  over  their 
feelings.  The  decree  which  had  seemed  just  and  politic  a 
few  hours  before  was  now  regarded  as  cruel  and  monstrous. 
A  review  of  the  whole  circumstances  of  the  revolt  showed 
that  there  were  different  degrees  of  guilt ;  and  the  populace 
of  Mytilene,  who  were  involved  in  one  sentence  with  the  oli- 
garchs, had  practically  been  the  cause  of  the  surrender  of  the 
city  to  the  Athenians.  The  Mytilenaean  envoys  present  in 
Athens,  and  those  of  the  citizens  who  sympathised  with 
them,  were  not  slow  to  notice  the  change  of  sentiment. 
They  appealed  to  the  magistrates  to  call  a  second  Assembly, 
and  bring  the  matter  before  it  once  more.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  it  was  strictly  legal  to  reopen  a  question  which  had 
been  decided  by  a  former  vote  in  the  Assembly.  But,  as 
the  Assembly  was  itself  the  sovereign  power,  an  act  which 
received  its  approval  could  not  be  called  in  question  by  any 
other  body,  and  there  was  no  standing  ordinance  which 
forbade  the  sovereign  power  to  cancel  its  own  decrees.  On 
the  next  morning  notice  was  given  of  a  second  Assembly, 
and  the  people  were  once  more  gathered  in  the  Pnyx.1 

Cleon  was  furious.  It  was  his  motion  which  was  being 
rediscussed ;  his  policy  was  being  challenged ;  his  authority 
shaken.  In  the  speech  which  Thucydides  has 
put  into  his  mouth  on  this  occasion,  we  have  a 
sketch  of  the  attitude  of  the  demagogue  to  the  Athenian  allies 
abroad  and  to  his  own  opponents  at  home.  It  was  useless,  he 
said,  to  apply  the  principles  which  prevailed  in  the  democracy 


i  Time.  iii.  36. 


170 


C LEON'S  SPEECH,  427. 


[VI.  8- 


of  Athens  to  the  government  of  her  empire.  That  was  a 
tyranny,  and  must  be  maintained  as  such.  As  for  these 
changes  of  purpose— they  were  odious  and  ruinous  too. 
Let  the  law  be  maintained;  innovations  were  clever,  no 
doubt,  but  there  was  something  better  for  a  state  than 
cleverness,  and  that  was  consistency.  "  Can  any  one  show 
that  the  revolt  of  the  Mytilenaeans  is  a  benefit  to  the  state  1 
Of  course  he  can  not;  the  mere  attempt  to  do  so  means 
that  the  speaker  has  been  bribed  to  persuade  you  out  of 
your  senses.  And  when  can  we  punish  with  a  truer  sense 
of  the  injury  than  when  the  injury  is  fresh  in  our  minds  1 
The  love  of  fine  speeches  is  the  ruin  of  you  Athenians,  for 
when  straightforward  action  on  recognised  principles  is 
needed,  you  are  always  listening  to  the  last  argument. 
Nothing  can  be  worse  than  the  conduct  of  the  Mytilenaeans. 
They  were  safe  from  the  enemy ;  they  had  a  fleet  of  their 
own,  and  enjoyed  a  favoured  position;  yet  this  did  not 
prevent  them  from  taking  sides  with  our  bitterest  enemies. 
The  truth  is,  we  have  been  too  lenient  with  them.  We  ought 
to  have  reduced  them  to  subjection  long  ago,  and  treated 
them  like  the  rest.  It  is  not  too  late  to  let  them  feel  the 
weight  of  your  arm,  and  the  opportunity  must  not  be  allowed 
to  pass.  And  we  must  make  no  difference  between  nobles 
and  people.  They  were  all  of  one  mind  about  attacking 
us.  If  you  give  way  to  foolish  considerations  of  mercy,  all 
your  allies  will  revolt.  Remember  that  your  empire  is 
involved  in  the  sentence ;  for  if  you  spare  the  Mytilenaeans, 
you  confess  that  your  rule  is  unjust ;  you  cannot  take  up  an 
ideal  line  about  virtue  and  retain  that.  Think,  too,  how  they 
would  deal  with  you,  if  they  had  the  opportunity,  and  deal 
so  with  them.  Eemember  the  feelings  which  came  over  you 
when  first  you  heard  of  the  revolt,  and  punish  them  as  they 
deserve." 

That  his  opponents  are  bribed — that  argument  is  sophistical 
when  opposed  to  his  own  views — that  the  Athenian  power 
is  a  despotism  which  can  only  be  supported  by  despotic 
measures — that  justice  is  revenge — that  mercy  and  equity 


VI.  9.] 


THE  SPEECH  OF  DIODOTUS,  427. 


171 


are  out  of  the  question  in  dealing  with  the  allies— that  tory 
stupidity  is  better  than  liberal  discussion — these  are  the 
principles  on  which  Cleon  wishes  to  lead  the  Athenians  of 
his  day.  Such  ideas  were  clear  and  intelligible,  and  likely 
to  commend  themselves  to  the  meanest  citizen. 

9,  The  leader  of  the  opposite  party  was  Diodotus,  of 
whom,  unfortunately,  we  know  nothing.  He  began  with 
some  allusions  to  Cleon.  The  two  greatest  The  speech  of 
impediments  to  wise  counsel  were  haste  and  Dlodotus- 
passion,  of  which  the  first  was  a  sign  of  folly,  and  the  second 
implied  a  vulgar  and  narrow  mind.  A  man  who  wished  to 
prevent  discussion  was  either  one  who  had  not  the  sense  to 
see  that  in  no  other  way  could  light  be  thrown  on  the  future, 
or  he  had  a  discreditable  proposal  to  make,  and  knowing 
that  it  would  not  bear  examination,  he  endeavoured  to  silence 
opposition  by  the  virulence  of  his  abuse,  or  by  hints  of  cor- 
ruption. But  discussion  was  quite  a  different  thing  from 
slander,  or  invective,  and  those  who  demanded  it  ought  not 
to  be  suspected  of  dishonesty  and  corruption ;  there  was  no 
better  citizen  than  the  man  who  tried  to  convince  his  fellows 
of  what  was  right  by  fair  argument.  If  a  speaker  could  not 
venture  to  come  forward  openly  with  his  opinion,  he  was 
compelled  to  deceive  his  audience ;  and  thus  the  patriot  and 
the  traitor  were  on  the  same  level.  This  was  a  great  evil 
and  a  great  mistake  too,  for  those  who  came  forward  to 
advise  the  people  were  men  who  had  taken  unusual  pains 
to  form  a  sound  opinion,  and  moreover  they  were  respon- 
sible for  what  they  said. 

"The  present  question  is  merely  one  of  policy.  Is  the 
severe  sentence  likely  to  do  us  harm  or  good  1  Cleon's 
proposal  may  be  just  in  the  abstract  sense  of  justice — but  is 
it  politic  1  I  say  it  is  not.  The  fear  of  death  does  not 
deter  men  from  crime ;  men  have  gone  on  increasing  the 
severity  of  sentences — for  in  earlier  times  they  would 
naturally  be  milder — but  crimes  are  still  committed.  The 
present  outweighs  the  future;  and  hope  suggests  escape. 
It  is  impossible,  and  simply  absurd  to  suppose,  that  human 


i 


172 


THE  SPEECH  OF  DIODOTUS,  427. 


[VI.  9- 


nature  when  bent  upon  some  favourite  project  can  be 
restrained  either  by  the  power  of  law  or  by  any  other 
terror.  Such  a  sentence  as  that  which  we  are  met  to  discuss 
will  only  drive  our  enemies  to  despair.  They  will  resist  to 
the  last  man,  for  there  is  no  hope  if  they  yield.  Our  wars 
will  be  fought  to  the  bitter  end,  and  when  we  are  victorious 
there  will  be  nothing  left  for  us  to  gain.  Let  us  be  as 
cautious  and  vigilant  as  you  will;  but  avoid  extremity  in 
punishment.  In  the  present  case  we  must  make  a  distinction. 
The  popular  party  are  our  friends  everywhere ;  the  people 
of  Mytilene  took  no  part  in  the  revolt.  If  you  destroy  them 
equally  with  the  guilty,  you  will  alienate  your  friends; 
besides,  if  guilty  and  innocent  share  the  same  fate,  no  one 
will  care  to  be  innocent.  Cleon  may  insist  that  his  proposal 
is  just,  but  justice  and  expediency  cannot  always  be  com- 
bined. I  do  not  speak  to  you  of  lenity  or  mercy,  words 
which  are  out  of  place  in  a  discussion  of  this  kind.  I  only 
advise  what  is  most  politic.  You  have  the  guilty  men  in 
your  hands :  pass  sentence  on  them  as  you  will ;  but  leave 
the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  untouched." 1 

In  this  remarkable  speech  we  observe  that  hardly  a  word  is 
said  in  condemnation  of  the  cruelty  of  the  decree,  though  many 
of  the  audience  were  painfully  conscious  of  this.  Diodotus 
accepts  the  sentiment  of  his  audience,  and  endeavours  to 
show  how  far  it  can  be  rightly  indulged.  The  proposal  of 
Cleon  is  even  allowed  to  be  just,  i.e.  it  corresponds  fairly 
to  the  degree  of  resentment  which  the  Athenians  might  be 
expected  to  feel  towards  the  Lesbians.  The  only  point  in 
question  is  the  expediency  of  such  a  wholesale  execution. 
And  here  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  Diodotus  uses  argu- 
ments of  which  the  world  has  been  very  slow  to  recognise 
the  value.  That  severity  of  punishment,  far  from  preventing, 
tends  to  aggravate  crime  is  now  a  commonplace ;  but  it  has 
only  become  so  after  a  long  series  of  judicial  atrocities. 

Another  feature   of   these   speeches,  less  striking,  but 


1  Thuc.  iii.  42-48. 


See  Jowett's  translation. 


VI.  io.]  PUBLTC  SPEAKING  AT  ATHENS. 


173 


perhaps  even  more  significant  as  an  indication  of  Athenian 
feeling,  is  the  view  taken  of  the  political  adviser  or  speaker. 
We  see  an  audience  delighting  in  displays  of  rhetoric,  who 
can  be  influenced  and  carried  away  by  a  clever  speech ;  and 
as  a  natural  consequence  we  find  a  class  of  orators  growing 
up  who  make  it  their  sole  business  to  lead  or  mislead  the 
Assembly.  They  were  masters  of  argument  and  disputation ; 
men  with  whom  subtlety  was  far  above  sincerity.  They 
drew  upon  themselves  the  hatred  of  both  the  sections  of 
conservative  feeling  at  Athens ;  we  find  them  denounced  as 
bitterly  by  Aristophanes  as  they  are  by  Cleon.  Both  alike 
warned  the  people  against  unprincipled  leaders,  who  were 
either  bribed  to  play  their  part,  or  spoke  as  "sophists" 
from  a  mere  love  of  discussion.  There  was,  no  doubt,  some 
truth  in  this  point  of  view,  but  the  means  taken  to  destroy 
the  influence  of  these  "  orators  "  were  not  without  evils.  It 
was  unfair  to  charge  every  speaker  who  happened  to  oppose 
the  popular  feeling  with  corruption  and  dishonesty.  As 
Diodotus  points  out,  the  suspicion  thus  created  stood  in  the 
way  of  those  who  honestly  wished  to  give  good  advice  to 
their  citizens.  At  the  best,  the  politician  had  enough 
responsibility,  for  often  he  alone  was  made  to  suffer,  when 
the  people  had  eagerly  supported  him,  or  even  when  the 
failure  of  his  plan  was  due  to  others.1 

10.  The  excitement  in  the  Assembly  was  great,  and  no 
one  knew  on  which  side  the  decision  would  fall.  The  show 
of  hands  appeared  to  be  nearly  equal  in  favour  Mytiiene 
of  either  proposal,  but  the  amendment  of  issaved. 
Diodotus  was  carried  by  a  small  majority.  A  trireme 
was  immediately  despatched  to  overtake  the  ship  which  had 
been  sent  out  twenty-four  hours  previously.    The  envoys 

1  It  is  remarkable  that  Aristophanes,  though  opposed  to  the  war, 
and  to  any  severe  treatment  of  the  allies,  never  directly  alludes  to 
the  atrocities  which  made  the  Athenian  name  odious  in  Greece,  but 
cp.  Knights,  1025,  Kepfiepov  dvdpcnrodiaTrjv ;  and  indeed  the  massacre 
of  the  Mytilenaeans  "is  alluded  to  among  the  crimes  of  the  Athenian 
people  but  two  or  three  times  in  the  whole  of  ancient  literature." 
— Forbes,  Thuc.  I.  ci. 


174  C LEON'S  DECREE  RESCINDED,  427.        [VI.  10. 


from  Mytilene  provided  the  crew  with  wine  and  meal,  and 
promised  a  large  reward  if  they  arrived  at  Lesbos  in  time  to 
prevent  the  execution  of  the  decree.  The  sailors  rowed 
without  stopping,  eating  meal  kneaded  with  wine  and  oil 
as  they  sat  at  the  oar,  and  giving  up  their  places  to  a  fresh 
relay  of  men  when  they  required  sleep.  As  there  was 
happily  no  opposing  wind,  and  the  first  trireme  did  not 
hasten  on  its  dismal  errand,  the  race  was  won,  and  Mytilene 
was  saved.  Paches  had  already  read  the  decree  of  the 
Athenians,  and  was  preparing  to  carry  it  into  execution, 
when  the  second  vessel  arrived  to  countermand  the  orders.1 

Even  now  the  sentence  was  severe  enough.  All  the 
Mytilenaeans  who  had  been  sent  to  Athens,  more  than  a 
Massacres  and  thousand  in  number,  were  put  to  death;  the 
confiscations.  walls  of  the  city  were  pulled  down ;  the  ships 
carried  away.  The  whole  of  the  island,  with  the  exception 
of  the  territory  of  Methymna,  was  then  divided  into  three 
thousand  lots,  of  which  three  hundred  were  set  aside  for 
the  temples,  and  the  rest  assigned  to  Athenian  citizens. 
The  new  owners,  though  sent  out  to  the  island,  did  not 
permanently  reside  on  their  property,  but  leased  it  at  an 
annual  rent  of  two  minae  a  lot  to  Lesbian  tenants.  Such  an 
income  would  be  welcome  to  many  who  had  lost  all  their 
property  in  the  repeated  invasions  of  Attica,  and  enabled 
many  more  to  qualify  for  the  hoplite  class  who  had  hitherto 
fallen  below  it.  The  total  sum  brought  each  year  into 
Athens  was  5400  minae,  or  about  £18,000. 

On  his  return  to  Athens,  Paches  was  brought  to  trial  by 
Cleon,  and  so  shameful  was  his  conduct  proved  to  be  that  he 
slew  himself  in  open  court.2 

1  Time.  iii.  49.  There  could  not,  of  course,  be  two  sets  of  rowers 
in  one  ship,  for  the  space  would  not  admit  of  this.  But  we  may 
suppose  that  the  room  ordinarily  occupied  by  the  officers  of  the  sbip, 
or  assigned  to  hoplites,  was  on  this  occasion  given  up  to  men  who 
rowed. 

2  For  the  death  of  Paches  see  Plutarch,  Nic.  6,  who  says  that  it 
occurred  when  he  was  being  tried  for  his  conduct  in  office.  Another 
account  attributes  it  to  his  treatment  of  two  Lesbian  women ;  see  the 


VI.  ii.]  PLATAEA  SURRENDERS,  427. 


175 


II.  From  the  punishment  of  Mytilene  at  the  hands  of  the 
Athenians  we  pass  to  the  punishment  of  Plataea  at  the 
hands  of  the  Peloponnesians,  a  punishment  The  surrender 
more  severe,  more  indefensible,  and  more  dis-  of  Plataea- 
graceful  to  those  who  inflicted  it.  Soon  after  the  recovery 
of  Lesbos  the  supplies  of  the  besieged  Plataeans  were  utterly 
exhausted,  and  they  had  to  choose  between  starvation  and 
submission.  The  city  was,  indeed,  reduced  to  such  weakness 
that  resistance  to  a  vigorous  attack  from  the  besiegers  would 
have  been  impossible,  but  such  an  attack  was  strictly  for- 
bidden by  the  Lacedaemonians,  who,  looking  forward  to 
peace  with  Athens,  did  not  wish  Plataea  to  come  under  the 
category  of  towns  taken  by  force — which  it  might  be  neces- 
sary to  restore — but  under  that  of  towns  yielded  by  agree- 
ment, which  either  side  would  claim  to  keep.  For  this 
reason  the  general  in  command  of  the  siege  was  instructed 
to  send  a  herald  to  Plataea,  which  was  now  in  the  last  stage 
of  exhaustion,  and  inquire  whether  the  garrison  would  sub- 
mit themselves  to  the  judgment  of  the  Lacedaemonians; 
"  the  guilty  would  be  punished,  but  no  injustice  would  be 
done."  In  the  belief  that  they  would  receive  a  fair  trial, 
and  would  be,  at  any  rate,  in  the  hands  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians, not  of  their  bitter  enemies  the  Thebans,  the  garri- 
son gave  up  their  city.  Food  was  immediately  supplied  to 
them  until  the  commissioners  who  were  to  decide  their  fate 
should  arrive  from  Sparta. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  judges  the  hopes  of  the  Plataeans 
were  dashed  to  the  ground.  No  accusation  was  brought 
against  them ;  they  were  merely  asked,  one  after  the  other, 


epigram  of  Agathias  (a  d.  570,  Anthol.  v'\i.  614).  Paches  slew  their 
husbands,  but  the  women  escaped  him  and  made  their  way  to 
Athens,  where  they  denounced  his  conduct.  Cleon  probably  had 
a  grudge  against  Paches  for  his  want  of  promptness  in  executing  the 
first  decree.  See  Beloch,  Die  Attische  Politik,  pp.  30,  33.  Cp.  Plut. 
Aristid.  26.  For  some  difficulties  connected  with  the  revolt,  see 
Forbes,  Time.  i.  ci.,  f.  When  Thucydides  says  that  the  somewhat 
more  than  1000  who  were  put  to  death  were  alriaTaroi  rijs 
dnoardo-eais,  one  is  inclined  to  doubt  the  numeral. 


176  THE  TRIAL  OF  THE  PLATAEANS,  427.      [VI.  It. 


the  short  and  simple  question,  whether  they  had  rendered 
any  assistance  to  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies  in  the 
Trial  of  the  present  war.  Of  course,  as  they  were  allies  of 
piataeans.  Athenians,  there  was  but  one  answer ;  an 

answer  which  implied*  immediate  condemnation.  In  the 
hope  -that  they  might  move  their  judges  to  take  a  more 
favourable  view,  they  requested  leave  to  address  them 
through  two  of  their  number,  Astymachus,  and  Lacon,  who 
was  the  proxenus  of  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Plataea. 

The  head  and  front  of  the  offence  of  the  Piataeans  was  their 
alliance  with  Athens.  Originally  a  member  of  the  Boeotian 
Speech  of  the  League,  the  city  had  broken  away  from  the  con- 
piataeans.  federacy,  to  which,  both  by  race  and  territory, 
she  naturally  belonged,  and  associated  with  the  Athenians 
(supra,  p.  111).  But  the  Piataeans  were  able  to  prove  that 
they  had  taken  this  step  on  the  advice  of  the  Spartan  king, 
Cleomenes,  and  therefore — whether  they  were  right  or  wrong 
in  abandoning  their  Boeotian  friends — the  Spartans  could  not 
justly  condemn  them.  And  though  they  had  joined  in  the  gene- 
ral alliance  formed  in  481  to  resist  the  Persians,  this  did  not 
cancel  the  alliance  with  Athens  already  existing.  In  taking 
the  Athenian  side  they  were  only  fulfilling  obligations  which 
every  city  was  bound  to  fulfil.  In  the  present  war  their 
city  had  been  attacked  by  Thebes  without  notice  or  provoca- 
tion, even  at  a  holy  season,  a  proof  that  without  the  support 
of  the  Athenians  they  would  have  lost  their  independence. 
Instead  of  reproaching  them  for  their  fidelity  to  allies  who 
had  aided  them  in  a  time  of  trouble,  the  Spartans  should 
remember  their  services  to  the  cause  of  Hellas.  In  the  great 
invasion  they  alone  among  the  cities  of  Boeotia  had  fought 
for  liberty.  They  had  even  gone  on  board  ship  as  seamen, 
leaving  their  city  to  destruction.  How  different  was  the 
conduct  of  the  Thebans,  who  had  done  their  best  to  enslave 
Hellas  to  the  barbarians.  At  Plataea  the  decisive  battle 
had  been  fought;  in  their  country  were  the  memorials  of 
victory,  the  tombs  of  the  slain,  and  the  temples  in  which 
the  conquerors  offered  prayer  and  thanksgiving ;  it  was  they 


VI.  12.]     THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  PLATA  EANS,  Jffl.  177 


who,  year  by  year,  made  offerings  to  the  dead  who  had 
fallen  in  the  glorious  struggle ;  their  land  was  sacred, 
pledged  by  the  oath  of  Pausanias  to  be  inviolate  and  in- 
dependent. And  were  they  then  to  be  rooted  out  from  the 
soil  of  Greece  to  satisfy  the  revenge  of  their  most  bitter 
enemies  %  That  would  be  a  stain  on  the  honour  of  Lacedae- 
mon,  which  now  stood  first  in  Greece ;  a  denial  of  the  protec- 
tion due  to  them  as  to  all  suppliants.  But  if  the  Spartans 
were  indeed  obdurate,  let  them  at  least  put  the  garrison 
back  in  the  city  and  leave  them,  if  perish  they  must,  to 
perish  of  hunger.  Terrible  as  such  a  fate  would  be,  they 
would  rather  die  so  than  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Thebans.1 

The  language  in  which  Thucydides  has  clothed  these 
thoughts  is  touching  and  pathetic.  We  cannot  read  it 
without  realising  what  terrible  dangers  beset  a  small  city  in 
Greece  at  the  hands  of  powerful  neighbours ;  what  sacrifices 
were  made  in  the  passionate  desire  for  "independence."  We 
are  also  deeply  impressed  with  the  honourable  attachment 
of  Plataea  to  Athens — an  attachment  ill  repaid  by  the  selfish 
policy  which,  while  urging  resistance,  abandoned  the  city  to 
the  enemy.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  but  lament  the 
presence  in  this  brave  and  faithful  people  of  that  spirit  of 
division  which  caused  it  to  break  away  from  a  union  in 
which  alone  it  would  have  found  protection.  Odious  as  was 
the  conduct  of  Thebes,  we  cannot  say  that  her  efforts  to 
create  a  united  Boeotia  were  unjust  or  impolitic,  and  to 
these  efforts  Plataea  was  the  greatest  obstacle.  There  was 
also  the  danger  that  Plataea  might  become,  as  happened  in 
other  cities  of  Boeotia,  a  centre  for  democratic  intrigues  in 
the  interest  of  Athens. 

12.  The  Thebans  thought  it  necessary  to  make  a  reply 
to  this   appeal.      There  were  points  in  their  own  past 
which  required  excuse,  and  they  wished  to  put  Reply  of  the 
their  case  against  Plataea  as  strongly  as  they  Thebans- 
could.    It  was  true  that  in  the  Persian  invasion  they  had 


1  Time.  iii.  F  3  f. 

vol.  nv 


M 


178 


MASSACRE  OF  THE  PL  A  TAEANS,  $1.      [VI.  12. 


joined  the  invader,  but  Thebes  was  not  her  own  mistress  at 
the  time;  she  was  in  the  hands  of  a  few  leading  families, 
who  managed  everything  in  their  own  interests,  and  when 
she  got  back  her  constitution,  she  acted  very  differently. 
By  the  victory  of  Coronea  Hellas  was   freed   from  the 
dominion  of  Athens.    It  was  true,  too,  that  they  had  seized 
Plataea  at  a  time  of  peace  and  in  a  holy  season ;  but  they 
were  not  the  first  to  move  in  the  matter ;  they  merely 
accepted  an  invitation  sent  by  the  leading  citizens  in  the 
town.    The  Plataeans,  on  the  other  hand,  had  acted  with  the 
greatest  perfidy  in  attacking  the  Thebans  who  came  with 
peaceful   intentions,   and   slaying   their   captives,  though 
pledged  to  spare  their  lives.    As  for  their  fidelity,  it  was 
merely  another  name  for  perfidy.    They  had  forsaken  the 
alliance  which  they  made  with  the  Peloponnesians,  and 
joined  Athens  in  enslaving  cities  which  they  were  bound  to 
aid,  such  as  Aegina.    Their  boasted  patriotism  in  the  Persian 
war  was  due  to  their  alliance  with  Athens ;  it  did  not  arise 
from  any  regard  for  Hellas,  as  their  subsequent  conduct 
showed.     And  their  present  isolation  was  entirely  due 
to  their  own  obstinacy.    Had  they  accepted  the  offer  of 
Archidamus,  no  harm  would  have  happened  to  them.  Were 
they  to  go  unpunished  for  such  conduct,  and  claim  to  be  free 
from  the  operation  of  the  common  laws  of  Hellenic  warfare?1 
The  Spartans  took  the  view  that  Plataea,  by  refusing  the 
neutrality  which  Archidamus  offered,  had  fallen  back  into 
Massacre  of      her  original  position  as  an  ally  of  Sparta, 
the  Plataeans.    rpj^  iuckiess  Plataeans  were  brought  forward 
once  more,  one  by  one,  and  the  same  question  was  put  to 
each  :  "  Had  he  done  any  service  to  the  Lacedaemonians  or 
their  allies  in  the  war  1 "  and  each  one,  as  he  answered  "No," 
was  taken  away  and  put  to  death.    The  total  number  thus 
murdered  amounted  to  two  hundred  Plataeans  and  twenty- 
five  Athenians.    The  women  who  had  remained  in  the  city 
were  sold  into  slavery.     For  about  a  year  the  Thebans 


1  Thuc.  iii.  60 


VI.  13- ]  THE  CORCYRAEANS,  481-427. 


179 


allowed  the  deserted  town  to  be  the  home  of  some  Megarian 
exiles ;  but  afterwards  they  razed  it  to  the  foundations. 
The  territory  was  converted  into  public  land  and  leased 
to  citizens  of  Thebes.  For  many  years  the  site  of  the  city 
remained  desolate,  and  the  survivors  of  the  citizens  con- 
tinued to  live  at  Athens,  whence  a  number  of  them  were 
subsequently  sent  as  colonists  to  occupy  Scione.1 

13.  At  Plataea  and  Mytilene  we  have  examples  of  the 
principles  upon  which  the  war  was  conducted  by  the  leading 
cities  on  either  side.  The  course  of  our  narrative  now  leads 
us  to  Corcyra,  to  be  present  at  scenes  which  illustrate  the 
nature  of  domestic  strife  in  Greek  cities.  We  cannot  affirm 
that  this  ferocious  spirit  was  engendered  by  the  war,  but,  as 
we  shall  see,  the  opposition  of  Athenian  and  Peloponnesian 
interests  afforded  opportunities  to  the  conflicting  parties, 
oligarchical  and  democratic,  of  which  they  were  not  slow  to 
avail  themselves. 

When  the  Corcyraean  envoys  appeared  at  Athens  in  433, 
they  pointed  out  the  advantage  which  Athens  would  derive 
in  a  war  with  Sparta  from  the  union  of  the  „ 

„,  Corcyra  sends 

Corcyraean  and  Athenian  fleets.  The  greater  little  aid  to 
is  our  surprise  to  find  that,  when  the  war  Athens- 
broke  out,  Corcyra  furnished  little  or  no  assistance.  In  the 
summer  of  431,  notwithstanding  the  crushing  defeat  of  433, 
fifty  Corcyraean  vessels  joined  the  fleet  which  sailed  round 
Peloponnesus,  but  after  this  no  ships  were  sent  till  426, 
when  fifteen  came  to  the  help  of  Demosthenes.  When  the 
Corinthians  restored  Evarchus  to  Astacus,  when  Phormio 
was  engaged  at  such  fearful  odds  with  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet,  and  in  urgent  need  of  reinforcements,  the  Corcyraean 
triremes  lay  inactive  in  the  harbour  of  the  city. 

The  explanation  is  to  be  sought  in  the  changes  which  took 
place  at  Corcyra  in  the  interval  between  431  and  427.   In  the 

1  Thuc.  iii.  68  ;  v.  32  ;  Diod.  xii.  76.  The  restoration  came  forty 
years  later,  after  the  peace  of  Antalcidas  in  387,  but  the  town  was 
again  destroyed  (Diod.  xv.  46 ;  Pans.  ix.  1)  For  the  Plataeans  at 
Athens,  see  Gilbert,  Handbuch,  i.  p.  178  (  =  187  E.T.). 


180 


FA C TIONS  AT  CORC YA'A . 


[VI.  13. 


naval  engagement  of  432  a  number  of  Corcyraeans,  belonging 
to  the  foremost  families  in  the  island,  had  been  captured  and 
carried  to  Corinth.  They  were  treated  with  the  greatest 
consideration  while  detained  in  the  city,  and  at  some  time, 
which  we  cannot  fix,  were  allowed  to  return  at  a  nominal 
ransom  of  eight  hundred  talents,  for  which  their  proxeni  at 
Corinth  became  security.  It  was  not  intended  that  such  an 
enormous  sum  should  ever  be  exacted ;  on  the  contrary,  the 
captives  were  really  sent  back  in  the  Corinthian  interest,  to 
detach  Corcyra  from  Athens ;  and  on  their  return  the  city 
was  thrown  into  great  confusion.1 

The  condition  of  parties  at  Corcyra  at  this  time  is  un- 
certain. As  many  of  the  oligarchs  in  the  city  had  either 
The  Corcyraean  been  slain  or  taken  captive,  the  democrats 
oligarchs.  must  have  gained  in  power,  and  perhaps  it 
was  owing  to  their  ascendency  that  the  Athenians  received  a 
contingent  of  fifty  ships  in  431.  However  this  may  be,  the 
captives,  on  their  return,  endeavoured  to  estrange  Athens  and 
Corcyra,  and  so  great  was  their  influence,  that  the  Athenians 
and  Corinthians  each  sent  envoys  to  the  island,  the  first  to 
maintain  their  position,  the  second  to  take  advantage  of  the 
new  movement.  A  public  assembly  was  held,  in  which  it 
was  resolved  that  the  Corcyraeans,  while  continuing  allies  of 
the  Athenians  as  before,  should  renew  their  former  friendship 
with  the  Peloponnesians. 

The  oligarchs  were  not  content  with  this  success;  they 
aimed  at  nothing  less  than  the  suppression  of  the  Athenian 
or   democratic  party  in  the  city,  and  with 
Peithias.  this  view  they  summoned  Peithias,  the  leader 

of  the  people  and  proxenus  of  the  Athenians,  to  take  his 
trial  on  a  charge  of  attempting  to  enslave  Corcyra  to  Athens. 
The  people  refused  to  condemn  their  leader ;  and  in  revenge 
Peithias  charged  five  of  the  richest  citizens  with  cutting 
stakes  for  their  vineyards  in  the  sacred  wood  of  Zeus  and 
Alcinous,  a  practice  forbidden  by  law,  under,  a  fine  of  a 


1  Thuc.  iii.  70 ;  cp.  i.  55,  supra,  p.  81 


VI.  I4-]        THE  OLIGARCHS  VICTORIOUS,  427.  181 


stater  (3s.)  for  each  stake.  The  accused  were  condemned, 
and  found  themselves  burdened  with  a  ruinous  fine.  In 
vain  they  took  refuge  at  the  altars  of  Zeus  and  Alcinous, 
entreating  to  be  allowed  to  pay  their  debt  by  instalments ; 
at  the  instigation  of  Peithias,  the  council  insisted  on  im- 
mediate payment.  The  oligarchs  were  desperate  ;  they  knew 
that  the  democratic  leader  was  in  favour  of  a  strict  alliance, 
offensive  and  defensive,  with  Athens,  and,  as  he  was  all- 
powerful  in  the  council,  their  own  ruin  was  imminent. 
Eushing  with  daggers  into  the  council-chamber,  they  struck 
him  down,  and  others  to  the  number  of  sixty,  some  of  whom 
were  not  even  councillors.1  The  oligarchs  summoned  the 
people,  and  told  them  that  what  they  had  done  was  done  to 
free  Corcyra  from  the  dominion  of  Athens.  The  city  would 
now  go  back  to  her  old  neutrality,  and  stand  aside  from  the 
quarrel  which  divided  Greece.  Athenians  and  Pelopon- 
nesians  would  be  received  without  distinction,  if  they 
came  in  one  ship  only,  and  with  peaceable  intentions.  The 
people  had  no  alternative  but  to  sanction  this  arrangement ; 
the  oligarchy  then  sent  envoys  to  Athens  to  put  their 
conduct  in  the  best  light,  and  to  dissuade  the  democrats, 
who  had  set  sail  in  the  Athenian  trireme,  from  organising 
any  opposition.  But  their  envoys  no  sooner  arrived  than 
they  were  arrested  and  carried  over  to  Aegina.2 

These  events  took  place  while  the  Athenians  were  engaged 
in  the  blockade  of  Mytilene,  and  it  is  possible  that  the  oli- 
garchs of  Corcyra  ventured  to  strike  so  boldly  in  the  belief 
that  no  assistance  would  come  to  the  Corcyraean  demos 
from  Athens.  In  other  respects  the  moment  was  favourable ; 
the  death  of  Phormio,  and  the  defeat  and  death  of  his  son 
Asopius,  must  have  weakened  Athenian  influence  in  the 
west,  and  their  only  available  force  in  that  quarter  was  a 
squadron  of  twelve  ships  which  lay  at  Naupactus  under 
the  command  of  Nicostratus. 

14.  Soon  after  the  despatch  of  their  envoys  the  oligarchs 

1  Time.  iii.  70.  2  Time.  iii.  71-72. 


♦ 


182 


DEMOCRATIC  REACTION,  J$7. 


[VI.  14. 


were  reinforced  by  a  Corinthian  trireme  with  ambassadors 
from  Lacedaemon.  They  now  attacked  the  people,  driving 
Sedition  at  them  to  seek  refuge  at  night  in  the  acropolis 
Corcyra.  an(j  other  high  parts  of  the  town.  They 

also  held  the  southern  or  Hyllaic  harbour,  while  their 
opponents  occupied  .the  market-place  and  the  harbour 
opposite  the  continent. 

The  next  day  both  parties  endeavoured  to  increase  their 
numbers  by  inviting  the  slaves  in  the  island  to  join  them. 
A  large  number  came  to  the  help  of  the  democrats,  while 
the  oligarchs  were  aided  by  a  band  of  800  auxiliaries  from 
the  mainland,  for  here,  as  at  Epidamnus,  the  oligarchs  and 
barbarians  acted  together.  A  day  was  allowed  to  pass  in 
quietness,  but  on  the  next  the  contest  was  vigorously  renewed, 
even  the  women  joining  in  the  fray — at  least  on  the  popular 
side — and  hurling  missiles  from  trie  housetops  on  their 
enemies.  The  contest  went  on  till  evening,  and  was  turning 
in  favour  of  the  demos,  who  had  the  larger  numbers  and  the 
better  position,  when  the  oligarchs,  fearing  that  the  people 
would  seize  the  docks,  set  fire  to  a  number  of  houses  near 
the  market-place  and  other  large  blocks  of  building.  The 
fire  was  effectual  in  checking  the  advance  of  their  opponents, 
and  both  parties  remained  in  their  respective  positions  for 
the  night.  The  Corinthian  trireme,  seeing  the  turn  that 
events  had  taken,  stole  away,  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
auxiliaries  returned  to  the  continent.1 

On  the  next  day  Nicostratus  came  up  from  Naupactus 
with  his  ships,  and  500  heavyTarmed  Messenians.  He 
Nicostratus  endeavoured  to  reconcile  the  hostile  factions  by 
attempts  a  proposing  that  ten  of  the  most  guilty  oligarchs 
reconciliation,  should  De  brought  to  trial,  while  the  rest  made 
a  truce  and  laid  aside  their  enmity,  but  the  ten  selected  for 
trial  immediately  fled,  and  when  Nicostratus  was  about  to 
quit  the  island,  the  popular  leaders  requested  him  to  leave 
behind  five  of  his  ships  for  their  protection,  their  place  in 


1  Thuc.  iii.  74. 


VI.  IS-]         NICOSTRATUS  AT  CORCYRA,  427. 


183 


the  fleet  being  taken  by  five  Corcyraean  vessels.  Nicostratus 
agreed,  and  the  people  began  to  man  the  ships  with  crews 
selected  from  the  oligarchs.  The  oligarchs  took  alarm. 
Why  were  they  selected  to  serve  under  Athenians  1  Were 
they  not  being  sent  to  Athens  for  punishment  1  In  their 
terror  they  took  refuge  in  the  temple  of  the  Dioscuri,  where 
they  remained  in  spite  of  the  assurances  of  Nicostratus.  In 
the  eyes  of  the  people,  this  dread  of  serving  in  the  Athenian 
fleet  was  a  proof  of  treasonable  designs.  They  Distress  of 
disarmed  them  by  removing  their  weapons  the  oligarchs, 
from  their  houses,  and  would  even  have  killed  those  whom 
they  met — for  in  the  meanwhile  most  of  the  refugees  had 
left  their  sanctuary — had  not  Nicostratus  interfered.  In 
their  distress  the  unfortunate  oligarchs,  to  the  number  of 
400,  took  refuge  in  the  temple  of  Hera;  but  the  people, 
believing  themselves  to  be  insecure  so  long  as  their  enemies 
remained  in  the  city,  persuaded  them  to  leave  the  temple, 
and  they  were  conveyed  to  the  island  opposite,  to  which 
provisions  were  regularly  sent.1 

15.  For  three  or  four  days  affairs  continued  in  this  posi- 
tion, Nicostratus  still  remaining  at  Corcyra.  A  new  scene  in 
the  drama  opened  with  the  arrival  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet. 
After  the  failure  at  Lesbos,  the  Lacedaemonians  had  deter- 
mined to  increase  their  navy ;  and  hearing  of  the  troubles  in 
Corcyra,  they  instructed  Alcidas,  who  was  still  in  command, 
to  sail  to  the  island.  Accompanied  by  Brasidas,  who  had 
been  chosen  as  his  adviser,  he  set  sail  from  Cyllene  in  Elis, 
with  a  fleet  of  fifty-three  ships,  and  anchored  for  the  night 
at  Sybota,  a  harbour  on  the  mainland.  The  next  morning 
he  sailed  upon  the  city.2 

His  arrival  created  the  greatest  confusion.  The  popular 
party  were  now  between  two  enemies — those  in  the  city 
and  those  in  the  fleet.  They  hastily  manned  sixty  vessels 
which  lay  in  the  harbour  and  sent  them  out  in  detachments, 
without  waiting  till  the  whole  force  was  ready.    Two  of  the 


1  Thuc.  iii.  75. 


2  Thuc.  iii.  76. 


184 


ALCIDAS  AT  COKCYRA,  [VI.  15. 


Corcyraean  ships,  on  reaching  the  enemy,  at  once  deserted  to 
them ;  in  others  the  crews  began  to  fight  with  each  other.  A 
Arrival  of  the  battle  followed,  which,  owing  to  the  skill  and 
Peioponnesian  coolness  of  the  Athenians,  was  protracted  till 
fleet-  sunset,  when  the  Peloponnesians  returned  to 

their  station  at  Sybota  with  thirteen  Corcyraean  vessels.  No 
attempt  was  made,  either  on  that  or  the  succeeding  day,  to 
capture  the  town,  for  in  spite  of  the  remonstrances  of 
Brasidas,  Alcidas  refused  to  take  the  opportunity  offered  by 
the  panic  which  prevailed.  So  great  was  the  alarm  in  the 
city  that  the  Corcyraeans  removed  the  refugees  from  the 
island,  and  even  persuaded  some  to  go  on  board  the  thirty 
triremes,  which  they  were  able  to  man  in  expectation  of  a 
second  battle.  Alcidas,  however,  contented  himself  with 
ravaging  the  south  of  the  island  for  half  the  day,  and  when 
at  nightfall  signals  from  Leucas  announced  the  arrival  of 
sixty  Athenian  ships,  he  at  once  sailed  homewards,  creeping 
along  the  shore,  and  transporting  his  ships  over  the  low 
isthmus  which  united  Leucas  with  the  mainland,  to  escape 
detection  by  the  Athenians. 

The  popular  party  were  now  absolute  masters  of  the  city. 
The  fleet  which  arrived  from  Athens,  under  the  command  of 
Eurymedon,  joined  that  of  Nicostratus,  making  a  total  of 
seventy-two  vessels,  besides  the  thirty  Corcyraean  ships, 
which,  though  partly  manned  by  oligarchs,  were  commanded 
Massacre  of  by  captains  of  the  other  party.  Thus  supported, 
the  oligarchs.  the  Corcyraean  demos  went  to  work  with  a  will. 
The  five  hundred  Messenians,  who  had  hitherto  remained  out- 
side the  city,  were  brought  within  the  walls,  and  all  the  ships 
were  united  in  the  Hyllaic  harbour.  The  massacre  then 
began.  Every  oligarch  found  in  the  city  was  at  once  cut 
down ;  and  when  the  Corcyraean  ships  approached  the  shore, 
those  refugees  who  had  been  placed  on  board  were  taken  out 
and  slaughtered.  Of  the  suppliants  who  still  remained  in 
the  temple  of  Hera,  about  fifty  were  persuaded  to  come  out 
and  stand  their  trial.  These  were  at  once  condemned.  A 
much  larger  number  refused  to  leave  the  temple,  preferring 


VI.  16.]       MASSACRE  OF  THE  OLIGARCHS,  $7.  185 

to  be  their  own  executioners  ;  many  put  an  end  to  their  lives 
in  the  shrine ;  others  went  into  the  precincts  and  hanged 
themselves  on  the  trees,  or  destroyed  themselves  in  any 
manner  they  could.  The  massacre  went  on  for  the  seven 
days  during  which  the  Athenian  fleet  remained  at  Corey ra. 
It  was  ostensibly  a  political  execution,  an  extermination  of 
the  oligarchs,  but  in  reality  many  other  motives  were  at 
work ;  personal  enmity,  and  even  the  desire  to  get  rid  of  a 
creditor,  were  as  active  here  as  in  the  proscriptions  of  Rome. 
Whatever  crimes  a  man  committed  there  was  no  risk  of  con- 
demnation, for  all  were  alike  implicated  in  the  slaughter. 
"Every  form  of  death  was  seen,  and  everything,  and  more 
than  everything,  that  commonly  happens  in  revolutions 
happened  then.  The  father  slew  the  son,  and  the  suppliants 
were  torn  from  the  temples  and  slain  near  them;  some  of 
them  were  even  walled  up  in  the  temple  of  Dionysus  and 
there  perished."1 

Even  a  week  of  butchery  did  not  suffice  for  the  demos 
to  exterminate  their  opponents.     About  500  of  the  oli- 
garchs survived  the  massacre,  and  passed  over  Escapeofthe 
— we  do  not  know  how — to  the  mainland,  survivors  to 
whence  they  issued  forth  in  plundering  raids  the  mainland- 
to  the  island,  raids  so  successful,  that  Corcyra  was  reduced  to 
famine.    But  in  spite  of  their  successes  they  were  unable 
to  bear  the  separation  from  their  city.    They  sent  envoys  to 
Lacedaemon  and  Corinth  asking  to  be  restored,  and  when 
this  hope  failed,  they  returned  to  Corcyra  in  boats,  which 
they  burnt,  that  they  might  have  no  resource  except  in  the 
conquest  of  the  island.    They  established  themselves  in  a 
fort  on  Mount  Istone,  from  which  they  plundered  the  country 
and  the  city.2 

l6.  We  may  anticipate  the  progress  of  events  and  tell  out 
this  wretched  story  to  the  end.  For  a  year  and  a  half  the 
exiles  continued  their  depredations,  but  in  the  spring  of  425 
the  Athenians,  when  despatching  a  fleet  of  forty  vessels  to 


1  Time.  iii.  81  (Jowett). 


2  Thuc.  iii.  85. 


186  THE  OLIGARCHS  AT  CORCVRA,  425.        [VI.  16. 


Sicily  under  the  command  of  Eurymedon  and  Sophocles, 
gave  them  orders  to  call  at  Corcyra  on  their  way  and  put 
End  of  the  an  en(^  to  the  disorder.  During  the  last  year 
Corcyraean  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  had  been  greatly  dis- 
sedition.  tressed,  and  they  were  now  suffering  severely 

from  famine,  while  their  enemies  were  supported  by  the 
presence  of  a  Peloponnesian  fleet  of  sixty  vessels.  On  its 
way,  as  we  shall  see,  the  Athenian  fleet  occupied  Pylus,  an 
event  which,  though  it  delayed  the  Athenians,  compelled  the 
Peloponnesians  to  withdraw  their  fleet  from  the  island.  On 
their  arrival,  Eurymedon  and  Sophocles  joined  the  citizens  in 
an  attack  upon  the  fortress  of  Istone.  The  attack  was 
successful ;  the  exiles  were  driven  out,  and  after  fleeing  for 
refuge  to  an  elevated  part  of  the  mountain,  surrendered  at 
discretion  to  the  Athenians.  The  generals  carried  their 
captives  to  the  island  of  Ptychia,  till  they  could  be  sent  to 
Athens,  guaranteeing  their  safety  on  condition  that  no 
attempt  at  escape  should  be  made.  But  the  leaders  of  the 
Corcyraean  demos,  fearing  that  the  Athenians  would  not  put 
their  captives  to  death,  persuaded  a  few  to  run  the  risk,  and 
promised  to  find  a  boat  for  the  purpose.  The  fugitives  were  of 
course  captured,  and  the  whole  number  were  now  given  up  to 
the  Corcyraeans.  For  this  treachery  the  Athenian  generals 
themselves  were  partly  to  blame ;  at  any  rate,  they  were  not 
unwilling  to  insist  with  the  utmost  precision  on  the  terms  of 
the  capitulation,  without  any  regard  to  the  means  by  which 
the  fugitives  had  been  brought  to  break  them ;  and  as  they 
were  themselves  engaged  to  sail  to  Sicily,  they  had  no  wish 
that  captives  whom  they  had  taken  should  be  carried  to  Athens 
by  others,  who  would  reap  the  honour  of  their  success.1 

The  Corcyraeans  placed  the  prisoners  in  a  large  chamber, 
from  which,  having  arranged  a  number  of  hoplites  in  two 
The  final  rows,  they  led  them  out,  twenty  at  a  time, 

massacre.  chained  to  one  another.  As  they  passed  along 
the  rows  they  were  beaten  and  stabbed  by  the  hoplites  on 


i  Thuc.  iv.  46,  47. 


VI.  17.] 


THE  FINAL  MASSACRE,  48$. 


187 


either  side,  each  of  whom  seized  the  opportunity  to  avenge 
himself  on  an  enemy,  while  others  with  scourges  lashed  those 
who  lingered  on  their  way.  In  this  manner  about  sixty  were 
taken  out  and  destroyed  before  their  fate  was  discovered. 
When  this  was  known,  those  who  remained  in  the  chamber 
called  on  the  Athenians  to  put  them  to  death  with  their  own 
hands  if  they  pleased,  but  they  refused  to  go  out  or  to  allow 
any  one  to  enter.  The  Corcyraeans  made  no  attempt  to 
force  a  passage  through  the  doors;  they  climbed  on  the 
roof,  and,  breaking  through  it,  pelted  the  prisoners  with  the 
tiles,  or  shot  arrows  upon  them.  The  wretched  men  de- 
fended themselves  for  a  time,  but  at  length  most  of  them  in 
despair  put  an  end  to  their  lives  in  any  way  that  they  could. 
The  massacre  went  on  through  the  day  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  following  night,  till  all  were  destroyed.  The  women  who 
had  been  captured  in  the  fortress  were  sold  as  slaves.  "  This," 
says  Thucydides,  "was  the  end  of  the  great  Corcyraean  sedi- 
tion, at  any  rate  for  the  period  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  for, 
in  fact,  little  or  nothing  was  left  of  the  oligarchical  party."1 

17.  We  now  return  to  the  year  427.  The  Athenians  did 
not  forget  the  threatened  attack  on  the  Peiraeus  in  429. 
Soon  after  the  recovery  of  Lesbos  Nicias  seized  Nicias  captures 
the  island  of  Minoa,  lying  in  front  of  Megara,  Minoa- 
which  the  Megarians  had  fortified  and  used  as  a  military 
station.  It  was  nearer  Megara  than  Budorum  or  Salamis, 
and  if  the  Athenians  held  it  they  would  have  complete 
control  of  Nisaea.  Nicias  directed  his  attack  to  the  side 
nearest  the  mainland,  and  after  destroying  two  towers  which 
commanded  the  connection  with  the  shore,  gained  the  whole 
island,  in  which  he  built  a  fort  and  left  a  garrison.2 

At  the  close  of  the  summer  Athens  took  a  step  which  was 
attended  with  momentous  results — a  step  more  opposed  than 


1  Thuc.  iv.  47,  48.  For  a  criticism  on  Thucydides'  account  of  the 
Corcyraean  sedition,  see  Muller-Strubing  in  N~.  Jahrbiich.  fur  Phil. 
vol.  133,  p.  585  ff.  ;  and  for  a  criticism  on  this,  Holm,  Greek  Hist.  ii. 
p.  392.  See  also  Macan,  Transactions  of  the  Oxford  Phil.  Soc.  1886- 
1887,  pp.  30-31.  2  Thuc.  iii.  51. 


188 


THE  ATHENIANS  IN  SICILY,  427.  [VI.  17. 


any  which  she  had  hitherto  taken  to  the  policy  of  Pericles. 
Envoys  arrived  from  the  Chalcidians  of  Sicily,  among  whom 
was  Gorgias,  the  sophist,  of  Leontini,  asking  for  assistance 
against  Syracuse  and  the  Dorians.  Since  the  final  suppres- 
sion of  the  rising  of  the  Sicels,  Syracuse  had  greatly  extended 
her  power  (vol.  ii.  p.  472).  She  was  now  at  war  with  the 
Leontines,  who,  finding  themselves  shut  up  by  land  and  sea, 
and  relying  on  the  alliance  which  had  been  made  in  433, 
came  to  Athens  for  assistance.  With  them  were  envoys 
from  Ehegium,  a  city  which,  like  their  own,  was  in  alliance 
with  Athens.  The  envoys  were  well  received.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war  the  Dorians  of  Sicily  had  been  ranged 
among  the  allies  of  Sparta,  in  the  confident  hope  that  they 
would  send  to  the  Peloponnese  a  fleet  far  more  numerous 
than  that  of  Athens,  and  though  no  ships  had  ever  crossed 
the  sea,  the  alarm  had  not  passed  away.  There  were  other 
reasons  also  which  weighed  with  the  Athenians;  in  the 
petition  of  the  Leontines  they  saw  an  opportunity  of  realis- 
ing the  long-cherished  hope  of  extending  their  dominion 
The  Athenians  over  most  prosperous  of  Greek  settlements, 
send  ships  to  A  pretext  for  war  was  not  far  to  seek.  As 
Sicily.  Ionians,  as  allies,  they  were  bound  to  succour 

their  allies  and  kinsmen.  A  small  fleet  was  despatched  to 
Sicily  under  Laches,  who  seems,  however,  to  have  done 
nothing  till  the  winter,  when  an  abortive  attack  was  made 
on  the  inhabitants  of  the  Liparaean  Islands.1 

Meanwhile  Athens  was  once  more  a  city  of  the  dead  and 
dying.  The  plague,  which  since  the  summer  of  428  had  greatly 
The  plague  diminished  in  severity,  though  it  had  never 
reappears  at  entirely  ceased,  returned  in  all  its  terrors,  and 
Athens.  continued  to  rage  for  a  whole  year  (427-426). 

In  this  dreadful  scourge  no  fewer  than  4400  of  the  heavy- 
armed  citizens  perished,  and  300  of  the  knights;  the  mortality 
among  the  common  people  could  not  even  be  estimated.2 

1  Thuc.  iii.  86,  88. 

2  Thuc.  iii.  87.  The  plague  raged  from  early  summer  430  to  early 
summer  428,  and  again  from  winter  427  to  winter  426. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


FROM  THE  BEGINNING  OF  426  TO  THE  END  OF  425. 

I.  There  was  no  invasion  of  Attica  by  the  Lacedaemonians 
in  the  spring  of  426.  The  allies  had  collected  at  the  Isthmus 
as  usual,  but  their  advance  was  prevented  by  no  invasion  of 
a  series  of  earthquakes,  and  they  returned  Attica- 
home.  The  season  was  indeed  remarkable  for  physical 
disturbances,  which  could  not  fail  to  impress  the  super- 
stitious minds  of  the  Greeks.  The  elements  seemed  to  be 
taking  a  part  in  the  terrible  conflict  which  was  spreading 
desolation  and  bloodshed  throughout  Hellas. 

But  though  the  Lacedaemonians  allowed  the  year  to  pass 
without  an  invasion  of  Attica,  they  fell  upon  another  project, 
which  promised  far  greater  results,  and  is  a  Colonisation  of 
proof  that  their  plans  of  warfare  were  being  Heraclea  by  the 
conceived  on  a  larger  and  more  effective  scale.  sPartans- 
The  Trachinians,  a  Melian  tribe,  dwelling  near  the  pass  of 
Thermopylae,  had  suffered  greatly  at  the  hands  of  their 
neighbours  the  Oetaeans.  Their  first  intention  was  to  put 
themselves  in  the  hands  of  the  Athenians,  but  on  second 
thoughts  they  sent  an  envoy  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  as  the 
more  trustworthy  allies  (infra,  p.  1 99).  Their  envoy  was  joined 
by  others  from  the  Dorians,  the  mountain  state  which  claimed 
to  be  the  metropolis  of  Lacedaemon,  for  they,  like  Trachis, 
had  been  ravaged  by  the  Oetaeans,  and  were  in  urgent  need 
of  help.  The  Lacedaemonians  resolved  to  send  out  a  colony, 
not  merely  to  assist  the  suppliants,  but  because  a  city  of 
their  own  in  that  region  would  be  of  service  in  the  war. 
Could  a  fleet  be  maintained  at  Thermopylae,  it  might  cross 
to  Euboea,  or  control  the  passage  to  Thrace.   They  consulted 


190  THE  FO  UN  DA  TION  OF  HERA  CLE  A,  426.     [VI  I.  2. 


the  oracle  of  Delphi,  and  on  receiving  a  favourable  answer 
sent  out  colonists  from  Sparta  and  the  Perioecic  cities,  in- 
viting any  of  the  Greeks  who  chose  to  join,  except  the 
Ionians  and  Achaeans  and  some  other  nations.  The  leaders 
of  the  colony  were  three  in  number,  and  all  from  Lacedae- 
mon:  Leon,  Alcidas,  and  Dam  agon.  The  name  Heraclea 
was  given  to  the  new  city. 

The  Athenians  were  at  first  greatly  alarmed  for  the  safety 
of  Euboea,  but  their  fears  proved  to  be  groundless.  The 
Thessalians,  who  ruled  the  neighbouring  districts,  and  all 
whose  territory  was  threatened,  were  bitterly  hostile  to  the 
new  city,  and  carried  on  ceaseless  war  against  it ;  and  when 
the  governors  who  were  sent  out  from  Sparta,  by  their 
harsh  and  tyrannical  conduct,  frightened  away  the  greater 
part  of  the  settlers,  it  was  easy  for  the  neighbouring  nations 
to  complete  their  conquest.1 

The  foundation  of  Heraclea  was  an  attempt  to  carry  out 
the  plan  of  e^iTcix"7"/^,  which  the  Corinthians  mentioned 
in  432  as  one  of  the  means  by  which  Athens  might  be 
attacked.  To  whom  the  attempt  was  due  we  do  not  know, 
but  in  the  winter  of  427-426  the  aged  king  Archidamus  was 
succeeded  by  his  son  Agis,  who,  as  a  younger  man  and  more 
warlike  in  his  views,  would  be  likely  to  venture  on  new 
methods.  About  this  time  also  Plistoanax  was  brought  back 
to  Sparta  after  nineteen  years  of  exile.  This  for  a  time  may 
have  encouraged  the  Spartans  to  new  plans,  though  Plisto- 
anax was  subsequently  desirous  of  peace.2 

2.  The  Athenians  also  ventured  on  new  projects.  They 
began  the  operations  of  the  year  by  sending  out  fleets  to  the 
Nicias  at  Melos  east  and  west.  Nicias  was  despatched  with  a 
and  Tanagra.  large  force  to  the  island  of  Melos,  a  colony  of 
the  Lacedaemonians,  which  had  hitherto  refused  to  become 


1  Thuc.  iii.  92,  23.  Strabo,  p.  428.  Leake,  Northern  Greece,  ii. 
26  f. 

2  Thuc.  v.  16.  Can  we  accept  Aristoph.  Ach.  652  f.,  hia  tov&  i/fias 
AaKedaifxovioi  rrjv  elprjvqv  npoKakovvTai  kcli  ttjv  K'iyivav  anaiTovcrw, 
as  evidence  that  the  Spartans  were  willing  to  make  peace  in  426  ? 


V 1 1 .  3.  ]  D  EMOS  THENES  AT  LE  UCAS,  426. 


191 


a  member  of  the  Delian  confederacy.  The  recent  events  in 
Lesbos  may  have  warned  the  Athenians  that  it  was  necessary 
to  make  their  power  felt  in  the  Aegean,  and  above  all  to 
deprive  the  Lacedaemonians  of  any  stations  where  a  Dorian 
fleet  might  find  shelter.  Whatever  the  cause,  they  now 
determined  to  force  the  island  into  the  confederacy.1  The 
attempt  failed,  and  after  devastating  the  island,  Nicias 
returned  to  Oropus,  on  the  northern  border  of  Attica.  Here 
the  hoplites  disembarked  under  cover  of  night,  and  marched 
along  the  Asopus  to  Tanagra.  At  the  same  time,  on  a  pre- 
concerted signal,  the  whole  force  of  Athens  advanced  over 
the  border  to  join  the  invading  army.  They  devastated 
the  country  round  Tanagra,  and  defeated  the  Tanagraeans 
in  battle,  after  which,  without  attempting  to  make  use  of 
the  victory,  they  retired,  some  to  the  city,  and  others  to  the 
ships.  Nicias  continued  his  voyage  to  eastern  Locris,  where 
he  ravaged  the  sea-coast ;  and  then  returned  home.2 

3,  The  second  fleet  sailed  westwards  under  the  command 
of  Demosthenes,  the  son  of  Alcisthenes,  of  whom  we  now 
hear  for  the  first  time.     Nothing  is  said  of  ~ 

P  Demosthenes 

any  attempt  to  land  on  the  Peloponnesus ;  in  western 
Demosthenes  opened  the  campaign  by  destroy-  Greece- 
ing  the  garrison  at  Ellomenus  in  Leucadia,  and  followed  up 
his  success  by  devastating  the  territory  of  Leucas.  He  laid 
waste  the  territory  on  both  sides  of  the  isthmus  on  which 
the  town  lay,  and  reduced  the  enemy  to  inaction,  but  when 
the  Acarnanians  in  his  army  urged  him  to  cut  the  city  off 
with  a  wall  and  help  them  to  rid  themselves  of  an  old  enemy, 
they  found  that  he  had  other  plans  in  view.3 

The  Messenians  at  Naupactus  were  on  bad  terms  with 
their  neighbours  the  Aetolians,  and  they  wished  to  avail 

1  About  this  time,  or  a  little  earlier,  Thera  must  have  been  com- 
pelled to  join  the  Athenian  alliance,  and  pay  a  tribute  of  three 
talents  {supra,  p.  100). 

2  Thuc.  iii.  91.  The  attack  on  Melos  was  renewed  ten  years  later 
with  terrible  success :  the  battle  of  Tanagra  was  an  anticipation  of 
the  battle  of  Delium  two  years  later. 

3  Thuc.  iii.  91,  94. 


192 


INVASION  OF  AETOIIA,  426.  [VII.  3. 


themselves  of  the  large  army  collected  under  the  com- 
mand of  Demosthenes,  to  subdue  their  opponents.  They 
pointed  out  that  the  Aetolians,  though  numerous  and  warlike, 
dwelt  in  villages  distant  from  each  other,  and  unprotected 
by  walls.  Their  warriors  were  only  light-armed  soldiers, 
who,  if  they  were  attacked  before  they  had  time  to  assemble, 
could  be  reduced  without  difficulty.  Of  the  three  tribes 
which  composed  the  nation,  the  Apodoti  were  to  be  taken 
first,  then  the  Ophioneis,  and  after  these  the  Eurytanes,  the 
largest  and  most  barbarous  portion  of  the  whole.1  If  these 
were  conquered,  the  rest  could  be  brought  over  without 
difficulty. 

Demosthenes  was  inclined  to  gratify  the  Messenians,  but 
his  plans  went  far  beyond  their  proposals.  He  hoped,  by 
winning  over  the  nations  of  Aetolia  and  the  neighbouring 
Demosthenes  in  districts,  to  march  through  western  Locris, 
Aetoha.  unassisted   by  any  power  from   Athens,  to 

Cytinium  in  Doris,  and  so  make  his  way  round  Parnassus 
into  Phocis.  The  Phocians,  though  nominally  allies  of  the 
Spartans,  were  friendly  to  the  Athenians,  and  would  probably 
join  the  Athenian  leader,  or  could  be  compelled  to  do  so. 
When  in  Phocis,  Demosthenes  would  be  on  the  borders  of 
Boeotia,  the  ultimate  object  of  his  expedition.2  He  led 
his  forces  away  from  Leucas,  much  against  the  will  of  the 
Acarnanians,  to  Sollium,  a  town  on  the  opposite  coast,  where 
he  laid  his  new  plans  before  the  army.  The  Acarnanians, 
finding  that  Leucas  was  not  to  be  besieged,  at  once  with- 
drew, and  with  them  fifteen  ships  which  had  come  from 
Corcyra,  but  with  th,e  rest  of  his  army,  to  which  he  now 
added  300  Epibatae  (marines)  from  the  Athenian  ships, 
Demosthenes  marched  against  the  Aetolians.    The  western 


1  Time.  iii.  94.  Of  the  Eurytanes,  Thucydides  tells  us  that  their 
dialect  was  unintelligible,  and  that  they  ate  their  meat  uncooked. 

2  It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  both  Demosthenes  and  Nicias 
have  in  view  an  attack  on  Boeotia  in  this  year ;  the  one  from  the 
south,  the  other  from  the  north.  It  is  obvious  that  the  plan  of  424 
was  already  in  the  air. 


VII.  3-] 


DEMOSTHENES  DEFEATED,  426. 


193 


Locrians,  unlike  their  kinsmen  on  the  east,  were  allies  of  the 
Athenians,  and  being  neighbours  of  the  Aetolians,  armed 
like  them,  and  acquainted  with  their  mode  of  fighting,  their 
co-operation  was  eagerly  sought  by  the  general,  who  per- 
suaded them  to  join  him  at  some  point  in  the  interior  and 
serve  as  his  guides  through  the  country. 

The  territory  which  Demosthenes  was  about  to  invade 
forms  roughly  the  apex  of  an  angle,  of  which  the  two  sides 
are  the  river  Hylaethus  and  the  Corinthian  gulf.  It  is  a 
mountainous  region,  difficult  of  access.  The  Apodoti  appear 
to  have  occupied  the  left  bank  of  the  river  and  the  hills 
which  border  it;  the  Ophioneis  lay  beyond  them  on  the 
right  bank ;  the  Eurytanes  further  to  the  north  and  north- 
east.1 Marching  from  Oeneon,  whither  he  sailed  from 
Sollium,  Demosthenes  halted  his  troops  for  the  night  in  the 
temple  of  Nemean  Zeus,  a  place  well  known  as  the  scene  of 
the  death  of  the  poet  Hesiod.  In  the  next  three  days  he 
captured  three  Aetolian  villages,  the  last  of  which  was 
Teichium  on  the  confines  of  the  Ophioneis.  He  did  not 
intend  to  push  his  conquests  beyond  the  Apodoti  till  he  had 
reduced  the  whole  of  their  territory.  "When  this  was 
accomplished  he  would  return  to  Naupactus,  and  thence, 
begin  a  new  expedition  against  the  Ophioneis.  But  the 
Messenians,  impatient  of  the  caution  of  their  leader,  urged 
him  to  press  on  at  once,  and  unfortunately  Demosthenes 
adopted  their  advice.  Without  waiting  for  the  Locrians, 
of  whose  light-armed  javelin  men  he  was  greatly  in  need,  he 
marched  upon  Aegitium,  a  town  lying  among  Defeat  of 
high  hills,  about  ten  miles  from  the  coast.  Demosthenes  at 
The  inhabitants,  who  had  already  been  joined  Ae&ltlum- 
by  the  combined  forces  of  the  Aetolians,  even  from  the 
distant  tribes  bordering  on  the  Meliac  gulf,  abandoned  the 
town  and  encamped  upon  the  surrounding  heights,  from 
which  they  threw  their  missiles  at  the  Athenians,  running 

1  See  Woodhouse,  Aetolia,  p.  16  ff.  The  dividing  lines  of  the 
tribes  cannot  be  drawn  very  precisely.  The  Apodoti  may  have  been 
settled  on  both  banks  of  the  river  Hvlaethus. 

VOL.  III.  N 


194 


A  TTA  CK  ON  NA  UP  A  CTUS,  426.  [VI 1 .  3. 


down  from  the  summits  in  all  directions,  retiring  whenever 
the  Athenians  advanced,  and  attacking  when  they  retired. 
This  desultory  mode  of  battle  continued  for  a  long  time, 
greatly  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Athenians.  So  long  as 
their  archers  had  a  supply  of  arrows  and  could  use  them, 
they  held  their  ground,  the  Aetolian  light-armed  being  com- 
pelled to  retire  before  the  shots  of  the  bowmen;  but  when 
the  archers  lost  their  commander,  and  were  themselves 
exhausted  by  the  long  conflict,  they  turned  and  fled. 
Ignorant  of  the  locality,  for  their  guide  was  slain,  they  found 
themselves  entangled  in  impassable  ravines,  in  which  their 
light-armed  and  active  enemies  caught  them  at  every  step. 
A  large  number  fled  into  a  wood,  to  which  the  Aetolians  at 
once  set  fire ;  others  wandered  about  till  death  overtook 
them,  and  but  a  small  remnant  escaped  to  Oeneon.  Of  the 
three  hundred  Athenians,  one  hundred  and  twenty  had  been 
slain,  men  in  the  very  flower  of  their  youth,  whom  Thucy- 
dides  describes  as  the  finest  soldiers  who  fell  in  the  war. 
When  the  dead  had  been  recovered  from  the  Aetolians, 
the  ships  returned  to  Naupactus  and  thence  to  Athens; 
Demosthenes,  however,  fearing  to  return  home  after  his 
failure,  remained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Naupactus.1 

After  this  success  the  Aetolians  were  eager  to  revenge 
themselves  on  Naupactus  for  the  invasion  of  their  country. 

In  the  late  summer  the  Lacedaemonians,  at 
pactus,  which  their  request,  sent  a  large  force  over  the  gulf, 
is  saved  by        When  he  reached  Delphi,  the  Spartan  general, 

Demosthenes.  .  T 

.hiUrylocnus,  sent  envoys  to  the  Locrians, 
through  whose  territory  the  route  to  Naupactus  lay,  to 
detach  them  from  the  Athenians ;  and  the  Locrian  towns, 
far  from  making  any  resistance,  not  only  gave  hostages  for 
a  safe  conduct,  but  even  joined  in  the  expedition,  with 
one  or  two  exceptions.  The  army  entered  the  territory  of 
Naupactus,  where  they  were  joined  by  the  Aetolians,  and  laid 


1  Thuc.  iii.  95-98.  For  the  locality,  see  Leake,  Northern  Greece, 
ii.  612  ff.,  and  especially  Woodhouse,  Aetolia,  p.  57  ff.,  340  ff. 


VII.  4.] 


A  MB  R  AC  I  A  AND  ARGOS,  426. 


195 


waste  the  country  as  far  as  the  suburbs  of  the  city ;  but  here 
their  successes  came  to  an  end.  Demosthenes,  when  he 
heard  of  the  intended  expedition,  knowing  the  defenceless 
state  of  Naupactus,  which  was  both  weakly  garrisoned  and 
weakly  fortified,  persuaded  the  Acarnanians  to  send  1000 
hoplites,  with  whom  he  sailed  to  the  city,  just  in  time  to 
save  it.  Eurylochus  felt  that  it  was  now  impossible  to  take 
the  place  by  storm,  and  withdrew  into  the  neighbouring 
territory  of  Calydon  and  Pleuron.  He  had  already  entered 
into  negotiations  with  the  Ambraciots  for  a  combined  attack 
upon  Argos  Amphilochicum  and  Acarnania,  by  which,  if 
successful,  the  inhabitants  of  those  regions  could  be  brought 
over  to  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance.1 

4.  In  the  autumn  the  Ambraciots,  as  they  had  promised, 
sent  a  large  force  against  Argos.  Traversing  the  pass  between 
the  mountains  and  the  sea,  which  commands  invasion  of 
the  northern  entrance  into  the  Argive  territory,  Ar£°s- 
they  seized  Olpae,  a  strong  fortress  on  a  hill  by  the  sea, 
about  three  miles  distant  from  the  city.  The  Argives  were 
aided  by  the  Acarnanians,  who,  with  part  of  their  forces, 
marched  to  the  city,  and  with  others  occupied  Crenae  (wells), 
a  place  in  the  adjacent  plain,  to  prevent  the  Peloponnesians 
under  Eurylochus  from  joining  the  Ambraciots  at  Olpae. 
They  also  sent  a  messenger  to  Demosthenes  begging  him 
to  take  command  of  their  army,  and  to  twenty  Athenian 
vessels  which  happened  at  the  time  to  be  cruising  off  the 
coast  of  the  Peloponnese.  The  Ambraciots  at  Olpae, 
fearing  that  Eurylochus  might  be  unable  to  make  his 
way  through  Acarnania,  when  they  would  have  to  fignt 
without  his  assistance  or  return  home  as  best  they  could, 
sent  to  Ambracia  and  requested  the  citizens  to  join  them  in 
full  force.  When  he  heard  that  the  Ambraciots  were  at 
Olpae,  Eurylochus  set  out  out  in  haste  from  Proschium  (west 
of  Pleuron),  and  crossing  the  Achelous,  advanced  through 
Acarnania,  where,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  inhabitants 


1  Time,  iii.  100-102. 


196 


DEMOSTHENES  AT  OLPAE,  426.  [VII.  4. 


at  Argos,  he  met  with  no  resistance.  Leaving  Stratus  on  his 
right,  and  taking  to  the  range  of  Mount  Thyamus,  a  wild 
uncultivated  district,  he  descended  into  the  Argive  plain  by 
night,  and  passed  between  Argos  and  Crenae  to  Olpae.  At 
daybreak  the  united  forces  pitched  their  camp  at  a  place 
called  the  "metropolis,"  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood. 

Not  long  afterwards  the  Athenians  sailed  into  the 
Ambracian  gulf,  and  with  them  Demosthenes  at  the  head 
of  200  Messenian  heavy-armed  and  sixty  Athenian  bowmen. 
The  battle  of  The  ships  lay  at  anchor  off  the  hill  of  Olpae, 
oipae.  while   the  Acarnanians   and  Amphilochians, 

who  had  already  assembled  at  Argos,  prepared  for  battle. 
Demosthenes,  who  was  commander-in-chief,  at  once  led  out 
his  army  to  Olpae,  and  encamped  in  a  position  separated 
from  the  enemy  by  a  deep  ravine.  For  five  days  the  two 
armies  remained  inactive,  but  on  the  sixth  they  drew  out  for 
battle.  Finding  that  the  Peloponnesian  forces  were  numerous 
enough  to  overlap  his  own,  Demosthenes  placed  a  force  of 
hoplites  and  light-armed  soldiers  in  a  deep  lane  overgrown 
with  brushwood,  in  order  that  they  might  attack  in  the  rear 
the  extreme  wing  of  the  enemy  should  it  attempt  to  encircle 
him.  The  armies  then  joined  battle.  The  stratagem  of 
Demosthenes  was  entirely  successful.  The  Peloponnesians 
had  begun  to  encircle  his  right,  when  the  Acarnanians 
appeared  from  their  ambush  and  drove  them  back  in  such 
haste  that  they  carried  with  them  the  greater  part  of  the 
army.  On  the  other  wing  the  Ambraciots  succeeded  in 
defeating  their  opponents  and  driving  them  to  the  city, 
but  on  their  return  they  were  attacked  by  the  victorious 
Acarnanians,  and  forced  to  seek  refuge  in  Olpae,  with  much 
difficulty  and  loss.  The  Mantineans  alone  among  the  invad- 
ing forces  preserved  an  orderly  retreat.  On  the  next  day 
Menedaeus,  who  was  now  general  of  the  Peloponnesians,  as 
both  Eurylochus  and  Macarius,  the  second  in  command,  had 
fallen,  proposed  a  truce  to  cover  the  retreat  of  his  soldiers. 
Demosthenes  was  unwilling  to  enter  into  open  negotiations 
for  the  retreat  of  the  whole  army,  and  proposed  a  separate 


VII.  5-]       PELOPONNESIAN  TREACHERY,  426. 


197 


treaty  with  the  Mantineans  and  the  Peloponnesians,  hoping 
thereby  not  only  to  isolate  the  Ambraciots  and  their  mer- 
cenaries, but  also  to  bring  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Pelopon- 
nesians into  ill  repute  for  their  selfish  treachery  in  saving 
their  own  lives  at  the  cost  of  their  allies.  The  Retreat  of  the 
terms  were  no  sooner  fixed  than  the  Pelopon-  Peloponnesians. 
nesians  buried  their  dead  and  prepared  for  their  own  escape. 
Under  pretence  of  gathering  wood  and  fodder,  the  Mantineans 
and  others  included  in  the  truce  began  to  steal  away  in  small 
companies,  till  they  were  at  some  distance  from  Olpae,  when 
they  abandoned  all  disguise  and  ran  off  at  full  speed.  The 
Ambraciots  and  others  who  had  gone  out  with  them,  seeing 
their  movements,  quickened  their  pace  in  order  to  overtake 
them,  while  the  Acarnanians,  who  thought  that  all  alike  were 
retiring  without  permission,  started  in  pursuit.  When  their 
generals  announced  that  the  Peloponnesians  were  retreating 
under  a  truce,  there  was  for  a  moment  an  alarm  that  the 
whole  army  had  been  treacherously  allowed  to  escape,  and 
one  of  the  soldiers  in  his  rage  and  disappointment  threw 
a  javelin  at  his  commanders.  Afterwards  they  let  the 
Mantineans  and  Peloponnesians  go,  but  the  Ambraciots  were 
cut  down  on  every  hand.  The  survivors  escaped  into  the 
territory  of  the  Agraeans,  whose  king,  Salynthius,  afforded 
them  a  friendly  shelter.1 

5.  Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Olpae,  news  had  been 
brought  to  Demosthenes  that  the  Ambraciots  were  advancing 
in  full  force  from  the  city  to  join  their  allies,  of  whose  defeat 
they  knew  nothing.  He  at  once  sent  a  portion  of  his  army 
to  occupy  the  roads  and  take  up  a  strong  position  on  the 


1  Thuc.  iii.  105-111.  For  the  topography,  see  Leake,  Northern 
Greece,  iv.  p.  242  ff.  ;  Oberhummer,  Alcarnanien,  p.  107  f .  ;  Heuzey, 
Le  Mont  Olympe  et  VAcarnanie,  p.  293  f.  The  possible  changes  of 
the  coast  render  it  difficult  to  be  precise,  but  on  the  whole  I  am 
inclined  to  agree  with  Heuzey  about  the  situation  of  Olpae,  which  he 
places  at  Hellenokuli,  and  not  as  Leake  and  Oberhummer  at  Agrilo- 
vuni.  The  ravine  which  separated  the  two  armies  will  then  be  the 
stream  flowing  from  Lutro  to  Arapi.  The  position  of  Argos  and 
Crenae  is  certain. 


198 


BATTLE  OF  IDOMENE,  me.  [VII.  S 


enemy's  route,  intending  to  follow  with  the  remainder  as 
soon  as  possible.  On  their  way  into  the  Argive  plain  the 
Ambraciots  had  to  pass  through  a  narrow  and  difficult  defile, 
which  forms  the  only  entrance  in  this  direction,  and  it  was 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  Demosthenes  that  he  should 
secure  this  pass.  His  advanced  force  succeeded  during  the 
night  in  seizing,  unknown  to  the  enemy,  the  larger  of  two 
hills,  which  Thucydides  calls  Idomene ;  the  smaller  had 
already  been  occupied  by  the  Ambraciots.  After  the  evening 
meal,  Demosthenes  advanced  with  half  his  force  to  the  pass, 
while  the  other  half  was  sent  further  to  the  east,  through 
the  Amphilochian  hills.  Marching  all  night,  he  came  upon 
Battle  of  the  Ambraciots  at  daybreak,  while  they  were 

idomene.  yet  jn  their  beds  and  quite  ignorant  of  his 

approach.  Their  confusion  was  the  greater  because  he  had 
purposely  placed  his  Messenians  in  the  van,  that  the  Am- 
braciots, hearing  their  Doric  dialect,  might  receive  them  as 
friends.  The  army  thus  surprised  was  immediately  put  to 
flight  with  prodigious  slaughter  ■  they  fled  down  the  hill,  but 
only  to  find  the  roads  secured,1  and  driven  back  on  every  side 
they  wandered  in  unknown  ravines  or  fell  into  the  ambuscades 
prepared  for  them.  In  despair  some  rushed  to  the  sea-shore 
and  swam  to  the  Attic  ships,  thinking,  in  the  extremity  of 
their  terror,  that  if  die  they  must,  it  was  better  that  they 
should  be  slain  by  the  sailors  than  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
detested  and  barbarian  Amphilochians.  The  few  survivors 
found  their  way  back  to  Ambracia. 

Thucydides  illustrates  the  severity  of  this  defeat  by  the 
following  incident.  When  the  herald  came  from  the  Am- 
Numberofthe  braciots  at  Olpae  to  ask  for  the  corpses  of 
slain ;  the  Am-    the  slain,  knowing  nothing  of  the  battle  of 

braciot  herald?     Tj  j         •        j.i  p    .  i       -i  i 

Idomene,  and  seeing  the  arms  of  the  dead, 
he  expressed  his  astonishment  at  their  number.  A  by- 
stander, who  believed  him  to  be  the  herald  from  Idomene, 
asked  how  many  he  thought  had  fallen.     "About  two 


1  Were  they  secured,  in  part,  by  the  forces  sent  through  the  hills  ? 


VII.  6.]    SLAUGHTER  OF  THE  AMBRA CIOTS,  426.  199 


hundred,"  was  the  reply.  "  Then  these  are  not  their  arms, 
for  here  are  those  of  more  than  a  thousand."  The  herald 
answered,  "They  cannot  then  be  the  arms  of  those  who 
fought  with  us."  " Indeed  they  are,"  said  the  other,  "if  you 
were  fighting  yesterday  at  Idomene."  "Yesterday  we 
fought  with  no  one ;  it  was  the  day  before,  in  the  retreat." 
The  other  replied,  "  All  I  know  is  that  these  are  the  arms 
of  those  with  whom  we  fought  yesterday,  the  men  who 
marched  from  the  city  of  Ambracia."  When  the  herald 
heard  this,  he  understood  that  the  army  from  the  city 
had  perished,  and  overcome  by  the  disaster,  he  broke 
into  a  loud  cry  and  departed  as  he  came,  without  even 
asking  for  the  dead.  For  this,  adds  the  historian,  was  the 
greatest  calamity  that  overtook  any  one  city  in  an  equal 
number  of  days  throughout  the  whole  war,  and  so  great  was 
the  number  of  the  slain,  compared  with  the  population  of 
the  city,  that  he  does  not  venture  to  state  it.  Had  the 
Amphilochians  and  the  Acarnanians  been  willing  to  take  the 
advice  of  Demosthenes  and  march  upon  Ambracia,  they  would 
easily  have  captured  the  city,  but  this  they  refused  to  do 
lest  they  should  find  the  Athenians,  if  settled  there,  more 
troublesome  neighbours  than  their  old  enemies.1  Ambracia 
was  subsequently  reinforced  by  a  garrison  from  Corinth. 

6.  In  Sicily  (supra,  p.  187)  nothing  of  importance  was  achieved 
beyond  the  capture  of  Messene'  by  which  the  Athenians 
became  masters  of  both  sides  of  the  strait  and 

,  ~.  .,.  l       mi       Affairs  in  Sicily; 

planted  a  firm  toot  on  bicilian  ground.    Ine  desultory  war- 
fleet  seems  to  have  been  distracted  between  the  fare :  .new  Pre- 
claims  of  Italy  and  Sicily;  too  weak  to  take 
an  independent   line,  it   made  desultory  attacks  as  the 
Rhegians,  the  Sicilian  allies,  or  the  Sicels  called  for  its 


1  Thuc.  iii.  112-113;  Oberhummer,  I.e.,  p.  110;  Heuzey,  I.e. 
293  ff.  He  places  the  greater  Idomene  at  Liapochori,  the  smaller 
at  Paleokoulia  (p.  304),  but  the  locality  cannot  be  determined  with 
precision.  It  is,  however,  certain  that  the  smaller  Idomene  was  near 
the  sea,  and  apparently  it  was  not  far  from  the  iar^oXrj  or  pass 
leading  from  Ambracia  into  the  plain  of  Argos. 


200 


THE  A  THENIANS  IN  SICIL  Y,  426.  [VII.  7. 


assistance.  In  one  of  these,  Laches  captured  a  fortress  on 
the  river  Halex,  the  boundary  separating  the  territory  of 
Locri  from  that  of  Rhegium.  In  another,  he  made  an  un- 
successful attempt  on  Inessa,  a  Sicel  town,  but  held  by  the 
Syracusans.  In  a  third,  the  Athenians  landed  in  the  territory 
of  Himera,  while  their  Sicel  allies  ravaged  the  interior 
border.1  At  the  close  of  the  year,  when  Laches  returned  to 
Ehegium,  he  found  himself  superseded  by  Pythodorus.  The 
alli.es  of  Athens  in  Sicily  had  become  weary  of  the  useless 
war.  On  land  they  had  lost  ground,  and  though  an  insig- 
nificant fleet  was  as  yet  sufficient  to  keep  the  Syracusans  off 
the  sea,  the  enemy  were  preparing  a  larger  force.  They 
called  on  the  Athenians  to  increase  the  number  of  their 
ships,  and  the  Athenians,  "partly  because  they  wished  to 
bring  the  war  in  Sicily  to  an  end,  and  partly  to  keep  their 
sailors  in  practice,"  equipped  a  fleet  of  forty  vessels.  As  it 
was  now  too  late  for  naval  operations,  they  sent  Pythodorus, 
with  a  few  ships  only,  intending  to  despatch  a  larger  number 
in  the  following  spring.  The  change  brought  no  better 
fortune.  On  his  arrival  Pythodorus  sailed  to  the  Locrian 
fortress,  which  Laches  had  captured,  but  he  was  defeated 
and  forced  to  retire.2 

7.  Towards  the  close  of  the  year  the  Athenians,  warned 
by  an  oracle,  as  was  said,  resolved  to  purify  the  sacred 
p  <fi  t>  island  of  Delos,  and  restore  the  old  festival 
ofDeios;  and  which  once  made  it  the  centre  of  the  Ionic 
restoration  of  race  (vol.  i.  519).  A  similar  purification  had 
_e  .  been  made,  more  than  a  century  before,  by 
Pisistratus,  but  to  a  limited  extent,  so  much  only  of  the 
island  being  cleansed  as  could  be  seen  from  the  temple.  On 
the  present  occasion  the  purification  was  thorough  and 
complete :  all  the  dead  who  had  been  buried  in  Delos  were 


1  Thuc.  iii.  90,  99,  103.  Perhaps  it  was  at  this  time  that  Laches 
renewed  the  fatal  alliance  with  Segesta,  which  is  recorded  as  his  work. 
Thuc.  vi.  6.    For  the  previous  alliance  see  vol.  ii.  468. 

2  Thuc.  iii.  115;  Freeman,  Sicily,  iii.  31  ff.  Laches  was  put  on 
his  trial  on  his  return  :  see  Aristoph.  Wasps,  240,  836  ff. 


VII.  8.]  PURIFICATION  OF  DELOS,  426. 


201 


removed,  and  for  the  future  neither  death  nor  birth  was 
allowed  to  take  place  in  the  island.  The  Athenians  then 
restored  the  Delia  as  a  "  five-yearly  "  festival.  Though  the 
old  games  had  fallen  into  disuse,  the  islanders  had  kept  up 
their  choral  dances,  and  the  Athenians  had  sent  choruses 
and  sacrificed.  The  gymnastic  exercises  were  now  renewed, 
and  horse-races  were  added— a  contest  unknown  in  the 
old  festival.  We  can  hardly  doubt  that  tke  Athenians,  in 
thus  renewing  the  sanctity  and  importance  of  Delos,  wished 
to  bind  together  the  Ionic  race  as  closely  as  possible.  The 
events  of  the  previous  year  had  shown  how  necessary  it 
was  to  preserve  by  every  means  the  allegiance  of  their  allies 
in  the  east,  and  they  had  recently  launched  on  a  new  career 
as  the  champion  of  Ionic  influence  in  the  west.  It  was 
important  to  show  that  the  championship  was  something 
more  than  imperial  domination.  The  head  of  Ionic  cities 
must  treat  the  colonies  of  her  race,  not  merely  as  allies 
or  subjects,  but  as  fellow-worshippers  of  the  great  Ionic 
deity,  and  linked  together  by  the  enjoyment  of  a  common 
festival.1 

8.  In  the  following  spring  (425)  the  Peloponnesians  invaded 
Attica,  but  they  had  barely  been  in  the  country  a  fortnight 
before  they  returned  home.  The  invasion  had  short  invasion 
been  made  so  early  in  the  year  that  they  could  of  Attica, 
not  support  their  forces  on  the  harvest,  and  the  weather  was 
unusually  severe,  but  what  chiefly  hastened  their  return  was 
the  alarming  news  from  Sparta.2 

The  fleet  destined  for  Sicily  set  out  from  Athens  about 
the  same  time  that  the  Peloponnesians  invaded  Attica.  The 
generals  in  command  were  Eurymedon  and  Sophocles,  but 
Demosthenes,  who  had   returned   home   from  Acarnania, 

1  Thuc.  iii.  1 04.  The  celebration  of  the  festival  took  place  in  the 
spring.  The  final  disappearance  of  the  plague  in  this  year  may 
also,  as  Cur tiiis  thinks,  have  influenced  the  Athenians  in  this 
matter. 

2  Thuc.  iv.  2 :  rot)  rjpos  Tvp\v  tov  oltov  iv  tt}  aK/xfj  elvai,  ib.  6, 
irpcp  e<r(Sa\6vTes  feat  tov  (t'itov  en  ^Xajpoy  ovros.  They  remained  in 
Attica  fifteen  days  ;  the  shortest  stay  that  they  ever  made. 


202  THE  ATHENIANS  EORTIFY  PYLUS,  425.     [VII.  9. 


though  no  longer  a  general,  was  allowed  to  accompany  the 
expedition  and  make  what  use  he  pleased  of  the  ships  on  the 
voyage  round  the  Peloponnese.  When  they  had  reached 
ed  Laconia,  they  learnt  that  a  Peloponnesian  fleet 
and  fortified  was  already  at  Corcyra  {supra,  p.  186),  and 
by  the  Athenian  generais  were  eager  to  press  forward  ;  but 
Demosthenes  wished  them  to  put  in  at  Pylus,  a 
headland  on  the  Messenian  coast,  about  fifty  miles  distant 
from  Sparta,  which,  owing  to  the  harbour  formed  by  the 
island  of  Sphacteria,  was  the  most  favourable  station  for 
a  fleet  in  that  part  of  the  Peloponnese.  The  generals  were 
unwilling  to  delay  their  voyage,  when  an  opportune  storm 
carried  their  ships  to  shore.  Demosthenes  then  urged  them 
to  fortify  the  place,  but  they  refused.  Pylus  was  no  better 
than  any  other  desert  headland,  and  it  would  be  mere  waste 
of  the  city's  resources  to  occupy  it.  Finding  that  he  could 
not  prevail  with  the  generals  or  with  the  soldiers,  or  even 
the  inferior  officers,  to  whom  he  proposed  his  plan,  Demos- 
thenes had  desisted  from  further  efforts,  when  fortune  came 
to  his  aid.  The  bad  weather  continuing,  the  soldiers  them- 
selves, for  want  of  occupation,  began  to  fortify  the  rock. 
Tools  they  had  none ;  they  picked  up  loose  stones  which  they 
fitted  together  as  they  could,  and  mortar,  when  necessary, 
was  brought  by  the  soldiers  on  their  backs,  each  man  bending 
forward  as  low  as  he  dared  and  locking  his  hands  behind 
him,  to  prevent  the  load  from  slipping  away.  The  greater 
part  of  the  place  needed  no  fortification.  In  six  days  the 
Athenians  had  completed  the  necessary  work,  and  the  fleet 
could  sail  away  to  Corcyra  and  Sicily,  leaving  Demosthenes 
with  five  ships  to  protect  the  new  fortress. 

9.  The  Peloponnesian  army  had  no  sooner  returned  from 
Attica  than  the  Spartans  marched  upon  Pylus.  They  took 
The  Spartans  witn  them  tne  nearest  of  the  Perioeci,  the 
march  upon  on\y  forces  available  at  the  moment,  for  the 
ketncaUed  rest  of  tne  Lacedaemonians,  having  recently 
from  Corcyra.  returned  from  the  invasion,  were  unwilling  to 
move.    They  also  sent  round  the  Peloponnese,  bidding  the 


VII.  9-]  ALARM  OF  THE  SPARTANS,  425. 


203 


allies  go  to  Pylus,  and  the  fleet  was  recalled  from  Corcyra. 
On  the  arrival  of  their  forces  the  Lacedaemonians  at  once 
made  preparations  for  an  attack  by  land  and  sea  ;  they 
thought  that  they  would  have  no  difficulty  in  capturing 
a  fortress  built  in  such  haste,  and  defended  by  so  small  a 
garrison.  Thucydides  goes  on  to  say  that  they  also  resolved, 
.  if  they  failed  to  take  the  fort  before  the  arrival  The  Lacedae- 
of  the  Athenian  ships  which  Demosthenes  monian  plans, 
had  already  summoned  to  his  aid,  to  block  the  entrances 
into  the  harbour,  of  which  the  northern  one  admitted  two 
ships  only,  the  southern  not  more  than  eight  or  nine.  It 
seems  certain  that  Thucydides,  in  making  the  statement,  has 
in  view  the  entrances  into  the  bay  of  Navarino,  at  either 
end  of  Sphacteria,  but  if  so  he  has  been  misled  as  to  their 
breadth.1  And  that  the  Athenians  might  not  make  the 
island  a  base  of  operations,  they  disembarked  a  number  of 
hoplites  upon  it,  while  others  were  stationed  on  the  main- 
land. By  these  measures  they  hoped  to  keep  the  Athenians 
off  the  land  altogether,  for  the  coast  beyond  the  immediate 
limits  of  the  island  was  quite  impracticable.  Unfortunately 
for  them,  a  part  only  of  these  preparations  was  carried  into 
effect.  A  number  of  soldiers  were  taken  by  lot  from  all  the 
companies  and  placed  in  the  island  in  rotation,  those  stationed 
there  at  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  Athenian  fleet  being 
420  in  number,  with  their  helots,  under  the  command  of 
Epitadas.  The  obstruction  of  the  entrances  to  the  harbour 
was  for  some  reason  neglected.2 

Demosthenes  prepared  to  receive  the  attack ;  the  triremes 
which  had  been  left  with  him  he  drew  up  on  the  shore 
and  surrounded  with  a  palisade ;  the  sailors  he  armed  with 

1  The  southern  entrance  to  the  bay  of  Navarino  is  about  1400 
yards  wide,  the  northern  about  150  yards  wide.  But  at  the 
end  towards  the  bay  this  northern  entrance  is  now  fordable,  there 
being  only  two  feet  of  water  for  some  distance  (Grundy,  infra). 
Throughout  his  description  Thucydides  has  in  view  one  harbour  only 
— the  bay  of  Navarino.  If  the  Athenians  were  prevented  from 
entering  this,  and  from  landing  on  the  island,  their  fleet  would  have 
no  base  of  operations  at  all.  a  Thuc.  iv.  8. 


204 


BRAS  IDAS  AT  PYLUS,  425. 


[VII.  9- 


such  shields  as  he  could  provide.  He  pressed  into  his  service 
forty  Messenians  from  two  pirate  vessels,  which  happened 
Demosthenes  to  be  Present-  The  majority  of  his  forces, 
prepares  for  armed  or  not,  he  ranged  on  the  stronger 
defence.  parts  of   the  fortress  toward  the  mainland, 

with  orders  to  resist  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  but  himself, 
taking  sixty  hoplites  and  a  few  bowmen,  he  marched  out 
of  the  fort  to  the  shore  at  the  point  where  he  thought  the 
enemy  would  be  most  likely  to  land.  He  then  addressed 
his  soldiers,  bidding  them  meet  the  enemy  with  a  good 
courage,  and  above  all  to  make  the  best  use  of  their  position 
by  beating  him  off  before  he  could  land.  They  were  not  to 
be  alarmed  by  the  noise  or  splash  of  the  vessels,  but  to 
remember  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  so  long  as  they  were  on 
the  sea,  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  any  accident,  whereas  if 
once  they  landed  the  conflict  would  be  equal. 

The  Lacedaemonians  now  began  the  attack,  directing  their 
vessels  to  the  point  where  Demosthenes  expected  them. 
Attack  of  the  Their  ships  were  forty-three  in  number,  but  as 
Lacedae-  the  space  only  allowed  a  few  to  advance  at 

monians:  .,  -,  n 

energy  of  once,  they  came  on  in  relays,  keeping  up  a 
Brasidas.  furious  attack  in  the  hope  of  capturing  the 

fortress  by  assault.  Conspicuous  among  the  trierarchs  was 
Brasidas,  who,  seeing  that  his  fellow-commanders,  even  when 
they  had  the  opportunity  of  landing,  hesitated  to  risk  their 
ships  on  the  rocky  shore,  bade  them  not  to  spare  their 
timbers  when  the  enemy  had  planted  a  fortress  in  their 
land ;  they  must  force  their  ships  ashore,  and  wreck  them 
if  necessary :  now  was  the  time  for  the  allies  to  remember 
what  they  owed  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  repay  their 
debt,  whatever  the  cost.  Brasidas  himself  was  as  good  as 
his  word;  he  forced  his  pilot  to  run  his  ship  ashore  and 
prepared  to  disembark,  but  before  he  could  land  he  was 
struck  down.  As  he  fell  fainting  back  into  the  prow  of  his 
vessel  his  shield  fell  from  his  arm,  and  being  carried  on  shore, 
was  secured  by  the  Athenians,  who  afterwards  used  it  to 
adorn  their  trophy.    The  rest  of  the  commanders,  in  spite 


VII.  10.]       BLOCKADE  OF  SPHACTERIA,  J$5. 


205 


of  their  courage,  were  unable  to  land,  owing  to  the  firm 
resistance  of  the  Athenians  and  the  difficulty  of  the  place. 
Through  the  whole  day  the  attack  was  kept  The  attack 
up,  and  for  a  considerable  part  of  the  next,  fails- 
when  at  length  the  assailants  ceased,  and  for  the  first  time 
in  Greek  history,  the  Lacedaemonians,  the  finest  soldiers 
in  Greece,  saw  themselves  beaten  from  their  own  shores  by 
the  Athenians  ;  sailors  and  soldiers  on  this  occasion  seemed 
to  have  changed  places.1 

10.  The  Athenian  ships  now  arrived  from  Zacynthus,  fifty  in 
number,  but  when  they  saw  the  mainland  occupied  by  soldiers 
and  the  harbour  full  of  ships,  they  retired  for  Arrival  of  the 
the  night  to  the  adjacent  island  of  Prote.  On  Athenian  fleet, 
the  next  day  they  advanced  with  the  intention  of  delivering 
battle  in  the  open  sea,  if  the  enemy  would  meet  them ;  if 
not,  they  would  force  their  way  into  the  harbour.2  The 
Peloponnesians  remained  within  the  harbour,  and  manned 
their  ships,  but  even  now  they  took  no  measures  to  block  the 
entrances,  and  the  Athenians,  on  perceiving  this,  attacked 

1  Thuc.  iv.  12. 

2  The  operations  at  Pylus  have  been  placed  in  a  new  light  by  the 
careful  survey  and  paper  by  Mr.  G.  B.  Grundy,  in  the  Journal  of 
Hellenic  Studies,  1896.  He  takes  the  ordinary  view  that  Palaeocastro 
is  Pylus,  and  Sphagia  is  Sphacteria.  In  the  account  of  the  island  and 
all  that  took  place  on  it,  Thucydides  appears  to  be  accurate  (with  the 
exception  of  the  length  of  the  island,  which  is  4800  yards,  not  3000, 
as  he  says),  but  he  has  a  mistaken  idea  of  the  harbour  and  its  mouth. 
There  were  two  harbours  ;  and  the  harbour  into  which  the  Lacedae- 
monians sailed  was  not  the  bay  of  Navarino,  but  the  lake  of  Osmyn 
Aga  (cp.  Arnold's  Thuc.  vol.  ii.)  ;  the  outlets  which  the  Lacedae- 
monians intended  to  block  up  were  the  outer  and  inner  mouths  of  the 
passage  at  the  southern  (Sphacteria)  end  of  Palaeocastro,  between 
which  lay  the  opening  into  the  lake.  But,  with  the  appeal ance  of 
the  Athenian  fleet,  the  scene  changes  to  the  bay  of  Navarino,  in 
which  the  Lacedaemonians  were  defeated. 

Able  as  Mr.  Grundy's  paper  is,  I  still  doubt  whether  the  lake  of 
Osmyn  Aga  is  to  be  brought  into  the  account.  The  Lacedaemonians 
intended  to  keep  the  Athenians  in  the  open  sea,  and  this  could  only 
be  done  by  blocking  the  entrances  to  the  bay  of  Navarino.  For  some 
reason,  they  neglected  to  do  so  ;  in  fact,  the  Athenians  caught  them 
unprepared.  We  must,  I  fear,  accept  the  fact  that  Thucydides  was 
misinformed  as  to  the  width  of  the  entrances  into  the  bay. 


VII  I0  ]  AN  ARMISTICE,  ^S.  207 

them  at  either  inlet,  with  an  onset  so  sudden  and  severe, 
that  they  not  only  put  to  flight  those  ships  which  met  them 
on  the  sea,  but  also  seized  many  before  the  sailors  had  time 
to  man  them  ;  others  they  captured  without  resistance.  The 
Lacedaemonians  were  in  the  greatest  alarm  on  seeing  that 
their  soldiers  on  the  island  were  being  cut  off,  They  attack 
and  in  the  hope  of  saving  them,  they  rushed 
in  their  armour  into  the  sea,  seizing  the  ships 
and  dragging  them  back  to  shore,  out  of  the  clutches  of  the 
Athenians.  After  a  long  and  violent  struggle  they  succeeded 
in  saving  their  empty  ships,  except  those  which  had  been 
captured  at  the  first  onset,  and  both  sides  retired.  The 
Athenians,  after  setting  np  a  trophy,  and  collecting  tne 
wrecks,  began  to  sail  round  the  island,  to  prevent  the 
soldiers  on  it  from  escaping;  the  Peloponnesians,  who  had 
now  assembled  in  all  their  contingents,  remamed  inactive 
on  the  mainland.1 

The  news  of  this  calamity  excited  the  greatest  alarm  at 
Sparta.     The  situation  was  felt  to  be  so  grave  that  the 
ephors  at  once  left  for  Pylus,  in  order  to  decide  A]arm  at 
on  the  spot  what  measures  should  be  taken.  Sparta:  the 
They  found  on  their  arrival,  that  it  was  im-  pPyh°"VIS,t 
possible  to  remove  the  men  from  the  island, 
and  if  hostilities  continued,  these  must  either  perish  by 
famine,  or  succumb  to  an  overwhelming  attack    No  other 
course  was  open  than  to  ask  for  an  armistice,  during  which 
envoys  could  be  sent  to  Athens  with  proposals  tamjta 
for  peace.     To  this  request  the  Athenians  •«»  • 
agreed,  but  on  terms  which  greatly  increased  the  strength  of 
their  own  position.     They  undertook  that  no  Athenian 
should  land  on  the  island,  and  no  attack  be  made  on  the 
Spartan  force  by  land  or  sea ;  that  a  fixed  but  ample  supply 
of  food  should  be  furnished  to  the  imprisoned  Spartans  and 
their  servants  ;  but,  on  their  part,  they  demanded  not  only 
that  the  Peloponnesian  army  should  remain  inactive,  but  that 


1  Thuc.  iv.  13,  14. 


208 


PROPOSALS  FOR  PEACE,  J&5.  [VII.  10. 


the  entire  fleet,  whether  lying  at  Pylus  or  elsewhere,  should 
be  surrendered,  on  the  understanding  that  it  would  be 
restored  uninjured  to  the  Peloponnesians  on  the  return  of 
the  envoys  from  Athens;  if  these  conditions  were  broken, 
even  in  the  slightest  particular,  the  armistice  was  to  be  at 
an  end,  and  the  Athenians  would  retain  the  ships.  They 
also  provided  a  vessel  to  convey  the  envoys  to  Athens. 
The  severity  of  these  terms  shows  that  the  Spartans  realised 
to  the  full  the  desperate  situation  of  their  countrymen,  but 
what  they  did  not  realise  was  the  duplicity  of  the  enemy 
with  whom  they  had  to  deal.  It  was  not  long  ere  they  dis- 
covered that,  in  endeavouring  to  avert  one  calamity,  they 
had  fallen  into  another,  even  more  disastrous. 

When  the  envoys  arrived  at  Athens,  they  were  .at  once 
brought  before  the  Assembly.    They  began  with  an  apology 
for  their   speech  :  it  was  not  the  Spartan 
L™ysaf n      habit  to  speak  at  length,  but  it  was  their 
Athens.  habit  to  use  every  available  means  for  at- 

taining the  object  which  they  had  in  view,  and,  in  the 
present  case,  a  speech  was  necessary.  Then  followed  the 
usual  platitudes.  The  speaker  reminded  his  hearers  of  the 
instability  of  fortune,  and  warned  them  against  abusing  the 
opportunity  which  had  been  thrown  in  their  way.  Let  them 
not  drive  the  Spartans  to  despair  by  harsh  conditions; 
rather  let  them  win  their  eternal  gratitude  by  restoring  the 
They  propose  a  Spartans  now  shut  up  in  Sphacteria,  and 
peace.  accepting  the  peace  which  was  offered.  "No 

time,"  he  added,  "can  be  better  than  the  present  for  recon- 
ciliation, for  as  yet  no  irreparable  injury  has  been  done  to 
add  private  to  public  causes  of  enmity.  The  die  is  not  yet 
cast ;  it  is  still  open  to  you,  Athenians,  to  win  glory  and  the 
friendship  of  Lacedaemon,  and  to  us  to  come  well  out  of  a 
great  disaster.  Let  us  make  peace,  and  put  an  end  to  the 
troubles  of  the  Hellenes.  It  is  you  who  will  gain  the  credit 
of  the  step  ;  for,  while  no  one  knows  who  began  the  war, 
you  will  clearly  take  the  lead  in  bringing  it  to  an  end.  We 
offer  you  our  friendship,  to  be  won  by  kindness,  not  by 


VII.  io.]    THE  DEMANDS  OF  THE  ATHENIANS,  425. 


209 


force ;  and  if  you  and  we  are  friends,  the  rest  of  Greece  will 
follow  in  our  train."1 

In  making  this  proposal,  the  Spartans  were  under  the 
impression  that  the  Athenians  would  gladly  come  to  terms. 
Even  in  the  lifetime  of  Pericles  Athenian  envoys  had  visited 
Sparta  with  overtures  of  peace,  and  it  was  reasonable  to 
suppose  that,  after  his  death,  the  friends  of  reconciliation 
would  have  gained  yet  greater  authority.  In  this  case,  as  in 
many  others,  the  Spartans  showed  their  ignorance  of  the 
Athenian  character  and  Athenian  politics.  TheAthenia 
The  Athenians  were  not  the  men  to  forget  an  disinclined  to 
injury,  or  to  lose  an  opportunity  of  avenging  it.  Peace- 
They  remembered,  even  now,  the  humiliating  terms  which 
Sparta  had  forced  upon  them  twenty  years  before,  and  they 
were  well  aware  that  they  could  command  peace  whenever 
they  chose,  so  long  as  the  Spartans  in  the  island  were  in 
their  power.  On  the  other  hand,  the  revolt  of  Mytilene  had 
made  it  clear  that  Athens  must  assert  her  imperial  position, 
if  she  was  to  maintain  her  hold  upon  her  allies,  and  enjoy 
their  contributions.  On  this  imperial  policy,  Cleon,  the 
leader  of  the  democracy,  had  already  declared  cieon'sextrava- 
himself,  and  he  now  came  forward  with  the  gant  demands, 
demand  that,  before  any  proposal  for  peace  could  be  enter- 
tained, the  Spartans  in  the  island  must  surrender  their 
arms,  and  allow  themselves  to  be  brought  as  prisoners  to 
Athens.  If,  on  their  arrival,  the  Spartans  were  willing  to 
restore  Nisaea,  Pegae,  Troezen,  and  Achaea,  which  Athens 
had  been  compelled  to  abandon  under  the  terms  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  peace,  the  Athenians  would  give  up  the 
prisoners  and  arrange  a  peace.  The  Spartans  made  no 
public  reply  to  this  demand,  beyond  requesting  that  a 
committee  might  be  formed  to  discuss  the  question,  a  step 
which  damaged  their  cause  irreparably,  committees  being  at 
all  times  odious  to  Greek  democracies.  Cleon  was  furious, 
and  bade  the  envoys  speak  out,  if  they  had  anything  to 


1  Time.  iv.  15-20. 
VOL.  III. 


0 


210 


THE  LACEDAEMONIAN  FLEET,  J^25.      [VII.  II. 


say,  but  the  Lacedaemonians  seeing  that  no  reasonable  terms 
could  be  obtained,  and  wishing  to  avoid  the  disgrace  of 
making  useless  concessions  in  public,  returned  to  Pylus.1 

On  the  arrival  of  the  envoys,  the  armistice  came  to  an  end  ; 
but  when  the  Spartans  demanded  their  ships,  the  Athenians 
refused  to  restore  them,  on  the  ground  that  an 
returnnV°The  attack  had  been  made  on  the  fortress,  contrary 
Athenians  re-  '  ^0  the  agreement.  The  Lacedaemonians  pro- 
theVacedaT-8  °  tested,  but  they  were  helpless ;  their  fleet  was 
monians^who  gone,  and  nothing  remained  but  to  besiege  the 
prived  of  their  Athenians  by  land.  The  Athenians,  on  their 
entire  fleet.  par^  kept  a  close  watch  on  the  island  ;  during 
the  day,  two  ships  sailed  round  it  in  opposite  directions ; 
and  at  night,  when  the  weather  permitted,  the  whole  fleet, 
now  increased  by  the  arrival  of  twenty  ships  from  Athens, 
was  moored  off  it.2 

II.  When  the  truce  came  to  an  end,  no  further  supplies  of 
food  were  sent  to  the  island,  and  as  the  Lacedaemonians, 
having  lost  their  fleet,  could  render  no  further  assistance  to 
their  countrymen,  the  Athenians  expected  that  the  prisoners 
would  be  starved  out  in  a  few  days.  In  this  they  were  very 
.    ,        greatly  deceived.     Week  after  week  passed 

Delay  in  the         to         J  .  .    .  \ 

operations  at  away,  and  no  sign  of.  submission  was  shown. 
Pyius.  While  the  armistice  lasted,  the  allowance  of 

food  had  been  so  ample  that  a  reserve  could  be  formed,  and 


1  Aristoph.  Pax,  648  f.: 

i\6ovcrd  (prjcriv  avTOfxdrr)  perk  rdv  UvXco 
aTvovhoiV  (pepovcra  rrj  TtoktL  klo~tt]v  nXeav 
a.TVO-)(ei>poTOvr)6r}vai  rpls  iv  rr]K<kr)(r[q. 

2  Thuc.  iv.  21-23.  Holm,  Hist,  of  Greece,  i'i.  p.  394  E.T.,  con- 
siders that  the  Athenians  were  "  actually  and  formally  in  the  right," 
in  refusing  to  give  up  the  ships.  But,  if  their  contention  was  true, 
they  ought  not  to  have  awaited  the  return  of  the  envoys  for  the  dis- 
solution of  the  truce  ;  that  should  have  followed  at  once  on  the  alleged 
attack  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  And  Thucydides  evidently  thought 
that  they  were  going  beyond  their  rights  :  oi  §'  'Adrjvaioi  iyK\rjp.ara 
e%ovres  e7ridpop,rjv  re  ra>  rei^icr/xan  Trapdanovbov  koL  aXXa  ovk  d£i6\oyo 
boKovvra  elvai  ovk.  dnedldoaav,  laxvpiCdfi€Voi  on  drj  e'lp-qro,  eav  no.) 
otiovv  irapajSadrj,  \e\vo-0ai  rds  airovbds. 


VII.  II.]  THE  DELA  Y  AT  PYLUS,  $5. 


211 


afterwards  the  liberal  offers  of  the  Lacadaemonians  tempted 
mariners  to  set  out  from  every  part  of  the  coast,  under  cover 
of  bad  weather,  and  land  on  the  outward  shore  of  the  island. 
The  Helots  more  especially  were  ready  to  encounter  any 
danger  in  the  hope  of  freedom.  Divers  were  also  found  who 
passed  from  the  army  on  the  mainland  to  the  island,  drawing 
leather  bottles  attached  to  a  string,  and  filled  with  poppy- 
seed,  mixed  with  honey  and  bruised  linseed. 

Meanwhile  the  position  of  the  Athenians  was  becoming 
critical.    The  island  must  be  blockaded,  the  fortress  garri- 
soned night  and  day,  but  there  was  no  secure  Difficult  posi. 
anchorage  for  the  ships;  the  forces  on  land  tionofthe 
were  without  sufficient  supplies  of  food  and  Athenians- 
water  or  a  proper  camp.    If  the  siege  lasted  into  the  winter, 
neither  ships  nor  army  could  maintain  iheir  position.  An 
attack  on  the  island  would  seem  to  have  been  an  obvious 
expedient,  but  so  great  was  the  terror  inspired  by  the 
Spartan  name,  that  the  attempt  was  not  even  proposed. 
The  generals  contented  themselves  with  sending  messages  to 
Athens,  and  waiting  for  further  orders.1 

The  disappointment  led  to  a  change  of  feeling,  and  for  the 
moment  Cleon  was  the  best-abused  man  in  the  city.    It  was 
he  who  had  repulsed  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  put  an  end  to  the  overtures  of  peace ;  ii  cieon,  who 
the  prisoners  escaped,  as  was  only  too  probable,  retorts  on  the 
Athens  would  have  thrown  away  her  great  generals* 
opportunity.    Cleon,  who  was  still  firm  against  peace,  replied 
to  these  charges  by  asserting  that  the  accounts  from  Pylus 
were  untrue,  and  proposing  that  a  commission  be  appointed 
to  visit  the  place  and  report  precisely  on  the  state  of  affairs. 
The  commission  was  at  once  appointed,  Cleon  himself  with 
one  Theagenes  being  placed  upon  it.    Upon  this  he  changed 
his  ground,  declaring  that  a  commission  was  a  waste  of  time. 
If  the  generals  were  men,  they  would  sail  to  Pylus  and  finish 
the  business  out  of  hand :  were  he  a  general  he  would  do  so 


1  Thuc.  iv.  26. 


212 


CLEON  SENT  TO  PYLUS,  425.  [VII.  12. 


without  delay.  In  these  hints  Cleon  was  aiming  at  Nicias, 
who,  though  he  had  taken  no  part  in  the  action  at  Pylus, 
was  the  most  influential  of  the  staff,  and  supported  the 
Lacedaemonians  in  their  proposals  for  peace.  The  scene 
which  follows  is  probably  without  a  parallel  in  any  civilised 
cieon  and  political  community.  Nicias  came  forward  and 
Nicias.  offered  to  forego  his  command  in  favour  of 

Cleon ;  let  him  be  chosen  general  and  try  his  fortune.  Cleon 
retorted  that  it  was  for  Nicias,  not  for  him,  to  lead  the  army 
of  Athens ;  but  it  was  now  too  late,  and  the  audience  would 
not  let  him  withdraw.  He  made  the  best  of  his  position, 
and  declared  that  without  taking  a  single 
Pylus  as"**0  Athenian  resident  with  him,  assisted  only  by 
general :  his  the  colonists  from  Lemnos  and  Imbros  who  were 
promises.  Athens,  by  the  targeteers  recently  arrived 

from  Aenus,  and  a  body  of  archers,  he  would  bring  the  Spartans 
alive  to  Athens,  or  slay  them  on  the  spot,  within  twenty  days. 
The  Athenians  laughed  at  the  extravagant  promise,  but  they 
readily  gave  their  consent  to  his  appointment  as  general. 
If  he  succeeded,  the  success  would  be  a  public  gain;  if  he 
failed,  the  city  would  be  well  rid  of  him.1 

12.  When  the  Assembly  had  finally  confirmed  him  in  his 
office,  Cleon  at  once  sent  news  of  his  coming  to  Demosthenes, 
whom  of  all  the  generals  at  Pylus  he  chose  as  his  colleague.2 
Demosthenes  was  already  preparing  to  make  an  attack  on 
Sphacteria,  and  had  collected  some  additional  forces  with 
this  object.    An  accidental  fire  had  burned  down  the  wood 

1  Time.  iv.  27,  28. 

2  Thuc.  iv.  29.  Demosthenes  is  here  spoken  of  as  one  of  the 
generals,  but  when  the  fleet  sailed  in  the  spring,  he  was  merely  a 
private  citizen  (iv.  2).  In  the  inscription,  C.  I.  A.  i.  273  (01.  88,  4, 
425-424),  we  read  among  the  payments  in  the  "fourth  prytany," 
i.e.  about  Nov.  425  :  crTpaTTjyols  irepi  UeXonovvrjaov  ArjiioaOevei 
'A^Kiadevovs  'A</hoW<b  A  ^  A  {i  e.  thirty  talents),  where  the  omission 
of  the  words  /cat  (rvvdpxova-ip  implies  that  Demosthenes  occupied  a 
peculiar  position.  Are  we  to  suppose  that  the  election  of  generals 
took  place  between  the  sending  of  the  fleet  and  the  action  of  Cleon ; 
or  was  the  election  of  Demosthenes  as  irregular  as  that  of  Cleon  him- 
self? 


VI 1 .  12. ]  A  TTA  CK  ON  SPHA  C TERIA,  425. 


213 


which  covered  the  island,  so  that  the  numbers  and  position 
of  the  enemy  could  now  be  seen,  and  his  own  army  was 
growing  impatient  of  further  delay.  When  Cleon  arrives 
Cleon  arrived  with  his  contingent  from  Athens,  at  Pvlus- 
the  two  generals  despatched  a  herald  to  the  Lacedaemonian 
army,  proposing  that  the  Spartans  in  the  island  should  lay 
down  their  arms  and  surrender  themselves,  to  be  kept  under 
control  till  terms  could  be  arranged.  This  offer  being  re- 
fused, the  Athenians  remained  inactive  for  a  day,  but  when 
night  fell  they  embarked  all  their  hoplites,  and  a  little  before 
daybreak  landed  them  on  both  sides  of  the  Attackonthe 
island,  to  the  number  of  800.  The  Spartans  island  of 
were  divided  into  three  companies,  the  largest  sPhacteria- 
body  being  stationed  at  the  centre  of  the  island,  near 
the  spring  which  supplied  them  with  water;  a  small 
detachment  guarded  the  northern  part — a  strong  position, 
precipitous  towards  the  sea,  and  difficult  of  approach  by 
land ;  and  about  thirty  men  were  encamped  near  the  southern 
extremity.  Upon  these  thirty  the  Athenian  hoplites  fell  in 
the  gloom  of  the  morning,  and  cut  them  down  before  they 
could  make  any  resistance.  The  embarkation  thus  secured, 
the  rest  of  the  Athenian  forces  crossed  to  the  island ;  every 
one  who  could  be  spared  from  the  defence  of  the  fortress 
was  pressed  into  the  service :  archers,  peltasts,  Messenians, 
and  other  troops  hurried  across  ;  and  in  the  entire  fleet  only 
the  rowers  in  the  lowest  benches,  or  "thalamii,"  remained  in 
the  ships.  These  forces  Demosthenes  distributed  into  com- 
panies of  about  200  each,  with  which  he  occupied  all  the 
elevated  parts  of  the  island,  in  order  that,  by  attacking  the 
enemy  from  many  points  at  once,  he  might  distract  their 
attention,  and  prevent  a  combined  resistance.  For  this 
purpose  his  light-armed  troops,  slingers,  archers,  and  javelin- 
men,  were  of  the  greatest  service.1 

When  Epitadas,  who  was  with  his  troops  in  the  centre  of 
the  island,  found  himself  attacked,  he  at  once  drew  out  his 


1  Thuc.  iv.  29-32. 


214  THE  STRUGGLE  ON  SPHACTERIA,  J$5.    [VII.  12. 


soldiers  for  battle,  wishing  to  force  an  engagement.  Opposed 
to  him  were  the  Athenian  heavy-armed,  on  either  wing 
The  conflict  in  and  in  his  rear  hovered  the  light-armed  troops. 
Sphacteria.        jje  g00n  foun(j  that  an  attack  was  out  of 

the  question;  the  heavy-armed  of  the  enemy  would  not 
meet  him,  while  his  own  advance  was  checked  by  the 
stones  and  arrows  of  the  light-armed.  These  could  not  be 
driven  away,  and  though  for  a  time  they  kept  at  a  safe 
distance,  they  gained  courage  with  every  new  onset.  At 
length  they  left  skirmishing,  and  gathering  in  a  mass  rushed 
on  the  Spartans,  striking  them  down  with  arrows,  javelins, 
stones,  and  any  weapons  which  came  to  hand.  The  Spartans 
were  utterly  confounded ;  such  a  mode  of  battle  was  new  to 
them  ;  the  air  rang  with  shouts,  the  sky  was  black  with  dust 
and  ashes,  and  through  the  noise  and  the  darkness  came  the 
shots  of  an  enemy  whom  they  could  neither  see  nor  reach. 
To  remain  where  they  were  was  impossible;  they  closed 
their  ranks  and  fell  back  on  the  detachment  at  the 
northern  end  of  the  island,  which  they  reached  with  difficulty, 
hotly  pursued  by  the  Athenians.  The  natural  strength  of 
the  position  was  increased  by  an  old  wall  or  fort,  which  the 
garrison  had  repaired  as  a  last  refuge.  Behind  this  the 
fugitives  ranged  themselves,  and  being  now  protected  in 
front  and  rear,  they  maintained  a  more  even  conflict.1 

In  this  position  the  Spartans  were  able  to  continue  the 
struggle  for  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  in  spite  of  the 
Defeat  and  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy.  The  suffer- 
captureofthe  ings  on  both  sides  were  great,  owing  to  the 
Spartans.  severity  of  the  conflict  and  the  excessive  heat. 

When  the  end  seemed  no  nearer,  the  general  of  the  Messenians 
begged  Demosthenes  to  allow  him  to  conduct  a  party  of 
archers  and  light-armed  along  the  rocks  to  an  elevated 
point  in  the  rear  of  the  Spartans.  He  succeeded  in  the 
attempt,  and  his  appearance  on  the  height  was  the  signal 
for  a  renewed  attack.    The  Spartans,  who  were  now  exposed 


*  Thuc.  iv.  33,  34. 


215 


VII.  I3-]      CAPTURE  OF  THE  SPARTANS,  m 

to  a  cross  fire,  and  were  by  this  time  enfeebled  for  want  of 
food  and  water,  were  unable  to  hold  out  longer,  and  the 
Athenians  obtained  possession  of  the  approaches  to  the 
stronghold.    A  moment  more  and  they  would  have  broken 
in,  but  Cleon  and  Demosthenes,  who  wished  to  carry  the 
Spartans  alive  to  Athens,  called  their  forces  off,  and  sent  a 
herald  to  the  fort  demanding  unconditional  surrender.  When 
the  Spartans  made  signs,  by  dropping  their  shields  and  rais- 
ing their  hands,  that  they  were  willing  to  listen  to  terms,  a 
conference  of  the  generals  took  place,  and  Styphon,  who  was 
now  in  command,  for  Epitadas  had  fallen,  requested  permis- 
sion to  consult  with  the  Lacedaemonians  on  shore.  From 
them,  after  some  delay,  he  received  the  final  response  that 
"they  must  decide  for  themselves,  but  do  nothing  dishonour- 
able," a  discreditable  attempt  to  throw  upon  the  heroic 
garrison  the  responsibility  of  the  decision.    Upon  this  they 
gave  up  their  weapons  and  surrendered.    For  the  remainder 
of  the  day  and  the  following  night  the  Athenians  kept  their 
prisoners  in  custody;  on  the  next  day  they  were  distributed 
among  the  trierarchs.    The  number  was  292,  of  whom  120 
were  Spartans.    The  rest  of  the  420  who  had  passed  to  the 
island  had  perished.     The  siege  had  lasted  seventy-two 
days,  and  though  food  had  been  furnished  by  the  Athenians 
during  twenty  days  only,  the  store  was  not  wholly  exhausted.1 
13.  After  this  decisive  success  both  Peloponnesians  and 
Athenians  left  Pylus.    Cleon  had  made  good  his  boast,  and 
returned  home  within  the  time  that  he  had  stated,  bringing 
his  prisoners  with  him.    To  the  Athenians  this  was  a  great 
surprise ;  but  greater  by  far  was  the  astonishment  caused 
throughout  Greece  by  the  conduct  of  the  prisoners.    That  a 
Spartan  should  lay  down  his  arms,  no  matter  what  the  odds 
against  him,  or  the  extremity  to  which  he  was  reduced,  was 
incredible,  and  some  even  doubted  whether  those  who  sur- 
rendered could  be  men  of  the  same  stamp  as  those  who  fell. 
«  Were  those  who  fell  brave  men  ? "  was  the  taunting  question 


1  Thuc.  iv.  35-39. 


216 


MESSENIANS  IN  PYLUS,  ^25.  [VII.  13. 


put  by  an  Athenian  ally  to  one  of  the  captives.  "  The  spindle 
(arrow)  would  indeed  be  a  weapon  of  value  if  it  could  dis- 
tinguish brave  and  coward,"  was  the  reply.1 

When  the  prisoners  reached  Athens  they  were  at  once 
placed  in  close  confinement.  So  long  as  these  hostages  were 
Th  Ath  •  *n  t^ie^r  Power5  the  Athenians  could  not  only 
garrison  Pyius ;  insist  on  favourable  terms  with  Sparta,  but 
distress  of  the  could  prevent  any  further  invasion  of  Attica, 
They  also  took  measures  to  secure  Pylus,  which 
they  garrisoned  with  a  number  of  Messenians  from  Naupactus3 
who  spoke  the  Laconian  dialect,  and  could  easily  communi- 
cate with  the  neighbouring  Helots.  The  Lacedaemonians 
felt  the  danger  of  their  presence  severely.  The  constant 
dread  of  a  Helot  rebellion  seemed  now  to  assume  definite 
shape,  and  though  they  concealed  their  anxiety,  they  sent 
envoys  more  than  once  to  Athens  with  proposals  for  peace, 
but  owing  to  the  extravagant  terms  demanded  by  the 
Athenians  the  negotiations  fell  through.2 

"  So  ended  the  affair  of  Pylus."  Had  the  story  come  down 
to  us  on  any  slighter  authority  than  that  of  Thucydides,  we 
Remarks  on  the  might  question  the  accuracy  of  some  of  the 
capture  of  details.  The  most  important  success  which  the 
Pyius.  Athenians  achieved  in  the  first  ten  years  of  the 

war  was  not  the  result  of  any  plan  formed  by  the  Athenian 
generals  of  the  year.  At  his  own  request  Demosthenes,  then 
a  private  citizen,  is  allowed  to  accompany  a  fleet  sent  out  to 
Sicily,  and  to  make  what  use  of  it  he  chooses — for  another 
object !  The  generals  in  command  oppose  his  views,  and  he 
only  attains  his  end  by  the  opportune  accident  which  compels 
the  ships  to  put  into  Pylus  under  stress  of  weather.  Even 
then  there  is  no  attempt  to  occupy  the  place,  till  the  soldiers, 
weary  of  inaction,  begin,  as  it  were,  to  play  at  building  a 
fortification.  Again,  when  the  Spartans  are  cut  off*  in  the 
island,  no  attack  is  made  upon  them  till  Cleon  arrives  upon 
the  scene.    And  Cleon's  position  is  even  more  anomalous  than 


1  Thuc.  iv.  40. 


2  Thuc.  iv.  41,  supra,  p.  210,  n.  1. 


VII«  r3.]  CLEON  AND  NJCIAS. 


217 


that  of  Demosthenes.    As  the  leader  of  the  Assembly,  he 
was  more  than  justified  in  criticising  the  conduct  of 'the 
generals,  more   especially  of   those  who  re-  Position  of 
mamed  at  home,  while  the  siege  of  Pylus  cleon- 
lingered  on,  week  after  week;  but  a  foolish  expression 
is  seized  upon,  and  Cleon,  who  boasts  what  he  would  do 
if  m  command,  is  chosen  a  supernumerary  general  on  the 
spot,  at  the  instigation  of  Nicias,  amid  the  roars  of  a 
delighted  multitude.    Finding  that  he  cannot  shuffle  out  of 
his  position— so  Thucydides  represents  the  case— he  con- 
fidently accepts  it,  and   leaves  Athens  with  extravagant 
promises  of  success.    He  is  allowed  to  go,  not  because  his 
promises  are  believed,  but  because  the  city  will  be  well  rid 
of  him,  even  if  the  worst  happens.    It  is  true  that  he  took 
no  citizens  from  Athens  with  him,  but  were  the  lives  of  the 
"  cleruchs  "  of  absolutely  no  value  1    And  at  Pylus  there  were 
Athenians  whose  lives  might  be  sacrificed  by  Cleon's  folly 
The  whole  scene  is  more  like  a  passage  from  a  comedy  than 
an  incident  m  Athenian  political  history. 

And  what  are  we  to  think  of  Nicias  and  his  party  1  We 
naturally  ask,  why  were  they  so  inactive  1    Intelligence  of 
the  situation  was  constantly  brought  to  them,  conduct  of 
and  they  were  well  aware,  as  commanders  of  Nici*s. 
Athenian  fleets,  that  the  blockade  of  the  island  could  not  be 
strictly  kept  up  in  bad  weather,  or  the  fortress  maintained 
during  the  winter.     Yet  they  propose  no  fresh  reinforce- 
ments.   Did  they  wish  the  affair  to  linger  on,  in  order  that 
the  Athenians  might  accept  the  terms  which  the  Spartans 
ottered?    Or  were  some  personal  jealousies  at  work;  some 
undercurrents  of  political  feeling  at  which  we  can  only  guess  ? 
Was  Nicias  jealous  of  the  success  of  Demosthenes  1    Or  was 
he  now  as  at  Syracuse,  unable  to  understand  the  necessity 
ot  rapid  movement  and  hard  hitting,  the  first  elements  of 
success  in  warfare  ? 

Those  who  claim  to  be  able  to  read  between  the  lines  of 
their  authorities,  speak  of  the  affair  of  Pylus  as  a  scheme 
arranged  between  Demosthenes  and  Cleon.    What  Demos- 


218 


CLEON  AND  DEMOSTHENES.  [VII.  13. 


thenes  planned  as  a  soldier,  Cleon  made  possible  as  a 
statesman.  But  secrecy  was  indispensable,  or  Pylus  could 
never  be  occupied.  Cleon  too  must  gain  his  position  as 
general  by  stratagem,  and  bring  the  incompetent  Nicias  to 
resign  his  post  by  pretending  to  decline  his  offer.1  However 
this  may  be,  and  certainly  the  scene  as  described  by  Thucy- 
dides  cannot  have  been  preconcerted,  Demosthenes  and  Cleon 
Energy  of  are  the  only  Athenians  who  make  a  creditable 
Demosthenes  appearance  in  the  matter.  Down  to  this  period, 
giUs  a£new  tne  Athenians  had  frequently  sailed  round  the 
character  to  Peloponnesus,  and  had  landed  here  and  there 
e    91  on  the  Laconian  coast,  but  no   result  had 

followed.  Demosthenes  sees  where  to  strike  and  how,  and 
from  this  moment  the  war  began  to  assume  a  far  more 
serious  aspect.  The  old  policy  of  "parade,"  so  dear  to 
Pericles,  is  at  an  end ;  there  is  no  more  playing  at  soldiers, 
and  what  Demosthenes  made  possible,  the  energy  of  Cleon 
accomplished.  What  was  wanted  was  vigour,  and  this  he 
brought  to  the  work;  Demosthenes  supplied  the  rest.  It 
suits  the  comedian2  to  speak  of  Cleon  as  an  incompetent 
swaggerer,  who  stole  the  cake  which  Demosthenes  had  made, 
but  this  is  not  the  view  which  history  takes  of  the  situation. 
Cleon  helped  Demosthenes  to  do  what  he  could  not  have 
done  without  him ;  he  brought  him  the  support  of  the 
Athenian  people  at  the  moment  when  he  most  needed  it; 
he  freed  him  from  the  paralysing  association  with  Nicias,  and 
infused  new  life  into  the  conflict.  The  Athenian  generals, 
trained  in  the  school  of  Pericles,  had,  with  some  exceptions, 
achieved  nothing,  because  they  risked  nothing.  Cleon  did 
not  hesitate,  where  they  held  back;  and  great  as  was  the 
material  result  of  his  victory,  the  moral  result  was  hardly 
less  important.  Had  the  energy  of  the  great  demagogue 
invigorated  the  city  at  the  time  of  the  Sicilian  expedition, 
Athens  might  have  come  triumphant  out  of  the  harbour  of 


1  Holm,  Hist,  of  Greece,  iii.  393  E.T. 

2  Aristoph.  Knights,  55. 


VII.  14.]  NIC  I  AS  AT  CORINTHIA,  425. 


219 


Syracuse.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  Cleon  by  his  victory 
made  peace  impossible;  but  at  the  time  Athens  was  right 
in  continuing  the  war.  If  the  victory  at  Pylus  had  been  a 
little  more  complete;  if  Brasidas  had  been  slain  when  he 
fell  fainting  into  his  vessel,  or  if  he  had  been  brought  a 
captive  with  his  shield  to  Athens,  the  policy  of  Cleon  and 
Demosthenes  would  have  been  more  fully  justified  in  its 
results.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  Athens  that  Brasidas 
survived  to  attack  her  in  a  place  as  vital  as  that  in  which 
she  had  attacked  Sparta,  and  with  an  energy  and  genius 
far  beyond  that  of  any  Athenian. 

14,  After  the  success  of  Cleon  it  was  necessary  for 
Nicias  and  his  colleagues  to  retrieve  their  position.  It  was 
now  too  late  in  the  summer  for  a  distant  expedition,  but  a 
blow  might  be  struck  nearer  home,  in  the  territory  of 
Corinth  or  Epidaurus.  Embarking  a  considerable  force  of 
Athenians  and  allies,  Nicias  succeeded  in  landing  by  night 
on  the  Corinthian  coast  near  the  Solygean  Nicias  at 
hill,  a  position  which  had  been  occupied  by  Soly&ea- 
the  Dorians  in  ancient  days,  when  they  wrested  Corinth 
from  the  Aeolian  inhabitants.  The  Corinthians  who  had 
assembled  at  the  Isthmus,  having  been  warned  that  the 
Athenians  were  planning  a  descent  upon  their  coast,  on  see- 
ing fire  signals  marched  up  to  the  hill.  One  of  their  generals 
occupied  the  ridge  of  Solygea ;  the  other  gave  battle  to  the 
Athenians.  After  a  severe  struggle  the  Corinthians  gave 
way,  and  retiring  to  a  position  on  the  slope,  strong  enough 
to  protect  them  from  attack,  they  refused  to  renew  the 
engagement.  Meanwhile  a  division  of  the  Corinthians 
which  had  been  left  at  Cenchreae,  perceiving  from  the  dust 
that  an  engagement  was  going  on,  joined  their  ranks,  which 
were  further  reinforced  by  a  number  of  citizens  from  Corinth. 
The  Athenians,  who  supposed  that  these  new  forces  were 
auxiliaries  from  the  neighbouring  towns  in  the  Peloponnesus, 
felt  their  position  to  be  no  longer  tenable,  and  retired  hastily 
with  their  dead  and  their  spoils  to  the  neighbouring  islands. 
The  Corinthians  had  lost  four  times  as  many  men  as  the 


220 


METHANA,  A IV A CTORIUM,  CHIOS,  J&5.     [VII.  14. 


Athenians,  and,  among  them,  one  of  their  generals,  but 
Solygea  was  saved,  and  Nicias  had  gained  nothing  by  his 
victory,  except  the  satisfaction  of  beating  Peloponnesian 
infantry  in  the  open  field. 

Yet  he  was  not  wholly  unsuccessful  in  his  efforts  to  plant 
a  foot  on  the  enemies'  territory.  Sailing  down  the  coast  he 
Nicias  at  seized  Methana,  a  town  lying  between  Epidaurus 

Methana.  an(j  Troezen,  on  the  peninsula,  which  forms  such 
a  striking  feature  in  the  coast-line  of  this  region.  The 
peninsula  he  cut  off  from  the  mainland  by  a  wall,  and 
leaving  a  garrison  in  possession,  returned  home.1 

In  western  Greece  the  Athenians  at  Naupactus,  aided  by 
the  Acarnanians,  acquired  Anactorium,  an  important  colony 
of  the  Corinthians  and  Corcyraeans,  which  the  former  had 
appropriated  in  432.  The  Corinthians  were  expelled,  and 
their  place  was  taken  by  settlers  selected  from  all  the  cities 
of  Acarnania.  In  the  east  the  Chians,  who  had  recently 
rebuilt  the  walls  of  their  city,  were  compelled  to  pull  them 
down.  The  revolt  of  Lesbos  was  not  forgotten,  and  any 
attempt  at  fortification  in  the  islands  or  Ionia  was  regarded 
as  a  sign  of  intended  rebellion.2 

In  the  winter  season  one  of  the  generals  engaged  in 
collecting  the  tribute  of  the  allies,  when  at  Eion  on  the 
Arrest  of  a  Strymon,  arrested  Artaphernes,  a  Persian  on 
Persian  his  way  from  Susa  to  Sparta.    The  envoy  was 

envoy.  conveyed  to  Athens.    In  the  despatches  found 

upon  him,  which  were  written  in  the  cuneiform  alphabet,  the 
King  complained  that  he  had  failed  to  discover  the  intentions 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  as  no  two  of  their  numerous  envoys 
said  the  same  thing;  and  he  requested  that  an  embassy 
should  return  with  his  own  messenger  to  explain  their  wishes 
clearly.  The  Athenians  seized  the  opportunity  to  send 
ambassadors  of  their  own  to  the  Great  King.  These  accom- 
panied the  Persian  as  far  as  Ephesus,  but  on  learning  that 


1  Thuc.  iv.  42-45. 


2  Thuc.  iv.  49,  51. 


VII.  1 5-]  AFFAIRS  IN  SICILY,  J&5.  221 


Artaxerxes  had  recently  died,  they  returned  home,  and  the 
attempt  to  negotiate  with  Persia  was  abandoned.1 

15.  In  the  winter  of  426-425,  in  response  to  the  appeal  of 
their  allies,  the  Athenians  had  equipped  a  fleet  for  service  in 
Sicily,  and  Py  thodorus,  one  of  the  three  com-  The  war  in 
manders,  had  been  sent  forward  to  announce  its  Slcllv- 
coming  (supra,  p.  200).  But  his  colleagues  were  detained  till 
late  in  the  year  at  Pylus  and  Corcyra,  and  meanwhile  the  tide 
had  turned  against  the  Athenians.  The  great  success  of  the 
previous  year  had  been  the  capture  of  Messene,  by  which,  as 
Rhegium  was  a  friendly  city,  the  Athenians  gained  the  com- 
plete control  of  the  straits.  In  the  early  spring  of  425  this 
advantage  was  lost,  for  at  the  invitation  of  a 

©  »  Messene 

party  in  Messene,  an  allied  fleet  of  twenty  ships  revolts  from 
— ten  from  Syracuse  and  ten  from  Locri — seized  Athens ;  actions 

J  in  the  strait. 

the  town.    The  Syracusans  could  not  allow  a 

port  which  commanded  the  approach  to  Sicily  to  remain  in 

Athenian  hands,  and  the  Locrians  hated  Rhegium.2 

After  acquiring  Messene,  the  allied  fleet,  now  increased 
by  additional  ships  to  more  than  thirty,  remained  on  guard 
in  the  harbour  of  the  city,  and  opposite  them  at  Rhegium 
lay  the  Athenian  fbet  of  twenty-eight  vessels.  The  Locrians 
were  most  eager  that  operations  should  be  pushed  on  before 
the  reinforcements  from  Athens  arrived,  and  from  the 
harbour  of  Messene ;  if  the  Athenian  fleet  were  defeated, 
they  would  the  more  easily  subdue  the  detested  Rhegium, 
and  bring  the  strait  completely  under  their  own  control.  One 
evening  an  accident  brought  on  an  engagement,  and  the  allies 
were  partly  defeated,  but  others  followed  in  which  they  held 
their  own,  till  the  Athenians  were  called  away  camarina ; 
to  Camarina,  where  a  plot  had  been  framed  for  Naxos- 
betraying  the  city  to  the  Syracusans  In  their  absence  the 
Messenians  and  the  allied  fleet  attacked  the  neigbouring  city 
of  Naxos — the  oldest  of  all  the  Greek  colonies  in  Sicily. 


1  Time.  iv.  50. 


2  Time.  iv.  1.    See  vol.  ii.  4C0,  497  i 


222 


ATHENS  LOSES  MESSENE,  425.  [VII.  16. 


Naxos  was  completely  enclosed,  and  in  great  danger,  when 
suddenly  numerous  bands  of  Sicels  began  to  pour  down 
the  hills  from  the  interior  upon  the  Messenians.  The 
Naxians,  who  took  them  for  Greeks  from  Leontini  and  else- 
where, plucked  up  courage  at  the  sight,  and  sallying  out, 
defeated  the  besiegers  with  great  slaughter.  A  thousand 
were  left  dead  on  the  field •  a  large  part  of  the  survivors 
were  slain  by  the  natives,  and  but  a  few  escaped  to  Messene. 
The  fleet,  now  unable  to  render  further  service,  returned  to 
Messene,  and  shortly  afterwards  dispersed.1 

After  suppressing  the  plot  at  Camarina,  the  Athenian  fleet 
returned  to  Rhegium,  where  a  plan  was  arranged  for  a  corn- 
Attack  on  bined  attempt  on  Messene,  in  which  the  Leon- 
Messene.  tines  and  other  Siciliots  were  to  march  upon 
the  city  by  land,  while  the  Athenians  attacked  it  from  the 
sea.  Messene  was  not  recovered,  and  for  the  rest  of  the 
year  the  Athenians  left  the  Sicilian  Greeks  to  fight  out  their 
quarrels  on  land  by  themselves.  Even  when  Eurymedon  and 
Sophocles  appeared  with  their  fleet,  little  or  nothing  was 
done.  "  They  joined  in  the  war  with  their  allies  " ;  this,  and 
nothing  more,  is  the  information  which  Thucydides  gives  us 
about  them.2 

l6.  After  the  capture  of  the  entire  Peloponnesian  fleet  at 
Pylus,  the  subject  allies  of  the  Athenians  were  more  than 
The  Tribute  ever  at  the  mercy  of  the  imperial  city.  The 
raised.  opportunity  was  not  lost.    For  some  time  past 

the  treasury  had  been  low,  and  it  had  been  found  necessary 
to  levy  a  property-tax  (supra,  p.  164).  Could  not  the  allies 
be  compelled  to  supply  the  deficiency  ?  From  the  fragments 
of  a  long  inscription  it  is  clear  that  in  425  the  Athenians 
made  a  new  assessment  of  the  tribute,  and  in  some  cases  the 
amount  was  more  than  double  of  the  previous  payments. 
Many  cities  also  were  assessed,  which  previously  had  escaped 
payment  altogether.3 


l  Thuc.  iv.  24,  25.  2  ThnQ  iy 

3  Cp.  CI, A.  i.  37,  and  infra,  Appendix  i. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


FROM  THE  BEGINNING  OF  424  TO  THE  PEACE  OF 
NICIAS,  421. 

I.  With  the  spring  of  the  following  year  there  came  a 
total  change  in  the  usual  order  of  events.  The  Athenians 
were  now  the  invaders.  Encouraged  by  their  The  capture 
success  at  Pylus,  they  began  the  new  year  with  of  Cythera. 
an  attack  on  Cythera,  the  island  which  Demaratus  had 
urged  Xerxes  to  capture,  which  Chilon  had  wished  sunk  in 
the  sea  (vol.  ii.  p.  158).  A  large  force  was  despatched  under 
the  command  of  Nicias  and  two  others,  one  part  of  which 
assailed  and  captured  Scandeia,  a  town  on  the  shore,  com- 
manding the  harbour,  while  Nicias  landed  with  the  remainder 
on  the  side  of  the  island  looking  towards  Malea,  and 
marched  upon  the  port  or  maritime  city  of  Cythera.  After 
a  short  resistance,  the  inhabitants  fled  into  the  citadel,  and 
surrendered  on  condition  that  their  lives  should  be  spared, 
pending  final  arrangements.  Ultimately  a  few  of  the  citizens 
who  were  thought  dangerous  were  deported  into  the  islands 
of  the  Athenian  empire ;  the  rest  remained  on  their  property, 
paying  a  tribute  or  rent  of  four  talents.  An  Athenian 
garrison  was  placed  in  the  island.1 

Cythera  now  became  a  base  of  operations  for  the  Athenian 
fleet.  They  ravaged  the  Laconian  coast,  and  finding  that 
they  met  with  little  resistance,  they  seized  the  opportunity 


1  Time.  iv.  53-57.  If  the  text  is  right,  there  were  two  parts 
of  the  city  Cythera,  one  on  the  shore,  another  further  inland,  and 
besides  there  was  a  town  called  Scandeia.  But  Pausanias  distinctly 
states  that  Scandeia  was  the  maritime  quarter  of  Cythera  (iirtveiqv)} 
hi.  23.  I.    For  the  importance  of  Cythera,  see  Thuc.  iv.  53. 


224  MASSACRE  OF  THE  AEGINETANS,  424.    [VIII.  1. 


to  revenge  themselves  to  the  full  on  an  ancient  enemy. 
After  their  expulsion  from  their  home  in  431,  the  Aeginetans 
had  been  allowed  to  occupy  the  region  of  Thyrea,  on  the 
shore  of  the  bay  of  Argos.  Thither  the  Athenians  now  sailed, 
after  ravaging  Epidaurus  Limera.  The  exiles  were  engaged 
in  building  a  fort  on  the  shore  with  the  help  of  a  Lacedae- 
monian garrison,  which  was  stationed  in  the  neighbourhood 
{infra,  p.  226);  but  when  the  Athenians  came  in  sight  they 
hastily  retired  to  the  upper  city,  distant  more  than  a  mile 
from  the  sea.  The  Lacedaemonians,  such  was  their  state 
of  demoralisation,  refused  to  enter  the  gates  with  them  or 
run  the  risk  of  being  besieged,  and,  climbing  to  the  heights 
above,  remained  inactive,  on  the  ground  that  their  numbers 
Destruction  of  were  insufficient  for  attack.  Meanwhile  the 
the  Aeginetans.  Athenians  sacked  and  burnt  the  city.  All  the 
surviving  Aeginetans  were  carried  to  Athens,  and  there  put 
to  death  by  a  vote  of  the  Assembly — a  sacrifice  to  the 
inveterate  hatred  subsisting  between  the  cities.1 

The  destruction  of  the  Aeginetans  casts  a  dark  shadow  on 
the  reputation  of  Athens.  So  great  a  city,  famous  alike  in 
legend  and  history,  in  art  and  commerce,  deserved  a  better 
fate  than  to  fall  a  victim  to  the  inexorable  hatred  of  a  neigh- 
bour. Herodotus,  whether  from  his  Athenian  prejudices,  or 
as  a  partisan  of  Samos,  is  always  unfavourable  to  Aegina, 
and  though  he  cannot  deny  the  legendary  greatness  of  the 
city  as  the  home  of  the  Aeacidae,  or  the  bravery  of  the 
Aeginetans  in  the  battle  of  Salamis,  he  presents  them  to  us 
as  a  rebellious,  cruel,  and  treacherous  race,  whose  wealth  was 
obtained  by  cheating  ignorant  Helots;  whose  calamities 
were  due  to  their  own  sacrilegious  violence.2  He  dwells  on 
their  quarrels  with  Epidaurus  and  Athens,  and  attributes  to 
the  Aeginetan  Lampon  the  infamous  proposal  to  mutilate  the 
body  of  Mardonius.  In  the  poems  of  Pindar  we  see  Aegina  in  a 


1  Thuc.  iv.  57.  Thyrea  is  said  to  be  ten  stadia  from  the  sea,  but 
Leake  puts  it  at  three  times  that  distance  ;  Morea,  ii.  492. 

2  See  Herod,  iii.  59  ;  vi.  91  ;  ix.  80. 


VIII.  r.] 


GREATNESS  OF  A  EG  IN  A. 


225 


fairer  light.  One-fourth  of  his  extant  odes  were  composed  in 
honour  of  Aeginetans,  a  proof  that  the  oligarchs  of  the  island, 
wealthy  traders  though  they  were,  preserved  Greatnessof 
some  of  the  best  traditions  of  the  Dorian  race,  the  city  attested 
Pindar  also  praises  the  justice  and  wisdom  of  by  Pindar- 
the  government :  "  The  people  are  guided  by  the  Dorian 
rule,  not  transgressing  the  right  or  customs  of  strangers; 
as  dolphins  in  the  sea  do  they  excel,  wise  arbiters  in  the 
contests  of  song  and  of  strength."  "There  Saviour  Themis, 
who  sits  in  judgment  by  Zeus,  the  stranger's  succour,  is 
honoured  more  than  elsewhere  among  men.  .  .  .  Some 
ordinance  of  immortals  hath  given  to  this  sea-girt  land  to 
be  to  strangers  out  of  every  clime  a  pillar  built  of  God."  1 

These  noble  words  are  something  more  than  venal  praises 
from  a  professional  eulogist.  The  greatness  of  Aegina  is 
attested  by  imperishable  evidence.  The  barren  rock  which 
now  supports  six  thousand  inhabitants,  was,  in  antiquity,  a 
great  centre  of  industry  and  commerce,  finding  employment 
for  470,000  slaves.2  The  Aeginetans  gave  their  name  to  the 
oldest  and  most  widely  spread  of  all  the  Greek  systems 
of  weights  and  coinage ;  their  commerce  extended  from 
Egypt  to  Etruria,  and  for  thirty  years  before  the  battle 
of  Salamis,  they  were  "rulers  of  the  seas."  In  art  and 
architecture  they  took  a  leading  place :  the  great  temple 
of  Athena — of  which  the  ruined  columns  may  still  be  seen 
on  the  island,  though  the  sculpture  of  the  pediments  and 
friezes  are  at  Munich — was  perhaps  at  the  time  when  it  was 
built  the  finest  in  Greece ;  the  plastic  work  of  the  Aeginetan 
school  was  distinguished  for  the  felicity  with  which  the 
lightness  of  bronze  was  transferred  to  marble,  and  forms  an 
important  step  in  the  development  of  Greek  art. 

Unhappily,  owing  to  her  position  in  the  centre  of  the 
Saronic  gulf,  her  interests  clashed  with  those  of  Athens. 


1  Pind.  Frag.  1  ;  01.  viii.  28  f.  (Myers). 

2  Aristotle,  in  Athen.  vi.  272,  and  Schol.  Pind.  01.  viii.  30. 
Beloch  would  reduce  the  number  to  70,000  !    Bevolkerung,  p.  95. 

VOL.  III.  P 


226 


THE  SPARTANS  DESPONDENT,  424.      [VIII.  2. 


The  quarrel  between  the  two  cities  was  ancient  and  em- 
bittered by  cruel  memories,  which  swelled  in  the  breast  of 
every  Athenian  as  he  looked  across  to  the  "  eyesore  of  the 
Peiraeus."  The  glory  of  Aegina  implied  the  dishonour  of 
Athens,  for  to  her  and  not  to  the  Athenians  had  fallen 
the  prize  of  valour  at  Salamis.  The  opposition  of  oligarch 
and  democrat,  of  Dorian  and  Ionian,  made  the  enmity  of  the 
rival  cities  more  intense ;  but  rarely,  even  in  Greece,  was  a 
quarrel  fought  out  with  such  relentless  ferocity.  Had  the 
enemies  of  Athens  dealt  with  her  as  she  dealt  with  Aegina, 
Athenian  history  would  end  with  the  fifth  century. 

2.  For  more  than  a  year  the  Athenians  had  carried  all 
before  them.  They  had  gained  possession  of  the  Spartan 
Despondency  fleet;  they  had  carried  Spartans  in  chains 
of  the  Spartans.  to  Athens.  From  Cythera  they  could  ravage 
the  coast  of  Laconia  as  they  pleased,  and  Pylus  was  a  centre 
to  which  any  revolted  Helot  could  repair.  The  Spartans 
were  in  the  greatest  distress.  Their  star  had  never  sunk 
so  low.  Without  a  ship  to  call  their  own  they  found  them- 
selves engaged  with  a  maritime  power  of  unbounded  enter- 
prise and  animated  with  the  enthusiasm  of  success.  Instead 
of  invading  Attica  they  were  at  a  loss  how  to  protect  their 
own  country  from  invasion.  The  system  in  which  they 
trusted  had  failed,  and  after  the  capture  of  Cythera,  "  con- 
trary to  their  tradition,"  they  established  a  force  of  cavalry 
and  archers,  rapidity  of  movement  being  essential  against  an 
enemy  who  could  select  his  own  point  of  attack.  They  also 
placed  garrisons  at  various  parts  of  their  territory.  But 
these  innovations,  however  useful,  did  not  remove  the  pre- 
vailing despondency;  the  Spartans  were  haunted  with  the 
sense  of  impending  evil;  they  shrank  from  every  new  under- 
taking, and  allowed  their  courage  to  sink  with  their  fortunes.1 

It  was  not  at  Sparta  only  that  the  success  of  Athens 
created  alarm.  The  revolted  cities  of  Chalcidice  must  ex- 
pect the  vengeance  of  the  Athenians,  if  Sparta  could  no 


1  Thuc.  iv.  55. 


VIII.  2.] 


SPARTA  AND  THRACE,  424. 


227 


longer  hold  them  in  check,  and  those  cities  which  were 
secretly  in  favour  of  revolt  saw  their  hopes  delayed  by 
every  new  victory.     Perdiccas  too,  though  Application 
nominally  an  ally,  when  he  reflected  on  the  from  cnaici- 
past,  had  little  reason  to  anticipate  advantage  ocelots  to* 
from  the  presence  of  Athenians  in  Thrace.1  be  sent  out 
On  these  grounds,  and  also  because  Perdiccas  under  Brasidas- 
wished  for  assistance  in  reducing  the  king  of  the  Lyncestians, 
a  common  embassy  was  sent  to  Sparta  with  a  request  for 
troops,  and  promises  to  support  them  while  in  service.  To 
the  Spartans  nothing  could  be  more  opportune.     By  de- 
spatching a  force  to  Thrace  they  would  divert  the  attention 
of  Athens,  and  also  rid  themselves  of  the  most  dangerous 
element  in  the  Peloponnesus.     For  some  time  past  they 
had  been  in  more  than  their  usual  dread  of  the  Helots, 
and  since  the  loss  of  Pylus  this  alarm  had  amounted  to 
a  panic  :   more    especially   they   feared    those   who,  by 
service  in  the  field,  had  become  acquainted  with  the  opera- 
tions of  war.     They  had  already  diminished 
their  numbers  by  a  deed  of  iniquity  unparal-  measures  for 
leled  in  Greek  or  any  other  history.    They  repressing 

•     i  t t  1  i        i   •       i  i     /         i  the  Helots. 

invited  every  Helot,  who  claimed  to  have  done 
good  service  in  the  field,  to  come  forward  and  receive  his 
freedom.  Of  those  who  responded,  two  thousand  were 
selected  and  allowed  to  crown  themselves  with  garlands 
and  visit  the  temples,  but  in  a  short  time  every  one  of 
them  disappeared,  no  one  knew  how.  In  such  a  state  of 
public  feeling  there  could  be  no  hesitation  about  sending 
Helots  into  Thrace.  Above  all,  the  expedition  was  warmly 
supported  by  Brasidas,  whose  fame  had  already  reached 
Chalcidice  as  the  most  active  and  energetic  of  the  Spartans. 
At  his  own  wish  he  was  placed  in  command  of  the  troops 
and  allowed  to  collect  such  other  forces  as  he  could  get 
together  by  his  personal  influence.    A  man  of  less  tact  and 


1  In  427,  and  again  iu  425,  the  Athenians  had  been  in  negotiation 
■with  him  about  Methone  (G.  I.  A.  40).    Jowett,  Thuc.  I.  lxxxviii. 


228 


CAPTURE  OF  NISAEA,  4%. 


[VIII.  2. 


ability  would  have  accomplished  nothing,  even  if  he  had 
succeeded  in  reaching  Chalcidice,  but  Brasidas,  as  we  shall 
see,  not  only  struck  a  blow  at  Athens  from  which  she  never 
recovered,  but  acquired  for  the  Lacedaemonians  a  reputation 
for  liberality  and  wisdom,  which  greatly  misled  the  Greeks 
in  their  favour.1 

Before  he  left  southern  Greece  he  was  able  to  check  the 
long  series  of  Athenian  successes.  Since  the  beginning  of 
The  popular  the  war  tne  unfortunate  Megarians  had  suffered 
party  at  all  the  evils  of  foreign  invasion  and  domestic 

Megara.  strife.     Twice  every  year  the  Athenians  in- 

vaded their  territory,  destroying  the  crops  so  completely 
that  the  inhabitants  were  reduced  to  famine ;  and  to  com- 
plete the  ruin  of  the  city  a  body  of  oligarchical  exiles 
established  themselves  at  Pegae,  whence  they  were  able  to 
cut  off  communications  with  the  Corinthian  gulf,  and  ravage 
that  part  of  the  Megarid,  which,  as  it  lay  furthest  from 
Athens,  might  perhaps  have  escaped  the  Athenian  troops. 
The  distress  became  intolerable,  and  the  question  was  raised 
whether  the  exiles  should  not  be  received  into  the  city.2  The 
leaders  of  the  popular  party,  finding  that  they  could  no 
longer  carry  the  people  with  them,  made  overtures  to  the 
Athenian  generals,  Demosthenes  and  Hippocrates,  for  the 
surrender  of  the  city.  The  Athenians  were  at  least  democrats 
from  whom  they  had  less  to  fear  than  from  the  oligarchs  of 
their  own  nation.  A  plan  was  arranged  by  which  the 
Athenians  should  capture  the  Long  Walls,  cut 

Nisaea  is  .  . 

captured  by  off  Megara  from  Nisaea,  which  was  held  by 
the  Athenians.  a  pei0p0nnesian  garrison,  and  then  attempt 
the  city.     The  conspiracy  was  so  far  successful  that  the 


1  Tbuc.  iv.  79-81. 

2  Mr.  Forbes  suggests  that  the  Megarians  were  able  to  bold  out 
under  these  terrible  privations  because  they  were  a  manufacturing 
state  (cp.  Ach.  493  :  eavaocpdurei  ra  MeyapeW  xka.vlo~K.ia,  Xen. 
Memorab.  ii.  7.  6,  Meyapecov  oi  -rXelaroi  dno  i^copidonoLias  diarpecpov- 
rat).  They  could  go  on  with  their  weaving  when  driven  into  their 
walls,  and  sell  or  exchange  their  goods  in  the  neighbouring  towns  of 
the  Peloponnese  in  the  winter, 


VIII.  2.]      BRASIDAS  COLLECTS  TROOPS,  4H- 


229 


Athenians  captured  the  Long  Walls  by  a  stratagem  in  the 
night,  and  shut  up  the  Peloponnesians  in  Nisaea.  When  the 
day  dawned,  the  conspirators  in  Megara,  who  were  aware  that 
a  large  Athenian  force  had  come  up  from  Eleusis  during  the 
night,  proposed  to  open  the  gates  and  go  out  to  attack  the 
enemy,  hoping  by  this  means  to  gain  admittance  for  the 
Athenians.  But  one  of  their  number  betrayed  the  secret, 
upon  which  the  oligarchs  gathered  together  and  refused  to 
meet  the  enemy  or  risk  the  safety  of  the  city.  When  they 
saw  that  the  conspiracy  had  failed,  the  Athenians  advanced 
upon  Nisaea,  and  began  to  invest  it  with  a  wall.  By  the 
evening  of  the  second  day  the  work  was  almost  completed, 
and  the  garrison,  who  were  without  provisions,  in  despair  of 
any  assistance,  surrendered  to  the  Athenians  on  condition  that 
each  man  should  give  up  his  arms  and  pay  a  fixed  ransom.1 
The  Athenians  then  established  themselves  in  Nisaea,  and 
threw  down  part  of  the  Long  Walls  towards  Megara. 

The  fate  of  Megara  hung  in  the  balance.  Would  the 
oligarchical  faction  save  the  city  for  Sparta,  or  would  the 
democrats  bring  it  over  to  Athens  %  The  Brasidas  in 
question  was  decided  by  the  presence  of  Brasidas,  the  Megarid. 
who  was  now  collecting  troops  for  his  Thracian  expedition 
at  Sicyon  and  Corinth.  On  hearing  of  the  capture  of  the 
walls,  he  at  once  sent  to  Boeotia  for  reinforcements,  and  mean- 
while, with  a  force  of  more  than  3000  men,  furnished  from 
the  neighbouring  towns,  advanced  to  Tripodiscus,  in  the  hope 
of  saving  Nisaea.  When  he  found  that  he  was  too  late,  he 
marched  rapidly  to  Megara  with  a  select  body  of  troops,  and 
begged  to  be  received  into  the  city.  There  was  still  a  hope, 
he  thought,  of  recovering  Nisaea,  and  in  any  case  his 
presence  would  strengthen  the  Megarians.  But  they  refused 
to  open  their  gates;  the  democrats  fearing  that  by  the 
restoration  of  the  exiles  he  would  bring  about  their  own 
expulsion;  the  oligarchs  lest  the  demos  in  alarm  for  their 

1  These  terms  did  not,  however,  extend  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
in  the  garrison,  who  were  to  be  dealt  with  as  the  Athenians 
pleased. 


230 


BRASIDAS  SA  VES  MEGARA,  4%.         [VIII.  2. 


safety  should  attack  them,  while  the  Athenians  lay  at  hand 
to  take  advantage  of  the  faction.  It  was  better  to  wait  and 
let  Brasidas  and  the  Athenians  fight  it  out ;  the  issue  of  the 
battle  might  determine  the  fate  of  the  city,  which  could 
safely  pronounce  for  oligarchy  if  Brasidas  were  victorious,  or 
for  democracy  with  the  Athenians. 

Brasidas  retired  to  his  camp,  where  at  daybreak  he  was 
joined  by  the  Boeotians.  The  arrival  of  this  force  was  quite 
Brasidas  unexpected  by  the  Athenians,  whose  hoplites 

watches  the  were  drawn  up  in  Nisaea  or  on  the  coast,  while 
N^saea3118^  lignt-armed  ranged  freely  in  the  plain 

between  Megara  and  the  sea.  The  Boeotian 
horse  had  no  difficulty  in  driving  these  stragglers  down  to 
the  coast,  but  when  the  Athenian  cavalry  came  out  to  protect 
them,  an  engagement  took  place  which  was  hotly  contested  and 
ended  without  decisive  advantage  to  either  side.  Brasidas 
now  ventured  to  advance  nearer  the  sea  and  the  city,  where 
he  awaited  the  action  of  the  Athenians  in  a  convenient 
position,  from  which  his  movements  could  be  seen  by  the 
Megarians.  If  the  enemy  were  willing  to  fight,  he  had  no 
reason  to  fear  the  event,  for  his  forces  were  now  superior  to 
theirs ;  if  they  thought  it  prudent  to  remain  in  their  encamp- 
ment, he  would  attain  his  object  at  Megara  without  striking 
a  blow.  And  in  this  he  was  not  mistaken.  The  Athenians 
went  so  far  as  to  draw  up  in  order  of  battle  under  the  Long 
Walls,1  but  they  did  not  venture  into  the  open  field ;  they 
had  achieved  a  considerable  success  in  the  capture  of  Nisaea, 
Brasidas  at  and  ^  would  be  foolish  to  run  the  risk  of  an 
length  secures  engagement  with  superior  numbers;  they  would 
Megara.  indeed  gain  Megara  if  successful,  but  if  de- 

feated the  entire  loss  would  fall  upon  the  flower  of  the 
Athenian  troops.  After  a  time  they  retired  to  Nisaea,  upon 
which  the  oligarchs  at  Megara  received  Brasidas  into  the  city 
to  the  great  dismay  of  the  conspirators. 


1  Of  these  they  had  destroyed  part  (supra) ;  the  rest  were  destroyed 
by  the  Megarians  later  in  the  year ;  see  Thuc.  iv.  109. 


VIII.  3-]  THE  CONGRESS  AT  GELA,  & 


231 


The  allies  from  Boeotia  and  Peloponnesus  now  dispersed 
and  Brasidas  returned  to  Corinth.    The  Athenians  also  re- 
turned home.     The  conspirators  at  Megara  Theoli  arch 
retired  from  the  city,  but  those  of  the  popular  ar/rLSred  S 
party  who  were  not  implicated  agreed  to  recall  at  Me^ara- 
the  exiles  from  Pegae,  binding  them  by  solemn  pledges  to 
forget  the  past  and  promote  the  good  of  the  city.  No 
sooner  were  the  exiles  elected  to  public  office  than  they 
seized  the  opportunity  of  an  inspection  of  arms  to  arrest  about 
a  hundred  of  their  opponents,  whom  they  put  to  death  after 
a  mock  trial ;  a  strict  oligarchy  was  established  in  the  city, 
and  Thucydides  observes  that  it  remained  in  power  for  a 
longer  time  than  any  other  government  which  owed  its  origin 
to  a  revolution  carried  out  by  so  small  a  number  of  men.1 

^  3.  In  the  west  also  the  tide  turned  against  the  Athenians. 
Since  the  winter  a  new  policy  had  been  gaining  ground 
among  the  Sicilians.    The  cities  resolved  to  forego  their 
mutual  quarrels,  and  by  uniting  together  to  Sicily .  change 
preserve  Sicily  from  foreign  intervention.    The  of  policy, 
first  to  combine  were  Gela  and  Camarina,  neighbouring  towns, 
which  the  war  had  brought  into  a  peculiar  relation  to  each 
other.    Both  were  Dorian;  and  Camarina  had  been  re- 
colonised  by  Geloans,  after  the  destruction  of  the  old  city  by 
Syracuse ;  but  the  memory  of  the  ancient  enmity  remained, 
and  though  Dorian,  Camarina  was  the  ally  of  Leontini  and 
Athens.    In  this  policy  the  citizens  were  by  no  means  united, 
and  as  there  were  some  who  wished  to  betray  Camarina  to 
Syracuse  {supra,  p.  221),  so  there  were  others  who  wished  to 
be  on  friendly  terms  with  Gela.    Through  these  negotiations 
were  opened,  which  ended  in  an  armistice  between  the 
cities. 

.  This  example  was  quickly  followed.  Envoys  from  all  the 
cities  met  at  Gela  and  discussed  the  question  of  a  general 
reconciliation.  There  were  great  difficulties  in  the  way  :  the 
cities  were  sensitive  and  jealous ;  each  suspected  her  neighbour 


1  Thuc.  iv.  66-74. 


232 


SPEE CH  OF  HERMO CPA  PES,  424.         [VIII.  3. 


of  some  selfish  design;  each  had  her  own  claims  to  maintain. 
The  congress  was  a  scene  of  animated  discussion,  but  of  the 
The  congress  speeches  one  only  is  recorded,  which  Thucy- 
ofGeia.  dides  selects  as  being  in  his  judgment  most 

influential  in  determining  the  result— the  speech  of  Hermo- 
crates  of  Syracuse,  the  great  Sicilian  patriot,  of  whom  we 
now  hear  for  the  first  time. 

Hermocrates  was  a  citizen  of  no  mean  city.    It  was  not 
from  any  fear  for  Syracuse,  or  owing  to  any  loss  which  she 
had  sustained,  that  he  came  forward  to  advocate 

Hermocrates. 

peace — he  spoke  in  the  interests  of  all  Sicily. 
He  had  no  wish  to  control  the  free  action  of  the  cities ;  he 
was  no  supporter  of  peace  at  any  price ;  but  the  war,  so  far 
as  it  had  gone,  had  brought  no  advantage  to  any  one.  Let 
them  try  peace,  therefore,  and  if  that  failed,  let  them  go  to 
war  again.  The  danger  at  the  moment  was  not  from  within 
but  from  without.  While  they  were  wearing  each  other  out 
in  factions  and  conflicts,  the  Athenians  were  at  hand  to  take 
advantage  of  the  result. 

"The  question  which  we  have  met  to  discuss,"  he  said,  "is 
not  the  settlement  of  our  private  quarrels  but  the  preserva- 
tion of  Sicily.  The  Athenians  are  here  with  a  few  ships  as 
yet,  and  under  the  pretence  of  an  alliance — but  they  aim  at 
the  conquest  of  the  whole  island,  and  when  they  have  secured 
a  firm  footing  they  will  come  again  with  a  larger  fleet  to 
carry  out  their  design.  In  all  our  wars  and  our  appeals  to 
them  for  help,  we  are  but  preparing  the  way  for  our  own 
subjugation.  Their  presence,  far  more  than  any  arguments 
of  mine,  should  incline  you  to  reconciliation.  In  union  lies 
our  strength.  Let  us  hear  no  more  of  Dorian  and  Ionian — 
the  Athenians  care  nothing  about  either ;  it  is  Sicily  and  her 
wealth  that  they  desire.  Let  every  man  and  every  city 
unite  against  the  common  foe.  It  is  human  nature  to  take 
what  we  can  get,  and  I  am  far  from  blaming  the  Athenians ; 
but  it  is  not  less  human  to  resist  attack  and  defend  what  is 
our  own.  Of  all  ways  of  getting  rid  of  them  this  is  the 
speediest.    For  it  is  not  from  Athens,  but  from  those  cities 


VIII.  3-]        SICILY  FOR  THE  SICILIANS,  m> 


233 


which  have  invited  their  assistance,  that  they  carry  on  war 
against  us.  Deprived  of  these,  they  will  go  back  whence 
they  came ;  and  we  shall  be  at  peace. 

"Let  me  remind  you  also  that  the  end  of  war  is  uncertain. 
It  is  not  determined  by  the  justice  or  injustice  of  a  cause. 
Fortune  is  capricious,  and  fortune  is  supreme.  The  best 
lesson  which  she  teaches  is  distrust.  Let  us  take  this  lesson 
to  heart,  and  in  our  distrust  of  the  future  and  alarm  at  the 
presence  of  the  Athenians,  make  up  our  quarrels,  at  least  till 
we  have  got  rid  of  the  common  enemy.  In  this  way  we 
shall  preserve  our  independence  ;  we  shall  go  to  war  how  and 
when  we  please,  and  not  at  the  bidding  of  another. 

"I  will  end  as  I  began.  I  am  not  speaking  solely  in  the 
interest  of  Syracuse,  but  in  the  interests  of  all.  Do  not, 
I  entreat  you,  in  your  eagerness  to  damage  your  opponents, 
inflict  far  worse  damage  on  yourselves  ;  or  think  that  you 
can  govern  fortune  according  to  your  own  moods.  Be  willing 
to  make  mutual  concessions ;  cast  aside  all  jealousies  of  tribe 
or  city ;  be  good  neighbours  and  good  Siceliots,  resolute  in 
the  determination  to  manage  your  own  affairs,  and  resist  the 
interference  of  foreigners  whether  they  come  as  allies  or  as 
mediators."1 

The  speech  of  Hermocrates  was  decisive.  The  cities  agreed 
to  unite ;  and  no  change  was  made  in  their  mutual  relations, 
with  the  exception  of  Camarina,  which  agreed  to  purchase 
Morgantina  from  Syracuse  for  a  fixed  sum.  Those  who  were 
allies  of  the  Athenians  sent  for  the  officers  in  command  of 
the  fleet  and  requested  them  to  join  in  the  pacification. 
They  accepted  the  proposal  without  any  remonstrance,  and 
after  a  brief  interval  withdrew  their  forces  from  the  island. 

Thus  the  Athenians  saw  themselves  shut  out  from  any 
hope  of  planting  a  foot  in  Sicily,  or  taking  advantage  of 
local  quarrels  to  further  their  own  interests.    They  were  at 

1  Thuc.  iv.  58-64.  Notice  that  Hermocrates,  in  this  speech,  while 
appealing  to  the  common  feeling  of  the  Greeks  in  Sicily,  and  urging 
them  to  act  as  inhabitants  of  one  island  home,  entirely  ignores  the 
natives  of  the  island. 


234 


THE  A  THENIANS  LEA  VE  SIC1L  Y,  [VIII.  4- 


liberty  to  visit  the  western  waters  in  a  single  ship  of  war- 
that  was  allowed  by  the  common  custom  of  Greece — but 
The  Athenians  tneir  Presence  witn  any  greater  number  would 
retire  from  be  the  signal  for  hostilities.  So  far  as  we  can 
sicily'  see,  Eurymedon  and  his  fellow-generals  were 

quite  unable  to  make  or  mar  in  the  pacification ;  they  could 
neither  prevent  the  meeting  of  the  congress  nor  influence  its 
decision,  nor  refuse  to  accept  the  result.  On  their  return  to 
Athens  they  were  at  once  put  on  their  trial.  Pythodorus 
and  Sophocles  were  driven  into  exile,  and  we  do  not  hear 
of  them  again.  Eurymedon  was  merely  fined ;  he  was  des- 
tined to  return  and  fall  in  Sicily.  From  the  language  of 
Thucydides  we  infer  that  the  accusations  were  frivolous. 
"In  the  enthusiasm  of  their  success  the  Athenians  were  im- 
patient of  every  check ;  they  looked  on  all  things  as  possible, 
and  any  armament  as  sufficient,  so  extravagant  were  the 
hopes  aroused  in  them  by  their  unexpected  prosperity."1 

4.  The  Lesbians  who  had  escaped  from  the  island  in  428-427 
had  settled  on  the  mainland  opposite.  With  the  help  of 
some  Peloponnesian  mercenaries  they  captured  Rhoeteum, 
but  afterwards  they  restored  the  town  to  the  rightful  owners 

 for  a  large  sum  of  money— and  acquired  Antandrus,  which 

they  intended  to  make  their  headquarters.  Timber  was 
abundant  there,  and  with  the  help  of  a  fleet  they  could 
harass  Lesbos.  But  two  Athenian  generals,  who  were  col- 
lecting tribute  in  the  neighbourhood,  seeing  their  designs, 
gathered  together  a  force  and  recovered  the  town.  They 
feared  that  it  would  become  to  Lesbos  what  Anaea  was  to 
Samos,  a  constant  source  of  danger  and  alarm.2 

The  successes  of  Athens  had  kindled  new  hopes  in  the 
heart  of  every  democrat  throughout  Greece.  Hippocrates 
and  Demosthenes  had  no  sooner  returned  to  Athens  from 
Nisaea  than  negotiations  were  opened  with  them  by  a 
number  of  Boeotians,  who  desired  to  see  a  popular  form  of 
government  established  in  their  cities.    A  plot  was  formed 


1  Thuc.  iv.  65. 


2  Thuc.  iv.  52,  75. 


VIII.  4.] 


MOVEMENT  IN  BOEOTIA,  4H- 


235 


by  which  the  conspirators  undertook  to  raise  a  revolt  at 
different  points  in  Boeotia :  at  Siphae,  a  seaport  on  the 
Corinthian  gulf  in  the  territory  of  Thespiae, 
and  at  Chaeronea,  a  dependency  of  Orchomenus,  movement  in 
in  the  extreme  north,  while  the  Athenians  were  Boeotia :  plan 
to  seize  the  temple  of  Apollo  at  Delium,  near  for  an  invaslon- 
Tanagra,  in  the  south.  To  prevent  the  Boeotians  from 
bringing  their  whole  force  to  bear  on  any  single  point,  these 
movements  were  to  take  place  simultaneously,  on  a  fixed  day. 
If  successful,  the  conspirators  would  have  at  least  three  places 
of  vantage,  and  by  maintaining  these  and  devastating  the 
country,  they  hoped  in  time  to  effect  a  general  revolution. 
Demosthenes  was  at  once  sent  to  Naupactus  to  collect  an 
army  of  Acarnanians  and  other  allies  for  the  attack  on 
Siphae,  while  Hippocrates  remained  in  the  city,  ready  to 
march  on  Delium  at  the  time  appointed.  Some  Orchomenian 
exiles  had  already  engaged  a  body  of  mercenaries  from 
Peloponnesus,  and  a  number  of  the  neighbouring  Phocians 
were  associated  in  the  project.1 

On  his  arrival  at  Naupactus  Demosthenes  found  that  the 
Acarnanians  had  already  brought  Oeniadae  into  the  Athenian 
alliance.  He  immediately  began  to  collect  Demosthenes 
forces  for  the  attack  on  Siphae,  and  while  at  Naupactus. 
waiting  for  the  time  appointed,  employed  them  in  subduing 
the  Agraeans.  But  the  plan  of  invasion  miscarried.  By 
some  mistake  Demosthenes  sailed  for  Siphae  before  Hippo- 
crates had  reached  Delium,  and  the  Boeotians,  who  had 
been  forewarned  of  the  danger,  occupied  Siphae  and 
Chaeronea  in  force.  The  revolt  was  suppressed  before  it 
had  broken  out ;  the  conspirators,  seeing  their  mistake,  made 
no  sign,  and  Demosthenes  returned  to  Naupactus.2 

Hippocrates  was  not  deterred  from  executing  his  part  of 
the  plot.  Marching  to  Delium  with  the  entire  force  of 
Athens,  both  light  and  heavy-armed,  including  all  the 
available  metic  and  allied  troops,  he  set  about  fortifying  the 


1  Time.  iv.  76,  77. 


2  Thuc.  iv.  89. 


236  THE  ATHENIANS  IN  BOEO 77 A,  4U-       [VIII.  4. 

temple.  In  three  days  and  a  half  the  work  was  nearly 
finished,  and  the  array  set  out  on  its  return.  When  they 
Hippocrates  had  marched  about  a  mile,  the  hoplites  halted, 
at  Deiium.  awaiting  their  general,  who  had  re-mained  at  the 
temple  to  superintend  the  completion  of  the  defensive  works, 
but  the  light-armed  went  their  way  homewards.  Meanwhile 
the  Boeotians  had  gathered  together  from 
forces  assemble  every  part  of  the  country,  under  the  command 
and  attack  the  0f  the  Boeotarchs.  When  they  saw  that  the 
Athenian  army.  Athenians  were  returning  home,  most  of  the 
generals  were  unwilling  to  attack  them,  on  the  ground  that 
the  enemy  were  no  longer  in  Boeotian  territory ;  they  had, 
in  fact,  halted  on  the  borders  of  Oropia ;  but  Pagondas,  one 
of  the  two  Boeotarchs  from  Thebes,  was  eager  for  battle,  and 
summoning  the  soldiers  in  detachments,  lest  they  should  all 
leave  their  arms  at  once,  urged  them  to  engage,  without 
caring  where  the  battle  was  fought,  whether  on  Athenian 
soil  or  on  Boeotian.  The  Athenian  was  an  invader  whom 
they  must  repel;  and  it  was  folly  to  talk  of  boundaries 
when  dealing  with  a  neighbour  who  sought  to  advance  his 
frontier  to  the  utmost  limit  of  Boeotia.  Let  them  remember 
Coronea,  and  show  themselves  worthy  of  that  glorious  day.1 

The  soldiers  responded  to  this  appeal,  and  as  it  was  now 
late  in  the  day,  Pagondas  at  once  led  them  forward  to  a 
position  where  they  were  separated  from  the  enemy  by  a 
hill.  When  he  had  drawn  up  his  forces,  he  ascended  to  the 
summit,  ready  to  sweep  down  on  the  foe.  He  had  under 
his  command  7000  heavy-armed,  500  targeteers,  and  1000 
horse,  besides  an  organised  force  of  10,000  light-armed.  On 
the  right  he  placed  the  Thebans  and  the  Boeotians  from  the 
neighbouring  districts ;  on  the  left  the  Thespians,  Tana- 
graeans,  and  Orchomenians ;  in  the  centre  the  troops  from 
Haliartus,  Coronea,  and  Copae,  and  the  region  round  Lake 
Copais.  The  cavalry  and  light-armed  troops  were  placed,  as 
usual,  on  the  wings.    The  formation  of  the  ranks  varied  in 


1  Thuc.  iv.  90-92. 


VIII.  4-]  THE  BATTLE  OF  DELIUM,  424. 


237 


the  different  contingents,  but  the  Thebans  were  drawn  up 
twenty-five  deep. 

While  at  Delium  Hippocrates  had  been  informed  of  the 
approach  of  the  Boeotians.  He  at  once  sent  orders  to  the 
army  to  form  for  battle,  and  soon  afterwards  joined  them  in 
person,  leaving  three  hundred  horse  at  Delium,  partly  to 
protect  the  temple,  and  also  in  the  hope  that  they  might 
have  an  opportunity  of  attacking  the  Boeotians  during  the 
battle,  a  danger  which  the  Boeotians  provided  against  by 
detaching  a  separate  body  of  troops  to  meet  them.  In 
heavy-armed  and  cavalry  the  Athenians  were  about  equal  to 
the  Boeotians,  but  they  were  almost  entirely  without  light- 
armed  troops.  No  organised  force  of  the  kind  existed  in 
the  Athenian  service,  and  of  the  irregular  multitude  which 
had  followed  the  expedition  from  Athens,  the  greater  part 
were  by  this  time  far  on  their  way  to  the  city.  The  army 
was  drawn  up  at  a  uniform  depth  of  eight  shields;  the 
cavalry  took  their  place  on  the  wings.  Before  advancing 
Hippocrates  made  a  short  address  to  the  troops,  in  which  he 
reminded  his  soldiers  that  a  victory  over  the  Boeotian  cavalry 
would  not  only  give  them  possession  of  Boeotia,  but  relieve 
Attica  from  invasion,  for  without  the  protection  of  this  force 
the  Peloponnesians  would  never  venture  into  their  land. 
"Meet  your  enemy,"  he  cried,  "as  those  ought  to  meet  him 
who  call  Athens  their  home— as  sons  of  the  men  whom 
Myronides  led  to  victory  at  Oenophyta  !  " 1 

He  had  only  gone  over  half  the  line  when  the  Boeotians 
rushed  down  the  hill  with  a  shout,  and  the  Athenian  heavy- 
armed  met  them  at  the  double.    Those  on  the 
extreme  right  and  left  of  either  army  could  ofDeiSST- 
not  engage,  owing  to  the  watercourses  which  defeat  of  the 
prevented  their  advance,  but  the  rest  at  once  Athenians- 
joined  in  close  conflict,  shield  upon  shield.    On  their  own 
right  the  Athenians  were  victorious ;  part  of  the  enemy  were 
put  to  flight,  and  the  Thespians,  who  stood  their  ground, 


1  Thuc.  iv.  93-95. 


238  DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS,  [VIII.  4. 


though  attacked  on  all  sides,  were  at  length  driven  to  seek 
the  protection  of  the  centre.  So  furious  was  the  fighting, 
so  confused  the  ranks,  that  some  of  the  Athenians  fell  by 
the  hands  of  their  own  countrymen,  who  mistook  them  for 
the  enemy.  On  the  left  the  extraordinary  weight  of  the 
Theban  column,  aided  by  the  ground,  was  found  irresistible ; 
slowly,  and  step  by  step,  the  Athenians  were  driven  back, 
though  as  yet  the  line  was  unbroken.  But  now  Pagondas, 
seeing  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear  in  this  part  of  the  battle, 
secretly  detached  two  companies  of  horse  to  assist  his  broken 
left,  and  when  they  appeared  over  the  ridge,  the  victorious 
Athenians,  believing  themselves  attacked  by  a  new  army, 
were  panic-stricken  and  fled ;  after  this  the  wavering  left 
could  no  longer  keep  their  ground,  and  the  whole  army  was 
put  to  flight,  every  man  seeking  safety  where  he  could  find 
it.  The  Boeotian  cavalry,  who  were  now  joined  by  a  troop 
of  Locrians,  followed  in  pursuit,  but  the  approach  of  night 
aided  the  fugitives.  Some  reached  Mount  Parnes,  on  the 
direct  route  to  Athens,  others  Oropus  and  Delium,  whence, 
on  the  next  day,  they  were  conveyed  home  by  sea.1 

The  battle  of  Delium  presents  many  features  of  interest. 
It  is  the  first  battle  in  Greek  history  of  which  the  details 
are  clear  enough  to  enable  us  to  form  an  idea 

Remarks  on  0 

the  battle  of  the  engagement.    We  know  the  numbers 

of  Delium.  on  s-jdeSj  an(j  their  disposition ;  the  mode 
of  attack,  and  the  cause  of  defeat.  The  absence  of  light- 
armed  troops  was  a  defect  in  the  Athenian  army,  which 
their  defeat  at  Spartolus  should  have  taught  them  to  remedy; 
which  Demosthenes,  had  he  been  in  command,  would  probably 
have  remedied.  The  enormous  depth  of  the  Theban  line 
was  an  anticipation  of  the  tactics  which  proved  successful 
fifty  years  later  on  the  field  of  Leuctra,  and  on  this  occasion 
it  seems  to  have  taken  the  Athenians  by  surprise,  or  they 
were  unable  to  perceive  its  importance.    While  the  Boeotians 

1  The  Boeotians  lost  about  500  in  the  battle,  the  Athenians  1000, 
including  the  general  Hippocrates,  besides  light-armed  and  baggage 
bearers.    See  Thuc.  iv.  96  :  cf.  ib.  101. 


VIII.  4-]        CAPTURE  OF  THE  TEMPLE,  404. 


239 


have  the  advantage  in  the  composition  of  their  army,  their 
strategy  is  also  superior  to  that  of  the  Athenians.  Not  only 
do  they  secure  a  position,  which  added  immensely  to  the 
force  of  their  charge,  but  when  his  left  is  broken  Pagondas 
at  once  sees  that  his  cavalry  can  be  employed  to  restore  it, 
though  unable  to  advance  on  the  troops  ranged  opposite ;  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Athenian  cavalry  is  useless  Decline  of  the 
from  first  to  last,  failing  even  to  cover  with  effect  Athenian  army- 
the  retreat  of  the  army.  If  it  be  said  that  the  Athenians  were 
now  departing  from  the  policy  of  Pericles,  and  that  their  defeat 
is  a  proof  of  his  wisdom  in  forbidding  them  to  meet  the  enemy 
in  the  field,  the  observation  is  true,  but  it  seems  to  be  not  less 
true  that  the  policy  which  Pericles  pursued  in  regard  to  the 
Athenian  army  had  been  fatal  to  strategic  skill.1 

The  Athenian  garrison  was  still  in  possession  of  the  temple 
at  Delium.  The  Boeotians  attempted  to  dislodge  them  by 
refusing  to  give  up  the  bodies  of  those  who  capture  of 
had  fallen  in  the  battle,  but  after  some  time  Delium- 
had  been  wasted  in  fruitless  negotiations,  they  resolved  to 
carry  the  place  by  assault.  They  had  already  been  joined 
by  large  reinforcements,  and  the  number  of  the  heavy-armed 
infantry  must  have  amounted  to  nearly  10,000— an  over- 
whelming force  to  bring  upon  a  temple  surrounded  by  an 
earthwork  thrown  up  in  three  days,  and  held  by  a  few 
hundred  men.  But  so  helpless  was  a  Greek  army  before  a 
fortress  of  any  kind,  that  the  besiegers  found  it  necessary 
to  send  for  slingers  and  javelin-men  from  the  Melian  gulf  to 
clear  the  walls,  and  even  then  the  fort  was  not  captured  till 
an  ingenious  engine  had  been  devised  by  which  they  set  fire 
to  the  woodwork  of  the  palisade  and  material  from  the 
neighbouring  vineyard,  with  which  the  ramparts  had  been 
hastily  constructed.  The  greater  part  of  the  garrison 
escaped  to  the  sea,  but  about  two  hundred  were  captured 

1  Cp.  Aristoph.  Frogs,  1021  fF.: 

AIO.  Qrjfialovs  yap  TveTrolrjKas 
dvbpeiorepovs  els  rov  noXepov  .  .  . 
AI.  dXX  vpiv  avr'  egrjv  aaKeiv,  dXX'  ovk  eVi  tovt  eTpdrreaQf. 


240  BRAS  ID  AS  MARCHES  TO  THRACE,  J&4.    \_V\U.  5. 


and  a  few  were  slain.  The  Athenians  now  sent  a  second 
herald  to  recover  their  dead,  who  were  at  once  given  up  to 
them.    They  had  remained  unburied  seventeen  days.1 

5.  The  defeat  of  Delium  was  a  heavy  blow  to  Athens,  but  a 
heavier  still  was  now  to  fall  upon  her.  Brasidas  had  returned 
Brasidas  ivom  Megara  to  his  task  of  collecting  forces 

marches  to  for  the  expedition  to  Chalcidice.  In  addition 
chaicidice.        tQ  the  70Q  Helotg  provided  by  the  Spartan 

government,  he  got  together  by  persuasion  and  promises  a 
force  of  a  thousand  heavy-armed,  and  with  these  he  set  out  to 
the  north.  He  had,  of  course,  no  difficulty  in  reaching  the 
Lacedaemonian  colony  at  Heraclea ;  but  to  pass  through 
Thessaly  was  not  an  easy  task,  for  the  Thessalian  people  were 
friendly  to  Athens,  and  Greek  custom  did  not  allow  an  armed 
force  to  cross  a  neighbour's  territory  without  formal  consent. 
But  the  governing  class  in  Thessaly  was  oligarchical,  and 
Brasidas  had  friends,  who,  at  his  request,  acted  as  his  guides. 
With  their  help  and  his  own  tact  and  energy,  he  succeeded 
in  making  his  way  to  Pharsalus,  whence  he  passed  through 
Perrhaebia  to  Dium,  a  city  in  the  territory  of  Perdiccas. 

The  Macedonian  king  lost  no  time  in  uniting  the  Greek 
force  with  his  own  army,  for  the  purpose  of  attacking 
Brasidas  and  Arrhibaeus,  the  king  of  the  Lyncestians,  but 
Perdiccas.  when  they  were  on  the  point  of  entering 
Lyncestis,  Brasidas  expressed  a  wish  for  a  personal  inter- 
view with  Arrhibaeus,  whom  he  hoped  to  make  an  ally  of 
the  Peloponnesians.  Perdiccas  was  greatly  enraged,  and 
reminded  him  that  he  was  paid  to  obey  Macedonian  orders, 
not  to  "act  as  a  peacemaker."  Brasidas,  nevertheless, 
opened  negotiations  with  Arrhibaeus,  and  at  his  persuasion 
withdrew  his  army,  upon  which  Perdiccas,  who  had  hitherto 
paid  half  the  expenses  of  the  Peloponnesian  forces,  now 
refused  to  pay  more  than  a  third.  His  position  was  even 
worse  than  it  had  been  before  the  arrival  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians ;  he  had  less  hope  of  subduing  Arrhibaeus ;  and  the 


1  Time.  iv.  97-101. 


VIII.  5-]    BKASIDAS  RECEIVED  AT  ACANTHUS,  241 


Athenians,  suspecting  that  he  had  brought  Brasidas  into 
Macedonia,  declared  him  an  enemy. 

Brasidas  was  now  free  to  pursue  his  own  plans  in  regard  to 
the  Chalcidic  cities.  On  the  eastern  shore  of  Chalcidice,  where 
the  isthmus  connects  the  promontory  of  Acte  Brasidas  at 
and  Mount  Athos  with  the  mainland,  a  few  Acanthus- 
miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  canal  of  Xerxes,  lay  Acanthus, 
a  colony  of  Andros,  and  a  subject  city  of  the  Athenians. 
Hither  he  marched  in  response  to  an  invitation  from  the 
oligarchical  party  in  the  town.  He  found  the  inhabitants  by 
no  means  agreed  on  the  question  of  admitting  him  with  his 
forces,  for  here,  as  almost  everywhere,  the  people  were 
attached  to  the  Athenians.  But  as  it  was  now  the  vintage 
time,  and  the  crop,  still  un gathered,  was  at  the  mercy  of  the 
army,  they  consented  to  receive  him  alone,  and  hear  what  he 
had  to  say.  Brasidas,  who  was  "not  a  bad  orator  for  a 
Lacedaemonian,"  made  the  most  of  the  permission.  He 
declared  that  he  had  come  to  liberate  Hellas,  and  to  make 
good  the  promises  with  which  Sparta  had  begun  the  war. 
He  had  come  at  great  risk,  and  it  was  a  bitter  disappointment 
to  find  opposition  in  the  first  city  to  which  he  appealed. 
What  was  it  that  they  feared  %  Was  his  power  inadequate  %  At 
Nisaea  the  Athenians,  though  superior  in  numbers,  refused 
to  fight  with  his  unassisted  forces,  and  would  they  be  able 
to  send  as  large  an  army  across  the  sea  to  Acanthus  % 1 
Or  was  his  honesty  questionable  %  He  brought  the  most 
solemn  pledges  from  the  Spartans,  that  every  city  which 
joined  them  at  his  invitation  should  be  an  independent 
ally.  Or  did  they  suspect  that  he  had  come  to  help  one 
party  in  the  city  against  the  other  %  Nothing  was  further 
from  his  intention ;  neither  the  many  nor  the  few  had  reason 
to  fear  him ;  he  had  no  thought  of  substituting  a  domestic 
for  a  foreign  tyranny.    The  Spartans  were  known  to  be  men 

1  This  statement  of  Brasidas  is  not  true,  see  Thuc.  iv.  108.  His 
army  at  Nisaea  included  a  lar^e  number  of  Corinthians,  who  were 
not  with  him  at  Acanthus,  and  was  superior  in  number  to  the  enemy 
(iv.  73). 

VOL.  III.  Q 


242  ARG1LUS  AND  AMPHIPOLIS,  m>         [VIII.  5- 


of  their  word ;  they  would  not  damage  their  reputation  by- 
actions  which  would  be  disgraceful  even  in  an  Athenian.  But 
the  Acanthians  must  not  suppose  that  they  could  remain 
neutral  and  continue  friends  while  refusing  to  admit  him  into 
the  city.  If  they  would  not  listen  to  persuasion,  he  would  try 
force,  for  he  could  not  allow  them  to  help  the  Athenians  by 
their  contributions,  or  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  liberation 
of  Hellas.  They  had  it  in  their  power  to  save  their  property, 
and  win  a  name  for  their  city ;  but  he  would  maintain  his  cause 
against  all  opposition.    Let  them  choose  the  better  part.1 

The  Acanthians  were  in  favour  of  admitting  Brasidas, 
as  might  be  expected  when  an  army  was  at  the  city  gates 
awaiting  the  signal  to  devastate  the  fruit-laden 
Acanthusgand  vineyards— and,  as  they  gave  their  votes 
marches  on  secretly,  every  one  could  follow  his  own 
Amphipohs.  judgment.  Their  example  was  followed  by 
the  neighbouring  city  of  Stagirus.  It  was  now  October,  but 
Brasidas  had  no  intention  of  throwing  away  the  advantages 
which  he  might  gain  before  the  Athenian  fleet  could 
arrest  his  progress.  He  was  already  in  communication 
with  Argilus,  and  had  hopes  of  winning  no  less  a  prize 
than  Amphipolis  itself.  The  foundation  of  that  city 
appears  to  have  caused  the  greatest  discontent  at  Argilus, 
and,  as  we  find  Argilians  settled  in  Amphipolis,  it  is  probable 
that  the  territory  and  population  of  the  new  town  had  been 
increased  at  the  expense  of  the  older  settlement.  Whatever 
the  cause,  the  Argilians  and  Athenians  were  on  bad  terms, 
and  Amphipolis  was  the  bone  of  contention.  The  Argilians 
wished  for  nothing  better  than  to  expel  the  Athenians,  who 
were  but  a  small  minority  in  the  mixed  population  of  the 
city,  and  their  efforts  were  aided  by  a  party  which  had  the 
support  of  Perdiccas  and  the  Chalcidic  cities.  Of  these  dis- 
contents Brasidas  was  fully  informed,  and  he  resolved  to 
make  use  of  them.  Starting  from  Arnae,  a  town  a  few  miles 
distant  from  Acanthus,  on  the  evening  of  a  stormy  day,  he 


1  Thuc.  iv.  84-88. 


VIII.  5  ]         BRASIDAS  A  T  AMPHIPOLIS,  4%. 


243 


advanced  rapidly  to  Argilus,  where  his  arrival  was  the  signal 
for  revolt,  but  he  would  not  allow  himself  to  be  detained; 
he  rushed  on  through  the  storm  and  darkness,  and  by  early 
morning  reached  the  bridge  which  crossed  the  Strymon,  at  a 
little  distance  from  Amphipolis.  A  small  body  of  soldiers 
were  in  charge ;  these  he  quickly  dispersed,  and  crossing  the 
river,  entered  the  territory  of  Amphipolis,  which  he  allowed 
his  army  to  ravage.  The  citizens,  who  woke  in  the  gloom  of 
a  wintry  morning  to  find  themselves  the  prey  of  an  unex- 
pected enemy,  were  filled  with  alarm;  of  those  who  dwelt 
outside  the  walls,  some  fled  to  the  city,  others  were  taken 
captive.  They  felt  that  they  were  betrayed,  but  the  extent 
of  the  conspiracy  was  unknown,  and  every  man  suspected  his 
neighbour.  So  great  was  the  panic  that  Brasidas  might  have 
secured  the  city ;  but  he  preferred  to  wait  for  the  action  of  his 
confederates,  and,  when  they  failed  to  carry  out  their  part 
of  the  plot,  he  remained  in  his  position. 

The  Athenians,  on  hearing  of  the  arrival  of  Brasidas  in 
Chalcidice,  had  kept  a  close  watch  on  the  district ; 1  and  of 
the  two  generals  who  had  been  appointed  to  this  service,  Eucles 
and  Thucydides  the  historian,  the  first  was  now  in  Amphi- 
polis, the  second  at  Thasos,  half  a  day's  voyage  distant.  In 
concert  with  Eucles,  the  Athenian  party  kept  the  gates  of  the 
city  closed,  and  sent  to  Thucydides  for  help,  who  immedi- 
ately set  sail  with  seven  vessels,  in  the  hope  of  saving 
Amphipolis,  or  at  least  occupying  Eion,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Strymon.  As  owning  a  right  over  the  working  of  gold- 
mines in  Thrace,  he  was  a  man  of  much  influence  in  the 
district ;  and  could  he  reach  Amphipolis,  he  would  be 
able  to  bring  in  reinforcements  by  land  and  sea.  Brasidas 
no  sooner  heard  of  his  approach  than  he  issued  a  pro- 
clamation offering  the  most  moderate  terms.  Any  citizen 
of  Amphipolis,  even  if  an  Athenian,  might  either  remain 
in  the  city  undisturbed,  or,  if  he  chose,  leave  it  in  five  days, 
taking  his  property  with  him.    The  proclamation  had  the 


*  Thuc,  iv,  82, 


244 


EXILE  OF  THUCYDIDES,  424. 


[VIII.  6. 


desired  effect ;  the  Amphipolitans  were  relieved  for  them- 
selves and  their  relatives  who  had  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  Brasidas;  the  Athenians,  who  were  but  a  small  propor- 
tion of  the  inhabitants,  were  glad  to  escape  from  danger. 
Capture  of  Brasidas  took  possession  of  Amphipolis,  and 
Amphipoiis.  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  Thucydides 
occupied  Eion.  With  the  help  of  the  fugitives  from 
Amphipolis,  he  put  the  place  into  a  state  of  defence,  and 
when  Brasidas  suddenly  attacked  it  by  land  and  water,  his 
attempt  was  defeated.  The  Athenians  were  still  able  to 
watch  the  lower  course  of  the  Strymon  with  their  triremes.1 

6.  But  Amphipolis  had  fallen,  and  with  it  the  bridge  over 
the  river  had  passed  out  of  Athenian  control.  The  prize  so 
Condemnation  long  coveted,  so  hardly  won,  was  lost ;  and  the 
of  Thucydides.  wav  to  their  allies  was  open  to  the  enemy.  In 
their  vexation  the  Athenians  turned  upon  Thucydides,  whom 
they  chose  to  consider  responsible  for  the  disaster.  He  was 
brought  to  trial  and  banished,  or  perhaps,  after  his  failure, 
went  into  voluntary  exile.  If  we  may  trust  his  own 
narrative,  he  was  certainly  not  remiss  in  reply  to  the  appeal 
for  help,  and  but  for  his  rapidity  of  movement  Eion  would 
have  been  lost  no  less  than  Amphipolis.  It  is  not  so  clear 
that  proper  measures  had  been  taken  to  secure  the  safety  of 
the  Strymon.  The  importance  of  the  bridge  over  the  river 
was  well  known  to  the  Athenians,  and  above  all  to  Thucy- 
dides, as  his  own  words  prove  to  us.2  Indeed,  it  is  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  this  position  was  allotted  to  him  among  the 
generals,  owing  to  his  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  region 
and  his  great  influence  in  it.  Yet  the  bridge  over  the  Strymon, 
though  at  some  distance  from  Amphipolis,  and  apparently 
within  easy  reach  of  Argilus,  a  city  long  suspected  by  Athens 
Negligence  °^  disloyalty,  is  ne^  Dy  a  small  guard  only ;  at 
of  the  Amphipolis  the  general  is  unsupported  by  any 

Athenians.  garrison,  and  is  therefore  compelled  to  accept 
the  decision  of  the  people,  while  Eion  is  the  prize  of  the 


1  Thuc.  \v.  102-107. 


2  Thuc,  iv.  108. 


VIII.  6.]  BRASIDAS  IN  THRACE,  424.  245 


first  comer.  Even  at  Thasos  no  regular  force  seems  to  have 
been  maintained,  for  the  ships  which  Thucydides  brought  to 
Eion  are  said  to  "have  been  accidentally  at  hand."  Such 
negligence  was  certainly  culpable,  but  we  hardly  know 
enough  of  the  facts  to  decide  who  was  to  blame.  The 
Athenians  may  have  sent  out  the  generals  with  orders  to 
go  to  Amphipolis  and  Thasos ;  they  may  have  supplied  them 
with  insufficient  forces,  trusting  to  "moral  influence,"  and 
believing  that  the  period  of  the  year  had  begun  in  which 
active  operations  were  impossible.  We  are  told  that  when 
they  heard  of  the  arrival  of  Brasidas  in  Chalcidice  they 
declared  Perdiccas  an  enemy,  and  kept  a  watch  on  their 
colonies  in  that  district,  but  we  do  not  hear  of  any  forces 
being  sent  out,  and  it  was  not  till  Amphipolis  had  fallen 
that  they  placed  garrisons  in  the  towns.  One  point  is  very 
clear.  The  Athenians  were  quite  incapable  of  dealing  with 
so  great  a  soldier,  so  acute  a  diplomatist  as  Brasidas.  While 
they  slept,  he  marched,  regardless  of  the  weather  and  the 
season.  While  they  collected  revenues,  he  offered  emanci- 
pation. The  power  of  Sparta,  which  hitherto  had  been 
a  mere  name  to  the  subjects  of  Athens  in  northern  Greece, 
he  brought  in  visible  presence  to  the  gates  of  their  cities : 
the  hopes  of  years  were  at  last  realised ;  the  liberator  was 
come.  And  he  came,  not  in  the  interests  of  party,  to  give 
oligarch  the  advantage  over  democrat,  or  democrat  over 
oligarch,  but  offering  freedom  to  all,  without  respect  to  their 
political  creed.  The  Sparta  which  he  represented  was  not 
the  narrow  and  selfish  community  by  the  Eurotas,  but  a 
large  and  liberal  state,  which,  far  from  seeking  to  establish 
oligarchy  in  every  allied  city,  was  bound,  not  in  honour 
only,  but  by  solemn  oaths,  to  respect  the  independence  of  all 
who  joined  her.  He  encouraged  the  timid,  reassured  the 
suspicious,  and  convinced  the  wavering  ■  in  his  description 
Sparta  was  the  ideal  deliverer  of  whom  the  oppressed  had 
dreamed  so  long,  and  the  impression  thus  created  continued 
for  years  to  increase  the  reputation  of  the  city.  When 
persuasion  failed,  he  struck,  and  struck  hard.     He  saw 


246 


TORONE  CAPTURED,  424.  [VIII.  7. 


that  the  real  weakness  of  the  Athenian  empire  was  its 
great  extent.  If  an  active  spirit  of  revolt  were  excited 
through  the  various  districts,  even  Athenian  resources  were 
inadequate  to  keep  her  power  from  crumbling  to  decay. 
Athens  never  recovered  from  the  blow  dealt  her  by  Brasidas 
in  Chalcidice,  and  when  the  same  policy  was  repeated  by 
Alcibiades  in  Ionia,  the  empire  was  doomed.  Fortunately 
for  Athens,  the  plans  of  Brasidas  received  little  support 
from  the  Spartans,  who  were  quite  unable  to  sympathise 
with  them.  The  liberation  of  Greece  was  in  Spartan  eyes 
a  small  matter  compared  with  the  recovery  of  the  prisoners 
captured  at  Sphacteria  ;  and,  blinded  by  the  miserable 
jealousy  which  is  so  painful  a  feature  in  the  Greek  character, 
their  leading  men  were  more  anxious  to  check  the  success  of 
their  great  general  than  to  promote  it. 

7.  After  the  capture  of  Amphipolis,  Perdiccas  forgot  his 
resentment  and  came  to  support  the  conqueror  in  settling 
Brasidas  cities.     Eager  to  extend  his  operations, 

acquires  Brasidas  sent  to  Sparta  for  reinforcements,  and 

Acte,  etc.  began  building  ships  of  war  on  the  Strymon. 

With  his  allies  he  marched  into  Acte,  the  most  eastern  of 
the  three  promontories  of  Chalcidice,  and  brought  over  the 
cities  there,  with  one  or  two  exceptions.1 

From  Acte  he  crossed  to  Torone,  which  he  captured  with 
the  aid  of  a  party  in  the  city.  Marching  through  the  night 
Brasidas  as  ^e^ore5  ne  encamped  before  daylight  at  a 

captures  temple  less  than  half  a  mile  from  the  city — his 

1 0  ro  n  e  approach  being  unperceived  by  all  but  those  who 

were  in  the  plot.  Of  these  a  few  met  him  at  the  temple,  and 
by  them  seven  of  his  light-armed  soldiers — for  out  of  twenty 
selected  for  the  purpose  only  seven  had  the  courage  to  go — 
were  introduced  into  the  city  and  obtained  possession  of  the 
gates.  When  the  signal  was  given,  Brasidas  rushed  forward 
and  secured  the  town  without  difficulty.  Most  of  the  in- 
habitants were  entirely  ignorant  of  the  plot  by  which  they 


1  Time.  iv.  107,  108,  109. 


VIII.  8.]      WEAKNESS  OF  THE  DEFENCE,  m. 


247 


had  been  betrayed  to  the  enemy.  The  Athenian  garrison, 
who  though  apparently  charged  with  the  care  of  the  great 
gates  had  been  asleep  in  the  market-place  at  the  time  of  the 
attack,  escaped  with  some  slight  loss— partly  on  foot,  partly 
with  the  assistance  of  two  vessels  which  lay  off  the  shore — 
to  Lecythus,  a  fortified  promontory  separated  from  Torone 
by  a  narrow  isthmus,  where  they  were  joined  by  their 
adherents  in  the  town. 

After  an  interval  of  two  days,  during  which  he  had  granted 
a  truce  to  the  Athenians  for  the  burial  of  their  dead,  Brasidas 
attacked  and  carried  Lecythus.  His  success  was  greatly  due 
to  the  fall  of  a  tower,  which  spread  consternation  among  the 
besieged.  Eegarding  this  accident  as  a  proof  of  divine  aid, 
he  piously  devoted  a  sum  of  thirty  minae,  which  he  had  pro- 
mised as  a  reward  to  the  soldier  who  should  first  climb  the 
walls,  to  the  temple  of  Athena,  and  consecrated  the  whole  of 
Lecythus  as  a  precinct  to  the  goddess. 

The  capture  of  Torone  was  the  last  event  of  the  campaign. 
For  the  rest  of  the  winter  Brasidas  occupied  himself  with 
securing  his  conquests  and  forming  future  plans.  So  far  he 
had  been  entirely  successful,  and  his  last  enterprise  taught 
him  that  he  had  little  to  fear  from  an  Athenian  garrison. 
Nothing  could  be  more  inefficient  than  the  defence  of  Torone ; 
the  walls  are  out  of  repair,  and  in  parts  without  a  guard ;  a 
conspiracy  is  formed  in  the  city,  without  any  suspicion  either 
on  the  part  of  the  Athenians  or  their  supporters ;  the  garrison 
are  asleep ;  the  gates  are  insufficiently  watched.  If  this  were 
all  the  opposition  which  Athens  had  to  offer,  another  campaign 
would  decide  the  fate  of  the  Athenian  possessions  in  Thrace.1 

8.  Such  was  the  war  in  Chalcidice,  where,  by  his  energy 
and  enthusiasm,  one  man  was  carrying  all  before  him.  At 
home  matters  wore  a  very  different  aspect.  Each  of  the 
combatants  had  suffered  severely  in  the  last  year,  and  each 
was  apprehensive  of  new  calamities.  The  fall  of  Torone 
roused  the  Athenians  to  their  danger,  and  the  insufficiency 


1  For  Torone,  Thuc.  iv,  110-116, 


248 


A  TRUCE  CONCLUDED,  423. 


[VIII.  8. 


of  their  own  measures.  If  their  empire  was  to  be  kept 
together  a  larger  force  must  be  sent  out  to  Chalcidice,  and 
a  truce  in  the  meantime  Brasidas  must  be  restrained 

concluded.  from  further  aggression.  The  Lacedaemonians, 
though  regarding  the  successes  of  Brasidas  as  a  poor  com- 
pensation for  their  losses  at  home,  were  aware  of  the 
impression  which  they  made  at  Athens,  and  sought  to  take 
advantage  of  it.  Both  parties  hoped  to  gain  by  a  cessation 
of  hostilities,  and  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  spring  of  423 
a  truce  was  concluded  for  a  year. 

In  this  instance,  as  so  often,  the  Spartan  policy  was  short- 
sighted and  selfish  to  a  degree  almost  incredible.  We  can 
understand  why  the  Athenians  should  desire  a  truce  which 
would  prevent  Brasidas  from  making  new  conquests,  and 
enable  them  to  send  out  reinforcements;  but  why  should 
Sparta  consent  to  it  1  Why  should  she  wish  Brasidas  to  be 
stopped  in  his  career,  when,  as  she  very  well  knew,  he  was 
inflicting  the  severest  blows  upon  the  enemy  1  Thucydides 
explains  the  situation,  but  in  language  so  obscure  that  it  is 
almost  unintelligible.  The  dominant  feeling  of  the  Spartans 
was  a  wish  to  recover  the  prisoners  now  lying  at  Athens, 
and  this  they  might  hope  to  do  by  offering  in  exchange 
their  conquests  in  Thrace,  conquests  which  they  could 
surrender  without  injury  to  their  allies  in  Peloponnesus. 
If,  however,  the  war  continued,  Brasidas  might  be  defeated, 
and  they  would  then  no  longer  have  these  conquests  to  offer, 
and  if  he  were  victorious,  he  might  indeed  restore  the 
balance  of  the  war,  but  even  so  they  would  not  have  gained 
their  point.  Their  prisoners  would  be  prisoners  still ;  their 
recovery  would  be  subject  to  the  chances  of  war.  It  was 
better  to  sacrifice  Chalcidice  at  once,  in  spite  of  all  that 
Brasidas  had  said  about  liberation,  and  make  use  of  his 
success  for  the  object  which  they  had  most  at  heart.1 

1  Thuc.  iv.  117.  The  words  <a\  epeWov  eVt  /xei£bi/  ^cop^o-ai/roy 
avrov  Kai  avTLTraXa  KaraaTrjaavTos  ra>v  fxev  arepeadai,  rols  &'  e<  rov 
'Lcrov  dfivvofievoi  tavSvveveiv  koX  Kparrjaeiv,  are  very  obscure.  See 
Barton  and  Chavasse,  ad  loc. 


VIII.  9-] 


TERMS  OF  THE  TRUCE,  1^23. 


249 


We  observe  with  some  surprise  that  the  first  two  clauses 
of  the  truce  refer  to  the  temple  at  Delphi.  All  Greeks  are 
to  be  allowed  to  consult  the  oracle  according  Terms  of  the 
to  hereditary  custom,  and  steps  are  to  be  taken  truce- 
for  the  detection  of  those  who  misappropriate  the  funds  of 
the  temple — provisions  which  imply  that  there  had  been 
some  difficulty  in  obtaining  access  to  the  sacred  shrine  and 
some  improper  use  of  the  sacred  treasure.1  With  regard 
to  their  conquests  each  side  was  to  keep  what  it  possessed 
on  the  day  when  the  truce  was  signed.  The  Lacedaemonians 
might  sail  along  their  own  coasts  and  the  coasts  of  the 
confederacy  in  rowing  vessels  of  not  more  than  500  talents 
burden,  but  not  in  ships  of  war.  A  safe-conduct  was 
assured  during  the  truce  to  envoys  from  both  cities,  in  the 
hope  that  a  lasting  peace  might  be  arranged  ;  deserters  were 
not  to  be  received ;  and  any  disputes  which  might  arise 
were  to  be  settled  by  arbitration.  The  terms  having  been 
agreed  upon  by  Sparta  and  her  allies,  were  carried  by 
envoys,  with  plenary  powers,  to  Athens  for  acceptance,  and 
if  any  change  was  desired,  the  Athenians  were  requested  to 
send  plenipotentiaries  to  Sparta. 

On  the  motion  of  Laches  the  Athenians  accepted  the 
terms,  and  on  the  14th  of  Elaphebolion,  i.e.  about  the  end 
of  March  423,  hostilities  were  suspended. 

9.  The  truce  had  hardly  been  signed  before  new  diffi- 
culties arose.  While  Athens  and  Sparta  were  negotiating 
peace,  the  city  of  Scione,  on  the  promontory  of  Pallene,  went 
over  to  Brasidas.  He  at  once  crossed  from  scione  revolts 
Torone,  and  publicly  commended  the  Scionaeans  from  Athens- 
for  their  courage  and  good  sense.  Though  almost  as  defence- 
less as  islanders,  owing  to  the   Athenian   occupation  of 


1  The  oracle  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  quite  impartial  in  the 
war.  Apollo  promised  his  assistance  to  the  Peloponnesians.  He  also 
authorised  the  foundation  of  Heraclea.  Whether  the  Peloponnesians 
carried  out  their  intention  of  borrowing  money  from  Delphi  we  do 
not  know  ;  but  the  funds  seem  to  have  been  open  to  them  and  not  to 
thr  Athenians. 


250 


SCIONE  REVOLTS,  423. 


[VIII.  9. 


Potidaea,  they  had  by  their  own  act  joined  the  side  of 
liberty :  such  bravery  was  a  good  omen  of  their  future 
conduct,  and  the  Lacedaemonians  would  honour  it  as  it 
deserved. 

The  Scionaeans  were  filled  with  delight ;  even  those  who 
had  opposed  the  revolt  now  supported  it,  and  were  prepared 
to  go  to  war  with  Athens.  One  spirit  animated  all. 
Brasidas  received  the  greatest  honours  which  the  city  could 
bestow ;  as  the  deliverer  of  Greece  he  was  crowned  with  a 
crown  of  gold ;  while  the  citizens  crowded  round  him  with 
salutations  and  placed  garlands  on  his  head  as  though  he 
had  been  a  victorious  athlete  returning  from  the  games. 
Brasidas  left  a  small  garrison  in  the  city  and  returned  to 
Torone,  but  soon  afterwards  he  appeared  again  with  a  larger 
force ;  he  was  already  in  negotiation  with  Mende  and 
Potidaea,  and  hoped  to  acquire  those  cities,  with  the  help  of 
Scione,  before  the  Athenians  could  arrive.1 

At  this  moment  came  the  envoys  from  home  announc- 
ing the  truce.  The  allies  of  Lacedaemon  in  Ghalcidice  all 
agreed  to  the  terms,  but  the  Athenian  envoy  refused  to 
admit  the  Scionaeans  when  it  was  found  that  they  had 
Difficulties  revolted  after  the  truce  had  been  signed, 
about  Scione.  while  Brasidas,  though  he  sent  back  his  army 
to  Torone,  would  not  surrender  the  town.  The  Athenians, 
when  they  heard  the  report  of  the  envojr,  prepared  to  sail 
to  Scione,  but  the  Lacedaemonians  announced  that  they 
should  regard  the  expedition'  as  a  breach  of  the  truce,  and 
asked  to  have  the  matter  settled  by  arbitration.  To  this 
the  Athenians  would  not  agree :  they  were  exasperated  at 
the  thought  that  even  islanders  were  revolting  in  reliance 
upon  the  power  of  Lacedaemon — a  power  useless  at  sea — and 
instantly  passed  a  resolution,  on  the  proposal  of  Cleon,  that 
Scione  should  be  destroyed  and  all  the  inhabitants  put  to 
death.  In  the  main  question  they  were  right,  for  the  revolt 
of  Scione  took  place  two  days  after  the  signing  of .  the  truce, 


l  Time.  iv.  120,  121, 


VIII.  9-]  INVASION  OF  L  YNCESTIS,  423. 


251 


and  confining  their  operations  to  this  one  point,  they  avoided 
any  further  hostilities.1 

Meanwhile  Mende  went  over,  and  Brasidas,  though  the 
truce  had  been  proclaimed,  did  not  hesitate  to  receive  the 
city,  excusing  his  conduct  on  the  ground  that  Revolt  of 
the  Athenians  had  themselves  violated  the  Mende- 
terms.  His  action  at  Scione  inspired  the  Mendaeans  with 
confidence,  but  the  movement  was  due  to  a  small  party  who, 
fearing  for  their  own  safety,  compelled  the  populace  to  go 
with  them.  The  Athenians  were  now  more  enraged  than 
ever,  and  directed  their  expedition  against  Mende  as  well  as 
Scione. 

Brasidas  made  arrangements  for  the  defence  of  both,  but  he 
was  unable  to  be  present  in  person.  At  this  crisis  in  the 
fortunes  of  two  Greek  cities,  which  trusted  in  him  to  save 
them  from  destruction,  he  was  called  away  to 

.  .         £T  Brasidas  joins 

support  Perdiccas  in  a  new  invasion  oi  Lyncestis.  Perdiccas  in  an 
At  the  cause  of  this  sudden  change  in  his  plans  invasion  of 

.  -i       Lyncestis ; 

we  can  only  guess  •  m  the  previous  summer  he  reasons  for  this, 
had  offended  Perdiccas  by  coming  to  terms 
with  Arrhibaeus,  and  his  subsequent  career  had  been  one 
of  unbroken  success;  he  was  not  now  seeking  admission 
into  the  Chalcidic  cities ;  he  was  the  hero,  the  deliverer, 
to  whom  all  turned  with  longing  eyes.  After  the  con- 
quest of  Amphipolis  he  was  visited  by  Perdiccas,  who 
may  have  induced  him  to  reconsider  his  position  towards 
Arrhibaeus;  or  he  may  have  been  driven  by  the  need  of 
larger  forces  for  protecting  his  conquests  to  secure  the  help 
of  the  Macedonian  army  at  any  price.  He  knew  that  the 
Athenians  would  come,  and  come  quickly  ;  that  he  must  meet 
them  unaided  by  any  troops  from  Lacedaemon ;  that 
Perdiccas  would  not  render  him  assistance  till  he  had  helped 
to  carry  out  the  object  for  which  he  and  his  forces  had  been 
invited  to  Macedonia.  On  some  such  grounds  he  may  have 
been  brought  to  join  Perdiccas,  as  he  now  did,  with  the 


1  Thuc.  iv.  122.    /ecu  raXXa  f)avxaCOVT€S  *s  tovto  7rap€aKevd£ovTO. 


252 


RE  TREA  T  OF  PERDICCA  S,  423.         [  V 1 1 1 .  10. 


bulk  of  his  Peloponnesian  forces,  and  as  mmy  Chalcidian 
troops  as  could  be  supplied  by  Acanthus  and  other  towns. 
That  he  did  so  with  a  heavy  heart  and  divided  purpose 
is  clear  from  his  conduct — and  indeed  the  step  was  fatal; 
no  fewer  than  3000  heavy-armed  Hellenic  troops  and  a 
large  force  of  cavalry  were  withdrawn  from  Chalcidice  at 
a  time  when  the  presence  of  the  Athenians  was  daily 
expected. 

10.  The  combined  armies  entered  the  Lyncestian  territory 
and  defeated  the  troops  of  Arrhibaeus,  after  which  they 
Defeat  of  the  remained  inactive,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  some 
Lyncestians.  Ulyrian  auxiliaries.  When  the  Illyrians  did 
not  appear,  Perdiccas  wished  to  push  on  and  destroy  the 
villages  round,  while  Brasidas  was  anxious  to  return  to 
Mende,  and  refused  to  go  further  without  the  Illyrians. 
The  dispute  was  ended  by  the  news  that  the  Illyrians  had 
thrown  Perdiccas  over  and  joined  Arrhibaeus.  Perdiccas  and 
Brasidas  now  resolved  to  retreat.  The  two  armies  lay  at 
some  distance  from  each  other,  and  in  the  night  the  Mace- 
Retreat  of  donians,  seized  with  a  sudden  panic,  rushed 
Perdiccas.  homewards,  carrying  Perdiccas  with  them 
before  he  had  time  to  acquaint  Brasidas  with  his  move- 
ments. When  the  morning  broke,  Brasidas  found  himself 
face  to  face  with  the  Illyrians,  and  without  the  support 
of  his  allies.  Nothing  remained  but  retreat,  and  was  retreat 
possible  ?  Could  his  army  be  kept  together  in  the  pre- 
Difficuit  osi  sence  °f  a  multitude  of  dancing  and  yelling 
tionof  Brasidas;  Savages,  who  threatened  an  immediate  attack. 
retreat6rly  ^G  ^ree^s  rarely  marched  far  beyond  their 
own  borders,  and  expected  to  find  in  the 
enemy  armour,  tactics,  and  organisation  resembling  their 
own ;  conflict  with  savages  was  new  to  them.  Brasidas  saw 
the  danger  and  met  it.  He  arranged  his  army  in  a  hollow 
square,  within  which  he  collected  the  light-armed  forces ;  the 
most  active  of  the  soldiers  were  placed  in  readiness  for  a  sally, 
should  the  enemy  attack ;  while  the  general  himself,  with 
300  picked  men,  took  up  his  position  in  the  rear,  to  receive 


VIII.  10.]    BR  AS  IDAS  AND  THE  ILL  YRIANS,  253 


the  first  onset.  He  briefly  addressed  his  men.  What  if  they 
had  been  abandoned  by  their  allies  %  It  was  their  duty  to 
conquer  by  their  own  valour  without  the  assistance  of  others. 
What  if  they  were  attacked  by  greater  numbers  %  They 
came  from  cities  where  the  few  held  the  many  in  subjection. 
The  sight  of  a  barbarian  foe  was  new  to  them,  and  what  was 
unknown  was  feared ;  but  the  terror  was  for  the  eye  only. 
Barbarians  were  not  trained  to  fight  in  ranks ;  they  felt  no 
shame  in  deserting  their  post ;  they  were  under  no  control- 
ling authority.  "  Your  safety  lies  in  despising  these  attempts 
to  frighten  you,  which  are  but  a  proof  that  the  enemy 
shrinks  from  a  battle.  By  resisting  their  onset,  and  retiring 
in  perfect  order,  you  will  soon  reach  a  place  of  security ;  and 
you  will  find  that  hordes  such  as  these,  if  you  receive  their 
first  attack,  are  careful  for  the  future  to  display  their  valour 
at  a  distance.  But  if  you  yield  to  them  they  will  dog  your 
steps,  being  men  of  infinite  courage  where  there  is  nothing 
to  fear." 

The  orders  of  Brasidas  were  obeyed ;  the  barbarians  were 
successfully  resisted.  After  a  time  they  ceased  to  attack 
him,  and  hastened  forward,  partly  to  overtake  the  retreating 
Macedonians,  some  of  whom  they  slew,  partly  to  occupy  the 
heights  commanding  the  gorge  through  which  Brasidas  must 
pass  on  his  way  to  Macedonia.  When  he  was  about  to 
enter  the  defile  he  perceived  their  intention,  and  bade  his 
three  hundred  run  at  full  speed,  without  thought  of  line  or 
order,  to  the  summit  of  the  hill,  which  he  thought  that  they 
would  occupy,  and  dislodge  the  enemy.  This  was  done, 
and  the  rest  of  the  army  ascended  without  difficulty,  for 
the  barbarians,  being  greatly  discouraged,  desisted  from 
further  pursuit. 

The  soldiers  of  Brasidas  were  greatly  enraged  at  the 
conduct  of  their  allies,  and  on  entering  Macedonia  they 
revenged  themselves  by  slaughtering  the  oxen  Breach  between 
of  the  waggons,  and  appropriating  the  baggage  Brasidas  and 
thrown  away  in  the  retreat.    Perdiccas  now  Perdlccas- 
regarded  Brasidas  as  an  enemy,  and,  forgetting  the  old  hatred 


254 


MENDE  AND  SCI  ONE,  1^23.  [VIII.  n. 


in  the  new,  forgetting  too  his  own  natural  interests,  he 
sought  an  opportunity  of  joining  the  Athenians.1 

II.  When  Brasidas  returned  to  Torone  his  worst  fears  were 
realised.    Mende  had  been  captured  by  the  Athenians,  and 
the  position  of  Scione  was  desperate.    On  their  arrival  in 
Chalcidice,  under  the  command  of  Nicias  and  Nicostratus,  the 
Athenian  fleet  found  the  Mendaeans  and  their  garrison,  a  body 
of  700  Peloponnesian  hoplites,  encamped  under  the  command 
of  Polydamidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  on  a  steep  hill  outside  the 
town.    An  attempt  was  made  to  dislodge  them,  but  without 
success ;  Nicias  was  driven  back  wounded,  and  the  whole  army 
narrowly  escaped  a  severe  defeat.    Next  day  the  Athenians 
sailed  round  to  the  other  side  of  the  city,  where,  without 
even  a  brush  with  the  enemy,  they  took  the  suburb  and 
ravaged  the  country  round.    Nicostratus  encamped  near  the 
Potidaean  gate  of  the  town,  where  Nicias  joined  him  after 
completing  the  devastation  of  the  country  as  far  as  the 
borders  of  Scione.     Within  the  city  all  was  confusion. 
Faction  had  broken  out,  three  hundred  Scionaeans,  who  had 
come  to  the  help  of  the  city,  had  gone  home,  and  when 
Polydamidas  began  to  draw  up  his  soldiers  in  the  market- 
place for  an  attack  on  the  enemy,  one  of  the  popular  party 
declared  that  he  had  no  wish  to  fight,  and  would  not  go  out. 
Polydamidas  answered  him  sharply,  and  from  words  proceeded 
to  blows,  upon  which  the  populace  at  once  seized  their  arms 
and  rushed  upon  the  Peloponnesians.    They  fled  in  terror 
at  this  unexpected  attack,  and  their  alarm  was  increased 
when  they  saw  the  gates  opened  to  receive  the  Athenians  ; 
they  believed  themselves  to  be  the  victims  of  a  preconcerted 
plot,  and  sought  refuge  in  the  Acropolis,  with  some  loss. 
Meanwhile  the  Athenian  army  poured  into  the  town,  pillaging 
and  destroying,  and  it  was  only  by  the  personal  intervention 
of  the  generals  that  the  lives  of  the  inhabitants  were  spared. 
The  Mendaeans  were  bidden  to  return  to  their  old  form  of 
constitution,  and  it  was  left  to  them  to  put  on  their  trial  any 


*  Time.  iv.  124-128. 


VIII.  12.]    PERDICCAS  jOlNS  THE  ATHENIANS,  42S.  255 


citizen  whom  they  thought  guilty,  a  concession  which  could 
safely  be  made  after  the  recent  outburst  of  popular  fury. 
The  Athenians  then  cut  off  the  fugitives  in  the  Acropolis  by 
a  wall,  extending  at  either  end  to  the  sea,  and,  leaving  a 
detachment  to  guard  it,  went  on  to  Scione.1 

Here  the  same  tactics  were  pursued.  To  save  the  city 
from  being  surrounded,  the  inhabitants,  with  their  Pelopon- 
nesian  auxiliaries,  encamped  on  a  hill  outside  Blockade 
the  walls ;  the  Athenians  by  a  vigorous  effort  °f  Scione. 
dislodged  them,  and  at  once  set  about  building  a  siege-wall. 
Before  the  work  was  finished,  the  Peloponnesians  who  had 
taken  refuge  in  the  Acropolis  of  Mende  broke  out  by  the 
shore,  and  joined  their  friends  in  Scione.2 

In  the  meantime  Percliccas  came  to  terms  with  the  Athen- 
ian generals,  and  in  order  to  prove  the  sincerity  of  his  con- 
version, which  Nicias  thought  was  much  in  need  Perdiccas  joins 
of  proof,  he  prevailed  on  his  friends  in  Thessaly  *ed**pft*"s ; 
to  stop  the  passage  of  some  reinforcements  Lacedaemonian 
which  were  marching  to  the  aid  of  Brasidas.3  reinforcements. 
The  three  commissioners  who  had  been  sent  to  Chalcidice  to 
report  on  the  state  of  affairs  were,  however,  able  to  make 
their  way  through,  and  brought  with  them  a  number  of  the 
younger  citizens,  whom,  contrary  to  the  custom  of  their  state, 
the  Spartans  intended  to  make  governors  of  their  cities  in 
Thrace.  Of  these,  Clearidas  was  established  in  Amphipolis, 
and  Pasitelidas  in  Torone.4 

12.  In  Greece  the  truce  was  strictly  maintained,  so  far  as 
operations  between  the  belligerents  were  concerned  ;  but  for 
those  who  had  old  scores  to  pay  off,  the  opportunity  was  too 
good  to  be  lost.    Taking  advantage  of  the  heavy  losses  which 

i  Thiic.  iv.  129,  130.  2  Time.  iv.  131. 

3  This  agreement  was  confirmed  by  a  formal  alliance :  cp.  C.  I  .A. 
i.  42  ;  Thuc.  v.  6,  83  ;  Forbes,  Time.  I.  xcv. 

4  Thuc  iv.  132.  On  the  inscription  which,  as  Boeckh  and  Hicks 
suppose,  contains  the  names  of  Athenians  who  fell  in  Chalcidice  in 
423,  see  Jowett,  Thuc.  t.  xcviii.  The  blockade  of  Scione  is  alluded 
to  in  Aristoph.  Wasps,  209  (Feb.  422)  :  vrj  At'  rjplp  Kpelrrov  rjv  Trjpelv 
^Kiiivqv  dvTi  tovtov  rov  narpos* 


256 


EXPULSION  OF  THE  DELIA NS,  422.     [VIII.  13. 


the  Thespians  had  suffered  in  the  battle  of  Delium,  the 
Thebans  marched  to  the  town  and  destroyed  the  walls.  They 
Thespiae  charged  the  Thespians  with  "Atticism,"  an 

absurd  accusation  against  men  who  had  fought 
by  their  side  in  defence  of  Boeotia  at  Delium,  and,  under  the 
circumstances,  as  hypocritical  as  it  was  absurd.  Later  in 
Tegea  and  the  year  the  Mantineans  and  Tegeans  renewed 
Mantinea.  their  long-standing  feud,  but,  after  a  hotly  con- 
tested battle,  the  victory  was  undecided ;  both  sides  set  up 
trophies,  both  sent  spoils  to  Delphi,  but  the  Tegeans  could 
claim  the  slight  advantage  of  encamping  on  the  field  of  battle.1 
When  the  winter  of  423  was  drawing  to  a  close,  Brasidas 
endeavoured  to  retrieve  his  fortunes  in  Chalcidice  by  an 
Brasidas  attack  on  Potidaea.    Arriving  in  the  night,  he 

attempts  succeeded  in  planting  a  ladder  against  the  wall, 

Potidaea,  but     at  ^  moment  wnen  the  watchman  had  passed 

in  vain.  Jr 

by ;  but  before  he  could  ascend  it,  the  attack 
was  discovered,  and  he  withdrew  his  army  in  haste  to  Torone.2 
The  year  had  seen  a  disastrous  change  in  his  position ;  of  the 
cities  which  had  come  over  to  him  in  the  spring,  when  his 
star  was  in  the  ascendant,  Mende  was  lost,  and  Scione  was 
closely  besieged.  No  assistance  could  be  expected  from 
Macedonia,  and  the  way  was  blocked  against  reinforcements 
from  home.  As  yet  the  Athenians  were  present  with  but  a 
small  number  of  ships ;  in  the  coming  summer  he  might  be 
called  upon  to  meet  their  whole  force  unaided. 

13.  The  truce  expired  in  March,  but  hostilities  were  not 
resumed  till  the  summer,  after  the  Pythian  games.  During 
Expulsion  of  the  interval  the  Athenians,  thinking  that  the 
theDeiians.  purification  of  Delos  was  still  incomplete,  ex- 
pelled the  entire  population  from  the  island,  on  the  ground 
that  they  were  defiled  by  some  ancient  stain,  and  unfit  to 


1  Thuc.  iv.  133,  134.  The  battle  took  place  iv  AaodiKia  rys 
'Opeo-Bidos,  "in  the  valley  of  the  Alpheus,  near  the  spot  where 
Megalopolis  was  afterwards  built"  (Arnold). 

2  Thuc.  iv.  135  :  rov  yap  KG)$a>vos  napevc^devToe  ovtg>9  is  to 
hiaitevov,  np\v  inaveXdelv  tov  irapabihovTa  avTov,  r)  npoadeo-LS  iyevero. 


VIII.  13.]  CLEON  AT  TO  RONE,  422. 


257 


dwell  in  the  holy  land.  The  exiles  found  a  home  at  Adra- 
myttium,  under  the  protection  of  Pharnaces,  the  Persian 
satrap  1  {infra,  p.  270). 

When  the  Pythian  games  were  over,  Cleon  persuaded  his 
citizens  to  send  him  out  with  an  army  to  Chalcidice.  The 
success  of  the  previous  year  had  fallen  to  his  cleon  sails 
opponent  Nicias,  whose  reputation  as  a  general  to  chalcidice. 
had  steadily  advanced  since  the  miserable  scene  of  425.  In 
the  interval  Cleon  had  been  busy  squeezing  the  allies  2  and 
filling  the  law-courts,  to  the  great  satisfaction  of  his  followers 
and  the  increase  of  his  own  power.  His  military  ambition 
had  been  kindled  by  his  achievement  at  Pylus,  and  when  in 
422  he  was  once  more  chosen  general  he  wished  for  an 
opportunity  of  displaying  his  genius.  He  nattered  himself 
that  he  had  only  to  appear  in  Chalcidice  and  all  that  had 
been  lost  would  be  recovered.  He  set  sail  with  thirty  ships, 
having  on  board  twelve  hundred  Athenian  hoplites  and 
three  hundred  horsemen,  besides  a  number  of  allies.  At 
Seione,  which  was  still  blockaded,  he  added  to  his  forces  any 
soldiers  who  could  be  spared  from  the  siege.  Landing  near 
Torone,  and  finding  that  Brasidas  had  left  the  city  in  charge 
of  Pasitelidas  with  a  diminished  garrison,  he  at  once  des- 
patched ten  of  his  ships  into  the  harbour,  and  marched  his 
infantry  on  the  town.  In  order  to  increase  the  size  of 
Torone  and  protect  the  inhabitants,  Brasidas  had  enclosed 
and  fortified  a  suburb,  which  he  incorporated  with  the  city 
by  breaking  down  the  old  wall.  On  this  new  fortification 
Cleon  directed  his  attack.  Pasitelidas  was  preparing  to 
repel  him  when  the  Athenian  ships  sailed  into  the  harbour. 
His  forces  being  inadequate  to  hold  both  the  He  captures 
suburb  and  the  town,  he  rushed  back  to  the  Torone. 
city,  leaving  the  way  clear  for  Cleon.  But  he  was  too 
late.    The  ships  had  taken  the  city  before  he  could  reach  it, 

1  Time.  v.  1.  What  led  the  Athenians  to  this  step  we  do  not  know  ; 
but  it  indicates  an  unusual  degree  of  religious  excitement  in  the  city.' 

2  For  the  ra£is  (popov  of  425  (C  /.  A.  i.  37)  and  the  raising  of 
the  tribute,  supra,  p.  222. 

VOL.  III.  r 


258 


CLE  ON  AT  EION,  422. 


[VIII.  14. 


and  meanwhile  the  army  entered  from  the  suburb.  Some  of 
his  men  were  cut  down  at  once,  the  rest  were  captured, 
himself  among  them.  Brasidas,  who  hastened  to  the  rescue, 
was  within  five  miles  of  the  city  when  he  heard  of  its  fall. 

Cleon  had  reason  to  be  proud  of  his  success.  At  his  first 
attempt,  without  even  a  serious  conflict,  he  had  recovered 
the  headquarters  of  the  enemy,  and  could  send  seven  hundred 
prisoners  to  Athens.  He  had  stolen  a  march  on  Brasidas, 
and  proved  himself  more  energetic  than  the  greatest  of 
Spartan  generals.  It  cannot  be  said  on  this  occasion  that  he 
reaped  the  glory  which  was  another's  due ;  he  sailed  out,  so 
far  as  we  know,  in  sole  command,  taking  the  whole  responsi- 
bility upon  himself.  His  success  was  owing  to  the  rapidity 
of  his  movements,  his  skill  in  dividing  his  force,  and 
attacking  the  town  simultaneously  at  two  points.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  conduct  of  Brasidas  is  inexplicable.  What 
induced  him  to  leave  Torone  with  an  insufficient  garrison  at 
the  moment  when  a  large  Athenian  force  was  expected? 
"Was  he  misled  by  false  intelligence,  or  was  he  still  collecting 
reinforcements  at  the  time  when  Cleon  arrived  ?  Whatever 
the  cause,  the  result  was  disastrous,  and  the  Spartan  power 
in  which  he  had  persuaded  the  Chalcidic  cities  to  put 
their  trust  was  shown  to  be  unequal  to  the  task  which  it 
had  undertaken. 

14.  From  Torone  Cleon  sailed  to  Eion  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Strymon.  The  recovery  of  Amphipolis  was  the  chief  object 
cieon  arrives  of  his  expedition,  but,  before  entering  on  so 
at  Eion.  difficult  a  task,  he  wished  to  collect  reinforce- 

ments from  Macedonia  and  Thrace.  While  waiting  for  their 
arrival,  he  attacked  and  took  the  neighbouring  town  of 
Galepsus. 

Brasidas  was  informed  of  his  movements,  and  at  once 
marched  up  from  Argilus  to  Cerdylium,  a  hill  on  the  right 
Brasidas  ^ank  °*  tne  Strymon,  commanding  a  view  of 

marches  to  Amphipolis  and  the  country  round.  From  this 
Cerdylium.  point  he  could  keep  a  watch  on  Cleon,  should 
he  attempt  the  town  without  waiting  for  his  reinforcements. 


VIII.  14- ]       HE  ADVANCES  TO  AMPHIPOLIS,  422.  259 


He  divided  his  army  into  two  portions,  one  of  which  he  kept 
near  him  on  the  hill ;  the  other  was  placed  in  Amphipolis, 
under  the  command  of  Clearidas.1 

Cleon  was  unable  to  carry  out  his  plans.    His  soldiers 
grew  weary  of  inaction;  their  spirits  drooped;  they  mur- 
mured loudly  against  the  strategy  which  kept  cleon  ad_ 
them  idle  in  the  sight  of  their  enemy;  and  vanceson_ 
contrasted  in  no  flattering  terms  the  conduct  AmPhlP°lls- 
and  abilities  of  their  own  general  with  those  of  Brasidas. 
It  was  with  the  utmost  unwillingness  that  they  had  taken 
service  under  such  a  leader.2    Cleon  gave  way  to  the  dis- 
content so  far  as  to  advance  upon  Amphipolis,  not  with  the 
intention  of  risking  a  battle,  but  merely  to  reconnoitre.  He 
posted  his  army  on  the  hill  above  the  city,  which  commanded 
a  view  of  the  lake  on  the  Strymon,  and  the  country  towards 
Thrace,  as  well  as  the  interior  of  Amphipolis.    He  did  not 
anticipate  an  engagement,  and  felt  confident  that  he  could 
without  difficulty  retire  to  Eion  whenever  he  pleased. 

The  opportunity  which  Brasidas  desired  had  come  ;  Cleon, 
unsupported  by  his  Thracian  and  Macedonian  auxiliaries, 
was  within  striking  distance.    As  soon  as  he  Brasidas 
saw  the  Athenians  on  the  opposite  hill,  he  prepares  to 
hastened  from  Cerdylium,  and  entering  Amphi-  attack  the 

,  ,  .     ,  ,  r   ™       •  i  Athenians. 

pons,  joined  his  forces  to  those  oi  Clearidas. 
He  did  not  venture  to  offer  battle  in  the  open,  for  though  his 
army  was  about  as  numerous  as  that  of  the  enemy,  it  was 
far  inferior  in  quality.  He  selected  150  of  his  best  hoplites 
with  whom  to  make  a  sudden  attack  on  the  Athenian  centre, 
while  the  rest  were  stationed  under  the  command  of  Clearidas 
at  the  Thracian  gate  of  the  city,  with  orders  to  rush  out  and 


1  Thuc.  v.  6. 

2  Thucydides  says  that  their  reluctance  was  more  than  justified, 
and  such  was  the  feeling  of  the  knights  or  cavalry  who  served  under 
Cleon  ;  cp.  Aristoph.  Clouds,  572  f . ;  but  so  far  as  Cleon's  conduct 
went,  they  had  no  reason  to  be  dissatisfied.  When  rapidity  was 
required,  he  moved  rapidly,  and  it  was  in  the  confidence  arising  from 
success  that  his  soldiers  became  so  impatient.  Cleon  knew  when  to 
wait,  and  they  did  not. 


260  DEFEAT  AND  DEATH  OF  CLE  ON,  422.    [VIII.  14. 


support  him.  In  a  short  address  to  the  soldiers  he  explained 
his  plans  :  they  were  not  to  be  dismayed  by  the  disparity  of 
numbers ;  the  enemy  would  be  taken  unawares  and  thrown 
into  disorder  by  his  attack,  and  the  reinforcement  under 
Clearidas  would  come  upon  them  as  a  new  army  and  fill 
them  with  alarm. 

The  advance  of  Brasidas  into  the  town  was  observed  by 
the  Athenians,  and  Cleon  was  informed  that  the  enemy's 
forces  were  collected  near  the  gate,  under  which  the  feet  of 
men  and  horses  could  be  seen.  He  went  himself  to  look, 
and  finding  that  an  attack  was  intended,  he  gave  orders  to 
his  army  to  retire  by  the  left  wing,  which,  as  he  lay  along 
the  ridge  facing  the  town,  was  the  part  of  his  army  nearest 
Eion.  He  hoped  to  get  away  before  the  enemy  sallied 
out,  and  when  the  troops  seemed  to  delay,  he  ordered 
his  right  to  wheel  round  and  march  forward  to  the  coast, 
thus  presenting  the  unshielded  side  of  his  soldiers  to 
Amphipolis.  Brasidas  detected  the  mistake.  He  rushed 
out  of  the  city  with  his  followers  at  the  first  gate  in  the 
Long  Wall,  and  hastening  up  the  steepest  part  of  the  hill, 
fell  upon  the  Athenian  centre  as  it  was  preparing  to  retire  to 
Eion.     The  Athenians  were  terrified  at  the 

Battle  of  1  1  1  ... 

Amphipolis : 

sudden  attack,  and  thrown  into  disorder. 
Death  of  cieon    Clearidas  then  sallied  out  and  attacked  the 

and  Brasidas.         .  ,         .  . 

right  wing ;  upon  which  the  army  was  panic- 
stricken  and  fell  to  pieces.  The  left,  which  was  completely 
severed  from  the  rest,  hastened  to  Eion,  the  right  retired  up 
the  hill.  At  this  moment  both  the  commanders  fell :  Brasidas, 
while  advancing  to  attack  the  Athenian  right,  was  wounded 
and  carried  off  the  field ;  Cleon  was  overtaken  in  his  flight 
by  a  Myrcinian  targeteer  and  cut  down  on  the  spot.  On 
the  top  of  the  hill  the  Athenian  right  continued  for  some 
time  to  repulse  the  attacks  of  Clearidas,  but  at  length, 
hemmed  in  by  cavalry  and  targeteers,  with  whom  they 
could  not  come  to  close  quarters,  they  were  put  to  flight. 
The  whole  army  was  now  routed,  and  the  survivors  fled  as 
they  could  to  Eion,  whence  they  sailed  back  to  Athens. 


VIII.  15] 


DEA  TH  OF  BRASIDAS,  1$2. 


261 


About  six  hundred  Athenians  were  slain,  of  their  enemies 
seven  only,  but  of  these  seven  one  was  Brasidas. 

He  lived  long  enough  to  be  assured  of  his  victory.  He 
was  buried  with  public  honours  in  the  city,  followed  to  his 
grave  by  all  the  army.  And  as  his  devotion  Honours  paid 
in  saving  the  city  seemed  more  than  human,  to  Brasldas- 
the  grateful  citizens  made  his  tomb  a  shrine,  and  sacrificed 
to  him  with  yearly  games  and  offerings  as  a  Hero.  Regard- 
ing him  as  their  deliverer,  they  also  made  him  the  Founder 
of  Amphipolis,  transferring  to  him  the  honours  hitherto 
assigned  to  Hagnon,  whose  shrine  they  destroyed,  as  well  as 
any  other  building  which  commemorated  their  connection 
with  Athens.    They  were  an  Athenian  colony  no  longer.1 

15.  By  saving  Amphipolis,  Brasidas  rendered  a  great 
service  to  Sparta,  who  had  now  an  important  post  to  offer 
in  return  for  the  captives  at  Athens.  And  we  Brasidas 
cannot  praise  too  highly  the  skill  and  devotion 
by  which  the  city  was  saved.  The  attack  on  the  Athenian 
line  was  admirably  planned  and  executed.  Every  detail  of 
the  action  was  carefully  arranged :  every  arrangement  effi- 
ciently carried  out.  Brasidas  anticipated  every  movement 
of  Cleon,  and  fell  upon  him  at  the  very  moment  when  re- 
sistance was  almost  impossible.  His  own  onset  at  the  head 
of  150  men  upon  the  centre  of  the  Athenian  army — a  force 
of  picked  men— over  most  unfavourable  ground,  was  a  feat 
without  parallel  in  the  war,  and  impossible  for  any  general 
but  Brasidas,  who  alone  possessed  the  genius  to  plan  such 
a  charge,  and  the  power  to  inspire  his  men  and  keep  them 
together.  Confidence  in  their  leader's  judgment,  devotion 
to  his  person,  and  admiration  of  his  courage,  these  were  the 
feelings  which  animated  every  soldier  in  his  army,  and  by 
these  the  audacious  enterprise,  which  in  other  hands  might 
have  proved  a  disastrous  failure,  if  it  could  have  been  executed 

1  Time.  v.  6-12.  For  the  topography  of  Amphipolis,  see  Leake, 
Northern  Greece,  iii.  190  f. ;  Grote,  Hist,  of  Greece,  iv.  546.  Diodorus, 
xii.  14,  gives  a  different  account  of  the  battle ;  Cleon  falls  fighting 
bravely  in  the  ranks. 


262 


CLEON  AND  BR  AS  ID  AS,  422.  [VIII.  15. 


at  all,  proved  a  brilliant  victory.  When  we  turn  from  this 
rapid,  definite,  and  energetic  movement,  this  devoted  con- 
fidence and  admiration,  to  consider  the  action  of  the 
Conduct  of  Athenians,  the  contrast  is  great  indeed.  Cleon 
cieon  at  is  compelled  by  the  clamours  of  his  army  to 

Amphipohs.  marcn  upon  Amphipolis  without  waiting  for 
his  reinforcements ;  the  leader  allows  his  wishes  to  be  forced 
by  his  soldiers,  and  the  soldiers  claim  to  direct  their  general. 
Such  insubordination  is  fatal  to  the  discipline  which  alone 
makes  an  army  efficient,  and  such  weakness  marks  a  general 
as  unfit  for  his  post.  Yet  we  must  in  this  point  make  large 
allowance  for  Cleon.  He  appears  to  have  had  some  difficulty 
in  persuading  the  Athenians  to  send  an  expedition  against 
Amphipolis  at  all ;  they  did  not  see  the  imperative  necessity 
of  recovering  the  town  by  arms,  when  they  still  had  the 
Spartan  prisoners  in  their  hands,  and  they  were  disinclined 
to  renew  the  war  after  the  year  of  truce.  Thus  the  expedi- 
tion was  unpopular  from  the  first,  and  only  sent  out  under 
His  command  the  pressure  of  Cleon's  personal  influence.  It 
unpopular.  became  more  unpopular  still  when  it  was  known 
that  Cleon  was  to  have  the  command.  The  soldiers,  who 
were  knights  and  hoplites  of  the  best  class,  took  service  with 
the  greatest  unwillingness :  they  had,  or  professed  to  have, 
no  confidence  in  their  leader.  With  such  relations  existing 
between  general  and  soldiers,  there  was  little  hope  of  success- 
ful action,  but  the  conduct  of  Cleon  on  reaching  Amphipolis 
goes  far  to  cancel  any  excuse  which  we  can  make  for  his 
He  is  entirely  marcn  thither.  He  at  once  fell  into  the  trap 
outwitted  by  which  Brasidas  had  prepared  for  him ;  and 
Brasidas.  when  he  saw  the  gates  closed,  and  no  evidence 
of  an  intended  sally,  he  assumed  that  the  enemy  was  over- 
awed at  his  mere  approach.  In  his  extravagant  self-confidence 
he  thought  that  he  could  come  and  go  as  he  pleased,  and 
allowed  his  soldiers  to  wander  from  their  ranks.  "  Had  he 
brought  up  his  siege-engines,"  he  said,  "he  could  have  assaulted 
the  city  at  once."  When  he  became  aware  of  his  danger,  he 
at  once  lost  all  courage,  threw  his  army  into  confusion  by 


VIII.  i6.] 


DESIRE  FOR  PEACE, 


263 


giving  orders  for  retreat,  and  fled  for  his  life.  The  Athenians, 
abandoned  and  demoralised,  were  cut  down  almost  without 
resistance,  till  six  hundred  of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  city 
were  left  upon  the  field,  at  a  loss  to  the  enemy  of  seven 
men  only. 

16.  The  battle  of  Amphipolis  was  the  last  event  of  the 
Archidamian  war,1  for  in  Greece  neither  side  had  moved 
since  the  expiration  of  the  truce.  The  scene  in  Chalcidice 
was  indeed  little  more  than  a  personal  duel,  in  which 
both  principals  were  but  moderately  supported  by  the 
government  at  home.    Influence  now  passed 

Desire  for  peace; 

into  the  hands  of  those  who  heartily  desired  Niciasand 

,„..  .  .    ,  ,  /  ,  Phstoanax. 

peace — Nicias  at  Athens  and  Phstoanax  at 
Sparta.  The  fall  of  Gleon  after  a  career  of  such  unexpected 
prosperity  must  have  made  a  deep  impression  on  the  sensitive 
and  even  superstitious  mind  of  Nicias.  He  was  afraid  that  a 
similar  reverse  might  overtake  himself.  He  desired  to  pre- 
serve the  good  fortune  which  had  attended  him  hitherto; 
"he  would  have  liked  to  rest  from  toil  and  to  give  the  people 
rest ;  and  he  hoped  to  leave  behind  him  to  other  ages  the 
name  of  a  man  who  in  all  his  life  had  never  brought  disaster 
on  the  city."2  Plistoanax  had  other  reasons,  and  they  were 
even  more  personal.  Banished  from  Sparta  after  the  events 
of  446-445,  in  which  he  was  suspected  of  receiving  bribes 
to  induce  him  to  quit  Attica,  he  had  retired  to  Mount 
Lycaeus,  where  he  dwelt  in  a  house,  half  of  which  lay 
within  the  sacred  precinct  of  Zeus— so  great  was  his  fear 
of  the  Lacedaemonians.  He  remained  in  exile  nineteen 
years,  when,  owing  to  the  repeated  commands  of  the  Oracle 
of  Delphi,  he  was  brought  back  and  restored  to  the 
throne  with  all  the  ceremonies  customary  at  a  coronation. 
Nevertheless  he  was  suspected  of  influencing  the  Delphic 
priestess  in  some  dishonest  manner,  and  the  calamities  which 
the  Spartans  sufl'ered  after  426  were  by  some  attributed  to 
his  return.    For  this  reason  he  was  anxious  to  put  an  end 


1  The  name  given  to  the  war  from  431  to  421. 


2  Thuc.  v.  16. 


264 


FEELING  AT  SPARTA,  422-421.  [VIII.  16. 


to  the  war,  and  preclude  any  further  chance  of  disaster  from 
this  source  ;  above  all  by  recovering  the  Spartan  captives 
from  Athens  to  rescue  the  city  from  her  helpless  position. 
Nor  were  the  cities  less  inclined  to  peace  than  their  leaders. 
Since  their  success  at  Pylus,  the  Athenians  had  suffered 
Feeling  at  severely  at  Delium  and  Amphipolis,  and  they 
Athens  and  now  perceived  that  war  was  not  the  one-sided 
Sparta.  game  which  in  the  flush  of  their  success  they 

had  imagined  it  to  be ;  the  Lacedaemonians,  so  far  from 
reducing  the  Athenians  by  a  few  invasions  of  Attica,  found 
themselves  at  the  end  of  a  ten  years'  struggle  with  their  own 
territory  ravaged  from  Pylus  and  Cythera,  and  a  number  of 
their  best  citizens  in  chains  at  Athens.  The  Helots  were 
constantly  deserting,  and  the  ever-present  fear  of  a  revolt 
was  more  keenly  felt  than  ever. 

Another  reason  of  great  weight  with  them  was  the 
approaching  close  of  the  Thirty  Years'  Peace  which  had  been 

concluded  between  Argos  and  Sparta  in  451. 

If  Argos  were  free  from  her  obligations,  she 
might  join  Athens,  or  she  might  form  a  second  centre  in 
Peloponnese,  to  which  any  dissatisfied  city  could  repair. 
She  was  demanding  the  restoration  of  Cynuria  as  a  condition 
of  renewing  the  peace,  and  if  pressed  by  the  war  to  secure 
her  help  Sparta  would  be  compelled  to  give  way. 

On  these  grounds  negotiations  for  peace  were  opened  in 
the  winter  of  422-421,  and  towards  the  spring  the  Spartans, 

in  order  to  force  the  hand  of  the  Athenians, 

Negotiations  m         ,  7 

for  peace—  announced  to  their  allies  that  they  would  be 
422-421,  winter.  reqUjre(j  to  assist  in  invading  Attica  and 
building  a  fort  to  command  the  country.  The  announce- 
ment had  the  desired  effect;  and  after  a  good  deal  of 
negotiation  and  many  journeys  to  and  fro,  a  peace  was 
finally  arranged.  The  Lacedaemonians  then  summoned 
their  allies  to  a  conference  at  Sparta,  and  in  spite  of  the 
opposition  of  the  Boeotians,  Corinthians,  Megarians,  and 
Eleans,  the  majority  accepted  the  terms. 

17,  These  were  as  follows :  Both  parties  were  to  give  up 


VIII.  170  PEACE  CONCLUDED,  421. 


265 


what  they  had  acquired  by  force  of  arms.  The  Athenians  were 
to  restore  Pylus,  Cy  thera,  Methana,  Pteleum,  and  Atalanta ; 
the  Lacedaemonians  Amphipolis  and  Panactum  The  terms 
(a  fortress  on  the  frontier  of  Attica  which  had  of  peace- 
been  betrayed  to  the  Boeotians  just  after  the  renewal  of  the 
war).  The  Boeotians  refused  to  surrender  Plataea,  on  the 
ground  that  it  had  been  won  not  by  force  but  by  agree- 
ment, and  Athens  replied  by  retaining  Nisaea  for  the 
same  reasons.  With  regard  to  the  Chalcidic  cities,  Scione, 
Torone,  and  Sermyle  were  left,  without  any  conditions,  to 
the  mercy  of  the  Athenians.  Others  were  to  be  independent 
on  condition  that  they  paid  the  tribute  as  assessed  by 
Aristides;  they  were  to  be  allies  of  neither  party  unless 
they  joined  the  Athenians  of  their  own  free  will — these 
were  Argilus,  Stagirus,  Acanthus,  Scolus,  Olynthus,  and 
Spartolus.  If  the  inhabitants  were  dissatisfied,  they  were 
free  to  change  their  abode  and  take  their  property  with 
them.    All  prisoners  on  either  side  were  to  be  restored. 

Free  access  to  the  "  common  temples  "  was  guaranteed  to 
all  Hellenes.  The  temple  at  Delphi  was  declared  inde- 
pendent, and  the  Delphians  were  to  be  an  independent 
state,  enjoying  their  own  revenues,  laws,  and  customs. 

Neither  party  was  to  take  up  arms  to  the  injury  of  the 
other  in  any  way  or  manner ;  and  controversies  were  to  be 
decided  by  arbitration. 

The  peace  was  to  continue  for  fifty  years.1 

In  these  terms  the  Spartans  paid  but  little  attention  to  the 
interests  of  their  allies.  No  mention  is  made  of  Potidaea, 
the  relief  of  which  was  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  war. 
The  Megarian  decree  was  so  far  from  being  rescinded,  that 
the  port  of  the  city  was  now  given  up  to  Athens  ;  the  desola- 
tion of  Aegina  and  the  slaughter  of  the  inhabitants  were 
condoned;  and  from  her  action  in  Chalcidice  it  was  plain  that 
Sparta  was  wholly  careless  what  befel  the  towns  if  she  could 
save  her  own  citizens : — the   tribute   was  guaranteed  to 


1  Thuc.  v.  18. 


266 


TERMS  OF  THE  PEACE,  421. 


[VIII.  17- 


Athens  from  cities  from  which  she  had  not  now  the  power 
to  collect  it  without  an  armed  force.  There  was  no  doubt 
a  party  at  Athens  which  had  looked  for  more  than  this. 
Those  who  had  hoped,  with  Cleon,  to  break  up  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  confederacy,  and  recover  the  full  extent  of  empire 
which  Athens  had  possessed  in  447  or  gain  more,  were  bitterly 
disappointed.  In  the  Peloponnesus  Sparta  had  lost  nothing ; 
she  was  still  the  head  of  the  confederacy,  if  the  confederacy 
would  follow  her.  The  treasury  of  Athens  had  been  emptied ; 
the  utmost  pressure  had  been  put  upon  the  allies  to  provide 
money  and  men,  yet  both  by  sea  and  land  Athens  had  since 
424  failed  to  achieve  any  success.  Even  those  who  acquiesced 
in  the  plan  of  "wearing  Sparta  out "  must  have  felt  that  the 
war  had  been  useless.  And  the  peace  was  useless  too.  All 
the  causes  which  led  to  hostilities  in  431  were  still  at  work : 
was  it  likely  that  an  agreement  for  fifty  years,  which  settled 
nothing,  would  prevent  them  from  taking  effect  1 


CHAPTER  IX. 


FROM  THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  PEACE  TO  THE  INVASION  OF 
SICILY,  421-415. 

I.  The  peace  had  barely  been  concluded  before  it  became 
clear  what  peace  meant.  The  question  who  should  begin 
the  work  of  restitution  was  decided  by  lot,  Thetermsof 
and  the  lot  fell  on  Sparta.  She  found  herself  the  peace  not 
unable  to  carry  out  her  undertaking.  All  the  carrie  out* 
prisoners  in  her  hands  were  at  once  set  at  liberty  ;  but  when 
Clearidas,  who  commanded  in  Thrace  after  the  death  of 
Brasidas,  received  orders  to  give  up  Amphipolis,  he  declared 
himself  unable  to  do  so  against  the  wishes  of  the  Chalcidians, 
and  he  was  eventually  recalled  home  with  all  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  forces  under  his  command  ; 1  Athens  continued  to  be 
deprived  of  her  most  coveted  possession.  She  retaliated 
by  refusing  to  give  up  Pylus  and  Cythera,  or  the  prisoners 
taken  at  Sphacteria  :  and  thus  the  Spartans  also  failed  to 
secure  the  objects  for  which  they  had  sacrificed  all  their 
gains  in  the  war.  Still  greater  were  the  difficulties  which 
arose  out  of  the  attitude  of  the  allies.  The  Corinthians, 
exasperated  at  the  neglect  of  their  claims,  refused  to  accept 
the  peace ;  and  the  Boeotians  contented  themselves  with 
securing  their  own  interests  by  a  truce  with  Athens  terminable 
at  ten  days'  notice.2 

Sparta  was  in  difficulties.  In  spite  of  her  recent  successes 
her  reputation  in  the  Peloponnese  had  fallen  so  low,  that 
the  Argives  ventured  to  reject  the  terms  which  she  had 
offered  for  a  renewal  of  the  truce.   On  the  other  hand,  there 


1  Thiic.  v.  21. 


2  Thuc.  v.  32. 


268        ALLIANCE  OF  SPARTA  AND  ATHENS,  J&l.    [IX.  2. 


was  nothing  under  the  terms  of  the  existing  peace  to  prevent 
the  members  of  the  confederacy  from  joining  Athens  if  they 
chose  to  do  so.  To  obviate  these  dangers,  Sparta  proposed 
Alliance  be-  ^°  enter  into  a  separate  alliance  with  Athens ; 
tween  Sparta     and  after   some   negotiations  the  offer  was 

accepted.  The  alliance  was  primarily  defen- 
sive :  each  city  was  to  assist  the  other  in  case  of  invasion, 
and  Athens  was  to  help  Lacedaemon  against  any  revolt  of 
the  Helots.  But  the  invader,  in  each  case,  was  regarded  as 
an  enemy  of  both  cities,  to  be  punished  by  them  conjointly, 
and  neither  city  was  to  cease  from  war  before  the  other.1 
Immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance,  the  Athenians 
restored  the  captives  taken  at  Sphacteria,  but  as  Sparta  was 
unable  to  give  back  Amphipolis,  they  refused  to  withdraw 
their  troops  from  Pylus  or  Cythera.  By  this  alliance  the 
Spartans  were  greatly  the  gainers.  They  could  count  on  the 
help  of  Athens  in  case  of  an  invasion  by  Argos ;  Pylus  could 
not  be  used  as  a  centre  from  which  to  spread  revolt  among 
the  Helots  ;  and  above  all,  they  had  attained  the  object  which 
they  had  most  at  heart — the  recovery  of  their  countrymen. 

2.  The  Argives  were  confirmed  in  their  contempt  of 
their  ancient  enemy.  For  ten  years  past  the  Grecian  cities 
Argos  had  been  oppressed  by  military  service  and 

contributions  ;  they  had  seen  their  cities 
pillaged,  their  fields  wasted,  their  commerce  destroyed,  while 
Argos  had  enjoyed  the  blessings  of  peace  and  prosperity. 
The  city  has  indeed  no  history  during  the  thirty  years  since 
she  concluded  peace  with  Sparta,  but  Thucydides  significantly 
remarks  that  she  had  made  "  a  harvest  of  both  sides  " ;  she 
had  also  become  a  centre  of  democracy  in  the  Peloponnese ; 
and  so  far  as  we  can  form  an  opinion,  she  had  been  improving 
her  army  by  the  creation  of  what  may  be  called  a  "  standing 
force  "  of  a  thousand  picked  soldiers,  supported  and  trained 
at  the  expense  of  the  city,  a  body  with  which  no  doubt  she 
intended  to  meet  the  trained  soldiers  of  Sparta.    Once  more 


1  Thuc.  v.  22-24,  and  the  note  in  Poppo-Stahl  on  22.  2. 


IX.  3.]         ARGOS  COMES  TO  THE  FRONT,  J$l>  269 

she  might  hope  to  resume  the  position  which  her  rival  could 
no  longer  retain,  and  become,  as  in  heroic  days,  the  leader  of 
Greece.  The  allies  of  Sparta  were  more  exasperated  than 
ever  by  the  alliance  between  Sparta  and  Athens,  and  per- 
sisted in  their  refusal  to  accept  the  terms  of  the  peace.  As 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Corinthians  Corinthians 
were  the  most  energetic  in  expressing  their  at  Argos. 
displeasure.  On  leaving  the  conference  at  Sparta,  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  peace  and  alliance,  their  envoys  turned  aside 
to  Argos,  and  urged  the  authorities  there  not  to  lose  the 
opportunity  which  now  offered  of  drawing  over  the  con- 
federacy, and  protecting  the  Peloponnese  from  the  Spartans 
and  Athenians,  who  were  conspiring  against  the  liberties  of 
Greece.  If  it  were  known  that  Argos  would  receive  any 
city  into  a  defensive  alliance,  many  would  flock  to  her,  through 
hatred  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  To  prevent  any  public 
repulse,  they  advised  that  negotiations  should  be  carried 
on  by  a  select  body  of  men,  and  not  through  the  general 
Assembly.  The  Argives  took  the  matter  up,  and  appointed 
twelve  men  with  whom  the  cities  could  treat.  Only  in  the 
case  of  Athens  or  Sparta  wishing  to  join  were  the  proposals 
to  be  laid  before  the  people.1 

3.  The  Mantineans  were  the  first  to  join.  For  some  time 
past  they  had  acted  in  a  manner  of  which  they  could  hardly 
expect  that  Sparta  would  approve.  During  the 

The  Argive 

truce  of  423  they  had  been  at  war  with  Tegea,  confederacy, 
and  though  they  failed  in  this  direction,  they  had  succeeded 
in  reducing  a  considerable  part  of  Arcadia.  These  conquests 
they  knew  that  the  Lacedaemonians,  now  that  their  hands 
were  free  from  the  war,  would  not  allow  them  to  retain. 
Moreover  they  were  a  democracy  like  Argos,  and  had 
always  been  in  sympathy  with  that  city.2  Their  defection 
was  the  signal  for  a  general  agitation  among  the  cities  of  the 
confederacy,  which  the  Lacedaemonians  vainly  endeavoured 

1  Thuc.  v.  27,  28.    See  Aristoph.  Pax,  468,  9,  the  Argives  nare- 
yiXav  roiv  TaXanrcopovfievcoP  Kai  ravra  8i;^o#ei>  fiicrBo(popovvT€s  a\(piTa. 
?  ^hucf  iv,  134,  and  v.  28,  29,  33,  81. 


f 


270  ALLIES  OF  ARGOS,  421.  [IX.  3. 

to  check  by  sending  envoys  to  Corinth  to  remonstrate.  The 
Corinthians,  who  had  summoned  the  recalcitrant  cities, 
replied  in  their  presence  that  they  were  justified  in  breaking 
away  from  the  confederacy.  Of  the  real  but  private  grounds 
of  offence — that  neither  Sollium  nor  Anactorium  had  been 
restored  to  them — they  said  nothing,  but  pretended  that 
they  were  bound  by  their  oaths  to  their  allies  in  Thrace,  for 
in  the  ordinances  of  the  confederacy  such  separate  oaths 
were  allowed  to  be  a  valid  reason  for  refusing  to  accept 
Mantinea  the  decision  of  the  majority.  The  Eleans 
andEiis.  were  the  next  to  conclude  an  alliance  with 

Argos.  They  also  had  their  quarrel  with  Sparta,  who  had 
decided  against  them  in  a  contention  with  Lepreum,  and 
restored  this  city  to  its  former  independence  (infra,  275). 
They  were  followed  by  the  Corinthians,  who,  however, 
would  only  consent  to  a  defensive  alliance,  and  the  Chalci- 
dians.  The  Megarians  and  Boeotians  agreed  to  stand  aloof. 
They  were  well  aware  that  the  Lacedaemonian  constitution 
was  more  congenial  to  their  own  oligarchical  form  of  govern- 
ment than  the  Argive  democracy.1 

While  these  negotiations  were  taking  place  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesus, Athens  was  asserting  her  imperial  power.  The 
blockade  of  Scione  was  brought  to  an  end,  and  the  un- 
fortunate city  treated  with  the  utmost  severity.  All  the 
grown  up  men  were  put  to  the  sword,  and  the  women  and 
children  sold  into  slavery.  The  Athenians  also  brought 
back  the  Delians  from  Adramyttium  to  Delos,  "moved 
partly  by  the  defeats  which  they  had  sustained,  partly  by  an 
oracle  of  the  Delphic  God."  2 

When  the  Argives  and  Corinthians  appeared  at  Tegea 
with  proposals  that  the  city  should  join  them,  they  met 
Tegea  and  with  a  repulse.  In  Boeotia  they  fared  little 
Boeotia.  better.     The  Boeotians  still  hesitated  about 

joining  the  Argives.  They  had  concluded  a  truce,  termin- 
able at  ten  days'  notice,  with  Athens  soon  after  the  peace 


1  Time.  v.  29-34. 


2  Time,  v.  32. 


IX.  4.] 


ACTION  OF  SPARTA,  421- 


271 


was  settled,  and  the  Corinthians  were  anxious  that  they 
also  should  be  on  a  similar  footing.  They  persuaded  the 
Boeotians  to  go  with  them  to  Athens  and  support  their 
request,  but  the  Athenians  merely  answered  that  if  the 
Corinthians  Were  allies  of  Sparta  they  were  included  in  the 
terms  of  the  general  truce.1 

4.  Meanwhile  Sparta  endeavoured  to  recover  her  position. 
King  Plistoanax  marched  with  the  whole  force  of  the  city 
into  Arcadia,  rescued  the  Parrhasians  from  their 
subjection  to  the  Mantineans,  and  destroyed  a 
fort  which  had  been  built  by  the  Mantineans  in  the  Par- 
rhasian  town  of  Cypsela,  to  command  the  Sciritis.  The 
Helots  who  had  served  with  Brasidas,  on  their  return  to 
Laconia,  had  received  their  freedom  and  permission  to  dwell 
where  they  pleased,  but  now  they  were  settled  with  the 
Neodamodes2  at  Lepreum  to  defend  it  against  Elis.  The 
prisoners  from  Sphacteria,  who  hitherto  had  enjoyed  the 
privileges  of  citizens,  and  in  some  cases  had  been  elected  to 
public  office,  were  disfranchised :  they  could  neither  hold 
office,  nor  buy  nor  sell — a  severe  sentence  considering  that 
the  government  had  thrown  upon  them  the  responsibility  of 
their  surrender  (supra,  p.  215),  but  one  which  after  a  time 
was  cancelled.  Negotiations  went  on  with  Athens  about 
the  terms  of  the  peace  which  were  still  unfulfilled,  and  though 
no  result  -was  attained,  the  Athenians  agreed  to  withdraw 
the  Messenians  and  Helots  from  Pylus,3  and  settled  them  in 
Cephallenia. 

Such  a  state  of  affairs  satisfied  no  one.  When  the  ephors 
of  the  year  came  into  office  at  Sparta  in  the  autumn  of  421, 
a  new  line  of  policy  was  taken  up.  After  an  abortive  dis- 
cussion at  Sparta,  in  which  the  Athenians,  Boeotians,  Corin- 

1  Time.  v.  32. 

2  The  Neodamodes  were  emancipated  Helots  (Thuc.  vii.  58),  but 
there  was  some  difference  between  them  and  the  soldiers  of  Brasidas 
which  we  cannot  explain. 

3  Thuc.  v.  34,  35.  The  reasons  of  the  Spartans  for  the  disfranchise- 
ment are  noticeable :  beiaavres  pr\  n  Sia  rrjv  £vp<popav  vofiicravres 
4\a<T<ra)6r)(r€(Tdai  Kai  ovres  enirifxoi  vecorepiaaxTLV. 


272  SPARTA  AND  BOEOTIA,  J&l.  [IX.  5. 

thians,  and  other  allies  took  part,  the  ephors  urged  the 
Corinthians  and  Boeotians  to  unite  as  closely  as  possible. 
The  Boeotians  should  then  ally  themselves  with  Argos,  and 
bring  both  Argives  and  Boeotians  into  alliance  with  Sparta  ! 
The  Boeotians  would  thus  escape  the  Athenian  alliance,  and 
even  the  Spartans,  if  they  could  gain  Argos,  were  ready  to 
Alliance  of  throw  Athens  over.  The  envoys  who  carried 
Sparta  and  these  proposals  to  Thebes  and  Corinth  were 
Boeotia.  overtaken  on  leaving  Sparta  by  two  Argives  of 

great  authority  who  pressed  their  alliance  very  strongly  on 
the  Boeotians.  All  promised  well,  but  when  laid  before  the 
Boeotian  councils  by  the  Boeotarchs,  the  proposals  were 
rejected.  The  Boeotians  were  afraid  to  conclude  an  alliance 
with  Corinth — a  city  which  had  revolted  from  her  allegiance 
to  Sparta — and  the  Boeotarchs  had  unwisely  concealed  the 
fact  that  they  were  acting  with  the  authority  of  Sparta. 
The  plan  fell  to  the  ground 1  so  far  as  it  concerned  Argos 
and  Corinth.  With  the  Boeotians,  in  spite  of  their  treaty 
with  Athens,  the  Spartans  concluded  an  alliance ;  only  thus 
could  they  recover  Panactum,  which  they  wished  to  exchange 
for  Pylus.  But  no  sooner  was  the  alliance  concluded  than 
Panactum  was  levelled  to  the  ground,  and  the  plans  of  the 
Spartans  were  foiled.2 

5.  When  it  became  known  that  Sparta  had  concluded  an 
alliance  with  Boeotia,  there  was  the  greatest  excitement  at 
Argos  and  Athens.  The  Argives,  who  supposed  that  the 
alliance  had  been  made  with  the  cognisance  of  Athens,  were 
afraid  that  so  far  from  leading  the  Peloponnesus,  they  would 
be  left  in  isolation,  while  Sparta  would  be  joined  by  Athens 
and  Boeotia  in  addition  to  her  loyal  allies  within  the  Isthmus. 
Argos  and  They  immediately  sent  envoys  to  Sparta  to 
Sparta.  open  negotiations  (420).  The  old  dispute  about 

Cynuria  could  not  be  set  aside,  but  they  were  willing  to 
leave  the  decision  to  any  city  or  individual  who  might  be 
agreed  upon,  and  when  the  Spartans  would  not  allow  a 


1  Thuc.  v.  37,  38. 


8  Thuc.  v.  39. 


IX.  5-1       ALC1BIADES  AND  THE  ARGIVES,  420. 


273 


word  of  this  to  be  mentioned  in  the  terms,  they  made  a 
second  proposal,  declaring  themselves  ready  to  enter  into 
an  alliance  for  fifty  years,  on  condition  that  either  side  might 
challenge  the  other,  if  not  suffering  from  plague  or  engaged 
in  war,  to  settle  the  possession  of  the  land  by  combat.  To 
this  the  Spartans  assented — though  it  was  in  their  opinion 
a  foolish  proposal,  and  the  envoys  were  bidden  to  acquaint 
their  state  with  the  conditions  of  alliance;  if  they  were 
accepted,  they  were  to  return  again  at  the  Hyacinthia  and 
take  the  oaths.1 

The  Spartan  envoys,  on  their  return  from  Boeotia,  had  gone 
to  Athens  to  deliver  the  prisoners  that  they  had  received 
from  the  Boeotians.  They  also  endeavoured  to  explain  away 
the  Boeotian  alliance,  and  asked  for  the  surrender  of  Pylus 
in  return  for  Panactum.  The  Athenians  were  in  no  mood 
for  explanations;  they  considered  that  the  Spartans  had 
transgressed  the  treaty,  both  in  regard  to  Spartaand 
Panactum  and  the  Boeotian  alliance,  and  the  Athens: 
envoys  were  sent  home  with  a  rough  answer.  Alcibiades. 
At  this  time  the  foremost  man  in  the  war-party  was 
Alcibiades,  the  son  of  Cleinias,  who  was  just  beginning 
public  life,  and  burning  with  ambition  to  win  for  himself 
a  place  among  the  great  names  of  Athenian  history.  He 
may  have  thought,  as  Thucydides  says,  that  the  alliance 
with  Argos  was  really  for  the  interest  of  Athens;  he  was 
certainly  piqued  that  he  had  been  passed  over  in  the  negotia- 
tions for  the  peace  with  Sparta,  in  spite  of  the  hereditary 
"  Spartan  friendship  "  in  his  family,  which  his  grandfather 
had  disowned,  and  which  he  was  anxious  to  renew.  Taking 
advantage  of  the  ill-feeling  which  had  arisen,  he  bade  the 
Argives  send  envoys  to  Athens  together  with  Mantinea 
and  Elis :  now  was  the  time  to  propose  an  alliance,  and  he 
would  help  them  to  the  utmost.  Upon  this  the  Argives 
threw  over  their  envoys  at  Sparta,  and  repaired  to  Athens, 
carrying  their  new  allies  of  Mantinea  and  Elis  with  them.2 


1  Time.  v.  40,  41. 
VOL.  III. 


2  Thuc.  v.  42-44. 

S 


274    ATHENS  JOINS  THE  ARGIVE  ALLIANCE,  J&O.   [IX.  6. 


6.  The  Lacedaemonians  were  alarmed.  They  at  once  sent 
envoys  to  Athens,  among  them  Endius,  of  whom  we  shall 
hear  again,  giving  them  full  powers  to  settle  all  the  points 
in  dispute.  Alcibiades  was  in  a  difficult  position ;  if 
the  Lacedaemonians  carried  the  Assembly  with  them,  the 
Argive  offer  would  be  rejected,  and  his  credit  for  political 
influence  would  be  at  an  end.    Falsehood  and 

Alliance  of  . 

Athens  and  deception  were  resources  which  he  employed 
Argos,  etc.  without  hesitation.  He  persuaded  the  en- 
voys to  deny  before  the  people  that  they  had  come  with 
full  powers,  promising  in  return  that  he  would  induce  the 
Athenians  to  restore  Pylus  and  settle  all  the  points  in  dis- 
pute. No  sooner  had  the  envoys  announced  in  the  Assembly 
that  they  had  not  come  as  plenipotentiaries,  thus  denying 
what  they  had  affirmed  in  the  Council,  than  Alcibiades  fiercely 
attacked  them  for  their  dishonesty ;  and  so  exasperated  were 
the  people,  that  they  would  have  concluded  an  alliance  with 
Argos  on  the  spot  had  not  an  earthquake  brought  the  meeting 
to  a  close.  On  the  next  day  Nicias  was  able  to  prevent  an 
open  breach  with  Sparta.  Envoys  were  despatched  demand- 
ing the  restoration  of  Panactum — as  a  fortress  not  as  a  ruin 
— and  of  Amphipolis;  the  Boeotian  alliance  must  also  be 
renounced,  or  the  Athenians  would  join  the  Argives.  Of  the 
envoys  Nicias  himself  was  one,  but  the  utmost  that  he  could 
obtain  was  a  renewal  of  the  oaths  between  the  cities.  On  their 
return  an  alliance  was  at  once  concluded  between  Athens  on 
the  one  hand,  and  Argos,  Man  tinea,  and  Elis  on  the  other, 
for  mutual  protection  against  invasion.  A  force  of  Athenian 
knights  was  sent  to  Argos  to  be  in  readiness  if  required.1 


1  Thuc.  v.  45-47.  See  also  the  fragment  of  the  stone  copied  in 
Hicks,  Hist.  Inscr.  No.  52,  and  the  remarks  in  Jowett's  Essay  on 
Inscriptions,  p.  lxxxix-xci.  The  principal  terms  were  as  follows  : — (I ) 
The  Argives,  Eleans,  Mantineans,  and  their  allies  are  not  to  attack  the 
Athenians,  or  the  allies  "  over  whom  they  rule  "  ;  and  conversely  the 
Athenians  are  not  to  attack  the  Argives,  Eleans,  Mantineans  and 
their  allies;  (2)  If  the  Athenian  territory  is  invaded,  the  Argives, 
Eleans,  and  Mantineans  are  to  send  such  help  as  the  Athenians  may 
demand,  to  the  utmost  of  their  power,  and  if  the  enemy  has  devas- 


IX.  7-1 


DECLINE  OF  SPARTA,  420. 


275 


In  this  treaty  the  Corinthians  refused  to  join,  though  they 
were  still  willing  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  the  defensive 
alliance  into  which  they  had  originally  entered  The  Corin- 
with  Argos.  They  were  now  more  inclined  to  thians. 
think  kindly  of  their  old  friends  the  Lacedaemonians.  Later 
in  the  year,  after  the  Olympic  festival,  the  question  was  once 
more  discussed,  but  without  result.  "Much  was  said  and 
nothing  was  done,  till  an  earthquake  put  an  end  to  the 
meeting  and  the  envoys  dispersed." 1 

7.  In  the  course  of  this  summer  two  incidents  occurred 
which  indicated  the  declining  influence  of  Sparta.  Her 
citizens  were  excluded  from  the  Olympic  festival,  on  the 
ground  that  she  had  refused  to  pay  a  fine  which  the  Eleans 
had  imposed  on  her  for  violating  the  Olympic  truce,  and  her 
colony  of  Heraclea,  after  suffering  a  defeat  at  the  hands  of 
the  neighbouring  tribes,  was  seized  by  the  Boeotians,  "lest 
the  Athenians  should  take  it  while  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
involved  in  troubles  in  the  Peloponnesus." 

From  what  we  read  in  Thucydides,  it  is  difficult  to  say 
whether  the  Eleans  were  right  in  their  contention  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  violated  the  truce ;  or  The  Lacedae- 
whether  they  used  the  charge  as  a  pretext  for  monians  ex- 
demanding  the  restoration  of  Lepreum.2   They  the  Olympic 
asserted  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  sent  festivai. 
a  force  into  Lepreum  when  the  truce  had  already  been  pro- 
claimed, but  as  the  truce  was  proclaimed  at  Elis  first,  and 

tated  the  territory  and  gone  away,  that  city  is  to  be  the  enemy  of  the 
Argives  and  their  allies  ;  they  are  to  do  it  what  injury  they  can  ;  and 
no  single  city  is  to  come  to  terms  without  the  consent  of  all.  And 
conversely:  (3)  Without  the  consent  of  all,  no  single  city  is  to  allow 
an  armed  force  to  pass  through  its  territory. 

1  Thuc.  v.  48,  50. 

2  The  Lepreans,  being  at  war  with  certain  Arcadian  tribes,  called 
in  the  Eleans  to  assist  them  on  condition  of  receiving  half  their 
territory.  When  the  war  had  been  brought  to  a  successful  end,  the 
Eleans  allowed  the  Lepreans  to  cultivate  the  land  on  payment  of  a 
rent  of  a  talent  a  year  to  Olympian  Zeus.  Until  the  Peloponnesian 
war  this  rent  was  paid,  but  then  the  Lepreans  took  advantage  of  the 
war  to  discontinue  it.  When  the  Eleans  tried  to  compel  them  to  pay, 
they  appealed  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  undertook  to  arbitrate. 


276 


SPARTA  AND  EL1S,  420. 


[IX.  8. 


afterwards  in  the  cities  at  a  distance,  the  Lacedaemonians 
could  reply  that  it  had  not  been  proclaimed  to  them  when 
the  force  was  despatched.  The  Eleans,  while  refusing  to 
accept  this  view,  were  willing,  if  the  Lacedaemonians  would 
restore  Lepreum,  to  remit  part  of  the  fine  and  pay  the  rest 
themselves,  an  offer  which  seems  to  reveal  their  real  motives. 
But  when  the  Lacedaemonians  refused  to  accept  this  offer, 
and  refused  even  to  take  an  oath  that  they  would  subse- 
quently pay  the  fine,  the  sentence  of  exclusion  was  passed 
on  them.  During  the  festival  there  was  great  alarm  lest  they 
should  take  up  arms  to  enforce  their  rights,  and  troops  were 
in  readiness  to  resist  them.  The  excitement  became  intense 
when  Lichas,  the  Lacedaemonian,  was  beaten  by  the  officers 
in  full  view  of  the  gathering.  His  pair  of  horses  had  been 
entered  in  the  name  of  the  Boeotian  community,  and  when 
they  were  declared  the  winners,  he  came  forward  and  placed 
a  chaplet  on  the  head  of  the  charioteer,  thus  claiming  the 
honour  for  himself.  But  there  was  no  further  disturbance. 
The  Lacedaemonians  were  content  to  offer  sacrifice  at  home.1 
8.  In  the  next  spring  (419),  Alcibiades  was  chosen  to  be  one 
of  the  generals  at  Athens.  He  was  no  sooner  in  office  than 
Alcibiades  in  ne  entered  on  a  vigorous  policy.  Crossing  into 
Achaea.  Peloponnesus  with  a  small  force  of  Athenians, 

and  being  there  joined  by  the  Argives  and  other  allies,  he 
marched  through  the  whole  breadth  of  the  country,  and 
formed  alliances  wherever  he  went.  He  persuaded  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Patrae  to  extend  the  walls  of  their  city  to  the  sea,  and 
was  about  to  build  a  fortress  at  Rhium,  but  his  efforts  were 

"  The  Eleans  suspected  that  they  would  not  have  fair  play  at  their 
hands ;  they  therefore  disregarded  the  arbitration  and  ravaged  the 
Leprean  territory.  Nevertheless  the  Lacedaemonians  went  on  with 
the  case  and  decided  that  the  Eleans  were  in  the  wrong,  and  that 
Lepreum  was  an  independent  state.  As  their  award  was  rejected  by 
the  Eleans,  they  sent  a  garrison  of  hoplites  to  Lepreum." — Thuc.  v. 
31.  The  incident  is  characteristic,  (1)  of  the  feeling  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  towards  Sparta ;  (2)  of  Spartan  policy  in  establishing  inde- 
pendent states ;  (3)  of  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  peace  in  the 
confederacy. 

1  Thuc.  v.  48-51. 


IX.  8.] 


ARGOS  AND  EPIDAURUS,  419. 


277 


checked  by  the  Corinthians  and  Sicyonians,  who  saw  that 
the  fortress  would  be  to  their  injury.1 

A  quarrel  now  broke  out  between  Argos  and  Epidaurus. 
As  keeper  of  the  temple  of  Apollo  Pythaeus,  Argos  still 
claimed  the  right  to  demand  certain  offerings  War  between 
from  the  neighbouring  cities,  and  Epidaurus  Epidaurus  and 
had  failed  to  comply.2  This  was  a  sufficient  Argos' 
pretext  for  war.  Epidaurus  lay  between  Argos  and  the 
Isthmus,  and  for  the  Argives  in  their  present  relations  with 
Corinth  the  acquisition  of  her  territory  was  most  desirable ; 
the  route  to  Aegina  and  Athens  would  also  be  rendered  much 
shorter.  The  Argives  at  once  prepared  to  invade  Epidauria 
and  take  the  victims  for  themselves.  About  the  same  time 
the  Lacedaemonians  marched  out  with  their  whole  force  to 
Leuctra  on  their  own  borders  under  the  command  of  Agis, 
but  for  what  object  no  one  knew,  "  not  even  the  towns  which 
furnished  the  troops."  The  sacrifices  offered  before  crossing 
the  border  proving  unfavourable,  the  army  was  disbanded ; 
and  orders  were  sent  to  the  allies  to  assemble  when  the  month 
of  Carneus — a  sacred  season  for  all  Dorians — was  over.  The 
Argives  took  advantage  of  the  delay.  Entering  Epidauria 
on  the  27th  of  the  month  preceding  Carneus,  and  keeping 
this  day  during  the  whole  of  the  invasion,  they  devastated 
the  country,  while  the  Epidaurians  in  vain  appealed  to  their 
allies  for  help.  Some  excused  themselves  owing  to  the  sacred 
season,  others,  though  they  advanced  to  the  frontier,  would 
not  cross  it.3  Meanwhile,  at  the  instance  of  Athens,  the 
allies  were  assembled  at  Mantinea  to  discuss  the  question  of 
peace.    The  Corinthian  envoy  at  once  called  attention  to  the 


1  Thuc.  v.  52.  2  See  vol.  i.  p.  226  and  note. 

3  The  words  in  Thucydides  v.  54,  ayovres  ttjv  rjixepav  Tavrrjv  navra 
rbv  xpovov,  can  only  be  translated  as  in  the  text ;  and  the  confusion 
of  Greek  calendars,  which  constantly  required  intercalary  days  or 
months,  might  easily  render  such  a  fraud  possible.  All  the  days 
during  which  the  Argives  were  in  Epidauria  were  considered  as  coming 
before  the  close  of  the  27th  of  Hecatombeus,  the  month  preceding 
Carneus,  in  which  the  festival  was  held.  See  Xen.  Hell.  iv.  7.  2  for 
this  trick. 


278 


THE  TREATY  BROKEN,  419. 


[IX.  9. 


hostilities  between  Argos  and  Epidaurus,  and  urged  that  these 
must  be  brought  to  an  end  before  the  question  of  peace  could 
be  discussed.  The  Argives  were  withdrawn  from  Epidauria, 
but  in  vain.  No  conclusion  was  reached  at  the  conference. 
The  Argives  then  returned  to  their  work,  aided  by  1000 
Athenians  with  Alcibiades  in  command,  and  they  did  not 
retire  till  they  had  devastated  a  third  of  the  country.  The 
Lacedaemonians,  who  again  marched  as  far  as  Caryae,  were 
again  prevented  by  ill  omens  from  crossing  the  border,  and 
went  home.1  Later  in  the  year  they  sent  a  force  by  sea  to 
Epidaurus,  upon  which  the  Argives  at  once  complained  at 
Athens.  By  the  treaty,  each  ally  had  undertaken  to  pre- 
vent any  armed  force  from  passing  through  their  territory ; 
the  sea  was  the  territory  of  the  Athenians,  and  they  had 
allowed  the  Lacedaemonians  to  pass  through  it, — an  un- 
friendly act  which  the  Argives  would  only  condone  if  the 
Athenians  would  take  back  the  Helots  to  Pylus.  This  was 
done  by  the  influence  of  Alcibiades,  and  a  note  was  made 
on  the  pillar  on  which  the  treaty  was  recorded,  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  not  observed  the  terms  of  it.  The  rest 
of  the  year  passed  with  nothing  more  important  than  slight 
skirmishes  between  Argos  and  Epidaurus.2 

9.  The  reputation  of  the  Lacedaemonians  was  now  at  so 
low  an  ebb  that  if  the  state  was  not  to  lose  her  position  alto- 
Agis  invades  gether,  vigorous  steps  must  at  once  be  taken 
Argos.  to  retrieve  it.    In  the  summer  of  418  Agis 

marched  upon  Argos  with  the  whole  force  of  the  city,  includ- 
ing the  Helots.  He  was  joined  by  the  Tegeatae  and  the 
other  allies  in  Arcadia,  but  the  rest  of  the  allies  in  Pelopon- 
nesus and  the  Boeotians  (5000  hoplites  with  as  many  light- 


*  Thuc.  v.  54,  55.    Cp.  Aristoph.  Lysistr.  507  ff.,  esp.  512-515  : 
€lt  akyovaaL  ravhoOev  v/jlcls  eVavj/pd/xe^'  av  yeXdaacrai,, 
ri  /3e/3ovXeurai  7repi  twv  (movbwv  iv  rfj  0-7-17X77  irapaypd^rai 
iv  tu>  drjpcp  rr]p.(pov  vpiv  ;  rt  be  o~oi  ravr  ;  rj  6°  6y  av  avrjp, 
ov  criyr)o-€i  ;  Kayco  Vt'ycov. 
A  passage  which  shows  with  what  interest  these  negotiations  and 
changes  were  watched  in  Athenian  homes. 
2  Thuc.  v.  56. 


IX.  9.] 


AGIS  IN  ARGOLIS,  418. 


279 


armed,  500  cavalry  and  an  equal  number  of  "runners"1) 
collected  at  Phlius.  Before  the  forces  could  combine,  the 
Argives  met  the  Lacedaemonians  at  Methydrium,  supported 
by  the  Mantineans  and  3000  Eleans.  They  were  eager  to 
attack,  but  in  the  night  Agis  broke  up  his  camp  and  joined 
the  allies  at  Phlius.  The  Argives  followed,  and  took  up  a 
position  on  the  road  from  Nemea  to  Argos,  expecting  by 
this  means  to  prevent  Agis  from  reaching  the  city.  Agis 
outmanoeuvred  them  by  dividing  his  forces.  With  his 
Arcadian  and  Epidaurian  allies,  he  descended  by  a  difficult 
path  into  the  plain ;  the  Corinthians  and  Phliasians  entered  it 
at  another  point  by  an  equally  difficult  route ;  the  Boeotians, 
who  were  well  supplied  with  cavalry,  the  Megarians,  and 
Sicyonians  descended  by  the  Nemean  road,  on  which  the 
Argives  lay.  On  hearing  that  Agis  was  in  the  plain,  lay- 
ing waste  their  territory,  the  Argives  returned  from  their 
position  near  Nemea,  and  after  a  slight  brush  with  the 
Corinthians  and  Phliasians,  drew  up  for  battle.  They  were 
surrounded  on  all  sides.  Agis  cut  them  off  from  the  city ; 
the  Corinthians  and  their  allies  held  the  higher  ground  to 
the  west;  and  on  the  Nemean  road  lay  the  Boeotians. 
Their  Athenian  allies  had  not  yet  come  up,  and  they  were 
without  cavalry.  When  the  armies  were  on  the  point  of 
engaging,  two  Argives,  Thrasyllus,  one  of  the  five  generals, 
and  Alciphron,  the  proxenus  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  came 
to  terms  with  Agis,  undertaking  that  Argos  Agiscomesto 
should  satisfy  any  complaints  which  the  terms  with 
Lacedaemonians  had  to  bring  against  her,  and  Argos- 
enter  into  a  lasting  peace.  Agis,  after  conferring  with  one  of 
the  Lacedaemonian  magistrates  who  were  in  the  camp,  agreed 
to  a  truce  for  four  months,  to  allow  time  for  the  Argives  to 
fulfil  their  promises.  In  these  transactions  neither  party 
was  supported  by  public  authority ;  four  persons  only — two 
on  each  side — acting  entirely  upon  their  own  responsibility, 

1  Thuc.  v.  57.  For  the  afiLTmoi  who  are  mentioned  in  this  passage 
only  in  Thucydides,  see  Arnold's  note,  ad.  loc.  Xenophon  mentions 
them  among  the  Boeotian  forces  at  Mantinea  (362). 


280 


THE  ALLIES  IN  ARCADIA,  418. 


[IX.  10. 


decided  the  issue  of  the  campaign.  When  drawing  off  his 
forces,  Agis  did  not  even  inform  his  allies  what  had  taken 
place,  but  such  was  the  discipline  of  the  Peloponnesian  army 
that,  though  indignant  at  his  action,  they  obeyed  his  com- 
mands. Never  before  had  so  fine  an  army  been  collected ;  all 
the  allies  were  present  except  the  Mantineans  and  Eleans,  who 
were  fighting  for  Argos,  and  the  soldiers  were  picked  men. 
"  In  numbers  and  quality  they  were  a  match  for  the  force 
opposed  to  them  and  for  another  as  large,"  and  they  had 
caught  the  Argives  in  a  trap.  More  undaunted  still  were 
the  Argives,  who  had  not  at  all  realised  how  perilous  was 
their  position.  They  blamed  their  generals  for  allowing  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  escape  them.  It  was  their  custom  to 
decide  any  disputes  which  arose  in  a  campaign  at  the 
Charadrus,  a  ravine  outside  the  city  walls,  and  when  the 
army  reached  this  place  on  the  march  home,  the  soldiers 
began  to  stone  Thrasyllus.  He  saved  his  life  by  fleeing  to 
an  altar  for  protection,  but  his  property  was  confiscated.1 

10.  After  the  truce  had  been  concluded,  the  Athenian 
contingent  arrived  at  Argos,  1000  foot  and  300  horse,  under 
The  Argives  Laches  and  Nicostratus.  The  Argives  were 
renew  the         f  or  senclinpr  them  back,  as  the  war  was  at  an 

war  on  the  0  i  n  /r  • 

instigation  of  end,  but  the  Eleans  and  Mantineans  compelled 
Aicibiades.  them  to  listen  to  Alcibiades,  who,  though  not 
one  of  the  generals  for  the  year,  was  present  as  an  envoy. 
He  urged  that  the  truce  which  had  been  concluded  in  the 
absence  of  some  of  the  allies  had  no  validity.  They  must 
disregard  it,  and  make  the  best  of  the  present  opportunity, 
Alcibiades  prevailed.  The  allies  at  once  marched  upon 
Orchomenus  in  Arcadia,  where,  after  some  delay,  they  were 
joined  by  the  Argives,  in  open  violation  of  their  engagement 
with  Sparta.  Orchomenus,  unable  to  resist  the  united  forces, 
agreed  to  join  them.  These  were  now  uncertain  what  step 
to  take  :  the  Eleans  called  on  them  to  march  upon  Lepreum; 
the  Mantineans  proposed  an  attack  upon  Tegea;  and  when 


1  Thuc.  v.  57-60. 


IX.  10.]  THE  LACEDAEMONIANS  AT  MANTINEA,  4I8.  281 


the  proposal  of  the  Mantineans  was  preferred,  the  Eleans 
withdrew  their  forces,  thus  depriving  the  army  which  they 
had  insisted  on  calling  into  the  field  of  the  support  of  three 
thousand  men.1 

The  conduct  of  Agis  had-  been  severely  condemned  at 
Lacedaemon,  and  when  it  was  known  that  Argos  had 
promptly  broken  the  truce,  and  that  Orchomenus  had 
surrendered,  it  was  proposed  to  punish  him,  contrary  to  all 
tradition,  by  razing  his  house  to  the  ground  and  imposing 
a  heavy  fine.  Agis  prevailed  on  the  authorities  to  remit 
these  severe  penalties,  but  the  Lacedaemonians  passed  a  new 
law,  by  which  the  king  was  forbidden  to  lead  out  an  army 
from  the  city  without  the  leave  of  ten  commissioners,  who 
were  chosen  to  be  his  advisers.  They  were  now  informed 
by  their  friends  in  Tegea  that  the  city  was  all  but  lost; 
nothing  could  save  it  but  immediate  help.  They  were 
roused  to  action  as  they  had  never  been  roused  before : 
without  a  moment's  delay  they  marched  with  their  Helots 
to  Orestheum,  and  called  on  their  Arcadian  TheLacedae 
allies  to  follow  them  to  Tegea.  The  allies  in  monians  again 
Corinth  and  Boeotia  were  summoned,  and  the  take  the  field- 
war-cry  was  sent  even  to  Phocis  and  Locris ;  but  it  was 
difficult  for  the  contingents  to  assemble  at  such  short  notice, 
and  unless  united  they  could  not  make  their  way  through 
territory  which  was  occupied  by  the  enemy.  With  the 
Arcadians  to  support  them,  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  had 
put  five-sixths  of  their  force  in  the  field,  took  up  a  position 
near  the  temple  of  Heracles,  in  the  territory  of  the  Man- 
tineans. The  allies  then  ranged  themselves  in  a  strong 
position  over  against  them.  The  light-armed  were  already 
throwing  their  stones  and  javelins,  when  one  of  the  elders 
called  to  Agis  that  he  was  curing  one  mistake  by  committing 
another,  for  the  enemy  were  in  too  strong  a  position  to  be 
attacked  with  success.  Upon  this  Agis  withdrew  his  troops  to 
a  position  on  the  low  watershed  between  Tegea  and  Mantinea, 


1  Thuc.  v,  61,  62. 


282 


SPARTAN  DISCIPLINE,  418. 


[IX.  11. 


and  directed  the  water,  which,  as  it  did  much  damage,  was 
a  constant  source  of  contention  between  the  two  cities,  upon 
the  fields  of  the  Mantineans.  By  this  means  he  succeeded 
in  drawing  the  allies  into  the  plain.  The  generals  were 
The  armies  at  unwilling  to  leave  their  strong  position,  but 
Mantinea.  soldiers,  who  were  already  dissatisfied  with 

the  campaign  in  Argolis,  declared  that  they  were  again  be- 
trayed. The  enemy  was  escaping  once  more,  without  attack 
or  pursuit.  They  descended  into  the  plain ;  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians, on  returning  to  their  old  camp  by  the  Heracleum, 
suddenly  found  themselves  face  to  face  with  an  army  drawn 
up  for  battle.  It  was  a  moment  in  which  Spartan  discipline 
was  invaluable;  never  before  had  they  been  so  taken  by 
surprise.  Under  the  commands  of  Agis,  passed  down  through 
a  succession  of  officers  to  the  smallest  divisions  of  the  army, 
the  troops  fell  into  order.  On  the  left  were  the  Sciritae,  next 
to  whom  were  the  Helots  who  had  served  under  Brasidas, 
and  the  Neodamodes ;  beside  these  were  ranged  the  Lacedae- 
monians in  their  companies ;  then  came  the  Arcadian  allies, 
and  on  the  right  the  Tegeatae  and  a  few  Lacedaemonians : 
the  cavalry  were  placed  on  both  wings.  The  right  wing  of 
the  allies  was  held  by  the  Mantineans,  in  whose  territory  the 
engagement  took  place ;  next  to  them  were  the  allies  from 
Arcadia;  beside  these  were  the  "Thousand"  of  the  Argives, 
a  select  body  of  troops  trained  at  the  public  expense ;  then 
the  rest  of  the  Argives,  who  were  arranged  in  five  battalions, 
and  their  allies  the  Cleonaeans  and  Orneatae.  On  the  left 
were  the  Athenians,  flanked  by  their  cavalry.1 

II.  Before  joining  battle,  the  commanders  spoke  a  few 
words  of  encouragement  to  their  soldiers.    The  Mantineans 

1  In  numbers  the  Lacedaemonians  appeared  to  have  the  advantage  ; 
but  beyond  a  computation  which  gives  3584  as  the  number  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  Thucydides  will  not  venture  on  any  precise  state- 
ment. It  is  worth  attention  that  Thucydides  describes  the  Cleon- 
aeans and  Orneatae  as  allies  of  the  Argives  :  this  would  lead  us  to 
suppose  that  they  stood  in  the  same  relation  to  Argos  as,  e.g.,  the 
Tegeatae  to  Sparta.  The  words  fxel^ov  ecpavrj  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
army  may  imply  that  he  was  present  at  the  battle. — Thuc.  v.  67-68. 


IX.  ii.]         THE  BATTLE  OF  MA NT1NEA ,  418- 


283 


were  reminded  that  if  defeated  they  would  again  be  slaves 
of  the  Lacedaemonians,  but  if  victorious  they  could  maintain 
the  dominant  position  which  they  had  recently  gained  in 
Arcadia;  the  Argives  that  they  had  at  last  an  opportunity 
of  revenging  themselves  on  their  ancient  The  battle  of 
enemies,  and  recovering  their  supremacy  in  the  Mantinea- 
Peloponnese.  The  Athenians  were  told  that  a  defeat  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  in  Peloponnese  would  be  a  blow  to  their 
supremacy  from  which  they  would  not  recover ;  they  would 
never  again  interfere  with  the  expansion  of  Athenian  power 
or  invade  Attica.  "But  the  Lacedaemonians,  both  in  their 
war-songs  and  in  the  words  which  a  man  spoke  to  his  com- 
rade, did  but  remind  one  another  of  what  their  brave  spirits 
knew  already.  For  they  had  learned  that  true  safety  was  to 
be  found  in  long  previous  training,  and  not  in  eloquent 
exhortations  uttered  when  they  were  going  into  action." 1 

When  the  signal  was  given  for  battle,  the  Argives  and 
their  allies  rushed  eagerly  forward,  while  the  Lacedaemonians 
advanced  slowly  to  the  music  of  flute-players,  who  were  placed 
in  their  ranks,  not  from  motives  of  religion,  as  Thucydides 
remarks,  but  that  by  their  music  the  steps  of  the  soldiers 
might  be  steadied,  and  their  time  preserved  unbroken. 

The  weak  point  in  a  Greek  army  was  the  right  or 
unshielded  flank,  and  for  this  reason  every  army  tended,  even 
unconsciously,  to  overlap  the  opposing  line  by  moving  to  the 
right,  each  soldier  seeking  to  cover  his  spear  arm  by  the 
shield  of  his  comrade.  Owing  to  this  movement,  the  two 
armies,  even  before  joining  battle,  began  to  overlap  each 
other  on  the  right — the  Lacedaemonians  passing  beyond 
the  Athenians,  and  the  Mantineans  beyond  the  Sciritae. 
Agis  had  sufficient  forces  at  command  to  extend  his  line 
beyond  both  wings  of  the  enemy  without  unduly  diminish- 
ing its  depth ;  and  seeing  the  danger  to  which  the  Sciritae 
and  Brasideans  were  exposed,  he  gave  instructions  for  them 
to  move  to  the  left  and  cover  the  Mantineans,  and  at 


1  Thuc.  v.  69,  Jowett. 


284 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ALLIES,  418. 


[IX.  11. 


the  same  time  ordered  two  of  the  Lacedaemonian  polemarchs 
to  march  their  divisions  from  the  right  into  the  vacant 
space  which  the  movement  of  the  Sciritae  necessarily  caused 
in  the  centre  of  his  line.  The  polemarchs  refused  to  obey 
orders :  the  Sciritae  were  unable  to  close  up,  and  the 
Lacedaemonian  army  was  broken  into  two  divisions.  To 
any  other  forces  such  a  failure  in  tactics  would  have  been 
ruinous,  but  the  Spartans  were  either  too  stupid  to  under- 
stand the  full  extent  of  their  danger,  or  too  courageous  to  be 
discouraged  by  it.  Their  left  wing  was  defeated  and  driven 
back  to  the  waggons  by  the  Mantineans  and  the  select  Ar- 
gives,  who  outflanked  them  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other 
dashed  through  the  broken  line  upon  the  unshielded  arm  of 
their  opponents ;  but  in  the  centre,  where  Agis  was  posted 
with  the  three  hundred  Spartan  "knights,"  the  allies  fled 
at  the  first  approach  of  the  enemy  without  striking  a  blow. 

The  allied  line  was  now  in  a  worse  plight  than  that  of 
the  Peloponnesians.  The  right  had  rushed  forward  in  pur- 
suit of  the  enemy ;  the  centre,  including  some  of  the 
Athenians,  was  driven  back  by  the  Spartan  charge.  Only 
the  Athenians  on  the  extreme  left  remained  in  their  position. 
They  were  in  great  danger  of  being  surrounded  on  one  side 
and  defeated  on  the  other,  but  they  were  saved  from  destruc- 
tion partly  by  the  excellent  service  of  their  own  cavalry,  and 
partly  by  a  change  in  the  plans  of  Agis,  who  ordered  the 
whole  army  to  go  to  the  support  of  his  defeated  left.  The 
Athenians  and  Argives  of  the  centre  seized  the  opportunity 
to  leave  the  field,  and  this  was  the  end  of  the  conflict.  For 
when  the  Mantineans  and  select  Argives  saw  the  rest  of 
their  army  defeated,  and  the  whole  Spartan  force  advancing 
on  themselves,  they  abandoned  any  further  pursuit  of  the 
Sciritae,  and  fled.  Of  the  allies,  about  eleven  hundred  fell, 
including  both  the  Athenian  generals ;  and  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians about  three  hundred.  The  loss  of  the  allies  on 
their  side  was  inconsiderable.1 


1  Time.  v.  70-74. 


IX.  12.]  EFFECT  OF  THE  BATTLE,  '418. 


285 


Thucydides  describes  the  battle  of  Mantinea  as  "  by  far 
the  greatest  of  Hellenic  battles  which  had  taken  place  for  a 
long  time,  and  fought  by  the  most  famous  cities."  It  is  also 
so  described  that  we  can  form  a  clear  conception  of  it.  We 
can  follow  the  progress  of  the  conflict  step  by  step.  One 
point  only  is  not  easily  explained — the  insubordination  of  the 
Spartan  polemarchs.  No  doubt  the  movement  which  Agis 
ordered  was  one  involving  difficulty  and  danger  ;  but  danger 
and  difficulty  are  not  reasons  for  disobeying  orders  in  the 
battlefield  ;  and  such  a  movement,  difficult  as  it  was,  could 
not  have  been  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  Spartan  army — 
the  most  perfect  instrument  of  war  in  the  Grecian  world. 
The  polemarchs  were  afterwards  sent  into  exile  "  for  their 
cowardice,"  a  light  punishment  for  their  offence.  They  had 
imperilled  the  safety  of  the  Spartan  army  on  a  day  when 
Sparta's  power  and  position  were  at  stake. 

After  the  battle,  the  Spartans  collected  the  arms  of  the 
enemies  slain,  and  erected  a  trophy;  the  dead  they  gave 
back,  according  to  custom,  and,  retiring  to  Tegea  with  their 
own  dead,  buried  them  there.  They  then  dismissed  their 
allies,  and  returned  to  Sparta  to  celebrate  the  Carnea.  The 
second  king,  Plistoanax,  who  had  marched  out  just  before 
the  battle  with  reinforcements,  had  reached  Tegea,  but  re- 
turned on  hearing  of  the  victory.  The  contingents  from  the 
more  distant  allies  were  countermanded.1 

12.  The  battle  of  Mantinea1  placed  Sparta  in  a  higher 
position  than  she  had  occupied  since  the  outbreak  of  war  in 
431.  The  reputation  of  her  army,  which  had  suffered  from 
the  disaster  at  Pylus,  was  fully  restored ;  her  soldiers  "were 
thought  to  have  been  hardly  used  by  fortune,  but  in  character 
to  be  the  same  as  ever."2  Her  policy  was  now  clear,  and 
she  began  to  carry  it  out  in  an  effective  manner.  When  the 
festival  of  the  Carnea  was  over,  an  army  was  led  out  to 
Tegea,  and  with  these  warlike  movements  to  support  them, 
proposals  of  peace  were  sent  to  Argos.    In  that  city  there 


1  Thuc.  v.  73-75. 


*  Thuc,  v,  75,  Jowett, 


286 


SPARTA  AND  ARGOS,  418. 


[IX.  12. 


had  always  been  a  party  which  sympathised  with  Sparta, 
and  were  willing  to  overlook  the  jealousies  and  enmities 
of  the  past,  if  they  might  have  her  assistance  in  establishing 
Alliance  their  own  power  on  the  ruins  of  the  democracy, 

between  Sparta  The  proxenus  of  the  Argives  at  Sparta,  Lichas 
and  Argos.  by  name,  appeared  at  Argos  offering  war 
or  peace,  as  they  were  pleased  to  accept  it.  It  happened 
that  Alcibiades  was  in  the  city  at  the  time,  supporting  the 
democratic  interest,  but,  in  spite  of  his  influence,  after  a 
heated  discussion,  the  Spartan  party  carried  the  day ;  terms 
were  agreed  upon  between  Argos  and  Sparta.  The  army 
then  retired  from  Tegea,  and  not  long  afterwards  Argos, 
renouncing  her  alliance  with  Mantinea,  Athens,  and  Eiis, 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  Sparta.1 

The  alliance  between  Argos  and  the  discontented  members 
of  the  Peloponnesian  League  is  now  finally  at  an  end,  and 
the  Peloponnesus  is  again  united  round  Sparta,  with  Argos 
as  her  ally.  The  alliance  between  Sparta  and  Athens  is 
still  in  force ;  but  Athens  and  Argos  are  allies  no  more.2 
In  the  strength  of  this  new  combination,  the  two  cities  dis- 
played an  energy  hitherto  unknown  in  the  Peloponnesus. 

1  By  the  terms  of  the  first  treaty,  the  Argives  were  to  evacuate 
Epidauria  and  destroy  iheir  fortifications.  And  if  the  Athenians 
refused  to  do  the  same,  they  were  to  be  regarded  as  enemies.  No 
pretext  was  to  be  left  for  their  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Peloponnese.  The  cities  in  the  Peloponnesus,  both  small  and  great, 
were  to  be  independent ;  a  provision  which  put  an  end  to  any 
ambitious  schemes  of  dominion  cherished  by  the  Mantineans.  One 
clause  seems  directly  aimed  at  the  Athenians  :  "  If  any  one  from 
without  Peloponnesus  comes  against  Peloponnesus  with  evil  intent, 
the  Peloponnesians  shall  take  counsel  together,  and  shall  repel  the 
enemy."  The  terms  of  the  treaty  might  be  shown  by  either  party  to 
their  allies,  who,  however,  were  allowed  to  accept  or  refuse  them  as 
they  pleased. 

In  the  second  treaty,  the  alliance  between  Argos  and  Sparta  is 
extended  to  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnesus,  and  even  to  the  allies 
outside  the  Peloponnesus.  All  were  to  be  independent,  and  in 
undisturbed  possession  of  their  own  territory  ;  all  were  to  submit  to 
arbitration  on  fair  terms  ;  and  if  a  quarrel  broke  out  between  any 
two  of  them,  it  was  to  be  settled  by  some  impartial  state. 

2  Thuc.  v.  77,  79. 


IX.  13- ]         EXTENSION  OF  OLIGARCHY,  418. 


287 


Envoys  were  sent  to  Perdiccas,  whom  they  persuaded  to 
join  them,  when  it  suited  his  convenience  to  do  so,  and  to  the 
Chalcidian  cities,  with  which  "they  renewed  their  former 
oaths  and  swore  new  ones."  No  communications  were  to  be 
entered  into  with  Athens  unless  she  withdrew  entirely  from 
the  Peloponnesus,  and  no  alliance  was  to  be  made,  no  war 
declared,  by  the  cities,  except  in  concert.1 

The  action  of  Argos  made  it  impossible  for  the  Mantineans 
to  hold  out.  The  claim  to  supremacy  over  neighbouring 
cities  of  Arcadia,  which  they  had  endeavoured  Action  of 
to  set  up  in  the  general  confusion  of  the  war,2  Sparta  towards 
was  abandoned,  and  they  came  to  terms  with  her  alhes* 
Lacedaemon,  concluding  a  peace  for  thirty  years.3  At 
Sicyon,  also,  where  the  government  was  unsatisfactory,  the 
Lacedaemonians  appeared  in  force,  and  established  a  more 
oligarchical  constitution.  Similar  changes  were  soon  after- 
wards carried  out  through  the  whole  of  Achaea,  in  which 
hitherto  Pellene  alone  had  been  an  active  ally  of  Sparta. 
In  their  own  city,  the  oligarchs  of  Argos  put  down  the 
democracy,  with  the  help  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and 
Argos  was  now  entirely  governed  in  the  interests  of  Lace- 
daemon; even  Elis,  finding  she  had  as  little  to  hope  from 
the  Athenians  as  from  the  Lacedaemonians,  in  a  short  time 
ceased  to  take  any  part  on  either  side.4 

13.  The  hopes  of  Alcibiades  appeared  to  be  ruined.  After 
the  battle — too  late  to  be  of  any  service  at  the  critical 
moment — reinforcements  had  arrived  at  Mantinea  from 
Athens  and  Elis  ;  and  while  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
occupied  with  the  Carnea,  these  allied  forces  marched  upon 
Epidaurus  to  punish  an  invasion  which  the  Epidaurians  had 
made  into  the  Argive  territory.  They  began  siege  of 
to  surround  the  city  with  a  wall,  and  when  the  EPldaurus. 
Athenians  had  completed  their  portion,  a  garrison  was  left  in 
it  composed  of  contingents  from  the  various  cities,  and  the 
allies  returned  home.    Little  was  gained  by  their  labour ;  by 

1  Time.  v.  79,  SO.  2  Thuc.  v.  29. 

3  Thuc.  v.  81  ;  Xen.  Hell.  v.  2.  2.  4  Thuc.  v.  82. 


288 


PARTIES  AT  ATHENS,  4I8.  [IX.  14. 


the  terms  agreed  upon,  since  the  commencement  of  the  work, 
between  Argos  and  Lacedaemon,  Argos  was  compelled  to 
evacuate  Epidauria  and  call  on  Athens  to  do  the  same.1 
Not  long  afterwards,  the  Athenians  sent  Demosthenes  to 
bring  their  troops  away :  he  succeeded  in  getting  the  fortifi- 
cations into  his  own  hands,  but  it  was  impossible  to  remain ; 
the  Athenians  renewed  their  treaty  with  Epidaurus,  and  gave 
up  the  position.2 

For  these  disasters  Alcibiades  and  Nicias  were  chiefly  to 
blame.  The  restless  spirit  of  Alcibiades  had  involved  Athens 
„    .  in  the  complications  which  had  turned  out  so 

Parties  at  „,     _ A 

Athens;  "1 ',  -Nicias  had  been  dilatory  in  sending  out 

ostracism  of       the  necessary  forces.    The  popular  leaders  at 

Hyperbolus.  .    -  1    f        1  . 

Athens  believed  that  their  opportunity  had 
come.  What  the  failure  of  Nicias  at  Pylus  had  been  to 
Cleon,  the  failure  of  Alcibiades  at  Mantinea  might  be  to 
Hyperbolus.  Ostracism  was  demanded  in  the  hope  of  getting 
rid  of  Nicias  or  Alcibiades,  one  the  opponent,  the  other  the 
rival,  of  the  lamp- seller.  It  was  thought  that  the  supporters 
of  Nicias  would  vote  against  Alcibiades,  and  the  supporters 
of  Alcibiades  against  Nicias.  Alcibiades  saw  the  danger,  and 
met  it  by  joining  Nicias.  Contrary  to  all  expectation,  the 
sentence  fell  on  Hyperbolus,  who  left  Athens,  never  to  return. 
So  absurd  did  the  result  appear,  that  ostracism  was  henceforth 
discontinued.  It  was  not  to  protect  Athens  against  such 
men  as  Hyperbolus  that  the  institution  had  been  invented ; 
for  him  to  aspire  to  the  position  of  a  tyrant  was  ridiculous.3 

14.  In  the  following  summer  (417)  the  Spartans  discovered 
how  slight  was  the  hold  which  they  had  on  Argos.  The  alliance, 
Athens  and  which  was  to  last  for  fifty  years,  did  not  last 
Argos.  twelve  months.    The  popular  party  took  ad- 

vantage of  the  G-ymnopaediae  at  Lacedaemon  to  attack  the 


1  Time.  v.  75. 

2  Thuc.  v.  80  ;  O.  I.  A.  i.  180 ;  Dittenberger,  Sylloge,  p.  69. 

3  Thuc.  viii.  73  ;  Plut.  Ale.  13  ;  Arist.  7.  The  year  of  the  ostra- 
cism is,  however,  uncertain  :  417  is  the  most  probable  on  general 
grounds ;  see  Beloch,  Attisch.  Pol.  p.  339  f.,  Griech.  Oesch.  i.  567. 


IX.  i4,] 


ARGOS  AND  A  THENS,  417-416. 


289 


oligarchs,  of  whom  they  slew  some  and  expelled  the  rest. 
The  Spartans,  who  were  informed,  unwillingly  put  off  the 
festival  and  advanced  to  Tegea ;  but  it  was  too  late ;  they 
could  only  return  home  and  resume  the  celebration  of  the 
festival.  Even  when  both  the  Argive  parties  appeared 
before  a  congress  of  the  allies  at  Sparta,  the  Lacedaemonians 
contented  themselves  with  denunciations  of  the  democrats, 
and  idle  promises  of  help  to  their  opponents.  Meanwhile 
the  democratic  party  at  Argos  drew  nearer  to  Athens.  In 
order  to  secure  their  communications  with  the  sea,  should 
the  Spartans  invade  Argolis,  they  began  to  build  Long  Walls 
from  Argos  to  the  coast.  All  the  citizens,  with  their  wives 
and  slaves,  were  engaged  in  the  work,  assisted  by  masons 
and  carpenters  from  Athens.  Sparta  was  now  thoroughly 
roused,  and  before  the  walls  could  be  finished,  Agis  appeared 
with  an  army  and  destroyed  them.  Yet  the  constitution  of 
the  city  was  unchanged;  the  oligarchical  faction  was  too 
feeble  to  help  the  Lacedaemonians  or  to  be  helped  by  them.1 
In  these  movements  at  Argos  we  may  trace  the  hand 
of  Alcibiades.  Meanwhile  Nicias  was  engaged  in  the 
northern  Aegean,  where  he  blockaded  the  ports  of  Perdiccas, 
whom  the  Athenians  now  regarded  as  an  enemy.2  In  the 
summer  (416),  Alcibiades  sailed  to  Argos,  and,  seizing  three 
hundred  of  the  citizens  who  were  suspected  of  favouring  the 
Lacedaemonians,  he  placed  them  in  the  adjacent  islands.  In 
spite  of  this  severe  purging,  the  democrats  were  still  sus- 
picious; and  when  the  Lacedaemonians  threatened  an  in- 
vasion towards  the  end  of  the  year,  they  apprehended  more 
of  the  citizens.  The  Spartans,  however,  finding  the  omens 
against  them,  returned  home  without  entering  the  Argive 
territory.3 

Athens  and  Sparta  were  still  at  peace ;  and  the  situation 
remained  the  same  even  when  the  Athenians  at  Pylus  plun- 
dered the  Lacedaemonians,  and  the  Corinthians,  on  private 

1  Thiic.  v.  82,  83. 

2  Thuc.  v.  83  ;  see  Dittenb.  Syll.  p.  70. 

3  Time.  v.  115,  116. 

VOL.  III.  T 


290  THE  PEACE  OF  NICIAS  AND  AFTER.      [IX.  14. 


grounds,  went  to  war  with  the  Athenians.  The  Spartans 
contented  themselves  with  proclaiming  that  any  one  who 
chose  to  make  reprisals  by  plundering  the  Athenians  was  at 
liberty  to  do  so.1 

In  the  Archidamian  war  it  was  the  Corinthians  who  took 
the  lead  in  forcing  the  Lacedaemonians  to  take  up  arms; 
and  in  their  forecasts  they  pointed  out  more  clearly  than 
others  what  was  needed  in  order  to  ensure  success.  When 
peace  was  concluded  they  found  that  their  exertions  had 
been  in  vain ;  so  far  from  gaining  anything  by  ten  years  of 
war,  their  towns  of  Sollium  and  Anactorium  had  been  lost 
to  them,  and  Potidaea  was  now  an  Athenian  colony.  The 
same  was  the  case  with  the  Megarians,  who  saw  their  port  in 
Athenian  hands.  The  Boeotians  had  indeed  gained  some- 
thing by  the  destruction  of  Plataea  and  Panactum,  and  their 
victory  at  Delium  had  given  them  a  high  position  in  Greece, 
yet  they  also  must  have  felt  that  a  peace  which  formally  left 
Athens  where  she  was  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  was  not  the 
object  for  which  they  had  taken  up  arms.  In  the  negotiations 
which  follow  the  peace  of  Nicias,  the  Corinthians  again  take 
the  lead,  but  while  refusing  to  accept  the  terms,  they  are 
conscious  that  they  cannot  themselves  form  a  centre  to  which 
the  discontented  members  of  the  confederacy  will  flock. 
Neither  in  legend  nor  in  history  was  the  city  so  famous  that 
she  could  lead  the  Peloponnesus ;  she  had  never  held  the 
"Hegemonia"  by  acquisition  or  inheritance.  Hence  she 
betook  herself  to  Argos,  the  city  of  Agamemnon,  and  for  a 
time  there  was  a  probability  that  a  second  Peloponnesian 
confederacy  would  be  formed  with  Argos  at  the  head,  while 
Sparta  sought  to  protect  herself  by  separate  alliances  with 
Athens  and  Boeotia,  thus  revealing  the  weakness  of  her 
position,  and  the  selfishness  of  her  aims.  The  project  is 
wrecked  on  political  difficulties.  Argos  was  a  democracy — 
which,  though  a  recommendation  in  the  eyes  of  Mantineans 
and  Eleans,  could  not  fail  to  excite  jealousy  in  the  minds  of 


1  Thuc.  v.  115. 


IX.  IS.]  ATHENS  AND  ME  LOS,  416. 


291 


Corinthians  and  Boeotians.  For  if  democracy  formed  the  basis 
of  union,  Athens  must  come  in.  Alcibiades  seizes  a  favour- 
able moment,  and  endeavours  to  unite  the  democratic  cities 
of  Peloponnese  with  Athens.  Hence  the  alliance  of  Argos, 
Elis,  Mantinea,  and  Athens.  Democracy  is  now  ranged  against 
oligarchy.  This  gives  Sparta,  to  whom,  as  an  oligarchy,  her 
old  allies  return,  the  opportunity  which  she  wishes  for.  The 
two  opposing  forces  meet  at  Mantinea,  and  Sparta  is  victorious. 
The  superiority  of  her  army  is  re-established.  Once  more 
she  becomes  the  leading  state  of  the  Peloponnesus  and  the 
acknowledged  head  of  the  confederacy.  She  avails  herself  of 
her  position  to  establish  oligarchy  on  a  firmer  basis  where 
necessary,  as  at  Sicyon  and  in  Achaea.  Argos  is  isolated 
and  compelled  to  make  terms — for  a  time ;  Mantinea  comes 
in ;  Elis  stands  sullenly  aloof,  and  we  hear  but  little  more 
of  her  in  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

It  must  however  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Peloponnesians 
were  still  without  a  fleet.  On  the  water  Athens  was 
supreme,  and  she  could  retaliate  on  the  spread  of  Laconian 
oligarchy  on  land  by  the  extension  of  Athenian  imperialism 
at  sea.  Her  second  expulsion  from  any  share  in  the  affairs 
of  the  Peloponnese  made  her  more  determined  to  be  absolute 
in  her  own  dominions.  Hence  the  attack  on  Melos,  and  the 
savage  temper  in  which  hostilities  were  carried  on ;  hence, 
perhaps,  among  other  motives,  a  desire  to  revenge  on  the 
Dorians  in  Sicily  her  failure  against  the  Dorians  at  home. 

15.  For  us  who  read  our  Greek  history  in  Thucydides,  all 
other  events  of  the  year  416  are  overshadowed  by  the 
expedition  which  the  Athenians  now  sent  against  Melos.  In 
the  year  426  Nicias  had  made  an  attack  on  the  island,  and 
though  the  attempt  was  unsuccessful,  we  find  the  Melians 
assessed  at  15  talents  in  the  tribute  list  of  425.  Steps  were 
taken  to  enforce  this  payment,  or,  at  any  rate,  to  coerce  the 
Melians  into  becoming  subject  allies  of  the  Athenians,  and 
at  length  they  were  driven  into  open  hostilities.  The 
Athenians  resolved  to  make  an  example  of  them,  and 
teach  the  Greeks  that  if  Sparta  had  won  her  cause  in  the 


292 


THE  ATHENIANS  AT  ME  LOS,  416.         [IX.  15. 


Peloponnese,  she  was  powerless  to  help  her  allies  in  the 
islands.  Athens  was  mistress  of  the  sea,  and  if  islands  such 
as  Melos  and  Thera  were  allowed  to  be  independent,  or  to 
range  themselves  on  the  side  of  Sparta,  they  held  their 
position  on  sufferance.  Athens  had  long  held  her  hand,  but 
now  she  allowed  it  to  fall  with  fearful  severity.1 

A  large  force  was  despatched  against  the  island,  but 
before  taking  further  steps,  envoys  were  sent  to  treat  with 

,    .  the  Melians.    These  were  not  brought  before 

Athenian  0  . 

expedition  the  people,  as  was  common  m  democratic  states, 
to  Meios.  were  requested  to  explain  their  views  to 

the  magistrates  and  chief  men  of  the  city.2  The  Athenians 
agreed  to  this  with  some  reluctance — they  would  gladly 
have  displayed  their  eloquence — and  suggested  that  the 
conference  should  take  the  form  of  a  dialogue,  in  which 
each  side  should  state  their  opinions.  This  dialogue 
is  reproduced  in  the  history  of  Thucydides.  What 
opportunity  he  had  of  making  himself  acquainted  with 
the  actual  substance  of  the  discussion  we  do  not  know ;  he 
is  not  likely  to  have  been  at  Melos  at  the  time ;  and  it  was 
impossible  to  get  information  from  the  Melians  who  took 
part  in  it — for  they  were  put  to  death.  His  information  can 
only  have  come  from  the  Athenian  side,3  and  if  the  dialogue 
has  any  claim  to  authenticity,  if  it  is  not  merely  a  record  of 
the  arguments  which  Thucydides  puts  into  the  mouth  of 
Athenians  and  Melians,  as  suitable  to  the  situation  of  each, 
we  must  suppose  that  there  were  Athenians  who  thought 
that  the  arguments  used  by  the  envoys  could  be  repeated 
without  discredit  to  the  Athenian  people.     Or  shall  we 


1  Thuc.  v.  84.  Tkuc.  says :  "  The  Melians  are  colonists  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  who  would  not  submit  like  the  other  islanders.  At 
first  they  were  neutral  and  took  no  part;  but  when  the  Athenians 
tried  to  coerce  them  by  ravaging  their  lands,  they  were  driven  into 
open  hostilities."]  The  generals  in  command  were  Cleomedes  and 
Tisias.    Thuc.  I.e.  ;  cp.  Dittenberger,  Syll.  p.  70. 

2  Thuc.  v.  85  j  cf.  iv.  22  and  v.  27. 

3  Unless  the  partisans  of  the  Athenians  in  the  city  were  spared  in 
the  general  massacre, 


IX.  15- ]     THE  CLAIMS  OF  THE  ATHENIANS,  416.  293 


suppose  that  the  historian,  before  narrating  a  deed  which 
left  even  in  antiquity  an  indelible  stain  on  the  name  of 
Athens,  endeavours  to  explain — not  to  palliate — their  action 
by  showing  that  such  deeds  were  the  natural  result  of  the 
ideas  which,  under  the  tuition  of  Cleon  and  Hyperbolus,  and 
perhaps  of  Alcibiades,  had  now  begun  to  take  possession  of 
the  Athenian  mind  1 

We  have  not  come  here,  the  Athenians  say,  with  any 
pretence  of  justice,  which  is  a  question  to  be  discussed 
between  equals.  We  fall  back  on  an  older  principle — that 
those  who  have  the  power  will  take  what  they  can,  and  the 
weaker  must  submit.  It  is  to  our  interest  that  you  should 
be  our  subjects,  for  every  independent  island  is  at  once  a 
danger  to  our  empire  and  evidence  of  its  weakness ;  if  you 
will  submit  without  resistance  no  harm  will  befall  you,  but 
if  from  any  foolish  love  of  freedom  or  loyalty  to  Lacedaemon 
you  resist  an  overwhelming  power,  you  will  be  the  authors 
of  your  own  destruction.  If  you  trust  to  the  chances  of  war, 
in  which  the  result  is  sometimes  contrary  to  all  expectation, 
we  remind  you  of  the  delusive  nature  of  hope — a  spendthrift 
who  ruins  every  one  who  stakes  his  all  at  her  bidding.  If 
again  you  believe  that  the  justice  of  your  cause  will  win  you 
the  favour  of  heaven,  we  reply  that  we  are  no  less  confident. 
In  acting  as  we  act,  we  are  but  doing  as  men  have  always 
done,  and  as  we  believe  that  the  gods  also  do :  we  rule 
where  we  have  the  power.  This  always  has  been  and 
always  will  be  the  guiding  principle  of  action.  And  if  you 
trust  in  the  honour  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  we  reply  that 
their  virtue  begins  at  home  and  ends  at  home.  In  their 
dealings  with  foreign  nations  they  are  well  known  to  regard 
what  is  pleasant  as  honourable,  and  what  is  convenient 
as  just. 

It  was  in  vain  that  the  Melians  pleaded  the  claims  which 
bound  them  to-  their  kinsmen  at  Lacedaemon.  The  point 
at  issue  was  not  honour  but  existence.  Honour  is  a  foolish 
word  which  has  brought  many  men  to  ruin,  and  to  shame 
too,  because  their  disasters  were  the  result  of  their  own 


294 


MASSACRE  OF  THE  MEL1ANS,  416.        [IX.  15. 


folly.  "Remember  this,"  the  Athenians  said  in  conclusion, 
"and  be  on  your  guard  against  a  seductive  name.  The 
safety  of  your  city  rests  on  your  decision  !  'n 

In  spite  of  this  plain  speaking,  the  Melians  resolved  to  hold 
out.  They  would  not  surrender  without  a  struggle  the 
freedom  which  they  had  enjoyed  for  700  years ;  and  they  still 
hoped  that  assistance  would  come  from  Lacedaemon.  They 
were  willing  to  remain  neutral,  but  to  this  proposal  the 
Athenians  would  not  listen.  The  envoys  returned  to  the 
army,  and  the  city  was  at  once  surrounded  by  a  wall;  a 
garrison  was  left,  and  the  troops  dispersed.  The  siege  lasted 
through  the  summer ;  twice  did  the  Melians  break  through 
the  wall  and  bring  in  supplies,  but  as  the  winter  approached 
a  larger  force  was  sent  out.  Within  the  walls  there  was 
treachery,  and  at  length  no  other  course  was  left  but  to 
surrender  at  discretion.  The  men  of  military  age  were 
massacred,  the  women  and  children  sold  into  slavery. 


1  Thuc.  v.  112.  It  is  probable,  though  not  certain,  that  in  the 
years  424-415  was  written  the  singular  treatise  on  the  Athenian 
Republic,  which  is  commonly  included  among  the  works  of  Xenophon. 
It  is  the  work  of  some  Athenian  oligarch,  who,  though  quite  out  of 
sympathy  with  the  Athenian  constitution,  criticises  it  as  an  instru- 
ment adapted  for  a  certain  object.  The  expansion  of  the  democracy, 
and  the  maintenance  of  Athens  at  the  expense  of  the  allies,  are  the 
main  thesis  of  the  book,  ideas  which  were  naturally  popular  at  a 
time  when  Athens  was  absolute  mistress  of  the  sea,  and  which 
resulted  in  the  Sicilian  expedition.  See  Forbes,  Thuc.  1.  lix.  f. ; 
and  Newman,  Politics  of  Aristotle^  i.  538  f. 


CHAPTER  X. 


AFFAIRS   IN   SICILY,  422-413. 

I.  So  far  as  ridding  Sicily  of  the  Athenians  went,  the 
pacification  of  Gela  was  a  masterstroke.  From  the  departure 
of  Eurymedon  and  his  colleagues  in  424  down  to  the  great 
expedition  nine  years  later,  no  Athenian  ships  of  war  visited 
the  island.  Less  was  achieved  in  putting  an  end  to  domestic 
strife;  in  this  respect  Hermocrates  had  hardly  hoped  for 
success ;  he  was  aware  that  factions  would  break  out  in  the 
cities,  and  if  they  confined  their  quarrels  within  the  limits 
of  Sicily,  he  was  willing  to  let  things  take  their  course. 
It  was  at  Leontini  that  disturbances  arose,  and  Syracuse 
herself,  the  city  of  Hermocrates,  had  a  share  in  them. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  the  Athenians,  the  Leontinians  had 
enrolled  a  number  of  additional  citizens,  and  in  order  to  find 
land  for  them,  it  was  proposed  to  redivide  the  Faction  at 
territory  of  the  state.  This  popular  measure  Leontim- 
alarmed  the  notables,  who  at  once  sought  the  aid  of  Syracuse, 
and  drove  the  demos  out  of  the  town  to  seek  refuge  where 
they  could,  after  which  they  abandoned  their  old  home  and 
went  to  live  at  Syracuse  as  citizens  of  that  city.  Not  long 
afterwards  a  number  of  them,  discontented  with  their  new 
position,  returned,  and  established  themselves  partly  at  a 
fortress  in  the  Leontine  territory,  partly  in  Leontini  itself, 
from  which,  supported  by  the  majority  of  the  exiled  demos, 
they  carried  on  war  with  Syracuse.  Their  efforts  availed 
little ;  the  Leontine  territory  still  remained  a  part  of  Syra- 
cuse \  Leontini  ceased  to  exist  as  a  community,  and  all  that 
now  remained  of  the  once  flourishing  city  state  was  a  band 
of  exiles  encamped  in  two  fortresses ;  democrats  who  had 

295 


298 


PHAEAX  IN  SICIL  Y,  422. 


[X.  2. 


been  driven  from  Leontini,  and  oligarchs  who  had  exiled 
themselves  from  Syracuse.1 

At  Messene  also  domestic  faction  broke  out  soon  after  the 
congress ;  the  aid  of  the  Locrians  was  invited  by  one  of  the 
Faction  at  parties,  and  so  numerous  were  the  settlers  who 
Messene.  ^00]^  Up  their  abode  there,  that  for  a  time 

Messene  became  "a  possession  of  the  Locrians."  But  the 
absence  of  so  large  a  body  weakened  Locri,  and  when  a 
revolt  broke  out  among  some  of  the  Locrian  colonies,  she 
could  no  longer  maintain  her  position  at  Messene.2 

2.  On  hearing  of  these  domestic  quarrels,  the  Athenians 
resolved  to  renew  communication  with  their  friends  in 
mu  A  .  Sicily.     In  the  summer  of  422  a  commission 

The  Athenians  J  .  . 

send  Phaeax  was  sent  out,  consisting  of  Phaeax  and  two 
to  Sicily.  others,  in  the  hope  of  forming  a  combination 

against  Syracuse.  Such  a  combination  was  necessary  if 
Leontini  was  to  be  restored,  and  Phaeax  could  now  answer 
Hermocrates  by  pointing  out  that  the  enemy  whom  all  had 
to  fear  was  not  the  foreigner  against  whom  he  had  warned 
them,  but  the  city  which  he  represented.  In  choosing 
Phaeax  as  an  envoy,  the  Athenians  appear  to  have  carefully 
selected  a  man  who  was  known  as  a  diplomatist  rather  than 
a  general.  He  was  smooth  of  tongue  and  conciliatory  in 
manner,  a  man  of  persuasive  conversation  rather  than  an 
orator,  yet  subtle  in  argument  and  forcible  in  expression — 
a  favourite  among  the  fledgling  disputants  of  Athens.3 

On  his  way  Phaeax  was  able  to  make  terms  with  the 
Locrians,  who  alone  of  the  allies  had  refused  to  make  peace 
with  the  Athenians  at  the  time  of  the  pacification  of  Gela. 
From  Locri  he  went  on  to  Camarina,  the  city  which  had 
most  to  fear  from  Syracuse,  as  her  immediate  neighbour. 
Here,  and  at  the  more  powerful  city  of  Agrigentum,  he  was 
successful,  but  at  Gela  he  failed;  the  city  adhered  to  her 
policy,  choosing  Syracuse  before  Athens.  Phaeax  was  dis- 
heartened; and,  thinking  it  useless  to  visit  the  rest  of  the 

1  Thuc.  v.  4.  2  Thuc.  v.  5. 

3  Eupolis,  Frag.  95  K.    Aristoph.  Knights,  1374  f. 


X.  3-]  PROSPERITY  OF  ATHENS,  421-415. 


297 


cities,  he  returned  through  the  country  of  the  Sicels  to 
Catana,  where  his  ships  met  him.  On  the  way  he  visited 
Bricinniae,  one  of  the  fortresses  in  which  the  Leontines  were 
encamped,  and  gave  them  what  encouragement  he  could.1 

In  his  voyage  home  he  endeavoured  to  establish  amicable 
relations  with  those  maritime  cities  of  Sicily  and  Italy  at 
which  he  touched,  but  his  embassy  had  little  or  no  result. 
The  time  had  not  yet  come  when  Athens  could  interfere 
with  effect  in  the  affairs  of  Sicily,  and  indeed  it  never  came. 
And  at  this  moment  the  spirit  of  enterprise  at  Athens  was 
crushed.  The  tide  of  success  had  turned  in  favour  of  Sparta : 
the  defeat  of  Delium  and  the  loss  of  Amphipolis,  with  other 
successes  of  Brasidas  in  Chalcidice,  weighed  heavily  against 
the  gains  at  Pylus  and  Cythera.  Danger  threatened  the  city 
in  a  very  vital  part  of  her  empire ;  and  till  the  career  of 
Brasidas  could  be  checked,  a  distant  expedition  to  the  west 
was  out  of  the  question. 

3.  In  the  years  which  followed  the  peace  of  Nicias,  Athens 
rapidly  recovered  from  the  disasters  of  the  Archidamian 
war.    Her  revenues  were  unimpaired,  and  we  are  informed 
that  seven  thousand  talents  of  surplus  were  Athens  during 
deposited  in  the  Acropolis  in  the  time  of  the  peace  of 
Nicias.2     The  population  increased  till  the  Nlcias* 
ravages  of  the  plague  were  forgotten.    There  were  many 
who  longed  for  the  stirring  times  of  war,  and  with  the 
genuine  spirit  of  Athenians  thought  the  years  wasted  which 
passed  in  inaction.    They  longed  for  novelty ;  they  dreamed 
of  empire ;  and  why  not,  when  the  men  and  money  were  at 
hand  %    Others  turned  their  thoughts  to  the  revenues  which 


1  Thuc.  v.  5. 

2  Andocides,  De  Pace,  §  8  ;  Aeschines,  Fals.  Leg.  p.  337.  But  I 
agree  with.  Grote,  v.  144,  note  3,  that  we  cannot  place  confidence  in 
either  of  these  authorities.  For  the  inscription  to  which  Grote  refers 
as  proving  that  3000  t.  had  been  stored  in  the  Acropolis  during 
the  peace  of  Nicias  {C.  I.  A.  i.  32  ;  Hicks,  Hist.  Inscrip.  37)  see 
Jowett's  Essay  on  Inscriptions,  Thuc.  I.  lxii.  ff.  Though  written 
down  after  420,  it  is  supposed  by  some  authorities  to  refer  to  a 
period  before  the  war.    Money  was  accumulated,  Thuc.  vi.  26. 


298  THE  SEG ESTAEANS  AT  ATHENS,  416.        [X.  3. 


were  lying  useless  in  the  treasury  of  Athena.  The  soldier's 
calling  was  rapidly  becoming  a  profession,  by  which  he 
expected  to  live,  and  for  him  war  was  a  time  of  plenty. 
There  could  be  no  better  use  of  the  public  funds  than  the 
acquisition  of  new  territory,  from  which  new  revenues  would 
flow  to  the  city,  and  new  pay  to  the  citizens. 

In  the  autumn  of  416  a  quarrel  broke  out  between  two 
neighbouring  cities  in  the  west  of  Sicily — Segesta  and  Selinus. 
Segesta  and  Segesta  was  a  town  of  the  Elymi,  with  which, 
Selinus.  as  we  have  seen,  the  Athenians  had  entered 

into  alliance  about  the  middle  of  the  century — an  alliance 
apparently  renewed  by  Laches.1  Selinus  was  a  colony  of  the 
Sicilian  Megara,  a  Dorian  city  which  could  rely  on  Dorian 
Syracuse.  The  quarrel  related  to  those  trivial  matters  which 
were  always  disturbing  the  peace  of  neighbouring  towns: 
rights  of  intermarriage,  and  the  use  or  limits  of  neutral 
ground.  Selinus  sought  the  aid  of  Syracuse,  and  thus  suc- 
ceeded in  reducing  her  enemy  to  great  straits  by  sea  and 
land.  In  her  distress,  Segesta  called  to  mind  her  ancient 
ally,  the  city  beyond  the  sea,  whose  eyes  had  long  been  fixed 
with  an  eager  gaze  on  Sicily.  Her  envoys  appeared  at 
Athens,  reminding  the  Athenians  of  the  old  connection,  and 
begging  for  assistance.2  They  had  many  complaints  to  make, 
but  throughout  they  dwelt  chiefly  on  the  aggression  of  Syra- 
cuse. Was  the  desolation  of  Leontini  to  go  unpunished  ? 
Was  Syracuse  to  destroy  the  allies  who  still  remained  to 
Athens  in  Sicily  1  In  that  case  Dorian  would  join  Dorian, 
and  colonist  would  join  mother-city,  and  the  west  would 
come  with  an  overwhelming  host  to  overthrow  the  empire  of 
Athens.  It  was  prudent  for  the  Athenians  to  meet  the 
danger  before  it  was  too  late  by  sending  help  to  their 
oppressed  allies ;  ample  means  would  be  supplied  for  the 
support  of  any  assistance  which  might  come.3 

1  Supra,  p.  188.    In  Thuc.  vi.  6  Classen  omits  Aeovrivoiv. 

2  Diodorus,  xii.  82,  asserts  that  Segesta  applied  in  vain  to  Acragas 
and  Syracuse, — and  to  Carthage.  The  first  statement  is  so  im- 
probable that  we  cannot  ascribe  any  weight  to  the  second. 

3  Thuc.  vi.  6. 


X.  3-]  THE  ATHENIANS  AND  SICILY,  41$. 


299 


The  appeal  of  the  Segestaeans  led  to  much  discussion. 
Some  supported  it ;  others  pointed  out  that  Segesta  was 
a  distant  barbarian  city  of  which  little  was  Envoyssent 
known.  After  many  meetings,  it  was  resolved  from  Athens 
to  send  envoys  to  Segesta  to  report  on  the  to  Segesta- 
resources  of  the  city,  and  the  state  of  the  war  with  Selinus. 
Here  for  the  moment  the  matter  rested,  but  the  thoughts  of 
the  Athenians  were  once  more  turned  to  Sicily.  We  may 
imagine  how  the  subject  grew  in  the  minds  of  men  during 
the  winter  months  (416-415)  before  the  return  of  the  envoys. 
The  distance  of  the  island,  the  extent  and  resources  of  it,  the 
number  and  size  of  the  cities,  their  population,  their  sym- 
pathies and  antipathies,  their  past  history— all  these  were 
subjects  of  discussion  in  the  colonnades  and  shops  of  Athens. 
Any  one  who  had  more  information  than  the  rest  became 
the  hero  of  the  hour ;  men  gathered  round  him  and  hung  on 
his  lips,  forming  in  their  minds  bright  pictures  of  the  gain 
and  glory  that  was  coming.  Foremost  in  the  movement  was 
Alcibiades,  whose  restless  spirit  foiled  at  Mantinea,  was  eager 
to  seek  distinction  in  some  new  field  of  action.  Athens  at 
peace  and  limited  by  treaties,  Athens  unable  to  put  forth  her 
strength,  was  no  city  for  him.  He  saw  himself  sailing  to 
Sicily  at  the  head  of  a  larger  force  than  any  which  had  ever 
visited  the  waters  of  the  west,  winning  the  cities  by  force  or 
persuasion,  and  so  passing  onwards,  "  roaming  with  a  hungry 
heart,"  till  he  reached  Carthage,  the  metropolis  of  the  west. 
The  greatest  of  Phoenician  cities  would  fall  before  his  attack ; 
her  fleets  would  be  added  to  his  own,  and  he  would  then  turn 
upon  his  course,  and  bring  an  irresistible  armament  against 
the  Peloponnesus. 

Meanwhile  the  envoys  arrived  at  Segesta.  They  were 
more  than  satisfied  by  what  they  saw  of  the  wealth  of  the 
town ;  they  were  entertained  most  hospitably,  and  at  every 
house  they  saw  an  abundance  of  gold  and  silver  plate ;  they 
also  heard  of  large  reserves  in  the  treasuries  and  temples; 
and  what  they  heard  they  believed,  without  further  examina- 
tion.   On  their  return  they  were  accompanied  by  Segestaean 


300 


ATHENS  WILL  HELP  SEGESTA,  415. 


envoys,  who  brought  with  them  sixty  talents,  a  month's 
pay  for  the  sixty  ships  which  they  asked  the  Athenians  to 
supply. 

The  Athenians  hesitated  no  longer.  On  hearing  the  report 
of  the  envoys,  they  decreed  to  send  sixty  ships  to  Segesta, 
The  Athenians  nn^er  tne  command  of  Nicias,  Alcibiades,  and 
decree  aid  to  Lamachus.  The  immediate  object  of  the  ex- 
Segesca-  pedition  was  to  aid  Segesta  against  Selinus, 

but  if  time  and  means  permitted,  the  generals,  who  were 
granted  full  powers,  were  to  promote  the  restoration  of 
Leontini,  and  advance  in  any  way  that  they  could  the 
interests  of  Athens  in  Sicily  (415). 

4.  Four  days  after  this  decree  was  passed,  the  Assembly 
was  again  summoned  to  discuss  the  details  of  the  expedition. 
Opposition  Nicias  seized  the  opportunity  to  give  expres- 
of  Nicias.  g-on  to  views<  ln  his  opinion  the  decree 
was  a  mistake ;  and  it  was  against  his  wish  that  he  had  been 
chosen  one  of  the  generals  to  conduct  the  expedition.  "  We 
are  met  to  discuss  the  details  of  our  force,"  he  said ;  "but  in 
my  judgment  it  would  be  better  to  discuss  the  original  ques- 
tion." It  was  useless  to  advise  Athenians  to  be  content  with 
what  they  had,  or  to  warn  them  against  risking  present 
advantage  in  the  hope  of  future  gain.  But  was  it  wise  to 
seek  new  enemies  in  Sicily,  when  they  were  leaving  so  many 
enemies  behind  them  in  Greece  1  They  must  not  rely  on  the 
peace ;  those  who  maintained  it  had  many  complaints  to 
make,  and  others  did  not  maintain  it  at  all.  The  Chalcidic 
cities  were  still  in  revolt ;  the  Corinthians  had  never  accepted 
the  terms  of  agreement;  the  Boeotians  were  only  held  in 
check  by  a  truce  terminable  at  ten  days'  notice.  Was  this 
a  time  to  divide  the  Athenian  power  and  send  the  greater 
half  across  the  sea  1 

"If  we  are  successful,"  he  continued,  "we  cannot  maintain 
our  conquests ;  and  what  can  be  more  foolish  than  to  enter 
into  a  war  in  which  we  gain  nothing  if  we  succeed,  and  lose 
much  if  we  fail  %  We  are  warned  that  if  we  do  not  interfere, 
all  Sicily  will  fall  into  the  hands  of  Syracuse — but  what  have 


X.  4.] 


NICIAS  OPPOSES,  415. 


301 


we  to  fear  ?  The  Syracusans  will  not  risk  their  empire  by 
joining  the  Lacedaemonians  against  us — that  would  prepare 
the  way  for  their  own  destruction.  Leave  Sicily  to  the 
Siceliots,  and  be  on  your  guard  against  the  old  enemy,  who 
is  plotting  to  overthrow  your  democracy  first,  and  then  your 
empire.1 

"The  best  way  of  terrifying  the  Siceliots  is  to  keep  at  a 
distance  from  them,  or,  if  we  visit  the  island  at  all,  to  display 
our  power  and  return  at  once.    Men  are  always  afraid  of 
what  is  strange  and  distant.    And  we  must  not  despise  the 
Lacedaemonians  because  we  have  defeated  them.    They  are 
still  planning  to  retrieve  the  past.    We  ourselves  have  only 
recently  recovered  from  great  disasters  ;  we  cannot  afford  to 
waste  our  resources  on  those  who  will  make  no  adequate 
return  if  successful,  and  if  they  fail  will  involve  us  in  their 
own  destruction.    He  who  urges  you  to  undertake  this  war 
is  a  young  man  without  experience,  pleased  with  the  novelty 
of  office,  and  eager  to  gratify  his  own  ambition,  or  find  means 
to  support  his  extravagance.    He  has  gathered  his  friends 
round  him,  but  you  must  not  be  afraid  of  them ;  remember 
the  risk,  and  do  not  be  shamed  into  voting  against  your 
convictions.    Leave  the  Siceliots  to  manage  their  own  affairs, 
and  tell  the  Segestaeans  that  as  they  began  the  quarrel  with- 
out consulting  you,  they  must  bring  it  to  an  end  without  your 
help."   Nicias  then  turned  to  the  presiding  officer,  and  begged 
him  not  to  shrink  from  putting  to  the  vote  a  question  which 
had  been  decided  already.    Such  an  act  might  be  informal, 
but  no  formalities  should  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  safety  of  the  state.2 

1  Thuc.  vi.  11  :  oira>s  ttoKlv  8i  dXcyapxtas  enifiovXevovo-av  ogecos 
(hvXa£6peda;  a  passage  which  shows  that  Nicias  at  any  rate  was  fully 
alive  to  the  action  of  Sparta  after  Mantinea.  ^ 

2  Thuc.  vi.  14  :  iuu  <ri>  <b  irpvravL  ravra,  einep  rjyel  <roi  irpoarjKeiv 
KnbeaBai  re  t^s  TroXecos  teat'  fiovXei  yeveatfai  TroXlrrjS  dya66s,  eVn/^iCe 
Kai  ywpas  rrporldei  avOis  'Adrjvaiots,  vo^aas,  d  o>pa>SeZ^  to 
dvaylrMo-ai,  to  p.kv  Xvetv  tovs  vop.ovs  p.i]  /xera  Toa&vb"  av  p.apTvp(ov 
ahiav -  oW,  k.tX  In  what  did  the  illegality  consist?  In  the  case 
of  the  Mytilenaean  decree,  iii.  36,  a  subject  already  decided  was 


302 


ALCIBIADES  AND  NIC/AS,  415. 


5.  Though  Nicias  had  not  mentioned  Alcibiades  by  name, 
the  audience  were  well  aware  who  the  young  man  was  whom 

The  answer 

he  accused  of  urging  Athens  to  her  destruction, 
of  Alcibiades.  All  eyes  were  turned  upon  him,  and  he  was  not 
slow  to  respond.  The  public  policy  at  once  became  a  personal 
question,  as  was  invariably  the  case  with  Alcibiades.  His 
own  wishes,  his  own  interests,  his  own  influence  and  position 
were  of  paramount  importance  to  him.  In  genius,  both 
political  and  military,  he  was  far  the  first  man  of  his  day, 
and  he  did  not  underrate  hi,  abilities.  Nor  did  the  Athenians 
underrate  them,  but  they  looked  with  suspicion  on  one  whose 
personal  extravagance  and  contempt  of  all  social  custom 
marked  him  out  as  a  man  who  had  objects  in  view  which 
he  could  never  satisfy  as  a  citizen  among  citizens.  The  ever- 
present  dread  of  "a  tyranny"  gave  a  legitimate  sanction 
to  the  envy  with  which  many  Athenians  regarded  every 
eminent  citizen. 

"Nicias  has  attacked  me,"  Alcibiades  said,  "  for  my  wish 
to  take  command  in  this  expedition.  My  answer  is  that  I 
have  as  good  a  right  to  command  as  any  other  man,  or 
better ;  and  I  am  equal  to  the  post.  The  extravagance  which 
he  charges  against  me  has  been  of  the  greatest  service  to  the 
city.  At  a  time  when  our  resources  were  thought  to  be 
exhausted,  I  made  a  display  at  Olympia  which  was  the 
astonishment  of  all  Greece,  entering  seven  chariots  for  the 
race,  and  obtaining  the  first,  second,  and  fourth  places.1  Such 
success  is  rewarded  with  public  distinctions,  and  it  is  also 
evidence  of  power.  That  I  should  be  envied  is  natural ;  but 
those  who  are  disliked  in  their  lifetime  often  become,  in  a 
later  age,  the  pride  of  their  cities.  At  any  rate,  I  had  influence 
enough  to  combine  the  Peloponnesus  against  Sparta.  I 


proposed  for  reconsideration,  and  not  a  word  is  said  about  any 
illegality.  In  this  case,  it  may  be  urged,  the  reconsideration  of  the 
decree  was  not  the  object  for  which  the  meeting  had  been  summoned  • 
it  was  brought  up  in  the  course  of  the  debate ;  and  to  this  extent  the 
Mytilenaean  decree  is  not  strictly  parallel. 
1  Probably  in  01.  90  (b.c.  420). 


2t  5.]  ALC1BIADES  SUPPORTS  THE  EXPEDITION,  4-16.  303 


appeal  to  you,  then,  to  make  use  of  my  impetuosity  while  it 
lasts ;  combine  my  rashness  and  the  good  fortune  of  Nicias  to 
secure  success  in  this  great  expedition.  Do  not  change  your 
minds  under  the  impression  that  Sicily  is  a  great  power :  the 
Sicilian  cities  are  not  like  ours;  they  are  inhabited  by  a 
mixed  population,  without  common  sympathies,  or  fixed 
sentiments.  No  one  thinks  of  his  city  as  his  home,  nor  is  he 
prepared  to  fight  for  it— to  him  it  is  a  place  to  make  a  fortune 
in,  which  he  may  carry  elsewhere  when  he  pleases.  Among 
such  cities  there  can  be  no  consistent  policy :  they  will  not 
follow  one  leader,  nor  are  their  armies  so  large  as  we  think ; 
and  indeed  throughout  Hellas,  the  fighting  force  has  been 
found  far  less  than  the  estimate. 

"  But  Nicias  says :  *  Remember  what  an  enemy  you  are 
leaving  behind  you.'    This  consideration  will  weigh  with  us 
but  little,  if  we  look  at  the  matter  fairly.    When  our  fathers 
acquired  this  empire,  they  were  at  war  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  and  the  Persians  too,  but,  owing  to  the  superiority 
of  their  fleet,  they  overcame  both.    And  we  also  shall  leave 
behind  a  fleet  more  than  sufficient  to  keep  the  Peloponnesians 
in  check.    On  these  grounds,  then,  we  have  no  reason  to 
hesitate,  nor  have  we  any  excuse  for  throwing  over  our  allies. 
We  must  keep  our  engagements  with  them,  regardless  of  loss 
and  gain.    We  did  not  attach  them  to  us  with  the  intention 
that  they  should  come  to  our  assistance,  but  in  the  hope  that 
they  would  prevent  our  enemies  from  crossing  the  sea.  It 
was  by  helping  others— Greeks  or  barbarians— when  they 
called  upon  us,  that  we  acquired  our  empire,  and  if  we 
abandon  this  policy  to  stay  at  home  and  make  nice  dis- 
tinctions in  sending  assistance,  we  may  lose  what  we  have 
got.    We  cannot  fix  a  limit  to  our  empire,  and  say  that 
we  will  go  thus  far  and  no  farther:  we  must  rule  or  be 
ruled;  and  before  we  can  change  our  politics,  we  must 
change  our  nature.    If  we  sail  to  Sicily,  we  shall  humble  the 
pride  of  the  Peloponnesians  ;  we  shall  add  Western  Hellas  to 
our  empire,  or  at  least  injure  the  power  of  Syracuse  to  our 
own  advantage. 


304  EXTENSIVE  PREPARATIONS,  bl5.  [X.  6. 


"  Do  not  follow  Nicias  in  his  want  of  energy  and  mistrust 
of  youth.  Youth  and  age  must  go  together ;  each  supplying 
the  defects  of  the  other,  as  they  have  done  in  the  past. 
The  state,  if  at  rest,  like  everything  else  will  wear  herself 
out  by  internal  friction.  Every  pursuit  which  requires  skill 
will  bear  the  impress  of  decay,  whereas  by  conflict  fresh 
experience  is  always  being  gained,  and  the  city  learns  to 
defend  herself,  not  in  theory,  but  in  practice.  My  opinion 
in  short  is,  that  a  state  used  to  activity  will  quickly  be 
ruined  by  a  change  to  inaction ;  and  that  they  of  all  men 
enjoy  the  greatest  security  who  are  truest  to  themselves  and 
their  institutions  even  when  they  are  not  the  best."1 

6.  Such  a  speech  could  not  fail  to  be  convincing,  for  it 
appealed  to  the  strongest  impulses  of  the  Athenians ;  and 
when  the  envoys  from  Segesta  and  Leontini  came  forward, 
reminding  them  of  the  pledges  which  they  had  given,  they 
were  more  eager  than  ever  for  the  expedition.  Nicias  saw 
that  it  was  useless  to  press  his  arguments  further ;  the 
stream  was  too  strong  for  any  direct  opposition ;  he  hoped 
that  a  change  might  come  when  the  Athenians  realised  the 
vast  preparations  which  would  be  required.  It  was  not  now 
a  question  of  thirty  or  forty  ships.  To  meet  the  forces  of 
Sicily  with  any  hope  of  success,  a  large  army  must  be  sent 
out,  including  slingers  and  bowmen  who  would  act  against 
the  Sicilian  cavalry ;  the  fleet  must  be  on  a  great  scale  to 
ensure  a  constant  supply  of  food,  besides  that  which  would 
have  to  be  conveyed  from  Attica.  An  ample  supply  of 
money  would  also  be  necessary,  for  the  promises  of  the 
Segestaeans  might  be  found  delusive. 

The  words  of  Nicias,  so  far  from  diverting  the  Athenians 
from  their  purpose,  merely  confirmed  them  in  it.  They 
thought  that  with  a  general  so  cautious,  and  an  equipment 
so  complete,  they  could  not  fail.  The  Sicilian  fever  ran 
higher  than  ever.  All  alike  were  seized  with  a  passionate 
desire  to  sail,  the  elder  among  them  convinced  that  they 


1  Time.  vi.  16-18.    See  Jowett's  translation. 


X.  7-] 


OMENS  AT  ATHENS,  415. 


305 


would  achieve  the  conquest  of  the  island,  the  younger  long- 
ing to  see  with  their  own  eyes  the  marvels  of  a  distant 
country,  while  the  main  body  of  the  troops  expected  to 
receive  present  pay  and  to  conquer  territory  which  would  be 
an  inexhaustible  mine  of  pay  for  the  future.1  At  last  one  of 
the  audience,  weary  of  the  objections  and  delays  of  Nicias, 
came  forward  and  asked  him  to  state  plainly  what  forces  he 
considered  necessary.2  Nicias  replied  that  so  far  as  he  could 
form  an  opinion,  without  further  consideration,  a  fleet  of  not 
less  than  100  triremes,  and  a  force  of  5000  heavy-armed,  with 
a  proportionate  number  of  light-armed,  would  be  required. 
On  this  the  Assembly  at  once  decreed  that  the  generals  should 
receive  full  powers  to  decide  about  the  number  of  the  fleet, 
and  arrange  for  the  despatch  of  the  expedition. 

The  day  on  which  this  decree  was  passed  was  a  day  of 
evil  omen  at  Athens.  It  was  the  sacred  day  of  Adonis,  and 
if  Aristophanes  may  be  believed,  the  cries  of  the  women  who 
came  out  upon  the  roofs  of  the  houses  to  lament  Adonis  were 
heard  even  in  the  Assembly.3  Other  tokens  of  impending 
evil  were  not  wanting,  and  even  Socrates  is  said  to  have 
been  warned  by  his  familiar  sign  against  the  expedition. 

7.  At  this  moment,  when  every  one  was  more  than  usually 
disposed  to  pay  attention  to  signs  and  omens,  an  outrage  was 
committed  at  Athens  which  spread  a  panic  through  the  city. 


1  Thuc.  vi.  24. 

2  Thuc.  vi.  25.  Thucydides  does  not  give  the  name,  hut  there  is  little 
doubt  that  the  man  w  as  Demostratus.  See  Plut.  Nic.  12 :  dvaaras  yap 
6  pa\i(TT(i  tcov  drjpaycoycov  eVi  tov  -rrokepov  napo^vvcov  tovs  'AOrjvaiovs 
Arjpoo-TpaTOs  ecprj  tov  Ni/aai>  irpocpdcreLs  \eyovTa  navo-eiv  Kai  yjrrjcpio-pa 
ypdtyas  oncos  aiiTOKpaTopes  coaiv  oi  aTpaTrjyol  ndvTavda  Kanel  (BovXevo- 
pevoi  Kcii  7rpaTTOVT€S,  eneio-e  tov  brjpov  -^/rjCplaaadaL.  This  account 
agrees  with  Aristoph.  Lysistr.  391  ff. 

3  Aristoph.  Lysistr.  339  f.  : 

o  t  'Adcoviacrpos  ovtos  ovirl  tcov  Teycbv, 
ov  'yo!>  tvot  cov  fjicovov  iv  Tr)KKkr]o-iq. 
eXeyev  S'  6  prj  copacri  pev  ArjpocrTpaTOS 
7rAfii>  ds  ^LKeXlav  17  yvvfj  8'  opxovpevrj 
"at,  at,  "AcWtV,"  cprjaiv,  k.t.X. 
Cp.  Plut.  Ale.  18 ;  Nic.  13. 

VOL.  III.  U 


306 


SA  CRILE  GIO  US  0  UTRA  GES,  415. 


It  was  the  custom  of  the  Athenians  to  set  up  in  the  porti- 
coes of  their  houses  and  temples  square  pedestals  of  stone, 
The  mutilation  carved  into  a  rude  resemblance  of  the  human 
of  the  Hermae.  head  and  trunk.  These  statues  were  known 
as  Hermae-,  they  were  relics  of  some  primeval  cult,  associ- 
ated with  good  luck  and  productive  power.  In  a  single 
night,  about  six  weeks  after  the  vote  had  been  given  for  the 
expedition,  every  statue  in  the  city  but  one  was  found 
mutilated  to  a  greater  or  less  degree. 

Who  committed  the  outrage,  and  what  was  their  object  in 
committing  it,  was  never  known.  It  may  have  been  an 
attempt  to  put  a  stop  to  the  expedition  to  Sicily  by  adding 
one  more  to  the  unfavourable  omens  which  attended  it ;  and 
it  was  even  asserted  to  be  the  work,  directly  or  indirectly, 
of  the  Corinthians,  who  thus  sought  to  save  Syracuse  from 
attack.  If  this  was  really  the  case,  the  attempt  entirely 
failed ;  amid  all  the  excitement  which  the  outrage  created, 
no  one,  not  even  those  most  opposed  to  the  expedition,  took 
advantage  of  it  to  persuade  the  people  to  change  their  plans. 
It  is  also  possible  that  the  outrage  was  merely  the  frolic  of  a 
wine-party,  but  this  explanation,  though  afterwards  given, 
did  not  satisfy  public  opinion  in  the  present  state  of 
excitement.  The  crime  was  commonly  regarded  as  the  act 
of  conspirators,  who  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  the  overthrow, 
of  the  constitution,  a  view  which  we  should  be  better  able 
t©  explain  if  we  were  more  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the 
state  of  feeling  at  Athens  at  this  time.  It  is  also  possible  to 
take  another  view.  The  party  spirit  aroused  by  the  ostracism 
of  Hyperbolus  was  still  bitter  ;  there  may  have  been  a  feeling 
that  the  people  had  feeen  deprived  of  the  leader  whom  they 
trusted,  and  deceived  into  accepting  Alcibiades.  Every  one 
felt  that  a  man  was  growing  into  power  whose  habits  and 
aims  were  inconsistent  with  the  safety  of  the  existing  con- 
stitution. It  was  largely  due  to  him  that  the  Sicilian  ex- 
pedition was  sent  out;  he  was  one  of  the  generals;  if  he 
returned  victorious,  his  power  would  be  unbounded ;  he 
might  aim  at  the  consummation  which  every  eminent  Greek 


X.  7.] 


ATTACK  ON  ALCIBTADES,  4-15. 


307 


was  supposed  to  desire,  and  make  himself  tyrant.  But  if 
the  mutilation  of  the  Hermae  was  in  any  way  connected 
with  an  attempt  to  destroy  Alcibiades,  we  must  regard  it 
as  a  preliminary  step,  intended  to  excite  public  fanaticism, 
and  fill  the  mind  of  the  people  with  alarm  for  the  safety  of 
the  city,  for  no  evidence  was  ever  produced  which  implicated 
Alcibiades  in  this  crime. 

Large  rewards  were  at  once  offered  for  the  discovery  of  the 
perpetrators  ;  and  every  one  who  knew  of  any  sacrilegious  act 
committed  against  the  gods  was  requested  to 

,  f       ,     .       . &,  Z1  Profanation  of 

come  forward  and  give  information,  lo  carry  the  mysteries : 
out  the  investigation  more  successfully,  the  attack  on 
Council  received  full  powers,  and  a  Commis- 
sion was  appointed,  of  which  Pisander,  Charicles,  and  Diog- 
netus  were  members.1  Information  was  given  by  a  number 
of  metics  and  slaves,  who,  though  they  could  tell  nothing 
about  the  Hermae,  spoke  of  other  mutilations  committed  by 
young  men  in  their  intoxication.  It  was  also  stated  that  the 
mysteries  wefre  profaned  by  being  celebrated  in  private 
houses ;  and  in  connection  with  this  the  name  of  Alcibiades 
was  mentioned.  Thereupon  his  enemies,  especially  Androcles, 
the  leading  democrat  of  the  day,  at  once  attacked  him, 
declaring  that  he  was  really  to  blame  for  all  the  acts  of 
impiety  which  had  been  committed.  His  life  and  conduct 
showed  that  he  was  no  friend  to  democracy,  and  these  out- 
rages were  steps  towards  its  overthrow.2 


1  Thuc.  vi.  27  ;  Andoc.  De  Myst.  14,  36. 

2  Thuc.  vi.  28,  aWeov  dyaXp-drcov  irepLKOiral  rives  vtto  vcoarepav  /xera 
7raiSia?  Kai  o'lvov  yeycvrjpevai ;  viii.  65.  The  details  are  by  no  means 
clear.  In  Andoc  De  Myst.  11  ff.,  we  are  told  that  in  the  Assembly 
which  was  held  just  before  the  departure  of  the  expedition,  Pythoni- 
cus  came  forward  with  a  declaration  that  Alcibiades  was  in  the  habit 
of  celebrating  the  mysteries  in  a  private  house,  and  offered  to  prove 
the  charge  on  the  evidence  of  a  slave,  by  name  Andromachus.  The 
slave,  when  produced,  asserted  that  Alcibiades,  Niciades,  and  Meletus 
celebrated  the  mysteries  in  the  house  of  Pulytion.  But  in  Plut. 
Alcib.  19,  Androcles  is  mentioned  as  bringing  forward  slaves  and 
metics  with  information  of  the  same  kind;  and  apparently  before 


308 


THE  FLEET  SAILS  FOR  SICILY,  415.  [X.  8. 


Alcibiades  demanded  to  be  put  on  his  trial  at  once.  It 
was  unjust,  he  said,  that  he  should  be  exposed  in  his  absence 
Alcibiades  to  tne  attacks  °f  nis  enemies.  This  was  exactly 
allowed  to  go  what  his  enemies  did  not  wish.  If  the  case  were 
to  Sicily.  brought  up  for  settlement  before  the  expedition 

sailed,  Alcibiades  would  have  the  support  of  all  those  who  were 
serving  in  the  army ;  if  he  were  detained  in  Athens,  it  Was 
doubtful  whether  the  Argives  and  Mantineans  who  had 
joined  at  his  solicitation  would  not  return  home.  And  his 
own  personal  influence  would  go  far  towards  securing  his 
acquittal.  Availing  themselves  of  the  help  of  other  speakers 
in  the  Assembly  who  were  not  known  as  opponents  of  Alci- 
biades, they  carried  through  a  proposal  that  he  should  sail  at 
once,  and  be  recalled  to  stand  his  trial  within  a  fixed  time.1 

8.  The  time  was  now  come  for  the  departure  of  the  ex- 
pedition. Most  of  the  allies,  the  merchantmen,  and  the 
Departure  of  lesser  craft  had  been  ordered  to  sail  to  Corcyra, 
the  expedition.  anc[  there  await  the  arrival  of  the  Athenians. 
On  the  day  fixed,  the  soldiers  and  sailors  went  down  to  the 
Peiraeus  at  daybreak,  accompanied  by  almost  the  whole  popu- 
lation of  the  city,  whether  native  or  foreign.  It  was  an 
impressive  scene.  At  this  final  moment  of  their  departure, 
the  dangers  of  the  enterprise  seemed  more  real ;  there 
were  many  misgivings  and  fears  for  the  future,  and  the 
partings  were  not  without  tears.  But  the  preparations  were 
on  so  great  a  scale,  the  equipments  so  complete,  that  failure 
seemed  impossible,  and  as  the  day  wore  on,  confidence  was 
restored.  No  armament  so  magnificent  had  ever  left  the 
harbour  of  Athens.  Empty  ships  had  been  provided  at  the 
public  expense,  and  pay  for  the  sailors  at  the  rate  of  a 
drachma  a  day ;  the  trierarchs  had  not  only  selected  the  best 
crews,  paying  additional  wages  to  the  superior  sailors  and 
the  officers,  but,  in  a  spirit  of  honourable  rivalry,  had  spent 
large  sums  on  the  adornment  of  their  vessels.    The  same 


the  Council.    There  were  also  other  informers  ;  and  the  reward  was. 
claimed  by  all.    Andoc.  I.  c.  §  27. 
1  Thuc.  vi.  29  ;  Plut.  Alcib.  19. 


X.  8.] 


THE  FLEET  OFF  ITALY,  415. 


309 


spirit  prevailed  in  the  infantry.  For,  though  the  Athenian 
soldier  had  what  might  be  called  a  "  regulation  "  shield  and 
spear,  the  body-armour  was  determined  in  some  degree  by 
the  means  or  caprice  of  each  citizen,  who  could  vary  his 
panoply  as  he  pleased.  A  Greek  campaign  was  never  with- 
out its  commercial  accompaniments ;  besides  the  soldiers  and 
sailors,  merchants  joined  the  expedition  with  a  view  to  trade ; 
and  even  among  the  soldiers  themselves,  many  took  with 
them  goods  for  traffic  as  well  as  maintenance.  When  all 
were  on  board,  silence  was  proclaimed  by  sound  of  trumpet ; 
the  customary  prayers  were  offered,  not  singly  from  each 
ship,  but  in  unison  from  all,  in  which  the  thousands  gathered 
on  the  shore  took  part.  Libations  were  then  poured  from 
vessels  of  gold  and  silver ;  the  paean  rose,  and  when  these 
rites  were  ended,  the  ships  sailed  out  of  the  harbour  in 
single  line.  They  raced  as  far  as  Aegina,  after  which  they 
passed  quickly  on  to  Corcyra.1 

Here  the  generals  arranged  the  vast  host,  making  three 
divisions,  which  were  assigned  by  lot,  one  to  each  general.2 
They  also  sent  on  three  ships  to  make  inquiries  The  fleet  at 
what  cities  in  Italy  or  Sicily  would  receive  Corcyra~ 
them.  On  reaching  Italy  they  first  touched  at  Tarentum, 
where,  as  was  natural  from  a  Dorian  city,  they  met  with  a 
very  cold  reception.  They  were  not  allowed  to  cast  anchor 
or  obtain  a  supply  of  water.  The  same  was  the  case  at 
Locri ;  the  rest  of  the  cities  were  content  with      ^u  . 

}  .  at  Rhegium. 

closing  their  gates  and  markets  against  them. 

Even  at  Ehegium,  which,  as  a  Chalcidian  city,  was  expected 

1  Thuc.  vi.  30-32. 

2  The  numbers  which  crossed  to  Sicily  at  this  time  were  as  follows  : 
—Heavy-armed  Athenians,  1500  +  700  armed  Thetes  =  2200  ;  allies, 
2900  ;  total  5100.  Bowmen,  480,  slingers,  700  ;  light-armed  Megar- 
ians,  120  ;  horsemen,  30  ;  making  a  total  of  6430  in  all.  Of  ships 
there  were  sixty  triremes  and  forty  transports  from  Athens  ;  thirty- 
four  Chian  ships  and  two  Rhodian  penteconters.  The  crews  of 
the  last  cannot  be  accurately  calculated,  but  altogether  the  sailors 
amounted  to  more  than  twenty  thousand  men.  There  were  also 
thirty  merchantmen,  with  corn,  bakers,  etc.;  a  hundred  boats,  be- 
sides boats  of  merchantmen  which  followed  to  trade.    Thuc.  vi.  43. 


310 


PARTIES  IN  SYRACUSE,  415. 


[X.  9- 


to  be  friendly,  they  were  not  received  within  the  walls, 
though  allowed  to  encamp  outside  and  obtain  provisions. 
The  Rhegians  would  only  act  in  concert  with  the  other 
Italiots.  Here  for  a  time  the  fleet  remained,  awaiting  the 
return  of  the  ships  which  had  been  sent  on  to  Segesta  to 
inquire  what  money  might  be  expected  from  that  city. 

9.  Meanwhile  intelligence  of  the  expedition  was  con- 
veyed to  Syracuse.  At  first  it  was  received  with  disbelief. 
Discussion  Athenagoras,  who  was  at  the  time  leader  of 
at  Syracuse.  ^he  p0pUlar  party,  declared  that  the  Athenians 
would  never  be  guilty  of  such  folly  as  to  attack  Sicily  in  the 
present  state  of  affairs  in  Greece.  Men  who  were  so  familiar 
with  military  preparations  as  the  Athenians,  knew  too  well 
what  was  necessary  for  such  a  great  and  distant  enterprise, 
to  enter  upon  it ;  and  the  reports  which  were  current  had 
been  set  about  with  a  purpose.  In  war  the  city  must  be  led 
by  a  few  men,  and  this  was  what  the  oligarchical  party  most 
desired. 

Athenagoras  spoke  in  answer  to  Hermocrates,  who  had 
received  accurate  information,  and  knowing  that  the  Athen- 
ians would  certainly  come,  and  were  or  soon  would  be  at 
Corcyra,  had  suggested  that  the  Syracusans  with  all  the 
Siceliots  who  would  join  should  sail  to  Tarentum  to  meet 
them  on  their  arrival  off  the  coast  of  Italy.  Such  a  bold  stroke 
would  give  them  pause,  and  perhaps  prevent  them  from  cross- 
ing the  Ionian  Sea.  This  daring  suggestion  received  no  sup- 
port. Finally,  a  general  who  was  present  reminded  his 
countrymen  that  this  was  not  the  time  for  political  strife ; 
and,  availing  himself  of  the  powers  which  his  position  con- 
ferred upon  him,  he  dismissed  the  Assembly  with  an  assur- 
ance that  the  proper  precautions  would  be  taken  for  the 
public  safety.1 


1  Thuc.  vi.  32-41.  The  proposal  of  Hermocrates  was  perhaps  in- 
tended to  unite  Sicily  and  Italy  in  resistance  to  the  invader.  His 
plan  would  not  have  turned  the  Athenians  from  their  purpose.  All 
would  have  been  risked  on  a  single  battle,  and  the  probability  is  that 
the  Athenians  would  have  won. 


X.  10.]    PLANS  OF  THE  GENERALS ;  N/CI  AS,  415.  311 


All  doubt  was  soon  removed.  Word  came  from  Rhegium 
that  the  enemy  were  encamped  there.  Upon  this  the  Syra- 
cusans  reviewed  the  available  military  force  of  the  city,  and 
despatched  garrisons  to  various  border  fortresses  in  the  in- 
terior, for  it  was  of  the  first  importance  that  the  Sicels  should 
be  prevented  from  joining  the  Athenians. 

10.  The  ships  which  had  been  sent  forward  to  Segesta 
returned  to  the  Athenians  with  the  intelligence  that  their 
envoys  had  been  grossly  deceived.  There  were  The  fraud  of  the 
only  thirty  talents  in  the  Segestaean  treasury.  Sesestaeans- 
The  profusion  of  gold  and  silver  plate,  which  had  been  re- 
garded as  evidence  of  wealth,  was  a  mere  sham  ;  the  same  cups 
and  vessels  had  been  used  over  and  over  again  at  the  various 
entertainments  to  which  the  Athenians  had  been  invited 
during  their  stay  in  the  city,  and  a  portion  of  these  had  been 
borrowed ;  the  vessels  in  the  temple  of  Eryx  were  of  silver 
only.  By  Nicias  the  news  was  not  unexpected,  but  the  spirits 
of  the  other  generals  sank  at  the  disappointment  of  their  hopes. 
Not  a  man  from  Ehegium  ;  not  a  talent  from  Segesta  ! 1 

Before  advancing  further,  the  generals  discussed  the  plan 
of  campaign.  The  opinions  given  were  characteristic  of  their 
authors.  Nicias  wished  to  make  as  great  a  piansofthe 
show  and  do  as  little  as  possible.  He  proposed  &enerals- 
that  they  should  sail  at  once  against  Selinus,  and  if  the 
Segestaeans  would  find  pay  for  the  whole  army,  they  would 
act  accordingly  ;  if  not,  they  must  demand  pay  for  the  sixty 
ships  which  had  been  asked  for,  and  the  fleet  should  remain 
and  bring  the  quarrel  to  an  end  by  force  or  persuasion. 
They  would  then  sail  along  the  coast  of  Sicily,  displaying  to 
the  cities  the  power  of  Athens,  and  her  loyalty  to  her  allies 
— and  so  return  home  without  wasting  the  resources  of  the 
city,  unless  some  favourable  opportunity  occurred  of  rendering 
aid  to  Leontini.  The  most  splendid  armament  which  had  ever 
left  Athens  was  to  aim  at  nothing  more  than  composing  a 
petty  squabble  between  two  cities  of  the  second  rank,  and 


1  Time  vi.  46. 


312 


ALCIBIADES  AND  LAMACHUS,  415.  [X.  10. 


this  on  condition  of  receiving  an  adequate  contribution  to 
the  expense  ! 

Alcibiades  was  all  for  diplomacy.  He  had  not  forgotten 
his  successes  in  the  Peloponnese  ;  how  he  had  combined  the 
cities  against  Sparta,  and  forced  her  to  stake  her  position  on 
the  issue  of  a  single  battle.  He  wished  to  send  envoys  to  all 
the  Grecian  cities,  except  Selinus  and  Syracuse,  beginning 
with  Messene,  which,  being  placed  on  the  strait,  was  a  most 
excellent  base  of  operations.  The  Sicels,  also,  must  be 
visited;  those  who  were  subject  to  Syracuse  must  be  per- 
suaded to  revolt;  those  who  were  independent  must  be 
brought  into  alliance.  When  allies  had  been  secured,  they 
could  attack  Selinus  and  Syracuse,  if  these  cities  refused  to 
accede  to  their  requests.  Alcibiades  was  unwilling  that  so 
great  a  force  should  return  home  without  any  adequate 
achievement,  but  he  failed  to  see  how  greatly  the  Athenians 
would  suffer  in  prestige,  if,  tacitly  confessing  that  their 
force  was  insufficient,  they  delayed  action  till  they  had 
secured  allies  in  Sicily. 

To  Lamachus  neither  of  these  plans  commended  itself; 
he  was  a  soldier,  and  nothing  but  a  soldier — a  plain  man 
without  the  support  of  birth  or  wealth.  He  had  a  soldier's 
instinct  for  striking  while  the  iron  is  hot.  He  proposed  to 
attack  Syracuse  at  once,  using  the  deserted  port  of  Megara 
as  a  base  of  operations.  If  Syracuse  was  gained,  Sicily  was 
gained,  and  it  would  be  far  easier  to  gain  Syracuse  if  they 
attacked  at  once,  while  their  power  was  most  impressive, 
and  the  fear  of  them  at  its  height.  They  would  win  far 
more  allies  by  immediate  action  than  by  delay;  and  their 
armament  would  never  be  so  efficient  as  at  the  moment  of  its 
arrival  in  Sicily.1 

That  this  advice  was  far  the  best  from  a  military  point  of 
view  there  can  be  no  doubt.    It  was,  however,  open  to  one 

1  Thuc.  vi.  47-49.  For  Lamachus  see  Plut.  Mc.  15 ;  and  the 
Acharnians  of  Aristophanes,  where  he  is  mockingly  called  rjpcos  (549, 
etc.) ;  Pax,  465.  In  the  Frogs,  after  his  death,  the  title  is  given  him 
in  earnest  (1307). 


X.  10.]         THE  ATHENIANS  AT  CA  TANA,  4,15. 


313 


serious  diplomatic  objection  :  it  tore  away  the  flimsy  disguises 
by  which  the  Athenians  had  endeavoured  to  conceal  their 
plans,  and  made  it  perfectly  clear  that  the  conquest  of  Sicily 
was  the  object  of  the  expedition.    Besides,  such  hard  hitting 
was  not  likely  to  find  favour  with  Nicias,  and  it  also  destroyed 
the  play  of  diplomacy  in  which  Alcibiades  hoped  to  shine. 
Lamachus  received  no  support,  and  gave  his  vote  in  favour 
of  the  plan  of  Alcibiades,  which  would  at  least  prevent  the 
expedition  from  returning  to  Athens  without  achieving  any 
result  whatever.1   Alcibiades  at  once  visited  Messene,  but  he 
failed  to  obtain  any  active  support  from  the  city ;  if  the 
fleet  came  they  would  grant  supplies  and  no  more.    Two  of 
the  generals  then  sailed  with  sixty  ships  to  TheAthenians 
Naxos,  where  they  were  well  received,  and  m0vefrom 
Catana,  which  hesitated.     From  Catana  they  ^™™to 
sailed  on  to  the  Terias,  and  the  next  day  to 
Syracuse,  sending  ten  triremes  into  the  Great  Harbour  to 
see  what  ships  were  there,  and  also  to  announce  to  the  city 
that  they  had  come  to  restore  the  Leontines.  On  their  return 
to  Catana,  some  Athenian  soldiers  entered  the  city  through  a 
neglected  postern  gate,  and  appeared  in  the  market-place  at 
a  time  when  the  citizens  were  gathered  in  assembly  to  hear 
an  address  from  Alcibiades— for,  though  the  army  was  ex- 
cluded, the  generals  were  allowed  to  enter  the  city  and 
say  their  say.     Upon  this  the  Syracusan  party  became 
alarmed  and  left  the  city;  the  rest  decided  to  receive  the 
Athenians,  who  now  sailed  thither  with  their  whole  fleet 
from  Ehegium.    At  Catana  intelligence  was  brought  from 
Camarina  which  induced  them  to  hope  that  the  city  might 
be  won  if  they  appeared  there.     They  sailed  at  once,  but 
nothing  came  of  the  visit.     The  Camarinaeans  declared 


1  It  is  strange  that  Alcibiades  should  not  have  seen  how  excellent 
the  advice  of  Lamachus  was.  A  decisive  victory  on  the  first  arrival 
of  the  fleet  at  Sicily  would  have  placed  him  beyond  the  reach  of  his 
enemies.  He  may  have  feared  failure,  but  more  probably  he  was 
blinded  by  his  passion  for  diplomacy.  Nor  would  such  an  aristocrat 
willingly  listen  to  the  suggestion  of  the  plebeian  Lamachus. 


314 


THE  HER  MAE  AND  AND0C1DES,  415. 


[X.  ii. 


that  they  were  under  an  oath  to  receive  a  single  vessel  and 
no  more.1    The  Athenians  returned  to  Catana. 

II.  Meanwhile  the  opponents  of  Alcibiades  were  pursuing 
their  course  at  Athens.  In  the  eagerness  to  obtain  informa- 
The  affair  of  tion  about  the  Hermae,  any  evidence  was  ac- 
the  Hermae.  cepted,  no  matter  from  what  source  it  came.2 
Numbers  of  citizens  were  thrown  into  prison  by  the  Council. 
Among  the  informers  Teucer  and  Dioclides  were  the  most 
prominent.  Dioclides  declared  that  he  had  seen  the  muti- 
lators at  their  work  by  the  light  of  the  full  moon,  but  on 
investigation  it  turned  out  that  the  outrage  took  place  on 
the  night  of  the  new  moon  ! 3  With  hardly  less  shameless- 
ness  he  asserted  that  he  gave  information  because  the  guilty 
persons  would  not  pay  him  to  withhold  it.  Yet  he  was 
regarded  as  a  patriot,  and,  adorned  with  a  crown,  he  was  con- 
ducted in  a  mule  car  to  dine  in  the  Prytaneum.4 

What  followed  is  told  differently  by  Thucydides  and 
Andocides,  the  orator,  who  was  implicated  in  the  affair. 
From  Thucydides,  who  mentions  no  names,  we  learn  that 
one  of  those  who  had  been  arrested  and  imprisoned  "was 
induced  by  a  fellow-prisoner  to  make  a  confession — whether 
true  or  false  I  cannot  say •  opinions  are  divided,  and  no  one 
knew  at  the  time,  or  to  this  day  knows,  who  the  offenders 
were.  His  companion  argued  that  even  if  he  were  not  guilty 
he  ought  to  confess  and  claim  a  pardon ;  he  would  thus  save 
his  own  life,  and  at  the  same  time  deliver  Athens  from  the 
prevailing  state  of  suspicion.  His  chance  of  escaping  would 
be  better  if  he  confessed  his  guilt  in  the  hope  of  a  pardon, 
than  if  he  denied  and  stood  his  trial.  So  he  gave  evidence 
both  against  himself  and  others  in  the  matter  of  the  Hermae.5 
The  Athenians  were  delighted  to  think  that  they  had  at  last 

1  Time.  vi.  50-52.  2  Thuc.  vi.  53. 

3  Plut.  Alcib.  20 ;  Diod.  xiii.  2.  Grote  disbelieved  this.  (Vol.  v. 
p.  174,  n.) 

4  Andoc.  De  Myst.  §§  41,  45.  In  examining  the  persons  thus 
ruthlessly  attacked,  the  Council  went  so  far  as  to  suspend  the  decree 
of  Scainandrius,  which  forbade  the  putting  of  any  Athenian  to  torture, 
but  the  men  escaped.    Andoc.  I.e.  §  43.        6  Thuc.  vi,  60,  Jowett. 


X.  II.]  ATTACK  ON  A L CIBIADES,  Itl5.  315 


discovered  the  authors  of  the  conspiracy.  The  informer 
was  liberated,  and  all  against  whom  he  brought  no  charges  : 
the  accused,  as  many  of  them  as  could  be  found,  were 
executed." 

In  his  Oration  on  the  Mysteries,  delivered  in  399,  Andocides, 
who  is,  no  doubt,  the  prisoner  to  whom  Thucydides  refers, 
endeavours  to  clear  his  character.  He  could  point  to  the 
fact  that  the  Hermes  before  his  own  house  was  the  only 
one  uninjured  in  the  city,  as  evidence  that  he  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  outrage.  That  he  had  informed  against  his 
fellow-prisoners  he  could  not  deny,  but  he  could  explain  the 
motives  which  led  him  to  do  so.  It  was  not  from  any  desire 
to  save  himself  that  he  repeated  what  he  had  heard  from 
those  who  were  implicated  in  the  outrage ;  he  wished  to  save 
his  friends  and  relations,  and  put  an  end  to  the  painful  state 
of  suspicion  in  which  the  city  was  plunged.  He  also  main- 
tains, in  direct  contradiction  to  the  statement  of  Thucydides, 
that  no  one  was  put  to  death  in  consequence  of  his  infor- 
mation. Among  those  mentioned  in  his  list  some  had  already 
been  condemned  on  the  evidence  of  Teucer;  others  had 
escaped  sentence  by  going  into  exile;  and  the  remaining 
four,  whom  he  was  the  first  to  mention,  men  previously  sus- 
pected and  certainly  guilty,  had  saved  their  lives  by  flight.1 

True  or  false,  the  information  given  by  Andocides  cleared 
the  air.  The  Athenians  were  delivered  from  their  fear  of 
revolution.  But  the  enemies  of  Alcibiades  had  Renewed  attack 
all  the  wider  scope  for  their  schemes ;  they  on  Alcibiades. 
could  now  fix  the  attention  of  the  people  cm  the  danger  to 
be  apprehended  from  his  ambition.  About  this  time  the 
Spartans  happened  to  send  a  small  body  of  troops  to  the 
Isthmus  in  connection  with  the  Boeotians,  and  this  was  re- 
presented as  a  movement  against  Athens,  prompted  by 
Alcibiades  and  supported  by  a  party  of  conspirators  in  the 

i  Andoc.  De  Myst.  §§  49,  52  f.  See  also  De  Reditu,  §  7,  and  Mr. 
Merchant's  Appendix,  "On  the  connection  of  Andocides  with  the 
mutilation  of  the  Hermae,"  p.  178  of  his  edition,  Bivingtons,  1889 ; 
Plutarch,  Alcib.  21. 


316 


HE  IS  RECALLED  BUT  ESCAPES,  415. 


[X.  12. 


city.  The  greatest  excitement  prevailed,  and  for  one  night 
the  people  lay  in  arms  in  the  temple  of  Theseus.  At  Argos 
also  there  was  some  disturbance,  and  his  friends  there  were 
suspected  of  a  leaning  towards  tyranny.  This  was  enough 
to  revive  the  impression  made  by  the  violation  of  the 
mysteries,  and  it  was  resolved  to  bring  him  to  trial  without 
further  delay.1  An  impeachment  for  impiety  was  brought 
forward  by  Thessalus,  the  son  of  Cimon,  and  the  Sala- 
minian  galley  was  despatched  to  Catana  to  bring  him  home 
to  trial.2 

On  their  return  to  Catana,  the  Athenians  found  the 
Salaminia  waiting  for  Alcibiades.  Orders  had  been  given 
A1'    ■  to  those  on  board  not  to  arrest  him,  a  step 

Alcibiades  re-  ,  .  , .  .      .  '  * 

called  from        wincn  might  have  alienated  the  Argives  and 
Sicily:  his        Mantineans  in  the  army;  he  was  merely  re- 
'  quested  to  go  back  to  Athens  and  defend  him- 

self. He  made  no  resistance,  and,  together  with  others  who 
were  accused,  at  once  accompanied  the  state  galley  on  the 
homeward  voyage.  By  the  time  that  they  reached  Thurii 
he  seems  to  have  ascertained  more  clearly  the  state  of  feeling 
at  Athens ;  to  return  was  to  fall  a  victim  to  the  prejudice 
which  his  enemies  had  created  against  him.  He  disappeared 
from  his  ship  with  his  companions,  and  after  searching  for 
him  in  vain,  the  Salaminia  returned  alone  to  Athens.3 

12.  After  the  departure  of  Alcibiades,  Mcias  and  Lamachus 
divided  their  forces  into  two  portions,  for  which  they  cast 
Movements  of  lots'  as  before.  Whether  they  formally  revised 
the  Athenians  their  plans  is  not  stated;  in  the  operations 
m  Sicily.  which  immediately  follow,  we  seem  to  have  a 

combination  of  the  three  schemes.  The  whole  fleet  sailed 
from  Catana  to  Segesta  to  ascertain  what  money  would  be 

1  Thuc.  vi.  61. 

2  According  to  Plutarch,  Alcib.  22,  Alcibiades  was  charged  with 
celebrating  the  mysteries  in  his  own  house,  where  he  took  the  part 
of  hierophant  himself,  Pulytion  that  of  torchbearer,  and  Theodoras 
that  of  herald,  etc.  This  is  a  different  version  from  that  given  in 
Andocides,  I.e.  §  12,  where  it  is  stated  that  the  celebration  took  place 
in  the  house  of  Pulytion.  3  Thuc.  vi.  61. 


X.  12.]        THE  ATHENIANS  AT  SYRACUSE,  415.  317 


supplied,  and  also  to  investigate  the  nature  of  the  dispute 
with  Selinus.  On  the  way  they  touched  at  Himera,  where 
they  were  not  received,  and  succeeded  in  capturing  and  en- 
slaving Hyccara,  a  town  of  the  Sicanians.  From  Hyccara 
the  army  returned  by  land  to  Catana,  through  the  territory 
of  the  Sicels.  Nicias,  with  the  fleet,  went  on  to  Segesta, 
where  he  received  the  30  talents  still  remaining  in  the 
treasury.  A  far  larger  sum  was  received  from  the  slaves 
taken  at  Hyccara,  who  were  sold  at  Catana  for  120  talents. 
The  summer  was  now  almost  over ;  what  remained  was  spent 
in  a  fruitless  attempt  on  Hybla  Geleatis.1 

So  far  the  campaign  had  been  conducted  on  the  programme 
of  Nicias  and  Alcibiades.  The  result  cannot  be  called 
successful.  Besides  Naxos,  no  Greek  city  had  joined  the 
Athenians  but  Catana,  and  Catana  had  been  gained  by  an 
accident;  no  town  had  been  captured  but  the  barbarian 
Hyccara.  The  delay  had  produced  the  natural  result  at 
Syracuse.  The  alarm  created  by  the  arrival  of  the  Athenians 
had  worn  off :  the  Syracusans,  so  far  from  dreading  attack, 
clamoured  to  be  led  out  to  Catana ;  their  horse  rode  up  to 
the  Athenian  lines,  asking  whether  they  had  come  to  restore 
the  Leontines,  or  themselves  to  settle  in  Syracusan  territory. 
Such  insolence  could  not  be  permitted.  The  generals  at 
once  resolved  to  remove  from  Catana  to  Syracuse,  but  the 
change  was  not  easily  accomplished.  If  they  went  openly 
by  sea,  there  would  be  difficulties  about  disembarka- 
tion; if  by  land,  they  would  be  harassed  by  the  Syracusan 
horse.  It  was  necessary  to  resort  to  stratagem,  in  which 
Nicias  was  helped  by  citizens  of  Syracuse,  acting  in  concert 
with  their  party  at  Catana.  The  Syracusans  Theyadvance 
were  led  to  believe  that  the  Athenian  camp  fromcatana 
might  be  surprised  at  night  and  their  fleet  toSyracuse- 
burnt.  A  day  was  fixed  upon ;  the  Syracusans  marched  out 
and  encamped  for  the  night  on  the  Symaethus,  from  which, 
next  day,  they  pressed  on  to  Catana,  to  find  the  Athenians 


i  Thuc.  vi,  62, 


318         BATTLE  BY  THE  GREAT  HARBOUR,  415.     [X.  12. 


gone,  they,  meanwhile,  learning  that  the  Syracusans  had  left 
the  city,  embarked  with  all  haste,  entered  the  Great  Harbour, 
and  encamped  on  a  convenient  site  which  had  been  pointed 
out  to  them  near  the  Olympieum.  Lying  between  trees  and 
houses  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  cliffs  of  the  shore  on  the 
other,  they  were  well  protected  from  the  Syracusan  cavalry, 
which  could  not  take  them  on  either  flank.  They  strengthened 
their  position  still  further  by  repairing  a  fortress  on  the 
promontory  of  Dascon  and  breaking  down  the  bridge  over 
the  Anapus ;  their  ships  they  protected  by  a  stockade.  No 
attempt  was  made  from  the  city  to  disturb  them  till  the 
Syracusans,  on  their  return  from  Catana,  rode  up  to  the  lines 
and  offered  battle,  an  offer  which  Nicias  did  not  then  accept.1 
The  next  day  a  sharp  engagement  took  place.  The 
Athenian  army  was  divided  into  two  sections ;  one  half  was 
Battle  of  in  advance,  drawn  up  in  line,  eight  shields 

Syracuse.  deep  ;  the  other  remained  near  the  encampment, 
arranged  in  a  square  with  the  baggage  in  the  centre.  These 
also  were  eight  shields  deep,  and  were  under  orders  to 
support  any  part  of  the  line  which  might  be  in  difficulties. 
The  Syracusans  were  drawn  up  sixteen  shields  deep,  and  on 
the  right  were  posted  their  cavalry,  1200  in  number,  with 
the  javelin  men.  After  a  short  speech,  Nicias  led  his  men 
forward,  too  rapidly  for  the  enemy,  who  never  supposed  that 
the  Athenians,  after  their  refusal  of  the  previous  day,  would 
begin  the  attack.  The  engagement  opened  with  skirmishes 
of  the  light-armed — the  "  stone-throwers,"  bowmen,  and 
slingers  on  either  side,  each  in  turn  defeating  the  other,  but 
without  any  decisive  result.  Sacrifices  were  then  offered; 
the  trumpets  sounded;  the  heavy-armed  met.  For  a  long 
time  the  Syracusans  held  their  ground,  though  somewhat 
dismayed  by  a  violent  thunderstorm  which  broke  upon  the 
battle — for  though  not  deficient  in  courage,  they  were  with- 
out experience  of  war.  At  length  the  Argives  defeated 
the  Syracusan  left,  and  the  Athenians  those  on  the  right: 


1  Thuc.  vi.  63-66.    For  the  places  mentioned  see  the  plan,  p.  327. 


X.  12.]      THE  ARMY  RETURNS  TO  CA  TANA,  415.  319 


the  whole  line  then  broke  up  and  turned  to  flight.  The 
victorious  army  had  to  remain  content  with  the  possession  of 
the  field,  for  pursuit  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  Syra- 
cusan  horse,  which  by  repeated  charges  compelled  the 
Athenians  to  keep  together.  Without  even  seizing  the 
Olympieum,  where  the  Syracusans  had  placed  a  large  amount 
of  treasure,1  they  returned  to  their  position  and  set  up  the 
usual  trophy  of  victory.  They  then  gathered  up  the  corpses 
of  their  slain,  and  burnt  them  on  a  funeral  pyre.  On  the 
next  day,  after  giving  back  to  the  Syracusans  Thg  Athenians 
their  dead,  they  collected  the  spoils  on  the  return  to 
battlefield  and  at  once  sailed  back  to  Catana,  Catana- 
carrying  with  them  the  bones  of  their  dead.  They  thought, 
or  Nicias  thought,  that  in  spite  of  their  victory  they  could  not 
maintain  their  position  without  a  force  of  cavalry ;  and  they 
were  in  need  of  supplies.  They  resolved  to  defer  further 
operations  till  the  spring.  Meanwhile  they  would  send  to 
Athens  for  money  and  horsemen;  and  gain  what  support 
they  could  from  the  cities  of  Sicily.2 

We  cannot  of  course  tell  to  what  extent  the  Athenians 
suffered  from  the  Syracusan  horse,  but  as  their  loss  in 
the  battle  did  not  amount  to  one-fifth  of  the  enemy's,  the 
damage  cannot  have  been  great.  Yet  Nicias  at  once  con- 
demns his  equipment  as  insufficient,  abandons  all  thought 
of  further  hostilities,  and  resolves  to  spend  the  whole  of  the 
coming  winter  in  renewed  preparations.  He  was  known  as 
one  of  the  safest  of  Athenian  generals — a  commander  under 
whom  any  one  might  serve  with  the  least  possible  risk, — but 
his  caution  was  now  become  timidity.  A  resolute  attack  on 
Syracuse  at  this  time,  such  as  Lamachus  doubtless  advised, 
would  probably  have  carried  the  city ;  but  such  an  attack 
would  have  cost  lives  ;  and  Nicias  knew  the  temper  of  the 
Athenians  towards  those  who  led  their  fellow-citizens — their 


1  This  omission  Plutarch  ascribes  to  the  piety  of  Nicias;  Nic.  16. 

2  Thuc.  vi.  67-71.  The  historian  seems  to  dwell  with  peculiar 
interest  on  this  first  conflict,  describing  in  considerable  detail  what 
was  after  all  an  unimportant  matter. 


320  EFFORTS  OF  THE  SYRACUSANS,  415-4U.      [X.  13. 


sons  or  brothers — to  destruction.  He  fell  back  on  the  plan 
of  Alcibiades,  when  Alcibiades  was  no  longer  present  to 
carry  it  out. 

13.  The  Syracusans  made  the  best  of  the  respite.  On  the 
advice  of  Hermocrates,  who  encouraged  his  countrymen  by 
pointing  out  that  their  defeat  was  due  to  want 
atrsymcuse.S  °f  skill  rather  than  want  of  courage — they 
Envoys  sent  had  been  like  apprentices  in  war  matched 
to  Greece.  with  skilled  craftsmen — they  reformed  their 
military  system,  training  their  army,  and  reducing  the  num- 
ber of  generals  from  fifteen  to  three,  of  whom  Hermocrates 
was  himself  to  be  one.  To  these  they  gave  full  powers, 
binding  themselves  by  an  oath  to  obey  the  orders  given. 
They  also  sent  envoys  to  Corinth  and  Lacedaemon.  They 
wished  if  possible  to  get  help  from  these  cities,  or  at  least 
to  induce  the  Lacedaemonians,  by  making  open  and  vigorous 
war  on  Athens,  to  prevent  the  sending  of  additional  forces 
to  Sicily.1 

When  they  arrived  at  Corinth,  the  envoys,  who  had 
endeavoured  on  their  way  to  rouse  the  Greek  cities  in  Italy 
to  a  sense  of  the  impending  danger,  were  received  with 
great  enthusiasm;  a  vote  was  at  once  passed  for  sending 
aid  to  Syracuse,  and  Corinthian  envoys  were  chosen  to 
accompany  them  to  Sparta  and  support  their  petition. 

To  Sparta  they  went,  and  there  found  Alcibiades  and  his 
companions,  who,  on  their  non-appearance  at  Athens,  had 
been  condemned  to  death.  They  had  crossed  from  Thurii  to 
Cyllene  in  Elis,  whence  Alcibiades  had  been  brought  to 
Alcibiades  Sparta  under  a  safe-conduct.  He  now  appeared 
at  Sparta.  jn  ^he  Assembly,  and  every  eye  was  turned 
upon  him  when  he  came  forward  to  support  the  Syracusans. 
For  the  Spartan  authorities  were  already  intending  to  send 
envoys  to  prevent  the  Syracusans  from  coming  to  terms  with 
the  Athenians,  but  they  declined  to  take  any  more  active 
steps  in  their  behalf.     They  were  in  fact  considering  the 


1  Thuc.  vi.  72,  73. 


X.  i3.] 


ALCIBIADES  AT  SPARTA,  415-4U- 


321 


renewal  of  the  war  at  home,  and  wished  to  concentrate 
their  forces  on  that.1 

After  a  few  opening  words,  in  which  he  convinced  his 
audience  that  he  was  a  traitor  to  Athens,  and  not  to  them, 
Alcibiades  pointed  out  the  importance  of  sending  assistance 
to  Syracuse.  He  declared  that  the  object  of  the  expedition 
was  not  the  conquest  of  Sicily  only,  but  of  Italy,  and  even 
Carthage.  Mistress  of  these  regions,  and  using  their 
resources  to  increase  her  fleets  and  her  armies,  Athens  would 
then  bring  an  irresistible  force  against  the  Peloponnesus, 
and  reduce  her  to  the  condition  of  a  subject.  This,  which 
was  a  dream  of  his  own  and  other  excited  minds  at  Athens, 
he  declared  to  be  a  settled  plan,  which  the  generals  in  Sicily 
would  endeavour  to  carry  out.  Hence  it  was  of  vital  im- 
portance to  Sparta  to  save  Syracuse.  He  urged  them  to 
send  ships  so  manned  that  the  rowers  could  at  once  serve  as 
heavy-armed,  and  above  all  to  send  a  Spartan  to  take  the 
chief  command  in  the  city.  At  the  same  time  they  must 
not  neglect  the  war  in  Greece.  They  must  occupy  Decelea, 
which  commanded  the  frontier  towards  Boeotia  and  Euboea ; 
by  this  means  they  would  not  only  damage  the  Athenian 
territory,  but  cut  off  the  revenues  derived  from  the  silver- 
mines  at  Laurium  and  other  sources.  When  the  allies  saw 
the  Lacedaemonians  in  earnest,  they  would  no  longer  stand 
in  awe  of  Athens,  and  would  refuse  to  pay  their  tribute.  With 
this  the  Athenian  empire  would  come  to  an  end,  and  Sparta 
would  become  the  acknowledged  leader  of  a  willing  Hellas.2 
The  Spartans  were  persuaded;  they  believed,  and  were 
right  in  believing,  that  Alcibiades  spoke  in  their  interests, 
and  that  he  knew  the  points  at  which  Athens  could  be 
attacked  with  the  greatest  success.  Gylippus,  the  son  of 
Cleandridas,  who  was  well  known  in  the  west  (supra,  p.  21), 
was  appointed  to  take  the  command  in  Sicily,  and  ordered 
to  arrange  at  once  with  the  Corinthians  and  Syracusans  as 
to  the  best  and  speediest  means  of  sending  help. 


i  Time.  vi.  88,  93. 
VOL.  III. 


2  Thuc.  vi.  89-92. 

X 


322  HERM OCR  A  TES  AT  CAMAR/JVA,  41&414.       [X.  14. 

14.  The  Syracusans  were  not  less  active  than  the  Spartans. 
During  the  winter  they  enlarged  the  fortifications  of  the  city, 
Preparation  of  inclosing  the  district  known  as  the  Temenites, 
the  syracusans.  and  extending  the  new  wall  along  the  whole 
front  towards  Epipolae.1  They  also  planted  a  garrison  at 
Megara,  and  at  the  Olympieum,  and  protected  with  stockades 
any  point  in  the  shore  which  offered  opportunities  for 
landing.  The  Athenians,  after  leaving  the  Great  Harbour, 
had  sailed  to  Messene,  in  the  hope  that  the  city  would  be 
betrayed  to  them,  but  failing  in  this,  owing  to  the  treachery 
of  Alcibiades,  they  returned  to  Naxos  for  the  winter,  aban- 
doning their  camp  at  Catana.  This  the  Syracusans  now 
destroyed;  and  hearing  that  the  Athenians  were  in  hopes 
of  persuading  Camarina  to  disregard  the  convention  of 
Gela  and  go  back  to  the  alliance  which  had  been  made 
in  the  time  of  Laches,  they  sent  Hermocrates  and  other 
envoys  to  counteract  them.  The  situation  was  discussed 
in  a  public  assembly  of  the  Camarinaeans,  and  Thucy- 
dides  has  availed  himself  of  the  opportunity  to  bring  before 
us  the  opposite  views  of  the  patriotic  defenders  of  the 
island,  and  of  the  invaders.  Hermocrates  spoke 

Camarina,  *■ 

Hermocrates,  first.  He  endeavoured  to  throw  discredit  on 
Athenians  ^e  Athenian  professions  by  pointing  to  their 
past  conduct,  which  showed  what  they  really 
had  in  view  when  proposing  an  alliance.  They  had  gathered 
allies  round  them  under  pretence  of  liberating  them  from 
the  yoke  of  Persia,  but  the  liberation  had  been  no  more 
than  a  change  of  slavery;  and  their  object  now,  in  their 
pretended  support  of  Leontini,  was  the  enslavement  of 
Sicily.  Besides  Camarina  was  a  Dorian  city,  and  between 
Dorians  and  Ionians  there  could  be  no  lasting  friendship. 
Sicily  must  combine  to  repel  the  invader;  by  offering  a 
united  front  they  might  hope  for  success,  but  if  there  was 
a  division  among  them,  the  Athenians  would  carry  the  day. 


1  See  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily,  vol.  iii.  Appendix  xii.  The  details 
cannot  be  fixed  with  any  degree  of  certainty. 


X.  14- ]     THE  ATHENIANS  AT  CAMARINA,  415-414-  323 


Syracuse  would  do  her  part ;  if  Camarina  did  not  choose  to 
join  her — and  in  the  recent  battle  her  assistance  had  been 
of  the  most  half-hearted  kind— she  would  be  treated  as 
a  traitor,  should  the  Syracusan  cause  gain  the  day. 

The  Athenian  envoy,  Euphemus,  took  up  the  assertion  that 
the  Ionians  and  Dorians  were  always  at  enmity.  It  was  for 
that  reason  that  Athens  had  established  her  independence  in 
Hellas  after  the  Persian  war— for  why  should  she  follow 
the  lead  of  Sparta  ?— and  that  independence  she  would  main- 
tain. On  her  empire  depended  her  safety.  It  was  the  same 
fear  of  falling  into  the  power  of  Dorian  Peloponnesus 
that  had  brought  them  into  Sicily,  but  they  came  as  allies 
and  not  to  establish  an  empire.  This  might  appear  to  be 
an  inconsistent  policy,  but  it  was  not  so ;  the  Athenians 
were  guided  by  the  same  motives  in  each  case.  It  was  to 
their  advantage  to  have  subject  allies  in  Greece,  and  inde- 
pendent allies  in  Sicily ;  and  therefore  the  Camarinaeans 
need  not  be  afraid  of  them.  But  of  Syracuse  they  had 
every  reason  to  be  afraid  ;  she  was  an  aggressive  city,  which 
sought  by  subjugating  Sicily  to  become  a  great  power,  and 
for  that  reason  Athens  was  attacking  her.  It  was  through 
fear  of  Syracuse  that  Camarina  had  already  entered  into 
alliance  with  Athens ;  let  her  follow  the  same  policy  with 
greater  vigour  now,  when  it  was  in  her  power  to  render 
efficient  help. 

The  hearts  of  the  Camarinaeans  were  with  the  Athenians 

 though  they  were  not  without  some  suspicions  of  their 

designs  on  Sicily;  with  Syracuse,  as  a  neighbouring  city, 
they  were  always  at  variance.  At  the  same  time  they  were 
afraid  of  the  Syracusans,  who,  if  victorious,  would  certainly 
punish  their  defection.  They  answered  the  envoys  that  as 
both  cities  were  allies,  they  could  join  neither;  but  they  never- 
theless sent  some  slight  assistance  to  the  Syracusans,  as  they 
had  already  done  in  the  battle  by  the  Great  Harbour.1 

The  Athenians  spent  the  rest  of  the  winter  in  negotiating 


1  Thuc.  vi.  75-88. 


324  THE  ATHENIANS  ON  EPIPOLAE,  414.        [X.  15. 


with  the  Sicels.  Those  who  had  maintained  their  inde- 
pendence— inhabitants  of  the  midland  regions  of  the  island 
The  Athenians  — were  mostly  on  the  Athenian  side,  and 
and  the  Sicels.  furnished  supplies.  Others,  who  dwelt  in  the 
plain  and  were  subject  to  the  Syracusans,  stood  aloof  for 
a  time,  but  were  compelled  to  come  over,  except  those  who 
were  rescued  by  timely  aid  from  Syracuse.  The  Athenian 
camp  was  also  removed  from  Naxos  to  the  old  position  at 
Catana.  At  the  beginning  of  the  winter  a  trireme  had  been 
sent  to  Athens  for  cavalry  and  supplies ;  another  was  des- 
patched to  Carthage  to  open  friendly  negotiations  and 
obtain  help  if  possible,  and  yet  another  to  Etruria,  where 
some  of  the  cities  promised  help,  which  subsequently  came. 
Horses  were  demanded  from  the  Sicels  and  Segestaeans, 
and  siege-materials  were  prepared.1 

15.  As  soon  as  the  weather  permitted  (414),  the  Athenians 
opened  the  campaign  by  devastating  parts  of  the  Syracusan 
territory  which  lay  between  the  city  and  Catana,  and 
acquired  a  Sicel  town  named  Centoripa.  On  their  return 
to  Catana  they  found  that  250  horsemen  had  arrived  from 
Athens  with  their  harness,  but  no  horses,  and  large  supplies 
of  money. 

Nicias  now  resolved  to  begin  the  siege  of  Syracuse.  In 
order  to  cut  off  the  city  on  the  landward  side,  it  was  neces- 
The  Athenians  sary  *or  tlie  Athenians  to  occupy  Epipolae — a 
succeed  in  seiz-  long  triangle  of  table-land,  with  sides  more  or 
mg  Epipolae.  jegg  precjpit0us,  which  slopes  gently  from  an 
elevated  point  on  the  west  to  the  city  wall — as  a  base ;  if  this 
occupation  could  be  prevented,  a  siege  was  impossible.  On 
hearing  that  the  Athenians  had  received  reinforcements,  the 
Syracusan  generals  held  a  review  in  the  low  land  by  the 
Anapus,  and  chose  a  select  band  of  six  hundred  heavy-armed 
to  act  as  a  garrison  on  Epipolae,  which  seems  to  have  been 
hitherto  left  unprotected.  But  it  was  too  late.  While  they 
were  thus  engaged,  the  Athenians  advanced  from  Catana  to  a 


1  Thuc.  vi.  74,  88. 


X.  16.]    THEY  BEGIN  THE  SIEGE  OF  SYRACUSE,  4U-  325 


point  on  the  shore  near  Leon,  less  than  a  mile  from  Epipolae. 
Here  they  landed  their  infantry,  while  the  fleet  returned  to 
Thapsus.  The  infantry  at  once  rushed  to  Epipolae,  which 
they  ascended,  unperceived,  by  a  narrow  path  near  the  Eury- 
elus,  at  the  western  end  of  the  slope.  When  the  Syracusans 
caught  sight  of  them  from  their  position  near  the  Anapus, 
they  hastened  to  the  defence;  the  six  hundred  and  other 
troops  came  up  at  full  speed,  but  as  they  had  to  traverse 
about  three  miles  before  they  reached  the  enemy,  their 
attack  was  ineffectual  and  irregular.  About  half  of  the 
select  troops  were  slain,  including  the  commander,  and  the 
rest  retreated  into  the  city.  The  Athenians  then  built  a 
fort  at  Labdalum,  on  the  edge  of  Epipolae,  looking  towards 
Megara,  as  a  storehouse  for  their  supplies.  They  were  now 
joined  by  a  body  of  horsemen  from  Segesta,  and  having  also 
obtained  horses  for  the  cavalry  who  had  come  from  Athens, 
they  could  put  in  the  field  a  troop  of  six  hundred  and  fifty 
mounted  soldiers.  From  Labdalum  they  advanced  to  Syke, 
in  the  direction  of  Syracuse,  and  began  to  build  a  circle  or 
central  fortress,  from  which  to  carry  on  the  wall  of  circum- 
vallation.1 

16.  The  Athenians  were  now  firmly  established  on  Epi- 
polae ;  for  the  Syracusans  did  not  venture  on  a  general  battle, 
and  even  their  dreaded  cavalry  were  defeated  in  a  slight 

1  Thuc.  vi.  97  :  tvanep  KaOe^o^voi  Irelxicrav  tov  kvkXov  Sia  rdxovs. 
There  is  much  doubt  about  the  meaning  of  tov  kvkXov.  Is  it  (1)  the 
wall  by  which  they  intended  to  surround  Syracuse,  or  (2)  a  circular 
fort  at  Syke  ?  That  there  was  such  a  fort  is  certain,  cp.  c.  102  ;  yet 
in  vii.  2  t<3  aXXto  tov  kvkXov  trpbs  rbv  TpayiKov  seems  to  mean  the 
part  of  the  besiegers'  wall  towards  Trogilus.  For  though  in  vi.  98 
we  can  join  itpbs  Bopeav  tov  kvkXov,  we  cannot  joinTrpo?  rbv  TpayiXov 
rov  kvkXov.  In  some  other  points  also  the  language  of  Thucydides 
is  obscure.  Why  does  he  use  the  extraordinary  expression  at  the 
beginning  of  c.  97  :  TavTrjs  ty)S  vvktos  Trj  eniyiyvopevr)  rjpepa"}  There 
is  nothing  to  which  Tavrrjs  rrjs  v.  can  conveniently  refer.  What  we 
expect  to  be  told  is  that  the  Athenians  came  to  Leon  during  the  night, 
and  on  the  next  day  ascended  Epipolae.  But  he  also  speaks  of  a 
review— i£r}Ta£ovTo,  c.  97  ;  and  where  does  this  come  in  ?  It  is  difficult 
to  suppose  that  it  was  held  at  Leon,  for  time  was  everything  in  seizing 
Epipolae.    See  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily,  iii.  211,  Appendix  xiii. 


326 


: 

WALL  AND  COUNTER-WALL,  414. 


[X.  16. 


engagement.  They  at  once  began  to  build  a  wall  which 
should  extend  from  the  edge  of  the  Great  Harbour  to  the 

open  sea  towards  Trogilus,  using  the  "circle" 
wan  and  the  as  a  Dase  of  operations.  They  first  took  in  hand 
first  Syracusan    the  section  towards  the  north  of  the  circle ;  and 

the  Syracusans,  seeing  them  engaged  in  that 
direction,  resolved,  on  the  advice  of  Hermocrates,  to  run  a 
counter-wall,  protected  by  a  stockade,  south  of  the  circle 
from  the  city  wall,  so  as  to  cross  the  line  on  which  the 
Athenian  wall  would  be  built.  Even  if  they  did  not 
succeed  in  carrying  their  counter-wall  past  the  Athenian 
line,  they  would  at  least  divide  them,  and  prevent  them  from 
carrying  on  their  work  with  their  whole  force.  And  as  the 
Athenian  ships  had  not  yet  sailed  into  the  Great  Harbour, 
the  Syracusans  could  still  make  free  use  of  the  shores  of  it. 
Without  any  opposition  from  the  Athenians,  who  refused  to 
be  drawn  from  their  building  on  the  north,  they  completed 
the  wall,  and  placed  a  garrison  on  it.  The  Athenians  replied 
by  severing  the  conduits  which  conveyed  water  into  the  city, 
and  afterwards,  taking  advantage  of  the  carelessness  of  the 
garrison  at  noonday,  they  drove  the  Syracusans  from  the 
counter-wall  and  destroyed  it.1 

On  the  next  day  the  Athenians  began  to  carry  their  wall 
southwards  from  the  circle,  to  secure  the  cliffs  which  over- 
The  second  hung  the  marshy  ground  between  Epipolae  and 
syracusan  wall.  tne  Qreat  Harbour ;  and  the  Syracusans,  on 
seeing  this,  resolved  at  any  rate  to  prevent  them  from  advanc- 
ing from  the  cliffs  to  the  shore  of  the  harbour.  Abandoning 
the  higher  ground,  and  even  the  lower  level  on  the  southern 
slope  of  Epipolae,  they  now  cut  a  trench  "  through  the  middle 
of  the  marsh,"  and  planted  a  stockade  alongside.  The 
Athenians  in  reply  ordered  their  fleet  to  sail  from  Thapsus 
into  the  Great  Harbour,  and  when  they  had  brought  their 

1  Thuc.  vi.  99,  100.  The  nature  of  the  counter- wall  is  clear  from 
C.  100  :  ocra  re  earavpadr]  Kai  (OKohoiir)6r)  rov  V7rorei^i'cr/xaro?.  It  was 
also  furnished  with  wooden  towers.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  ran 
south  of  the  circle,  though  iu  Poppo-Stahl — on  vi.  99 — it  is  put  north. 


X.  16.]         THE  SECOND  COUNTER-WALL,  4U-  327 


wall  to  the  edge  of  the  cliffs,  they  at  once  attacked  and 
destroyed  the  newly  erected  stockade.    In  the  battle  which 
followed  they  defeated  the  Syracusans,  but  the  Death  of 
victory  was  dearly  purchased  by  the  death  of  Lamachus' 
Lamachus,  who,  while  reinforcing  the  Athenian  right,  was 


SYRACUSE  DURING  THE  ATHENIAN  SIEGE. 

This  plan  has  been  copied,  with  the  permission  of  the  Delegates  of  the  Clarendon 
Press,  from  that  in  Professor  Freeman's  History  of  Sicily,  vol.  iii.  p.  167.  The  forti- 
fications of  Tycha  and  Temenites  are  quite  uncertain  ;  perhaps  the  dotted  line  1 
should  be  extended  south-east  to  the  point  where  the  dotted  line  7  leaves  the  wall 
of  Achradina,  and  the  solid  lines  enclosing  Temenites  (on  all  sides  but  the  east) 
removed.   This  is  the  view  taken  in  the  map  given  in  Lupus,  Syrakus. 


cut  off  from  the  main  body,  and  slain,  with  five  or  six 
others.    Nicias  had  taken  no  part  in  the  attack.    He  had 


328  THE  SYRACUSANS  IN  DESFA1K,  414.         [X.  17. 


remained  behind  in  the  "  circle  "  on  Epipolae  owing  to  illness. 
He  too  found  himself  in  danger  of  being  cut  off,  for  while 
the  engagement  in  the  marsh  was  still  going  on,  a  party  of 
Syracusans,  who  had  fled  into  the  city,  formed  again,  attacked 
the  circle,,  and  even  carried  an  outwork  connected  wkh  it. 
Nicias,  who  was  almost  alone,  could  only  save  himself  by 
setting  on  fire  the  engines  and  timber  which  lay  scattered 
round.  By  this  means  he  not  only  kept  off  the  enemy, 
but  gave  a  signal  to  the  Athenians  on  the  lower  ground, 
who  at  once  sent  assistance.  At  the  same  time  the  sight 
of  the  Athenian  ships  sailing  into  the  Great  Harbour  re- 
called the  Syracusans  to  the  defence  of  the  city.  From 
all  quarters  they  retired  within  the  walls,  and  abandoned 
the  attempt  to  prevent  the  Athenians  from  completing  their 
siege  wall.1 

17.  The  death  of  Lamachus  was  a  severe  blow  to  the 
Athenians — the  more  severe  because  the  sole  command  of 
the  fleet  and  army  was  now  in  the  hands  of  Nicias,  who, 
owing  to  illness,  was  more  than  ever  unequal  to  his  position. 
Fortunately,  no  further  action  was  required  for  a  time.  The 
Athenians  went  on  with  their  work,  unmolested  by  the  Syra- 
cusans, carrying  a  double  wall  from  the  cliffs  of  Epipolae  to 
the  edge  of  the  harbour.2  The  tide  of  feeling  now  changed 
in  their  favour ;  supplies  were  brought  in  from  all  parts  of 
Sicily;  from  Etruria  came  three  ships  of  fifty  oars;  and 
many  of  the  Sicels,  who  had  hitherto  wavered,  sent  con- 
Despondency  ot  tingents.  The  Syracusans,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Syracusans.  Degan  to  despair ;  no  help  came  to  them  from 
the  Peloponnesus,  and  the  complete  blockade  of  the  city 
seemed  inevitable.  In  their  vexation  they  deposed  the 
generals,  including  Hermocrates,  whom  they  blamed  for 
their  misfortunes,  and  chose  three  others  in  their  place. 


1  Time,  vi.  101,  102  ;  Freeman,  I.e.  p.  669.  The  words  airb  rov 
kvkKov  irel^i^ov  rov  Kprj/xvov  are  explained  by  eVetS?)  to  npos  rov 
Kprjpvov  i^eipyaaro  just  below. 

2  Thuc.  vi.  103  :  airo  rav  'EnnroXcov  koX  tov  Kpr]p.vd>dovs  ,  .  .  (**XPl 
rrjs  0a\do-(TT)s. 


X.  i7.] 


GYL1PPUS  AT  HIM  ERA,  4U> 


329 


The  surrender  of  the  city  was  publicly  discussed,  and 
negotiations  were  opened  with  Nicias. 

Unknown  to  them  the  Deliverer  was  on  his  way.  On 
receiving  his  instructions  (supra,  p.  321),  Gylippus  had 
arranged  with  the  Corinthians  to  despatch  two  Approach  of 
ships  without  delay  to  Asine  in  Messenia,  and  GyHPPus- 
prepare  for  starting,  when  the  season  arrived,  as  many 
more  as  they  meant  to  send.1  With  these  ships  he  had 
reached  Leucas  on  his  way  to  the  west,  when  he  was  in- 
formed that  Syracuse  was  completely  invested  by  the 
Athenians  and  beyond  relief.  Gylippus  at  once  showed 
of  what  metal  he  was  made.  If  Sicily  were  lost,  he  might 
still  save  Italy,  and  he  determined  to  press  on.  Accom- 
panied by  Pythen,  the  Corinthian  commander,  he  sailed 
with  two  Laconian  and  two  Corinthian  ships  to  Tarentum, 
leaving  the  rest  to  follow.  From  Tarentum,  after  an  un- 
successful effort  to  win  over  Thurii,  of  which  city  his  father 
had  once  been  a  citizen,  he  passed  along  the  coast,  intending 
to  visit  the  adjacent  cities,  but  he  was  caught  in  a  violent 
storm,  and  only  with  difficulty  made  his  way  back  to  Taren- 
tum.2 Nicias  was  informed  of  his  arrival,  but  treated  it  as  a 
matter  of  no  importance.  What  harm  could  a  privateering 
expedition,  with  four  ships,  inflict  on  the  Athenian  army  1 
And  this  had  been  the  opinion  at  Thurii.  But  Gylippus 
thought  differently.  After  refitting  his  ships  at  Tarentum, 
he  advanced  to  Locri.  Here  he  received  more  precise  infor- 
mation about  the  situation  of  affairs  at  Syracuse,  He  lands  at 
and  formed  his  plans  accordingly.  He  deter-  Himera- 
mined  to  sail  to  Himera,  and  after  collecting  what  forces 
he  could,  to  come  back  to  Syracuse  by  land.    He  succeeded 

1  Time.  vi.  93. 

2  Thuc.  vi.  104.  dpTraardeis  vn'>  dvepov  Kara  rov  Tepivaiov  KoXnov, 
os  innvel  ravrr)  jxeyas  Kara  Bopeav  £o~tt)kg)s,  dirocpeperai  is  to  ireXayos. 
The  Terinaean  gulf  is  on  the  other  side  of  the  "  foot 55  of  Italy,  and 
Gylippus  could  not  have  reaohed  it  without  passing  through  the 
straits  of  Messina.  Why  Thucydides  chooses  so  distant  a  point  in 
determining  the  position  of  Gylippus  it  is  difficult  to  say.  Was  he 
misled  by  imperfect  information  1 


330 


GONG  YL  US  RE  A  CHES  S  YRA  C  USE,  4H>        [X.  i3. 


in  passing  the  straits  unseen  by  the  ships  which  Nicias,  on 
hearing  of  his  advance  to  Locri,  had  sent  to  intercept  him, 
and  reached  Him  era.  The  Sicels  of  the  district  were  favour- 
able, and  as  their  king,  Archonides,  who  was  a  friend  of  the 
Athenians,  had  recently  died,  they  could  render  efficient 
assistance;  Himera,  Selinus,  and  Gela  also  furnished  con- 
tingents. Gylippus  quickly  found  himself  at  the  head  of  a 
force  of  about  three  thousand  men,  including  the  rowers  on 
his  own  vessels,  whom  he  armed.  With  these  he  at  once 
marched  on  Syracuse. 

l8.  The  great  news  had  already  reached  the  city.  After 
the  departure  of  Gylippus,  the  Corinthian  ships  had  crossed 
.  .   ,  .         with  all  speed  from  Leucas,  and  Gongylus,  one 

Arrival  of  r  .  . 

Gongylus  at  of  the  commanders,  though  latest  in  starting, 
Syracuse.  was  the  first  to  arrive  at  Syracuse,  which  he 
seems  to  have  had  no  difficulty  in  entering.  He  found  the 
citizens  on  the  point  of  meeting  in  the  Assembly  to  discuss 
the  terms  of  peace  with  the  Athenians.  Hopeless  of  success, 
they  wished  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end.  This  mood  was 
quickly  changed  when  they  heard  from  Gongylus  that  his 
was  the  first  of  a  number  of  ships,  and  that  a  Lacedae- 
monian, Gylippus,  the  son  of  Cleandridas,  was  on  his  way  to 
Syracuse.  They  at  once  abandoned  all  thought  of  peace, 
and  resolved  to  march  out  with  their  whole  force  to  meet 
Gylippus. 

Of  the  double  wall  which  they  were  building  from  the 
southern  edge  of  Epipolae  to  the  harbour,  the  Athenians  had 
now  completed  about  a  mile ;  only  a  small  portion  at  the 
harbour's  edge  remained  to  be  finished.  From  the  cliff  to 
the  "circle,"  the  wall,  a  single  one,  was  finished;  from  the 
"circle"  to  Trogilus  on  the  north,  part  of  the  wall  was 
finished,  part  was  being  built,  and  for  the  remainder  the 
stones  were  placed  in  readiness.  It  was  still  possible  to 
enter  Syracuse  at  this  point.1    Gylippus  seems  to  have  been 

1  We  do  not  know  what  interval  of  time  separated  the  seizure  of 
Epipolae  by  the  Athenians  from  the  coming  of  Gylippus,  but  a 
more  active  general  than  Nicias  could  now  be  would  certainly  have 


X.  18.]  GY LIP  PUS  ENTERS  SYRACUSE,  414. 


331 


accurately  informed  of  the  state  of  affairs.    Seeing  that  the 
Athenians  were  engaged  upon  their  wall  on  the  edge  of  the 
harbour,  he  rushed  on  Epipolae,  ascending  GyiiPPus  on 
by  the  Euryelus,  as  the  Athenians  had  done  ^vo\^. 
before  him,  and  united  with  the  Syracusans,  who  had  come 
out  from  the  city  to  meet  him.     With  their  support  he 
advanced  on  the  Athenian  fortification.1    The  Athenians 
were  taken  at  a  disadvantage,  and  thrown  into  some  con- 
fusion, but  they  drew  out  for  battle.    Their  astonishment 
was  great  when  G-ylippus,  before  giving  the  order  for  attack, 
sent  a  herald  to  say  that  he  was  willing  to  grant  an  armis- 
tice for  five  days,  if  in  that  interval  the  Athenians  would 
leave  Sicily.    To  this  proposal  no  reply  was  made;  and, 
when  we  remember  that  the  Athenian  force  was  many 
times  as  great  as  that  commanded  by  Gylippus,  and  that 
they  held,  or  ought  to  have  held,  complete  control  of  the 
sea,  we  cannot  wonder  that  they  treated  the  offer  with 
contempt.    The  engagement  which  followed  was  not  fought 
out;  Gylippus,  seeing  that  the  Syracusans  had  a  difficulty  in 
forming,  withdrew  to  a  more  open  position,  and  He  enters 
when  Nicias  declined  to  follow,  led  his  army  Syracuse, 
within  the  walls  to  encamp  in  the  Temenites.  The  next  day, 
to  divert  the  attention  of  the  Athenians,  he  drew  out  the 
greater  part  of  his  army  in  front  of  the  Athenian  lines ; 
while,  with  a  smaller  force,  he  captured  Labdalum,  which 
was  out  of  sight  of  the  Athenian  lines.    The  Syracusans^also 
obtained  their  first  success  at  sea  by  seizing  an  Athenian 


completed  his  wall  of  circumvallation  without  delay.  A  single  wall, 
cutting  off  the  city  from  sea  to  sea,  might  have  been  built  in  the  time 
required  to  build  a  double  one  for  a  much  smaller  distance,  but  such 
a  wall  did  not  satisfy  Nicias,  who  never  recognised  that  rapidity  is 
one  of  the  first  conditions  of  success  in  war.  He  had  of  course  failed 
m  his  duty  in  taking  insufficient  measures  for  intercepting  Gylippus 
and  the  Corinthians,  and  in  allowing  Gongylus  to  eDter  Syracuse. 

1  Thuc.  vii.  2:  eVi  r6  TeLXt(Tfxa  rS>v  'AO^vaicov.  Poppo-Stahl  regards 
this  reixio-fxa  as  the  double  wall  of  the  Athenians  on  the  level  ground 
near  the  harbour.  The  omission  to  secure  Euryelus  was  another 
gross  blunder  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians. 


332 


THE  THIRD  COUNTER-WALL,  4U.  [X.  19. 


trireme,  which  was  keeping  watch  near  the  mouth  of  the 
harbour.1  Encouraged  by  their  success,  the  Syracusans  now 
The  third  Syra-  reverted  to  their  old  plans.  Once  more  they 
cusanwaii.  began  to  build  a  wall  which  should  cut  the 
Athenian  line,  and  render  it  impossible  for  them  to  complete 
their  work.  This  new  wall  was,  of  course,  built  on  Epipolae 
to  the  north  of  the  circle,  where  the  Athenian  line  was  still 
incomplete. 

19.  Finding  that  all  was  going  against  him  on  land,  Nicias 
began  to  pay  more  attention  to  the  sea  than  he  had  done 
hitherto.  When  they  finally  entered  the  Great  Harbour,  the 
Athenian  ships  appear  to  have  been  stationed  in  the  north- 
west corner,  not  far  from  the  point  where  the  Athenian 
wall  subsequently  abutted  on  the  harbour's  edge.  It 
was  important  that  they  should  be  near  the  army,  but 
in  other  respects  the  position  was  unsatisfactory.  It  was 
at  a  distance  from  the  smaller  harbour  of  the  Syracusans, 
which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Athenians  to  blockade,  and 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour,  through  which  their 
Nicias  seizes  supplies  were  now  chiefly  brought.  To  obviate 
piemmyrium.  these  evils,  Mcias  seized  Plemmyrium,  the  pro- 
montory on  the  southern  side  of  the  entrance  to  the  harbour, 
and  built  on  it  three  forts,  one  large  and  two  smaller,  to 
serve  as  storehouses.  The  ships  of  war  and  larger  boats 
were  now  brought  up  and  moored  off  Plemmyrium.  Yet 
even  this  new  position,  though  excellent  so  far  as  the  control 
of  the  harbour  was  concerned,  was  not  without  its  disadvan- 
tages. Water  and  wood  could  only  be  obtained  at  a  distance, 
and  the  sailors  who  went  in  search  of  them  were  often  c^t 
off  by  the  Syracusan  horse,  of  which  a  third  part  was  told 
off  for  this  service.  Nicias  also  sent  out  twenty  ships  to 
intercept  the  Corinthian  contingent,  which  was  now  expected 
from  Leucas.2 

In  building  their  wall,  the  Syracusans  actually  availed 
themselves  of  the  stones  which  the  Athenians  had  placed 


l  Thuc.  vii.  3. 


2  Thuc.  vii.  4. 


X.  19.]    CARRIED  PAST  THE  ATHENIAN  WALL,  4U-  333 


for  use  in  their  own  fortification.  To  protect  the  work, 
Gylippus  constantly  led  out  his  forces  in  front  of  it ;  and  the 
Athenians  faced  him  with  theirs.  In  the  first  _ 

.  The  third  Syra- 

engagement  which  took  place  between  tnem,  cusanwaiiis 
they  fought  in  the  narrow  space  between  the  carried  past  the 

*   i       •  n        i  \i      a  .  n     Athenian  wall. 

Athenian  wall  and  the  byracusan  counter-wall, 
where  the  Syracusan  horse  could  not  operate.  The  Syra- 
cusans  were  defeated  and  driven  back,  but  Gylippus,  with 
a  frankness  remarkable  in  a  Spartan  general  addressing 
strangers  under  his  command,  took  the  blame  upon  himself, 
and  encouraged  his  men  to  try  their  fortune  again,  under 
more  favourable  conditions.  Peloponnesians  and  Dorians 
were  not  to  be  defeated  by  Ionian  s  and  islanders,  a  motley 
horde  gathered  from  the  ends  of  the  earth.  Nicias,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  anxious  to  fight  under  any  circumstances, 
for  the  counter-wall  was  now  brought  up  within  a  short  dis- 
tance of  the  Athenian  wall,  and,  unless  the  Syracusans  could 
be  checked,  there  was  an  end  to  all  hope  of  cutting  off  the 
city.  In  the  second  engagement,  Gylippus,  taught  by  his 
previous  experience,  drew  out  his  men  further  away  from 
the  walls,  and  placed  the  cavalry  on  his  right  wing,  which 
we  may  suppose  lay  towards  Epipolae  and  the  open  ground. 
His  dispositions  were  successful.  The  Athenians  were  de- 
feated and  beaten  into  their  own  lines,  and  in  the  following 
night  the  Syracusans  carried  their  wall  past  the  Athenian 
line.    The  game  was  won.1 

On  sea  also  the  Athenians  were  unfortunate.  The  squad- 
ron sent  out  to  intercept  the  Corinthian  ships  failed  to  catch 
them.  They  entered  the  harbour  unobserved,  and  their 
crews  at  once  joined  the  Syracusans  in  completing  their 
work  on  the  fortifications.2 


1  Thuc.  vii.  6,  7. 

2  Thuc.  vii.  7  :  i-vvereixi-o-av  to  Xoiitov  toIs  2vpaKoaiois  ^XPL  T°v 
iyicapo-iov  Tei'^ovs.  The  meaning  of  these  last  words  is  very  doubtful. 
Grote,  whom  Freeman  and  others  follow,  supposed  that  Thucydides 
is  referring  to  a  wall  along  Epipolae,  which  was  carried  down  from 
Euryelus  to  meet  (/ue^pO  the  counter-wall  of  the  Syracusans.  But  why 
with  a  fort  at  Euryelus,  another  at  Labdalum,  and  three  7rpor€t^tV/xara 


334      NIC  IAS1  IE  TIER  TO  THE  ATHENIANS,  4H-    [X.  20. 


20.  Gylippus  had  obtained  the  first  and  greatest  object 
of  his  coming;  he  had  delivered  Syracuse  from  any  im- 
mediate danger.  He  was  on  the  full  tide  of  success,  and 
Gylippus  collects  felt  that  he  was  able  to  leave  the  city  for  a 
reinforcements,  time,  to  collect  new  reinforcements  in  Sicily. 
He  was  now  able  to  persuade  those  who  had  hitherto  been 
waverers  to  join  him.  Preparations  were  also  made  for 
attacking  the  Athenians  on  sea,  and  more  envoys  were  sent 
to  Lacedaemon  and  Corinth,  asking  for  further  help  to  meet 
the  reinforcements  which  would  certainly  come  from  Athens 
in  the  spring. 

Nicias  had  already  sent  numerous  messengers  home  to 
report  the  change  in  his  prospects,  and  now  feeling  that  his 
Letter  of  Nicias  position  was  critical,  he  resolved  to  write  a 
totheAthen-  letter  to  the  Athenians,  in  order  that  they 
reinforcements  might  know  from  himself  the  difficulties  in 
required.  which  he  was  placed.     Sad  was  the  story 

which  he  had  to  tell,  and  envoys  might  be  unable  or  un- 
willing to  repeat  the  whole  truth.  In  this  he  acted  like  the 
honest  and  courageous  man  that  he  was;  he  also  acted 
wisely,  for  it  was  now  necessary  that  the  truth  should  be 
known.  He  had  to  confess  that  since  the  coming  of  Gylip- 
pus he  had  been  entirely  outgeneralled  on  land.  Unless  the 
Syracusan  counter-wall  was  captured,  and  this  could  not  be 
done  without  a  large  force,  Syracuse  could  no  longer  be 
besieged.  Encouraged  by  their  success  on  land,  the  enemy 
were  contemplating  an  attack  on  the  Athenian  fleet.  They 
who  but  a  little  while  ago  were  hardly  known  to  possess  a 
navy,  were  about  to  assail  the  greatest  sea-power  in  the 
world !  During  their  stay  in  Sicily,  the  Athenian  ships  had 
greatly  deteriorated  in  condition;  the  demands  on  the 
service  had  been  so  incessant,  that  there  was  no  opportunity 
of  properly  drying  the  vessels.  To  obtain  supplies  it  was 
necessary  to  be  constantly  on  the  watch ;  and,  as  the  Syra- 

on  Epipolae,  should  this  long  wall  be  necessary  ?  Yet  no  other  solu- 
tion has  been  found  which  suits  the  description  in  vii.  43  so  well. 
See  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily,  vol,  in.  Appendix  xv. 


X.  21.]    THE  ATHENIANS  DECREE  SUPPLIES,  tf4-  335 


cusan  ships  were  more  numerous  than  their  own,  there  was 
always  a  danger  of  attack.  Their  crews  were  also  destroyed 
and  demoralised ;  many  had  been  slain  by  the  Syracusan 
horse,  many  more  deserted,  and  their  places  had  to  be  filled  by 
slaves.  These  evils  Nicias  was  unable  to  remedy.  He  had 
now  no  resources  left  but  such  as  he  had  brought  with  him ; 
the  cities  in  Sicily,  Naxos  and  Catana,  were  unable  to  help, 
and  if  the  Italian  cities  from  which  he  purchased  supplies 
went  over  to  the  enemy,  the  war  would  be  brought  to  a 
close  by  the  starvation  of  his  army.  He  concluded  with  declar- 
ing that  the  force  at  his  disposal  was  no  longer  equal  to  the 
task  before  it.  They  had  to  face  a  united  Sicily,  which 
would  soon  receive  help  from  Peloponnesus.  Another  arma- 
ment, not  less  than  the  first,  and  amply  provided  with  money, 
must  be  sent  out,  or  the  forces  must  at  once  be  recalled  from 
Sicily.  And  what  was  done  must  be  done  quickly.  For 
himself,  he  begged  to  be  relieved  from  his  command,  to 
which  in  his  present  state  of  health  he  was  quite  unequal.1 

21.  Thucydides  ascribes  the  failure  of  the  Sicilian  expedi- 
tion to  a  want  of  support  from  home ;  the  Athenians  were 
absorbed  in  intrigues  and  factions,  and  paid  Reinforce. 
too  little  attention  to  affairs  in  Sicily.2  In  this  ments  decreed 
he  may  be  referring  to  the  recall  of  Alcibiades,  to  Slclly# 
which  was  a  grave  error — though  its  consequences  could 
hardly  be  foreseen  at  the  time — or  to  other  party  feuds,  un- 
known to  us,  which  prevented  the  Athenians  from  listening 
to  the  messages  of  Nicias.    For  otherwise  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  the  statement.    When  by  the  letter  of  Nicias  the 
true  condition  of  affairs  in  Sicily  became  known,  there  was  no 


1  Time.  vii.  7-15. 

2  Thuc.  ii.  65.  After  the  death  of  Pericles,  the  leaders  of  the 
people  irpdirovTO  ko.6'  rjbovds  rep  drjpco  /cat  ra  Trpdypara  ivdibovat.  e£ 
&v  SXXa  re  7roXXa,  cos  iv  p^ydXrj  ndkei  kol  dpxrjv  exovcrj],  fjpapTrjSr) 
kol  6  is  2iKe\iav  irkovs'  os  ov  rocrovrov  yvcopr]s  dpdprrjpa  rjv  irpbs  ovs 
iTrrjeo-av,  oaov  oi  iKnep^avres  ov  ra  7rpoo~(popa  rols  olxopevois 
imyiyvaaKOVTes,  dXKa  Kara  rets  Idias  8ia(3o\ds  nep\  rrjs  rov  br)p,ov 
irpocrrcKTiaS)  rd  re  iv  r<3  o-TparoTviba  dpfikvTepa  eVotow,  kol  to.  7rep\ 
Ttjv  irokiv  np&rov  iv  dXkr]\ois  irapdxOrjarav. 


336 


VIOLATION  OF  THE  TRUCE,  M- 


[X.  21. 


hesitation  about  sending  out  reinforcements  on  the  most 
liberal  scale.    And  though  the  Athenians  refused  to  relieve 
Nicias  from  his  command,  they  chose  two  officers  from  the 
troops  in  Sicily — Menander  and  Euthydemus  by  name — to 
support  him  till  new  generals  should  arrive  from  home.1 
Preparations  were  made  for  a  second  expedition,  of  which 
Demosthenes,  now  the  best  officer  in  Athens,  and  Eurymedon, 
who  was  already  known  in  Sicily,  were  placed  in  command. 
Eurymedon  was  despatched  at  once  (midwinter  414)  with 
ten  ships  and  120  talents.    He  did  not,  however,  remain  at 
Syracuse,  but  sailed  back  to  return  with  Demosthenes  in 
the  following  year.    At  the  same  time  twenty  ships  were 
sent  to  cruise  round  the  Peloponnesus,  and  keep  watch  at 
Naupactus,  to  prevent  any  reinforcements  reaching  Syracuse.2 
This  momentous  resolution  was  taken  at  a  time  when  the 
situation  of  affairs  at  home  was  becoming  more  serious  from 
day  to  day.    To  the  end  of  the  summer  of  414  the  peace 
between  Athens  and  Sparta  had  been  maintained,  at  least  to 
the  extent  that  neither  state  had  invaded  the  territory  of  the 
other.    Such  restraint  satisfied  the  letter  of  the  treaty,  and 
that  was  enough.     But  in  the  autumn  of  414,  when  an 
Athenian  fleet  had  gone  to  the  help  of  Argos  in  resisting  an 
invasion   from   Lacedaemon,  the   generals  in  command — ■ 
Pythodori^  and  others — were  persuaded  to 
3ioiatethemnS    make   a   descent   on  Laconian   territory  at 
truce  in  the        Epidaurus  Limera  and  Prasiae.3    This  was  the 
Peloponnesus.    0pp0rtunfty  for  which  the  Lacedaemonian s  had 
long  been  waiting ;  the  marauding  excursions  from  Pylus, 
and  damage  done  to  other  parts  of  the  Peloponnesus  beyond 
the  limits  of  Laconia,  did  not  amount  to  actual  violation  of 
the  terms  of  peace,  and  if  they  had  acted  upon  them,  they 
would  again  have  been  haunted  by  the  feeling  that  they  were 
the  aggressors  in  the  quarrel,  as  they  had  been  during  the 

1  Cp.  Grote,  Hist,  of  Greece,  iv.  196. 

*  Thuc.  vii.  17  :  it<i\mov(Ti  8e  Kai  nepl  rrjv  HiKoTTOvvqaov  oi  'Adrjvaioi 
c'Lkoo-i  vavs,  k.t.X.  These  must  be  the  same  as  rals  iv  rfj  ~Nav7rd<T(o 
eUoatv'ATTtKais,  c.  19.  3  Thuc.  vi.  105;  cp.  c.  95. 


X.  22.] 


AG  IS  INVADES  ATTICA,  413. 


337 


Archidamian  war.  But  now  the  violation  of  the  truce  was 
undeniable ;  and  they  entered  on  the  war  wifeh.  a  clear 
conscience  and  a  hearty  good  will.1 

22.  At  the  beginning  of  spring  (413),  "earlier  than  ever 
before,"  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  once  more  in- 
vaded Attica.  King  Agis  was  in  command. 
After  ravaging  the  plain  of  the  Cephisus,  they  A?t\ca"andeS 
set  about  fortifying  Decelea,  as  Alcibiades  had  occupies 
urged  them  to  do.  At  the  same  time  large 
reinforcements,  amounting  to  1600  heavy-armed,  were  sent  out 
to  Sicily  from  Lacedaemon,  Boeotia,  Corinth,  and  Sicyon,  and 
twenty-five  Corinthian  ships  which  had  been  prepared  earlier 
in  the  year  were  despatched,  to  hold  in  check  the  Athenian 
squadron  at  Naupactus,  while  the  merchantmen,  with  the 
troops  on  board,  should  pass  on  to  Sicily.2  Nor  were  the 
Athenians  less  active,  though  their  plans  were  marred  by  a 
want  of  decision.  Charicles  was  sent  out  early  in  the  spring 
to  coast  round  Peloponnesus  as  a  kind  of  counterstroke  to 
the  occupation  of  Decelea,  but  he  was  also  ordered  to  put  in 
at  Argos  to  take  on  board  a  force  of  heavy-armed.  Demos- 
thenes, who  was  in  command  of  the  fleet  destined  for  Sicily 
— sixty  Athenian  ships  and  five  Chian,  1200  heavy-armed 
"from  the  roll,"  and  as  many  others  as  could  be  got  from  the 
islanders — was  ordered  to  act  with  Charicles,  but  wasted  time 
at  Aegina  waiting  for  his  forces  to  assemble.  When  the 
armament  was  at  last  complete,  he  joined  Charicles  off 
Laconia.  Together  they  ravaged  Epidaurus  Limera,  and 
landing  on  the  coast  opposite  Cythera,  they  erected  a  fortress 
to  form  a  second  Pylus,  a  Decelea  in  Laconia,  a  base  from 
which  excursions  could  be  made,  and  a  point  to  which  Helots 
might  flock.8  Demosthenes  then  sailed  to  Corcyra  on  his 
way  to  Sicily  ;  Charicles  returned  home  with  the  Argives. 

The  effects  of  the  occupation  of  Decelea  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  were  quickly  felt  at  Athens.    Deprived  of  the  use  of 

1  Thuc.  vii.  18. 

2  These  merchantmen  were  driven  far  out  of  their  course,  infra,  348. 

3  Thuc.  vii.  26. 


VOL.  III. 


Y 


338 


ATHENIAN  FINANCES,  US. 


[X.  23, 


their  fields,  the  citizens  were  now  entirely  dependent  on 
imported  supplies— chiefly  from  Euboea.  These  could  no 
Exhaustion  longer  be  carried  over  land  past  Oropus ;  and 
of  Athens.  the  conveyance  by  sea  round  Sunium  was  longer 
and  more  costly.  The  sources  of  public  and  private  income, 
so  far  as  Attica  was  concerned,  were  dried  up,  so  that  many 
families  who  had  hitherto  lived  in  comfort  were  now  penniless. 
Those  who  possessed  shops  and  manufactories  were  hardly 
better  off,  for  the  slaves,  especially  those  employed  in  any 
kind  of  handicraft,  deserted  by  hundreds.  The  efforts 
necessary  to  send  out  the  second  expedition  to  Sicily  seem 
to  have  exhausted  the  treasury ;  and  in  the  hope  of  improv- 
ing the  finances,  the  Athenians  changed  the  tribute  hitherto 
paid  by  the  subject  cities  for  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  on  their 
maritime  trade.  The  demands  of  military  service  were  severe ; 
the  cavalry  were  constantly  in  requisition  to  keep  the  raids 
of  the  enemy  in  check,  and  the  horses,  as  their  hoofs  were  not 
protected  by  iron,  were  soon  lamed  by  their  incessant  work 
on  rocky  ground.  The  city  walls  needed  a  guard  day  and 
night,  and  owing  to  the  absence  of  so  many  men  in  Sicily, 
this  duty  fell  the  heavier  on  those  who  were  left.  Yet  in  spite 
of  these  difficulties,  the  Athenians  maintained  their  spirit, 
and  once  more  astonished  the  Grecian  world  by  their  courage 
and  tenacity.  They  did  not  suffer  themselves  to  be  diverted 
from  the  war  in  Sicily  by  the  renewal  of  the  conflict  at  home ; 
regardless  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  their  land,  which 
they  sacrificed  now  as  readily  as  they  had  done  in  the  Persian 
war,  they  still  indulged  their  dream  of  conquest  in  the  west. 

23.  But  the  strain  was  great,  and  the  Athenians  felt  it. 
What  could  be  done  towards  cutting  down  expenses,  they 
did.  A  force  of  Thracians,  1300  in  number,  had  been  hired 
at  a  drachma  a  day  to  take  part  in  the  expedition  to  Sicily, 
but  before  they  arrived  Demosthenes  had  set  sail.  To  keep 
them  idle  at  Athens  was  a  greater  expense  than  the  treasury 
could  bear.  They  were  sent  back  under  the  command  of 
Diitrephes,  who  received  orders  to  do  the  enemy  any  injury 
that  he  could  on  the  way.     When  passing  through  the 


X„  24. ]       FIRST  SEA -FIGHT  AT  S YRA CUSE,  413.  339 


Euripus,  Diitrephes  landed  his  men,  and  led  them  against 
Mycalessus,  a  Boeotian  town  at  SOme  distance  Massacre  at 
from  the  sea.  The  town  was  easily  surprised,  Mycalessus. 
for  no  attack  was  apprehended,  and  no  guard  had  been  set. 
The  Thracians  burst  through  the  gates  and  crumbling  walls, 
plundering  the  houses  and  temples,  and  slaying  every  living 
thing  that  came  in  their  way — man,  woman,  child,  or  beast. 
To  crown  their  murderous  work,  they  fell  upon  a  school  in 
which  the  boys  had  recently  assembled,  and  slaughtered 
every  one  of  them.1  Happily  vengeance  was  not  long  in 
coming.  Before  they  could  regain  the  shore,  the  Thracians 
were  overtaken  by  the  Thebans,  and  two  hundred  and  fifty 
of  the  number  were  cut  down. 

24.  Meanwhile  affairs  were  going  from  bad  to  worse  in 
Sicily.  With  the  spring  (413)  Gylippus  had  returned  to  Syra- 
cuse bringing  large  reinforcements.    He  was  no  The  Syracusans 
sooner  in  the  city  than  he  urged  the  Syracusans  jj^aciTthe t0 
to  attack  the  Athenians  by  Sea  as  Well  as  land.  Athenians 
His  appeal  was  supported  by  the  eloquence  of  at  sea- 
Hermocrates,  who  pointed  out  that  the  skill  of  the  Athenians 
at  sea,  which  caused  so  much  alarm,  was  after  all  acquired 
rather  than  innate  and  inherited.    They  had  become  mariners 
under  the  stress  of  a  great  war,  and  why  should  not  the 
Syracusans  do  the  same  1    The  Syracusans  were  persuaded. 
A  combined  assault  on  Plemmyrium  was  arranged.  Under 
cover  of  night  Gylippus  led  out  the  whole  of  his  forces  to 
be  in  readiness  for  an  attack  on  land.    The  next  morning, 
at  a  concerted  signal,  forty-five  ships  advanced  from  the 
arsenal  in  the  Lesser  Harbour  to  the  mouth  of  the  Greater, 
in   order  to  join   other  thirty-five  which   put   out  from 
the  Great  Harbour  in  delivering  an  attack  by  sea.  The 
Athenians  answered  the  challenge  by  sending  First  engage- 
twenty-five  vessels  to  engage  the  Syracusans  in  ment- 
the  Great  Harbour  and  thirty-five  to  keep  the  entrance.  For 

1  Time.  vii.  29  f.  For  Diitrephes,  cf.  Aristoph.  Birds,  798  ff.  It 
•was  doubtful  whether  he  was  a  citizen :  rbv  fiawo/jLevop,  rbv  Kprjra, 
rbv  fxoyis  'Attikqv,  Plato,  the  comedian,  calls  him,  'Eoprai,  frag.  31, 


340  SUCCESS  OF  GYLIPPUS,  413.  [X,  24. 


a  time  the  Syracusans  were  victorious ;  those  in  the  harbour 
defeated  the  Athenians,  those  outside  succeeded  in  forcing 
their  way  in.  But  the  advantage  was  not  maintained.  As 
the  ships  streamed  through  the  entrance  they  were  carried 
upon  those  in  the  harbour,  and  both  were  thrown  into  con- 
fusion. The  Athenians  seized  the  opportunity,  and  defeated 
the  combined  fleet,  sinking  eleven  of  their  enemy's  ships  with 
a  loss  of  three  of  their  own. 

What  was  gained  on  sea  was  more  than  lost  on  land.  In 
the  early  morning,  when  the  fleets  were  engaged,  Gylippus 

Gyiippus  fel1  uPon  the  forts  on  Piemmyrium    They  had 

acquires  not  been  left  without  defence,  but  the  garrisons 

piemmyrium.     were  ina(iequate,  and  the  movements  of 

Gylippus  were  as  rapid  as  they  were  unexpected.  He 
captured  the  largest  of  the  three  forts  without  any  difficulty, 
and  the  garrisons  of  the  other  two  did  not  even  wait  to  be 
attacked.  The  loss  to  the  Athenians  in  captives  and  stores 
was  great,  for  Piemmyrium  was  regarded  as  a  safe  repository 
in  which  trierarchs  could  place  their  tackle  and  merchants 
their  goods.  It  was  also  the  granary  of  the  army.  Gylippus 
knew  how  to  make  use  of  his  conquest.  Of  the  two  smaller 
forts  one  was  destroyed,  the  other,  and  the  larger  fort,  were 
strongly  garrisoned.  It  was  now  difficult  for  the  Athenians 
to  bring  supplies  into  the  harbour  or  control  the  entrance 
to  it,  yet  on  this  depended  the  very  existence  of  the  army. 
Dismay  and  despondency  fell  upon  them.1  The  army  was 
confined  to  the  camp  between  the  siege-walls,  where  these 
came  down  to  the  water's  edge  and  the  Anapus;2  they 
had  no  hope  of  effective  operations  on  land,  and  were 
entirely  dependent  on  their  ships  for  supplies.  Meanwhile 
each  side  endeavoured  to  damage  the  other  as  opportunity 
offered. 

.  The  Syracusans,  to  protect  their  docks,  had  driven  piles 
off  the  shore,  some  of  which  were  not  even  visible  above  the 
water.    These  the  Athenians  now  endeavoured  to  destroy 


1  Thuc.  vii.  22-25. 


See  Freeman,  Hist.  Sic.  iii.  285. 


X.  25.]      REINFORCEMENTS  FOR  SYRACUSE,  418.  341 


in  any  way  that  they  could,  for  the  two  fleets  were  in  close 
proximity,  and  in  part  they  succeeded — but  for  a  time  only, 
for  the  Syracusans  replaced  them  as  soon  as  possible. 

Not  content  with  merely  defensive  measures,  the  Syracusans, 
hearing  that  supplies  were  at  hand  for  the  Athenians  off  the 
coast  of  Italy,  sent  out  twelve  ships  which  destroyed  most  of 
them.  Envoys  were  also  despatched  to  Old  Greece,  and  to 
the  Greek  cities  in  Sicily,  to  announce  the  capture  of  Plem- 
myrium  and  ask  for  fresh  aid. 

In  an  attempt  to  intercept  the  twelve  Syracusan  ships  on 
their  return  home,  Nicias  was  unsuccessful ;  in  the  engage- 
ment which  took  place  off  Megara  one  ship  only  was  taken — 
ten  others  escaped  safe  into  the  harbour  of  Syracuse,  and  the 
twelfth  had  sailed  with  the  envoys  to  Greece.  With  them 
came  one  of  the  merchant-ships  from  Peloponnesus,  having 
on  board  a  number  of  Thespians,  who  were  destined  to  take 
a  memorable  part  in  the  defence  of  Syracuse.  In  another 
quarter  Nicias  was  more  fortunate.  He  persuaded  the  Sicels, 
who  were  still  his  friends,  to  lie  in  wait  for  the  reinforce- 
ments which  the  envoys  sent  to  the  Greek  cities  in  the  west 
of  Sicily  were  bringing  through  the  interior  of  the  island  to 
Syracuse,  and  they  did  so  with  such  success  that  about  a 
third  of  the  force  was  destroyed.1  Still  the  Corinthian, 
who  alone  of  the  envoys  escaped,  brought  in  about  1500 
men;  and  in  addition  large  reinforcements  came  from 
Camarina  and  Gela.  Agrigentum,  alone  of  the  Dorian 
cities  of  Sicily,  still  refused  to  range  herself  on  the  side  of 
Syracuse. 

25.  The  news  of  this  disaster  so  far  damped  the  spirits  of 
the  Syracusans  that  they  desisted  from  the  immediate  attack 
on  the  Athenians  by  land  and  sea  which  they  _ 

J  J    The  Syracusans 

had  planned.    But  when  they  heard  of  the  prepare  for  a 
approach  of  Demosthenes  and  his  fleet  they  second  battie. 
delayed  no  longer ;  their  reinforcements,  in  spite  of  the  loss, 
were  considerable,  and  they  had  prepared  their  ships  in  a 


1  Thuc.  vii.  25,  32. 


342  SECOND  SEA-FIGHT  AT  S YRA CUSE,  413.      [X.  25. 


way  which  they  hoped  would  enable  them  to  overcome  the 
skill  of  the  Athenians.  From  their  experience  of  the  last 
engagement,  they  perceived  that  the  battle  would  be  fought 
out  prow  to  prow :  the  Athenians  would  have  no  room  within 
the  limits  of  the  harbour  for  their  ordinary  manoeuvres,  and 
as  the  shore  was  now  in  Syracusan  hands,  except  the  small 
part  occupied  by  the  Athenian  camp,  they  would  not  be  able 
to  retire  to  the  land  to  recover  impetus  for  a  fresh  charge. 
Nor  could  they  sail  out  into  the  open  sea,  for  on  either  side 
in  their  docks  and  at  Plemmyrium,  close  to  the  mouth  of 
the  harbour,  the  Syracusans  lay  in  wait  for  them.  To  meet 
the  new  conditions  of  warfare,  the  Corinthians  suggested 
alterations  in  the  form  of  the  prows  of  the  vessels,  which 
were  made  shorter  and  stronger,  and  strengthened  in  a 
manner  which  the  Corinthians  had  already  adopted  in  a 
conflict  off  Erineum.1 

When  all  was  ready,  a  combined  attack  was  made  on  sea 
and  land.  Nicias  was  taken  off  his  guard ;  he  had  expected 
Second  naval  an  attack  on  land  only,  misled  perhaps  by  his 
engagement.  -wish  ^h&t  n0  attack  by  sea  should  take  place 
till  the  arrival  of  Demosthenes.  Amid  some  confusion  troops 
were  despatched  to  meet  the  Syracusan  army,  and  seventy- 
five  ships  were  launched  against  the  Syracusan  eighty.  Of 
the  fortunes  of  the  army,  Thucydides  says  but  little ;  his 
interests  are  mainly  occupied  with  the  great  struggle  at  sea. 
No  decisive  advantage  was  gained  on  the  first  day ;  the  fleets 
advanced  and  retreated  without  coming  to  an  engagement. 
The  next  day  was  spent  by  Nicias  in  preparing  for  the  attack 
which  he  saw  would  be  renewed ;  any  ship  which  had  been 
damaged  was  repaired,  and  a  secure  retreat  provided  for  those 
which  might  be  hard  pressed.  On  the  third  day  the  Syra- 
cusans again  advanced  to  the  attack,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the 
fleets  would  spend  their  time  in  ineffectual  skirmishes  as  they 
had  done  before,  when  Ariston,  a  Corinthian,  "who  was  the 

1  Infra,  p.  344.  The  changes  necessary  for  meeting  the  Athenians 
in  the  Corinthian  gulf  had  no  doubt  been  discussed  at  Corinth  for 
some  time  past. 


X.  26.]        THE  SYRACUSANS  VICTORIOUS,  US.  343 


ablest  pilot  in  the  Syracusan  fleet/'  persuaded  the  admirals 
to  give  orders  for  supplies  to  be  brought  down  to  the  water's 
edge,  in  order  that  the  sailors  might  take  their  meal  and 
rejoin  their  ships  with  the  least  possible  delay.  This  was 
done,  and  the  Syracusans  at  once  retired  to  the  shore.  The 
Athenians,  mistaking  their  action  for  a  sign  of  defeat,  under 
the  impression  that  the  contest  was  at  an  end  for  the  day, 
disembarked  at  their  leisure  and  set  about  preparing  their 
meal.  Suddenly  they  saw  the  Syracusan  fleet  bearing  down 
upon  them.  In  great  confusion,  and  many  of  them  still 
fasting,  they  rushed  on  board,  and  after  some  delay,  feeling 
that  their  only  hope  was  in  immediate  action,  they  charged 
the  enemy  face  to  face.  Their  light  prows  were  shattered 
by  the  heavy  ships  of  the  Syracusans,  and  their  victory  of  the 
crews  wounded  by  the  ceaseless  stream  of  darts  Syracusans. 
which  were  poured  upon  them,  partly  from  the  Syracusan 
decks,  and  partly  from  small  boats  which  crept  up  under  the 
blades  of  the  oars.  Outmanoeuvred  in  every  way,  they  at 
length  desisted  from  the  conflict,  and  retired  behind  the 
merchantmen  which  Nicias  had  moored  in  front  of  his  stockade 
for  their  defence.1  Beyond  these  the  enemy  did  not  venture 
to  pursue  them,  owing  to  the  leaden  dolphins  which  had 
been  suspended  aloft  in  the  merchantmen.  Two  Syracusan 
ships,  which  advanced  too  near,  were  disabled,  and  one  of 
them  captured  with  the  crew. 

A  victory  had  been  won — a  clear,  undoubted  victory. 
"  The  Syracusans  were  now  quite  confident  that  they  were 
not  only  equal  but  far  superior  to  the  Athenians  at  sea,  and 
they  hoped  to  gain  the  victory  on  land  as  well.  So  they 
prepared  to  renew  the  attack  on  both  elements." 

26.  In  the  midst  of  these  preparations  the  Athenian  rein- 
forcements arrived.  While  engaged  in  collecting  forces  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Corcyra,  Demosthenes  had  been  joined 
by  Eurymedon,  who  brought  from  Syracuse  the  news  that 
Plemnrvrium  had  been  taken  by  Gylippus.    At  the  same 


1  Time.  vii.  36-41. 


344  DEMOSTHENES  SAILS  TO  SICIL  Y,  413.       [X.  26. 


time  Con  on  appeared  from  Naupactus  asking  for  help  against 
the  Corinthian  ships,  who  were  threatening  to  engage  him. 
Engagement  Ten  of  the  best  ships  in  the  fleet  were  handed 
offErineum.  0Ver  to  him,  and  soon  after  an  engagement 
took  place  off  Erineum  in  Achaea,  in  which  the  Corinthians, 
who  had  specially  prepared  their  ships  for  charging  the 
enemy  prow  to  prow,  inflicted  some  damage  on  the  Athenians, 
and  the  two  fleets  parted  without  any  decisive  result.  The 
Corinthians  were  triumphant.  For  them  it  was  victory  not 
to  be  defeated.  The  Athenians  were  proportionately  down- 
cast. In  this,  the  first  engagement  fought  at  sea  between 
Peloponnesians  and  Athenians  since  425,  they  had  failed  to 
win,  and  such  failure  was  in  their  eyes  a  defeat.1 

From  Corcyra  the  Athenian  fleet,  increased  by  fifteen  ships 
from  Corcyra,  sailed  to  Iapygia,  where  they  renewed  an  old 
The  fleet  of  friendship  with  Artas,  a  Messapian  chief,  who 
Demosthenes,  furnished  javelin-men.  They  passed  on  to 
Metapontum,  from  which  they  received  reinforcements,  and 
thence  to  Thurii.  On  finding  that  the  party  opposed  to 
Athens  had  just  been  expelled  from  the  city,  they  remained 
there  for  some  days,  and  succeeded  not  only  in  obtaining 
reinforcements  from  the  Thurians,  but  in  persuading  them 
to  become  allies  of  the  Athenians.  The  ships  then  sailed 
towards  Crotona;  the  men  were  reviewed  and  led  to  the 
river  Hylias,  which  divided  the  Thurian  and  Crotoniate 
territory.  They  were  forbidden  to  pass  through  the  latter, 
and  descending  to  the  mouth  of  the  river,  were  again  taken 
on  board  the  fleet,  which  coasted  along  till  it  reached  Petra 
in  the  territory  of  Ehegium.  From  Petra  it  crossed  over  to 
Sicily,  and  entered  the  Great  Harbour  of  Syracuse.  The 
force  consisted  of  seventy- three  ships,  five  thousand  heavy- 
armed,  and  large  numbers  of  javelin-men,  slingers,  and 
archers.2 


1  Thuc.  vii.  34.  No  Athenian  ship  was  sunk,  but  seven  of  them 
were  rendered  useless,  by  this  novel  mode  of  attack. 

2  Thuc.  vii.  35,  42.  Demosthenes  arrived  at  Syracuse  about  the 
middle  of  August;  yet  the  fleet  left  Athens  early  in  the  spring. 


X.  27.]  HE  ARRIVES  AT  SYRACUSE,  413.  345 


27.  At  the  sight  of  this  great  armament,  the  Syracusans 
were  filled  with  dismay.  The  resources  of  Athens  seemed  to  be 
inexhaustible.  Their  labour  had  been  in  vain ;  their  successes 
unavailing.  The  Athenians  were  encouraged  in  proportion 
to  their  previous  despondency,  but  unhappily  for  them, 
Demosthenes  had  not  come  with  plenary  Arrivalof 
powers;  he,  the  most  enterprising  and  ener-  Demosthenes 
getic  of  Athenian  officers,  was  in  joint  com-  atSyracuse- 
mand  with  Nicias  and  others,  who  could  outvote  him  on 
any  proposal.  When  Demosthenes  saw  in  what  a  position 
the  Athenians  were,  he  was  eager  to  strike  at  once.  He 
believed  it  to  be  impossible  to  remain  where  they  were 
without  decisive  action,  and  he  had  no  intention  of  bringing 
upon  himself  the  contempt  of  the  Syracusans  as  Nicias  had 
done  by  wasting  a  winter  at  Catana.  The  counter-wall  of 
the  Syracusans,  which  prevented  the  Athenians  from  carrying 
their  wall  of  investment  to  the  northern  edge  of  Epipolae, 
was  but  a  single  wall,  and  might  be  captured.  If  he 
succeeded  in  the  attempt  he  would  be  able  to  complete  the 
Athenian  wall ;  if  he  failed,  he  would  carry  the  army  back 
to  Athens,  abandoning  all  further  operations  in  Sicily. 
He  had  left  Athens  after  the  renewal  of  the  war,  and  knew 
that  she  was  in  need  of  money  and  men  at  home.  The 
mode  in  which  his  attack  was  carried  out  is  obscure.  We 
first  hear  of  an  assault  by  engines, — apparently  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Syracusan  wall,  from  the  "  circle  "  which  was  still 
in  the  hands  of  the  Athenians.  When  this  failed,  it  was 
decided,  on  the  urgent  advice  of  Demosthenes,  to  attempt 
to  regain  possession  of  the  northern  and  western  part  of 
Epipolae,  from  which  the  Athenians  had  been  dislodged 
by  Gylippus.  To  do  this  in  the  daytime  was  impossible ; 
but  in  the  night  a  surprise  might  be  successful.  Night  attack 
Leaving  the  camp  early  in  the  night,  Demos-  on  ^p01^- 
thenes,  Eurymedon,  and  Menander  led  the  whole  army 
round  the  western  end  of  Epipolae  to  the  path  by  which 


This  long  delay  is  very  remarkable,  especially  when  we  read  in  c.  26  : 
O7rcos  eKeldev  (from  Corcyra)  top  ttXovv  wj  rd^iara  7roLr]Tai. 


346 


ATTACK  ON  EPIPOLAE,  413. 


[X.  27. 


the  Athenians  had  first  climbed  the  heights.  Unnoticed 
by  the  Syracusan  guards,  they  attacked  and  took  the 
fort  of  the  Syracusans  which  commanded  the  ascent. 
Fugitives  carried  the  news  to  the  three  camps  which  had 
been  established  on  Epipolae,  and  the  troop  of  six  hundred, 
which  were  stationed  as  a  guard  at  this  point.  These 
rushed  forward  to  the  defence,  but  part  of  the  Athenian 
force  beat  them  back,  while  others  swept  on  to  the  Syra- 
cusan counter- wall,  of  which  they  captured  a  part  and  began 
to  destroy  it.1  Gylippus  at  the  head  of  his  forces  sallied 
out  from  the  fortified  camps  to  render  aid,  but,  startled  at 
the  sudden  attack,  he  too  was  at  first  beaten  off.  In  the 
elation  of  victory,  the  Athenians  pressed  on  too  rapidly ;  they 
were  thrown  into  disorder,  and  when  they  came  into  colli- 
sion with  the  Boeotians  (the  Thespians  who  had  joined  the 
Syracusans  at  Locri,  supra,  p.  341)  they  were  repulsed  and 
put  to  flight.  The  details  of  the  engagement  Thucydides 
Defeat  of  the  was  unable  to  discover.  Many  things  con- 
Athenians,  tributed  to  increase  the  confusion.  It  was 
night,  and  though  the  moon  shone  brightly,  it  was  impossible 

1  Thucydides  does  not  make  it  clear  how  far  the  Syracusan  cross- 
wall  passed  beyond  the  Athenian  siege-wall  to  the  west.  Grote  and 
Freeman  thought  that  there  was  a  wall  running  along  the  whole 
of  the  northern  part  of  Epipolae,  from  Euryelus  to  the  city, 
supra,  p.  333  ;  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily,  Appendix  xv.  Thucydides 
mentions  (1)  a  re^io-aa  at  the  ascent  of  Euryelus;  this  the 
Athenians  captured ;  (2)  ra  o-rpaTOTreha,  d  rjv  eiri  tS>v  'ETwroAeoi/ 
rpia — to  which  the  fugitives  fled  ;  (3)  to  aVo  rrjs  TrpvTrjs  naparei- 
^itr/xa  tooi>  'Svpa.Koalcou — which  the  Athenians  captured  and  began 
to  strip  of  its  battlements.  The  expression  dno  rrjs  7rpamj?  is  very 
obscure — it  seems  to  mean  the  nearest  part  of  the  Traparelxtarpa, 
but  this  would  be  more  correctly  expressed  by  to  and  Tijs  TrpcoTtjs  rod 
naparei^o'paTos :  (4)  ra  rrpoTeixto-para,  from  which  Gylippus  brought 
his  forces  to  the  assistance  of  the  Syracusans.  These  are  the  same 
as  the  o-rpaToneha  (hence  the  reading  £v  TrporeixLO-pao-iv,  vii.  43).  The 
position  of  the  camps  is  not  given  with  accuracy.  The  impression  left 
by  Thucydides  is  that  to  dno  tt]s  Trpar-qs  7raparei'xio-/ia  reached  a 
point  not  very  far  from  Euryelus — that  the  camps  lay  between  this 
point  and  the  city.  And  as  the  Athenians  were  apparently  on  the 
northern  side  of  the  wall,  the  camps  of  the  Syracusans,  etc.,  were  on 
this  side  also 


1 


X.  28.]  NIC  IAS  DECIDES  TO  REMAIN,  413.  347 


to  distinguish  accurately  who  was  a  friend  and  who  was  an 
enemy.  The  Athenian  front  was  driven  back,  but  others 
were  still  climbing  up  Epipolae,  and  pressing  forward, 
ignorant  of  what  had  occurred.  No  one  knew  whither  to  turn 
first,  or  whom  to  attack,  and  owing  to  the  constant  use  of 
it  in  their  uncertainty,  the  Athenian  watchword  became 
known  to  the  enemy.  Still  more  misleading  was  the  Dorian 
war-cry,  which,  being  used  on  both  sides,  made  their  Dorian 
allies  as  terrible  to  the  Athenians  as  the  enemy.  At  length 
the  Syracusans  succeeded  in  driving  the  Athenians  to  the 
edge  of  the  cliff.  Some  found  their  way  to  the  level  ground 
down  the  narrow  path;  others  threw  themselves  from  the 
cliffs  and  perished.  Of  the  survivors  those  who  were 
acquainted  with  the  locality  returned  to  the  camp,  but 
many  lost  themselves  and  were  cut  off  when  day  appeared 
by  the  Syracusan  horse.1 

28.  After  this  disaster,  Demosthenes  wished  at  once  to 
return  to  Athens.    The  soldiers  were  encamped  in  a  marshy 
and  unwholesome  region;   and  their  spirit  Demosthenes 
was  broken  by  constant  defeat.    The  sea  was  wishes  to 
still  open,  and  there  was  work  for  them  nearer  £52!i  to™** 
home  than  at  Syracuse.    But  Nicias  feared  the 

remain. 

shame  of  an  open  confession  of  defeat,  and  bad  as  his  own 
position  was,  he  was  led  to  suppose  from  the  information 
supplied  by  his  friends  that  affairs  in  Syracuse  were  still 
worse.  In  spite  of  the  successes  of  Gylippus — who  after 
his  victory  went  for  a  second  time  into  the  interior  to  collect 
troops— there  was  an  Athenian  party  at  Syracuse  who 
wished  Nisias  to  remain,  and  misled  him  into  the  belief 
that  the  resources  of  Syracuse  were  all  but  exhausted.  Of 
this,  or  of  his  own  doubts  and  fears,  he  said  nothing,  but 
strongly  urged  that  if  they  returned  to  Athens  without  a 
vote  of  the  Athenian  people,  they  would  be  brought  to  trial 
before  juries  who  knew  nothing  of  the  situation,  and  the 
very  soldiers  who  now  clamoured  to  be  led  home  would  be 


1  Time,  vii.  42-45. 


348 


ECLIPSE  OF  THE  MOON,  41S. 


[X.  28. 


the  first  to  come  forward  against  them.  It  was  better,  if  die 
they  must,  to  fall  in  the  field  of  battle,  than  to  be  condemned 
on  a  false  charge  in  a  court  of  law.  Demosthenes  then 
insisted  that  if  they  remained  they  should  at  least  move  their 
quarters  to  Thapsus  and  Catana,  where  they  would  be  able 
to  support  the  army  by  raiding  the  interior,  and  at  the  same 
time  have  free  use  of  the  open  sea.  In  this  he  was  supported 
by  Eurymedon ;  but  Nicias  opposed  the  change,  and  nothing 
was  done. 

Gylippus  now  returned  with  large  reinforcements.  Agri- 
gentum,  it  is  true,  was  still  unfriendly,  and  as  the  anti- 
Gyiippus  Syracusan  party  had  just  succeeded  in  expelling 

collects  their  opponents,  the  hope  of  bringing  that 

reinforcements.    eifcy  Qver  feU  ^  the  groun(J.     But  the  rest  of 

Sicily  was  on  the  side  of  Syracuse.  With  these  reinforce- 
ments also  came  the  hoplites  who  had  been  despatched  from 
Peloponnesus  in  the  spring.  They  had  been  carried  away 
to  Libya,  whence  they  had  coasted,  in  triremes  furnished  by 
Cyrene,  to  Neapolis,  a  Carthaginian  factory.  From  this 
point — the  nearest  to  Sicily — they  crossed  to  Selinus,  where 
Gylippus  found  them.1 

On  the  arrival  of  Gylippus,  the  Syracusans  resolved  to 
make  another  attack  by  land  and  sea.  And  Nicias,  seeing 
the  great  increase  in  the  forces  of  the  enemy  and  the  daily 
deterioration  of  his  own,  came  over  to  the  view  of  Demos- 
thenes, and  gave  orders  for  all  to  be  ready  to  break  up 
Nicias  now  camp,  and  sail  out  of  the  harbour  at  a  given 
willing  to  signal.  The  necessary  preparations  were  made, 
deterred  by  an(^  tney  were  on  the  point  of  sailing,  when  the 
an  eclipse.  moon  was  eclipsed.  Such  a  phenomenon  was 
Aug.  27, 413,  g-fcill  regarded  by  the  Greeks  as  a  direct  mani- 
festation of  the  divine  will.2     The  soldiers,  who  had  been 


1  Thuc.  vii.  50  ;  supra,  p.  337. 

2  See  the  remarkable  passage  in  Plut.  Nic.  23  :  tov  fiev  yap  rjXiov 
rrjv  nepl  ras  rpiaKadas  enLaKOTrjaiv  dpcos  ye  ttcos  rjhrj  avvecppovovv  na\  oi 
ttoXXoI  yevofxevrjv  vno  rrjs  (reXrjvrjs'  avrrjv  be  rrjv  ae\qvr)v,  wtivi  avyrvy- 
%avovo-a  ml  ttcos  al<pvidiov  e/c  TravaeXrjvov  to  (pa>s  dnoWvai  Kai  ^poay 


X.  29.]        THIRD  SEA-FIGHT  AT  SYRACUSE,  413.  341 


eager  to  go,  were  now  as  eager  to  remain,  and  Nicias,  the 
most  superstitious  of  men,  declared  that  he  would  not  even 
allow  the  question  to  be  raised,  till  thrice  nine  days  had 
elapsed,  that  being  the  period  within  which  the  soothsayers 
forbade  any  movement.1  By  this  infatuated  folly  the  doom 
of  the  Athenians  was  sealed.  General  and  army  must  share 
the  blame,  for  in  this  matter  Nicias  and  his  men  were  in 
accord.  The  contempt  for  Anaxagoras  and  his  teaching  at 
Athens  was  bearing  bitter  fruit. 

29.  After  some  days'  practice  with  their  ships,  the  Syra- 
cusans  advanced  once  more  upon  the  Athenian  fleet.  The 
Athenians  had  still  the  advantage  of  numbers  on  their  side, 
but   they   were   fighting   under   conditions   which  made 
numbers  and  skill  of  little  avail.    Their  centre  was  the  first 
to  give  way ;  after  which  Eurymedon,  who  commanded  the 
right  wing,  and  was  endeavouring  to  sail  round  the  enemv, 
was  driven  to  shore,  in  the  "recess  of  the  harbour."  His 
ships  were  destroyed  and  himself  slain.    The  defeat  of  the 
rest  of  the  fleet  was  an  easy  task.  Gylippus, 
when  he  saw  that  the  Athenians  were  being  engagement: 
driven  to  shore  beyond  the  protection  of  defeat  of  the 
their  own  camp  and  stockade,  sent  down  a  Athemans- 
portion  of  the  infantry  who  had  been   led  against  the 
Athenian  wall,  to  destroy  the  sailors  as  they  came  to  land ; 
but  first  the  Tyrrhenians  {supra,  p.  328),  who  were  on  guard  at 
this  part  of  the  shore,  and  then  the  whole  body  of  Athenian 
hoplites  came  up,  and  the  Syracusans  were  defeated  with 
some  loss.    An  attempt  which  the  Syracusans  made  to  set 
the  remainder  of  the  ships  on  fire  was  also  unsuccessful.2 

The  help  sent  to  the  Athenians  had  been  sent  in  vain. 
Contrary  to  their  experience  and  expectation,  they  had 

irj(TL  7ravToba7ras,  ov  padiov  r\v  KaTaka$eiv,  nXX'  oXKokotov  fjyovvTo  /cat 
7rp6  avp,(popa>v  tivcov  p,eyciKa>v  e'fc  deov  yivop.evov  ar]p,elov. 

1  Thuc.  vii  50 ;  cp.  Plut.  Nic.  23,  who  tells  us  that  Nicias  had 
no  skilled  seer  at  hand  at  the  time  :  6  yap  avvrjdrjs  avrov  nai  to  noXv 
Ttjs  deiaidaifxovlas  dcpaipcov  2ri\l3i8r)s  iredvrjKci  jxiKpbv  €p,7rpoa6ev. 
Stilbides  would  have  told  him  that  the  omen  was  favourable. 

2  Thuc.  vii.  51-54.    See  Diodorus,  xiii.  13  ;  Freeman,  l,c.  pp.  693  ff, 


350 


THE  HARBOUR  CLOSED,  413. 


[X.30. 


suffered  a  serious  defeat  at  sea,  and  their  despondency  was 
great.  They  had  no  hope  of  gaining  any  advantage  by 
diplomacy,  for  Syracuse  was  a  democracy  like  Athens, 
and  a  change  of  constitution  could  not  be  held  out  as  an 
inducement  to  the  Syracusan  people  to  join  them.  On  land 
and  sea  they  were  outmatched.  This  was  the  first  time  that 
they  had  been  engaged  with  a  power  resembling  their  own 
in  energy  and  resources,  and  to  this,  more  than  any  other 
cause,  their  failure  was  due.1 

30.  The  Syracusans  now  sailed  about  the  harbour  as  they 
pleased.  They  were  no  longer  anxious  about  the  safety  of 
their  city;  they  thought  no  more  of  their  own  deliverance, 
but  were  eager  to  destroy  the  Athenian  fleet  and  army,  and 
win  for  themselves  imperishable  renown.  With  this  object 
The  Syracusans  tney  resolved  to  close  the  mouth  of  the  harbour, 
close  the  mouth  thus  preventing  any  escape  by  sea.  The  spirit 
the^thenians  °^  the  Athenians  was  so  greatly  broken  that 
prepare  for  a      they  made  no  effort  to  keep  the  harbour  open, 

final  struggle.       ^  when  ^  ^  d()ne  ^  effect  Qf  ft 

was  more  clearly  realised.  Food  was  already  scarce ;  the 
supplies  from  Catana  had  been  stopped  when  it  was  resolved 
to  transfer  the  camp  thither,  and  unless  the  bar  at  the 
harbour  mouth  were  broken,  nothing  could  be  brought  in 
by  sea.  The  generals  determined  to  concentrate  what  re- 
mained of  the  forces  for  a  final  effort'.  The  walls  on  Epipolae 
were  entirely  abandoned,  and  the  army  brought  within  the 
smallest  possible  space.  Every  ship  that  was  in  any  degree 
seaworthy  was  to  be  launched ;  and  every  available  man  was 
to  go  on  board.  If  they  succeeded  in  breaking  their  way 
out,  they  could  establish  themselves  at  Catana ;  if  they  failed, 
they  would  burn  their  ships  and  march  by  land  to  some 
friendly  city.  A  hundred  and  ten  ships  were  put  upon  the 
water ;  on  the  decks  were  archers  and  javelin-men — for  the 
contest  was  not  to  be  one  of  skill,  but  of  sheer  force — a 


1  Thuc.  vii.  55;  cp.  viii.  96.  Aristotle,  Politics,  v.  4-9  =  1304  a 
27,  observes  :  koi  iv  2,vpaKovo~ais  6  drjpos  a'lrios  yevopevos  rrjs  vlktjs  tov 
nuhepov  tov  npos  'AOrjvalovs  i<  nokiTelas  ds  drjpoKpaTiav  peTtfiakev. 


X.  30.]    PREPARATIONS  FOR  A  LAST  BATTLE,  fylS.  351 


"  land  -fight  on  sea."    In  order  to  counteract  the  effect  of  the 
heavy  prows  of  the  enemy's  ships,  the  Athenian  vessels  were 
furnished  with  "  iron  hands,"  or  grapnels,  which  would  hold 
the  attacking  ship  at  close  quarters,  and  prevent  it  from  retir- 
ing to  make  a  second  charge.    When  all  the  preparations  were 
complete,  Nicias   endeavoured   to  rouse  the  Address  of 
soldiers  from  their  despondency.    They  were  Nicias- 
veterans  in  warfare,  he  said,  who  knew  the  changes  and 
chances  of  battle.    They  might  still  hope  for  victory,  for  every 
precaution  had  been  taken,  and  with  their  infantry  they  still 
had  the  superiority.    He  called  on  the  sailors  who  were  not 
Athenians,  to  save  the  empire,  in  whose  advantages  they 
shared,  reminding  them  that  by  identifying  themselves  with 
Athens,  speaking  the  Athenian  dialect,  and  imitating  Athenian 
manners,  they  had  been  admired  throughout  Greece  as 
citizens  of  the  great  city.1    Let  them  show  that,  in  spite  of 
disease  and  calamity,  they  were  still  the  first  sailors  in  the 
world.    To  the  Athenians  in  the  army  he  pointed  out  how 
great  was  the  issue  at  stake.    The  fleet  and  the  army  could 
not  be  replaced.    If  they  failed  in  the  impending  contest, 
they  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Syracusans,  "  and  you 
know,"  Nicias  said  significantly,  "with  what  intentions  you 
attacked  them,"  while  the  Athenians  at  home  would  be 
unable  to  save  themselves  from  subjection  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians. "  Stand  firm,  therefore,  now  if  ever,  and  remember, 
one  and  all  of  you  who  are  embarking,  -  that  you  are  both  the 
fleet  and  army  of  your  country,  and  that  on  you  hangs  the 
whole  state  and  the  great  name  of  Athens :  for  her  sake,  if 
any  man  exceed  another  in  skill  or  courage,  let  him  display 
them  now ;  he  will  never  have  a  better  opportunity  of  doing 
good  to  himself  and  saving  his  country."  2 

Gylippus  also  addressed  his  soldiers.  He  reminded  them 
that  the  Athenians  had  come  to  Sicily  with  the  intention  of 

1  Thuc.  vii.  63  :  oi  Teas  3A6r]vaioL  voni£6jievoi  nai  /jltj  ovres  vfxwv  rrjs 
re  cfxov^s  rrj  Ittkttx]^  Kai  twv  TpoiroiV  rfj  /n/x^o-ei  eOanfid^eade  Karri  rrjv 
'EXXaSct. 

2  Thuc.  vii.  64,  Jowett. 


352 


THE  GREAT  STRUGGLE,  413. 


[X.  31. 


enslaving  the  island,  and  using  it  as  an  instrument  for  en- 
slaving Hellas.  These  hopes  had  been  dashed  to  the  ground. 
Address  of  The  irresistible  navy  had  been  defeated,  and 
Gyiippus.  it  would  soon  be  defeated  again.  The  pre- 
parations of  the  enemy,  the  crowding  of  their  decks  with 
heavy-armed  and  javelin-men,  and  the  great  number  of  ships, 
would  be  a  hindrance  rather  than  a  help.  The  attack  which 
they  were  about  to  deliver  was  the  last  effort  of  despair,  for 
it  was  impossible  for  them  to  remain  where  they  were.  Their 
good  fortune  had  left  them  and  deserted  to  the  Syracusans. 
"I  need  not  tell  you  that  they  are  our  enemies,  and  our 
worst  enemies.  They  came  against  our  land  that  they  might 
enslave  us,  and  if  they  had  succeeded,  they  would  have 
inflicted  the  greatest  sufferings  on  our  men,  and  the  worst 
indignities  upon  our  wives  and  children,  and  would  have 
stamped  a  name  of  dishonour  on  our  whole  city.  Wherefore, 
let  no  one's  heart  be  softened  to  them.  Seldom  are  men 
exposed  to  hazards  in  which  they  lose  little  if  they  fail,  and 
win  all  if  they  succeed."1 

31.  What  followed  can  only  be  told  in  the  words  of 
Thucydides. 

"While  Nicias,  overwhelmed  by  the  situation,  and  seeing  how 
great  and  how  near  the  peril  was  (for  the  ships  were  on  the  very 
D  f  t  f  th  point  of  rowing  out),  feeling  too,  as  men  do  on  the 
Athenians.  eve  °f  a  great  struggle,  that  all  which  he  had  done 
was  nothing,  and  that  he  had  not  said  half  enough, 
again  addressed  the  trierarchs,  and  calling  each  of  them  by  his 
father's  name,  and  his  own  name,  and  the  name  of  his  tribe,  he 
entreated  those  who  had  made  any  reputation  for  themselves  not  to 
be  false  to  it,  and  those  wkose  ancestors  were  eminent  rot  to  tarnish 
their  hereditary  fame.  He  reminded  them  that  they  were  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  freest  country  in  the  world^  and  how  in  Athens  there  was 
no  interference  with  the  daily  life  of  any  man.  He  spoke  to  them  of 
their  wives  and  children  and  their  fathers'  gods,  as  men  will  at  such 
a  time  ;  for  then  they  do  not  care  whether  their  common-place  phrases 
see  in  to  be  out  of  date  or  not,  but  loudly  reiterate  the  old  appeals, 


1  Thuc.  vii.  68,  Jowett. 


X.  3L]  NATURE  OF  THE  FIGHTING,  413. 


353 


believing  that  they  may  be  of  some  service  at  the  awful  moment. 
When  he  thought  that  he  had  exhorted  them,  not  enough,  but  as 
much  as  the  scanty  time  allowed,  he  retired,  and  led  the  land-forces 
to  the  shore,  extending  the  line  as  far  as  he  could,  so  that  they  might 
be  of  the  greatest  use  in  encouraging  the  combatants  on  board  ship. 
Demosthenes,  Menander,  and  Euthydemus,  who  had  gone  on  board 
the  Athenian  fleet  to  take  the  command,  now  quitted  their  own 
station,  and  proceeded  straight  to  the  closed  mouth  of  the  harbour, 
intending  to  force  their  way  to  the  open  sea  where  a  passage  was 
still  left. 

"  The  Syracusans  and  their  allies  had  already  put  out  with  nearly 
the  same  number  of  ships  as  before.  A  detachment  of  them  guarded 
the  entrance  of  the  harbour  ;  the  remainder  were  disposed  all  round 
it  in  such  a  manner  that  they  might  fall  on  the  Athenians  from  every 
side  at  once,  and  that  their  land-forces  might  at  the  same  time  be 
able  to  co-operate  wherever  the  ships  retreated  to  the  shore.  Sicanus 
and  Agatharchus  commanded  the  Syracusan  fleet,  each  of  them  a 
wing ;  Pythen  and  the  Corinthians  occupied  the  centre.  When  the 
Athenians  approached  the  closed  mouth  of  the  harbour,  the  violence 
of  their  onset  overpowered  the  ships  which  were  stationed  there  ; 
they  then  attempted  to  loosen  the  fastenings.  Whereupon  from  all 
sides  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  came  bearing  down  upon  them, 
and  the  conflict  was  no  longer  confined  to  the  entrance,  but  extended 
throughout  the  harbour.  No  previous  engagement  had  been  so  fierce 
and  obstinate.  Great  was  the  eagerness  with  which  the  rowers  on 
both  sides  rushed  upon  their  enemies  whenever  the  word  of  command 
was  given ;  and  keen  was  the  contest  between  the  pilots  as  they 
manoeuvred  one  against  another.  The  marines  too  were  full  of 
anxiety  that,  when  ship  struck  ship,  the  service  on  deck  should  not 
fall  short  of  the  rest ;  every  one  in  the  place  assigned  to  him  was 
eager  to  be  foremost  among  his  fellows.  Many  vessels  meeting — and 
never  did  so  many  fight  in  so  small  a  space,  for  the  two  fleets  together 
amounted  to  nearly  two  hundred — they  were  seldom  able  to  strike  in 
the  regular  manner,  because  they  had  no  opportunity  of  first  retiring 
or  breaking  the  line  ;  they  generally  fouled  one  another  as  ship 
dashed  against  ship  in  the  hurry  of  flight  or  pursuit.  All  the  time 
that  another  vessel  was  bearing  down,  the  men  on  deck  poured 
showers  of  javelins  and  arrows  and  stones  upon  the  enemy  ;  and 
when  the  two  closed,  the  marines  fought  hand  to  hand,  and  en- 
deavoured to  board.  In  many  places,  owing  to  the  want  of  room, 
they  who  had  struck  another  found  that  they  were  struck  themselves  ; 

VOL.  III.  Z 


354  THE  ATHENIANS  DEFEATED,  413.  [X.  31. 


often*  two  or  even  more  vessels  were  unavoidably  entangled  about 
one,  and  the  pilots  had  to  make  plans  of  attack  and  defence,  not 
against  one  adversary  only,  but  against  several  coming  from  different 
sides.  The  crash  of  so  many  ships  dashing  against  one  another  took 
away  the  wits  of  the  sailors,  and  made  it  impossible  to  hear  the  boat- 
swains, whose  voices  in  both  fleets  rose  high,  as  they  gave  directions 
to  the  rowers,  or  cheered  them  on  in  the  excitement  of  the  struggle. 
On  the  Athenian  side  they  were  shouting  to  their  men  that  they  must 
force  a  passage  and  seize  the  opportunity  now  or  never  of  returning 
in  safety  to  their  native  land.  To  the  Syracusans  and  their  allies 
was  represented  the  glory  of  preventing  the  escape  of  their  enemies, 
and  of  a  victory  by  which  every  man  would  exalt  the  honour  of  his 
own  city.  The  commanders,  too,  when  they  saw  any  ship  backing 
without  necessity,  would  call  the  captain  by  his  name,  and  ask,  of  the 
Athenians,  whether  they  were  retreating  because  they  expected  to  be 
more  at  home  upon  the  land  of  their  bitterest  foes  than  upon  that  sea 
which  had  been  their  own  so  long  ;  on  the  Syracusan  side,  whether, 
when  they  knew  perfectly  well  that  the  Athenians  were  only  eager  to 
find  some  means  of  flight,  they  would  themselves  fly  from  the  fugitives. 

"  While  the  naval  engagement  hung  in  the  balance,  the  two  armies 
on  shore  had  great  trial  and  conflict  of  soul.  The  Sicilian  soldier  was 
animated  by  the  hope  of  increasing  the  glory  which  he  had  already 
won,  while  the  invader  was  tormented  by  the  fear  that  his  fortunes 
might  sink  lower  still.  The  last  chance  of  the  Athenians  lay  in  their 
ships,  and  their  anxiety-  was  dreadful.  The  fortune  of  the  battle 
varied  ;  and  it  was  not  possible  that  the  spectators  on  the  shore 
should  all  receive  the  same  impression  of  it.  Being  quite  close,  and 
having  different  points  of  view,  they  would  some  of  them  see  their 
own  ships  victorious  ;  their  courage  would  then  revive,  and  they 
would  earnestly  call  upon  the  gods  not  to  take  from  them  their  hope 
of  deliverance.  But  others,  who  saw  their  ships  worsted,  cried  and 
shrieked  aloud,  and  were  by  the  sight  alone  more  utterly  unnerved 
than  the  defeated  combatants  themselves.  Others  again,  who  had 
fixed  their  gaze  on  some  part  of  the  struggle  which  was  undecided, 
were  in  a  state  of  excitement  still  more  terrible  ;  they  kept  swaying 
their  bodies  to  and  fro  in  an  agony  of  hope  and  fear  as  the  stubborn 
conflict  went  on  and  on  ;  for  at  every  instant  they  were  all  but  saved 
or  all  but  lost.  And  while  the  strife  hung  in  the  balance,  you  might 
hear  in  the  Athenian  army  at  once  lamentation,  shouting,  cries  of 
victory  or  defeat,  and  all  the  various  sounds  which  are  wrung  from 
a  great  host  in  extremity  of  danger.    Not  less  agonising  were  the 


X.  32.]    DEMOSTHENES  WOULD  FIGHT  AGAIN,  US.  355 


feelings  of  those  on  board.  At  length  the  Syracusans  and  their 
allies,  after  a  protracted  struggle,  put  the  Athenians  to  flight,  and 
triumphantly  bearing  down  upon  them,  and  encouraging  one  another 
with  loud  cries  and  exhortations,  drove  them  to  land.  Then  that  part 
of  the  navy  which  had  not  been  taken  in  the  deep  water  fell  back  in 
confusion  to  the  shore,  and  the  crews  rushed  out  of  the  ships  into  the 
camp.  And  the  land-forces,  no  longer  now  divided  in  feeling,  but 
uttering  one  universal  groan  of  intolerable  anguish,  ran,  some  of  them 
to  save  the  ships,  others  to  defend  what  remained  of  the  wall; 
but  the  greater  number  began  to  look  to  themselves  and  to  their 
own  safety." 1 

32.  Even  in  this  dreadful  hour  there  was  one  soldier  in 
the  Athenian  army  whose  spirit  was  not  broken,  whose  genius 
at  once  divined  the  best  plan  of  saving  the  wreck 

:  \  0     .,,  Demosthenes 

of  the  army.    The  Athenians  had  still  more  wiShes  to 
ships  available  for  service  than  the  enemy ;  let  *he 
them  go  on  board  again  and  endeavour  to  force 
their  way  out  at  daybreak :  such  was  the  advice  of  Demos- 
thenes.   Nicias  agreed,  but  when  the  order  was  given  to  the 
sailors,  they  refused  to  obey  it.    They  would  not  again  face 
the  enemy  on  sea ;  and  nothing  remained  for  the  generals 
but  to  arrange  for  retreat  by  land.    Hermocrates  suspected 
their  intention,  and  resolved  to  prevent  it  by  securing  the 
roads  and  passes.   Euined  though  it  was,  the  Athenian  army 
was  still  numerous,  and,  if  settled  in  Sicily,  might  become  a 
source  of  danger.    The  Syracusan  authorities  agreed  with 
Hermocrates;  but  would  their  soldiers  be  willing  to  carry 
out  the  plan  1    They  had  just  won  a  great  victory,  and  were 
also  celebrating  a  festival — to  be  called  out  for  service  at  such 
a  time  would  be  too  great  a  hardship.    If  Action  of 
Hermocrates  could  not  rouse  the  Syracusan  Hermocrates. 
soldier  to  a  sense  of  his  duty,  he  could  at  least  count  on  the 
folly  of  the  Athenian  commander.    When  night  came  on  he 
sent  out  friends  of  his  own  to  play  the  part  of  envoys  from  the 


1  Thuc.  vii.  69-71,  Jowett.  For  the  account  of  Diodorus,  see 
Freeman,  I.e.  p.  348  ff. 


356 


THE  ATHENIANS  RETREAT,  413. 


Athenian  party  in  Syracuse,  and  warn  Nicias  that  the  passes 
were  guarded.  Let  him  wait  for  daylight  before  moving  his 
army.  The  Athenian  generals  swallowed  the  bait,  counter- 
manded the  orders  given,  and  even  delayed  till  the  following 
day,  that  the  soldiers  might  set  out  as  well  equipped  as  the 
circumstances  permitted.  In  this  interval  the  Syracusans 
had  ample  time  to  secure  the  fords  and  passes  into  the 
interior,  and  to  dispose  their  forces  in  the  best  positions  for 
attack.  They  also  towed  the  Athenian  ships  from  the  shore 
of  the  harbour  to  the  city,  except  a  few  which  the  Athenians 
had  burnt.1 

33.  At  last  the  retreat  began. 

"  The  Athenians  were  in  a  dreadful  condition  ;  not  only  was  there 
the  great  fact  that  they  had  lost  their  whole  fleet,  and  instead  of  their 
Retreat  of  the  exPecte(i  triumph  had  brought  the  utmost  peril  upon 
Athenians.  Athens  as  well  as  upon  themselves,  but  also  the  sights 
which  presented  themselves  as  they  quitted  the  camp 
were  painful  to  every  eye  and  mind.  The  dead  were  unburied,  and  when 
any  one  saw  the  body  of  a  friend  lying  on  the  ground  he  was  smitten 
with  sorrow  and  dread,  while  the  sick  or  wounded  who  still  survived 
but  had  to  be  left  were  even  a  greater  trial  to  the  living,  and  more  to 
be  pitied  than  those  who  were  gone.  Their  prayers  and  lamentations 
drove  their  companions  to  distraction;  they  would  beg  that  they 
might  be  taken  with  them,  and  call  by  name  any  friend  or  relation 
whom  they  saw  passing  ;  they  would  hang  upon  their  departing 
comrades  and  follow  as  far  as  they  could,  and  when  their  limbs  and 
strength  failed  them  and  they  dropped  behind  many  were  the  impre- 
cations and  cries  which  they  uttered.  So  that  the  whole  army  was 
in  tears,  and  such  was  their  despair  that  they  could  hardly  make  up 
their  minds  to  stir,  although  they  were  leaving  an  enemy's  country, 
having  suffered  calamities  too  great  for  tears  already,  and  dreading 
miseries  yet  greater  in  the  unknown  future.  There  was  also  a  general 
feeling  of  shame  and  self-reproach,— indeed  they  seemed,  not  like  an 
army,  but  like  the  fugitive  population  of  a  city  captured  after  a  siege ; 
and  of  a  great  city  too.  For  the  whole  multitude  who  were  marching 
together  numbered  not  less  than  forty  thousand.  Each  of  them  took 
with  him  anything  he  could  carry  which  was  likely  to  be  of  use. 


l  Thuc.  vii.  74, 


X.  33-]  NICIAS  ENCOURAGES  THEM,  US. 


357 


Even  the  heavy-armed  and  cavalry,  contrary  to  their  practice  when 
under  arms,  conveyed  about  their  persons  their  own  food,  some  because 
they  had  no  attendants,  others  because  they  could  not  trust  them  ; 
for  they  had  long  been  deserting,  and  most  of  them  had  gone  off  all 
at  once.  Nor  was  the  food  which  they  carried  sufficient ;  for  the 
supplies  of  the  camp  had  failed.  Their  disgrace  and  the  universality 
of  the  misery,  although  there  might  be  some  consolation  in  the  very 
community  of  suffering,  was  nevertheless  at  that  moment  hard  to  bear, 
especially  when  they  remembered  from  what  pride  and  splendour 
they  had  fallen  into  their  present  low  estate.  Never  had  an  Hellenic 
army  experienced  such  a  reverse.  They  had  come  intending  to 
enslave  others,  and  they  were  going  away  in  fear  that  they  would  be 
themselves  enslaved.  Instead  of  the  prayers  and  hymns  with  which 
they  had  put  to  sea,  they  were  now  departing  amid  appeals  to  heaven 
of  another  sort.  They  were  no  longer  sailors  but  landsmen,  depend- 
ing, not  upon  their  fleet,  but  upon  their  infantry.  Yet  in  face  of  the 
great  danger  which  still  threatened  them  all  these  things  appeared 
endurable." 1 

Nicias  was  not  wanting  at  this  crisis.  Though  suffering 
so  severely  from  a  painful  disease  that  his  condition  was 
apparent  to  every  one,  he  endeavoured  to  Heroism  of 
inspire  his  soldiers  with  such  hope  as  their  Nlcias- 
circumstances  admitted.  He  entreated  them  not  to  be  cast 
down  by  their  misfortunes.  He  himself,  though  his  life  had 
been  passed  in  the  performance  of  every  duty,  was  now 
deserted  by  the  good  fortune  which  had  hitherto  attended 
him,  and  involved  in  the  common  calamity.  Yet  looking  on 
the  past  he  still  cherished  hope  for  the  future.  If  they 
had  been  under  the  displeasure  of  any  god  when  they  set 
forth  to  attack  Syracuse,  their  sufferings  were  an  ample  ex- 
piation ;  they  were  now  an  object  of  divine  compassion  rather  % 
than  divine  envy.  They  were  still  a  great  army,  such  as  no 
Sicilian  city  could  easily  resist ;  and  wherever  they  encamped 
they  would  at  once  form  a  city.  The  march  must  be  made 
in  good  order,  and  in  haste,  for  supplies  were  short ;  but  as 
soon  as  they  reached  the  territory  of  the  Sicels  they  would 
be  safe.    They  had  no  place  of  retreat  near,  to  which  a 


1  Thuc.  vii.  75,  Jowett. 


358 


THEIR  ROUTE  BARRED,  413. 


[X.  33. 


coward  could  fly,  and  on  their  success  it  depended  whether 
the  power  of  Athens,  overthrown  for  the  time,  should  be  re- 
stored.   "It  is  men,  not  walls  or  ships,  which  make  a  city." 

The  heavy-armed  were  arranged  in  two  hollow  squares, 
within  which  were  placed  the  baggage  and  the  light-armed, 
The  line  of  and  two  divisions  were  made  of  the  army  :  the 
march.  grgt  marcning  un(jer  the  command  of  Nicias, 

the  second  under  Demosthenes.  At  the  ford  of  the  Anapus 
they  found  a  body  of  Syracusans  waiting  for  them;  these 
they  defeated,  and  passed  onwards,  for  about  five  miles, 
harassed  all  the  way  by  the  Syracusan  horse  and  javelin 
men.  The  next  day,  after  marching  about  two  miles  and  a 
half,  they  encamped  in  a  plain  to  obtain  food  and  water; 
meanwhile  the  Syracusans  built  a  wall  across  a  steep  hill 
path,  between  two  ravines,  up  which  their  route  lay.  When 
the  Athenians  resumed  their  march  on  the  third  day  they  were 
again  attacked  by  the  horse,  as  before,  and  after  a  fruitless 
resistance  returned  to  their  camp.  The  next  day  (the  4th) 
they  marched  up  to  the  hill,  but  only  to  find  the  pass  held 
by  the  Syracusan  army  in  great  force.  Their  efforts  to  break 
through  were  in  vain,  and  to  add  to  their  discouragement  a 
storm  of  thunder  and  lightning  burst  over  the  army.  The 
very  elements  seemed  to  be  fighting  against  them.  They 
succeeded,  nevertheless,  in  preventing  an  attempt  which 
G-ylippus  made  to  cut  them  off  in  the  rear  by  a  wall 
across  the  ravine  through  which  they  had  passed.  They 
then  retired  towards  the  level  ground  and  encamped  for  the 
night.  With  the  next  day  (the  5th)  they  again  advanced, 
but  the  Syracusans  set  upon  them  from  every  side,  retiring 
when  the  Athenians  advanced,  and  attacking  when  they 
retired.  After  a  long  struggle  the  Athenians  once  more 
encamped  in  the  plain  about  three  quarters  of  a  mile  in 
advance  of  their  former  position.1 

1  Thuc.  vii.  77-79.  Thucydides  gives  the  name  'Anpaiov  \enas  to  the 
hill  between  two  ravines  where  the  Athenians  were  checked  :  it  is  the 
modern  Monasterello,  and  the  pass  leading  to  it  is  the  Cava  Spampi- 
nato.  See  Freeman,  Jlist.  of  Sicily,  iii.  p.  375 ;  p.  701  ff. ;  infra,  p.  364. 


X.  34-1 


DEMOSTHENES  SURRENDERS,  413. 


359 


The  Athenian  generals  now  changed  their  plans.  They 
abandoned  the  attempt  to  penetrate  into  the  interior,  and 
resolved  to  retire  to  the  coast  under  cover  of  ^ 

i    t         oc  Change  of  route. 

night.  In  this  way  they  hoped  to  shake  on 
the  Syracusans,  by  whom  such  a  change  of  route  would  be 
quite  unexpected.  They  got  away  unobserved,  but  their 
ill  luck  still  pursued  them ;  a  panic  fell  on  the  army ;  the 
division  of  Demosthenes  was  thrown  into  disorder,  and 
greatly  delayed  on  its  march.  At  daybreak  (6th  day)  Nicias 
reached  the  sea,  and  struck  into  the  Helorine  road,  intending, 
when  they  arrived  at  the  Cacyparis,  to  march  up  the  river 
into  the  interior,  where  the  Sicels,  to  whom  they  had  sent 
envoys,  would  receive  them.  When  he  reached  the  river,  he 
found  the  Syracusans  engaged  in  cutting  off  their  progress 
through  the  ford  by  walls  and  palisades.  He  succeeded  in 
driving  them  off,  but  on  the  advice  of  his  guides  he  aban- 
doned the  plan  of  marching  up  the  Cacyparis,  and  went  on 
to  the  Erineus,  where,  as  he  hoped,  he  would  be  less  hindered 
by  the  Syracusans.1 

34.  The  Syracusans,  when  they  found  the  Athenians  gone 
from  their  encampment,  were  for  a  moment  dismayed  and 
indignant.  They  even  suspected  Gylippus  of  Surrender  of 
allowing  them  to  escape.  But  though  the  Demosthenes, 
fugitives  had  changed  their  route,  it  was  easy  to  trace 
them,  and  in  a  short  time  the  Syracusans  came  up  with 
the  division  of  Demosthenes  (6th  day),  which  had  not  yet 


In  their  attempt  to  win  this  pass,  the  Athenians  were,  in  Professor 
Freeman's  opinion,  endeavouring  to  make  their  way  to  Catana — and 
this  is  the  view  of  Diodorus,  xiii.  18,  7rporjeaav  eVt  Kardvrjs — which, 
however,  must  be  a  mistake.  In  c.  80.  I,  Thucydides  says  rjv  fj 
^vjXTraa-a  686s  avrr)  ovk  eVi  Karats  to)  arparevpaTL,  and  if  rj  £vp..  686s 
means  "the  whole  retreat  "  this  is  decisive.  The  only  change  in  their 
plans  was  that  whereas  they  originally  intended  to  march  inland  at 
once,  now  they  marched  by  the  shore  till  they  could  find  a  favourable 
opportunity  of  striking  into  the  country.    Cp.  80.  2. 

1  For  the  topography,  see  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily,  iii.  706.  The 
Cacyparis  is  apparently  the  Cassibile;  about  the  Erineus  there  is 
more  doubt :  it  may  be  the  Cavallata,  a  small  stream  to  the  south  of 
Avola. 


360  NIC  I  AS  CONTINUES  HIS  RETREAT,  413.      [X.  34. 


recovered  from  the  panic  of  the  night,  and  was  about  six 
miles  in  the  rear  of  Nicias.  When  they  attacked  him  he 
abandoned  all  thought  of  retreat,  and  prepared  to  resist,  but 
the  enemy  would  not  give  him  the  opportunity  of  a  battle. 
He  was  driven  into  an  olive-garden,  an  enclosure  sur- 
rounded by  a  wall,  with  roads  running  on  each  side  of  it. 
Here,  the  whole  day  through,  his  soldiers  were  exposed  to 
the  missiles  of  the  enemy  from  every  side,  until  at  length 
Gylippus,  seeing  their  distress,  proclaimed  that  any  islanders 
in  the  army,  who  came  over  to  him,  would  retain  their 
freedom.  A  few  cities,  and  only  a  few,  availed  themselves 
of  the  permission;  the  majority,  whether  from  distrust  of 
the  Syracusans  or  from  loyalty  to  Athens,  preferred  the 
nobler  part  of  sharing  to  the  end  in  the  disasters  of  the  day. 
After  some  further  delay  the  whole  force,  amounting  to 
6000  men,  agreed  to  give  up  their  arms  on  condition  that 
their  lives  should  be  spared,  a  stipulation  in  which  Demos- 
thenes himself  refused  to  be  included.  What  money  they 
had  was  collected — and  enough  was  found  to  fill  four  shields 
— and  the  men  were  immediately  led  away  to  the  city.1 

Nicias  meanwhile  had  crossed  the  Erineus  and  encamped 
his  division  on  rising  ground.  The  next  day,  the  seventh  of 
Nicias  at  the  the  retreat,  when  the  Syracusans  came  up,  they 
Assinarus.  announced  the  surrender  of  Demosthenes,  and 
called  on  Nicias  to  do  the  same.    On  finding  that  the  state- 

1  Thuc.  vii.  81,  82.  The  narrative  of  Thucydides  is  not  clear;  he 
speaks  as  if  both  divisions  entered  the  Helorine  road  and  advanced 
to  the  Cacyparis.  Bat  this  is  not  probable,  for  by  the  middle  of  the 
day  Nicias  is  fifty  stadia  ahead  of  Demosthenes,  though  at  some 
distance  from  the  Erineus,  yet  the  whole  distance  between  the 
Cacyparis  and  Erineus  is  not  more  than  forty  stadia.  Plutarch 
identifies  the  olive- garden  as  that  of  Polyzelus  (the  brother  of  Hiero), 
Nic.  c.  27  ;  and  informs  us  that  Demosthenes  attempted  to  kill  him- 
self, but  was  prevented  by  his  captors.  Pausanias  also  mentions  the 
attempt,  on  the  authority  of  Philistus,  the  Sicilian  historian  (see 
below,  p.  364,  n.),  i.  29.  12  :  ypd(pa)  5e  ovdev  didcpopa  77  &[\c<ttos,  6s  e(f)rf 
ArjixoaOevrjv  fiev  anop^as  7TOLr)aaa0ai  tois  aWois  7tXt)v  avrov,  Kai  as 
^Xicrffero,  avrov  eVt^etpeti/  cmoKTeivai.  The  circumstances  of  the  retreat 
make  it  probable  that  Demosthenes  was  overtaken  before  he  reached 
the  coast. 


X.  34-] 


HE  REACHES  THE  ASSINARUS,  413. 


361 


ment  was  true,  Nicias  offered,  on  the  part  of  the  Athenians, 
to  pay  a  full  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  the  war,  if  his  army 
were  allowed  to  go  free,  and  to  give  sureties — one  citizen  for 
each  talent — till  the  money  was  paid.  The  offer  was  not 
accepted;  and  the  Syracusans  at  once  began  to  attack  the 
division  in  the  same  manner  as  they  had  done  that  of 
Demosthenes.  Though  greatly  distressed  for  want  of  food, 
the  soldiers  held  out  for  the  whole  of  the  day,  and  when 
night  came  they  endeavoured  to  steal  away  unobserved.  In 
this  they  were  detected,  though  three  hundred  broke  through 
the  ring  of  the  Syracusan  guards,  only  to  be  captured  later  on. 
The  rest  remained  where  they  were.  Next  day  (the  8th) 
Nicias  led  them  forward,  amid  the  attacks  of  the  Syracusans, 
to  the  Assinarus.  Here  they  hoped  to  find  some  relief,  and 
they  would  at  least  be  able  to  quench  their  intolerable  thirst. 

"  No  sooner  did  they  reach  the  water  than  they  lost  all  order  and 
rushed  in ;  every  man  was  trying  to  cross  first,  and  the  enemy 
pressing  upon  them  at  the  same  time,  the  passage  of  the  river 
became  hopeless.  Being  compelled  to  keep  close  together,  they  fell 
one  upon  another,  and  trampled  each  other  underfoot ;  some  at  once 
perished,  pierced  by  their  own  spears  ;  others  got  entangled  in  the 
baggage,  and  were  carried  down  the  stream.  The  Syracusans  stood 
upon  the  further  bank  of  the  river,  which  was  steep,  and  hurled 
missiles  from  above  on  the  Athenians,  who  were  huddled  together  in 
the  deep  bed  of  the  stream,  and  for  the  most  part  were  drinking 
greedily.  The  Peloponnesians  came  down  the  bank  and  slaughtered 
them,  falling  chiefly  upon  those  who  were  in  the  river.  Whereupon 
the  water  at  once  became  foul,  but  was  drunk  all  the  same,  although 
muddy  and  dyed  with  blood,  and  the  crowd  fought  for  it. 

"At  last,  when  the  dead  bodies  were  lying  in  heaps  upon  one 
another  in  the  water  and  the  army  was  utterly  undone,  some  perish- 
ing in  the  river,  and  any  who  escaped  being  cut  off  by  the  cavalry, 
Nicias  surrendered  to  Gylippus,  in  whom  he  had  more  confidence 
than  the  Syracusans.  He  entreated  him  and  the  Lacedaemonians 
to  do  what  they  pleased  with  himself,  but  not  to  go  on  killing  the 
men.    So  Gylippus  gave  the  word  to  make  prisoners."  1 


1  Time.  vii.  85,  Jowett.  The  Assinarus  is  identified  with  the 
Falconara. 


362 


SURRENDER  OF  NIC/AS,  413. 


[X.  34- 


Demosthenes  had  surrendered  on  terms,  and  his  soldiers 
became  prisoners  of  the  Syracusan  state.  It  was  otherwise 
with  the  division  of  Nicias ;  there  was  no  formal  agreement 
in  this  case;  the  slaughter  was  brought  to  an  end  at  the 
request  of  Nicias,  and  the  men  passed  into  the  hands  of  those 
who  took  them.  Of  the  whole  division  only  a  thousand  came 
into  the  possession  of  the  Syracusan  state.  The  slaughter 
had  been  great — both  at  the  Assinarus  and  on  the  march 
thither — and  many  escaped,  but  the  remarkable  difference  in 
the  number  of  the  captives  in  the  two  divisions  is  to  be 
explained  by  the  appropriation  of  the  prisoners  by  their 
captors.1 

In  Pausanias  we  read  a  story  which  casts  a  ray  of  light  on 
the  horrors  of  the  final  scene.  He  tells  us  that  Callistratus, 
one  of  the  Athenian  hipparchs,  cut  his  way  through  the 
enemy  at  the  Assinarus,  and  led  his  troop  in  safety  to  Catana. 
Then  he  returned  to  Syracuse,  and  finding  the  enemy  still 
engaged  in  plundering  the  Athenian  camp,  he  rode  in  upon 
them,  and  slew  five  of  the  number.  Then  he  fell,  and  his 
horse  also,  beneath  their  spears.2 

The  return  of  the  victorious  Syracusans  is  described  by 
Plutarch.  The  captives,  so  many  of  them,  that  is,  as  were  state 
The  return  prisoners,  were  collected  into  a  body  to  be  taken 
to  Syracuse.  to  the  city.  On  the  tallest  and  most  beautiful 
of  the  trees  which  grew  by  the  Assinarus  were  suspended  the 
panoplies  of  the  prisoners  to  serve  as  a  trophy ;  the  Syra- 
cusans adorned  themselves  with  crowns,  and  their  horses 
with  splendid  trappings,  while  they  clipped  the  manes  of  any 
of  the  enemy's  horses  which  fell  into  their  hands.  Thus  they 
rode  back  to  the  city.  The  day  was  celebrated  by  a  festival 
called  the  Assinaria.     No  contest  so  great  had  ever  been 


1  Thuc.  I.e. :  to  8e  biaKXairev  ttoXv.  See  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily, 
iii.  399. 

2  Paus.  vii.  16.  5.  He  may  have  got  the  story  from  Philistus.  Cp. 
Lysias,  20.  26,  eVetSr?  de  hiicpOapr)  [to  arpaTOTrebov}  ml  dveo~d>6r)v  eiy 
KaTcivriv,  eXrj'i^OjxrjP  6pp,mp,evos  ivTevOev  Kai  tovs  Tro\ep,iovs  /cantos 
in  o  low. 


X.  35-1  THE  STONE-QUARRIES,  413.  363 


fought  between  Greeks ;  no  conqueror  had  ever  won  a  victory 
so  complete.1 

35.  An  assembly  was  now  held  of  the  Syracusans  and 
their  allies  to  decide  on  the  fate  of  the  prisoners.  The  two 
generals — Nicias  and  Demosthenes — were  at  Fateofthe 
once  condemned  to  death,  in  spite  of  the  prisoners, 
opposition  of  Gylippus.  Demosthenes,  perhaps,  could  hardly 
have  expected  any  other  doom.  From  the  Lacedaemonians 
he  had  nothing  to  hope ;  the  seizure  of  Pylus  was  not  to  be 
forgotten ;  nor  were  the  Corinthians  likely  to  spare  the  man 
who  had  dealt  so  severe  a  blow  at  their  colony  of  Ambracia.2 
Nicias  was  sacrificed,  partly  to  the  Athenian  party  in  Syra- 
cuse, who  were  afraid  of  inconvenient  disclosures,  and  partly 
to  the  Corinthians,  who,  knowing  his  wealth,  thought  that  he 
might  purchase  his  escape  to  Greece.3  "  For  these  reasons  or 
the  like  he  was  put  to  death/'  a  man  who,  in  the  opinion  of 
Thucydides,  was  less  deserving  than  any  of  the  Hellenes  of 
his  time  of  such  a  miserable  end. 

The  rest  of  the  prisoners  were  placed  in  the  stone-quarries 
on  the  southern  slope  of  Achradina.  A  scanty  measure  of 
food  and  water,  barely  enough  to  sustain  life,  was  allowed 
them  day  by  day.  There  they  remained,  suffering  the 
extremes  of  temperature — glowing  heat  in  the  day,  and 
piercing  chill  at  night— in  the  midst  of  intolerable  smells, 
and  "every  kind  of  misery  which  could  befall  man  in  such 
a  place."  At  the  end  of  ten  weeks  the  Syracusans  took  out 
all  except  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  from  Sicily  or  Italy, 
and  sold  them  for  slaves.  The  rest  remained  for  nearly  six 
months  longer,  when  the  survivors  were  removed  to  the 
public  prison  of  Syracuse.4  Sicily  "  was  now  full  of  slaves  " 
—not  uncivilised  slaves  purchased  from  barbarous  regions, 


1  Plut.  Nic.  27,  28.  He  fixes  the  day  on  the  27th  Metageitnion 
(Sep.  21?).  *  Supra,  p.  199. 

3  Thuc.  vii.  86.  According  to  Diodorus,  xiii.  19,  it  was  at  first 
proposed  by  Diocles  to  put  them  to  death  with  torture.  He  gives  the 
discussion  at  great  length. 

4  Thuc.  vii.  87  ;  Diod.  xiii.  33. 


364 


ENSLAVED  ATHENIANS,  413.  [X.  35, 


but  cultivated  Athenians,  superior  in  every  way  to  many  of 
their  captors.  It  is  to  the  honour  of  the  Sicilians  that  their 
merits  were  recognised  by  their  masters.  Plutarch  informs 
us  that  those  who  could  repeat  passages  from  Euripides  were 
allowed  their  freedom ;  and  even  the  wretched  straggler  who 
could  sing  a  song  out  of  the  famous  tragedies  was  supplied 
with  food  and  water.1 

Such  was  the  end  of  the  Sicilian  expedition.  "  Of  all  the 
Hellenic  actions  which  took  place  in  this  war,  or  indeed  of 
any  Hellenic  actions  which  are  on  record,  this  was  the 
greatest,  the  most  glorious  to  the  victors,  the  most  ruinous 
to  the  vanquished,  for  they  were  utterly  and  at  all  points 
defeated,  and  their  sufferings  were  prodigious.  Fleet  and 
army  perished  from  the  earth — nothing  was  saved ;  and  of 
the  many  who  went  forth,  few  returned  home."  2 

1  Plut.  Nic.  29.  Later  writers,  as  usual,  supplement  or  correct  the 
narrative  of  Thucydides.  Justin  (iv.  5)  says  that  Demosthenes  put 
an  end  to  himself  (thus  improving  on  Philistus,  supra),  Plutarch,  that 
he  and  Nicias  were  not  put  to  death  by  the  order  of  the  Syracusans, 
but  died  by  their  own  hands,  Hermocrates  giving  them  the  oppor- 
tunity of  doing  this  while  the  Assembly  was  still  in  session.  Diodorus 
tells  us  that  they  were  put  to  death  at  the  instigation  of  Gylippus, 
whose  speech  he  gives  (inter  alia) — a  correction  of  Thucydides  due 
perhaps  to  some  Sicilian  historian  who  wished  to  remove  the  stigma 
from  his  nation.  What  value  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  picturesque 
details  given  in  the  text  from  Plutarch  it  is  impossible  to  say  ;  had 
we  the  history  of  Philistus  before  us  we  should  be  able  to  explain 
much.  He  was  an  eye-witness  of  the  siege  (Plut.  Nic.  19),  and  wrote 
a  history  of  Syracuse  down  to  the  capture  of  Agrigentum  in  406. 

2  Thuc.  vii.  87. 


Approach  to  'AKpaiov  Xenas. 

A  very  narrow  defile  with  steep  sides  at  least  one  and  a  half  mile 
long  :  then  a  very  small  space  of  open  country.  I  climbed  the  hill 
to  the  left.  The  "AKpaiov  Xerras  in  front,  rising  gently  at  first,  more 
steeply  afterwards  ;  a  little  road  running  up  it :  a  comparatively 
open  valley,  with  perhaps  a  ravine  at  the  bottom,  on  the  right  (of 
the  Xenas,  from  the  spectator's  point  of  view) :  a  very  deep  ravine 
running  far  up  into  the  hills  on  the  right,  and  forking  after  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile. 

W.  H.  FORBES, 
Note  of  a  Visit  to  Syracuse,  1881. 


CHAPTER  XL 


FROM  THE  END  OF  THE  SICILIAN  EXPEDITION  TO  -THE 
FALL  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED  (413-411). 

I,  No  formal  report  was  sent  to  Athens  of  the  destruction 
of  her  forces  in  Sicily,  and  the  unauthorised  rumours  which 
reached  the  city  were  at  first  received  with  Feeling  at 
incredulity,  for  the  Athenians  could  not  be-  Athens  on  the 
lieve  that  so  great  a  calamity  had  overtaken  sSnan  6 
so  splendid  an  army  and  so  safe  a  general ;  disaster, 
and  even  when  they  heard  the  story  from  the  lips  of  the 
survivors,  soldiers  of  known  reputation  who  had  escaped 
from  the  general  destruction,  it  was  long  before  they  could 
bring  themselves  to  accept  the  whole  truth.1 

When  doubt  was  no  longer  possible,  their  minds  were 
filled  with  rage,  grief,  and  alarm.  They  turned  fiercely 
upon  the  "  orators "  who  had  persuaded  them  into  the 
expedition,  forgetting  that  those  who  had  opposed  their 
wishes  had  been  cried  down  as  rogues  and  traitors.  Not 
less  bitter  was  their  resentment  against  the  prophets  who 
had  spoken  smooth  things,  and  the  diviners  who  had  foretold 
from  the  omens  the  conquest  of  Sicily.  Their  hearts  were 
saddened,  not  merely  by  the  failure  of  their  hopes,  but  by 
the  loss  of  friends  and  relatives.  "  The  citizens  mourned,  and 
the  city  mourned."    And  when  they  thought  of  the  war  in 


1  Thuc.  viii.  1.  Plutarch,  Nicias  30,  tells  us  that  the  news  was 
first  brought  to  Athens  by  a  stranger,  who  on  landing  in  the  Peiraeus 
entered  a  barber's  shop  and  spoke  of  the  disaster  as  commonly  known. 
The  barber  at  once  informed  the  magistrate,  who  summoned  him 
before  the  Assembly,  and  called  on  him  for  his  authority  ;  but  as  he 
could  give  no  account  of  the  stranger,  he  was  put  on  the  rack  and 
tortured  until  his  story  was  confirmed. 

sag 


366       ATHENS  AFTER  SICILIAN  DISASTER,  4I8.     [XI.  I. 


which  they  were  again  involved,  what  a  prospect  was  before 
them !  The  flower  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry  lay  in  the 
quarries  of  Syracuse,  and  their  places  could  only  be  filled,  if  at 
all,  by  the  old,  or  the  young,  or  the  incompetent.  Crews 
could  not  be  collected  for  the  ships,  and  if  they  could,  there 
was  no  money  to  pay  them ;  the  number  of  triremes  in  the 
docks  was  quite  inadequate  to  the  demands  of  the  crisis.  They 
foresaw  that  in  this  hour  of  her  weakness  not  only  would 
the  old  enemies  of  Athens  redouble  their  efforts  for  her 
destruction ;  not  only  would  the  allies  hasten  to  throw  off 
the  yoke  under  which  they  had  groaned  so  long,  but  the 
forces  of  the  West  were  now  free  to  take  part  in  the  conflict. 
Since  the  capture  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  in  the  harbour 
of  Pylus  in  425,  Athens  had  had  nothing  to  fear  at  sea,  but 
the  days  of  security  were  ended.  The  ships  of  Sicily,  which 
even  in  431  were  expected  to  form  the  bulk  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet,  would  now  appear  off  the  Peiraeus  to 
complete  the  ruin  of  the  tyrant  of  the  seas. 

Yet  even  in  this  crisis  of  their  fortunes,  the  Athenians  did 
not  lose  heart,  but  with  the  marvellous  buoyancy  which  they 
always  displayed  in  misfortune,  they  made 

Courageofthe  "       .     \  /  J 

Athenians :  preparations  to  meet  the  gathering  storm.  It 
they  prepare  was  fortunate  for  them  that  the  winter  season 
was  at  hand,  during  which  the  Syracusan  ships 
would  not  venture  across  the  water;  and  that  Brasidas, 
whose  restless  energy  regarded  all  seasons  of  the  year  as 
equally  fit  for  martial  operations,  was  no  longer  alive  to  lead 
or  inspire  the  Peloponnesians.  In  six  months  of  comparative 
inaction  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  much  might  be  done; 
ships  could  be  built ;  money  saved  or  collected ;  and  above 
all  a  strict  watch  set  over  the  subject  and  allied  cities. 

„   More  especially  the  Athenians  directed  their 

Fortification  of  .  j; 

Sunium :  estab-  attention  to  Jiuboea,  which,  since  Agis  had 
Prober  °f  occupied  Decelea,  was  doubly  necessary  to  them 
as  a  source  of  supplies ;  and  in  order  to  secure 
the  safety  of  their  merchantmen — as  it  was  now  impossible 
to  import  corn  overland — they  fortified  the  headland  of 


XI.  2.] 


THE  ENEMIES  OF  ATHENS,  413. 


367 


Sunium.  The  strictest  attention  was  given  to  economy, 
expenses  were  retrenched  where  possible ;  even  the  fortress 
in  Laconia,  which  had  been  built  by  the  fleet  on  the  voyage 
to  Sicily,  was  now  abandoned.  These  measures  were  carried 
out  under  the  superintendence  of  a  board  of  ten  Probuli  or 
Commissioners  of  Public  Safety,  "  who  were  chosen  to  advise 
together  and  lay  before  the  people  such  measures  as  might 
be  required  from  time  to  time." 1 

The  establishment  of  such  a  board  was  felt  to  be  a  step 
towards  oligarchy.  Democracy  was  in  fact  on  its  trial,  and 
many  were  ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  shock  which  it 
had  received  by  the  failure  of  the  great  popular  enterprise, 
though,  as  yet,  no  one  knew  how  deep  was  the  distrust  of 
existing  institutions.2  * 

2.  By  the  enemies  of  Athens  the  news  of  the  great  disaster 
was  received  with  a  thrill  of  delight.  At  last  the  tyrant 
city  was  down;  and  but  a  few  months  would  ~  .. 

r  eeling  of  the 

pass  before  her  destruction  was  complete,  enemies  of 
Every  one  hastened  to  be  in  at  the  death.  Athens- 
Those  who  had  hitherto  stood  apart  from  the  war  were 
eager  to  join  in  it.  They  wished  to  share  in  the  glory  of 
the  final  victory  which  could  not  be  long  delayed;  they 
longed  to  repay  the  evils  which  they  had  suffered  in  antici- 
pation, knowing  that  if  Athens  had  been  successful  in  Sicily 
they  would  have  been  added  to  the  list  of  her  victims.  The 


1  Of  the  duties  of  these  officers  we  can  only  form  a  vague  opinion 
on  evidence  which  is  not  very  trustworthy.  In  the  Lysistrata  of 
Aristophanes,  which  was  brought  out  in  411,  a  Probulus  is  intro- 
duced, and  the  duties  assigned  to  him  are  partly  financial  and  partly 
political.  With  his  colleagues  he  seems  to  have  had  control  over  the 
public  funds,  and  to  have  received  deputations  from  foreign  states, 
duties  which  usually  devolved  on  the  Prytanes.  But  they  did  not 
take  the  place  of  the  Council,  which  still  retained  its  administrative 
power  and  brought  proposals  before  the  Assembly.  See  Lysist  11 
421  f.,  433  ff.,  980  ff.  ;  Gilbert,  Beitrdge,  p.  289.  The  number  of 
the  Probuli  is  fixed  by  Aih.  Pol.  c.  29.  Two  only  are  known  to 
us  by  name:  Hagnon  and  Sophocles.  The  first  is  the  adoptive 
father  of  Theramenes  ;  the  second  may  be  the  poet. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  1,  4. 


368  THE  ALLIES  PREPARE  TO  REVOLT,  41S.     [XI.  2. 


subjects  of  Athens,  allowing  their  temper  to  get  the  better 
of  their  judgment,  were  convinced  that  the  tyrant  city  could 
not  hold  out  for  a  year.  The  Lacedaemonians  and  their 
allies  expected  a  large  force  from  Sicily  in  the  spring,  with 
whose  help  they  would  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  and  free 
themselves  for  ever  from  the  apprehensions  which  had  for 
two  generations  agitated  the  Grecian  world.  The  Athenian 
empire  and  Athenian  dreams  of  conquest  would  be  things  of 
the  past.  Greece  would  fall  back  into  the  old  grooves,  and 
Sparta  would  be  once  more  acknowledged  as  the  leading 
state.1 

But  low  as  she  was  brought,  Athens  was  still  "  mistress  of 
the  sea,"  and  without  ships  Sparta  could  accomplish  nothing.2 
Preparations  for  In  the  winter  of  413  Agis  marched  from 
aPeioponnesian  Decelea  upon  the  Oetaeans  and  neighbouring 
neet  tribes,  and  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  Thes- 

salians,  whose  subjects  they  were,  insisted  that  they  should 
not  only  join  the  alliance,  but  contribute  money  and  give 
pledges  of  fidelity.  On  their  part,  the  Lacedaemonians 
called  upon  the  cities  of  the  alliance  to  build  a  fleet  of  one 
hundred  vessels  (of  which  fifty  were  to  be  provided  by  them- 
selves and  the  Boeotians  in  equal  proportions) ;  these  were  to 
be  ready  by  the  following  spring. 

And  now  the  evil  which  Athens  had  most  to  fear  began  to 
show  itself.  From  all  sides  envoys  from  her  allies  flocked 
The  allies  pre-  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  requesting  their  help 
pare  to  revolt :  in  throwing  off  the  yoke.  First  in  the  field 
Lesbos  apply  were  the  Euboeans,  who  visited  Agis  at  Decelea. 
to  Agis.  Agis  eagerly  listened  to  their  proposals,  and  at 

once  sent  home  for  additional  troops  and  officers,  of  whom 
one  was  Alcamenes,  the  son  of  Sthenelaidas  (supra,  p.  89),  but 
when  he  was  about  to  transport  them  across  the  Euripus,  a 
deputation  from  Lesbos  arrived  proposing  to  bring  their 

1  Thuc.  viii.  2. 

2  The  Athenians  had  command  of  the  sea  during  the  winter  of  413 ; 
for  the  Spartans  were  without  ships,  and  were  as  always  slow  to 
take  advantage  of  the  situation. 


XI.  2.]        EUBOEA,  LESBOS,  CHIOS,  ETC.,  413. 


369 


island  over.  As  the  Lesbians  had  the  powerful  support  of 
the  Boeotians,  their  ancient  kinsmen,  Agis  abandoned  Euboea 
and  promised  to  send  a  small  fleet  to  act  with  the  Lesbians, 
under  the  command  of  Alcamenes,  who  was  to  be  "  harmost" 
of  Lesbos,  a  title  now  mentioned  for  the  first  time.  In 
making  these  arrangements  he  acted  without  reference  to 
the  home  authorities.1  His  position  at  Decelea  allowed 
him  to  take  up  an  independent  line,  and  by  his  zeal  and 
policy  he  had  won  the  confidence  of  the  allies.  Like  Brasidas, 
but  in  a  less  degree,  he  exhibited  Spartan  energy  and  ability 
without  the  severe  formalism  of  the  Spartan  officer,  and  for 
this  reason  the  cities  applied  to  him  for  help 

, .,      n  ,      .  .  r    The  Chians 

more  readily  than  to  the  impracticable  govern-  apPiyto  Sparta: 
ment  on  the  Eurotas.    To  Sparta,  meanwhile,  Tissaphernes 
came  the  Chians  and  Erythraeans  accompanied 
by  an  envoy  from  Tissaphernes,  the  King's  general  on  the 
Asiatic  coast  and  satrap  of  Sardis.    Tissaphernes  had  lately 
succeeded  Pissuthnes,  with  orders  to  crush  the  revolt  which 
that  satrap  had  excited.     By  purchasing  Lycon,  a  Greek 
soldier  in  command  of  the  revolted  troops,  he  had  forced 
Pissuthnes  to  capitulate ;  but  the  rebels  still  held  their 
ground  in  Caria,  under  Amorges,  the  son  of  Pissuthnes ;  and 
the  King  now  commanded  Tissaphernes,  not  only  to  produce 
Amorges  alive  or  dead,  but  to  collect  the  arrears  of  tribute 
from  the  Greek  cities  of  the  coast,  which  though  unpaid 
since  479  were  duly  entered  as  a  debt  against  the  satrap 
(cp.  vol.  ii.  73,  286).    For  these  reasons  Tissaphernes  readily 
undertook  to  support  any  force  which  the  Lacedaemonians 
would  send  into  Ionia.     Finally,  two  exiled  Envoysfrom 
Greeks,  Calligitus  of  Megara  and  Timagoras  of  Pharnabazus 
Cyzicus,  came  from  Pharnabazus,  the  satrap  of  at  Sparta- 
Phrygia,  who,  being  also  pressed  for  arrears  of  tribute,  was 
eager  to  bring  over  the  Athenian  allies  in  the  Hellespont 
to  Persia  and  negotiate  an  alliance  between  Lacedaemon  and 
the  Great  King.    But  though  the  envoys  of  Pharnabazus 

1  This  is  the  more  remarkable  after  the  events  of  418  and  the 
arrangements  mentioned  supra,  p.  281. 

VOL.  III.  2  A 


370 


THE  REVOLT  SUPPORTED,  412.  [XI.  3. 


had  brought  twenty-five  talents  with  them,  a  tempting  bait 
to  Spartan  cupidity,  Tissaphernes  and  the  Chians  found  a 
powerful  advocate  in  Alcibiades,  who  was  the  hereditary  and 
personal  friend  of  Endius,  one  of  the  ephors  of  the  year. 
Before  a  final  decision  was  pronounced,  the  Spartans  sent 
an  envoy  to  Chios  to  ascertain  whether  the  island  was  able 
to  make  good  her  promises.  On  receiving  a  favourable 
report,  they  at  once  admitted  the  Chians  and 
monians  decide  Erythraeans  into  alliance,  and  passed  a  vote 
to  support  the  to  send  forty  ships  to  their  help  (the  Chians 
chians°  had  sixty),  of  which  Lacedaemon  herself  under- 

took to  furnish  ten.  Melancridas,  the  admiral,  was  placed 
in  command,  but  an  earthquake  occurring  before  the  ships 
put  to  sea,  Chalcideus  was  elected  in  the  room  of  Melancridas, 
and  the  number  of  the  ships  was  reduced  to  five.1 

3.  Meanwhile  the  allied  vessels  and  those  which  Agis  had 
collected  to  sail  to  Lesbos,  thirty -nine  in  all,  were  assembled 
The  Lacedae-  in  the  Corinthian  gulf.  A  meeting  of  the  allies 
monian  fleet  to  was  held  at  Corinth,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the 
Lesbos,  and  the  Aeet  should  sail  first  to  Chios,  then  to  Lesbos, 
Hellespont.  and  finally  to  the  Hellespont.  To  each  district 
a  separate  commander  was  assigned :  Chalcideus  to  Chios, 
Alcamenes  to  Lesbos,  and  Clearchus  to  the  Hellespont.  In 
order  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  Athenians,  the  ships 
were  to  sail  in  two  detachments,  and  with  this  precaution  it 
was  thought  safe,  in  the  present  state  of  the  Athenian  navy, 
to  sail  through  the  open  sea  without  any  attempt  at  con- 
cealment. 

When  the  season  was  sufficiently  advanced  for  operations, 
the  Chian  envoys  were  most  urgent  that  the  Peloponnesian 
The  fleet  de-  ships  should  sail  at  once,  before  their  designs 
layedbythe  became  known  to  the  Athenians  (412).  Three 
Spartans  were  despatched  to  Corinth  with 
orders  to  carry  the  ships  over  the  Isthmus  and  set  out  for 

1  Thuc.  viii.  5  :  vtto  ftacri\ea>s  yap  vecoarl  irvy^ave  treir pay pevos 
tovs  €<  rrjs  eavrov  apx*}*  <pdpovs,  ovs  dt  'AOrjvalovs  dno  Tcov'EXXrivldau 
7roXeci)i>  ov  bvvdpevos  Trpdao-eaOai  enaXpeiXrjae  :  ibid.  c.  6.  Ctes.  Pers.  52. 


XI.  3.]  THE  DEFEAT  OFF  PEIRA E UM>  412. 


371 


Chios.  But  an  unexpected  difficulty  arose.  The  Corinthians 
would  not  sail  till  they  had  celebrated  the  Isthmia,  nor  even 
agree  to  the  suggestion  of  Agis  that  he  should  send  forward 
his  detachment  while  they  remained  behind.  Meanwhile  the 
Athenians,  who  had  received  information  of  what  was  going 
on,  sent  to  Chios  to  complain,  and  the  Chians,  though  deny- 
ing the  accusation,  complied  with  the  Athenian  demand  for 
a  contingent  of  seven  ships.  The  time  had  not  yet  come  for 
open  rebellion;  the  oligarchs,  who  alone  were  in  the  plot, 
were  not  in  a  position  to  brave  the  enmity  of  the  people,  who 
had  no  wish  to  break  with  Athens.1 

At  the  Isthmian  games,  which  they  visited  under  the 
protection  of  the  sacred  truce,  the  Athenians  discovered  the 
truth  about  Chios,  and,  on  returning  home,  TheLacedae. 
they  took  measures  to  prevent  the  Lacedae-  monian  fleet 
monian  ships  from  leaving  Cenchreae,  the  Corin-  Athenians^ 
thian  port  on  the  Saronic  gulf.     When  the  Peiraeumin 
Spartan  Alcamenes  set  sail  after  the  festival  Cormthla- 
with  twenty-one  ships,  he  found  his  movements  watched  by 
an  equal  number  of  Athenian  vessels,  by  which  he  was  at 
length  driven  on  shore  at  Peiraeum,  a  desolate  harbour  on  the 
extreme  edge  of  the  Corinthian  territory  towards  Epidauria. 
Leaving  a  sufficient  number  of  ships  to  blockade  the  defeated 
foe,  the  Athenians  retired  to  a  small  island  close  at  hand, 
where  they  encamped  and  sent  to  Athens  for  reinforcements. 
In  the  engagement  the  greater  part  of  the  Peloponnesian 
ships  had  been  disabled  and  Alcamenes  slain. 

News  of  the  disaster  was  at  once  conveyed  to  the  Corin- 
thians, who  came  to  the  rescue  on  the  next  day,  and  were 
quickly  followed  by  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
district.  At  first  they  despaired  of  protecting  the  ships  in 
a  situation  so  desolate,  but  finally  they  drew  them  ashore, 
and  left  a  force  of  infantry  in  charge,  till  some  opportunity  of 
escape  should  arise. 

It  had  been  arranged  between  Alcamenes  and  the  ephors 

1  Time.  viii.  7-9.  For  the  date  of  the  Isthmia  see  Goodhart's  note 
on  c.  9  ;  he  puts  them  in  May,  in  this  year. 


372 


ALCIBIA DES  AT  SPARTA,  412. 


[XI.  4. 


that  a  horseman  should  be  despatched  to  Sparta  when  his 
ships  left  the  Isthmus.  On  receiving  this  information,  they 
Dismay  at  prepared  to  send  off  their  own  five  vessels, 
Sparta :  under  Chalcideus  and  Alcibiades,  but  when  they 

Af-bSde^  neard  of  the  defeat  at  Peiraeum,  they  changed 
their  plans,  and  resolved  not  only  to  send 
no  ships  of  their  own  to  Asia,  but  to  recall  those  which  had 
already  put  to  sea.  If  Alcibiades  had  not  been  at  Sparta,  no 
further  steps  would  have  been  taken;  the  "Ionic  war" 
would  have  been  abandoned  before  it  had  well  begun ;  the 
Chians  would  have  been  left  to  their  fate,  and  the  offer  of 
Persian  aid  neglected.  He  pointed  out  to  the  ephors  that  if 
Chalcideus  set  sail  at  once,  he  would  reach  Chios  before  the 
news  of  the  disaster  of  Peiraeum;  and  for  himself  he  had 
only  to  land  in  Ionia,  and  so  persuasive  would  be  his  proofs 
of  the  inability  of  Athens  either  to  protect  or  to  punish  her 
subjects,  that  the  cities  would  at  once  come  over.  In 
private  he  appealed  to  the  ambition  of  his  friend  Endius, 
urging  him  not  to  allow  the  honour  of  exciting  rebellion  in 
Ionia,  and  winning  for  Sparta  the  alliance  of  the  Great  King, 
to  pass  into  the  hands  of  Agis.  The  ephors  withdrew  their 
opposition,  and  allowed  Chalcideus  to  set  sail.1  About  the 
same  time,  the  prospects  of  the  confederacy  were  a  little 
brightened  by  the  return  of  the  ships  which  had  sailed  to 
Sicily  with  Gylippus.  These,  sixteen  in  number,  had  been 
roughly  handled  off  Leucadia  by  the  Athenian  squadron 
which  lay  in  wait  for  them,  but  had  escaped  with  the  loss  of 
one  trireme,  and  now  sailed  into  the  harbour  of  Lechaeum.2 

4.  As  they  crossed  the  Aegean,  Chalcideus  and  Alcibiades 
seized  every  ship  which  came  in  their  way,  to  prevent  news 
chalcideus  and  of  their  aPProacn  reaching  Chios.  They  did 
Alcibiades  sail  not  make  directly  for  the  island,  but  put  in 
to  ioma.  a£  Q0IyCUS  on  the  mainland  opposite,  where 

they  were  met  by  some  of  their  Chian  confederates.  It  was 
arranged  that  the  Chians  should  return  home  and  summon  a 


1  Thuc.  viii.  11,  12. 


2  Thuc,  viii.  13, 


XI.  4.J   CHIOS  RE  VOLTS ;  ALARM  AT  A THENS,  412.  373 

meeting  of  the  Council,  without  announcing  publicly  the 
arrival  of  the  Peloponnesians,  who  suddenly  appeared  in  the 
harbour,  to  the  astonishment  of  the  populace.  Alcibiades 
and  Chalcideus  were  admitted  to  the  Council;  Revolt of chios, 
and,  on  hearing  that  a  fleet  was  coming  to  Erythrae, 
their  assistance,  the  Chians  revolted  from  clazomenae- 
Athens.  Their  example  was  followed  by  the  Erythraeans  on 
the  opposite  coast,  and  afterwards  by  Clazomenae.  And,  as 
Clazomenae  lay  on  a  small  island,  and  was  therefore  quite 
at  the  mercy  of  any  hostile  fleet,  the  citizens  fortified 
Polichna  on  the  mainland  as  a  place  of  retreat  in  danger. 
The  revolted  cities  at  once  began  to  rebuild  the  walls  which 
the  Athenians  had  compelled  them,  in  old  days,  to  pull 
down,  and  prepared  for  war.1 

The  news  was  quickly  carried  to  Athens,  where  it  created 
the  greatest  excitement.   Chios  was  the  only  "  independent " 
ally  remaining,  except  Methymna.  Since  the  for-  Alarmat 
mation  of  the  Delian  League,  she  had  continued  Athens :  the 
a  faithful  friend,  rendering  assistance  when  ^"J6  funds 
required,  and  in  return  retaining  unimpaired 
her  old  institutions,  though,  like  the  rest,  she  had  been  com- 
pelled to  destroy  her  walls.2  She  was  the  largest  and  perhaps 
the  wealthiest  of  all  the  allied  cities,  and,  amid  the  various 
storms  of  warfare,  she  had  enjoyed  profound  peace.  No 
island  was  so  well  and  thoroughly  cultivated  :  in  none  was 
there  such  an  abundance  of  slaves.    In  their  extremity,  the 
Athenians  considered  that  the  time  had  come  for  rescinding 
the  decree  by  which  a  thousand  talents  had  been  set  apart  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Archidamian  war  ;  and  the  money  was 
partly  spent  in  manning  ships  to  sail  to  Chios,  ships  sent 
Eight  were  at  once  despatched  under  the  com-  t0  Asia" 
mand  of  Strombichides,  and  twelve  more  were  to  follow 
under  Thrasycles.     Both  these  squadrons  were  withdrawn 
from  the  blockading  force  at  Peiraeum,  their  place  being 
taken,  at  least  in  part,  by  fresh  ships.    Other  thirty  vessels 


1  Thuc.  viii.  H. 


2  Thuc.  iv.  51. 


374 


A L CIBIA DES  AT  MILETUS,  412. 


[XI.  5. 


were  also  to  be  manned,  for,  in  the  excitement  of  the  moment, 
no  sacrifice  was  thought  too  great.  Strombichides  sailed  to 
Samos,  and  thence  to  Teos,  in  the  hope  of  preventing  a 
revolt  there,  but  Chalcideus  also  sailed  to  the  town  with 
twenty-three  ships,  supported  by  the  land  forces  of  Erythrae 
,    Fm        and  Clazomenae,  and  the  Athenians  were  com- 

Revolt  of  Teos.  rN  m 

pelled  to  return  to  Samos.  Teos  went  over  to 
the  Peloponnesians,  and  the  wall  which  the  Athenians  had 
built  to  protect  it  towards  the  interior  was  pulled  down. 

Having  thus  secured  the  most  important  of  the  Ionian 
islands  for  Sparta,  Alcibiades  resolved  to  bring  over  the  most 
important  of  the  cities  on  the  mainland.  He  was  on  friendly 
terms  with  the  leading  citizens  of  Miletus,  and  flattered 
himself  with  the  figure  which  he  would  make  with  the 
Chians  and  with  Endius,  if  he  could  win  the  capital  of  Ionia 
before  the  arrival  of  any  reinforcements  from  Peloponnesus. 
He  persuaded  Chalcideus,  on  his  return  from  Teos,  to  leave 
behind  the  crews  of  the  Peloponnesian  vessels  to  form  a 
force  of  heavy-armed  infantry  in  Chios,  and  fill  their  places 
in  the  ships  with  Chians.  With  the  five  vessels  thus  manned, 
and  other  twenty  obtained  from  Chios,  he  sailed  in  all  secrecy 
to  Miletus.  The  ships  had  barely  reached  the  harbour  before 
Strombichides  and  Thrasycles  appeared  with  the  united 
Alcibiades  wins  Athenian  fleet.  But  it  was  too  late.  Miletus 
over  Miletus.  had  aiready  reY0lted,  and  the  Athenians  could 
do  no  more  than  lie  at  anchor  off  the  island  of  Lade  and 
watch  the  progress  of  events.1 

5.  Alcibiades  had  made  good  his  promise  with  regard  to 
the  revolt  of  Ionia,  but  he  had  still  to  arrange  an  alliance 
First  alliance  between  Lacedaemon  and  the  Great  King, 
between  Sparta  This  was  a  matter  of  little  difficulty,  after 
and  the  King.  successes  which  had  been  gained,  and  on 

the  revolt  of  Miletus  Tissaphernes  and  Chalcideus  agreed 
upon  the  following  terms  :  that  all  the  territory  and  all 
the  cities  which  were  now  in  the  King's  possession,  or  had 


1  Thuc.  viii.  17. 


XI.  5-]       SPARTA  AND  THE  GREAT  KING,  418.  375 


ever  been  in  the  possession  of  his  forefathers,  should  be  his ; 
that  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  should  help  the  King 
to  prevent  the  Athenians  from  collecting  tribute,  or  deriving 
any  other  advantage  from  these  cities ;  that  both  parties 
should  carry  on  war  against  the  Athenians  in  common,  and 
bring  it  to  an  end  by  common  consent  only ;  that  cities 
which  rebelled  from  the  King  should  be  treated  as  rebels 
from  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies,  and  vice  versa.1 

The  words  of  this  shameful  bargain  can  hardly  have  been 
sufficiently  weighed  by  Chalcideus,  or  he  would  have  shrunk, 
as  Lichas  afterwards  shrank,  from  surrendering  to  the  King 
all  the  territory  which  his  forefathers  had  ever  Remarks  on 
possessed.  In  the  days  of  Xerxes,  before  480,  the  the  treaty- 
Persian  dominions  not  only  included  all  the  Greek  cities  in 
Asia,  all  the  islands  off  the  coast,  and  the  Cyclades,  but  ex- 
tended into  Europe  as  far  as  Mount  Olympus.  Even  Thessaly 
and  Boeotia  might  be  considered  as  part  of  the  kingdom  of 
Xerxes,  for  they  had  been  occupied  by  his  troops  with  the 
consent  of  the  inhabitants.  And  these  concessions  were 
more  than  a  mere  renunciation  of  claims ;  for  the  Spartans 
were  bound  to  assist  the  King  in  reducing  to  submission  any 
of  the  new  subjects  who  might  rebel.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  King  was  pledged  to  nothing.  No  stipulations  were 
made  for  the  payment  of  the  fleet,  the  bait  by  which 
Tissaphernes  had  gained  the  assistance  of  Sparta.  The  truth 
was  that  Chalcideus  was  merely  a  tool  in  the  hands  of 
Alcibiades  and  Tissaphernes.  In  order  to  gain  his  immediate 
purpose,  Alcibiades  was  willing  to  accept  any  conditions, 
regardless  of  the  fate  of  his  countrymen  and  the  liberty  of 
Greece,  and  it  was  a  matter  of  no  moment  to  him  that  the 
Spartans,  who  claimed  to  liberate  Hellas,  were  pledging  half 
of  it  into  slavery.  Tissaphernes  gained  all  and  more  than  all 
that  he  expected.  The  cities,  which  he  could  not  reduce, 
were  placed  in  his  hands  without  the  loss  of  a  ship  or  a  man  • 
the  tribute  for  which  he  was  pressed  would  flow  into  his 


1  Thuc.  viii.  18. 


376 


ACTIVITY  OF  THE  CHIANS,  412. 


[XI.  6. 


coffers,  and  the  satrap  of  Sardis  would  once  more  occupy  the 
position  which  he  had  lost  at  Mycale. 

The  Chians  were  not  content  with  sending  out  ships  under 
a  Spartan  officer ;  they  wished  to  play  their  own  part  in  the 
Action  of  great  work  of  liberation.    After  the  departure 

the  chians.  0f  Chalcideus,  they  despatched  ten  ships  which 
landed  at  Anaea,1  opposite  Samos,  wishing  to  gather  news  of 
the  attempt  on  Miletus.  But  Chalcideus  sent  messengers  to 
warn  them  away,  asserting  that  Amorges  was  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood with  his  army ;  and  at  the  same  time,  an  Athenian 
squadron  of  sixteen  triremes  was  sighted,  which  had  been 
sent  under  the  command  of  Diomedon,  to  join  the  other  two 
generals.  The  Chians  immediately  fled,  losing  four  ships  to 
the  Athenians,  who  went  on  to  Samos.  From  Teos,  where 
they  had  taken  refuge,  the  Chians  brought  over  Lebedos  and 
Lebedos  and  Erae,  after  which  their  forces,  both  naval  and 
Teos  partly1  military,  returned  home.  Not  long  afterwards 
recovered  by  Tissaphernes  appeared  at  Teos,  and  completed 
Athens.  destruction  of  the  wall,  but  he,  in  his  turn, 

had  no  sooner  gone  than  Diomedon  arrived  and  persuaded  the 
Teians  to  receive  the  Athenians  as  well  as  their  opponents. 
Erae,  however,  which  he  also  attempted,  held  out  against  him. 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  in  Ionia,  the  Spartans 
were  encouraged  by  success  at  home.  The  twenty  ships 
w,  „  ,  which  had  been  blockaded  since  the  Isthmia  at 

The  Pelopon-  . 

nesian  ships  .reiraeum,  succeeded  in  breaking  out.  They 
pTiraeum  fr°m  returne(^  to  Cenchreae,  where  they  were  joined 
by  Astyochus,  who  had  been  appointed  high 
admiral  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  and  prepared  to  sail  to 
Chios.2 

6.  So  far  the  balance  was  against  the  Athenians.  There 
was  hardly  a  place  on  the  mainland  of  Ionia  which  they 

1  See  Thiic.  iv.  75;  supra,  pp.  33,  164. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  19,  20.  The  appointment  of  Astyochus  would  lead 
us  to  suppose  that  the  annual  change  of  magistrates  had  taken  place 
at  Sparta  ;  if  so,  new  ephors  were  now  in  office,  and  Alcibiades  lost 
the  support  of  Endius,  which  would  give  Agis  the  opportunity  he 

ought. 


XI.  7.1 


RE  VOL  UTION  A  T  SAMOS,  412. 


377 


could  call  their  own ;  Chios  was  in  active  hostility ;  the  Great 
King  was  in  alliance  with  the  enemy.  All  their  hopes  centred 
in  Samos ;  if  this  island  remained  loyal,  they  samos  all 
had  still  a  strong  base  of  operations  ;  if  it  imP°rtant 
joined  in  the  revolt,  Ionia  was  gone.    It  was  state  of  the 
a  subject  city,  without  walls,  crushed  for  a  island- 
long  time  by  a  heavy  indemnity,1  and  subsequently  called 
upon  to  pay  tribute  and  furnish  soldiers.    The  nature  of 
the  government  after  440  is  uncertain,  but  as  the  oligarchs 
took  the  lead  in  the  rebellion,  and  Pericles,  on  his  first 
voyage,  established  a  democracy,  we  should  naturally  sup- 
pose that  a  democracy  was  left  in  power  when  the  city 
was  finally  reduced.    However  this  may  be,  the  oligarchs 
certainly  gained  in  influence,  and  if  the  government  was  not 
entirely  in  their  hands,  they  were  now  a  strong  party  in  the 
island.     Whether  they  entered  into  negotiations  with  the 
Chians  is  unknown,  but  it  is  probable  enough  that  the  success 
of  the  Chian  oligarchs  and  the  revolt  of  Miletus  aroused  in 
the  minds  of  the  Samian  oligarchs  the  hope  of  Popular 
recovering  their  power.    They  were,  in  any  revolution 
case,  suspected,  and  the  suspicion  gave  rise  atSamos- 
to  an  outbreak  of  popular  fury.    With  the  help  of  three 
Athenian  ships  which  were  at  hand,  the  demos  attacked 
the  notables,  slew  two  hundred  of  them,  banished  four 
hundred  more,  and  divided  among  themselves  their  houses 
and  lands  as  spoils  of  victory.    The  Athenians,  partly  to 
reward  such  ardour  in  a  good  cause,  and  partly  because  they 
were  now  sure  of  their  fidelity,  allowed  the  democrats  the 
privileges  of  independence.    Henceforth  they  governed  the 
city  for  themselves,  excluding  the  old  landowners  or  Geomori 
from  every  privilege,  refusing  even  to  marry  or  give  in 
marriage  among  them.2 

7-  On  their  return  from  Teos,  the  Chians  did  not  relax 
their  energies.  They  despatched  thirteen  ships  to  Lesbos— 
the  second  point  in  the  Lacedaemonian  programme.  On 


1  Time.  vii.  57  j  i.  117. 


Thuc.  viii.  21 ;  C.I.  A.  i.  56. 


378      ATHENIANS  AT  LESBOS  AND  CHIOS,  412.       [XI.  7. 

arriving  at  the  island,  the  ships  put  in  at  Methymna,  which 
immediately  revolted;  and  leaving  four  vessels  to  protect 
the  city,  they  passed  on  to  Mytilene,  which 
revo^of5  also  joined  them.  Meanwhile  Astyochus  had 
Lesbos.  arrived  at  Chios  from  Cenchreae,  and  after  a 

stay  of  two  days  followed  to  Lesbos ;  but  before  he  could 
reach  the  island,  the  Athenian  fleet,  twenty-five  vessels 
strong,  under  the  command  of  Diomedon  and  Leon  (who  had 
come  from  Athens  with  ten  additional  ships)  had  appeared 
at  Mytilene  and  recovered  the  city.  When  Astyochus  heard 
of  this  disaster  on  his  arrival  at  Eresus  (in  the  south  of  the 
island)  he  abandoned  Mytilene,  and  contented  himself  with 
bringing  over  Eresus.  Arming  the  citizens,  while  he  sent 
the  hoplites  of  his  own  ships,  under  the  command  of 
Eteonicus,  to  Antissa  and  Methymna,  he  himself  sailed 
thither  to  support  them.  Soon  afterwards  he  returned  to 
Chios,  taking  his  soldiers  with  him.  The  attempt  on  Lesbos 
proved  a  failure  at  every  point ;  the  island  fell  back  into  the 
hands  of  the  Athenians,  who  settled  affairs  to  their  liking, 
and  afterwards  crossed  over  to  the  mainland,  where  they 
destroyed  the  fort  which  the  Clazomenians  were  building  at 
Polichna.  The  authors  of  the  revolt  fled  to  Daphnus,  a 
neighbouring  town ;  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  returned  to 
their  island,  and  Clazomenae  also  was  once  more  Athenian.1 

Encouraged  by  these  successes,  Diomedon  and  Leon  carried 
the  war  into  Chios.  Using  Lesbos,  the  Oenussae,  and  some 
forts  in  the  territory  of  Erythrae  as  a  basis,  they  landed  at 
various  points  in  the  island.  Their  ships  had  been  manned 
by  hoplites  "from  the  roll,"  who  had  been  compelled  to  serve 
The  Athenians  as  marines,  and  with  these  excellent  troops  they 
in  Chios,  defeated  the  Chians  with  great  slaughter,  and 

laid  waste  their  country.  Such  a  disaster  had  not  been 
known  at  Chios  since  the  days  of  the  Persian  war,  and  it 
was  the  more  deeply  felt  owing  to  the  high  cultivation  of  the 


1  Time,  viii.  22,  23  §  4  ;  supra,  p.  373  ;  see  Jowett's  Thuc.  i.,  Essay 
on  Inscriptions,  xciii. 


XI.  8.] 


BATTLE  OF  MILETUS,  412. 


379 


island.  Hardly  any  other  people  in  Greece  had  enjoyed  so 
long  a  respite  from  the  miseries  of  war,  and  in  the  judgment 
of  Thucydides  none  had  made  a  better  use  of  their  prosperity. 
Their  present  sufferings  were  indeed  of  their  own  making, 
but  their  opinion  of  the  desperate  state  of  Athens  was  one 
shared  by  almost  all  the  Greeks,  and  therefore  a  pardonable 
mistake.  What  they  had  not  accurately  estimated  was  the 
indolence,  timidity,  and  incapacity  of  the  Spartan  rulers,  and 
the  almost  superhuman  energy  which  Athens  displayed  in 
the  hour  of  need.  When  they  found  themselves  driven  off 
the  sea  and  their  country  ravaged,  a  reaction  set  in,  and 
overtures  were  made  with  a  view  to  putting  the  city  into 
the  hands  of  the  Athenians.  But  the  plot  was  checked  by 
the  appearance  of  Astyochus,  who  was  brought  over  from 
Erythrae  for  the  purpose.1 

8.  Meanwhile  the  Athenian  squadron  of  twenty  ships  still 
lay  at  Lade  watching  Miletus.    A  descent  was  made  on  the 
Milesian  territory,  and  in  the  conflict  which  The  Athenians 
followed,  Chalcideus,  the  Lacedaemonian  com-  at  Miletus- 
mander,  was  slain ;  but  this  success  led  to  no  change  in  the 
situation,  and  it  was  not  till  the  close  of  the  summer  that 
affairs  took  a  decisive  turn.    By  this  time  Athens  had  once 
more  gathered  her  strength ;  a  fleet  of  forty-eight  ships  sailed 
to  Samos,  having  on  board  1000  Athenian  hoplites,  1500 
Argives — 500  of  whom  were  armed  by  the  Athenians — and 
1000  of  the  allied  forces,  under  the  command  of  Phrynichus 
and  two  others.    From  Samos  they  moved  to  Miletus,  where 
they  were  met  by  800  Milesians,  the  Peloponnesian  forces 
of  Chalcideus,  and  the  auxiliaries  of  Tissaphernes,  who  also 
furnished  a  force  of  cavalry.    In  the  battle  which  followed, 
the  Argives,  despising  their  enemies  as  Ionians,  Battle  of 
and  meeting  them  in  disorder,  were  defeated  Mlletus- 
by  the  Milesians  with  heavy  loss ;  but  the  Athenians,  after 
repulsing  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  auxiliaries,  marched 

1  Time.  viii.  24.  The  historian  is  very  anxious  that  we  should 
estimate  at  its  proper  value  the  acoeppoavvr]  of  a  city  which  was  not 
spoiled  by  prosperity. 


380         HERMOCRATES  ARRIVES  IN  IONIA,  412.      [XI.  8. 

up  to  the  gates  of  Miletus,  and  there  piled  arms,  for  the 
Milesians,  on  seeing  the  defeat  of  their  friends,  offered  no 
further  resistance.  After  the  battle,  which  was  remarkable 
for  the  victory  of  Ionians  on  both  sides,  the  Athenians 
proceeded  to  cut  off  Miletus  by  building  a  wall  across  the 
isthmus,  which  connected  the  city  with  the  mainland.1  But 
ere  the  day  closed,  the  news  came  that  the  combined  fleet 
of  the  Peloponnesians  and  Sicilians  was  at  hand,  fifty-five 
triremes  strong,  under  the  command  of  Theramenes.  What 
the  Athenians  dreaded  had  come  to  pass;  their  Syracusan 
enemy,  Hermocrates,  anxious  to  complete  the  ruin  which 
he  had  so  well  begun,  persuaded  his  city  to  send  him  over 
with  twenty  ships,  to  which  Selinus,  grateful  for  her  deliver- 
ance, had  added  two  :  and,  uniting:  with  these, 

Hermocrates         i      -n  i  i 

arrives  with  the  reloponnesian  squadron,  which  was  at  last 
£cUyfr0m  ready,  had  sailed  over  to  join  Astyochus.  The 
appearance  of  the  great  Syracusan  gives  in- 
terest and  elevation  to  the  war.  He  was  capable  and  honest, 
and  sincerely  in  earnest  in  liberating  Greece.  His  ability 
raised  him  above  his  Spartan  colleagues ;  his  honesty  above 
Alcibiades  and  Tissaphernes.  He  takes  no  decisive  part  in 
the  contest,  but  from  time  to  time  he  will  reappear,  leaving 
always  the  impression  of  a  noble  and  patriotic  soldier.  The 
fleet  sailed  to  Leros,2  but  on  learning  that  the  Athenians 
were  at  Miletus,  they  passed  on  to  Teichiussa,  in  the  Iasian 
gulf,  to  await  further  information.  Here  they  were  visited 
by  Alcibiades,  who  not  only  acquainted  them  with  the  defeat 
of  the  Milesians,  with  whom  he  had  fought,  but  urged  them, 
as  they  wished  to  save  Ionia,  to  lose  no  time  in  relieving 
Miletus. 

Upon  this  the  Peloponnesians  made  preparations  for  sail- 


1  Thuc.  viii.  25.  The  Peloponnesians  here  mentioned  are  thought 
to  be  the  e7Tt/3arat  who  served  on  board  the  ships  of  Chalcideus. 
Chalcideus  had  left  his  crews  behind  in  Chios  (cp.  c.  17,  32). 

2  Thuc.  viii.  26.  Leros  is  an  island  about  forty  miles  from  Miletus, 
but  a  convenient  position  from  which  to  watch  the  city.  See  Herod, 
v.  125. 


XI.  8.]    ATHENIAN  HEADQUARTERS  AT  SAMOS,  412.  381 


ing  on  the  next  morning  to  Miletus.    But  Phrynichus,  the 
Athenian  commander,  who  had  heard  of  their  approach,  had 
no  intention  of  risking  an  engagement,  and 
though  his  colleagues  were  at  first  indignant  ^tittf™™*™* 
that  an  Athenian  fleet  should  retire  before  Miletus  to 
the  enemy,  he  convinced  them  of  the  wisdom  Samos* 
of  a  cautious  policy.    The  fleet  broke  up  from  Miletus  and 
returned  to  Samos,  whence  the  Argives,  annoyed  at  their 
defeat  and  at  the  turn  which  events  had  taken,  returned 
home.    Next  morning  the  Peloponnesians  sailed  out  from 
Teichiussa,  leaving  their  heavy  tackle  behind  them,  in  ex- 
pectation of  an  engagement,  but  after  waiting  a  day,  they 
returned,  and  on  the  instigation  of  Tissaphernes  The  Pelopon 
went  on  to  Iasus,  where  Amorges  still  held  nesiansat 
out.    The  Iasians,  who  never  expected  to  see  Iasus- 
any  but  Athenian  ships  in  their  bay,  were  taken  unawares, 
and  the  town  captured.    Amorges  was  given  up  to  Tissa- 
phernes ;  his  mercenaries,  who  were  chiefly  Peloponnesians, 
were  pressed  into  the  victorious  ranks;  while  Tissaphernes 
was  allowed  to  have  the  town,  and  all  the  captives,  slave  or 
free,  on  a  payment  of  a  daric  (16s.)  for  each.   The  spoil,  which 
was  very  great,  the  accumulation  of  many  years  of  prosperity, 
was  divided  among  the  soldiers.     The  fleet  then  returned 
to  Miletus.1 

After  the  services  rendered  to  him  at  Iasus,  Tissaphernes 
could  no  longer  refuse  to  make  good  the  promise  of  support 
by  which  he  had  drawn  the  Spartans  to  Ionia.  He  now 
appeared  at  Miletus  with  a  month's  pay  for  the  whole  of  the 
fleet,  at  the  rate  of  an  Attic  drachma  (8d.)  a  man;  but  with 
ill-timed  parsimony  he  declared  that  he  could  not  for  the 
future  provide  more  than  half  a  drachma  without  special  per- 
mission from  the  King.  This  proposal  provoked  a  strong 
remonstrance  from  Hermocrates,  which  was  so  far  effectual 
that  Tissaphernes  slightly  increased  the  amount.2   The  total 

1  Time.  viii.  28. 

2  Time.  viii.  29.  He  appears  to  have  counted  55  ships  as  60.  See 
Goodhart's  note. 


382 


ASTYOCHUS  AND  THE  CHIANS,  412. 


[XI.  9. 


number  of  ships  in  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  at  Miletus  now 
amounted  to  eighty,  of  which  twenty  were  Chian.  About 
the  same  time  the  Athenians  received  a  reinforcement  of 
thirty-five  ships  from  Athens,  and  as  their  numbers  now 
amounted  to  a  hundred  and  four  triremes,  they  resolved  to 
divide  the  force  and  send  thirty  under  the  command  of 
Strombichides  to  Chios,  while  Phrynichus,  Charminus,  and 
others  with  the  remainder  kept  watch  over  Miletus.1 

9.  Astyochus,  the  admiral  of  Sparta,  was  still  engaged  at 
Chios  in  suppressing  the  plot  (p.  379),  but  when  he  heard  of 
the  arrival  of  Theramenes  he  took  courage,  and  sailed  out  to 
make  attacks  on  the  mainland  at  Pteleum  and  Clazomenae. 
At  neither  place  did  he  meet  with  success ;  and  when  leaving 
Clazomenae  he  was  caught  in  a  great  storm  and  carried  to 
Cyme,  while  the  rest  of  the  ships  sought  refuge  in  the 
adjacent  islands.  There  they  lay  for  eight  days,  consuming 
the  property  which  the  Clazomenians  had  conveyed  to  the 
islands  for  safety,  after  which,  the  storm  abating,  they  also 
went  on  to  Cyme.  Astyochus  was  now  solicited  to  take  part 
Astyochus  in  another  attempt  to  bring  over  Lesbos,  but 
at  Chios.  as  the  allies  refused  to  join,  he  returned  to 

Chios;  and  about  the  same  time  Pedaritus  arrived  from 
Lacedaemon  as  governor  of  the  island.  He  brought  with 
him  the  auxiliaries  which  had  been  obtained  at  Iasus,  and 
found  in  Chios  the  crews  of  the  ships  which  Chalcideus  had 
left  behind,  500  strong.  Nevertheless  he  turned  a  deaf  ear 
to  the  suggestions  of  Astyochus,  and  would  neither  sail  to 
Lesbos  nor  allow  the  Chians  to  do  so.  Upon  this  Astyochus 
went  away  in  a  rage  to  Miletus,  taking  with  him  the  few 
ships  which  he  had  in  his  own  command,  and  declaring  that 
a  day  would  come  when  the  Chians  would  need  his  help  and 
fail  to  obtain  it.  On  his  voyage  he  narrowly  escaped  being 
caught  by  the  Athenian  squadron  which  was  sailing  to 
Chios.    The  fleets  anchored  on  opposite  sides  of  Corycus, 


1  Thuc.  viii.  30.  Strombichides  is  mentioned  as  one  of  the  generals 
who  brought  up  these  reinforcements.    Had  he  gone  back  to  Athens  ? 


XI.  9.]        SPARTA  AND  THE  GREAT  KING,  ^12,  383 


hidden  from  each  other  by  a  spur  of  the  mountain ;  and  it 
was  merely  because  Astyochus  was  called  out  of  his  course 
to  investigate  a  supposed  plot  at  Erythrae  that  he  did  not 
fall  into  the  Athenians'  hands.1  From  Erythrae  He  returns  to 
he  made  his  way  to  Miletus.  On  their  part  Miletus- 
the  Athenian  ships  were  caught  in  a  storm  when  leaving 
Corycus,  by  which  three  of  their  number  were  carried  to  the 
city  of  Chios,  the  crews  being  slain  or  captured  as  they  were 
driven  ashore.  The  rest  sought  shelter  under  the  lee  of 
Mimas,  and  sailed  thence  to  Lesbos. 

So  far  Iasus  had  been  the  furthest  point  to  the  south 
touched  by  the  Peloponnesians,  and  this  town  had.  been 
attacked  to  please  Tissaphernes.  But  the  Peloponnesians 
now  bethought  themselves  of  their  own  kinsmen  in  Asia.  A 
fleet  under  the  command  of  Hippocrates,  a  Spartan,  but 
chiefly  composed  of  Thurian  vessels,  led  by  Dorieus  of 
Rhodes,  put  in  at  Cnidus,  a  Dorian  colony,  which  had  been 
already  won  over  by  Tissaphernes.2  They  were  quickly 
followed  by  the  Athenians  from  Samos,  who  captured  six  of 
the  vessels,  and  were  within  an  ace  of  recovering  Cnidus. 

When  Astyochus  arrived  at  Miletus  he  found  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency ;  pay  being  regular 
and  good,  and  the  spoil  of  Iasus  yet  unexhausted,  while  the 
Milesians  were  most  eager  in  the  cause.    The  spirits  of  the 
Peloponnesians  rose  with  their  prosperity,  and  the  former 
treaty  with  Tissaphernes,  which  had  been  drawn  up  in  the 
timidity  of  their  first  arrival,  was  no  longer  satisfactory.  A 
second  was  arranged  between  Theramenes — who  had  not  yet 
given  up  his  command — and  the  satrap,  in  which  Second  treaty 
the  King  was  pledged  to  maintain  any  army  with  the 
which  he  should  invite  to  his  aid,  while  it  was  Persians- 
in  his  country.    In  other  respects  also  some  modifications 
were  introduced ;  the  war  was  to  be  carried  on  in  common  as 
before,  and  neither  party  was  to  come  to  terms  without  the 


1  Thuc.  viii.  30-33. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  35,  reading  vno  TiacrcKfiepvovs.    See  Goodhart. 


384  PELOPONNESIANS  SAIL  TO  HELLESPONT,  412.  [XI.  10. 


consent  of  the  other,  but  if  one  party  required  the  aid  of 
the  other  he  was  to  be  satisfied  with  the  assistance  which 
he  could  persuade  him  to  give :  the  King  undertook  not  to 
attack  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies,  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians on  their  part  recognised  the  King's  claim  to  all  the 
country  and  cities  which  had  belonged  to  him  or  his  father, 
or  his  forefathers,  and  undertook  not  to  exact  tribute  from 
these.1 

After  concluding  this  treaty,  which  was  perhaps  intended 
for  the  home  authorities,  Theramenes  set  out  for  Sparta  in 
a  boat,  but  on  the  voyage  he  was  lost  at  sea. 

Affairs  at  Chios  were  going  from  bad  to  worse.  The 
Athenians  crossed  over  from  Lesbos  (p.  378),  and  after 
defeating  the  Chians  in  numerous  engagements,  established 
themselves  at  Delphinium,  a  strong  fortress  convenient  for 
the  sea,  and  close  to  the  town  of  Chios.  Factions  also  broke 
_  out  among  the  citizens.    The  revolt  had  been 

Desperate  ° 

condition  of  brought  about  by  the  oligarchs,  without  the 
Chios-  knowledge  of  the  people,  and  even  among  the 

oligarchs  there  had  been  a  reaction,  owing  to  the  ill  success 
of  the  rising.  Some  citizens  had  been  put  to  death  by 
Pedaritus,  the  new  governor,  on  a  charge  of  Atticism,  and  a 
spirit  of  suspicion  was  abroad,  which  required  most  careful 
watching.  Messengers  were  sent  to  Astyochus,  begging  him 
to  send  assistance,  but  in  vain,  and  at  length  Pedaritus 
despatched  an  envoy  to  Sparta  to  make  complaint  of  the 
conduct  of  the  admiral.2 

10.  The  Peloponnesians  now  carried  out  the  last  part  of 
the  programme  which  they  had  sketched  in  the  autumn  of  the 
preceding  year.  The  envoys  of  Pharnabazus  had  remained 
at  Lacedaemon,  in  the  hope  of  inducing  the 
nefian  fleet  is  authorities  to  send  out  a  fleet  to  the  Helles- 
despatchedto     pont.     At  length — it  was  now  December — 

the  Hellespont.     ,  i  £  n         ■>    ,         ,  ,  . 

they  were  successful,  and  twenty-seven  ships 
were  despatched  under  the  command  of  Antisthenes.  On 


1  Thuc.  viii.  37. 


2  Thuc.  viii.  38. 


XI.  io. ]  £)ISTR£SS  OF  THE  CHIANS,  41$.  385 


its  way  the  fleet  was  ordered  to  carry  eleven  commissioners, 
of  whom  Lichas  was  one,  to  Miletus,  where  they  were  to 
investigate  the  charges  against  Astyochus,  and  supersede  him 
if  necessary.  The  ships  were  then  to  sail  to  the  Hellespont 
under  the  command  of  Clearchus.  When  crossing  the 
Aegean,  the  fleet  put  in  at  Melos,  where  they  came  upon  ten 
Athenian  vessels ;  three  of  these  were  destroyed,  but  the 
rest  escaped,  and  fearing  that  they  would  convey  intelligence 
to  Samos,  the  Lacedaemonians  shaped  their  course  to  Crete, 
and  so  to  Caunus,  whence  they  sent  to  Miletus,  begging  for 
aid  in  conveying  the  ships  past  Samos.  For  since  their 
return  from  Iasus,  some  three  months  previously,  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  had  remained  at  Miletus,  and  over  against  them, 
on  the  island  of  Samos,  were  the  Athenians,  ever  ready  to 
make  a  descent  when  opportunity  offered.1 

Pedaritus  still  urged  Astyochus  to  come  to  Chios,  which 
was  reduced  to  the  greatest  distress.  The  sea  was  closed  to 
the  Chians,  their  land  laid  waste,  and  since  the  ^. 

7  ,  Disastrous 

occupation  of  Delphinium  by  the  Athenians,  the  state  of  affairs 
slaves  had  deserted  in  large  numbers,  putting  at  Chlos- 
their  knowledge  of  the  country  at  the  service  of  the  enemy. 
If  help  were  sent  at  once,  it  would  be  possible  to  prevent  the 
Athenians  from  completing  Delphinium  and  the  still  larger 
fortifications  which  they  were  planning  for  their  army  and 
fleet.     Astyochus  was  preparing  to  despatch  some  ships, 
notwithstanding  his  threat  (p.  382),  when  the  news  came  of 
the  arrival  of  the  Peloponnesian  ships  at  Caunus.  Upon 
this  he  abandoned  Chios,  and  sailed  to  join  the  new  comers. 
It  was  of  the  first  importance  to  bring  the  commissioners 
safe  to  Miletus,  and  by  uniting  the  fleets,  he  might  gain 
command  of  the  sea.    On  his  way  he  attacked  Movements  of 
and  overran  Cos,  which  had  been  recently  Astyochus: 
desolated  by  a  terrible  earthquake,  but  on  with  the 
reaching  Cnidus,  he  was  compelled  to  sail,  Athenians. 
without  disembarking  his  men,  against  an  Athenian  squadron, 


1  Thuc.  viii.  39. 

VOL.  III.  2  B 


386 


LICHAS  AND  TISSAPHERNES,  412.         [XI.  10. 


which  had  been  sent  from  Samos  under  Charminus  to  keep 
watch  over  the  Peloponnesian  ships.  Charminus  was  reported 
to  be  off  Syme,  and  thither  Astyochus  followed  him.  A 
storm  of  rain,  followed  by  a  thick  fog,  scattered  his  ships, 
and  when  morning  broke,  his  left  wing  came  in  sight  of  the 
Athenians,  the  rest  being  hidden  by  the  island.  Charminus 
at  once  attacked  with  a  few  vessels,  and  defeated  his 
opponents,  but  when  the  rest  of  the  fleet  came  up  he  found 
himself  outnumbered,  and  took  to  flight.  The  contingents 
of  the  Peloponnesians  then  united  and  returned  to  Cnidus, 
whither  they  were  soon  followed  by  the  entire  Athenian 
fleet,  but  neither  side  would  risk  an  engagement,1  and  the 
Athenians  returned  to  Samos. 

The  whole  Peloponnesian  fleet  was  now  collected  at 
Cnidus,  and  the  eleven  commissioners  reviewed  the  situation. 
The  Peiopon-  Tissaphernes  also  was  present.  Some  criticisms 
nesian  fleet  at  were  made  on  his  past  conduct,  and  arrange- 
cmdus'  ments  for  the  future  discussed.     Lichas  was 

bold  enough  to  express  his  dissatisfaction  at  both  the  treaties 
which  had  been  concluded,  pointing  out  that  if  the  King  was 
Quarrel  of  to  be  master  of  the  territory  which  had  been 
Lichas  and  governed  by  his  forefathers,  his  country  would 
Tissaphernes.  extend  to  Boeotia,  and  so  far  from  liberating 
Hellas,  the  Lacedaemonians  would  be  agents  in  establishing 
a  Median  empire.  He  must  have  better  terms  than  these, 
which  indeed  he  refused  to  observe,  nor  would  he  accept 
Persian  support  on  such  conditions.  On  this  Tissaphernes 
went  away  in  a  rage,  and  for  the  time  Persia  and  Sparta 
were  estranged.2 

The  alliance  now  received  an  important  acquisition.  As 
they  lay  at  Cnidus,  the  most  influential  inhabitants  of 
Rhodes  joins      Ehodes  made  overtures  to  them,  inviting  them 

the  alliance.         to  ^   the  igland>      Rhodes  wag  &  powerful 

state,  with  a  large  force  of  infantry  and  numerous  soldiers, 

1  Thuc.  viii.  41.     For  Charminus  at  Syme  see  also  Aristoph. 
Thesmoph.  801  ff. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  43 ;  cf.  52. 


XI.  II.]     THE  PELOPONNESIANS  AT  RHODES,  411.  387 


wealthy  enough  to  supply  the  funds  so  necessary  at  the  present 
moment,  when  the  allies  were  looking  for  supplies  to  take 
the  place  of  the  pay  of  Tissaphernes.  The  invitation  was 
eagerly  accepted,  and  the  fleet,  ninety-four  vessels  strong, 
put  in  at  Camirus.  The  populace,  as  usual,  had  not  been 
informed  of  the  plans  of  the  oligarchs,  and  as  the  place  was 
unfortified,  they  fled  in  terror.  The  Lacedaemonians  re- 
assured them,  and  a  congress  was  held  of  the  three  cities 
of  the  island,  Camirus,  Ialysus,  and  Lindus,  after  which 
Ehodes  formally  seceded  to  the  Peloponnesians.  On  hearing 
of  the  revolt,  the  Athenians  sailed  to  the  island  in  the 
hope  of  saving  it,  but  in  vain ;  all  that  they  could  do  was 
to  make  attacks  on  Ehodes  from  neighbouring  stations  at 
Cos  and  Chalce.  The  Rhodians  contributed  to  the  allies 
no  less  than  thirty-two  talents,  and  Astyochus,  Thg  PeIopon- 
finding  himself  in  comfortable  quarters,  drew  nesian  fleet 
his  vessels  on  shore  and  remained  inactive  for  ^f1*1118  at 

Rhodes. 

nearly  three  months  (January  to  March  411), 
equally  regardless  of  the  danger  in  Chios,  and  of  the  im- 
portant events  which,  as  he  knew,  were  taking  place  in 
Samos. 

II.  After  the  death  of  Chalcideus  and  the  accession  to 
office  of  new  ephors,  the  feeling  at  Lacedaemon  had  turned 
against  Alcibiades.     Agis  was  his  personal  ^g  Spartans 
enemy,  and  others  were  doubtless  jealous  of  his  turn  against 
success,  while  Endius  was  no  longer  in  office  to  Alciblades- 
protect  him.    Before  leaving  Miletus,  Astyochus  had  received 
instructions  to  put  him  to  death,  but  Alcibiades,  who  had  his 
suspicions,  escaped  by  withdrawing  to  Tissaphernes.  He 
was  naturally  indignant  at  the  conduct  of  the  Spartans ;  and 
perhaps  he  reflected  that  it  was  by  his  own  act  that  the 
Greeks  of  Asia  were  passing  into  the  empire  of  He  escapes  to 
the  Persians,  from  which  they  had  been  so  long  Tissaphernes, 
and  so  successfully  preserved.    His  thoughts  h?m  to  reduce 
once  more  returned  to  Athens,  and  with  his  thepayofthe 
usual  energy  he  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  Pel°P°nneslans- 
damage  the  Pelopoimesian  cause.  Knowing  that  Tissaphernes 


388  ALCIBIADES  AND  TISSA PHERNES,  411.     [XI.  ix. 

could  not  or  would  not  furnish  supplies,  he  supported  him  in 
reducing  the  pay  from  a  drachma  to  three  obols— and  even 
this  was  not  supplied  regularly-urging  that  the  Athenians 
paid  no  more,  not  so  much  from  economy  as  because  they 
found  that  sailors  if  overpaid  became  dissolute  and  incapable. 
Arrears  of  pay  were  also  an  inducement  to  sailors  to  re- 
main on  their  ships.    The  objections  of  the  trierarchs  and 
generals  could  be  silenced  by  timely  presents  of  money, 
and,  in  fact,  Hermocrates  alone  refused  the  bait.    When  the 
cities  applied  for  funds,  Alcibiades   had  answers  ready, 
telling  the  Chians  with  his  own  lips  that  the  richest  of 
the  Greeks  ought  to  be  ashamed  of  asking  for  funds; 
would  they  not  even  pay  the  auxiliaries  who  had  come  to 
their  assistance?    Did  they  expect  to  be  rescued  without 
cost  of  money  or  life  1    The  subject  cities  which  had  paid 
tribute  to  Athens  were  reminded  that  they  were  only  spend- 
ing on  themselves  what  they  had  formerly  spent  on  the 
Athenians.    And  to  one  and  all  he  pointed  out  that  Tissa- 
phernes  must  needs  be  careful  while  he  was  spending  his 
own  resources,  but  if  the  King  should  send  supplies,  the  pay 
of  the  sailors  would  be  increased,  and  the  wants  of  the  cities 
considered.    In  private  he  advised  Tissaphernes  not  to  be 
in  any  haste  to  finish  the  war,  either  by  bringing  up  the 
Phoenician  fleet— a  plan  which  he  had  in  view— or  by  in- 
creasing the  forces  of  the  Peloponnesians.    It  was  not  to  his 
advantage  that  the  same  state  should  be  supreme  by  land 
and  sea;  a  divided  control  was  better,  for  in  this  case  the 
King  could  use  one  power  against  the  other.    It  was  much 
The  true  policy    safer,  and  much  cheaper,  too,  to  allow  the 
fJZ7oT     Greeks  to  wear  out  their  power  on  each  other, 
batants  wear      than  to  raise  the  Spartans  into  a  position  from 

each  other  out.     which    ^   ^    ^  ^ 

great  expense  and  danger.  And  after  all  the  Athenians 
would  prove  the  more  serviceable  allies  of  the  two;  thev  had 
no  desire  to  make  conquests  on  land ;  they  wished  to  enslave 
the  seas,  and  could  assist  the  King  in  enslaving  the  Greeks 
in  his  territory;  whereas  the  Lacedaemonians  posed  as  the 


XI.  n.] 


ALCIBIADES  AND  ATHENS,  411. 


389 


liberators  of  Greece,  and  were  not  likely  to  free  the  cities 
from  the  Athenians  in  order  to  make  them  the  slaves  of  the 
King.  Let  it  be  his  object  to  reduce  both,  getting  as  much 
as  he  could  from  the  Athenians,  and  then  driving  the 
Peloponnesians  out  of  the  country.  This  advice  agreed  with 
the  wishes  as  well  as  the  interests  of  Tissaphernes.  He  took 
Alcibiades  into  his  confidence,  and  at  once  began  to  reduce 
his  payments  to  the  fleet.  At  the  same  time  he  refused  to 
allow  them  to  engage  with  the  enemy  till  joined  by  the 
Phoenician  fleet,  which  would  give  them  an  irresistible 
superiority.  By  this  means  he  destroyed  the  efficiency  of 
the  fleet,  and  Astyochus,  the  admiral,  being  already  in 
Persian  pay,  though  he  sought  to  conceal  his  own  treachery 
by  faint  remonstrances,  could  offer  no  real  opposition.1 

In  giving  this  advice  to  Tissaphernes,  sound  though  it  was, 
Alcibiades  had  other  aims  in  view  than  the  interests  of  the 
Persians.  He  must  be  a  power  somewhere,  and  a  power  in 
Greece;  and  he  had  no  sooner  ceased  to  be  influential  at 
Sparta  than  he  wished  to  be  again  influential  at  Athens. 
Yet  how  could  he  hope  to  be  restored  to  the  The  real  aims 
city  which  he  had  so  deeply  injured  1  or  what  of  Alcibiades. 
influence  could  he  gain  so  long  as  the  people  were  governed 
by  the  leaders  who  had  expelled  him  ?  The  position  might 
well  seem  desperate,  but  he  knew  the  divided  state  of  feeling 
at  Athens,  and  how  to  turn  it  to  his  own  advantage.  Since 
the  Sicilian  disaster  democracy  had  lost  in  credit,  and  many 
citizens  were  inclined— even  with  the  most  patriotic  views— 
to  doubt  whether  a  change  might  not  be  introduced  with 
advantage.  As  the  old  sources  of  supply  fell  off,  and  the 
burden  pressed  more  and  more  heavily  upon  them,  the  richer 
citizens  sought  to  be  rid  of  the  war  and  the  government 
which  persisted  in  it  at  their  expense.  The  old  opposition 
between  oligarchy  and  democracy  which  had  divided  Cimon 
and  Pericles  took  a  sharper  edge;  and  if  many  wished  to 
reform  the  democracy,  there  were  others,  and  those  perhaps 


Thuc.  viii.  45,  46. 


390     OLIGARCHICAL  MOVEMENT AT SAMOS,  jJl.    [XL  12. 


the  ablest  men  in  the  city,  who  wished  to  get  rid  of  it 
altogether.  If  Alcibiades  could  hold  out  a  hope  of  new 
supplies,  he  would  certainly  attract  those  who  were  being 
ruined  by  the  war ;  and  if  this  help  were  conditional  on  the 
overthrow  of  democracy,  he  would  get  rid  of  the  popular 
leaders  who  stood  in  the  way  of  his  return.  What  his  own 
position  under  an  oligarchy  would  be  he  does  not  seem  to 
have  considered,  but  if  he  were  the  instrument  in  establish- 
ing such  a  government,  he  could  hardly  fail  to  profit  by  it. 

12.  Such  were  his  hopes,  and  he  no  sooner  found  himself 
in  favour  with  Tissaphernes  than  he  began  to  feel  his  way 
Ai      d  in  the  fleet  at  Samos,  intimating  that  if  an 

proposes  an  oligarchy  took  the  place  of  the  "villainous 
oligarchical       democracy  "  which  had  banished  him,  he  would 

revolution.  «■»,,.  ,  -       A   ,  , 

be  willing  to  return,  and  secure  tor  Athens  the 
support  of  Tissaphernes.  These  overtures  were  met  more 
than  half  way  by  the  trierarchs  and  others  at  Samos,  who 
were  dissatisfied  with  the  existing  form  of  government.  Of 
these  a  few  visited  Alcibiades,  who  explained  his  views 
clearly,  promising  to  bring  over  Tissaphernes  and  the  King 
if  the  democracy  were  abolished  in  which  the  King  could 
place  no  confidence.  They  returned  filled  with  hopes  that 
they  would  get  the  government  into  their  own  hands,  and 
bring  the  war  to  an  end,  and  with  this  object  in  view,  a  plot 
for  a  revolution  was  formed.  The  proposals  of  Alcibiades 
were  announced  openly,  and  the  people,  though  at  first 
alarmed,  were  soon  quieted  by  the  prospect  of  receiving 
pay  from  the  treasures  of  the  Great  King ;  but  when  the 
conspirators  began  to  discuss  matters  more  carefully  among 
themselves,  they  found  a  formidable  opponent  among  their 
own  numbers. 

Of  all  the  generals  in  the  camp  at  Samos  the  ablest  was 
Phrynichus,  the  son  of  Stratonides.  We  have  already  seen 
Opposition  of  that  he  prevented  the  Athenians  from  rashly 
Phrymchus.  encountering  the  enemy  at  a  time  when  defeat 
would  have  been  fatal ;  and  Thucydides,  when  recording  his 
conduct,  remarks  that  on  this  as  on  every  other  occasion  "then 


XI.  12.] 


PHRYNICHUS  OPPOSES,  #11. 


391 


and  afterwards  "  he  showed  himself  a  man  of  most  capable 
judgment.     He  appears  to  have  been  of  humble  origin ;  he 
began  life  as  a  shepherd  in  the  country,  an  occupation  which 
he  afterwards  changed  for  the  more  promising  but  less  honest 
career  of  a  "sycophant"  in  the  city.1    What  his  political 
convictions  were  it  is  difficult  to  say  ;  for  on  the  one  hand  he 
saw  very  clearly  the  advantage  which  Athens  derived  from 
her  democratical  constitution,  and  on  the  other  he  became  one 
of  the  chief  agents  in  overthrowing  it.   Whether  democrat  or 
oligarch,  he  was  probably  guided  by  personal  motives  only, 
and  above  all  by  a  hatred  and  distrust  of  Alcibiades,  whose 
return  to  Athens  he  wished  to  prevent  by  every  means. 
This  hatred  now  brought  him  into  opposition  to  the  proposed 
revolution,  and  his  keen  insight  at  once  detected  the  diffi- 
culties which  attended  it.    The  King  was  not  likely  to  throw 
over  the  Lacedaemonians  when  their  fleet  had  become  power- 
ful, and  join  the  Athenians  in  destroying  what  views  of 
he  had  helped  to  create;  they  had  done  him  P^rynichus. 
no  harm,  while  the  Athenians  were  justly  the  objects  of  his 
suspicion.    The  change  from  democracy  to  oligarchy  would 
gain  Athens  no  advantage  in  the  subject  cities;  on  the 
contrary,  her  empire  mainly  rested  on  the  support  of  the 
demos,  and  those  who  had  gone  over  to  the  Lacedaemonians 
had  not  revolted  to  establish  an  oligarchy,  but  to  obtain 
independence.    The  desire  of  freedom  would  not  be  satisfied 
by  a  change   of   constitution,  and   the   oligarchs,  "the 
gentlemanly  party,"  would  cause  the  Athenians  quite  as 
much  trouble  in  the  allied  cities  as  the  democrats ;  they 
were  selfish  and  unscrupulous,  and  would  not  shrink  from 
bloodshed  without  form  of  trial,  while  the  people  were 
the  refuge  of  the  oppressed.2    On  general  grounds,  there- 


1  Lysias  20,  §§  11,  12.  /         ,    -  , 

2  Thuc.  viii.  48  :  tovs  re  icakovs  Kayadovs  ovop.a{op.<-vovs  ovk  e\ao~o-a> 
vvtovs  vofitCeiv  o-iplo-L  rrpdyp-aTa  rrapi&iv  tov  bfaov,  vopiaras  ovras 
KaX  io-rjyrjTas  twv  kolkvv  ro5  br)Li(0,  e£  hv  to.  TrAei'co  avrovy  cofpeXeio-Oai- 
Ka\  to  p,ev  eV  eneivoLs  dvai  kgu  afcpiroi  av ^  koi  fiiawTepov  aTrodvrjaKeit 
tov  Se  brjuov  acpuv  re  KaTafpvyrjv  dvai  Kai  iitelvav  a-o)(ppoviaTJ}V. 


392  HE  ATTEMPTS  TO  DESTROY  ALCIBIADES,  411.  [XI.  13 


fore,  there  was  no  reason  why  Athens  should  exchange 
democracy  for  oligarchy;  and  with  regard  to  Alcibiades, 
Phrynichus  was  aware  that  he  cared  neither  for  the  one  nor 
for  the  other  form  of  government.  His  only  object  was  to 
return  to  his  "  clique  "  at  Athens,  by  whose  help  he  would 
be  able  to  carry  out  his  designs,  whatever  they  might  be. 
Above  all,  Phrynichus  entreated  his  colleagues  not  to  c  jate 
divisions  among  the  people  at  a  moment  when  it  waa  nost 
important  that  all  should  act  in  harmony. 

13.  These  were  wise  counsels,  but  they  were  not  followed. 
The  conspirators  resolved  to  go  on  with  their  work,  and 
despatched  Pisander,  with  some  others,  to  Athens,  to  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  changes  which  were  to  win  Persian 
help  for  the  city — the  return  of  Alcibiades,  and  the  removal 

of  the  democracy.1  Phrynichus  now  found 
attempts  to  himself  in  a  dangerous  position,  for  if  the 
destroy  proposal  to  recall  Alcibiades  were  carried  at 

Athens,  as  he  foresaw  that  it  would  be,  his 
action  in  opposing  it  would  probably  cost  him  his  life.  He  re- 
solved, if  possible,  to  get  rid  of  Alcibiades ;  and  with  this  object 
secretly  informed  Astyochus,  who  had  not  yet  left  Miletus 
for  Rhodes,  that  Alcibiades  was  ruining  the  Lacedaemonian 
interests  with  Tissaphernes,  and  bringing  him  over  to  the 
Athenians.  His  own  treachery  he  excused  by  the  plea  that 
a  man  might  be  pardoned  for  damaging  his  enemy  even  at  the 
expense  of  his  state — such  was  the  morality  which  faction  and 
misapplied  acuteness  had  taught  the  Greeks.    But  Astyochus 

had  no  mind  to  punish  Alcibiades,  who  was 
great  danger,  indeed  out  of  his  power.  He  saw  that  he  was 
from  which       in  favour  with  Tissaphernes,  and  that  his  own 

he  extricates         .,         ,-,  ,.  .,.        i     ,  • 

himself  with      interests  lay,  not  m  punishing,  but  in  serving 
much  dim-        him.     He  immediately  went  to  Magnesia, 
a!  '  where  Alcibiades  and  Tissaphernes  were,  and 

laid  before  him  the  communications  of  Phrynichus.  His 
services  did  not  go  unrewarded,  and  from  this  time  he  was 


1  Thuc.  viii.  49,  50. 


XI.  I3-]        HIS  MESSAGE  TO  ASTYOCHUS,  411. 


393 


in  the  pay  of  Persia,  an  accomplice  in  the  designs  of  Tissa- 
phernes,  to  whose  injurious  treatment  of  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  he  could  only  oppose  a  faint  remonstrance  (p.  389). 
Alcibiades  at  once  sent  a  letter  to  the  authorities  at  Samos, 
attacking  Phrynichus,  and  demanding  his  execution  as  a 
traitor.  Phrynichus  was  in  greater  danger  than  before,  but 
he  extricated  himself  with  admirable  skill.  He  addressed 
another  communication  to  Astyochus,  complaining  of  his 
conduct  in  revealing  the  former  message,  but  nevertheless 
offering  him  an  opportunity  of  destroying  the  entire  Athenian 
fleet  at  Samos,  and  giving  minute  details  for  the  execution 
of  the  plan;  and  as  before,  he  excused  his  conduct  on  the 
ground  that  he  must  either  destroy  his  enemies  or  perish 
miserably  at  their  hands.  He  then  announced  to  the  army 
that  the  enemy  intended  to  take  advantage  of  the  unpro- 
tected state  of  Samos  to  make  an  attack  on  the  fleet,  and 
being  himself  general,  he  pushed  on  the  fortification  of  the 
city  and  kept  the  strictest  watch  at  every  point.  Meanwhile 
Astyochus  had  communicated  the  intelligence  to  Alcibiades, 
as  before ;  and  Alcibiades,  in  his  turn,  sent  a  second  letter  to 
his  friends  in  Samos  exposing  the  treachery  of  Phrynichus. 
But  the  letter  failed  to  have  any  effect,  for,  owing  to  the 
conduct  of  Phrynichus,  Alcibiades  was  not  believed,  and  his 
communication  was  thought  to  be  merely  a  malicious  attempt 
to  destroy  his  enemy. 

Alcibiades  now  addressed  himself  with  yet  greater  zeal  to 
the  task  of  winning  over  Tissaphernes  to  the  Athenian  cause. 
The  satrap  was  not  unwilling  to  be  persuaded, 
for  the  conduct  of  Lichas  at  Cnidus  had  con-  JoTunt^mng 
vinced  him  of  the  truth  of  Alcibiades'  warning,  to  abandon 
and  he  now  regarded  the  Lacedaemonians  as  the  spartans* 
bent  on  the  liberation  of  Greece — a  policy  not  at  all  in  his 
interests.    But  the  numbers  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  were 
so  great  that  he  did  not  venture  openly  to  break  with  Sparta.1 

Meanwhile  the  envoys  from  Samos,  with  Pisander  at  their 


1  Thuc.  viii.  52. 


394 


PISANDER  AT  A  THENS,  411.  [XI.  13. 


head,  arrived  at  Athens.  An  assembly  was  held,  in  which 
they  stated  the  chief  points  in  the  new  policy,  insisting  that 
Pisander  ^  Alcibiades  were  recalled  and  the  constitu- 

arrives  at  tion  changed,  they  would  have  the  assistance 

AtheiJa<  of  the  King  in  overcoming  the  Peioponnesians. 

The  proposal  met  with  much  opposition.  The  people  could 
not  bear  the  thought  of  exchanging  democracy  for  oligarchy, 
while  the  enemies  of  Alcibiades  protested  against  the  return 
of  an  outlaw,  and  the  protest  was  supported  in  the  strongest 
Excitement  language  by  the  Eumolpidae  and  Kerykes,  the 
at  Athens.  guardians  of  the  sacred  rites  which  he  had  out- 
raged. Pisander  was  not  to  be  turned  from  his  purpose : 
regardless  of  the  abuse  poured  upon  him,  he  called  up  each 
of  his  opponents,  and  asked  him  the  simple  question,  whether 
he  had  any  hope  of  the  city.  The  Peioponnesians  had  more 
ships  at  sea,  more  allied  cities  to  support  them ;  the  re- 
sources of  the  King  and  of  Tissaphernes  were  open  to  them, 
while  Athens  was  without  funds,  and  without  prospect  of 
funds,  unless  the  King  supplied  them.  To  this  question 
there  could  be  but  one  answer.  Pisander  then  plainly  told 
the  excited  multitude  that  they  would  never  succeed  in 
gaining  the  King,  unless  the  constitution  were  "sobered" 
and  office  confined  to  fewer  hands.  If  this  were  done, 
the  King  would  have  confidence  in  them,  and  why  should 
they  discuss  the  constitution  when  their  existence  was  at 
stake  %  At  a  future  time  they  could  restore  what  they 
had  removed.  Alcibiades  also  must  be  recalled,  for  he,  and 
no  one  else,  could  carry  the  negotiations  through.  Upon 
Th  Ath  ni  ns  ^s  tne  People  gave  way5  though  unwillingly ; 
agree  to  the  the  change  seemed  absolutely  necessary  at  the 
change  of         moment,  and  they  hoped  that  it  would  be  for 

constitution.  .  1  .       \  . 

a  time  only,  as  Pisander  suggested.  A  decree 
was  passed  empowering  Pisander  to  return  to  Samos  with 
ten  envoys,  and  make  the  best  arrangements  that  he  could 
for  securing  Alcibiades  and  Tissaphernes.1 


1  Thuc.  viii.  53,  54. 


XI.  14- ]       POLITICAL  CLUBS  AT  ATHENS,  411.  395 


At  the  same  time  Phrynichus  was  removed  from  his 
command— at  the  suggestion  of  Pisander,  who  knowing  that 
he  was  opposed  to  the  return  of  Alcibiades,  charged  him 
with  treacherously  betraying  Ionia  to  Amorges— and  with 
him  his  colleague,  Scironides.  Their  places  were  filled  by 
Leon  and  Diomedon,1  who  were  at  once  despatched  to  Samos. 

14.  In  his  public  advocacy  of  the  revolution,  Pisander  acted 
a  part  as  legitimate  as  it  was  courageous  ;  but  before  leaving 
Athens  he  took  other  steps  to  secure  his  ends,  pisander  and 
which  have  left  a  dark  stain  upon  the  move-  the  clubs- 
ment.  Among  the  characteristic  features  of  Athenian  life 
were  the  small  associations,  which  tended  to  flourish  and 
abound  in  a  society  where  family  influence  was  imperfectly 
felt,  and  where  the  church  was  not  yet  distinguished  from  the 
state.  They  were  formed  for  all  kinds  of  purposes — religious, 
social,  and  political — and  known  by  very  different  names.  The 
members  were  united  by  the  closest  obligations,  which,  being 
honourable  rather  than  legal,  they  could  not  break  without  in- 
curring the  deepest  infamy.  So  far  as  they  were  religious  and 
social,  these  combinations  were  tolerated  though  not  supported 
by  the  state;  no  one  was  thought  a  worse  citizen  because 
he  sought  enjoyment  or  protection  by  joining  an  Ipavos, 
whose  members  were  pledged  to  some  common  entertainment, 
or  to  save  any  one  of  their  body  who  fell  into  the  hands  of 
pirates.  "With  political  associations  the  case  was  different : 
these  might  be  open  or  they  might  be  secret,  in  support  of 
the  constitution,  or  against  it.  It  had  long  been  the  custom 
of  the  leading  politicians  to  gather  round  them  Political 
a  knot  of  friends  on  whom  they  could  rely  in  associations 
carrying  their  measures.  More  especially  was  at  Athens- 
this  the  case  with  the  oligarchical  party,  who.  being  fewer  in 
number,  naturally  sought  the  strength  of  union.  In  the  stormy 
times  which  followed  the  expulsion  of  the  tyrants,  Isagoras 
had  been  supported  by  an  association  of  this  kind  in  his 

1  Leon  and  Diomedon  must  therefore  have  returned  to  Athens 
from  Chios,  where  we  last  heard  of  them,  but  Thucydides  has  not 
recorded  this. 


396 


PISANDER  SETS  THE  CLUBS  TO  WORK,  [XI.  I* 


attempt  to  establish  an  oligarchical  government,  and  in 
the  last  struggle  against  Pericles,  Thucydides  had  carefully 
organised  and  drilled  his  party.    In  these  instances  there 
had  been  no  attempt  at  concealment,  and  though  the  result 
was  a  sharper  opposition  of  parties,  the  practice  was  no  more 
to  be  condemned  than  are  the  means  by  which  we  carry  on 
our  party  government.  It  was  otherwise  in  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  when  personal  aims  took  the  place  of  public.  The 
associations  became  more  secret,  their  aims  less  legitimate. 
Thucydides  speaks  of  conspiracies  which  had  for  their  object 
suits  at  law  and  public  offices,  that  is,  secret  societies  formed 
with  the  purpose  of  securing  for  their  members  success  in 
trials  and  elections.     Such   objects  were  not  necessarily 
criminal ;  the  richer  men  at  Athens  had  reason  enough  to 
protect  themselves  from  the  attacks  of  sycophants,  and  found 
it  difficult  to  maintain  their  position  in  the  government  of 
the  city,  but  the  societies  might  easily  become  criminal,  and 
being  secret  they  were  suspected.   Even  if  they  were  no  more 
than  clubs  formed  for  common  amusement,  the  prevailing 
distrust  and  discontent  ascribed  to  them  a  more  sinister 
motive,  especially  after  the  affair  of  the  Hermae  in  415. 

To  these  "conspiracies"  Pisander  now  addressed  himself, 
bidding  them  unite  and  form  some  common  plan  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  constitution.  They  must  set  to  work  at 
once  and  prepare  the  ground  against  his  return  from 
Samos.1 

But  the  game  was  far  from  being  won,  as  Pisander  quickly 
discovered  on  reaching  the  court  of  Tissaphernes.  In  so  far 
as  he  advised  him  to  allow  the  combatants  to 
fhTcourt  S  wear  out  their  strength  on  each  other,  Alcibi- 
Tissaphemes.  a(jeg  a  reai  influence  with  the  satrap,  but 
beyond  this  point  he  could  not  carry  him.  Tissaphernes 

1  Thuc  viii.  54  :  fivwfxoaias,  a'lnep  irdyxavov  nporepov  iv  rfj  TroXei 
oScnu,  Ari  StW  Ka\  dPXais,  Hi  82.  See  Thirlwall,  Hist.  Greece,  vol. 
iv.  (8vo),  Appendix  i.    Cp.  Aristoph.  Lysistr.  577  : 

kol  tovs  ye  (rvvcarafjihovs  tovtovs,  <a\  rovs  TTiXoyvras  eavrovs 
cVt  rais  dpxaio-i  diatfvai,  kcu  ras  K€(pa\as  drrorTXau 


XI.  I4-]      PISANDER  AND  TISSA PHE RNES,  411. 


397 


had   no   wish   to   be   at   war   with  the  Peloponnesians, 
whom  he  feared ;   or  to  assist  the  Athenians,  whom  he 
distrusted.     Alcibiades   found    himself    in   the  awkward 
position  of  a  man  who  has  promised  more  than  he  can 
perform.    If  the  Athenians  granted  all  that  Persia  asked 
without  obtaining  Persian  aid  in  return,  his  failure  would 
be  apparent.     He  must  therefore  insist  on  terms  which 
were  impossible.     When  Pisander  appeared,  he  took  the 
business  of  negotiation  upon  himself.    He  demanded  that 
Ionia  and  all  the  adjacent  islands  should  be  ceded  to  the 
King,  and  this  demand,  involving  the  sacrifice  Action  of 
of   Athenian   honour   and    reputation,    was  Alcibiades. 
granted.    Alcibiades  then  went  farther  and  insisted  that  the 
King  should  be  allowed  to  build  what  ships  he  pleased,  and 
cruise  with  them  along  the  shores  of  Asia.    Even  Athenian 
oligarchs  could  not  agree  to  terms,  which  not  only  annihi- 
lated the  Athenian  empire,  but  transferred  the  control  of  the 
eastern  Aegean  to  Persia.1    Pisander  broke  off 
the  negotiation  in  anger,  and  returned  to  wit^TiTsa^3^ 
Samos.    The  hopes  on  which  the  conspirators  Phernes  and 
had  chiefly  relied  in  carrying  out  their  scheme 
were  dashed  to  the  ground.     Nothing  remained  of  their 
programme   but   simple   revolution,  without  any  of  the 
advantages  which  revolution  was  supposed  to  bring  with  it. 

At  this  time  the  Athenian  fleet  was  divided  into  three 
portions  —  stationed  respectively  at  Samos,  their  head- 
quarters, Chalce,  and  Cos,  from  all  which  they  position  of  the 
watched  the  Peloponnesians  at  Ehodes.  When  Athenian  fleet. 
Leon  and  Diomedon  arrived,  apparently  at  Chalce,  they 
made  an  attack  on  Rhodes,  with  some  success,  and  finding 
Chalce  the  most  convenient  point  of  observation,  concentrated 
the  fleet  at  that  station,  with  a  view  of  preventing  any 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  Peloponnesians. 

Meanwhile  news  was  brought  from  Chios  to  Rhodes  that 


1  Thuc.  viii.  56  :  vavs  r)£lov  kav  fiacriXea  7roiei(T0at  /ecu  napanXelv 
ttjv  iavTov  yfjv,  07177  av  Kai  oaais  av  fiovXrjrai. 


398    TISSAPHERNES  AND  PELOPONNESIANS,  411.    [XI.  15. 


the  fortress  of  the  Athenians  at  Delphinium  was  all  but  com- 
pleted, and  unless  help  were  sent,  the  island  was  lost  (p.  385). 

The  facts  were  even  worse  than  the  messenger 
Affairs  at  Chios.  -^new^  for  after  his  departure,  Pedaritus,  the 

Spartan  commander,  fell  in  an  attack  on  the  Athenian  fortifi- 
cations, with  considerable  loss  of  men  and  arms.  Chios  was 
now  completely  invested,  and  the  famine  became  severe.1 

15.  For  the  moment  Tissaphernes  had  broken  with  both 
parties ;  yet  he  did  not  intend  to  withdraw  entirely  from  the 
Tissaphernes  war-  He  feared  that  the  Peloponnesians,  if 
concludes  a  deprived  of  his  support  too  long,  might  risk  an 
wi\rhtheapeio-  engagement  with  inadequate  forces,  or  their 
ponnesians.  navy  might  melt  away,  and  the  Athenians 
would  then  gain  what  they  wanted  without  Persian  help. 
Or  they  might  support  themselves  by  ravaging  the  King's 
territory.  Soon  after  the  conference  with  Pisander,  he  re- 
paired to  Caunus,  and  sending  for  the  commanders  of  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet  from  Ehodes,  furnished  them  with  supplies, 
and  concluded  a  third  treaty.  In  this  it  was  agreed  that  the 
King's  country,  so  far  as  it  was  in  Asia,  should  belong  to  the 
King,  and  that  he  should  deal  with  it  as  he  pleased.  Each 
party  undertook  not  to  damage  the  possessions  of  the  other, 
or  to  allow  their  allies  or  subjects  to  damage  it.  In  regard 
to  supplies,  Tissaphernes  was  to  support  the  Peloponnesian 
ships  at  the  same  rate  as  before  till  the  arrival  of  the  King's 
fleet,  after  which  they  were  to  furnish  supplies  for  them- 
selves, or  if  Tissaphernes  furnished  them,  they  must  repay 
the  cost  at  the  end  of  the  war.  The  two  fleets  were  to  act 
together  under  the  joint  control  of  Tissaphernes  and  the 
Lacedaemonians ;  and,  as  before,  the  war  was  only  to  be 
ended  by  common  consent.2 


1  Thiic.  viii.  55,  56. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  58.  The  heading  of  the  treaty  is  as  follows  :  gwOrjicai 
eyevovro  iv  Maidvbpov  7re8i'o>  AuKe8aip.ovlcov  Kal  rcov  £vp.p,dxa)v  npos 
Tiacra(pepvr]v  Kal  'lepap-ev-qv  Kal  tovs  Qapvanov  7rai8as  irepl  rcov  (Saai\ea>s 
irpayixarayv  Kal  AaKedaifiovicov  Kal  tcov  ^vp.p.dxo)v.  The  sons  of  Phar- 
naces  are  Pharnabazus  and  his  brother.    Hieramenes  is  a  doubtful 


XI.  15- ]  PELOPONNESIANS  RETURN  TO  MILETUS,  411.  399 

In  this  treaty  we  see  that  the  remonstrances  of  Lichas  had 
not  been  without  effect;  some  limits  are  assigned  to  the 
"  country  of  the  King  "  which  the  Greeks  were  Nature  of  the 
not  to  molest.  On  the  other  hand,  the  question  treaty- 
of  the  European  possessions  of  the  Persians  is  left  open ;  and 
much  more  definite  conditions  are  laid  down  about  supplies. 
We  observe  also  that  the  King  now  speaks  of  his  own  navy, 
implying  that  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  is  rather  a  useful  ally 
than  a  vital  force  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  By  promising 
to  bring  up  this  navy — which  never  appeared— Tissaphernes 
had  prevented  the  Lacedaemonians  from  engaging  with  the 
Athenians ;  and  he  now  formally  uses  the  same  promise  to 
put  a  limit  to  the  supplies  which  they  were  to  receive. 

On  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty,  Tissaphernes  pretended  to 
make  arrangements  for  the  arrival  of  the  Phoenician  fleet, 
while  the  Peloponnesians  at  last  broke  up  from 
their  long  inaction  at  Ehodes  and  returned  to  nesL^ieave 
Miletus.    In  this  they  were  not  only  consulting  Rhodes  for 
the  wishes  of  Tissaphernes ;  they  were  putting 
themselves  in  a  better  position  for  the  relief  of  Chios. 
Envoys  had  also  arrived  from  Eretria,  asking  assistance  in 
bringing  over  Euboea,  a  step  which  was  again  in  serious 
contemplation,  and  the  more  so  because  a  combined  party  of 
Boeotians  and  Eretrians  had  been  successful  in  persuading 
the  garrison  of  Oropus,  on  the  borders  of  Attica  and  Boeotia, 
opposite  Eretria,  to  surrender  the  place.    The  request  was 
refused,  or  perhaps  referred  to  the  authorities  at  home,  who 
soon  after  took  the  matter  up.    On  the  way  to  Miletus,  the 
fleet  came  in  sight  of  the  Athenian  squadron,  which,  under 
the  command  of  Leon  and  Diomedon,  had  been  watching 
them  from  Chalce,  but  neither  side  would  engage.1  The 
Athenians  now  returned  to  Samos  to  keep  watch  over  their 
enemy  at  Miletus. 

The  relief  which  the  Chians  expected  from  the  Pelopon- 


person.    In  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  1.  9,  a  Hieramenes  is  mentioned,  who 
married  a  sister  of  Darius. 
1  Time.  viii.  59,  60,  55. 


400 


THE  HELLESPONT,  411. 


[XI.  15. 


nesians  never  came,  for  Astyochus  was  unable  to  pass  the 
Athenians  without  an  engagement,  which  he  was  probably  for- 
,  bidden  to  risk  till  the  arrival  of  the  Phoenician 

The  Pelopon- 

nesiansin  fleet.  Their  position  was  almost  desperate, 
Chios.  when  they  succeeded  in  bringing  up  from 

Miletus  a  Spartan  named  Leon,  to  take  the  place  of  Pedaritus, 
and  a  small  squadron  of  twelve  vessels.  Upon  this  the  Chian 
fleet  attacked  the  Athenians,  and  though  the  engagement 
was  not  decided,  they  certainly  were  not  defeated.  A  few 
days  afterwards  the  Athenian  commander  Strombichides 
found  it  necessary  to  leave  Chios  for  the  Hellespont,  where 
Abydus  and  Lampsacus  had  been  induced  to  revolt  by 
Dercyllidas,  the  Spartan,  of  whom  we  now  hear  for  the 
first  time.  Strombichides  succeeded  in  recovering  Lamp- 
sacus, from  which  he  carried  off  the  slaves  and  materials 
of  war,  but  Abydus  could  neither  be  persuaded  nor  forced 
to  return  to  alliance.  Strombichides  had  to  content  him- 
self with  establishing  a  garrison  at  Sestos,  to  keep  watch 
over  the  Hellespont.1  The  news  of  these  successes  so  en- 
couraged Astyochus  that  he  at  length  ventured  to  sail  with 
two  ships  to  Chios,  and  finding  that  the  island  was  no  longer 
in  any  danger,  he  brought  back  all  the  Chian  ships  to  join 
his  own  fleet  at  Miletus.  With  these  reinforcements  he 
sailed  out  to  attack  the  Athenians,  but  in  vain ;  they  refused 
to  leave  the  harbour. 

They  were  indeed  in  a  miserable  plight.  On  their  return 
from  Tissaphernes,  Pisander  and  the  envoys,  far  from  aban- 
Attempted  doning  their  plans,  pursued  them  with  still 
revolution  greater  eagerness,  and  even  persuaded  some  of 
piansoTthe  tne  leading  Samians  to  join  them  in  establish- 
oiigarchs.  {ng  an  oligarchy,  though  these  had  recently 
helped  to  destroy  the  Samian  oligarchs.  They  resolved  to 
go  on  with  the  war,  and  contribute  the  necessary  funds  from 
their  own  resources ;  the  burden  would  not  press  so  heavily  if 
borne  in  their  own  interests.    And  with  regard  to  Alcibiades, 


1  Thuc.  viii.  62. 


XI.  I5-]  PI  SANDER  A  GAIN  AT  A  THENS,  411. 


401 


they  now  discovered  that  he  was  not  a  man  suited  to  an 
oligarchy,  and  left  him  to  go  his  own  way.     Being  firm 
for  revolution  at  all  costs,  they  sent  Pisander  and  half 
the  envoys  back  to  Athens  to  complete  the  Pisandersent 
revolution  there,  bidding  them  establish  oli- 

to  Athens  to 

garchies  in  every  city  at  which  they  touched  on  ration*16 
the  way  j  the  other  half  they  sent  to  various  there- 
subject  towns.    Diotrephes,  who  had  been  chosen  to  command 
in  the  Thracian  district,  was  despatched  to  his  province, 
where  he  had  no  sooner  arrived  than  he  put  Diotrephes 
down  the  democracy  at  Thasos ;  but  the  result  at  Thasos. 
was  by  no  means  answerable  to  the  expectations  of  the 
oligarchs.    Two  months  after  his  departure,  the  Thasians 
began  to  build  walls,  and  in  conjunction  with  some  exiles  who 
had  taken  refuge  with  the  Peloponnesians,  they  summoned 
ships  to  their  aid  and  went  over  to  Lacedaemon,  thus  re- 
forming the  state  and  getting  rid  of  the  demos  without  any 
risk  to  themselves.    And  the  same  thing,  Thucydides  says, 
happened  in  many  other  cities.    When  the  power  of  the 
demos  had  been  checked  and  the  oligarchs  could  act  in  safety, 
they  threw  aside  the  sham  independence  proffered  by  their 
fellow-oligarchs  at  Athens  and  secured  complete  freedom.1 

On  their  way  to  Athens,  Pisander  and  his  colleagues  not 
only  put  down  democracies  in  any  city  at  which  they  touched, 
but  collected  forces  to  aid  them  in  their  under-  Pisander  at 
taking.     When  they  reached  the  city,  they  Athens, 
found  that  their  partisans  in  the  various  clubs  had  been  most 
active  in  preparing  the  ground.    The  first  three  or  four 
months  of  the  year  411  had  been  little  better  than  a  reign  of 
terror  in  the  city.    Androcles,  a  leading  demo-  Reign  of  terror 
crat,  who  had  taken  the  foremost  part  in  ex-  at  Athens, 
polling  Alcibiades,  was  secretly  assassinated  by  some  of  the 
younger  oligarchs,  and  the  same  fate  overtook  others  who 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  conspirators.    A  programme  of  the 


1  Thuc.  viii.  64.  For  Diotrephes  we  ought  perhaps  to  read 
Diitrephes  {supra,  p.  338).    See  Goodhart's  note. 

VOL.  III.  2  0 


402 


THE  RE  VOL UTWN  AT  A THENS,  411.       [XI .  16. 


Reformed  Constitution  had  also  been  issued,  in  which  it  was 
declared  that  henceforth  no  one  should  receive  money  for 
service  to  the  state  other  than  military :  that  the  franchise 
should  be  confined. to  those  men  who  were  most  able  to  assist 
the  city  in  purse  and  person,  and  that  their  numbers  should 
not  exceed  five  thousand.  This  was  meant  for  the  public, 
for  of  course  the  conspirators  intended  to  keep  the  power 
. .  ,       in  their  own  hands.    The  Assembly  and  the 

Oligarchical  >        .  J 

plans  at  Council  still  continued  to  meet  as  before ;  but 

Athens.  at  their  meetings  such  subjects  only  were  dis- 

cussed as  pleased  the  conspirators;  no  one  spoke  who  was 
not  of  their  party,  or  said  anything  which  they  had  not 
previously  considered.  Opposition  was  indeed  out  of  the 
question,  for  if  any  one  was  rash  enough  to  support  the 
democracy,  he  at  once  disappeared,  and  no  attempt  was  made 
to  discover  his  murderers,  or  to  punish  them  if  they  fell 
under  suspicion.  The  people  were  terror-struck  and  dumb ; 
every  one  thought  himself  fortunate  if  silence  secured  im- 
munity. The  extent  of  the  conspiracy  was  unknown,  and 
therefore  exaggerated ;  to  claim  sympathy  was  dangerous,  to 
repel  attack  impossible :  many  were  found  among  the  con- 
spirators, whose  lives  and  opinions  seemed  to  make  such  a 
position  impossible,  and  the  popular  party,  terrified  by  these 
instances  of  treachery,  lost  all  confidence  in  themselves.1 

16.  Pisander  and  his  colleagues  now  appeared  at  Athens, 
and  lost  no  time  in  carrying  out  the  remaining  part  of  their 
_   „     ,  .      programme.    The  Athenians  were  summoned 

The  Revolution :  r     »  _  _ 

meeting  at  to  an  Assembly,  at  which  ten 2  commissioners 
Coionus.  with  full  powers  were  chosen  to  frame  a  con- 

stitution, and  they  were  to  report  by  a  given  day  to  the 
people.  When  the  day  came,  the  Assembly  was  again 
summoned,  not  in  the  Pnyx,  nor  in  Athens  at  all,  but  in  the 
precinct  of  Poseidon  at  Coionus,  rather  more  than  a  mile 


1  Thuc.  viii.  66. 

2  In  Ath.  Pol.  c.  29  we  have  thirty,  including  the  ten  Probuli  ; 
see  Sandys'  note. 


XI.  1 6.]  THE  ASSEMBLY  AT  COLON  US,  411. 


403 


distant  from  the  city.1    The  Commissioners  then  brought 
forward  their  report,  if  report  it  can  be  called,  for  they  had 
made  no  attempt  to  frame  a  constitution;  and  contented 
themselves  with  recommending  the  suspension  of  the  law 
against  illegal  proposals,  by  which,  more  directly  than  by 
any  other  provision,  the  stability  of  the  constitution  was  in 
ordinary  times  maintained.    Every  citizen  was  now  at  liberty 
to  make  what  proposals  he  pleased,  however  unconstitutional 
they  might  be,  and  any  one  who  attacked  him  on  the  score 
of  illegality  was  threatened  with  severe  penalties.    In  other . 
words,  the  Athenian  constitution  was  now  thrown  into  the 
melting-pot,  and  those  whose  business  it  was  to  provide  a 
new  model  left  matters  to  take  their  own  course,  which  was 
exactly  what  the  conspirators  wished.     Pisander  at  once 
came  forward  with  a  scheme  for  a  new  form  of 
government.    He  proposed  to  sweep  away  all  Government 
the  existing  arrangements  for  public  offices ;  of  the  Four 
and  for  the  future  to  abolish  the  payment  of  Hundred- 
officers  ;  to  restrict  the  franchise,  as  before,  to  five  thousand 
citizens;  and  to  place  the  management  of  the  state  in  the 
hands  of  a  new  Council  of  four  hundred  members,  who  were 
to  be  irresponsible,  and  empowered  to  summon  the  five 
thousand  at  their  pleasure,  and  at  their  pleasure  only.  The 
election  of  the  four  hundred  was  arranged  as  follows :  five 
proedri  were  chosen  by  the  Assembly;  of  these  five,  each 
selected  nineteen  others ;  and  each  of  the  hundred  thus 
chosen  selected  three.2 

Not  a  word  was  said  against  these  proposals.    So  well  had 

1  Thuc. 

Upbv  IIo(rei8<opos  e£co  TroXews,  ankyov  g-Tadiovs  ^dXiara  Sena).  Thucy- 
dides  gives  us  no  explanation  of  the  curious  word  ^vveKkyaav,  and  no 
reason  for  the  choice  of  Colonus.  The  oligarchs  no  doubt  took  steps 
to  hinder  the  free  action  of  the  people  by  limiting  the  number 
present ;  see  Goodh art's  note. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  67.  For  the  contradiction  between  Thucydides  and 
Aristotle,  see  Appendix  ii.  I  follow  Thncydides  throughout:  (1) 
as  a  contemporary,  his  authority  stands  first ;  (2)  so  vivid  and  im- 
pressive a  narrative  as  his  deserves  more  credit  than  the  confused 
account  of  Aristotle. 


404       THE  FOUR  HUNDRED  ESTA  BUSHED,  411.    [XI.  16. 


the  ground  been  prepared,  so  widespread  was  the  conspiracy, 
so  great  the  ability  of  the  leading  conspirators,  that  the 
Athenian  people  were  brought  to  surrender 
SePCouncii°of  without  a  struggle  the  freedom  which  they  had 
Five  Hundred,  enjoyed  for  a  hundred  years.  But  the  Council 
June  411.  o^  Five  Hundred  yet  remained,  and,  if  resolute, 

might  prove  a  serious  obstacle  to  the  revolution.  It  was  the 
Council  which,  in  the  days  of  Isagoras,  had  frustrated  the 
attempt  to  govern  Athens  by  an  oligarchy.  The  conspirators 
thought  it  necessary  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  caution. 
At  this  time,  owing  to  the  presence  of  their  enemies  at 
Decelea,  the  Athenians,  contrary  to  their  usual  custom,  were 
constantly  under  arms.  On  the  day  fixed  for  the  enterprise, 
the  Four  Hundred  allowed  those  who  were  not  in  the  plot  to 
leave  their  posts  for  rest  or  food,  but  ordered  those  in  their 
confidence  to  remain  within  reach  of  their  arms.  They  were 
also  supported  by  a  number  of  foreign  troops,  Tenians, 
Andrians,  Carystians,  and  by  colonists  of  Aegina ;  above  all 
by  a  band  of  a  hundred  young  men,  whom  they  could  trust 
to  carry  out  their  instructions.  Thus  prepared  against  any 
resistance  from  the  people,  they  proceeded  to  the  Council- 
Chamber,  each  carrying  a  concealed  dagger.  Their  pre- 
cautions were  needless  :  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  showed 
not  the  slightest  sign  of  resistance,  and  were  quite  willing  not 
only  to  leave  the  House,  but  to  take  the  pay  due  for  the 
remainder  of  their  year  of  office,  which  was  offered  to  them 
at  the  door  as  they  passed  out.  Their  expulsion  took  place 
about  a  month  before  the  close  of  the  Attic  year  in  July.1 

The  Four  Hundred  were  now  absolute  masters  of  the  city. 
The  people  had  been  partly  cheated,  partly  frightened  into 
Proceedings  of  accepting  the  revolution,  and  even  those  who 
the  New  council.  Were  under  arms  for  the  defence  of  the  city 
looked  on  with  indifference.  All  the  functions  of  government, 
deliberative  and  executive,  were  in  the  hands  of  the  new 


1  Thuc.  viii.  69.    Ath.  Pol.  32.    Cp.  Aristoph.  Thesmoph.  808,  809 
dAX'  Evfiov\r}S  tcov  nepvo-iv  tis  fiovXevrrjs  icrriv  ape'ivoiV, 
napadovs  erepa>  tt}v  ftovXelav ;  ovd'  avros  tovto  ye  (prjacis. 


XI.  i6.]     THE  OLIGARCHICAL  GOVERNMENT,  411.     .  405 


Council,  who,  after  offering  the  prayers  and  sacrifices  cus- 
tomary upon  entering  on  office,  chose  by  lot 1  some  of  their 
number  to  act  as  a  standing  committee,  and  set  about  chang- 
ing the  details  of  the  constitution.  There  was  now  no  general 
Assembly,  and  the  choice  of  officers,  civil  and  military,  lay 
entirely  with  the  Council :  any  one  not  of  their  party  was 
no  doubt  removed  from  his  post  to  make  way  for  an  oli- 
garch, but  we  cannot  follow  their  action  into  particulars. 
All  we  know  is  that  they  ruled  the  city  by  force ;  some 
citizens  whom  it  was  thought  convenient  to  get  rid  of  were 
put  to  death,  others  were  imprisoned,  others  were  sent  out  of 
the  country.2 

At  one  point  they  stopped  short — they  did  not  propose  to 
recall  the  exiles.  On  his  previous  visit  to  Athens,  Pisander 
had  used  the  name  of  Alcibiades  and  his  in-  The  exiles  not 
fluence  with  the  Persian  satrap  to  win  the  recalled- 
consent  of  the  Athenian  people  to  a  change  of  the  constitu- 
tion, but  after  the  interview  with  Tissaphernes  these  hopes 
came  to  an  end.  Phrynichus,  who,  since  his  recall  to  Athens 
had  worked  heartily  in  the  oligarchical  cause,  was  well  aware 
that  the  return  ot  his  enemy  would  involve  his  own  destruc- 
tion. Even  in  regard  to  the  war,  the  policy  of  the  oligarchs 
was  no  longer  in  harmony  with  that  of  Alcibiades.  He  was 
the  declared  enemy  of  Sparta,  and  offered'the  help  of  Persia  in 
continuing  the  war ;  they  had  no  wish  to  continue  the  war, 
and  had  therefore  no  .need  of  Persian  help.  Their  objects 
were  personal :  they  wished  to  secure  their  position  and  to 
free  the  city  from  the  rule  of  the  multitude  at  any  cost ;  in  the 
pursuit  of  these  aims  Alcibiades  would  have  been  in  their  way, 
and  they  could  not  recall  the  exiles  without  recalling  him.3 

1  Thuc.  viii.  70 :  dneKXrjp^aav. 

2  Thuc.  I.e.  :  Kara  updros  eve/xov  rrjv  ttoXlv.  For  the  election  of 
generals,  see  Pol.  Ath.  c.  31,  where  a  distinction  is  drawn  between 
the  election  of  the  generals  before  and  aftei  the  establishment  of 
the  Council.  For  the  remainder  of  the  Attic  year,  generals  were 
to  be  chosen  from  the  five  thousand  (by  whom?);  afterwards  the 
Council  was  to  elect  them. 

3  Thuc.  viii.  91.    Infra,  p.  412.    See,  however,  Ath.  Pol.  32  end, 


406 


THE  FOUR  HUNDRED  AND  AG  IS,  411.      [XI.  17. 


They  were  no  sooner  in  power  than  they  sent  envoys  to 
Agis  at  Decelea,  thinking  that  he  would  listen  to  overtures, 
Q  t  t  which  came,  not  from  a  "  faithless  multitude," 
Agis ;  his  fruit-  but  f rom  oligarchs  who  sympathised  with  Lace- 
less  advance  on  daemon.     Agis,  however,  was  by  no  means 

Athens.  .     . &    '  '  ,  / 

convinced  that  the  people  would  acquiesce  in 
the  new  government ;  if  all  were  quiet  for  the  moment,  new 
factions  would  certainly  arise,  should  a  large  army  appear 
before  the  gates  of  the  city.  So  far  from  entering  into 
negotiations,  he  at  once  summoned  forces  from  the  Pelopon- 
nese,  and  with  these  and  his  own  garrison  he  marched  upon 
Athens,  expecting  by  his  approach  to  throw  the  citizens  into 
such  confusion  that  they  would  accept  what  terms  he  pleased, 
or  at  least  to  find  the  Long  Walls  deserted  in  the  general 
tumult,  and  an  easy  prey  to  his  attack.  These  plans  were 
foiled  by  the  excellent  discipline  of  the  Athenians.  Within 
the  city  the  strictest  order  was  kept,  and  not  a  man  was 
moved  from  his  post ;  when  the  Peloponnesians  came  up  to 
the  walls,  troops  were  sent  out  against  them  with  such  effect 
that  Agis  suffered  some  loss.  Upon  this  he  retired  to 
Decelea,  and  sent  the  reinforcements  home.  He  was  now 
more  inclined  to  listen  to  the  overtures  which  still  came  to 
him  from  the  Four  Hundred,  and  they,  in  their  turn,  were 
encouraged  to  send  an  embassy  to  Lacedaemon.1 

17.  The  success  of  the  conspiracy  had  been  due  in  a  great 
measure  to  the  absence  of  large  numbers  of  the  citizens. 
Had  the  £<  seafaring  rabble  "  who  manned  the  fleet  at  Samos 
been  present  at  the  Assembly  at  Golonus,  democracy  would 
Difficulty  with  not  have  died  so  easily  at  Athens.  And,  in 
the  fleet.  truth,  it  was  not  dead.    The  fleet  now  consti- 

tuted the  real  power  of  the  city.  If  the  sailors  refused  to  obey 
orders  from  home,  any  treaties  which  the  oligarchs  might  make 

where  it  is  stated  that  the  Athenians  abandoned  negotiations  with 
Lacedaemon  because  the  Lacedaemonians  insisted  on  the  surrender 
of  the  empire. 

1  Thuc.  viii.  81  ;  see  also  c.  86,  90  ;  Antiphon  and  Pisander  were  the 
chief  movers.  The  envoys  were  Laespodias,  Aristophon,  and  Melesias. 
They  never  reached  Lacedaemon.    Infra,  p.  412. 


XI.  I7-]    OLIGARCHY  SUPPRESSED  AT  SAMOS,  411.  407 


with  Sparta  were  idle  forms.  So  long  as  the  action  of  the  fleet 
was  undecided,  Agis  was  not  likely  to  retire  from  Decelea. 
It  was,  therefore,  essential  to  the  success  of  the  oligarchical 
movement  that  it  should  be  supported  in  the  fleet.  The 
situation  was  the  more  difficult  as  the  sailors  were  strongly 
democratical ;  and  the  Samians  had  recently  The  revolution 
risen  against  their  oligarchical  government.  at  Samos- 
Yet,  before  leaving  for  Athens,  Pisander  and  the  Athenians 
of  his  party  had  persuaded  a  number  of  the  Samians  to 
abandon  their  new  principles,  and  a  body  of  three  hundred 
had  been  formed  with  a  view  to  carrying  out  a  counter- 
revolution. The  conspirators  began  their  work 

,  r  .  ,  .  ,         June  411. 

m  the  usual  manner,  with  assassination ;  they 
struck  down  Hyperbolus,  the  Athenian  demagogue,  who,  after 
his  ostracism  {supra,  p.  288),  had  lived  at  Samos — an  act  in 
which  they  were  abetted  by  Gharminus,  one  of  the  Athenian 
generals,  and  they  were  about  to  make  an  attack  on  the 
popular  party,  when  they  met  with  opposition  where  they 
perhaps  least  expected  it.  The  generals  Leon  and  Diomedon, 
who  had  been  sent  out  by  the  oligarchs  at  Athens  to  take 
the  place  of  Phrynichus  and  Scironides  (supra, 

o/Cr-x  i  •  n    i     .,i     1  Action  of  Leon 

p.  395),  were  by  no  means  satisfied  with  the  turn  and  Diomedon ; 
which  affairs  were  taking; ;  their  sympathies  the  revolution 

.  1     1  v     •        1  m  i  crushed. 

were  with  the  people,  m  whose  commence  and 
esteem  their  influence  lay.  Thrasybulus  also,  one  of  the 
trierarchs,  and  Thrasyllus,  one  of  the  heavy-armed  rank  and 
file,  with  some  others,  were  known  to  be  warm  friends 
of  democracy.  When  the  conspiracy  was  discovered,  the 
Athenians  at  once  went  among  the  soldiers  and  sailors, 
beseeching  each  one  separately  to  oppose  it:  more  especi- 
ally they  sought  out  the  crew  of  the  Paralus,  the  state 
ship,  who  were  all  Athenian  citizens,  and  ready  to  attack 
oligarchy,  real  or  imaginary.  The  generals  were  also  careful 
to  leave  behind  a  number  of  ships  when  they  were  called 
away  from  Samos,  and  when  at  last  the  three  hundred  made 
their  attack,  it  was  successfully  resisted,  and  democracy  was 
maintained.    About  thirty  of  the  conspirators  were  slain; 


408     UNION  OF  SAMIANS  AND  ATHENIANS,  411.    [XI.  18. 


three  who  were  most  deeply  implicated  were  sent  into  exile : 
the  remainder  were  allowed  to  live  in  peace  under  the 
democracy.1 

18.  The  Paralus  was  at  once  despatched  with  the  news  to 
Athens.  By  this  time  the  Four  Hundred  were  in  power, 
and  when  the  crew,  who  were  ignorant  of  the 
sent  ^Athens :  course  of  events,  landed  at  Peiraeus,  two  or 
chaereasre-  three  were  immediately  thrown  into  prison, 
withSnewsaof°S  while  the  rest  were  transferred  to  a  transport 
t  ie  Four  vessel  and  sent  to  keep  watch  off  Euboea. 

Hundred'  gut  Chaereas,  a  staunch  democrat,  who  had 

come  out  in  the  ship  from  Samos,  found  means  to  escape  and 
return  to  the  island,  where  he  set  about  most  exaggerated 
reports  of  the  conduct  of  the  oligarchs.  He  declared  that 
no  one  was  allowed  to  say  a  word  against  the  usurpers ;  that 
freeborn  Athenians  were  punished  with  the  lash;  that 
women  and  children  were  outraged ;  and  that  the  oligarchs 
intended  to  seize  the  relations  of  all  the  soldiers  in  Samos 
who  were  not  of  their  party  with  the  intention  of  putting 
them  to  death  if  resistance  were  made.  By  these  reports 
intense  excite-  the  Athenians  in  the  fleet  were  roused  to  such 
ment  at^Samos :  f  UIy  were  on  the  point  of  attacking 

Samiansand  the  oligarchs,  when  the  moderates  prevented 
Athenians.  an  outbreak  by  pointing  out  the  danger  of  a 
quarrel  while  the  enemy  lay  at  hand  to  take  advantage  of 
it.  Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus,  who  were  now  the  acknow- 
ledged leaders  of  the  democratic  party,  seized  the  spirit  of 
the  hour  to  come  forward  publicly  and  pledge  the  soldiers, 
especially  those  of  the  oligarchic  faction,  by  the  strongest 
oaths,  not  only  to  forget  their  differences  and  maintain  the 
democracy,  but  to  carry  on  the  war  with  Sparta  to  the  last ; 
and  above  all,  to  be  uncompromising  enemies  of  the  Four 
Hundred.  The  same  pledges  were  taken  by  all  the  Samians 
of  military  age.  From  this  time  forward  Athenians  and 
Samians   made    common    cause,   participating   equally  in 


1  Thuc.  viii.  73. 


XI.  i8.] 


SAMOS  IS  ATHENS,  411. 


409 


dangers  and  successes,  and  regarding  their  interests  as  in- 
separable. They  had  no  hope  but  in  themselves  and  in  each 
other ;  Samian  and  Athenian  would  alike  perish  if  the  enemy 
at  Miletus  or  the  oligarchs  at  Athens  gained  the  day.1  In 
this  common  danger  the  past  was  forgotten.  Thirty  years 
before,  Samos  had  nearly  destroyed  the  Athenian  power  in 
the  Aegean,  but  now  she  was  the  sole  means  of  preserving  it. 
For  if  the  Samians  had  joined  the  oligarchs  at  this  moment, 
or  had  merely  taken  up  an  independent  position,  the  war 
would  have  speedily  been  brought  to  an  end  in  the  interest 
of  the  oligarchs,  and  democracy  would  have  ceased  to  be  a 
power  in  Eastern  Greece. 

Secure  of  the  support  of  the  Samians,  the  Athenians  took 
steps  to  strengthen  their  position.  New  generals,  among 
whom  were  Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus,  were  Newgenerals 
chosen  in  the  room  of  the  old ;  and  any  trier-  chosen  at 
archs  who  were  suspected  of  oligarchical  sym-  Samos- 
pathies  were  replaced  by  men  of  sounder  principles.  They 
called  on  each  other  not  to  lose  heart ;  Athens  was  indeed 
lost  to  them,  but  in  numbers  and  resources  they  had  the 
advantage.  They  had  a  base  of  operations  at  Samos,  a  great 
and  famous  city,  from  which  they  could  send  out  to  collect 
supplies  from  the  allies.  It  was  owing  to  the  fleet  that 
Athens  had  enjoyed  security  ;  they  were  the  protecting  force 
which  kept  off  the  Persians  and  supplied  the  city.  They 
had  it  in  their  power  to  reduce  Athens  if  the  oligarchs 
refused  to  restore  the  ancient  constitution,  but  Athens  could 
neither  help  nor  injure  them.  She  could  not  send  them 
money,  for  she  had  none;  nor  direct  their  movements,  for 
they  could  not  trust  the  destroyer  of  their  liberties.  There 
was  also  a  hope  that  Alcibiades  would  yet  join  them,  and 
bring  the  King  to  their  side :  he  and  they  were  both  enemies 
of  the  Peloponnesians.  And  at  the  worst,  with  such  a  fleet 
at  command,  they  could  win  for  themselves  a  new  city  and 
a  new  country  on  some  distant  shore.2 


1  Thuc.  viii.  75. 


*  Thuc.  viii.  76. 


410 


ALCIBIADES  AT  SAMOS,  411.  [XI.  19. 


19.  The  next  step  was  to  approach  Alcibiades,  without 
whose  assistance  there  was  no  hope  of  obtaining  help  from 
Overtures  to  Tissaphernes.  Hitherto  he  had  declared  him- 
Aiobiades.  ge]f  an  enemy  to  democracy,  and  it  was  there- 
fore uncertain  what  attitude  he  would  take  up  towards  the 
Athenians  at  Samos,  or  whether  they  would  receive  him. 
The  second  difficulty  was  removed  by  the  persuasive  argu- 
ments of  Thrasybulus  and  his  friends,  who  at  length  obtained 
a  formal  safe-conduct  for  the  exile.  A  general  assembly  of 
the  soldiers  was  then  summoned,  at  which  Alcibiades  came 
forward.  For  the  first  time  since  the  Sicilian  expedition 
had  left  Athens,  he  stood  face  to  face  with  an  audience  of  his 
countrymen.  It  was  soon  clear  that  he  had  not  lost  the  old 
power  of  fascination.  After  lamenting  his  exile,  not  without 
reproach  of  those  who  had  been  the  cause  of  it,  he  entered 
on  the  political  situation.  He  exaggerated  his  influence  with 
Tissaphernes,  with  a  view  of  securing  his  own  position  at 
Samos  and  shaking  that  of  the  oligarchs  at  Athens,  whom 
he  knew  to  be  opposed  to  his  return ;  and  he  raised  the 
hopes  of  his  hearers  to  the  highest  pitch  by  declaring  that 
Tissaphernes  had  pledged  himself  to  keep  the  Athenians 
supplied — if  only  he  could  put  confidence  in  them— so  long 
as  he  had  any  resources  left,  even  if  he  had  to  coin  the  silver 
fittings  of  his  litter;  and  that  the  Phoenician  fleet,  which 
was  lying  at  Aspendus,  would  be  brought  up  to  their  assist- 
ance, and  not  to  the  assistance  of  the  Peloponnesians.  But 
on  one  condition  only  would  his  confidence  be  given  to  the 
Athenians — Alcibiades  must  be  received  back  and  placed  in 
a  responsible  position.1 

On  hearing  these  promises,  the  Athenians  were  greatly 
elated.   So  far  from  feeling  any  anxiety  about  their  own  future, 

„ .  -  they  looked  forward  with  confidence  to  the  day 

Alcibiades  r  ,  ^ 

elected  general  when  they  would  bring  the  Four  Hundred 
at  Samos.  to  account.  Alcibiades  was  at  once  elected  one 
of  the  staff  of  generals,  and  entrusted  with  the  control  of 


1  Thuc.  viii.  81  :  et  crcos  avros  Karikdutv  avrio  avabef-aiTo. 


XI .  20.  ]    THE  FLEE  T  AND  THE  F0  UR  HUNDRED,  411.  411 


affairs.  So  great  was  their  enthusiasm  that  many  were  eager 
to  sail  at  once  to  the  Peiraeus,  regardless  of  the  enemy  who 
lay  at  Miletus  watching  their  movements,  but  this  Alcibiades 
would  not  permit.  The  help  of  Tissaphernes  must  be  first 
secured,  and  with  this  object  he  departed,  immediately  the 
Assembly  was  over,  to  the  satrap's  court.1  It  was  now  as 
necessary  for  him  to  exaggerate  his  success  with  the  Athenians 
to  Tissaphernes  as  it  had  previously  been  to  overstate  his 
influence  with  the  satrap  at  Samos. 

20.  The  commissioners  of  the  Four  Hundred  had  reached 
Delos  when  they  became  aware  of  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Samos.  As  it  was  useless  to  go  back,  and  perhaps  worse  than 
useless  to  go  forward,  they  stayed  in  the  island  awaiting 
the  course  of  events.  When  they  heard  that  Alcibiades  had 
been  received,  they  ventured  to  continue  their  ^  commis 
journey,  and  on  their  arrival  at  Samos  they  Sionersfrom 
were  brought  before  a  meeting  at  which  he  Athens  arrive 

r™  ?  •   .  at  Samos. 

was  present.  The  excitement  was  intense ; 
for  a  time  the  soldiers  demanded  their  instant  execution  as 
the  destroyers  of  the  democracy,  but  when  at  length  they 
obtained  a  hearing,  they  entered  on  an  apology  for  the  Four 
Hundred,  contradicting  the  reports  of  Chaereas  about  the 
treatment  of  the  citizens,  and  maintaining  that  the  change  in 
the  constitution  had  been  made  honestly  in  the  interests  of 
the  city.  Little  attention  was  paid  to  their  words,  and  the 
angry  temper  of  the  Assembly  was  shown  in  a  number  of 
conflicting  proposals,  of  which  the  most  popular  was  a 
renewal  of  the  resolution  to  sail  at  once  to  the  Peiraeus. 
Alcibiades,  who  had  by  this  time  returned  to  Samos,  again 
interposed  his  veto,  and  repressing  the  excitement  against 
the  ambassadors,  he  sent  them  away  with  the  reply  that  he 
was  willing  to  accept  the  Five  Thousand  as  counsels  of 
the  governing  body  at  Athens,  but  the  Four  Alcibiades. 
Hundred  must  be  removed,  and  the  old  council  of  Five 
Hundred  restored.    He  also  expressed  his  warm  approval  of 


1  Time.  viii.  82. 


412      DIVISIONS  IN  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED,  411.      [XI.  21. 


any  measures  which  had  been  taken  with  a  view  to  economy, 
and  bade  the  Athenians  continue  the  war  to  the  uttermost, 
for  so  long  as  the  two  parties  remained,  there  was  a  hope  of 
reconciliation :  but  a  mistake  on  either  side  would  lead  to  the 
ruin  of  both.1  In  the  same  Assembly  the  Athenians  were 
cheered  by  the  presence  of  some  envoys  from  Argos,  who 
had  come  over  with  the  crew  of  the  Paralus  to  offer  their 
sympathy  and  assistance  to  "  the  Athenian  people  at  Samos." 
The  Paralians  had  been  recalled  from  their  cruise  off  Euboea 
to  convey  the  envoys  of  the  Four  Hundred  to  Lacedaemon, 
but  when  sailing  off  Argos  they  arrested  the  ambassadors 
and  deposited  them  with  the  Argives,  whose  envoys  they 
now  brought  to  Samos.2 

21.  The  commissioners  at  once  returned  to  Athens,  and  re- 
ported the  message  of  Alcibiades.  The  result  was  a  division 
Return  of  the  in  the  oligarchical  party.  Pisander  and  Phry- 
commissioners  nichus,  who  had  broken  with  Alcibiades,  and 
to  Athens.  were  0pp0sed  to  njs  return,  resolved  to  follow  the 
path  upon  which  they  had  entered :  the  advice  of  Alcibiades 
could  have  no  weight  with  them  while  his  position  at  Samos 
menaced  their  position  at  Athens.  They  were  more  eager 
than  ever  to  make  terms  with  Lacedaemon ;  and  for  this 
object  were  willing  to  sacrifice  not  only  the  Athenian  empire, 
but  even  the  independence  of  the  city,  if  required.  It  was 
better,  they  thought,  to  save  themselves  by  admitting  the 
Lacedaemonians  into  the  city  than  to  perish  at  the  hands  of 
the  hated  democrats,  as  they  certainly  would  perish,  if  the 
constitution  were  restored.  The  moderates,  on  the  other 
.  .  hand,  among  whom  were  Theramenes,  the  son 

Divisions  '  i    .    •  p  i 

among  the  of  Hagnon,  and  Anstocrates,  two  01  the  gene- 
Four  Hundred.  rajs  0f  t^e  Four  Hundred,  were  alarmed  at  the 
turn  which  events  had  taken.  They  recognised  the  power  of 
Alcibiades  and  the  armament  at  Samos,  and  without  openly 
opposing  the  oligarchs,  they  urged  the  policy  of  making  the 
Five  Thousand  a  real  and  not  a  merely  nominal  part  of  the 


1  Thuc.  viii.  86. 


2  Thuc.  viii.  86.    See  above,  p.  406. 


XI .  21 .  ]     THE  FOR  TIFICA  T10N  OF  EE  TIONEA ,  411. 


413 


constitution.  If  the  government  were  kept  in  too  few  hands, 
they  would  be  without  the  strength  necessary  for  carrying 
out  their  measures.  These  were  their  public  sentiments  :  in 
their  hearts  they  were  animated  partly  by  personal  jealousy 
— for  many  of  them  had  been  left  behind  in  the  race  for 
power  by  their  more  able  but  less  scrupulous  partisans — 
partly  by  real  alarm  and  the  desire  to  save  themselves  in  the 
coming  restoration  by  posing  as  democratic  leaders. 

The  extremists  saw  that  their  position  was  threatened. 
Another  embassy  was  sent  to  Sparta — Antiphon  and  Phry- 
nichus  being  among  the  envoys — with  instruc- 

j    1  iii  Proposals  for 

tions  to  conclude  peace  on  any  tolerable  terms,  peace  to  Sparta; 
And  meanwhile  a  fortress  which  was  in  course  fortification  of 

.  T-i     •  .  r  Eetionea. 

01  erection  on  JLetionea,  a  projecting  spur  of 
land  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  Peiraeus,  was  rapidly 
pushed  on  to  completion.1  Within  the  fortification  was 
included  a  large  portico  or  store-house,  and  orders  were 
issued  that  all  the  corn  in  the  city  should  be  conveyed  into 
it,  and  all  that  was  imported  should  be  deposited  there — and 
from  thence  retailed  to  the  city — orders  which  made  the 
holders  of  the  fort  absolute  masters  of  the  supplies  of  Athens. 
The  building  of  this  fortress  had  been  regarded  with  sus- 
picion from  the  first  by  the  more  moderate  members  of  the 
oligarchy,  and  Theramenes  had  repeatedly  expressed  his 
opinion  that  it  was  not  so  much  intended  to  keep  out  the 
Athenian  ships  from  Samos  as  to  admit  those  of  the 
Peloponnesians.2 

When  the  envoys  returned  from  Sparta  without  obtaining 
any  terms  of  peace,  and  at  the  same  time  the  news  was 
brought  that  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  raised  by  Excitement  at 
contingents  from  Italy  and  Sicily  to  forty-two  Athens- 
vessels,  lay  off  Las  in  Laconia  in  preparation  for  a  descent 
on  Euboea,  the  worst  suspicions  were  confirmed.  Theramenes 
asserted  that  the  fortress  would  prove  the  ruin  of  the  city : 

1  Thuc.  viii.  90.  The  details  are  somewhat  obscure,  but  see 
Goodhart's  plan. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  89,  90,  91. 


414  PHRYN1CHUS  IS  ASSASSINATED,  411.       [XI.  21. 


the  fleet  was  intended  not  for  Euboea  but  for  Athens,  and 
unless  immediate  steps  were  taken  all  would  be  lost.  These 
suspicions  were  at  first  whispered  about  in  small  knots  of 
the  citizens,  but  the  excitement  increased  every  hour.  At 
length  Phrynichus,  who  had  recently  returned  from  Sparta, 
and  was  perhaps  regarded  with  suspicion  more  than  any 
Assassination  other  of  the  extremists,  owing  to  his  previous 
of  Phrynichus.  conduct  at  Samos,  was  struck  down  by  an 
assassin  in  the  crowded  market-place,  near  the  Council- 
Chamber.  The  assassin,  who  was  one  of  the  frontier  guard, 
escaped,  and  his  accomplice,  an  Argive,  who  was  caught  and 
put  to  the  torture,  refused  to  give  the  name  of  any  person 
who  had  incited  him  to  the  act :  all  that  he  would  confess 
was  that  many  conspirators  were  in  the  habit  of  meeting  at 
the  house  of  the  captain  of  the  Peripoli  and  elsewhere. 
The  matter  was  allowed  to  pass  without  any  further 
investigation,  or  at  any  rate  without  any  severe  measures 
being  taken  to  crush  the  conspiracy.1 

1  Thuc.  viii.  92  says  that  the  assassin  (who  escaped)  was  one  of 
the  Peripoli,  and  that  his  accomplice  (who  was  captured)  was  an 
Argive.  Plutarch  {Ale.  25),  who  can  always  be  precise  where  older 
authorities  are  vague,  gives  the  name  of  the  Peripolus  :  Hermon 
(whom  Thuc.  mentions,  c.  92,  as  captain  of  the  Peripoli,  at  Munychia), 
and  adds,  ol  'ABrjvaioi  8lkt]s  yevopevrjs  tov  yJkv  Qpvvlyov  irpoboo-lav 
KaTeyjfrjCpLO-avTo  redvrjKoros,  top  5'  "Ep/uova  Kai  rovs  /ier'  avrov 
(tvo-tclvtcis  eo~Te(pdvu>o-av.  On  the  other  hand,  Lysias  asserts  (13,  §  71) 
that  Thrasybulus  the  Calydonian  and  Apollodorus  of  Megara  were 
the  assassins,  the  actual  blow  being  struck  by  Thrasybulus — and 
that  both  of  them  escaped.  For  this  service  they  were  subsequently 
made  Athenian  citizens  by  public  decree.  (The  object  of  Lysias  is 
to  prove  that  Agoratus  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  death  of  Phry- 
nichus.) Lycurgus,  while  retaining  the  names  Thrasybulus  and 
Apollodorus,  gives  a  different  account  of  the  circumstances  of  the 
murder:  <j>pim'yov  yap  arrocrcpayevTO?  vvurcop  napa  ttjp  Kprp>r]v  ttjv 
ev  rots  olavois  vtto  ' KnoWodcopov  Kai  Qpaav(3ov\ov  Kai  tovto,; 
\r)(p8  evToov  Kai  is  ro  ^eapcoTr/piov  dnoTedevTaiv  vtt6  tcov  tov  <&pvvi)(Ov 
(pikcov,  k.t.X.  A:nd  in  an  inscription  belonging  to  the  spring  of 
409,  Thrasybulus  and  Apollodorus  receive  rewards  from  the  Athenian 
people  by  public  decree  :  C.I. A.  i.  59  ;  Dittenb.  43  ;  Hicks,  56.  See 
Arnold's  note  on  Thuc.  I.e.,  which,  however,  was  written  before  the 
discovery  of  the  inscription.  Bergk  was  the  first  to  connect  the 
inscription  with  the  murder  of  Phrynichus.    Whether  he  was  right 


XI.  22.] 


THERAMENES,  411. 


415 


22.  The  death  of  Phrynichus  was  the  signal  for  more 
energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the  moderates.  The  pre- 
vailing suspicion  was  increased  by  the  movements  of  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet,  which  first  advanced  to  Aegina  and  then 
returned  to  Epidaurus.  Theramenes  insisted  that  there  was 
no  longer  any  room  for  doubt  or  delay,  the  army  must  act  or 
they  would  be  lost.  Thus  encouraged,  the  hoplites  engaged  on 
the  works  at  Eetionea,  among  whom  was  Aristo-  Destruction  Qf 
crates,  in  command  of  his  tribe,  and  Hermon,  the  fort  at 
the  captain  of  the  Peripoli,  seized  one  of  the  Eetionea- 
oligarchical  generals,  named  Alexicles,  "a  man  of  influence 
among  the  clubs,"  and  detained  him  amid  the  cheers  of  the  rank 
and  file.  The  Four  Hundred  were  assembled  in  the  Council- 
Chamber,  Theramenes  being  with  them,  when  they  received 
intelligence  of  the  outbreak.  They  wished  to  suppress  it  at 
once  by  force,  but  Theramenes  checked  them,  and  offered 
to  go  and  release  Alexicles.  He  took  with  him  one  of  the 
generals  whom  he  knew  to  be  of  his  own  party,  and  went  to 
the  Peiraeus,  which  was  now  a  scene  of  the  wildest  excite- 
ment. For  Aristarchus,  a  general  of  the  oligarchical  party, 
had  come  up  with  a  number  of  the  younger  knights,  and 
while  some  thought  that  Alexicles  had  been  killed,  others 


in  so  doing  may  be  doubted.  For  (1)  there  is  not  a  word  about  the 
assassination  in  the  inscription,  nor  is  Apollodorus  mentioned  as  the 
accomplice  of  Thrasybulus  ;  (2)  Lysias  says  that  it  is  clear  from  the 
inscription  that  Agoratus  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter,  but  his 
name  is  mentioned  in  this  inscription ;  (3)  Thucydides  gives  no 
names,  but  "  one  of  the  Peripoli "  would  naturally  be  an  Athenian 
citizen,  and  his  accomplice  was  an  Argive.  That  Thrasybulus  and 
Apollodorus  were  rewarded  for  some  act  which  benefited  the 
Athenian  people  is  clear,  and  in  the  time  of  Lysias  they  were  thought 
to  be  the  murderers  of  Phrynichus,  but  his  account  of  the  facts  is 
inaccurate.  The  older  contemporary  author  states  that  the  accomplice 
was  put  to  the  torture :  Lysias  says  that  both  assassins  escaped  :  in 
the  next  generation  both  were  captured  !  Such  is  our  evidence  for 
an  act  committed  in  open  day  (according  to  our  best  authority)  in 
the  market-place  of  Athens.  See  Gilbert,  Beitragr,  320  tf.,  on  the 
whole  story ;  he  attempts  to  explain  how  Thucydides  made  his 
mistakes  !  But  surely  Thucydides  could  have  learned  the  facts  from 
the  inscription. 


416 


DESTRUCTION  OF  EETIONEA,  411. 


[XI.  22. 


feared  an  attack  on  the  Peiraeus  from  the  city.  The  older 
men  endeavoured  to  calm  the  citizens,  and  Thucydides,  a 
Thessalian  of  Pharsalus,  the  proxenus  of  the  Athenians  in 
that  city,  was  especially  active  in  pointing  out  the  danger  of 
domestic  strife  when  the  enemy  was  at  hand  to  take 
advantage  of  the  confusion.  Theramenes  then  came  forward, 
and  in  a  loud  and  angry  voice  upbraided  the  soldiers  for 
their  action.  This  was  known  to  be  a  feint,  and  produced 
no  effect.  The  soldiers  asked  him,  in  reply,  what  he 
thought  about  the  fort :  "  Should  it  be  destroyed  or  not  ?  "— 
and  as  he  now  saw  which  way  the  feeling  ran,  he  replied : 
"Yes,  if  they  thought  so."1  The  work  of  destruction  was 
at  once  begun,  but  Theramenes,  though  he  had  broken  with 
the  Four  Hundred,  was  not  prepared  for  the  restoration  of 
democracy.  He  proclaimed  the  Five  Thousand,  and  called 
on  every  one  who  wished  them  to  govern  to  help  in 
destroying  the  fort. 

The  fort  was  destroyed ;  Alexicles  was  released.  On  the  * 
next  day  the  Four  Hundred  met  in  the  Council-Chamber; 
the  army  in  the  Peiraeus  assembled  in  the  theatre  of 
Dionysus  near  Munychia,  and  resolved  without  delay  to 
march  to  the  city,  where  they  piled  arms  in  the  temple  of 
the  Dioscuri.  Deputies  came  to  them  from  the  Four 
Hundred,  who  now  offered  to  publish  the  names  of  the  Five 
Thousand,  and  to  choose  the  Four  Hundred  from  them  in 
any  way  which  the  Assembly  might  approve.  After  long 
discussions,  the  soldiers  became  calmer,  and  a  day  was  fixed 
for  an  Assembly  to  be  held  in  the  theatre  of  Dionysus,  at 
which  the  constitution  should  be  settled. 

The  day  came,  and  at  the  very  moment  when  the  people 
were  gathering  in  the  theatre,  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  was 
Fear  of  attack  seen  sailing  from  Megara  along  the  coast  of 
from  Sparta.  Salamis.  The  excitement  was  intense;  the 
warning  of  Theramenes  was  remembered ;  every  one  thought 


1  Thuc  viii.  92.  The  historian  puts  the  conduct  of  Theramenes 
in  a  very  suspicious  light. 


XI.  23.]  DEPOSITION  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED,  411.  417 


that  Athens  was  betrayed.  The  whole  city  rushed  down  to 
the  harbour  and  prepared  to  defend  it.1  The  squadron  passed 
round  Sunium  to  Oropus  on  its  way  to  Euboea,  but  though 
their  worst  fears  were  over,  the  Athenians  found  themselves 
compelled  in  their  distracted  state  to  despatch  a  fleet  for  the 
protection  of  that  island.  A  battle  was  fought  off  Eretria 
under  very  disadvantageous  conditions  and  with  an  in- 
adequate force.  For  a  time  the  Athenians  resisted,  but  in 
vain.  They  were  overpowered  and  driven  to  the  shore. 
Some  escaped  to  Ohalcis,  and  to  a  fortress  near  Eretria,  but 
those  who  sought  refuge  in  the  city  were  cut  down  ;  twenty- 
two  ships  and  their  crews  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians.  The  whole  of  Euboea,  except  Oreus  (Hestiaea),  now 
revolted — a  very  severe  blow  to  Athens,  which  since  the 
occupation  of  Decelea  had  largely  depended  on  the  island 
for  supplies.2 

23.  Athens  was  well-nigh  lost.     Ships  there  were  none, 
nor  sailors ;  the  main  source  of  supplies  was  cut  off;  the 
fleet  at  Samos  was  alienated ;  the  city  was  torn  with  sedi- 
tion.   The  enemy  were  at  hand  with  a  victorious  fleet :  they 
had  but  to  lie  off  the  Peiraeus,  and  sedition  would  develop 
into  civil  war ,  or  to  blockade  the  city,  and  so  compel  the  fleet 
to  abandon  Ionia.  Either  of  these  plans  they  could  easily  have 
carried  out,  but  as  Thucydides  remarks,  "  on  this  as  on  so  many 
other  occasions,  the  Lacedaemonians  proved  themselves  to 
be  the  most  convenient  enemies  whom  the  Athenians  could 
possibly  have  had."3     The  danger  passed  away,  but  the 
panic  completed  the  ruin  of  the  Four  Hundred. 
An  Assembly  was  held  in  the  Pnyx,  the  "first  ?Xl?our 
of  many,"  at  which  the  Four  Hundred  were  Hundred: 
formally  deposed,  and  the  government  placed  theconsthu^ 
in  the  hands  of  the  Five  Thousand,  in  which  tion  which 
number  were  to  be  included  all  the  citizens  followed- 
who  could  provide  themselves  with  body-armour.    No  one 

1  Thuc.  viii.  94. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  95,  who  gives  more  details  of  the  battle. 

3  Thuc.  viii.  96. 

VOL.  III.  2  D 


418 


FATE  OF  THE  LEADERS,  411. 


[XI.  23. 


was  to  be  paid  for  the  discharge  of  official  duties.  The  details 
of  the  constitution  were  fixed  in  a  series  of  meetings,  and  Nomo- 
thetae  were  appointed  to  revise  the  laws  (see  infra,  p.  420). 
The  government  thus  appointed  was  the  best  which  ever  existed 
at  Athens  in  the  memory  of  Thucydides— at  least  in  its  early 
days — a  mixture  of  oligarchy  and  democracy,  under  which 
the  city  was  again  able  to  raise  her  head.  The  Athenians  at 
Samos  and  those  at  Athens  now  felt  themselves  in  accord, 
and  though  some  years  still  elapsed  before  they  became  one 
city,  there  was  no  longer  any  fear  of  a  serious  collision.1 

Of  the  leaders  of  the  Four  Hundred,  Pisander,  Alexicles, 
and  others  retired  to  Decelea ;  Aristarchus,  who  was  one 
The  leaders  °^  generals>  collected  a  few  archers,  "  of  the 
of  the  Four  most  barbarous  sort,"  and  led  them  to  Oenoe, 
Hundred.  the  Athenian  fortress  on  the  borders  of  Boeotia 
(supra,  p.  117),  which  was  now  being  besieged  by  the  Corin- 
thians. Availing  himself  of  his  position,  he  treacherously  in- 
duced the  garrison  to  capitulate,  and  Oenoe  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Boeotians.  Antiphon  and  Archeptolemus  were  arrested 
and  put  to  death,  and  their  property  was  confiscated.  The 
same  sentence  was  recorded  against  the  leaders  who  escaped.2 
Of  the  speech  made  by  Antiphon  in  his  defence,  Thucydides 
observes  that  it  was  undoubtedly  the  best  ever  made  by  any 
man  tried  on  a  capital  charge  down  to  his  day.  He  goes  on 
to  describe  Antiphon  as  inferior  in  aperf  to  none  of  his  con- 
temporaries— a  judgment  which  has  been  a  stone  of  stumbling. 

1  Thuc.  viii.  97;  Ath.  Pol.  33;  Beloch,  Griech.  Geschich.  ii.  71, 
speaks  of  this  as  the  constitution  of  Theramenes,  and  undoubtedly 
Theramenes  and  Aristocrates  were  the  leaders  of  the  moderate  party. 
When  Beloch  goes  further  and  asserts  that  the  constitutions  described 
in  Ath.  Pol.  30,  31  refer  to  the  constitution  of  Theramenes,  and  not 
to  the  oligarchy  of  the  Four  Hundred,  it  is  difficult  to  follow  him. 
There  was  doubtless  great  confusion  between  the  two  constitutions, 
and  between  the  proposals  of  the  Four  Hundred  which  were  and 
those  which  were  not  carried  out.  See  Thuc.  viii.  96,  and  infra. 
Appendix  ii. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  68  ;  Lysias,  7,  §  4.  The  accuser  of  Antiphon  was 
Andron,  himself  one  of  the  Four  Hundred.  Harpocration,  sub  voc. 
*Av8pa>v. 


XI.  23-]       AN  TIP  HON  AND  THERA  MENES,  411. 


419 


But  dpeWj  does  not  always  mean  moral  virtue.  The  historian 
would  not  for  a  moment  have  compared  Antiphon  and  Nicias. 
Antiphon  was  as  able  and  effective  a  man  as  lived  in  Athens 
in  his  day,  and  succeeded  where  success  seemed  almost 
impossible.  That  his  aims  were  treacherous,  and  that  the 
means  he  employed  to  compass  them  were  such  as  are  in  use 
among  traitors  and  conspirators,  Thucydides  has  made  per- 
fectly clear.  By  a  judgment  somewhat  similar  Theramenes 
is  said  by  the  historian  to  be  a  "good  speaker  and  a  sagacious 
man."  This  he  undoubtedly  was,  as  we  shall  see,  but  whether 
he  was  honest  in  his  sagacity  is  one  of  the  puzzles  of  Greek 
history.1 

1  Thuc.  viii.  68  ;  Beloch,  I.e.  ii.  72,  takes  a  favourable  view,  after 
Aih.  Pol.  c.  28.    For  Antiphon,  see  also  Plutarch,  Vitae  Dec.  Orat. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


FROM  THE  FALL  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED  TO  THE 
FALL  OF  THE  THIRTY. 

I.  The  constitutional  history  of  Athens,  from  the  fall  of 
the  Four  Hundred  to  the  end  of  the  war,  is  very  obscure. 
The  Nomo-  Who  were  the  Nomothetae  mentioned  by 
thetae.  Thucydides,  (supra,  p.  418)  and  what  were 

the  changes  to  which  he  alludes,  when  he  observes  that  the 
government  established  on  the  deposition  of  the  Four 
Hundred  was  "  in  its  early  days "  the  best  that  he  had 
known  1  How  long  did  these  early  days  last  ?  When  and 
how  was  the  democracy  restored  1  To  these  questions,  which 
it  is  easy  to  ask,  no  clear  answer  can  be  given. 

In  the  Athenian  constitution,  the  decrees  of  the  Assembly 
were,  strictly  speaking,  administrative  acts  only,  not  laws, 
and  how  laws  were  passed  in  the  fifth  century  at  Athens  is 
unknown.  It  is  usually  assumed  that  the  process  of  legisla- 
tion which  existed  in  the  fourth  century,  and  is  described 
by  Demosthenes,  was  in  use  in  the  preceding  century. 
Under  this  arrangement  the  Nomothetae  were  little  more 
than  a  special  jury,  selected  from  the  ordinary  Heliaea, 
before  whom  laws  were  put  on  their  trial — the  new  against 
the  old,  where  two  came  into  conflict,  or  the  new  on  its  own 
merits.  It  is  not  likely  that  such  Nomothetae  are  meant  in 
the  present  case.  More  probably  a  commission  is  meant,  who 
were  to  examine  the  statutes  of  Athens,  and  endeavour  to 
bring  them  into  better  order.  We  find  traces  of  such  a 
commission  in  the  appointment  of  Nicomachus  to  issue  a 
corrected  code  of  the  laws  of  Solon,1  and  the  publication  of 


i  Lysias,  OraU  30,  with  Frphberger's  Introduction.    The  task  was 
420 


XII.  2.]      THE  REFORMED  CONSTITUTION,  411.  421 


the  Draconian  laws  in  409.  But  the  work  was  not  carried  out 
with  any  completeness — an  indication  that  the  government 
of  the  Five  Thousand  did  not  long  continue  in  power.1 

2.  Immediately  after  assuming  office,  the  new  government 
passed  a  decree  for  the  recall  of  Alcibiades  and  other  exiles, 
and  sent  envoys  to  Samos  to  explain  the  posi-  Athens  divided . 
tion  of  affairs,2  and  urge  the  army  to  vigorous  the  city  and 
.   action.   Alcibiades  did  not  return  :  Athens  and  Samos- 

Samos  remained  for  the  present  divided  :  the  government  at 
Samos  was  not  the  government  at  Athens,  and  the  generals 
of  the  fleet  were  not  the  generals  in  command  in  the  city. 
This  division  could  not  fail  to  be  a  source  of  weakness  to 
the  government.  The  demos  quickly  recovered  its  position 
and  took  the  power  from  them.3  The  real  demos  was  not 
at  Athens,  but  at  Samos,  where  about  eighteen  thousand 
men  were  now  serving  in  the  fleet.  Even  if  half  of  these 
were  aliens,  the  remaining  nine  thousand  were  a  larger 
portion  of  the  city  than  the  Five  Thousand,  and  after  their 
victory  at  Cyzicus  {infra,  p.  427),  the  Athenian  sailors  would 
not  be  in  a  mood  to  allow  themselves  to  be  excluded  from 
the  franchise.4  In  a  very  few  months,  Theramenes  and  his 
friends  found  themselves  compelled  to  relax  something  from 
the  severe  standard  of  their  earliest  regulations.  In  an 
inscription  of  410,5  payments  are  made  for  the  "  diobelia  "  out 
of  the  state  funds.  Whatever  the  "  diobelia  "  may  have  been, 

to  be  finished  in  four  months,  but  Nicomachus  remained  in  office  six 
years,  furnishing  laws  on  demand  to  those  who  paid  for  them — so  at 
least  his  enemies  said — or  cancelling  those  in  existence. 

1  For  this  view  of  the  Nomothetae,  see  Frohberger,  I.e.,  Gilbert, 
Beitrage,  p.  326  ff.,  who  draws  a  parallel  between  this  legislation  and 
the  decree  of  Tisamenus  in  403. 

2  In  Plut.  Alcib.  32,  Critias  proposes  this  decree  ;  in  Diodorus, 
xiii.  38,  Theramenes. 

3  Ath.  Pol.  c.  34.  If  the  decree  of  Demophantus  (Andoc.  De  Myst. 
§  96)  really  belongs  to  Hecatombaeon  410,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
democracy  was  restored  by  that  time. 

4  For  the  absence  of  men  from  Athens  in  411,  cp.  Aristoph.  Lysistr. 
524.  Those  vvho  were  in  the  city  were  constantly  in  armour,  cp. 
ibid.  555  ff.,  and  Thuc.  viii.  69. 

5  Dittenberger,  SyU.  44 ;  C.  I.  A.  i.  188. 


422  DEMOCRACY  RESTORED,  4H-410.  [XII.  3. 


whether  payment  to  the  poorer  people  to  enjoy  the  festivals, 
or  payment  to  the  jurors,  such  payment  was  not  contem- 
plated in  the  first  ardour  of  financial  reform.  And  in  the 
Constitution  of  Athens  we  are  told  that  this  payment  was 
proposed  by  Cleophon,  who  was  the  leader  of  the  extreme 
ch  th  democratic  party.  Cleophon  may  have  been  a 
government  member  of  the  Five  Thousand,  but  he  is  not 
towards  likely  to  have  occupied  a  leading  position 

democracy.  .1  i         \  c    1      a  i 

among  them  unless  the  temper  01  the  Athen- 
ians had  undergone  a  considerable  change.  But  the  brilliant 
success  of  Cyzicus,  and  the  financial  relief  which  followed  it, 
may  have  made  it  impossible  to  repress  an  outburst  of 
democratic  fervour,  or  to  adhere  to  the  strict  rule  of  expendi- 
ture laid  down  in  411. 1 

3.  While  Athens  had  been  well-nigh  reduced  to  despair 
by  the  revolt  of  Euboea,  the  war  in  the  East  had  taken  a 
inactivity  of  more  favourable  turn.  For  some  time  the 
the  Peiopon-  Peloponnesian  sailors  had  been  much  dis- 
nesians.  satisfied  with  the  conduct  of  their  admiral 

Astyochus,  and  Tissaphernes.  No  advantage  had  been  taken 
of  the  anarchy  prevailing  among  the  Athenians,  though 
Astyochus  had  a  far  superior  fleet.  Tissaphernes  neither 
brought  up  the  promised  Phoenician  ships,  nor  provided 
regular  pay.  Astyochus  attempted  to  satisfy  his  men  by 
offering  battle;  but  the  Athenians  refused.  They  had 
summoned  Strombichides  from  the  Hellespont,  whither  he 
had  been  sent  with  twenty-four  ships,  and  till  he  arrived 
they  felt  their  numbers  to  be  insufficient.  The  Pelopon- 
nesians,  on  the  next  day,  were  about  to  attack  Samos,  but, 


1  Ath.  Pol.  c.  28.  That  the  sum  of  two  obols  constituted  some 
well-known  payment  at  Athens  at  the  time  when  the  Frogs  was  acted 
(405)  is  clear  from  1.  141  of  that  play  :  cos  fieya  bvvaaBov  navraxov  ro> 
dv  dj3o\a>.  The  scholiast,  ad  loc,  explains  it  by  the  juror's  fee,  and 
it  is  possible  that  the  juror's  fee,  which  was  abolished  under  the  Four 
Hundred,  was  reintroduced  at  i  lower  rate — two  obols  instead  of 
three.  But  Aeschines,  Fals.  Leg.  §  76,  asserts  that  Cleophon  cor- 
rupted the  Athenians  by  the  distribution  of  money,  which  is  the  view 
taken  in  the  Ath.  Pol.  of  the  "  diobelia." 


XII.  3.] 


ASTYOCHUS,  411. 


423 


on  learning  that  Strombichides  had  returned,  they  retired  to 
Miletus,  and  when  the  Athenians  offered  battle,  they  too 
refused  in  turn. 

The  large  fleet  (a  hundred  and  twelve  ships)  could  not  be 
maintained  without  Persian  help,  and,  as  Tissaphernes  was 
remiss  in  payment,  Astyochus  accepted  the  offer  of  Pharna- 
bazus,  and  despatched  forty  ships  to  the  Hellespont.  A 
storm  drove  them  back,  and  ten  only  reached  the  strait. 
These  brought  over  Byzantium,  where  Glearchus,  their  com- 
mander, joined  them.1 

The  ill-feeling  against  Astyochus  and  Tissaphernes  con- 
tinued to  increase,  and  when  it  was  known  that  Alcibiades 
had  returned  to  Samos,  the  sailors  were  more  Mutiny  at 
exasperated  than  ever.  More  especially  the  Miletus. 
Syracusan  and  Thurian  sailors,  who  were  free  men,  were 
outspoken  in  their  demands  for  pay,  and  when  Astyochus 
answered  them  roughly  and  even  threatened  Dorieus  of 
Thurii  with  his  staff,  they  broke  into  open  violence. 
Astyochus  only  saved  his  life  by  taking  refuge  at  an  altar. 
The  Milesians,  not  less  indignant,  drove  out  the  garrison 
from  a  fort  which  Tissaphernes  had  built  in  their  city,  in 
spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  Lichas,  the  Spartan  general, 
who  counselled  submission.2 

About  midsummer,  Astyochus  was  succeeded  in  his  office 
by  Mindarus.    He  returned  to  Sparta,  and  with  him  an 
envoy  from  Tissaphernes,  to  complain  of  the  Mindarus 
conduct  of  the  Milesians,  and  defend  himself  succeeds 
against   attacks.     The   Milesians   also   sent  Asty°chus. 
envoys,  together  with  Hermocrates  the  Syracusan,  who  had 
been  especially  vehement  in  condemning  the  inactivity  and 
treachery  of  the  Spartan  management  of  the  fleet.  Mean- 
while Tissaphernes  went  to  Aspendus,  under  pretence  of 
bringing  up  the  Phoenician  fleet,  which  was  there,  in  number 
147  ships,  and  appointed  Tamos  his  agent  in  his  absence.  At 
Aspendus  he  was  joined  by  Alcibiades.3 


1  Time,  viii.  78-80. 
3  Thuc.  viii.  87,  88. 


*  Thuc.  viii.  83,  84. 


424  MIND AR US  IN  THE  HELLESPONT,  411.     [XII.  4. 


Upon  this  Mindarus  delayed  no  longer.  Convinced  of 
the  dishonesty  of  Tissaphernes,  he  left  Miletus  for  the  Helles- 
He  moves  to  pont,  but  a  storm  compelled  him  to  take 
the  Hellespont.  refUge  at  Icarus,  whence  he  sailed  to  Chios. 
Thrasyllus  started  in  pursuit  with  the  Athenian  fleet,  and 
observing  that  the  enemy  was  at  Chios,  he  made  Lesbos  his 
headquarters,  intending  to  attack  him  there.  He  also  wished 
to  recover  Eresus,  which  had  revolted.  Thrasybulus  had 
already  reached  the  place,  having  sailed  direct  from  Samos. 
While  they  were  thus  engaged,  Mindarus  was  able  to  slip 
away  from  Chios  to  Rhoeteum  in  safety.  The  small  Athenian 
squadron,  which  had  previously  been  sent  into  the  straits  to 
watch  Clearchus  (supra,  p.  423),  escaped  with  some  loss  to 
Lesbos,  and  joined  the  fleet,  which  they  found  quietly  be- 
sieging Eresus,  never  supposing  that  the  Peloponnesians 
would  escape  them.  The  Athenians  at  once  followed  the 
enemy  to  the  Hellespont,  and  prepared  for  action.1 

4.  The  battle  took  place  off  Cynossema,  a  promontory  in 
the  Chersonese,  near  Madytus.  The  Athenian  ships,  seventy- 
Battle  of  six  in  number,  lay  along  the  Chersonese,  from 
Cynossema.  Idacus  to  Arrhiani.  The  Peloponnesian,  which 
numbered  eighty-eight,  extended  from  Abydus  to  Dardanus 
on  the  opposite  shore.  Mindarus,  on  the  left  wing,  was  opposed 
to  Thrasybulus ;  the  Syracusans,  on  the  right,  to  Thrasyllus. 
As  the  Peloponnesian  left  extended  beyond  the  Athenian, 
Mindarus  wished  to  shut  them  into  the  strait,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  force  their  centre  back  upon  the  land.  Thrasybulus 
was,  however,  able  to  over-lap  Mindarus,  and  secure  the  passage 
into  the  open  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  Athenian  left  passed 
beyond  Cynossema,  and  the  centre  being  thus  weakened  by 
the  extension  of  the  wings,  the  Peloponnesians  were  able  to 
drive  it  on  shore.  Neither  right  nor  left  wing  could  render 
assistance,  and,  indeed,  the  projecting  promontory  prevented 
Thrasyllus  from  seeing  what  was  taking  place.  But  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians, in  their  eager  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy, 


1  Thuc.  viii.  99-101. 


XII.  4  ]  DEFEATED  AT  CYNOSSEMA,  411. 


425 


allowed  their  line  to  fall  into  disorder.  Thrasybulus  at  once 
left  off  extending  his  wing,  turned  upon  the  ships  opposed  to 
him,  and  put  them  to  flight.  He  then  attacked  the  victori- 
ous centre,  which,  owing  to  the  confusion,  fell  into  a  panic, 
and  hardly  offered  any  resistance.  Thrasyllus  meanwhile 
had  defeated  the  Syracusans  ;  the  Athenians  were  victorious 
along  the  whole  line.1  In  material  advantage  the  Athenians 
did  not  gain  much  by  the  victory,  for  though  they  destroyed 
twenty-one  of  the  allied  ships,  they  lost  fifteen  of  their  own. 
But  the  moral  effect  was  great ;  they  had  once  more  proved 
their  superiority  at  sea.  They  ceased  to  depreciate  them- 
selves or  to  think  much  of  their  enemies'  seamanship.  In 
the  city  the  news  of  the  victory  was  received  with  delight  ; 
the  Athenians  could  hardly  believe  their  good  fortune. 
Their  spirits  rose ;  once  more  they  began  to  have  hopes  of 
victory,  and  their  immediate  anxiety  was  greatly  lessened 
on  finding  that  the  Peloponnesian  ships  were  summoned  by 
Mindarus  from  Euboea  to  the  Hellespont.  After  repairing 
their  ships,  the  fleet  captured  eight  more  of  the  enemy's  fleet, 
and  recovered  Cyzicus.2 

Alcibiades  now  returned  from  Aspendus,  declaring  that  he 
had  made  Tissaphernes  a  firmer  friend  of  the  Athenians  than 
ever.    Tissaphernes,  however,  finding  that  the 

-r,  -,  .  ,  .     0    ,         .  Tissaphernes. 

reloponnesians  were  resenting  his  conduct  m 
every  way,  thought  it  prudent  to  follow  them  to  the  Helles- 
pont and  explain  ;  it  was  not  to  his  advantage  that  Pharna- 
bazus  should  succeed  where  he  had  failed.    His  first  step 
was  to  visit  Ephesus  and  offer  sacrifice  to  Artemis.3 

The  fleet  from  Euboea  did  not  reach  Mindarus  without 
very  serious  loss,  owing  to  a  storm.4    It  was  followed  by  a 

1  Time.  viii.  104,  105.    See  the  plan  in  Goodhart's  Time.  viii.  p.  164. 

2  Thuc.  viii.  107. 

3  The  history  of  Thucydides  breaks  off  with  the  arrival  of  Tissa- 
phernes at  Ephesus. 

4  Diod.  xiii.  41  states  that  Epicles  and  Hippocrates,  whom  Min- 
darus sent  to  bring  away  Hegesandridas  and  his  fleet,  sailed  back 
with  fifty  ships,  which  were  entirely  lost,  except  twelve  men,  of 
whom  Hippocrates  must  have  been  one,  for  we  hear  of  him  again. 


426  ALCIBIADES  IN  THE  HELLESPONT.        [XII.  5. 


small  detachment  of  Athenian  vessels,  which  were  no  longer 
required  at  home,  and  a  slight  engagement  took  place.  Soon 
afterwards  Dorieus  brought  up  his  ships  from  Rhodes.  The 
Action  in  the  Athenians  attacked  him  as  he  entered  the 
Hellespont.  Hellespont,  and  a  general  engagement  followed. 
The  event  was  still  undecided  when  Alcibiades  arrived  with 
eighteen  ships  from  Samos,  upon  which  the  Peloponnesians 
broke  and  fled  to  Abydus.  When  they  reached  the  shore, 
they  were  vigorously  supported  by  Pharnabazus,  who  rode 
his  horse  into  the  sea,  calling  on  his  soldiers,  horse  and  foot, 
to  follow  him  and  beat  off  the  enemy.  The  Athenians  sailed 
back  to  Sestos,  taking  with  them  thirty  of  the  enemy's  ships, 
and  those  which  they  had  lost  in  the  previous  engagement. 
The  greater  part  of  the  fleet  then  dispersed  to  collect  money. 
Thrasyllus  was  sent  to  Athens  to  report  and  ask  for  reinforce- 
ments.1 

5.  Tissaphernes,  on  arriving  in  the  Hellespont,  was  at 
once  visited  by  Alcibiades,  who  brought  presents  and  tokens 
of  friendship.    The  Persian  replied  by  arrest- 
Aiubiadeb,  declaring  that  he  had  orders  from  the 

King  to  make  war  on  the  Athenians.  Alcibiades  was  taken 
to  Sardis,  and  there  remained  for  thirty  days,  when  he 
escaped  to  Clazomenae.  He  subsequently  rejoined  the 
Athenians  at  Cardia,  whither  they  had  retired  to  avoid  an 
attack  from  Mindarus,  and  on  hearing  that  the  Pelopon- 
nesians had  gone  to  Cyzicus,  he  resolved  to  attack  them  there. 
Crossing  over  to  Sestos,  where  the  fleet  was  instructed  to 
meet  him,  he  was  on  the  point  of  setting  out,  when  he  was 
joined  by  two  detachments  of  ships,  one  under  Theramenes 
from  Macedonia,  the  other  under  Thrasybuius  from  Thasos.2 

1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  1  ;  Diod.  xiii.  45,  46 ;  Plut.  Alcib.  27. 

2  After  helping  to  arrange  the  new  constitution  at  Athens,  Thera- 
menes had  been  sent  to  the  Euripus,  where  he  vainly  endeavoured 
to  prevent  the  completion  of  a  mole,  joining  Euboea  and  Boeotia. 
He  then  visited  the  islands,  levying  contributions,  and  restoring 
democracy  at  Paros ;  subsequently  he  aided  Archelaus  of  Macedonia 
in  besieging  Pydna,  whence  he  sailed  to  the  Hellespont  (Diod.  xiii. 
47,  49).    The  Four  Hundred  were  deposed  in  August  or  September 


XII.  5-1  BATTLE  OF  CYZICUS,  410.  427 

Alcibiades  was  anxious  to  come  upon  the  enemy  before  this 
addition  to  his  force  was  known.  When,  on  the  next  day,  he 
arrived  at  Proconnesus,  he  found  that  Mindarus,  supported  by 
Pharnabazus,  had  captured  Cyzicus.  He  remained  in  the 
island  for  the  rest  of  the  day,  keeping  under  strict  control  all 
the  craft,  down  to  the  smallest  boat,  and  forbidding  any  one 
to  cross  to  the  mainland  under  pain  of  death.  Next  morning 
he  assembled  his  men  and  addressed  them,  pointing  out 
that  they  had  no  supplies,  while  the  enemy  was  supported 
in  abundance  by  the  Persians  ;  whatever  the  conditions,  they 
must  fight — on  sea,  on  land,  and  if  necessary  against  walls 
and  fortifications.  In  the  midst  of  a  storm  of  The  battle 
rain  and  a  heavy  fog  he  set  sail  for  Cyzicus,  of  Cyzicus. 
but  as  he  approached  the  town  the  sky  cleared,  and  he  saw 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet  exercising  at  a  distance  from  the 
harbour,  to  which  his  ships  prevented  their  return.  The 
Peloponnesians,  when  they  saw  themselves  cut  off  from  the 
town  by  a  superior  force,  hastened  to  land,  and  forming 
their  ships  into  a  compact  line,  defended  themselves  against 
the  Athenian  attack.  Alcibiades  now  withdrew  twenty 
ships  from  his  line,  and  passing  behind  it,  put  the  crews  on 
shore  in  order  to  take  the  Peloponnesians  in  the  rear.  He 
was  met  by  Mindarus,  who  also  disembarked  a  number  of 
his  men,  but  Mindarus  was  slain,  and  his  soldiers  put  to 
flight.  The  whole  fleet  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Athenians, 
except  the  ships  of  the  Syracusans,  which  were  set  on  fire. 
Alcibiades  returned  with  his  prizes  to  Proconnesus.1 

From  Proconnesus  he  again  advanced  to  Cyzicus,  intend- 
ing to  attack  the  town,  but  the  inhabitants,  finding  themselves 
abandoned  by  Pharnabazus  and  the  Peloponnesians,  admitted 
him  without  resistance.  Once  more  master  of  the  sea,  he 
used  his  power  to  recruit  the  finances  of  Athens.  From 


411,  and  the  battle  of  Cyzicus  was  fought  in  March  410 — so  that 
little  time  can  have  been  devoted  by  Theramenes  to  the  new 
constitution. 

1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  1.  13  ff.  Diodorus,  xiii.  49-51,  gives  a  different 
account,  and  Plutarch  also  in  some  points,  Alcib.  28. 


428  PHARNABAZUS  AND  THE  PELOPONNESIANS.  [XII.  6. 

Cyzicus,  where  he  remained  twenty  days,  he  exacted  lar^e 
sums ;  then  he  sailed  to  the  Bosphorus,  collecting  money  on 
A1  ...  .  the  way  from  Perinthus  and  Selymbria.  At 

Alcibiades  J  \  J 

collects  Chrysopolis,  opposite  Byzantium,  he  built  a 

supplies.  fortress  and  custom  house,  after  which  he 

returned  to  the  Hellespont,  leaving  Theramenes  with  thirty 
ships  to  collect  the  dues  and  keep  the  strait  open.1 

6.  The  Peloponnesians  were  for  a  time  paralysed  by  their 
defeat.  Hippocrates,  the  second  in  command,  sent  home  a 
message  of  despair,  which  never  reached  Sparta,  but  was 
intercepted  and  carried  to  Athens :  "  Our  ships  are  gone : 
Mindarus  is  dead :  the  crews  are  starving :  we  know  not 
what  to  do."  From  this  helpless  plight  they  were  roused  by 
the  energy  and  faithfulness  of  Pharnabazus.  To  every 
soldier  he  gave  a  cloak  and  money  sufficient  for  two  months. 
The  sailors  he  equipped  in  heavy  arms,  and  bidding  them 
take  no  heed  of  the  loss  of  timber  while  their  lives  were 
safe,  he  dispersed  them  to  guard  the  coast  of  his  satrapy. 
He  then  assembled  the  generals  of  the  various  contingents  in 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  and  bade  them  build  triremes  at 
Antandrus  as  many  as  they  had  lost.2  Wood  they  could 
get  from  Ida,  and  money  he  would  supply.  But  though  the 
Syracusans  seem  to  have  replaced  their  twenty  ships  in  a 
short  time,  it  was  many  months  before  the  Peloponnesians 
were  again  in  possession  of  an  adequate  fleet.  '6 

The  success  of  the  Peloponnesians  since  the  renewal  of  the 
war  had  not  been  such  as  to  make  a  warlike  policy  popular 
at  Sparta.  It  was  true  that  Agis  was  master  of  Attica,  and 
that  the  Asiatic  cities  of  the  Athenian  empire  were  in  revolt ; 
but  Athens  could  still  keep  a  fleet  on  the  sea,  and  she  had 
triumphed   over    domestic   faction,   her  greatest  danger. 

1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  1.  20  f.  ;  Diod.  xiii.  52,  64. 

2  The  Antandrians  had  obtained  a  garrison  from  the  Peloponnesians 
on  their  arrival  in  the  Hellespont  to  protect  them  against  the  oppres- 
sion of  Tissaphernes  and  the  treachery  of  his  lieutenant  Arsaces  ; 
Time.  viii.  108.  For  the  previous  fortunes  of  the  town  see  supra, 
p.  234. 

3  Xen.  Hell.  i.  1.  23-26. 


XII.  7-]       THE  SPARTANS  PROPOSE  PEACE,  410.  429 


Tissaphernes  had  proved  a  faithless  friend ;  Alcibiades  was 
again  an  Athenian  general ;  Astyochus  had  shown  himself 
incompetent  and  dishonest.  The  reports  brought  home 
from  the  fleet,  the  conflicting  statements  of  Tissaphernes, 
Astyochus,  Hermocrates,  and  the  envoys  from  the  sailors, 
had  opened  the  eyes  of  the  Spartans :  they  now  understood 
why  their  fleet  had  remained  inactive  for  months  at  Ehodes ; 
and  why  Astyochus  had  taken  no  advantage  of  the  distracted 
state  of  the  Athenians  at  Samos.  Since  the  fleet  had  gone  to 
the  Hellespont,  in  spite  of  the  active  aid  of  Pharnabazus,  one 
disaster  had  followed  on  another,  and  now  came  the  tidings 
of  its  utter  destruction.  If  peace  could  be  had  on  tolerable 
terms,  peace  was  desirable.  So  Endius  (supra,  p.  37 0)  appeared 
at  Athens,  proposing  a  uti  possidetis  so  far  as  the  ^  gpartans 
cities  ranged  on  either  side  were  concerned ;  a  propose  peace ; 
withdrawal  of  troops  from  the  garrisons,  and  ^thens  reJects 
an  exchange  of  prisoners,  man  for  man.  The 
Spartans,  no  doubt,  greatly  exaggerated  the  distress  to  which 
they  had  reduced  Athens  by  the  desolation  of  Attica,  the 
liberation  of  Euboea,  and  the  cutting  off  of  supplies  from  the 
cities  of  the  empire ;  and  Endius  is  said  to  have  pointed  out 
that  peace  was  needed  quite  as  much  in  the  interests  of 
Athens  as  of  Sparta.  They  were  quickly  undeceived.  So 
far  from  being  cast  down  by  misfortune,  the  Athenians  were 
elated  by  their  victory ;  their  constitution  was  being  restored 
to  them ;  their  revenues  were  much  improved,  and  they  had 
hopes  of  recovering  their  empire.  On  Cleophon's  motion 
the  proposals  for  peace  were  rejected.1 

7.  The  misfortunes  of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  were  increased 


1  Xenophon  does  not  mention  this  proposal ;  Diodorus,  xiii.  52,  53. 
The  terms  are :  ras  pev  TtoKeis  e^eii/,  as  eKarepot  Kpa.Tovp.ev,  to.  8e 
dppoxipia  to.  7rap'  oXXtjXoi?  KaraXvaai,  tchv  de  di^aXcorGw  \vrpovvres  avd' 
euos  'Atiqvaiov  Xafieiv  eva  AaKwra.  In  the  archonship  of  Theopompus 
(411-410),  Philochorus,  frag.  117.  Diod.  gives  us  the  speech  of  Endius, 
and  his  account  is  supported  by  Nepos  and  Justin.  For  Cleophon, 
who  from  now  till  his  death  in  404  was  among  the  leaders  of  the 
democracy  see  supra,  p.  422,  and  infra,  p.  450.  fie  was  a  lyre-maker 
by  trade. 


430  HERMOCRATES  BANISHED,  /:10.  [XII.  7. 

by  the  loss  of  Hermocrates  and  his  colleagues.  Though  not 
less  unsuccessful  than  the  rest  in  the  recent  conflicts,  they 
had  displayed  more  capacity  and  resolution;  but  they  had 
lost  their  ships,  and  to  this  they  probably  owed  the  loss  of 
their  position.  During  the  absence  of  Hermocrates  from 
Syracuse  the  extreme  democrats,  with  Diocles  at  their 
head,  had  risen  to  power,  and  as  Hermocrates  was  not  in 
Banishment  of  favour  with  the  party  or  their  leader,  they  did 
Hermocrates.  n0^  jet  £ne  opportunity  slip.  He  was  banished 
with  his  colleagues,  and  new  generals  were  sent  out  to 
take  his  place.1  Hermocrates  communicated  the  decision  of 
his  government  to  his  soldiers,  and  at  their  request  he 
remained  in  office  till  his  successors  arrived.  In  the  interval 
the  new  vessels  were  finished,  and  they  were  sent  to  join 
the  new  generals  at  Miletus.  Hermocrates  himself  repaired 
to  Pharnabazus,  with  whom  he  visited  the  court  of  Susa. 
We  shall  hear  of  him  again  in  Sicily,  but  he  takes  no  further 
part  in  the  Peloponnesian  war.2 

Meanwhile  Thrasyllus  was  raising  a  force  at  Athens.  He 
nad  returned  to  the  city  shortly  before  the  battle  of  Cyzicus. 
The  success  of  the  fleet  was  greatly  in  his  favour,  and  he 
was  able  to  convince  the  Athenians  of  his  personal  capacity 
by  obtaining  a  slight  advantage  over  Agis,  who,  venturing 
Thrasyllus  too  near  the  walls  of  the  city,  was  repulsed 
at  Athens.  with  ioss  jje  t00k  out  a  fleet  of  fifty  ships, 
with  a  thousand  heavy-armed  and  a  hundred  horse.  Soldiers 
were  needed  now  no  less  than  sailors,  for  the  victories  of 
the  fleet  had  enabled  the  Athenians  to  attack  the  revolted 
cities  on  land.  That  the  Athenians  should  have  been  able 
to  furnish  such  a  force  is  truly  wonderful;  the  fleet  was 
still  in  the  Hellespont,  it  was  still  necessary  to  keep  watch 
on  the  walls  of  Athens  day  and  night,  and  no  supplies  could 
be  drawn  from  Attica  and  Euboea.    With  reason  might  Agis 


1  Infra,  p.  481. 

2  Xen.  Hell.  i.  1.  27-30.  For  the  journey  to  Susa,  cp.  Thuc.  viii. 
85,  infra,  p.  434.  In  a  short  time  the  Syracusans  found  it  necessary 
to  withdraw  their  ships  from  the  Aegean  for  use  at  home. 


XII.  8.] 


THRASYLUS  IN  IONIA,  410. 


431 


exclaim,  as  he  saw  the  corn  ships  sailing  past  from  Pontus 
to  the  Peiraeus,  that  it  was  of  little  use  for  him  to  remain 
at  Decelea,  if  Athens  could  be  fed  from  the  north.  At  his  re- 
quest Clearchus,  who  must  have  been  recalled  (supra,  p.  424), 
was  sent  back  with  a  few  ships,  collected  from  Megara  and 
other  allies,  to  the  Hellespont.  He  succeeded  in  escaping 
from  the  Athenians  with  some  loss,  and  once  more  established 
himself  at  Byzantium.1 

8.  In  the  summer  of  410  Thrasyllus  set  sail  from  Athens. 
He  had  come  to  the  city  to  collect  forces  for  the  support  of 
Alcibiades  in  the  Hellespont,  but  the  subsequent  victory  of 
Cyzicus  made  this  unnecessary,  and  he  directed  his  course 
to  Ionia.     After  defeating  the  Milesians  at  Pygela,  and 
obtaining  possession  of  Colophon,  he  made  an  incursion  into 
Lydia,  where  the  corn  was  now  ripe,  and  collected  a  large 
amount  of  spoil,  burning  the  villages  and  devastating  the 
country.  He  then  attempted  an  attack  on  Ephesus.  Dividing 
his  forces  into  two  detachments,  he  landed  his  He  is  defeated 
heavy-armed  at  the  foot  of  Mount  Coressus,  atEPhesus. 
to  the  south  of  the  city,  the  light  troops  and  cavalry  on  the 
marsh  to  the  north.     In  both  divisions  he  was  severely 
defeated;   the  Ephesians  being  greatly  assisted  in  their 
defence  by  the  Syracusans,  whose  twenty  ships  had  by  this 
time  been  completed  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
the  new  generals,  together  with  five  additional  vessels,  and 
by  troops  brought  up  by  Tissaphernes,  who  had  received 
warning  of  the  intended  attack.   Thrasyllus  retired  to  Lesbos. 
While  lying  at  anchor  at  Methymna,  he  caught  sight  of  the 
Sicilian  vessels  sailing  back  to  the  Hellespont,  and  at  once 
put  to  sea  in  pursuit.     Five  of  the  ships  he  Thrasyllus  in 
captured  with  their  crews;  the  remainder  he  the  Hellespont. 
pursued  to  Ephesus.2    He  now  joined  Alcibiades  at  Sestos, 


1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  1.  35,  36.  According  to  Diodorus,  Clearchus  was 
present  at  the  battle  of  Cyzicus,  I.e.  c.  51. 

2  The  captives  were  placed  in  the  stone  quarries  of  Peiraeus,  but 
in  the  following  winter  they  dug  their  way  out,  and  escaped,  some  to 
Decelea,  others  to  Megara. 


432 


ATHENS  LOSES  PYLUS  AND  NISAEA.        [XII.  8. 


and  the  whole  fleet  crossed  to  Lampsacus,  to  winter  quarters. 
But  when  Alcibiades  wished  to  combine  the  squadron  of 
Thrasyllus  with  his  own,  his  soldiers  refused  to  unite  with 
men  who  had  been  recently  defeated,  and  it  was  not  till  they 
had  joined  in  a  successful  engagement  with  Pharnabazus 
that  the  two  sections  became  one  army.  The  winter  was 
spent  at  Lampsacus,  in  fortifying  the  town  and  in  making 
incursions  into  the  King's  country.1 

During  this  winter  (i.e.  October  410- April  409)  the  Lacedae- 
monians at  length  succeeded  in  driving  the  Athenians  out  of 

1  recovered  Pynis-  Xenophon  merely  informs  us  that  "  the 
by  theLacI-6^  Helots  who  had  deserted  from  Malea  to  Cory- 
daemonians.  phasium  "  were  allowed  by  the  Lacedaemonians 
to  go  out  on  terms.  From  Diodorus  we  learn  that  the 
Athenians,  on  hearing  that  Pylus  was  closely  invested,  sent 
Anytus  with  thirty  triremes  to  relieve  it,  but  he  was  pre- 
vented by  contrary  winds  from  passing  Malea,  and  returned 
home.  Eager  to  bring  the  siege  to  an  end,  the  Lacedaemonians 
seem  to  have  offered  favourable  terms,  which  were  accepted. 
Whether  Anytus  was  to  blame,  or  not,  he  was  put  on  his  trial 
on  his  return,  and  only  escaped  conviction  by  bribing  his 
judges.2  Another  misfortune  which  befell  Athens  about  this 
The  Megarians  time  was  the  loss  of  Nisaea.  With  the  help  of 
recover  Nisaea.  ^he  Syracusan  prisoners  who  had  escaped  from 
Peiraeus,  and  perhaps  at  their  instigation,  the  Megarians, 
by  a  sudden  attack,  recovered  their  port.  The  Athenians 
at  once  came  up  with  a  considerable  force,  and  succeeded  in 

1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  2.  1-17  ;  Diod.  xiii.  64  ;  Plut.  Ale.  29.  I  hare  put 
the  expedition  of  Thrasyllus  in  410  in  spite  of  the  difficulty  about 
the  rebuilding  of  the  twenty  Syracusan  ships,  which  were  fiuished 
between  the  battle  of  Cyzicus  (spring)  and  some  little  time  before 
the  battle  of  Ephesus  (summer).  If  we  put  the  expedition  in  409, 
we  have  to  account  for  (1)  the  long  delay  of  Thrasyllus  at  Athens 
(from  the  beginning  of  410  to  May  409),  and  (2)  for  the  inaction  of 
Alcibiades  during  these  months.  But  see  Beloch,  Griech.  Gesch.  ii. 
79,  note,  and  his  paper  in  Philoo.  43,  p.  293  f. 

2  Xen.  I.e.  2.  18  ;  Diod.  xiii.  64  ;  Aih.  Pol.  27.  Anytus  is  said  to 
have  been  the  first  who  succeeded  in  bribing  a  jury.  Afterwards  he 
became  notorious  as  one  of  the  accusers  of  Socrates. 


XII.  9.]        ALCIBIADES  AT  CHALCEDON,  409. 


433 


defeating  the  Megarians,  but  their  success  was  in  vain. 
Nisaea  passed  out  of  their  hands.1  The  Spartans  also  had 
their  losses.  From  the  first  their  colony  at  Heraclea  had 
been  a  source  of  disaster  to  them,  and  now,  owing  to  the 
treachery  of  the  Achaeans,  their  harmost  Labotas  was  slain 
with  700  men  in  a  conflict  with  the  neighbouring  Oetaeans.2 
9.  In  the  spring  of  the  following  year  (409)  the  Athenians 
advanced  to  Proconnesus,  with  the  intention  of  carrying 
on  the  war  in  the  Bosphorus.  Their  first  operations  were  at 
Chalcedon.  The  Chalcedonians,  who  had  been  informed  of 
their  approach,  had  collected  their  movable  property,  and 
placed  it  for  safety  with  their  friends  and  neighbours  the 
Thracians  of  Bithynia.  Alcibiades  at  once  marched  to  the 
Bithynian  frontier  with  a  small  force  of  horse  and  foot, 
supported  by  the  fleet,  and  demanded  the  property.  The 
Thracians  were  unable  to  refuse  the  request,  and  Alcibiades 
returned  to  Chalcedon  laden  with  spoil.  He  Alcibiades  at 
invested  the  city  by  drawing  a  trench  and  chalcedon. 
palisade  round  it  from  the  Bosphorus  to  the  Propontis,  and 
where  the  work  was  intersected  by  the  river  Chalcedon  (?) 
he  fortified  the  banks  on  either  side  as  securely  as  the  nature 
of  the  ground  permitted.  The  Lacedaemonian  governor  of 
the  town,  Hippocrates,  offered  battle  within  the  lines,  while 
Pharnabazus  appeared  with  a  large  force  outside  the  city. 
The  issue  was  doubtful  for  a  time,  but  when  Alcibiades 
brought  up  reinforcements,  the  Chalcedonians  fled  into  the 
city,  with  the  loss  of  their  commander,  and  Pharnabazus 
retired  to  his  camp.  Alcibiades  then  left  for  the  Chersonese 
to  collect  money,  placing  the  army  in  the  command  of  Thra- 
syllus  and  Thrasybulus.  In  his  absence  these  Agreement 
generals  came  to  terms  with  Pharnabazus,  who  with 
agreed  to  pay  the  Athenians  twenty  talents,  Pharnabaz"s. 
and  to  conduct  their  ambassadors  to  the  King.  The  Chalce- 
donians on  their  part  pledged  themselves  to  pay  the  ordinary 

1  Diod.  xiii.  65.    Xenophon  does  not  mention  this  incident. 

2  Xen.  Hell.  i.  2.  18.  For  Heraclea,  see  supra,  p.  275.  The 
Lacedaemonians  seem  to  have  recovered  the  place  from  the  Boeotians. 

VOL.  III.  2  E 


434 


A  THENS  A  CQ  UIRES  B  YZA  N7IUM,  409.      [X 1 1 .  9. 


tribute1  to  Athens,  with  all  arrears;  and  the  Athenians  under- 
took not  to  make  war  on  Chalcedon  till  the  return  of  the 
embassy.  The  convention  was  subsequently  ratified  by  Alci- 
biades  on  behalf  of  Chalcedon,  after  which  Pharnabazus  retired 
to  Cyzicus,  bidding  the  envoys  meet  him  there.  The  embassy, 
which  consisted  of  five  Athenians  and  two  Argives,  was  joined 
by  envoys  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  including  Pasippidas,  the 
admiral  chosen  to  succeed  Mindarus,  together  with  Hermo- 
crates  and  his  brother  Proxenus.  When  the  winter  came  on, 
they  had  advanced  no  further  than  Gordieum,  in  Phrygia, 
where  for  the  present  they  remained.2 

Alcibiades,  who  had  not  only  collected  large  supplies  in 
the  Chersonese  on  his  previous  visit,  but  had  captured 
and  Selymbria,  and  even  made  an  attempt  on 
surrender  of  Byzantium,  had  taken  the  oaths  to  Pharnabazus 
Byzantium.  ^  proxy  at  Chrysopolis  in  the  Bosphorus.  He 
now  led  the  fleet  to  the  European  coast  to  attack  Byzantium, 
which  was  held  by  Ciearchus  with  some  Laconian,  Megarian, 
and  Boeotian  troops  (supra,  p.  431).  The  assault  soon  passed 
into  a  siege,  and  Ciearchus  did  not  hesitate  to  reserve  what 
food  there  was  for  the  use  of  the  garrison.  He  then  left  the 
city  in  the  care  of  the  Megarian  and  Boeotian  commanders, 
and  repaired  to  Pharnabazus  to  collect  money  and  ships — for 
the  Lacedaemonian  fleet  was  now  being  restored  :  a  few  ships 
had  been  left  in  the  Hellespont  by  Pasippidas ;  others  had 
been  built  at  Antandrus  ;  others  were  off  the  coast  of  Thrace 
in  command  of  Agesandridas,3  all  which  Ciearchus  hoped, 
with  the  help  of  Pharnabazus,  to  collect,  organise,  and  make 
efficient.  In  his  absence  a  party  in  Byzantium  betrayed  the 
city  to  the  Athenians  to  save  the  inhabitants  from  starvation. 
The  garrison  were  surprised,  and  compelled  to  surrender,4 


1  This  implies  that  the  duty  on  exports  {supra,  p.  338)  had  been 
removed  and  the  old  system  revived — in  certain  places,  at  any  rate. 

2  Xen.  I.e.  i.  3.  1-14.  For  Pasippidas,  who  had  fallen  under  a 
suspicion  of  treacherous  dealings  with  Tissaphernes  while  collecting 
ships  at  Thasos,  see  Xen.  I.e.  i.  1.  32. 

3  Xen.  Hell.  i.  3.  17.  4  Xen.  Hell.  i.  3.  1 8-22. 


XII.  10.]  CYRUS  SENT  TO  THE  COAST,  408. 


435 


and  the  Athenians  thus  acquired  possession  of  both  sides  of 
the  Bosphorus. 

10.  In  the  next  spring  (408)  Pharnabazus  and  the  envoys 
went  forward  from  Gordieum  on  their  way  to  Susa.  They 
were  met  by  a  former  embassy  of  Lacedaemonians,  Boeotius 
and  others,1  returning  from  Susa,  who  informed  Cyrug  .g  gent 
them  '  that  their  mission  was  useless  ;  the  down  to  the 
Lacedaemonians  had  carried  every  point  with  coast' 
the  King.  With  them  was  Cyrus,  the  King's  younger  son, 
who  had  been  sent  to  take  the  command  on  the  coast,  and 
aid  the  Lacedaemonians  in  the  war.2  He  carried  with  him 
a  royal  letter  addressed  to  all  the  cities  of  the  coast,  and 
bearing  the  King's  seal,  by  which  he  was  appointed  "'Caranus,' 
or  chief,  of  all  the  forces  which  muster  at  Castolus."  The 
Athenian  envoys  on  hearing  this  wished  to  go  on  at  once  to 
Susa,  or  to  return  home  ;  but  at  the  request  of  Cyrus, 
Pharnabazus  detained  them,  and  it  was  three  years  before 
they  were  set  at  liberty.  The  Lacedaemonians,  Argives,  and 
Syracusans  in  the  embassy  were  not,  of  corns'1,  subject  to  any 
restraint. 

With  the  exception  of  Abydus,  the  whole  of  the  Hellespont 
was  once  more  a  part  of  the  Athenian  empire.    The  city  was 
in  possession  of  an  all-powerful  fleet,  and  her  Alcibiades 
resources  had  been  largely  increased.   This  had  prepares  to 
mainly  been  the  work  of  Alcibiades,  and  the  return  home* 
time  seemed  to  have  come  when  he  might  return  to  Athens 
with  safety.    The  fleet  bad  been  divided  into  three  portions. 
Thirty  ships  had  been  sent  to  Thrace  under  Thrasybulus  to 
collect  money ;  twenty  Alcibiades  took  to  Samos  and  Caria, 
where  he  collected  no  less  than  a  hundred  talents  imme- 
diately after  the  conquest  of  Byzantium;  the  remainder 
returned  to  Athens  in  the  care  of  Thrasyllus.    From  Caria, 
Alcibiades  sailed  to  Samos,  and  from  thence  to  Paros,  with  a 


1  This  embassy  has  not  been  mentioned  before  by  Xenophon,  and 
nothing  more  is  known  about  it. 

2  Xen.  Hell.  i.  4.  3  :  Kapavov  to>v  els  KaaTo>\6v  d0poi£ofiepa>v.  Both 
Tissaphernes  and  Pharnabazus  were  now  subject  to  Cyrus. 


436 


ALCIBIADES  AT  ATHENS,  W8.  [XII.  II. 


small  part  of  his  force,  and  hearing  that  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  preparing  a  new  fleet  of  thirty  vessels  in  their  dock  at 
Gytheum,  he  at  once  sailed  thither  to  satisfy  himself  of  the 
fact.    He  was  also  anxious  to  receive  news  from  his  friends 
at  Athens,  being  still  uncertain  of  the  feeling  towards  him 
in  the  city.     He  now  learned  that  he  had  been  elected 
one  of  the  generals  for  the  year,  and  without  further 
delay  he  sailed  to  the  Peiraeus.    Seven  years  had  elapsed 
since  he  had  left  the  city,  in  the  pomp  of  the  great 
Sicilian  expedition — years  in  which  he  had  done  great  good 
and  great  evil  to  his  state.     He  had  become  the  foremost 
man  in  Hellas.     At  Sparta  and  at  Sardis,  no  less  than 
The  return  of     at  Athens,  he  had  carried  all  before  him.  At 
Aicibiades.        his  approach  the  Athenians  crowded  to  the 
port,  eager  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  their  great  citizen.  Some 
were  his  ardent  partisans,  who  declared  that  his  banishment 
had  been  unjust,  the  work  of  enemies  who  wished  to  bring 
about  his  destruction  for  their  own  purposes.    Others  still 
looked  on  him  as  the  chief  source  of  evil  in  the  past,  and 
of  danger  in  the  future.    So  apprehensive  was  Aicibiades 
that  some  attack  would  be  made  upon  him  that  he  refused 
to  go  ashore,  till  he  caught  sight  of  his  cousin  Euryptolemus 
and  other  friends,  to  whose  protection  he  could  trust.  Meet- 
ings were  held  of  the  Council  and  Assembly,  at  which  he 
declared  that  he  was  the  victim  of  injustice,  and  guiltless  of 
the  sacrilege  laid  to  his  charge.    He  carried  the  people  with 
him,  and  without  a  protest  from  his  enemies  he  was  elected 
general  with  full  powers,  as  the  one  man  who  could  save 
Athens  and  restore  her  empire.1 

II.  Aicibiades  arrived  at  Athens  on  the  day  of  the  Plyn- 
teria,  on  which  the  statue  of  Athena  was  disrobed  and 

1  Xen.  HelL  i.  4.  io,  Diodorus,  xiii.  68,  and  Athenaeus,  xii.  49 
give  a  highly  coloured  account  of  the  return  of  Aicibiades,  which 
becomes  more  highly  coloured  still  in  the  hands  of  Duris  ;  but  the 
historians  of  the  fourth  century  are  more  restrained.  Aicibiades  no 
doubt  brought  with  him  the  hundred  talents  from  Caria,  but  the 
spoils  and  captured  vessels  bad  already  been  conveyed  to  Athens  by 
Thrasyllus,  and  helped  to  turn  the  tide  in  favour  of  Aicibiades. 


XII.  ii.]      LYSANDER  BECOMES  ADMIRAL,  408.  437 


cleansed.    It  was  a  solemn  day  in  the  Athenian  calendar, 
on  which  business  was  suspended ;  and  this  was  afterwards 
remembered  as  ominous  of  the  later  fortunes  Returnof 
of  Alcibiades.    He  remained  in  the  city  three  Aicibiades 
months  or  more,  and  made  amends  to  the  to  Ioma* 
Eleusinian  deities,  whose  rites  he  had  profaned,  by  conduct- 
ing the  procession  to  Eleusis  at  the  time  of  the  mysteries 
by  land,  which  the  Athenians  had  not  ventured  to  do  since 
Agis  had  occupied  Decelea.    In  October  he  set  sail  with  a 
large  armament,  1500  heavy-armed,  150  horse,  and  100  ships. 
After  an  attack  on  Andros,  which  had  revolted,  he  returned 
to  Samos,  and  found  that  in  his  absence  changes  were  taking 
place  of  the  first  importance. 

Cyrus,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  sent  down  in  the  spring 
of  the  year  to  take  command  of  the  forces  on  the  coast. 
He  spent  the  summer,  we  do  not  know  how  Lysander 
or  where,  for  it  was  not  till  late  in  the  year  sent  out  as 
that  he  arrived  at  Sardis.    Here  he  was  visited  navarch- 
by  Lysander,  who,  shortly  before  the  return  of  Alcibiades, 
had  come  out  as  admiral  of  the  Lacedaemonian  fleet,  in 
the  place  of  Cratesippidas,  who  had  succeeded  Pasippidas. 
Lysander  had  employed  the  interval  in  collecting  ships,  and 
before  approaching  Cyrus,  he  was  master  of  a  fleet  of  seventy 
vessels.    The  meeting  of  the  two  men  was  the  turning-point 
in  the  war.    Sparta  had  at  last  found  the  right  man  for  her 
work,  and  her  action  was  no  longer  to  be  crippled  by  the 
vacillating  and  treacherous  policy  of  Tissaphernes.1 

Cyrus  had  brought  a  large  sum  of  money  with  him,  and 
was  also  prepared  to  spend  his  own  resources,  even  to  melt- 
ing down  the  throne  on  which  he  sat.  But  Lysander  and 
when  Lysander  asked  for  a  drachma  a  day  for  Cyrus, 
his  sailors,  he  replied  that  his  instructions  from  the  King 
would  not  allow  such  a  rate  of  pay.  Half  a  drachma  (3  obols) 
and  no  more  would  be  paid  to  each  man,  but  the  Lacedae- 


1  That  Cyrus  came  to  the  coast  early  in  the  year  is  clear  from 
Xenophon,  Hell.  i.  4.  3,  for  the  envoys  actually  saw  him. 


438 


LYSANDER  AND  CYRUS,  408.  [XII.  12. 


monians  might  maintain  as  many  ships  as  they  pleased. 
Lysander  was  not  to  be  foiled.  After  the  banquet,  when 
Cyrus  drank  to  him,  and  asked  how  he  could  gratify 
him,  he  replied,  "By  adding  an  obol  to  the  sailors' pay." 
This  was  done,  and  the  timely  liberality  roused  the  greatest 
enthusiasm  among  the  Spartan  fleet.  The  Athenians  were 
proportionately  discouraged.  They  endeavoured,  with  the 
help  of  Tissaphernes,  to  bring  Cyrus  back  to  the  old  plan 
of  wearing  out  each  combatant  upon  the  other,  but  Cyrus 
would  not  listen  to  the  suggestion.  A  new  policy  was  on 
foot,  and  Alcibiades  must  have  been  bitterly  conscious  of  the 
change.    He  was  no  longer  a  power  with  the  Persians. 

12.  Lysander  returned  to  Ephesus,  where  he  remained 
for  the  winter  (408-407),  quietly  refitting  and  repairing  his 
Defeat  of  the  fleet.  Alcibiades,  who  had  hitherto  remained 
Athenians  inactive  at  Samos,  now  sailed  to  the  help  of 
atNotium.  Thrasybulus,  who  was  fortifying  Phocaea, 
leaving  his  pilot  Antiochus  in  command,  with  instructions 
not  to  attack  Lysander.  Moved  by  curiosity  or  contempt, 
Antiochus  sailed  with  his  own  ship  and  one  other  into  the 
harbour  of  Ephesus,  and  passed  under  the  prows  of  Lysander's 
vessels.  This  led  to  an  engagement,  in  which  Lysander  bring- 
ing his  whole  fleet  to  bear  upon  the  Athenians,  who  hastened 
up  in  detachments,  defeated  them,  and  destroyed  fifteen  of 
their  ships.  Alcibiades  at  once  returned  to  Samos  and 
offered  battle,  but  Lysander  refused,  as  his  fleet  was  by  no 
means  equal  in  numbers  to  that  of  the  Athenians 1  (407). 

When  this  reverse  became  known  at  Athens,  the  popular 
feeling  turned  against  Alcibiades.  He  had  done  nothing  to 
......    .       realise  the  great  hopes  entertained  at  his  elec- 

Alcibiades  is  or 

deposed  from  tion ;  he  had  failed  in  the  negotiations  through 
his  command.  Tissaphernes ;  and  he  was  now  accused  of 
negligence  in  his  command,  and  deposed.  In  his  room  ten 
generals  were  elected,  whose  names  are  connected  with  one 
of  the  most  melancholy  passages  in  Greek  history — Conon, 


1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  5.  1-15. 


XII.  12.]  ALCIBIADES  DEPOSED,  407. 


439 


Diomedon,  Leon,  Pericles,  Erasinides,  Aristocrates,  Arches- 
tratus,  Protomachus,  Thrasyllus,  Aristogenes.1  Alcibiades 
retired  to  a  fortress  which  he  had  built  in  the  Chersonese, 
near  Bisanthe.  His  place  at  Samos  was  taken  by  Conon, 
who  was  despatched  from  Andros  where  he  had  been  left  by 
Alcibiades,  with  the  twenty  ships  under  his  command.  He 
at  once  reorganised  the  fleet,  selecting  seventy  of  the  best 
ships,  and  manning  them  with  the  most  efficient  sailors. 
With  this  force,  though  less  by  forty  ships  or  more  than 
the  fleet  of  Alcibiades,  he  was  able  to  make  descents  on  the 
territory  of  the  enemy.2 

Conon's  place  at  Andros  was  taken  by  Phanosthenes,  with 
a  small  squadron  of  four  triremes.  On  his  way  thither  he 
overtook  two  Thurian  ships,  which  he  captured  with  their 
crews.  Among  the  prisoners  was  Dorieus  of  Rhodes,  a  famous 
athlete,  who  having  been  banished  from  Rhodes  by  the 
sentence  of  the  Athenians— in  the  period  when  Rhodes  was 
still  a  subject  ally  of  the  Athenian  empire— had  settled  at 
Thurii,  and  taken  command  of  Thurian  ships  against  Athens.3 
When  he  was  brought  to  Athens,  the  citizens  decided  by 
public  decree  to  treat  him  with  the  respect  due  to  an 


i  Xen.  i.  5.  16-17  ;  Plut.  Alcib.  36  ;  Diod.  xiii.  73.  That  he  was 
deposed  is  clear  from  Lysias,  21.  7.  Xenophon  mentions  Aristocrates 
and  Adimautus  as  generals  chosen  with  Alcibiades  to  act  on  land  when 
he  left  Athens,  Hell.  i.  4.  21.  Thrasybulus  and  Conon  were  also 
generals  for  this  year,  ib.  i.  4.  10,  and  probably  Thrasyllus.  If  so, 
Conon,  Androcles,  and  Thrasyllus  were  continued  in  office  ;  Thrasy- 
bulus, Alcibiades,  and  Adimantus  deposed.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
the  elections  of  generals  were  always  held  at  the  ordinary  time  in  these 
later  years  of  the  war,  or  whether  the  ten  were  always  elected  at  one 
time.  Before  Alcibiades  returned  to  Athens,  he,  Conon,  and  Thra- 
syllus were  chosen  ;  this  may  have  been  at  the  ordinary  time.  Then 
Alcibiades  seems  to  have  received  full  power  by  a  later  election  or 
confirmation  ;  and  the  election  of  Aristocrates  and  Adimantus  is  not 
mentioned  till  Alcibiades  is  leaving  Athens.  The  date  of  the  battle 
of  Notium  is  uncertain,  but  it  would  seem  to  have  taken  place  late  in 
the  summer  of  407,  for  the  generals  elected  after  it  are  in  office  in 
autumn  406,  when  the  battle  of  Arginusae  was  fought. 

2  Hell.  i.  5.  18-21.' 

3  Thuc.  iii.  8  ;  viii.  35,  84,  supra  p.  426. 


440 


PERICLES  THE  YOUNGER. 


[XII.  12. 


Olympian  victor ;  the  rest  of  the  captives  were  sold,  but  he 
was  set  at  liberty.1 

Before  entering  on  the  final  crisis  of  the  war,  we  may  turn 
aside  for  a  moment  to  listen  to  a  conversation  which,  as 
.  Xenophon  tells  us,  Socrates  held  with  Pericles 

Conversation  of  x 

Socrates  with  the  younger,  the  son  of  the  statesman  (supra, 
Pencies  the       p  132),  about  the  time  when  he  was  looking  for- 

younger.  A  /  ,    .  ° 

ward  to  becoming  one  of  the  generals  of  Athens. 
We  cannot  of  course  be  precise  about  the  year,  but  we  may 
fix  it  at  no  long  time  before  the  battle  of  Arginusae. 

After  dwelling  on  the  glorious  actions  of  Athens  in  old 
days,  Pericles  continues : — 

The  wonder  to  me,  Socrates,  is  how  our  city  ever  came  to  decline. 

Soc.  I  think  we  are  the  victims  of  our  own  success.  Like  some 
athlete,  whose  facile  preponderance  in  the  arena  has  betrayed  him 
into  laxity  until  he  eventually  succumbs  to  punier  antagonists,  so 
we  Athenians,  in  the  plenitude  of  our  superiority,  have  neglected 
ourselves  and  are  become  degenerate. 

Per.  What  then  ought  we  to  do  now  to  recover  our  former  virtue  ? 

Soc.  There  need  be  no  mystery  about  that,  I  think.  We  can 
rediscover  the  institutions  of  our  forefathers — applying  them  to  the 
regulation  of  our  lives  with  something  of  their  precision,  and  not 
improbably  with  like  success  ;  or  we  can  imitate  those  who  stand  at 
the  front  of  affairs  to-day,  adopting  to  ourselves  their  rule  of  life,  in 
which  case,  if  we  live  up  to  the  standard  of  our  models,  we  may  hope 
at  least  to  rival  their  excellence,  or  by  a  more  conscientious  adherence 
to  what  they  aim  at,  rise  superior. 

You  would  seem  to  suggest  (he  answered)  that  the  spirit  of  beautiful 
and  brave  manhood  has  taken  wings  and  left  our  city;  as,  for  instance, 
when  will  Athenians,  like  the  Lacedaemonians,  rever- 
The  decline  of     ence  Q^      — ^  Athenian  who  hates  his  own  father 

the  Athenian  .° 

character.  as  a  startmg-pomt  for  the  contempt  he  pours  upon 

grey  hairs  1  When  will  he  pay  as  strict  an  attention 
to  the  body,  who  is  not  content  with  neglecting  a  good  habit,  but 
laughs  to  scorn  those  who  are  careful  in  the  matter  ?  When  shall  we 
Athenians  so  obey  our  magistrates — we  who  take  a  pride,  as  it  were, 
in  despising  authority  %    When,  once  more,  shall  we  be  united  as  a 


1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  5.  19. 


XII.  I3-]  THE  ATHENIAN  SOLDIER. 


441 


people,  we  who,  instead  of  combining  to  promote  common  interests, 
delight  in  blackening  each  other's  characters,  envying  one  another 
more  than  we  envy  all  the  world  besides  ;  and— which  is  our  worst 
failing— who,  in  private  and  public  intercourse  alike,  are  torn  by 
dissension,  and  are  caught  in  a  maze  of  litigation,  and  prefer  to  make 
capital  out  of  our  neighbours'  difficulties  rather  than  to  render  mutual 
assistance  ?  To  make  our  conduct  consistent,  indeed,  we  treat  our 
national  interests  no  better  than  if  they  were  the  concerns  of  some 
foreign  state  ;  or  make  them  bones  of  contention  to  wrangle  over, 
and  rejoice  in  nothing  so  much  as  in  possessing  means  and  ability  to 
indulge  these  tastes.  From  this  hot-bed  is  engendered  in  the  state 
a  spirit  of  blind  folly  and  cowardice,  and  in  the  hearts  of  the  citizens 
spreads  a  tangle  of  hatred  and  mutual  hostility  which,  as  I  often 
shudder  to  think,  will  some  day  cause  some  disaster  to  befall  the 
state  greater  than  it  can  bear. 

Do  not  (replied  Socrates),  do  not,  I  pray  you,  permit  yourself  to 
believe  that  the  Athenians  are  smitten  with  so  incurable  a  depravity. 
Do  you  not  observe  their  discipline  in  all  naval  matters  ?  Look  at 
their  prompt  and  orderly  obedience  to  the  superintendence  at  the 
gymnastic  contests,  their  quite  unrivalled  subservience  to  their 
teachers  in  the  training  of  our  choruses. 

Yes  (he  answered),  there 's  the  wonder  of  it ;  to  think  that  all  these 
good  people  should  so  obey  their  leaders,  but  that  our  hoplites  and 
our  cavalry,  who  may  be  supposed  to  rank  before  the  rest  of  the 
citizens  in  excellence  of  manhood,  should  be  so  entirely  unamenable 
to  discipline.1 

13.  In  the  following  spring  (406),  Lysander,  who  seems 
to  have  remained  inactive  at  Ephesus  during  the  winter,  was 
succeeded  as  admiral  by  Callicratidas.2    When  Callicratidas 
handing  over  his  ships,  Lysander  reminded  his  succeeds 
successor  of  the  victory  which  he  had  won,  and  Lysander- 
claimed  for  his  fleet  the  supremacy  at  sea.    Callicratidas  bade 
him  take  the  fleet  to  Miletus,  passing  between  Samos  and 
the  mainland,  and  give  it  into  his  charge  there;  he  would 

1  Xen.  Mem.  iii.  5.  13  ff.    Dakyns'  translation. 

2  The  time  is  fixed  by  Xenophon's  mention  of  an  eclipse  of  the 
moon,  which  is,  no  doubt,  that  of  April  15,  406— unless,  indeed,  this 
notice  of  time  is  spurious  ;  see  Wilkins,  Mus.  Phil.  Cant.  i.  555,  and 
Beloch,  I.e.  Callicratidas  had  probably  been  appointed  admiral  in 
the  preceding  autumn. 


442   CALLICRA  TIDAS  SUCCEEDS  L  YSANDER,  406.    [XI I.  13 


then  allow  that  the  Peloponnesians  were  masters  of  the 
waters.  This  Lysander  refused  to  do,  as  he  was  no  longer 
admiral  of  the  fleet.  Callicratidas  immediately  increased  his 
fleet  to  140  ships  with  the  intention  of  attacking  Conon;  but 
he  found  that  he  was  the  object  of  a  conspiracy  on  the  part  of 
Ly sander's  adherents,  who  loudly  complained  of  the  folly  of 
the  Lacedaemonians  in  changing  their  admirals,  and  sending 
out  inexperienced  men  to  replace  those  who  had  acquired  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  their  ships  and  crews.  Callicratidas 
met  them  with  the  plain  statement  that  he  was  not  the 
maker  of  the  laws  of  his  city ;  it  was  his  business  to  obey 
them.  This  he  intended  to  do,  and  while  he  held  his  office 
he  would  make  the  best  of  it,  but  it  was  for  them  to  say 
whether  they  wished  him  to  stay  or  return  home  and  explain 
the  position  of  affairs.  Other  difficulties  were  in  store  for 
him.  Lysander  had  paid  back  to  Cyrus  all  the  money 
remaining  in  his  hands,  and  when  Callicratidas  repaired 
to  Sardis  to  ask  for  supplies,  he  was  kept  waiting  at  the 
doors  of  Cyrus  with  designed  humiliation.  Exasperated 
at  the  indignities  put  upon  him,  he  returned  to  Miletus, 
resolved,  if  ever  he  reached  Lacedaemon  again,  to  bring 
about  a  reconciliation  between  Athens  and  Sparta,  and  put 
an  end  to  the  discreditable  relations  now  existing  between 
Greeks  and  barbarians.  From  Miletus  he  sent  to  Lacedaemon 
for  supplies,  and  summoning  an  assembly  of  the  Milesians, 
asked  for  contributions  to  enable  him  to  make  use  of  his  force. 

The  Milesians,  in  spite  of  their  partiality  to  Lysander, 
could  not  refuse  to  contribute,  and,  having  also  procured  a 
sum  of  money  from  Chios,  Callicratidas  was  able  to  sail  to 
Methymna,  which  was  protected  by  an  Athenian  garrison.  He 
Callicratidas  took  the  town  by  storm,  but  of  the  captives  he 
at  Lesbos.  onjy  ^e  Athenian  garrison  and  the  slaves ; 

the  rest  he  set  at  liberty,  declaring  that  no  Greek  should 
be  sold  into  slavery  while  he  was  in  command.  To  Conon, 
who  had  sailed  up  from  Samos  to  the  aid  of  Methymna,  he 
sent  word  that  he  would  put  an  end  to  his  adultery  with 
the  sea,  and  when  he  saw  him  putting  out  on  his  return,  he 


XII.  I4-]  CONON  A  T  MYTILENE,  4O6.  443 

in^e^ed  his  ships  and  pursued  him  to  Mytilene,  with 
his  whole  fleet  consisting  of  one  hundred  and  seventy  vessels. 
Conon  with  whom  were  Leon  and  Erasinides,  was  compelled  to 
fight  at  the  harbour's  mouth,  and  lost  thirty  out  of  his  seventy 
ships  before  reaching  the  town.  Here  he  was  blockaded  by 
Callicratidas,  who  summoned  forces  from  Methymna  and 
Chios,  and  was  now  supplied  with  money  by  Cyrus. 

The  position  of  the  Athenians  was  indeed  alarming; 
Mytilene  was  without  provisions,  shut  in  on  every  side,  and 
unless  intelligence  could  be  conveyed  to  Athens,  conon  blockaded 
Conon  had  no  hope  of  relief.  Selecting  two  of  at  M^lene' 
the  swiftest  vessels,  he  prepared  them  for  four  days,  and  on 
the  fifth,  at  mid-day,  when  the  enemy's  vigilance  was  relaxed, 
he  sent  them  out  of  the  harbour,  one  towards  the  Hellespont 
the  other  across  the  open  sea.  Pursuit  was  immediate,  and 
before  sunset  the  second  vessel  was  brought  back.  The 
other  escaped  and  carried  the  news  of  the  siege  to  Athens 

14.  If  Conon  and  what  remained  of  his  fleet  were  to  be 
saved,  immediate  action  was  necessary,  and  that  on  no  small 
scale  In  thirty  days  the  Athenians  prepared  and  launched 
a  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  ten  vessels.  All  who  were  of  age 
to  serve,  whether  slave  or  free,  and  even  a  large  number  of 
the  class  of  the  knights,  were  compelled  to  go  on  board. 
On  reaching  Samoa,. the  fleet  added  ten  Samian  vessels  to  the 
number,  and  more  than  thirty  others  were  collected  from  the 
allies  The  generals  were  now  in  command  of  a  force  of 
more'  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  ships,  with  which  they 
sailed  to  the  islands  of  Arginusae,  opposite  Lesbos,  and  there 
took  their  evening  meal.  Callicratidas,  who  had  advanced 
to  meet  them  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  ships,  leaving 
Eteonicus  to  blockade  Conon  with  fifty,  when  he  saw  their 
fires,  attempted  to  surprise  them  by  a  night  attack,  but  was 
prevented  by  a  storm.  Towards  morning  the  weather  cleared, 
and  he  sailed  at  daybreak  to  Arginusae. 

The  battle  which  followed  was  the  greatest  fought  m  the 
whole  course  of  the  war.  For  Athens  it  was  a  decisive  battle; 
if  she  was  defeated,  the  war  was  at  an  end ;  she  had  ventured 


444 


BATTLE  OF  ARGINUSAE,  406. 


[XII.  14. 


her  last  stake.  The  Athenians  had  the  advantage  in  numbers, 
but  their  fleet  had  been  hastily  prepared,  and  was  manned 
by  inexperienced  sailors ;  they  were  conscious  that  it  was 
incapable  of  the  skilful  manoeuvres  for  which  they  had  long 
been  famous.  It  was  drawn  up  in  two  massive  wings,  each 
of  sixty  vessels;  the  centre,  which  apparently  lay  on  the 
islands  of  Arginusae,  was  formed  by  a  single  line.  On  the 
left  wing,  which  put  out  towards  the  open  sea,  Aristocrates 
and  Diomedon  were  in  command  in  the  first  line,  Pericles  and 
Erasinides  in  the  second,  each  with  fifteen  ships ;  the  centre 
was  occupied  by  the  Samians  and  other  allies ;  on  the  right, 
between  the  islands  and  the  shore,  were  Protomachus  and 
Thrasyllus,  supported  by  Lysias  and  Aristogenes,  each  with 
fifteen  ships  as  on  the  left.  The  Peloponnesians  were  drawn 
up  in  a  single  line  :  they  were  old  sailors,  and  wished  to  take 
whatever  advantage  of  their  skill  they  could.1 

The  pilot  of  Callicratidas,  observing  the  disparity  of 
numbers,  advised  him  to  decline  battle,  to  which  he  replied 
that  he  was  by  no  means  a  necessary  man  at  Sparta,  and  it 
would  be  disgraceful  to  retreat.  The  battle  was  hotly  con- 
tested, but  when  Callicratidas,  who  commanded  the  right, 
was  hurled  into  the  sea  by  the  force  of  his  impact  on  an 
enemy's  ship  and  drowned,2  and  the  left  wing  was  defeated 
by  Protomachus,  the  whole  fleet  turned  to  flight,  some  to 
Chios,  but  most  to  Phocaea.  The  Athenians  returned  to 
Arginusae.  They  had  lost  twenty-five  vessels  and  their 
crews,  but  in  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  at  least  seventy  ships 
had  been  destroyed,  including  nine  ships  out  of  ten  in  the 
Lacedaemonian  contingent.  The  victory  was  complete,  and 
at  once  restored  to  Athens  the  control  of  the  Aegean.3 

Immediately  after  the  battle,  the  Athenian  generals  issued 
orders  to  Theramenes  and  Thrasybulus  to  collect  the  crews 


1  Hell.  i.  6.  29  ff.    See  Zeune's  note. 

2  For  Callicratidas,  see  Grote,  Hist,  of  Greece,  v.  496  f.,  503  f. 

3  Hell.  i.  6.  34.  The  battle  was  fought  in  the  archonship  of  Callias 
(406-405),  Ath.  Pol.  c.  34 ;  and  not  long  before  the  Apaturia 
(November). 


XII.  IS]  LOSS  OF  THE  SAILORS,  4O6. 


445 


from  the  floating  wrecks,  and  were  about  to  sail  with  the 
rest  of  the  fleet  to  relieve  Conon  when  the  storm  of  the 
previous  night  again  broke  over  them  and  Escape  of 
rendered  any  movement  impossible.  Eteonicus,  Eteonicus. 
however,  was  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  delay  to  escape 
from  Mytilene.  A  despatch-boat  brought  him  the  news  of 
the  defeat,  but  he  at  once  bade  the  sailors  leave  the  harbour 
without  a  word,  and  return  with  crowns  proclaiming  the 
victory  of  Callicratidas  and  the  destruction  of  the  Athenian 
fleet.  On  their  arrival,  Eteonicus  offered  sacrifice  openly  for 
the  good  news.  He  then  despatched  his  triremes  with  all 
haste  to  Chios,  for  which  the  wind  was  favourable,  and  him- 
self led  his  army  into  camp  at  Methymna.  When  the  wind 
moderated,  Conon  sailed  to  meet  the  Athenians,  who  were 
advancing  from  Arginusae,  and  informed  them  of  the  escape 
of  Eteonicus.  After  an  ineffectual  movement  to  Mytilene 
and  Chios,  the  fleet  returned  to  Samos.1 

15.  The  victory  of  Athens  had  not  been  gained  without 
loss,  and  in  this  case  the  loss  fell  not  only  on  hired  crews 
and  slaves,  but  on  Athenian  citizens  who  had  been  compelled 
to  serve  as  sailors.  The  Athenian  general  who  risked  or  lost 
the  lives  of  his  citizens  could  not  rely  on  the  generosity  of 
the  people  to  save  him  from  the  attacks  of  rivals  and  enemies ; 
his  success  was  too  often  forgotten,  and  his  failure  punished 
with  unjust  severity.  When  it  became,  known  that  the 
survivors  had  not  been  saved  from  the  wrecks  after  the  battle, 
the  city  was  filled  with  indignation.  All  the  generals,  except 
Conon,  were  deposed  and  ordered  home.  Two  of  them, 
Protomachus  and  Aristogenes,  did  not  return,  but  Pericles, 
Diomedon,  Lysias,  Aristocrates,  Thrasyllus,  and  Erasinides 
appeared  at  Athens  to  answer  the  charges  against  them.2 

1  Xen.  Hell  i.  6  ;  Diod.  xiii.  98. 

2  The  tenth  general,  Archestratus,  seems  to  have  died  at  Mytilene 
before  the  battle ;  Diod.  xiii.  101  ;  Lysias,  21.  8.  Why  we  should 
have  Lysias  in  this  list  and  among  those  who  commanded  in  the 
battle,  while  Leon  is  mentioned  among  the  generals  of  the  year,  is  not 
clear.  In  Xen.  i.  6.  16,  Leon  is  said  to  have  accompanied  Conon  to 
Mytilene,  and  his  name  is  not  mentioned  again. 


446      THE RA MENES  AND  THE  GENERALS,  4O6.    [XII.  15. 


At  this  time  the  leader  of  the  people  at  Athens  was  Arche- 
demus,  "a  man  with  a  clever  tongue  in  his  head." 1  Having 
The  attack  on  brought  Erasinides  into  court  on  a  charge  of 
the  generals.  peculation,  he  seized  the  opportunity  to  attack 
him  for  his  conduct  as  general.  The  Council  took  the  matter 
up,  and  when  the  generals  made  their  report,  it  was  proposed 
that  they  should  be  arrested  and  the  case  referred  to  the 
people.  In  the  Assembly  which  followed,  the  chief  accuser 
was  Theramenes.  Together  with  Thrasybulus  he  had  been 
directed  to  save  the  men  on  the  wrecked  ships,  and  the  guilt 
of  abandoning  them,  if  it  could  not  be  brought  home  to  the 
generals,  would  rest  on  these  two.  In  the  despatch  written  by 
the  generals  immediately  after  the  battle,  they  had  been 
exempted  from  any  blame;  the  violence  of  the  storm  had 
rendered  it  impossible  to  save  the  survivors.  The  generosity 
of  the  generals  availed  them  little.  Theramenes  had  felt  the 
public  pulse,  and  saw  that  some  victim  would  be  demanded  in 
the  present  state  of  excitement.  That  victim  he  was  resolved 
not  to  be.  He  declared  that  the  generals  must  explain  why 
they  had  abandoned  the  sailors  to  their  fate.  In  a  brief  reply 
— for  the  legal  privilege  of  making  a  speech  was  denied  to 
them — each  general  stated  the  facts  :  that  they  had  intended 
to  sail  against  Eteonicus,  and  left  the  recovery  of  the  sailors 
to  Theramenes  and  Thrasybulus,  who  were  competent  and 
experienced  commanders,  but  the  storm  was  so  severe  that 
nothing  could  be  done.2    The  Assembly  was  convinced  of  the 


1  Xen.  Hell.  i.  7.  2  ;  cp.  Mem.  ii.  9.  4,  where  he  says  that  he  was 
poor  because  he  would  not  make  money  by  dishonest  means.  He 
was  employed  by  Crito  to  keep  the  sycophants  at  bay.  Aristophanes, 
if  he  is  speaking  of  the  same  man,  takes  a  different  view  (Frogs,  417) : 

os  €iTT€Tr)s  &>v  ovk.  e<fivo~e  (ppdropas, 

vvvi  8e  drjpaycoyel 

iv  tols  avco  v€Kpoio-i 

K&ariv  ra  irpatra  rrjs  t/ce?  fioxOr}pias. 

2  Xen.  Hell.  i.  7.  I  ff.,  5  :  ov  yap  Trpovredr)  o-cpiai  \6yos  Kara  top 
vopov.  The  words  are  ambiguous  ;  they  may  mean  what  is  said  in  the 
text ;  or,  "  according  to  the  law  under  which  they  were  being  judged," 
i.e.  some  law  relating  to  cases  tried  in  the  Assembly,  "they  were  not 
allowed  to  make  a  set  speech." 


XII.  I5-]         TRIAL  OF  THE  GENERALS,  4O6. 


447 


truth  of  their  plea,  and  many  came  forward  to  offer  bail  for 
them,  but  as  it  was  now  too  late  to  see  the  show  of  hands, 
the  decision  was  deferred  till  another  meeting.  The  generals 
were  sent  back  to  prison,  and  the  Council  were  ordered  to 
arrange  a  plan  for  their  trial. 

The  Assembly  did  not  meet  again  till  after  the  Apaturia — 
a  festival  at  which,  as  at  our  own  Christmas,  the  members 
of  families  gathered  together.  At  such  a  time 
the  gains  and  losses  of  the  past  year  were  c  Apatuna. 
noted ;  and  after  the  recent  battle  there  could  not  fail  to  be 
many  vacant  places.  Theramenes  and  his  party  did  not  let 
the  opportunity  slip.  A  number  of  men  were  kept  ready  to 
appear  in  the  Assembly,  clad  in  mourning  for  lost  relations, 
and  in  the  Council  an  indictment  against  the  generals  was 
prepared  by  Callixenus.  When  the  Assembly  met,  he  pro- 
posed that,  as  the  case  of  the  generals  had  already  been 
discussed,  the  Athenians  should  at  once  proceed  to  vote  on 
it.  Two  urns  were  to  be  placed  for  each  tribe,  one  for  con- 
demnation, the  other  for  acquittal,  and  if  condemned,  the 
generals  should  be  put  to  death  and  their  property  confiscated. 
Discussion  was  thus  silenced ;  at  the  same  time  the  robes 
of  mourning  were  to  be  seen  everywhere  in  the  Assembly, 
and  at  length  a  man  who  had  saved  his  life  by  clinging  to 
a  meal-tub  came  forward  declaring  that  his  dying  com- 
panions had  charged  him,  if  he  escaped,  to  tell  the  Athenians 
that  the  generals  had  abandoned  those  who  had  done  their 
duty  to  their  country.  Under  such  circumstances  there  was 
little  doubt  what  the  sentence  of  the  meeting  would  be. 
Euryptolemus,  a  kinsman  of  Pericles,  attempted  to  stay  pro- 
ceedings by  indicting  Callixenus  for  illegal  proposals,  but  at 
this  the  people  became  infuriated,  and  declared  that  it  was 
"monstrous  if  the  demos  might  not  do  as  it  pleased."  It 
was  even  proposed  to  include  Euryptolemus  and  his  supporters 
in  the  same  vote  with  the  generals  if  they  did  not  withdraw 
their  indictment.  They  were  frightened  into  submission. 
For  a  time  the  prytanes  refused  to  put  the  vote  to  the 
people  in  this  illegal  way ;  but  they  too  were  overawed,  with 


448 


THEY  ARE  CONDEMNED,  4O6.  [XII.  15. 


the  exception  of  Socrates,  who  refused  to  the  last  to  act 
contrary  to  the  law.1 

Euryptolemus  then  appealed  to  the  people.  He  proposed 
that  the  generals  should  be  tried  either  under  the  decree  of 
Cannonus — a  severe  enactment  by  which  the  criminal  was 
brought  before  the  people,  not  before  a  law-court,  in  chains, 
and,  if  condemned,  his  body  was  cast  out  unburied,  and  his 
property  confiscated — or  under  the  law  against  traitors  and 
sacrilegious  persons,  but  in  either  case  let  there  be  a  fair  trial. 
Let  each  general  be  heard  separately ;  with  a  proper  division 
of  the  day  into  a  time  for  accusation,  defence,  and  voting. 
In  his  opinion  the  generals  were  not  to  blame ;  it  was  not 
due  to  any  negligence  on  their  part  that  the  men  were  not 
saved,  but  to  the  violence  of  the  storm.  "  Do  not  then  turn 
victory  into  defeat ;  do  not  visit  inevitable  misfortune  with 
cruel  punishment;  do  not  treat  inability  as  treachery.  It 
would  be  far  more  just  to  honour  the  victorious  generals 
with  crowns  than  to  punish  them  with  death  at  the  instance 
of  scoundrels."  Euryptolemus  ended  by  proposing  that  the 
prisoners  should  be  tried  under  the  decree  of  Cannonus,  but 
one  by  one,  as  against  the  proposal  of  the  Council  to  decide 
upon  them  by  a  single  vote.2 

The  Assembly  were  inclined  to  follow  him,  but  Menecles 
interposed,  and  on  a  second  voting  the  proposal  of  the  Council 
Condemnation  was  adopted.  The  eight  generals  were  con- 
of  the  generals,  demned  to  death,  and  the  six  who  had  returned 
to  Athens  were  executed.  Afterwards  the  Athenians  were 
seized  with  remorse,  and  turned  upon  those  who  had  misled 
them,  and  though  by  a  fortunate  accident  they  escaped  pro- 
secution, Callixenus  was  regarded  with  universal  hatred,  and 
died  of  starvation.3 

1  Cp.  Plato,  Apol.  32  B.  ;  Xen.  Mem.  i.  1.  18 ;  iv.  4.  2,  and  the 
ironical  reference  in  Plato's  Gorgias,  473  E,  when  Socrates  sajs  that 
his  conduct  created  great  amusement ;  he  did  not  know  how  to  put 
a  question  to  the  vote. 

2  The  words  eKaarov  in  Xen.  i.  7.  34  do  not  refer  to  the 
decree  of  Cannonus. 

3  Xen.  i.  7.    The  points  which  Xenophon  marks  as  illegal  are: 


XIJ.  15.]        THERA menes  to  blame, 


449 


Our  knowledge  of  the  details  of  the  trial  and  condemnation 
of  the  generals  is  derived  from  Xenophon,  a  contemporary 
witness,  whose  account  may  be  accepted  as  true  in  themain. 
While  exulting  over  the  great  victory  which  had  once  more 
given  Athens  the  command  of  the  sea,  the  Remarks  on 
Athenians  were  suddenly  reminded  of  the  loss  thecal;  °n 
of  kindred  and  friends.    Brave  men  had  perished,  and  many 
of  them  through  the  culpable  negligence  of  their  commanders, 
or  so  at  least  it  was  asserted.    In  their  fury  they  turned 
upon  the  generals— they  would  listen  to  no  defence,  and 
insisted  on  immediate  punishment.     It  must  be  confessed 
that  there  were  times  when  the  Athenian  people  went  mad, 
and  blindly  followed  the  advice  which  appealed  to  their  worst 
passions.   At  such  a  time  a  wise  citizen  would  exert  any  in- 
fluence which  he  possessed  to  soothe  the  prevailing  excitement 
and  bring  the  people  into  a  better  mood.    Theramenes  did 
just  the  reverse.    He  availed  himself  of  every  means  in  his 
power  to  rouse  the  passions  of  the  mob,  and  to  him  the 
disastrous  sentence  is  mainly  due.    Whether  he  wished  to 
save  himself— for  the  fault,  so  far  as  there  was  one,  lay 
between  him  and  the  generals— or  whether  he  had  aims  in 
view  which  the  success  of  the  generals  would  defeat,  we 
cannot  tell,  but  whatever  his  motive,  his  conduct  on 'this 
occasion  admits  of  no  excuse  or  justification.1 

(1)  i.  7.  5 :  ov  yhp  wpoir&ri  acplac  X6yoS  Karh  rbv  vopov,  but  see  supra; 

(2)  the  proposal  of  Callixenus  to  vote  on  all  the  generals  at  once 
1.  7.  12,  i4>  25.^  Cp  Plato  Apol.  32  C:  rrapavo^,  Z>s  iv  T£  W  ' 
Xpovco  waaiv  vptv  edo£ev.  It  was  also  illegal  to  prevent  Euryptolemus 
from  following  up  his  indictment  of  Callixenus  for  illegality.  Frankel 
Die  Geschworn.  Gericht.  p.  79  ft,  endeavours  to  clear  the  Athenians 
from  the  charge  of  illegality  in  this  matter.  It  is  true  that  the  trial 
did  not  take  place  m  a  law-court,  but  in  the  Assembly,  and  the  forms  of 
law  which  prevailed  in  a  court  cannot  be  applied  to  it  The  fact  that 
^eP^UCd  wereasked  t0  Prepare  a  form  of  procedure  seems  to  imnlv 
that  there  was  no  fixed  rule  in  these  trials. 

1  As  a  boat  was  able  to  reach  Eteonicus  immediately  after  the 
battle,  and  Eteonicus  himself  escaped  from  Mytilene,  the  generals 
may  have  allowed  some  precious  time  to  elapse  before  giving  their 
orders  to  Theramenes  and  Thrasybulus.  But  nothing  is  said  of  this 
in  the  accusation  ;  and  the  boat  may  have  left  before  the  worst  of  the 

VOL.  III.  2 


450 


ETEONICUS  AT  CHIOS,  4O6.  [XII.  16. 


16  While  thus  executing  their  ablest  commanders,  the 
Athenians  haughtily  rejected  the  overtures  for  peace  which 
once  more  came  to  them  from  Lacedaemon.  The  terms 
offered  were  a  status  quo,  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  Lacedae- 
monian troops  from  Decelea.  Some  of  the  more  moderate 
citizens  were  inclined  to  accept  them,  but  Cleophon,  by  his 
violence,  carried  the  people  with  him.  He  came  into  the 
Assembly  intoxicated,  and  wearing  his  cuirass,  and  declared 
that  he  would  not  allow  any  peace  to  be  made  unless  the 
Lacedaemonians  restored  the  cities  of  the  Athenian  empire 
which  were  in  their  possession.1 

The  fleet  remained  at  Samos  for  the  winter,  making 
descents  on  the  enemy's  country,  but  without  any  attempt 
to  follow  up  their  victory  by  a  further  attack  on  the  remains 
of  the  Peloponnesian  fleet.2 

Chios  was  again  the  rendezvous  of  the  Peloponnesians 
There  may  have  been  some  sixty  vessels  in  all,  the  crews  of 
which  with  the  soldiers,  would  amount  to  a  total  of  twelve 
thousand  men.  To  feed  such  a  multitude  was  no  easy  task ;  to 
pay  them  was  impossible.   So  long  as  the  summer  lasted,  the 
men  could  earn  money  by  working  in  the  fields,  and  the  pro- 
duce of  the  country  sufficed  for  their  maintenance;  but  with 
the  approach  of  winter  they  found  themselves  as  ill-fed  as 
they  were  ill-clad  and  ill-paid.  In  their  distress 
fuppSses        they  formed  a  conspiracy  to  seize  the  city  of 
I  conspiracy      Chios,  and  that  they  might  be  known  to  each 
at  Chios.  othei>}  the  conspirators  agreed  to  distinguish 

themselves  by  carrying  a  reed.  .  Before  any  definite  step 
was  taken,  information  of  the  plan  was  brought  to  Eteomcus. 
His  position  was  difficult.  The  conspirators  were  so  numerous 

storm.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  generals  bad  bo  motive 
whatever  for  neglecting  to  rescue  the  survivors,  and  that  they 
consistently  maintained  that  rescue  was  impossible 

1  Ath  Pol.  c.  34.    Cleophon  had  already  opposed  peace  after  the 
battle  of  Cyzicus  (supra,  p.  429),  and  was  to  oppose  it  again  just 

2a/xou.   Diod.  xiii.  100. 


XII.  I7-]     INACTION  OF  THE  ATHENIANS,  4O6.  451 


that  an  attack  upon  them  was  by  no  means  certain  to  succeed. 
If  it  failed,  the  city  would  fall  into  their  hands,  and  the  pro- 
spects of  the  Peloponnesians,  already  sufficiently  low,  would 
be  ruined.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  succeeded,  the  conspiracy 
could  not  be  crushed  without  slaughter  of  the  allies  who  were 
serving  in  the  Peloponnesian  army.  Eteonicus  extricated  him- 
self with  the  same  resourcefulness  which  he  had  shown  at  Myti- 
lene.  Collecting  a  band  of  fifteen  men,  armed  with  daggers, 
he  passed  through  the  streets  of  Chios,  and  on  meeting  a 
conspirator  cut  him  down  on  the  spot.  A  crowd  gathered 
round,  inquiring  why  the  man  was  slain.  "  Because  he  was 
wearing  a  reed"  was  the  answer,  and  no  sooner  was  this 
known  than  every  one  who  was  wearing  a  reed  made  haste 
to  throw  it  away.  The  conspiracy  thus  broken  up,  Eteonicus 
called  the  Chians  together,  and  urged  them  to  supply  him 
with  funds  to  pay  his  sailors,  who  would  otherwise  mutiny. 
The  Chians  agreed,  upon  which  Eteonicus,  ordering  the 
sailors  to  go  on  board,  visited  each  trireme  in  turn,  and 
carefully  concealing  his  knowledge  of  the  recent  conspiracy 
from  the  crews,  presented  them  with  a  month's  pay.1 

17.  The  Athenians  still  remained  inactive.  Two  additional 
commanders  were  sent  out  to  join  Conon — Adimantus,  a 
former  colleague  at  Andros,  and  Philocles  ;  Adimantus  was  an 
oligarch,  subsequently  suspected  of  traitorous  communications 
with  the  enemy,  Philocles  a  democrat,  who  was  prepared  to 
outstrip  Cleon  in  his  cruel  punishment  of  conquered  enemies 
(see  infra,  p.  458).    Such  officers,  even  if  com- 

j   vi    i  11.  -i  Thelonians 

petent,  were  not  likely  to  work  harmoniously  ask  for  Ly_ 
together,  and  the  opportunity  of  reviving  the  sander  to  be 
fortunes  of  Athens  in  Ionia  was  allowed  to  slip. 
Eteonicus  remained  unmolested  at  Chios,  while  the  cities  of 
the  coast  annoyed,  rather  than  alarmed,  by  the  petty  inroads 
of  the  Athenians,  gathered  fresh  courage.    It  was  resolved 
to  despatch  envoys  to  Sparta  with  a  request  that  Lysander 
should  be  sent  out  to  take  command  of  the  fleet.    His  name 


1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  1.  I  f. 


452  LY SANDER  AGAIN  IN  COMMAND,  405.     [XII.  17. 


was  all-powerful  in  the  cities  of  Ionia,  and  he  was  also  the 
personal  friend  of  Cyrus,  who  indeed  sent  ambassadors  of 
his  own  to  support  the  request  of  the  Greeks.1 

The  laws  of  the  Spartans  did  not  permit  the  same  man  to 
serve  as  admiral  twice,  but  this  difficulty  was  overcome  by 
electing  Abacus  as  admiral,  and  Lysander  as  his  epistoleus 
or  lieutenant.  Aracus  was  nobody,  and  intended  to  be 
nobody  ;  indeed  it  is  doubtful  whether  he  left  Sparta  at  all. 
The  command  of  the  fleet  was  given  to  Lysander,  who 
arrived  at  Ephesus  in  the  spring  of  405. 2 

In  this  instance,  as  so  often,  we  see  the  vast  importance  of 
personal  influence  in  Greek  history.  Lysander  had  no  sooner 
Lysander  arrived  in  Asia  than  the  war  took  a  new  turn, 
and  Cyrus.  jje  summoned  Eteonicus  from  Chios  to  Ephesus, 
collected  and  repaired  any  vessels  which  had  taken  refuge 
elsewhere,  and  arranged  to  build  new  ships  at  Antandrus. 
Then  he  applied  to  Cyrus  for  the  money,  without  which 
operations  were  impossible,  and  Cyrus — though  nothing  was 
now  left  of  the  money  given  to  him  by  the  King — supplied 
him  from  his  own  resources  so  liberally  that  Lysander  was 
able  to  pay  all  arrears  due  to  his  sailors,  and  fit  his  ships  for 
action.  The  Athenians  advanced  to  Chios  and  Ephesus  in 
the  hope  of  engaging  with  Lysander,  but  failing  to  prevent 
the  union  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  they  contented  themselves 
with  putting  their  ships  in  order  and  awaiting  the  event.3 

The  Athenians,  meanwhile,  were  listening  to  the  Frogs  of 
Aristophanes,  and  laughing  over  the  adventures  of  Dionysus 
The  "Frogs"  of  when  journeying  to  Hades  in  search  of  a  tragic 
Aristophanes.    poet  to  take  the  place  of  Sophocles,  who  had 

recently  died.  The  play  is,  to  a  large  extent,  a  condemna- 
tion of  Euripides,  but  the  poet  has  seized  the  opportunity  to 
tell  the  Athenians  some  home  truths  about  the  political 


1  Xen.  Hell,  ii.  1.  6,  7  ;  Diod.  xiii.  100.  For  Cyrus  and  Lysander, 
see  Isocrates,  Panath.  39. 

2  Xen.  Hell.  I.e.,  where  see  Underbill's  note  on  the  admiral;  Plut. 
Lys.  7.    See  also  Beloeh,  Rhein.  Mus.  34.  117  ff. 

3  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  1.  10-12  ;  Diod.  xiii.  104. 


XII.  17.]    '  THE  "FROGS"  OF  ARISTOPHANES,  405.  453 


situation  at  the  moment.  The  dissensions  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred, in  spite  of  the  excellent  constitution  which  followed, 
had  left  bitter  memories  behind  them.  Many  citizens  had 
been  deprived  of  their  franchise ;  others  had  been  driven  into 
exile.    Aristophanes  counsels  reconciliation  and  unity. 

"We  ought  to  put  all  the  citizens  on  an  equality,"  he  says, 
"  and  remove  their  apprehensions.  If  any  one  was  thrown  by 
the  tricks  of  Phrynichus,  those  who  slipped  then  ought  to 
be  allowed  to  purge  their  offence,  and  put  away  their  mis- 
deeds. No  one  in  the  city  ought  to  be  deprived  of  his 
franchise;  it  is  disgraceful  that  those  who  have  fought  in 
one  battle,  and  one  only,  should  forthwith  be  '  Plataeans '  and 
masters  after  being  slaves,1  though  I  am  far  from  saying  that 
this  arrangement  is  not  a  good  one— in  fact,  it  is  the  only 
sensible  thing  that  you  have  done  ;  but  surely  those  who,  like 
their  fathers  before  them,  have  often  fought  at  our  side,  and 
are,  moreover,  our  kinsmen,  ought  to  be  forgiven  this  one 
offence.  Eelax  your  wrath,  you  who  are  naturally  the 
wisest  of  men,  and  let  us  gladly  make  every  one  who  will 
fight  on  our  side  a  kinsman  and  a  citizen  with  full  rights. 
If  we  behave  ourselves  in  this  proud  and  froward  spirit  when 
our  city  is  in  the  trough  of  the  seas,  we  shall  be  found  some 
day  to  have  made  a  great  mistake."2 

From  other  passages  in  the  play  we  see  that  the  conduct 
of  Theramenes  at  the  trial  of  the  generals  had  made  a  deep 
impression  on  the  city.  "Always  to  take  the  easier  place  is 
the  mark  of  a  man  of  ability,  a  born  Theramenes."  "  A  clever 
man  is  Theramenes,  and  quick  at  all  points.  If  a  comrade 
gets  into  a  scrape,  and  he  is  standing  by,  he  quickly  falls 
clear  of  the  mischief— no  Chian  but  a  Cean."3  Cleophon 
also,  who  took  a  foremost  part  in  rejecting  the  terms  of 


1  The  slaves  who  fought  at  Arginusae  were  allowed  to  become 
"Plataeans,"  i.e.  Athenian  citizens  with  a  limited  franchise,  like  the 
survivors  of  the  Plataeans  after  the  destruction  of  their  city  in  427 

2  Aristoph.  Frogs,  687  ff. 

3  Aristoph.  Frogs,  541,  965.  Hnos  was  the  name  given  to  the 
worst  throw  at  dice  ;  Ceos  was  the  birthplace  of  Theramenes. 


454 


LYSANDER  AND  CYRUS,  405.  [XII.  18. 


peace  with  Sparta,  comes  in  for  a  share  of  abuse,  as  he  always 
does  in  the  comedies  of  Aristophanes.  "  On  his  chattering  lips 
the  Thracian  swallow  mourns  and  raves,  perched  on  foliage 
of  alien  growth,  and  twitters  a  melancholy  nightingale  strain, 
that  he  will  be  lost  even,  even  if  the  votes  are  equal." 1 

In  407  a  new  and  debased  coinage,  of  gold,  had  been 
introduced  into  the  city,  in  the  foolish  hope  of  lightening  the 
financial  strain.  Aristophanes  speaks  of  this  new  coinage 
with  great  contempt  in  comparison  with  the  old  pure  silver 
coinage ;  urging  the  Athenians  to  cling  to  the  old  coins  and 
throw  what  is  new  and  worthless  aside.  So  also  must  they 
cling  to  men  of  the  old  true  stamp.  "  The  only  hope  of 
Athens  lies  in  the  employment  of  those  good  and  worthy 
citizens,  who  are  now  as  it  were  out  in  the  cold,  and  the  one 
hero  of  them  all,  round  whom  the  scattered  forces  of  the  city 
may  still  rally,  is  a  man  whom  they  half  love,  half  hate, 
yet  with  whose  services  they  cannot  dispense — the  exile 
Alcibiades."  2 

l8.  Cyrus  was  now  called  away  to  visit  his  father, 
Darius  II.,  who  had  fallen  sick  and  felt  his  death  to  be  at 
hand.  Before  leaving  Sardis,  he  sent  for  Lysander  and 
created  him  his  vicegerent  in  his  absence.  Placing  in  his 
hands  his  surplus  funds,  and  assigning  to  him  the  revenue  of 
his  cities,  he  charged  him  strictly  to  spare  no  expense  in 
building  ships,  and  not  to  engage  with  the  Athenians,  unless 
his  forces  were  far  superior  in  number.3 

Lysander's  plans  went  beyond  the  reconstruction  of  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet.  He  was  resolved  that  a  Lacedaemonian 
empire  should  take  the  place  of  the  Athenian  empire,  and  as 
a  necessary  step  to  this  end,  democratical  government  must 

1  Aristoph.  Frogs,  679  ff.  The  language  is  intentionally  grotesque. 
Cleophon  was  not  a  native  Athenian.  Lysias  speaks  of  Cleophon  in 
a  different  tone,  30.  IO  ff.  It  was  the  rule  to  acquit  a  criminal  if 
the  votes  were  equal,  but  the  misdeeds  of  Cleophon  were  too  patent. 

2  Merry's  Frogs,  Introd.  p.  6;  ib.  1.  720  ff.  ;  1418  ff. 

3  Plutarch,  Lys.  9,  adds  that  Cyrus  promised  to  bring  up  additional 
ships  from  Phoenicia  and  Cilicla,  which  may  be  true,  but  these 
"  Phoenician  ships  "  were  always  coming,  and  never  came. 


XII.  i8.]       LYSANDER  IN  THE  AEGEAN,  405.  455 


be  rooted  out.  Wherever  it  was  possible,  he  removed  his 
opponents  and  established  a  strictly  oligarchical  government 
under  the  control  of  decarchies  and  harmosts.  As  soon  as 
he  could  leave  Ephesus,  he  repaired  to  Miletus,  where  his 
oligarchical  friends  had  already  endeavoured  to  Lysander  at 
force  a  revolution  on  the  people,  but  without  Miletus, 
success.  Both  parties  were  by  this  time  prepared  to  forget 
the  quarrel,  and  Lysander,  who  pretended  to  agree  in  this 
reconciliation,  publicly  threatened  the  authors  of  the  revolu- 
tion with  punishment.  When  he  had  thus  induced  the 
democrats  to  remain  in  the  city,  he  attacked  them  at  the 
festival  of  the  Dionysia,  and  cut  down  more  than  three 
hundred  of  them  •  the  rest  of  the  party,  to  the  number  of  a 
thousand,  found  refuge  with  Pharnabazus.1 

Lysander  was  now  in  a  position  to  treat  the  Athenian  fleet 
with  the  contempt  which  it  deserved.  Regardless  of  its 
presence,  he  sailed  down  the  coast  to  Caria, 
and  then  struck  across  the  Aegean  to  Aegina  in  Attica : 
and  Attica.  The  cities  of  the  archipelago  he  sails  to 
saw  with  astonishment  a  Peloponnesian  fleet  Abydus' 
cruising  at  will  in  the  waters  which  Athens  had  so  long 
claimed  as  her  own  domain.  In  Attica  he  had  an  interview 
with  Agis,  in  which  the  course  may  have  been  fixed  upon 
which  he  finally  took  for  the  destruction  of  Athens.  Agis 
had  already  called  the  attention  of  the  Lacedaemonian 
authorities  to  the  supplies  which  reached  Athens  through 
the  Bosphorus,  and  rendered  useless  his  own  efforts  to  reduce 
the  city.  If  the  corn-ships  which  sailed  out  of  the  Pontus 
in  large  numbers  just  before  the  autumn  equinox  were 
allowed  to  reach  the  Peiraeus,  the  city  would  easily  bear  a 
protracted  siege.  The  cities  of  Ionia  were  indeed  secured, 
but  Byzantium  and  Chalcedon,  Sestos  and  Lampsacus  were 
still  in  the  hands  of  Athens  :  it  was  there  that  the  blow  must 
be  struck,  if  the  efforts  of  so  many  long  years  were  at  last  to 
be  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion.  From  Attica,  Lysander 


1  Diod.  xiii.  104;  Plut.  Lys.  9. 


456  LYSANDER  IN  THE  HELLESPONT,  405.    [XII.  19. 


seems  to  have  carried  his  fleet  back  to  Rhodes,  whence  as  the 
summer  went  on  he  sailed  northwards  as  far  as  Abydus.1 

19.  On  hearing  that  Lysander  had  sailed  to  the  Hellespont, 
the  Athenians  chose  three  additional  generals — Menander, 
Tydeus,  and  Cephisodotus 2 — and  followed  him  from  Chios 
with  their  whole  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  vessels, 
keeping  well  out  to  sea  as  the  coast  was  now  hostile  to  them. 
Before  they  arrived,  he  had  already  passed  from  Abydus  to 
Lysander  at  Lampsacus,  which  he  took  by  storm  and  gave 
Lampsacus.  over  to  his  soldiers  to  plunder,  for,  in  spite  of 
the  previous  capture  by  the  Athenians,  Lampsacus  was  still  a 
wealthy  city,  and  filled  with  supplies  of  all  kinds.  The  news 
of  this  disaster  was  brought  to  the  Athenians  immediately 
after  their  arrival  at  Elaeus ;  they  at  once  re-embarked  for 
Sestos,  and  after  obtaining  supplies  there,  advanced  to  the 
harbour  of  Aegospotami,  opposite  Lampsacus,3  where  Lysander 
was  still  stationed  with  his  ships.  The  hostile  fleets  were  now 
in  full  view  of  each  other,  for  the  Hellespont  is  at  this  point 
The  Athenians  not  (lu^e  two  miles  broad.  As  it  was  too 
at  Aegospo-       late  for  an  engagement,  the  Athenians  went  on 

1,1  shore  for  the  night,  according  to  the  custom  of 

Greek  sailors,  and  took  their  evening  meal.  Early  on  the 
following  morning,  Lysander  put  his  men  on  board,  and  made 
complete  and  minute  arrangements  for  a  battle,  giving  orders 
at  the  same  time  that  no  one  should  stir  from  his  post,  or  put 
his  ship  out  to  sea.  The  Athenians  also  embarked  at  sunrise, 
and  drew  up  their  ships  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  of 
Lampsacus,  but  after  waiting  the  whole  day  without  any 
forward  movement  on  Lysander's  part,  they  returned  to 
Aegospotami.  When  they  retired,  Lysander  sent  his  swiftest 
vessels  to  watch  their  movements ;  and  till  these  returned  he 


1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  1.  15,  16 ;  Plut.  Lys.  9 ;  Diod.  xiii.  104.  Diodorus 
speaks  of  a  pursuit  of  Lysander  by  the  Athenian  fleet.  Of  the  visit 
to  Attica,  Xenophon  says  nothing. 

2  Xenophon's  language  would  lead  us  to  believe  that  the  fleet  chose 
these  generals,  and  so  Gilbert  takes  it,  Beitrdge,  p.  390. 

3  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  1.  15-21;  Plut.  Lys.  9;  Diod.  xiii,  104, 


XII.  19- ]      THE  ATHENIANS  FOLLOW  HIM,  405. 


457 


kept  his  men  on  board.  For  four  days  in  succession  these 
manoeuvres  were  repeated,  for  Lysander  would  not  put  to 
sea,  and  the  Athenians  dared  not  attack  him  under  cover  of 
the  land.  The  delay  which  was  of  no  importance  to  one  fleet 
was  fatal  to  the  other.  Lysander,  lying  close  to  Lampsacus, 
had  ample  stores  of  all  kinds  at  hand ;  his  crews  were  kept 
together,  and  could  go  on  board  at  a  moment's  notice,  but  the 
Athenians  were  stationed  in  a  desert  harbour,  where  the 
sailors  had  to  fetch  their  provisions  from  Sestos,  nearly  two 
miles  distant.  Each  day  that  Lysander  refused  to  meet  them, 
they  grew  more  contemptuous  of  the  enemy,  and  wandered 
farther  from  their  ships.  The  danger  of  the  situation  did  not 
escape  Alcibiades,  who  watched  the  movements  from  one  of  his 
fortresses  (supra,  p.  429).  Biding  up  to  the  Athenian  camp,  he 
begged  the  generals  to  remove  their  ships  to  Sestos,  offering 
at  the  same  time  to  obtain  for  them  the  assistance  of  the 
Thracian  princes  —  Medocus  and  Seuthes — who  were  his 
friends.  The  advice  was  wise,  and  it  was  given  by  one  who 
knew  by  bitter  experience  the  tactics  of  Lysander ;  the  value 
of  it  is  not  lessened  if  we  suppose  that  Alcibiades  wished  to 
secure  his  own  return  home,  or  believe  Diodorus,  who  asserts 
that  he  asked  for  a  share  in  the  command.  But  it  was 
rejected ;  the  generals,  with  Tydeus  and  Menander  at  their 
head,  bade  him  depart :  the  fleet  was  in  their  charge,  not 
in  his.1 

On  the  fifth  day  the  Athenians  advanced  as  before,  pre- 
pared to  attack,  and  Lysander,  as  usual,  refused  to  meet 
them.  But  he  gave  orders  to  the  ships  which  followed  them 
to  the  shore  to  sail  back  as  soon  as  they  saw  them  disem- 
barked and  scattered  along  the  Chersonese,  and  raise  a  shield 
when  in  midchannel.  On  seeing  the  signal  he  ordered  his 
fleet  to  advance  with  the  utmost  speed  upon  the  enemy,  while 
the  land  forces,  under  the  command  of  Thorax,  marched  along 
the  coast  to  be  in  readiness,  if  needed.     Of  the  Athenian 


1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  1.  22-26  ;  Plut.  Lys.  10 :  Ale.  36,  37  ;  Djod. 
xiii.  105f 


458 


THE  BATTLE  OF  AEG OSPO TAMI,  405.     [XII.  20. 


generals  Conon  alone  appears  to  have  been  on  the  watch,  and 
he  at  once  gave  the  signal  for  action.    But  the  crews  were 

scattered;  in  some  vessels  there  were  rowers 
captures  the  enough  for  two  banks  of  oars,  in  others  for  one ; 
Athenian  others  were  entirely  empty ;  only  Conon's  own 

ship  with  seven  others  and  the  Paralus  were 
fully  manned.  These  escaped ;  the  rest  of  the  fleet  Lysander 
captured  before  they  had  time  to  put  to  sea,  all  the  crews  being 
taken  except  those  who  escaped  to  the  fortresses  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood. Conon  with  his  eight  ships  fled  to  join  Evagoras 
in  Cyprus  ;  the  Paralus  returned  to  Athens  with  the  news  of 
the  destruction  of  her  last  fleet.1 

20.  Lysander  returned  with  his  prizes  to  Lampsacus. 
Before  the  day  closed  he  despatched  Theopompus,  a  Milesian 
freebooter,  to  Sparta  with  the  news  of  his  victory,  and  so 
great  was  the  speed  of  the  pirate's  vessel,  that  it  reached 
the  city  on  the  third  day.  Lysander  then  assembled  the  allies 
to  deliberate  on  the  fate  of  the  captives,  and  the  opportunity 
was  not  lost.  Many  and  bitter  were  the  accusations  against 
the  Athenians ;  old  and  new  iniquities  were  charged  against 
them,  and  among  the  most  recent  a  resolution  which  they 
had  passed,  on  the  proposal  of  Philocles,  to  strike  off  the  hand 
of  every  prisoner,2  and  the  action  of  Philocles  himself  in 
dashing  from  the  rocks  the  entire  crews  of  two  triremes  which 
Massacre  of  had  fallen  into  his  hands.  It  was  resolved  to 
the  Athenians.  pUt  to  death  all  the  Athenian  prisoners,  except 
Adimantus,  who  had  opposed  the  decree  to  mutilate  the 


1  Xen.  I.e.  27-29;  Plut.  Lys.  11;  Alcib.  37.  Diodorus,  xiii.  106, 
gives  a  somewhat  different  account.  According  to  him,  Philocles, 
who  was  in  command  for  the  day,  ordered  the  trierarchs  to  man  their 
vessels  and  follow  him.  He  put  out  speedily  with  thirty  vessels, 
before  the  rest  were  ready,  and  Lysander  on  hearing  of  this  at  once 
attacked.  Philocles  was  defeated  ;  the  rest  were  unprepared  ;  and  at 
the  same  time  the  Lacedaemonian  infantry  under  the  command  of 
Eteonicus  were  put  on  shore  and  captured  part  of  the  Athenian 
camp.  Lysander  then  completed  the  destruction  of  the  fleet.  Lysias, 
21.  11,  speaks  of  twelve  ships  which  escaped,  in  which  the  eight 
ships  under  Conon  are  not  included. 

2  Plut.  Lys.  9. 


XIL  20.]     THE  ATHENIAN  FLEET  CAPTURED,  405.  459 


captives ;  or,  as  some  said,  had  betrayed  the  fleet  to  Lysander. 
The  remainder,  to  the  number  of  three  thousand,  were  slain 
on  the  spot,  beginning  with  Philocles,  who,  though  blood- 
thirsty and  incompetent,  was  a  man  of  high  spirit.  When 
asked  by  Lysander  what  penalty  a  man  ought  justly  to  suffer, 
who  had  urged  his  citizens  to  exercise  such  cruelty  upon 
Greeks,  he  bade  him  make  no  accusations  where  there  were 
no  judges  to  hear  them ;  now  that  he  was  victorious,  let  him 
do  as  he  would  have  been  done  by  had  he  been  conquered. 
Then  after  taking  a  bath  and  putting  on  his  best  attire,  he  led 
the  way  to  the  place  of  slaughter.1  The  bodies  of  the  slain 
were  cast  out  unburied,  in  defiance  of  the  deepest  sentiments 
of  Greek  religion  and  the  universal  practice  of  Greek  warfare.2 
Thus  without  the  loss  of  a  single  ship  Lysander  captured 
the  enemy's  fleet,  and  put  an  end  at  once  to  the  Athenian 
empire  and  the  Peloponnesian  war.  The  contest,  so  long  and 
stoutly  maintained,  was  decided  almost  without  a  blow ;  the 
city,  whose  courage  had  overcome  the  disaster  of  Syracuse, 
fell  a  victim  to  the  incompetence  of  her  own  generals,  and  in 
less  than  a  year  from  the  battle  of  Arginusae,  in  which  she 
seemed  to  have  swept  her  enemy  from  the  sea,  Athens  was 
left  with  hardly  a  trireme  to  call  her  own.  Plutarch,  moralis- 
ing on  the  success  of  Lysander,  remarks  that  in  many  minds 
the  achievement  was  regarded  as  superhuman,  and  tells  us  of 
omens  and  portents  which  preceded  the  event.  But  the  defeat 
of  Aegospotami  was  brought  about  by  causes  which  are  as 
common  as  they  are  human.  Lysander  conquered  in  the 
Hellespont  by  the  same  tactics  by  which  he  had  conquered 
at  Notium ;  he  refused  to  fight  till  he  had  beguiled  the  enemy 
into  security  and  could  take  him  at  an  advantage.  He  may 
have  been  assisted  by  the  treachery  of  his  opponents,  though 

1  Theophrastus,  in  Plut.  Lys.  13. 

2  Xen.  Hell.  I.e.  ;  Plut.  Lys.  11.  For  the  treachery  of  Adim'antus, 
besides  Xenophon  see  Lysias,  14.  38.  Gilbert  denies  it,  Beitrdge, 
p.  340.  For  the  disregard  of  burial,  Pausanias,  ix.  32.  9.  Neither 
Xenophon  nor  Diodorus  mentions  this.  The  date  of  the  battle  is 
about  September  405  ;  cp.  Ath.  Pol.  34.  2,  where  it  is  placed  in  the 
archonship  of  Alexias. 


460 


POLICY  OF  LYSANDER,  405. 


[XII.  21. 


the  only  ground  for  this  accusation  is  the  clemency  shown  to 
Adimantus,  for  which  a  sufficient  reason  was  given  at  the 
time ;  but  if  their  treachery  is  uncertain,  the  gross  incom- 
petence of  the  generals  is  plain  to  every  eye.  It  is  shown 
not  only  at  Aegospotami  by  their  rejection  of  the  warning  of 
Alcibiades,  but  even  more  by  the  carelessness  with  which  they 
had  allowed  precious  time  to  slip  past  while  stationed  at 
Samos.  At  the  last,  it  is  true,  they  seem  to  have  wished  to 
engage  with  Lysander,  who,  in  spite  of  their  efforts,  sailed 
to  and  fro  as  he  pleased ;  but  they  made  no  attempt  to  destroy 
his  fleet  before  it  had  become  formidable.  The  crews  of  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet  repaired  their  vessels,  Lysander  with 
thirty-five  ships  sailed  into  Ephesus,  and  collected  help 
from  far  and  near  till  his  ships  equalled  the  Athenians'  in 
numbers,  while  the  Athenians  occupied  their  fleet  with 
inroads  upon  the  Asiatic  cities,  which  may  have  provided 
some  necessary  supplies,  but  certainly  exasperated  the  in- 
habitants into  more  active  opposition.  Lysander,  as  they  well 
knew,  had  unlimited  means  at  his  disposal ;  he  could  afford  to 
wait  for  the  favourable  moment,  without  diminishing  the 
efficiency  of  his  ships  and  crews ;  but  the  cost  of  the  Athenian 
fleet  was  a  terrible  strain  on  a  city  exhausted  in  money  and 
men.  Every  month,  every  week,  was  of  importance,  yet  the 
summer  passed  away  and  nothing  was  done,  till  Lysander 
struck  a  blow  at  the  Hellespont,  the  last  source  from  which 
Athens  could  draw  supplies. 

21.  Lysander  had  no  thought  of  making  an  immediate 
attack  on  Athens,  but  as  in  winning  his  victory,  so  in  his  use 
,    .        of  it  he  followed  a  definite  and  preconceived 

Lysander  in  | 

the  Bosphorus  plan.  Knowing  well  that  the  walls  of  Athens 
and  Hellespont.  were  impregnable,  and  that  if  the  people  re- 
sisted, by  starvation  alone  could  they  be  brought  to  surrender, 
he  resolved  to  drive  back  to  Athens  every  Athenian  whom  he 
found  in  the  cities  of  her  empire,  in  order  that  the  number  of 
her  inhabitants  might  be  increased,  and  the  effects  of  famine 
be  more  quickly  felt.  He  was  also  aware  that  his  work  was 
but  half  done,  so  long  as  Sestos,  Byzantium,  and  Chalcedon 


XII.  21.]  ATHENS  BLOCKADED,  405. 


46J 


remained  Athenian,  especially  as  Alcibiacles  was  at  hand  to 
take  advantage  of  the  situation.  To  these  cities,  after  arrang- 
ing the  affairs  of  Lampsacus,  he  directed  his  course.  Sestos 
was  taken  after  a  slight  resistance  ;  at  Byzantium  and 
Chalcedon  he  was  received  without  opposition.  The  Athenian 
garrisons  were  dismissed  on  condition  of  returning  to  Athens ; 
if  found  elsewhere,  any  Athenian  would  be  put  to  death. 
Sthenelaus,  a  Lacedaemonian,  was  then  placed  in  charge  of 
the  cities  as  harmost,  and  Lysander  returned  to  Lampsacus 
to  refit  his  ships.  When  he  had  got  together  a  fleet  of  two 
hundred  vessels,  he  sailed  to  Lesbos,  where  he  established 
harmosts  and  decarchies  in  all  the  cities  of  the  island.1 
Eteonicus  was  despatched  to  the  Thracian  coast 
to  bring  over  the  cities  there,  a  task  which  he  of  Lysander: 
easily  accomplished.  For  the  whole  of  the  sle&eof  Athens, 
remaining  allies  of  Athens  now  revolted  from  the  city,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Samos,  where  the  demos,  repeating 
the  events  of  412,  massacred  any  notables  who  had  remained 
in  the  city  or  returned  to  it,  and  kept  the  power  in  their 
own  hands.  From  Lesbos,  Lysander  announced  to  Agis  at 
Decelea  and  the  authorities  at  Sparta,  that  he  was  advancing 
upon  Athens.  The  second  king,  Pausanias,  at  once  called  out 
all  the  Peloponnesians,  except  the  Argives,  and  marched  to 
the  city,  where,  uniting  with  the  forces  from  Decelea,  they 
encamped  in  the  "  Academy,"  the  gymnasium  beyond  the 
Ceramicus.  Lysander  on  his  voyage  collected  as  inany  of 
the  Aeginetans,  Scion  aeans,  Melians  and  other  exiles  as 
he  could,  and  restored  them  to  their  respective  cities.  Then 
he  appeared  at  the  Peiraeus  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  ships, 
blockading  the  harbours,  and  entirely  preventing  the  importa- 
tion of  food.2 

It  w7as  night  when  the  Paralus  reached  Athens  with  the 
news  of  the  destruction  of  the  fleet.  The  dreadful  words 
passed  from  lip  to  lip,  till  the  wail  of  lamentation  spread  from 

1  Xeu.  Hell.  ii.  2.  I,  2,  5    Diod.  xiii.  106, 

2  Plut.  Lys.  13,  14.  Diod.  xiv.  3 gives  a  hundred  ships.  Xen.  I.e.', 
Jspcr.  adv.  Call.  §  61. 


462 


THE  SIEGE  OF  ATHENS,  405.  [XII.  21. 


the  Peiraeus  to  the  city,  and  "for  that  night  no  one  slept." 
Sorrow  for  the  dead  was  mingled  with  fear  for  the  future,  for 
the  day  of  vengeance  was  at  last  come,  and  full  measure 
would  now  be  exacted  for  the  wrongs  inflicted  on  the  helpless 
allies — on  Aegina,  Scione,  Melos,  and  others.  Yet  even  in 
_   A  ,    .       this  dire  crisis,  the  courage  of  the  Athenians  did 

The  Athenians  '  ° 

prepare  for  not  fail.  If  there  was  no  prospect  of  a  success- 
a  siege.  fui  resistance,  there  was  at  least  a  hope  of 

obtaining  better  terms,  should  the  enemy  feel  that  they  had  still 
something  to  conquer.  On  the  next  day  an  Assembly  was 
held,  at  which  it  was  resolved  to  prepare  for  a  siege  by  filling 
up  the  mouths  of  all  the  harbours  but  one,  repairing  the  walls 
where  necessary,  and  manning  them.  They  had  expected  to  see 
Lysander  enter  the  Peiraeus  every  hour,  and  when  his  coming 
was  delayed,  they  recovered  a  little  from  their  consternation. 

It  was  not  long  before  they  discovered  the  meaning  of 
the  delay.  Fugitives  poured  in  from  one  city  after  another, 
swelling  the  multitude  which  had  to  be  fed.  Meanwhile 
Agis  had  marched  up  from  Decelea  and  Pausanias  from  the 
Peloponnesus,  and  at  last  Lysander  appeared.  By  land  and 
sea  the  hostile  forces  closed  round  the  doomed  city.  But 
the  walls  of  Themistocles  could  neither  be  stormed  nor 
destroyed ;  the  vast  array  of  force  was  helpless  against  them, 
and  as  Lysander  had  foreseen,  it  was  necessary  to  await 
the  effect  of  famine.  Pausanias  returned  to  Sparta,  Agis  to 
Decelea,  Lysander's  fleet  remained  off  the  Peiraeus  to  cut  off 
supplies.    Athens  was  left  to  starve.1 

22.  The  feeling  that  all  were  involved  in  a  common 
calamity,  that  the  city  needed  the  help  of  all  who  could  help 
Proposals  her,  promoted  harmony  for  the  moment  among 
for  peace.  the  various  sections  of  the  citizens.  Old  en- 
mities were  forgotten ;  and  many  who  had  been  deprived  of 
the  franchise  were  now  restored  to  their  rights.2    Ere  long 

1  Diod.  xiii.  107  ;  Plut.  Lys.  14. 

2  This  was  done  on  the  motion  of  Patroclides,  see  Andoc.  Myst. 
73  ff.  ;  Lys.  25,  27.  Perhaps  it  was  little  more  than  a  movement  to 
give  power  to  the  oligarchical  section  in  the  city. 


XII.  22.]         PROPOSALS  FOR  PEACE,  405-404. 


463 


the  inevitable  evil  appeared :   food  began   to  run  short. 
Envoys  were  sent  to  Agis,  intimating  that  Athens  would  join 
the  alliance  of  Sparta,  if  she  might  retain  the  Long  Walls 
and  Peiraeus.    Agis  bade  them  apply  to  Lacedaemon,  but 
when  they  reached  Sellasia,  on  the  borders  of  Laconia,  they 
were  stopped  by  the  ephors,  who  informed  them  that  they 
must  come  with  more  reasonable  proposals.1    These  tidings 
caused  the  greatest  despair  in  the  city.    Slavery  was  the 
doom  to  which  all  looked  forward ;  and  even  while  a  second 
embassy  was  being  arranged,  many  would  die  of  famine. 
Yet  when  Archestratus  suggested  that  ten  stadia  of  the 
Long  Walls  should  be  destroyed,  as  the  Lacedaemonians 
demanded,  he  was  at  once  thrown  into  prison,  and  on  a  motion, 
probably  due  to  Cleophon,  who  declared  that  he  would 
cut  the  throat  of  any  citizen  who  so  much  as  mentioned 
peace,  it  was  forbidden  by  public  decree  to  support  any  pro- 
posal of  the  kind.     Theramenes  now  came  forward  and 
suggested  that  he  should  go  to  Lysander  and  discover  what  the 
Lacedaemonians  really  meant  by  their  demand.   To  Lysander 
accordingly  he  went,  and  remained  with  him  three  months,  by 
which  time  Athens  was  reduced  to  such  a  plight  that  any 
terms  must  be  accepted.2    Even  when  he  returned,  he  merely 
reported  that  Lysander  had  referred  him  to  the  home  govern- 
ment for  terms.    Ten  envoys,  of  whom  he  was  one,  were  at 
once  despatched  with  full  powers  to  Sparta,  where  an  Assembly 
of  the  allies  was  summoned  by  the  ephors  to  discuss  the 
terms  of  peace.    The  envoys  of  Thebes  and  Corinth  were 
against  making  any  terms  at  all ;  they  wished  to  see  Athens 
utterly  destroyed,  but  Sparta  nobly  refused  to  enslave  a 


_  1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  2.  11  f.,  who  says  that,  though  many  died  of  starva- 
tion, no  mention  was  made  of  reconciliation,  and  it  was  only  when  the 
supply  of  food  was  exhausted  that  the  proposals  were  made.  This  is 
inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  the  city  held  out  for  more  than  three 
months  longer. 

2  Where  Lysander  was  at  this  time  it  is  not  easy  to  make  out  •  it 
appears  that  he  did  not  go  to  Samos  till  after  the  capitulation ;  and 
yet  he  cannot  have  remained  all  the  time  with  his  fleet  off  the 
Peiraeus 


464 


ATHENS  CAPITULATES,  404.  [XII.  22. 


Greek  city,  "  which  had  rendered  great  service  to  Greece  in 
her  hour  of  danger."  If  Athens  would  destroy  the  Long 
Walls  and  the  fortifications  of  the  Peiraeus,  receive  back  the 
exiles,  surrender  all  her  ships  of  war  except  twelve,  withdraw 
from  all  the  cities  of  her  empire,  and  join  the  Lacedaemonian 
confederacy,  Sparta  would  grant  peace,  and  allow  the  city  to 
retain  her  independence.  At  Athens  the  ground  had  been 
cleared  in  the  meantime  by  the  removal  of  Cleophon,  who  was 
brought  to  trial  on  a  charge  of  desertion  and  executed.  When 
Theramenes  returned,  a  multitude  gathered  round  him,  eager 
to  learn  their  fate.  Had  he  failed  in  his  mission,  and  was  the 
famine  still  to  rage  in  the  city  1  Or  what  were  the  terms  on 
which  Athens  was  to  purchase  her  existence  1  The  next  day 
an  Assembly  was  summoned  at  which  the  envoys  made  their 
report,  and  Theramenes  advised  that  the  terms  should  be 
accepted.  Even  at  this  last  moment  there  were  some  who 
The  urged  resistance,  but  this  was  mere  insanity; 

capitulation.  ^e  people,  by  a  large  majority,  were  in  favour 
of  peace.  Lysander  at  once  sailed  into  the  Peiraeus,  and,  amid 
great  rejoicing,  "to  the  sound  of  flutes,"  the  work  of  destruc- 
tion was  begun.  That  day  was  thought  to  be  the  dawn  of 
freedom  for  Greece  (Munychion  16= April  404).1 

23.  After  the  capitulation,  Lysander  sailed  to  Samos,  which 
was  still  independent.  Successful  resistance  to  such  a  force 
Lysander  at  as  he  had  at  command  was  hopeless,  yet  the 
Samos.  Samians  held  out  for  a  time,  and  at  length 

were  allowed  to  leave  the  island  uninjured.  The  oligarchs 
were  restored  to  their  homes  and  their  property,  but  the 

1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  2.  15-23  ;  Plut.  Lys.  14,  who  gives  the  text  of  the 
resolution  of  the  ephors ;  Diod.  xiii.  107  ;  Ath.  Pol.  34.  In  her  first 
proposals,  Sparta  was  willing  to  allow  Athens  to  retain  Lemnos, 
Imbros,  and  Scyros,  but  afterwards  this  concession  was  withdrawn ; 
similarly,  the  destruction  of  ten  stadia  of  the  Long  Walls  is  increased 
to  the  destruction  of  the  Long  Walls  and  fortifications  of  Peiraeus. 
For  the  opposition  of  Cleophon,  see  Lysias,  13.  8  f.,  who  also  puts  the 
conduct  of  Theramenes  in  a  very  unfavourable  light.  Among  those 
who  resisted  to  the  last  were  the  generals  Strombichides  and  Dio- 
nysodorus.  According  to  Plutarch,  Lysander  went  to  Samos  during 
the  siege,  but  Xenophon  does  not  mention  this. 


XII.  23.]  PARTIES  AT  A THENS, 


465 


government  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  decarchy  of  Spartans, 
with  Thorax  as  harmost.1  As  his  work— the  destruction  of  the 
Athenian  empire  and  of  democracy—seemed  now  to  be  com- 
plete, Lysander  dismissed  the  various  contingents  of  the  allied 
fleet  to  their  respective  cities,  while  with  the  Lacedaemonian 
squadron  he  returned  to  Laconia,  taking  with  him  the  prows 
of  the  captured  vessels  and  the  navy  of  Athens.  He  also 
brought  the  crowns  which  he  had  received  from  grateful 
cities  as  gifts  to  himself,  and  a  sum  of  470  talents  in  silver, 
the  surplus  of  the  tribute-money  assigned  to  him  by  Cyrus 
for  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  other  property  gained  in  his 
successes,  all  which  he  delivered  to  the  Lacedaemonians  "at 
the  end  of  the  summer."2 

Athens  was  at  peace  with  Sparta,  but  she  was  not  at  peace 
with  herself.    We  have  seen  that  in  411  there  were  three 
distinct  parties  in  the  city:   oligarchs  who  Factions  at 
would  have  nothing  but  oligarchy,  even  if  they  Athens, 
were  kept  in  power  by  Sparta;  moderates,  who  would  make 
the  franchise  co-extensive  with  civic  duties ;  and  the  extreme 
democrats,  who  maintained  that  Athens  was  the  Athenian 
people.    From  the  Constitution  of  Athens  we  learn  that  the 
same  parties  reappeared  on  the  present  occasion.    No  sooner 
had  Lysander  departed  than  Athens  was  disturbed  by  civic 
contention.    The  constitution  under  which  the  Athenians 
were  to  live  had  not  been  precisely  fixed  when  peace  was 
made.     The  democracy  wished  to  preserve  the  constitu- 
tion unaltered; 3  the  notables,  who  could  rely  on  associations 
or  clubs,  were  eager  for  oligarchy,  while  others,  who,  though 
without  the  support  of  clubs,  claimed  to  be  among  the  leading 
men  of  the  state,  wished  for  y  ^drptos  TroWa,  a  modified 

1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  3.  6;  Diod.  xiv.  3  ;  Plut.  Lyc.  14.  Thorax  had 
A^:;~nd  °f  ^  LaCedaemo™»  -™ 7  ^  Lampsacus  and 

*  Xen  Hell.il  3.  7  ff.  Plutarch  (Lys.  16)  differs  from  this  ;  in  his 
account  Lysander  sails  from  Samos  to  Thrace,  and  Gylippus  takes  the 
money  home,  appropriating  some  on  the  way-in  whichsoever  he 
is  detected.    Cp.  Diorl.  xiii.  106.  however,  ne 

3  Aih.  Pol.  34  :  diaaoi^eiv  rbv  8r}fj.ov. 

VOL.  III.  2(} 


466   OLIGARCHS,  MODERATES,  DEMOCRATS,  404.  [XII. 


democracy,  like  that  of  Clisthenes,  with  a  restriction  of  the 
franchise.1 

The  numbers  of  the  oligarchical  party  were  increased  by 
the  exiles,  who,  on  the  proposal  of  Theramenes,  were  allowed 
Critias.  t0  return  immediately  after  the  conclusion  of 

peace.2  Foremost  among  these  was  Critias,  the 
son  of  Callaeschrus,  who,  since  his  banishment  in  406,  had 
lived  in  Thessaly,  the  chosen  land  of  those  who  found  the 
existence  of  a  law-abiding  citizen  intolerable.3  While  there, 
he  had  occupied  himself  with  organising  a  rebellion  of  the 
Penestae  against  their  masters,  from  a  restless  spirit  of  faction 
rather  than  a  love  of  freedom  or  democratical  government,4 
for  he  was  himself  a  warm  admirer  of  the  Spartan  system, 
and  had  even  written  a  treatise  on  it.  Other  members  of  the 
extreme  party  were  Satyrus,  by  whom  Cleophon  was  brought 
to  execution,  Charmides,  Theognis,  and  Eratosthenes.  Alci- 
biades  either  could  not  or  would  not  return.  He  was  too 
deeply  implicated  in  hostility  to  Sparta  to  come  back  at  a 
moment  when  Spartan  influences  were  all-powerful.  After 
the  conclusion  of  peace  he  left  the  Chersonese  for  the  court 
of  Pharnabazus,  who  soon  afterwards  caused  him  to  be 
assassinated,  perhaps  at  the  request  of  Critias.5  The  head 
of  the  moderate  party  was  Theramenes,  with  whom  were 
associated  Anytus,  Clitophon,  Archinus,  Phormisius,  and 
others  ;  in  the  ranks  of  the  popular  party  were  the  generals 


1  Diodorus  repeats,  but  with  less  precision,  the  account  given  in 
the  Ath.  Pol.  In  both  it  is  assumed  that  it  was  one  of  the  conditions 
of  peace  that  the  Athenians  should  retain  rj  ndrpios  rroXirela,  but 
Diodorus  says  that  the  phrase  was  differently  interpreted— by  the  oli- 
garchs as  f)  7ra\aia  KardaTaais  {i.e.  the  constitution  before  Solon), 
and  by  the  moderates  as  fj  tg>v  Trarepcov  noXirela  {i.e.  the  constitution 
of  Clisthenes).  Xenophon  fails  us  at  this  point ;  he  says  not  a  word  of 
events  between  the  capitulation  and  the  establishment  of  the  Thirty, 
01  tovs  Trarpiovs  vopovs  (Tvyypdyj/ovai. 

2  Lysias,  12.  77  ;  Xen.  ii.  3.  42. 

3  Plato,  Orito  53. 

4  Xen.  Mem.  i.  2.  24. 

6  See  Pint.  Ale.  38  ff.  ;  Beloch,  G.G.  ii.  118  f.;  Critias  probably 
took  the  same  view  of  Alcibiades  now  as  Phrynichus  had  done  in  411. 


XI I.  24. ]     L YSANDER  AGAIN  AT  A THENS,  404. 


467 


Strombichides  and  Eucrates,  and  Thrasybulus  of  Steiria,  and 
they  were  afterwards  joined  by  many  of  the  moderates 'such 
as  Archinus  and  Anytus. 

m  Immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  the  associa- 
tions on  which  the  oligarchs  chiefly  relied  began  to  show 
activity.  Five  ephors  were  elected  by  them  to  promote  the 
interests  of  their  party  in  any  way  that  seemed  expedient. 
These  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  public  magistrates  like  the 
Probuli,  who  preceded  the  former  change  of  the  constitution; 
they  were  the  servants  of  their  party,  not  the  servants  of  the 
state.  The  public  election  of  such  officers— whose  number 
and  name  are  so  significant— would  imply  a  greater  change 
in  the  constitution  than  we  have  a  right  to  assume  at  a  time 
when  the  democracy  was  still  in  existence.1  Perhaps  it  was 
by  the  secret  influence  of  these  officers  that  the  oligarchs 
were  able  to  get  rid  of  the  leaders  of  the  democratic  party. 
Strombichides,  Eucrates,  and  others  were  accused  of  con- 
spiracy, and  put  in  prison,  though  their  execution  was  not 
carried  out  till  the  Thirty  came  into  power.2 

24.  The  disputes  were  brought  to  an  end  by  the  appear- 
ance of  Lysander,  who  was  summoned  to  decide  the  question. 
In  the  Constitution  of  Athens  we  are  briefly 
informed  that  the  oligarchs  carried  the  day  ^ns^the 
with  the  support  of  Lysander,  and,  on  the  Thh-ty^'re  6 
proposal  of  Dracontides,  it  was  resolved  to  established- 
elect  thirty  commissioners  to  draw  up  a  constitution.  Dio- 
dorus,  who  seems  to  follow  the  same  authority,  gives  more 
details.    As  the  leader  of  the  moderate  party,  Theramenes 
opposed  the  proposals  of  the  oligarchs  and  Lysander,  and 
remonstrated  against  the  attempt  to  rob  the  city  of  her 
freedom,  calling  his  attention  to  the  clause  in  the  treaty 
which  allowed  the  Athenians  to  enjoy  their  hereditary  con- 

*iA^?8ia8'  12'  43'  Wh°  alone  menti°ns  these  officers,  says  expresslv 
that  they  were  elected  8WoKpariaS  ert  oV<tVS.  As  Critias  was  one  of 
them,  they  cannot  have  been  elected  before  the  return  of  the  exiles 
i.e.  before  peace  was  concluded.  ' 
2  Lysias,  13.  23  ff.,  36 ;  30.  14. 


468    THE  THIRTY  TYRANTS  ESTABLISHED,  4O4.    [XII.  24. 


stitution.  Upon  this  Lysander  declared  that  the  terms  of 
the  truce  had  already  been  violated,  because  the  walls  had  not 
been  destroyed  within  the  fixed  time,  and  even  threatened 
Theramenes  with  the  loss  of  his  life,  if  he  opposed  the  wishes 
of  the  Lacedaemonians.  The  account  in  Lysias  is  quite 
different.  Theramenes  is  here  the  arch-traitor,  to  whom  all 
the  miseries  of  Athens  are  due.  It  was  he  who  sent  for 
Lysander,  and  at  the  Assembly  everything  was  so  arranged 
that  none  of  the  popular  speakers  could  say  a  word.  Thera- 
menes then  got  up  and  moved  that  thirty  commissioners 
should  be  elected  to  arrange  the  constitution,  as  Dracontides 
had  proposed.  His  speech  was  received  with  shouts  of  dis- 
approbation, but  he  persisted  in  his  course.  The  noise  was 
nothing  to  him,  he  said  ;  and  what  he  was  doing  had  the 
approval  of  Lysander.  Then  Lysander  spoke,  charging  the 
Athenians  with  violating  the  terms  of  the  truce,  and  declar- 
ing that,  if  they  did  not  follow  the  advice  of  Theramenes,  it 
would  be  no  longer  a  matter  of  the  constitution,  but  of  the 
existence  of  the  city.  This  reduced  the  patriotic  party  to 
silence  ;  some  of  them  were  content  to  remain  in  the  Assem- 
bly and  say  nothing ;  others  went  away,  resolved  that  they, 
at  any  rate,  would  not  give  their  votes  against  their  con- 
sciences. And  so  the  bill  of  Dracontides  was  passed  by  the 
votes  of  a  treacherous  minority.1    (After  Midsummer,  404.) 

It  is  clear  from  the  oration  of  Lysias  that  there  were  many 
in  Athens  who  did  not  take  his  view  of  the  conduct  of  Thera- 
menes on  this  occasion.    So  far  from  regarding 
Theramenes.  as  ^e  cnief  author  of  the  misfortunes  of 

Athens,  they  considered  that  he  had  conferred  many  benefits 
on  the  city,  and  it  is  with  the  aim  of  dispelling  this  feeling 
that  the  orator  attacks  him.  That  Theramenes  became  one  of 
the  Thirty  is  no  proof  that  he  was  on  the  side  of  the  extreme 
oligarchs,  and  he  subsequently  lost  his  life  in  endeavouring 
to  put  an  end  to  their  excesses.    Here,  as  in  the  previous 


1  Ath.  Pol.  c.  34.  The  Thirty  were  established  in  the  archonship 
of  Pythodorus,  404-403.    Lysias,  12.  71-76;  Diod.  xiv.  3. 


sm.  24.] 


THEKAMENES,  404. 


469 


revolution,  he  seems  to  have  taken  a  middle  course,  which, 
though  it  brought  upon  him  the  hatred  of  both  extremes  at 
the  moment,  commended  itself  to  the  more  impartial  judg- 
ment of  the  historians  who  wrote  at  a  later  date.  In  spite  of 
his  previous  failure  he  still  dreamed  of  a  constitution  in  which 
the  franchise  should  be  coextensive  with  the  ability  to  serve 
as  a  heavy-armed  citizen-soldier,  and  in  order  to  bring  about 
this  end  he  may  have  acquiesced  in  calling  in  the  help  of 
Lysander,  even  though  in  doing  so  he  acted  with  men  whose 
principles  he  did  not  approve.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was 
a  statesman  with  a  policy,  and  when  the  oligarchs  showed 
themselves  to  be_  mere  selfish  tyrants,  he  reverted  to  popular 
support.  He  had  to  bear  the  reproach  of  throwing  over  his 
friends  on  either  side ;  he  lived  long  enough  to  share  in  some 
of  the  iniquities  of  the  Thirty,  and  died  too  soon  to  have  a 
part  in  the  glory  of  deposing  them.1 

With  the  establishment  of  the  Thirty  at  Athens  the 
triumph  of  Sparta  was  complete.  The  walls  were  now 
entirely  destroyed,  and  Lysander  withdrew  his  fleet,  carrying 
with  him  all  the  Athenian  triremes  but  twelve.  For  the 
moment  democracy  was  at  an  end  in  Hellas.  Everywhere 
the  "few"  were  in  power,  supported  by  Sparta,  whose 
harmosts  and  decarchies  were  in  every  state  where  there  was 
the  least  fear  of  a  popular  rising.  This  was  the  "liberation " 
for  which,  as  she  said,  Sparta  had  gone  to  war;  this  the 
"freedom"  which  dawned  on  Hellas  with  the  fall  of  Athens; 
this  was  the  gain  won  by  thirty  years  of  desolation  and 
bloodshed,  by  a  war  which  was  the  ruin  of  Hellas. 

25.  The  Thirty  were  elected  to  draw  up  a  new  constitution, 
but  before  entering  on  their  task  they  took  care  to  fill  the 
Council  and  the  public  offices  with  friends  of  their  own.  The 

1  According  to  Lysias  I.e.  ten  of  the  Thirty  were  chosen  by  Thera- 
menes,  ten  by  the  ephors,  and  ten  from  those  present  in  the  Assembly, 
but  no  other  authority  mentions  this.  It  is  possible  that  Theramenes 
may  have  had  some  understanding  with  Sparta  about  the  form  of 
constitution  at  Athens.  In  Xen.  Bell.  iii.  4.  2  we  read,  of  the  decar- 
chies established  by  Lysander,  eKncn-TcoKvias  8ca  tovs  e<popovs  ot  ras 
7rarpiovs  noXiTetas  Trepirjyyeikav. 


470 


INCREASING  TYRANNY,  404. 


[XII.  25. 


Eleven  were  selected  with  especial  care ;  at  their  head  was 
Satyrus,  who  had  already  secured  the  condemnation  of 
Cleophon.  Ten  officers  were  also  chosen  to  manage  the 
Peiraeus.  With  their  help  they  got  the  leaders  of  the  people, 
who  had  already  been  arrested,  condemned  and  executed.1 
Together  with  these,  some  citizens  of  evil  reputation,  informers 
and  the  like,  were  put  to  death  to  satisfy  the  public  conscience. 
Towards  the  object  for  which  they  were  elected,  the  Thirty 
did  little  or  nothing  beyond  simplifying  the  ordinances  of 
Solon,  cancelling  the  laws  by  which  the  Areopagus  was 
deprived  of  its  authority,  and  limiting  the  power  of  the  law- 
courts.2  This  moderate  behaviour  did  not  long  continue. 
Uncertain  of  their  power,  and  conscious  that  they  were 
contemplating  measures  which  would  not  meet  with  the 
approval  of  the  people,  the  Thirty  applied  to  Sparta  for  a 
garrison,  on  whose  help  they  could  rely  in  removing  unsuit- 
able citizens,  and  seven  hundred  hoplites  were  sent  under 
the  command  of  Callibius. 

Then  followed  a  reign  of  terror,  of  which  we  have  a  graphic 
picture  in  the  speech  of  Lysias  against  Eratosthenes.  At  once 
Tyranny  of  greedy  and  hypocritical,  the  Tyrants  looked 
the  Thirty.  round  to  see  what  rich  citizen — not  of  their  own 
order — or  alien  they  could  murder  for  his  wealth,  and  excused 
their  conduct  by  the  pretence  of  clearing  the  city  of  undesir- 
able persons,  or  aiding  the  poor  in  the  distress  which  the 
war  had  caused.  In  a  short  time  no  less  than  fifteen  hundred 
persons  are  said  to  have  fallen  victims  to  their  rapacity,  and 
numbers  were  leaving  the  city  every  day  to  find  a  refuge 
in  Thebes 3  or  Megara.  To  Theramenes  such  excesses  were 
repugnant ;  he  remonstrated  with  Critias  against  the  removal 

1  Lys.  13.  36.  The  accused  were  not  brought  into  a  court,  but 
before  the  Council — eVt  5e  Aoyo),  oaoi  els  to  fiovkevTrjpiov  eVi  tg>v  rpia- 
kovtcl  elcrrjkdov  Kpidr]a6p.evoi,  arravTcov  Oavaros  KaTeyiyvacnteTO.  See 
further,  Ath.  Pol.  36. 

2  Ath.  Pol.  35  ;  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  3.  ii.  12. 

3  A  very  few  months  sufficed  to  show  the  Thebans  that  they  would 
gain  nothing  by  Sparta's  victory.  Hence  a  complete  change  in  their 
feelings  towards  the  Athenians. 


XII.  25.]        CRITICS  AND  THERA ME2VES,  404. 


471 


of  men  whose  only  fault  was  their  eminence  or  wealth.  If 
men  like  Leon  of  Salamis,  and  Niceratus,  the  son  of  Nicias 
(who  had  never  shown  any  sympathy  with  democracy),  were 
put  to  death,  their  friends,  who  were  now  inclined  to  support 
the  oligarchical  party,  would  become  hostile  to  it.1  Critias 
retorted  that  a  tyranny  needs  equal  watchfulness,  whether  the 
tyrants  be  thirty  or  one.  Theramenes  then  pointed  out  that 
the  basis  of  power  was  too  small;  they  must  associate  with  their 
rule  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  give  them  a  real  superiority 
in  power.  The  Thirty,  to  prevent  Theramenes  from  becoming 
the  centre  of  a  party,  prepared  a  list  of  three  thousand  . 
persons  to  whom  they  were  willing  to  give  a  share  in  the 
constitution,  and  when  he  declared  that  the  number  was 
insufficient,  they  deprived  all  the  citizens,  outside  their  list, 
of  their  weapons.  They  were  now  above  all  fear;  they 
robbed  and  murdered  as  they  pleased,  and  bade  Theramenes 
do  the  same,  but  he  refused,  saying  that  such  conduct  was 
worse  than  that  of  the  sycophants  whom  they  had  put  to 
death.  It  was  now  clear  to  the  more  violent  members  of  the 
party  that  they  must  rid  themselves  of  Theramenes.  In  a 
meeting  of  the  Council,  Critias  attacked  him  for  his  criticism 
of  their  conduct,  and  demanded  his  execution.  At  Sparta, 
the  best  governed  of  all  cities,  no  one  was  allowed  to  criticise 
the  government  under  the  severest  penalties.  If  Theramenes 
were  spared,  he  would  inspire  their  opponents  with  a  spirit 
of  rebellion;  if  he  were  put  to  death,  his  execution  would 
destroy  the  hopes  of  all  the  malcontents  within  the  city  or 
without.  Theramenes  defended  himself  in  a  manner  which 
won  the  audience,  and  there  was  little  doubt  that  he  would 
be  acquitted  if  the  decision  were  left  to  the  Council.  For 
this  Critias  was  prepared.  He  had  gathered  together  a 
number  of  men  armed  with  daggers  to  support  him  in  any 

1  For  Leon  see  Plato's  Apol.  32.  Socrates  with  four  others  was 
bidden  by  the  Thirty  to  bring  him  from  Salamis  to  Athens  for 
execution  :  Ota  kcu  aXkbis  eKetvoi  7toAAois  7roXAa  TrpoaeraTTov 
(iovKo/xevoi  oas  7r\eio-Tovs  avaiiKiiaai  alTia>v.  Socrates  refused  to  go, 
though  the  other  four  went. 


472 


DEATH  OF  THERAMENES,  404. 


[XII.  25. 


act  of  violence,  and  these  he  now  summoned  to  the  entrance 
of  the  Council  room.  He  then  came  forward  and  addressed 
the  Council:  "Among  our  recent  laws  is  one  which,  while 
Execution  of  forbidding  the  execution  of  any  member  of  the 
Theramenes.  Three  Thousand  wjfchout  your  vote,  permits 
the  Thirty  to  put  to  death  by  their  own  sentence  any  one 
outside  that  list.  I,  therefore,  with  the  consent  of  my 
colleagues  strike  off  Theramenes  from  the  list  of  the  Three 
Thousand ;  and  we  shall  order  his  execution."  Theramenes 
sprang  to  the  altar  of  Hestia,  and  called  on  those  present  for 
help.  "Any  one  of  your  names,"  he  cried,  "can  be  struck 
out  of  the  list  as  easily  as  mine."  The  appeal  was  in  vain. 
The  precincts  of  the  Council  room  were  filled  with  men  who 
were  known  to  be  armed,  and  no  one  dared  lift  a  hand  to 
help.  The  Eleven  were  summoned.  They  came,  led  by  "the 
shameless  and  insolent "  Satyrus,  and  Critias  bade  them  arrest 
Theramenes,  "who  had  been  sentenced  according  to  the  law," 
and  deal  with  him  as  was  fit.  Satyrus  and  his  attendants 
tore  Theramenes  from  the  altar  in  spite  of  his  resistance  and 
cries,  and  carried  him  through  the  market-place,  loudly  pro- 
testing against  the  iniquity  of  his  condemnation.  "  Be  quiet," 
said  Satyrus,  "or  you  will  suffer  for  it."  "If  I  am  quiet," 
retorted  Theramenes,  "  shall  I  not  suffer  % "  When  drinking 
the  hemlock  he  threw  a  portion  of  the  draught  away  as  in  a 
game  of  cottabus,  saying  :  "This  to  Critias,  the  fair."1 

26.  By  the  death  of  Theramenes  the  Thirty  seemed  to 
have  removed  all  opposition,  and  to  make  themselves  yet 
more  secure  they  allowed  no  one  but  those  who  were  on  their 


1  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  3.  In  the  Ath.  Pol.  c.  37,  Theramenes  is  con- 
demned not  only  under  the  law  quoted  by  Xenophon,  but  also  under 
another  which  forbade  any  of  those  who  had  taken  part  in  the  de- 
struction of  Eetionea  {supra,  p.  416)  to  share  in  the  constitution  of  the 
Thirty.  The  order  of  events  is  also  different :  the  citizens  are  not 
deprived  of  their  arms  till  after  the  death  of  Theramenes,  whose 
execution  takes  place  after  the  arrival  of  Thrasybulus  at  Phyle. 
There  is  a  similar  difference  with  regard  to  Callibius  and  the  garri- 
son from  Lacedaemon.  Xen.  Hell.  ii.  3.  14 ;  Plut.  Lys.  15 ;  Ath. 
Pol.  37. 


XII.  26.]        RETURN  OF  THRASYBULUS,  403. 


473 


list  to  enter  the  city.  But  a  reaction  had  begun.  With  a 
body  of  seventy  exiles,  Thrasybulus  (supra,  p.  407)  advanced 
from  Thebes  and  seized  Phyle,  a  border  fortress  Thrasybulus 
on  Mount  Parnes.  The  Thirty  sent  a  force  atPhyle- 
of  cavalry  to  dislodge  him,  but  in  vain.  A  blockade  was 
rendered  impossible  by  the  weather  (it  was  now  winter,  404- 
403),  and  when  the  Lacedaemonian  garrison  marched  out  from 
Athens  to  check  the  predatory  excursions  of  the  exiles, 
they  were  surprised  and  put  to  flight  with  considerable  loss. 
The  Thirty  became  alarmed.  They  resolved  to  secure  for 
themselves  a  refuge  at  Eleusis,  in  the  event  of  their  being 
unable  to  maintain  the  city.  The  population  of  the  town 
was  arrested  and  handed  over  to  the  Eleven;  on  the  next 
day,  by  a  forced  vote  of  the  Three  Thousand,  they  were 
condemned  to  death  to  the  number  of  three  hundred.1 

Thrasybulus  was  now  in  command  of  one  thousand  men. 
With  these,  by  a  rapid  march  through  the  night,  he  entered  the 
Peiraeus,  and  established  himself  at  Munychia.  „  A 

;  J  He  advances 

lhe  Thirty  at  once  attacked  him,  but  they  to  Peiraeus. 
were  defeated,  Critias  being  slain  in  the  con-  DeathofCritias- 
flict.2  '  When  giving  back  the  bodies  of  the  slain,  the 
opposing  parties  were  brought  into  contact,  and  Cleocritus, 
the  herald  of  the  mysteries,  a  man  of  large  stature  and 
commanding  voice,  addressed  the  citizens  from  the  city, 
begging  them  to  renounce  allegiance  to  the  Thirty,  who  for 
the  sake  of  their  own  gain  had  slain  more  Athenians  in  eight 
months  than  the  Peloponnesians  had  done  in  ten  years.  Let 
all  unite  and  put  an  end  to  this  shameful  war,  detestable 
alike  to  gods  and  men,  in  which  the  very  conquerors  wept 
over  the  slain.  The  words  were  not  without  effect.  The 
Three  Thousand  were  no  longer  of.  one  mind,  and  after  some 
discussion,  they  deposed  the  Thirty,  and  elected  a  body 
of  Ten,3  one  from  each  tribe.    The  Thirty  retired  to  Eleusis. 

1  Xen.  I.e.  ii.  4.  8  f.  ;  Lys.  12.  52;  13.  44;  cp.  Diod.  xiv.  32. 
Some  citizens  from  Salamis  were  included  in  the  condemnation. 

2  Xen.  I.e.  10-19. 

3  Xen.  I.e.  20-24.    In  Ath.  Pol.  two  bodies  of  Ten  are  mentioned. 


474 


PA  US  AN  IAS  AT  A  THENS,  403. 


[XII.  26. 


Skirmishes  went  on  between  the  city  and  the  Peiraeus 
without  any  important  result,  but  as  their  numbers  increased, 
the  exiles  became  more  confident  and  formidable.  From 
the  city  and  from  Eleusis  the  oligarchs  sent  to  Lacedaemon 
for  assistance.  At  Ly Sander's  suggestion  a  hundred  talents 
were  supplied.  He  also  persuaded  the  city  to  send  him  to 
Lysander  and  Athens  as  harmost,  and  his  brother  Libys,  who 
Pausanias  was  admiral,  in  command  of  a  fleet  of  forty 
ships.  On  his  arrival  he  joined  his  party  at 
Eleusis,  while  the  fleet  cut  off  all  supplies  from  the  Peiraeus. 
The  patriots  were  now  in  a  situation  almost  hopeless,  but 
fortunately  for  Athens,  Lysander's  successes  had  provoked 
a  reaction  against  him  at  Sparta.  King  Pausanias  was  by 
no  means  inclined  to  allow  Lysander  to  take  the  lead,  and 
with  him  was  a  majority  of  the  ephors.  They  called  out 
the  allies,  of  whom,  however,  the  Boeotians  and  Corinthians, 
already  offended  at  the  conduct  of  the  Spartans,  refused 
to  furnish  contingents,  and  sent  Pausanias  at  the  head 
of  a  considerable  force  to  Athens.  He  had  no  intention  of 
acting  with  vigour ;  he  wished  to  put  an  end  to  the  faction, 
and  deprive  Lysander  of  the  opportunity  of  interfering,  and 
in  this  policy  he  was  supported  by  the  ephor  Nauclidas,  who 
was  present  according  to  custom  in  his  army.  After  some 
skirmishing,  negotiations  were  opened  with  him  by  both 
The  recon-  parties,  from  the  Peiraeus  and  from  the  city, 
ciiiation.  an(j  through  him  with  Sparta.    Fifteen  com- 

missioners were  sent  to  Athens,  and  terms  were  arranged 
which  both  the  oligarchs  and  democrats  were  willing  to 
accept ;  on  the  disputed  question  of  the  constitution  nothing 
was  said.  The  citizens  were  allowed  to  return  unmolested 
to  their  occupations ;  but  any  one  who  was  afraid  to  remain 


The  first  were  chosen  on  the  deposition  of  the  Thirty  to  bring  the 
war  to  a  close,  but  they  continued  the  tyranny  until  they  were 
deposed  in  turn,  and  a  second  Ten,  ol  ^eXnaroi,  were  chosen. 
Yet  in  this  second  Ten  was  Rhinon,  whom  Isocrates  adv.  Call.  §  7 
mentions  as  one  of  the  Ten  elected  on  the  deposition  of  the  Thirty. 
Cp.  also  Heracl.  Pont.  i.  9. 


XII.  26.]       THE  ATHENIANS  RECONCILED,  403.  475 


in  the  city  was  at  liberty  to  migrate  to  Eleusis,  which  was 
established  as  an  independent  community,  and  so  remained 
for  two  years  (403-401).  A  general  law  of  amnesty  was 
carried,  under  which  the  past  was  to  be  forgotten;  the 
only  persons  excepted  being  the  Thirty  Tyrants,  the  Eleven, 
and  the  Ten ;  and  even  these  might  claim  the  benefit  of  the 
law,  if  they  would  submit  to  the  legal  scrutiny  of  their  office.1 
Pausanias  returned  with  his  army  to  Sparta.  Lysander  and 
Libys  were  completely  foiled ;  Athens  was  delivered  from 
the  Tyrants,  and  democracy  was  still  alive  in  Greece. 

1  Xen.  I.e.  24-29,  who  specifies  the  Ten  in  the  Peiraeus  (supra, 
p.  470) ;  Ath.  Pol.  c.  38-39,  in  which  the  Ten  who  first  succeeded  the 
Thirty  {supra,  p.  473)  are  meant.  Andoc.  De  Myst.  §  81  ff.  The  recon- 
ciliation took  place  in  the  archonship  of  Euclides,  403-402;  Ath.  Pol 
c.  39. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


EVENTS     IN     SICILY     FROM     THE      DESTRUCTION     OF  THE 
ATHENIAN  ARMAMENT  TO   THE   PEACE  WITH  CARTHAGE, 

4I3-405- 

I.  After  the  departure  of  Gylippus  and  the  allied  forces 
from  Syracuse,  Hermocrates  {supra,  p.  232)  was  by  far  the 
most  prominent  man  in  the  city.  It  was  due  to  him  that 
Syracuse  had  enlarged  and  improved  her  navy,  and  won  those 
great  victories  which  had  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Athenians 
by  sea;  he  had  also  taken  a  large  share  in  the 
e  '     final  destruction  of  the  Athenian  army.  Eager 

to  carry  out  to  the  end  the  work  which  he  had  so  success- 
fully begun,  he  persuaded  his  countrymen  to  send  him  out 
with  a  fleet  in  412  to  join  the  Peloponnesians  in  completing 
the  ruin  of  the  Athenian  empire,  which  he  with  the  rest  of 
the  Grecian  world  believed  could  not  be  long  delayed.1 

In  spite  of  his  noble  patriotism,  and  the  eminent  services 
which  he  had  rendered  to  his  nation,  Hermocrates  had  won 
neither  the  confidence  nor  the  affection  of  the  Syracusans. 
He  was  an  oligarch,  when  the  tide  of  feeling  was  setting 
strongly  to  democracy,  and  as  at  Athens  after  Salamis,  so 
now  at  Syracuse,  the  triumph  of  the  fleet  threw  increased 
power  into  the  hands  of  the  people.  It  was  only  by  his 
success  as  a  general  that  he  maintained  his  ground.  In  his 
absence  the  people  asserted  their  power,  and  the  constitution 
of  Syracuse  was  rearranged  on  more  purely  democratic  lines. 
The  change  was  mainly  due  to  Diocles — the  popular  leader  of 


1  Thuc.  viii.  26,  towards  the  end  of  the  summer.  Thucydides 
mentions  twenty-two  ships.    Diodorus,  xiii.  63,  speaks  of  thirty-five. 
476 


XIII.  2.] 


SEGESTA  AND  CARTHAGE,  410. 


477 


the  day ;  whether  or  not  he  was  Diodes  the  legislator  is 
doubtful— who  persuaded  the  city  to  introduce  the  lot  in 
the  election  of  officers,  and  to  appoint  a  commission  to  draw 
up  a  new  constitution.1 

When  the  Syracusan  fleet  was  destroyed  at  Cyzicus,  the 
enemies  of  Hermocrabes  had  no  difficulty  in  depriving  him  and 
his  colleagues  of  their  office,  and  driving  them  Hermocrates 
into  exile.  He  received  the  intelligence  at  isbanished. 
Antandrus,  and  though  assured  of  the  sympathy  and  support 
of  his  officers,  he  did  not  attempt  to  resist  the  decree  of  his 
city.  After  giving  up  the  fleet  to  his  successors,  he  retired 
to  the  court  of  Pharnabazus,  and  soon  afterwards  joined  the 
Spartan  embassy  to  Susa  (supra,  p.  430),  intending,  when  an 
opportunity  offered,  to  win  his  way  back  to  Syracuse. 

2.  Sicily  now  became  the  scene  of  a  conflict  even  more 
terrible  than  that  from  which  she  had  just  emerged,  and, 
as  before,  the  mischief  began  with  the  quarrels  of  Segesta 
and  Selinus.  The  success  of  Syracuse,  which  seiinusand 
supported  Selinus,  the  annihilation  of  the  Seges*a- 
Athenians,  who  were  the  allies  of  Segesta,  could  not  fail  to 
affect  the  mutual  relations  of  the  cities.  Selinus  was  able 
to  carry  everything  with  a  high  hand ;  Segesta  feared  that 
by  resistance  she  might  bring  upon  herself  the  vengeance  of 
Syracuse.  She  voluntarily  retired  from  the  territory  which 
had  been  in  dispute,  but  when  the  Selinuntians  pushed  their 
encroachments  still  further,  she  sent  envoys  Segesta  appeals 
to  Carthage,  begging  for  assistance,  and  offer-  to  Carthage. 
ing  to  place  herself  in  the  hands  of  Carthage.  After  some 
discussion  the  Carthaginians  decided  to  send  help,  and 
appointed  Hannibal,  the  grandson  of  Hamilcar  who  perished  at 
Himera,  general  of  the  forces.2    Hannibal  sent  envoys  with 


1  Diod.  xiii,  35,  who  ascribes  to  this  Diocles  what  was  true  or 
thought  to  be  so  of  the  older  statesman.  Freeman,  Hist  of  Sicily 
iii.  442,  722. 

2  Cp.  vol.  ii.  p.  446 ;  Diodorus  says  that  his  father,  Gisco,  ended 
his  life  at  Selinus,  having  been  banished  from  Carthage  owing  to 
Hamilcar's  defeat. 


478  THE  CARTHAGINIANS  IN  SICIIY,  409.     [XIII.  3. 


the  Segestaeans  to  Syracuse  to  complain  of  the  conduct  of 
Selinus,  and  the  Syracusans,  who  after  the  exhaustion  of  the 
previous  war  were  in  no  mood  to  enter  on  a  new  one,  voted 
to  remain  at  peace  with  Carthage,  though  they  would  not 
renounce  their  alliance  with  Selinus.1 

The  Carthaginians  upon  this  despatched  a  small  force  to 
the  aid  of  Segesta,  and  the  Selinuntians,  who  in  the  confidence 
of  superior  power  had  spread  through  the  country,  looting  and 
destroying,  were  at  length  taken  off  their  guard,  and  severely 
defeated,  with  the  loss  of  all  their  spoil.  Both  sides  now 
applied  for  help,  the  Selinuntians  to  Syracuse,  the  Segestaeans 
to  Carthage.  War  between  Sicily  and  Carthage  was  inevit- 
able, and  Hannibal,  who  was  eager  to  wipe  out  from  his  race 
the  blot  of  Himera,  spent  the  winter  in  collecting  forces.2 

3.  In  the  spring  of  409  Hannibal  landed  on  the  promontory 
of  Lilybaeum,  at  the  head  of  a  large  force  well  equipped 
Hannibal  lands  with  arms  and  siege-engines.3  He  drew  his 
in  Sicily.  ships  ashore  in  the  bay  of  Motye  to  show 

the  Syracusans  that  he  had  no  intention  of  sailing  against 
their  city,  and  marched  with  his  forces  to  Selinus.  The  city 
was  ill  prepared  for  an  attack.  Though  she  had  joined  in 
the  previous  war,  taking  the  part  of  the  Carthaginians  against 
Gelo,  in  two  generations  of  peace  her  walls  had  been  allowed 
to  fall  out  of  repair.  Her  energies  had  been  absorbed  in 
building  the  vast  temples  whose  ruins  attest  the  prosperity 
of  Selinus, — temples  still  unfinished  when  the  invader  fell 
upon  the  city.  Yet  in  the  hope  that  succour  would  come 
from  Syracuse  she  determined  to  resist.  Hannibal  brought 
Destruction  up  his  engines,  but  nine  days  elapsed  before 
of  selinus.  a  breach  was  made  in  the  walls  sufficient  to 
admit  of  a  successful  assault.    Even  then  the  town  was 


1  Diod.  xiii.  43. 

2  Diod.  xiii.  44.  He  informs  us  that  in  the  force  which  came  to 
the  aid  of  Segesta  were  a  number  of  Campanians  who  had  been  hired 
by  the  Chalcidian  cities  to  support  Athens. 

3  About  the  numbers  ancient  authors  were  in  dispute.  Ephoru3 
mentioned  200,000  foot  and  4000  horse ;  Timaeus  not  much  more 
than  100,000. 


XIII.  3-]         DESTRUCTION  OF  SELINUS,  409. 


479 


not  captured  without  a  good  deal  of  hard  fighting  in  the 
streets.  It  was  given  over  to  the  soldiers,  who  slew  without 
distinction  of  age  or  sex,  and  carried  off  everything  of  value 
from  the  houses  and  temples.  Only  those  women  were 
spared  who  had  fled  with  their  children  to  the  temples,  and 
they  were  spared  not  for  mercy's  sake,  but  lest  in  despair 
they  should  set  fire  to  the  sacred  places  and  destroy  the 
treasures  in  them— spared,  too,  for  outrage  and  slavery.  Six 
thousand  persons  are  said  to  have  perished;  five  thousand 
were  carried  captive  into  Africa ;  about  half  that  number 
escaped  to  Agrigentum.  The  very  corpses  of  the  dead  were 
mutilated ;  the  savage  conquerors  went  about  with  strings  of 
hands  round  their  bodies,  and  heads  spitted  on  their  spears. 
The  walls  of  the  city  were  levelled  to  the  ground.1 

When  the  envoys  from  Selinus  applied  for  assistance,  the 
Syracusans  were  at  war  with  Naxos  and  Catana.  They  at 
once  came  to  terms  with  these  cities ;  and  on  hearing  of  the 
siege  of  Selinus  they  sent  out  a  force  of  3000  heavy-armed 
under  Diocles  to  relieve  it.  The  army  had  only  reached 
Agrigentum  when  they  heard  that  Selinus  was  taken. 
Thereupon  they  sent  envoys  to  Hannibal,  begging  him  to 
allow  the  captives  to  be  ransomed,  and  to  spare  the  shrines 
of  the  gods.  Hannibal  replied  that  the  Selinuntians  had 
failed  to  preserve  their  freedom,  and  must  therefore  submit 
to  slavery ;  the  gods,  he  added,  had  already  left  the  city  in 
resentment  at  the  conduct  of  the  inhabitants.  Yet  he 
received  with  kindness  the  aged  Empedion,  who  came  to  him 
as  an  envoy  from  the  fugitives,  and  not  only  restored  to  him 
his  own  lands,  but  set  at  liberty  any  of  his  kinsmen  who  were 
among  the  captives.  Empedion  had  not  changed  with  his 
city ;  he  had  maintained  the  Carthaginian  cause,  and  urged 
Selinus  to  open  her  gates  to  Hannibal.  The  citizens  who  had 
escaped  were  subsequently  allowed  to  return  and  cultivate 
the  soil  on  condition  of  paying  a  rent  to  Carthage.2 

4.  Hannibal  now  advanced  to  Himera,  the  city  which  was 


1  Diod.  xiii.  54-57. 


2  Diod.  xiii.  59. 


480 


DESTRUCTION  OF  HIMERA,  409. 


[XIII.  4. 


the  scene  of  his  grandfather's  defeat  and  death,  and  which, 
therefore,  above  all  others,  was  marked  out  by  him  for 
Attack  on  vengeance.  Part  of  his  army  he  placed  on  some 
Himera,  and       hills  at  a  little  distance  from  the  city ;  with  the 

of  thTcity!1  resfc  he  encamPed  round  He  battered  the 
walls  with  engines,  and  drove  mines  under 
them,  supporting  the  roof  of  his  mines  with  beams,  which  he 
set  on  fire  when  the  work  was  finished.  The  Himeraeans, 
aided  by  the  army  of  Diodes,  now  amounting  to  about  5000 
men,  defended  themselves  with  courage  and  energy;  they 
repaired  their  shattered  walls,  and  even  drove  the  Cartha- 
ginians back  to  their  camp  on  the  hills,  but  only  to  be 
defeated  with  great  slaughter  by  Hannibal.  Diocles,  alarmed 
for  the  safety  of  Syracuse  by  a  report  that  Hannibal  was 
about  to  march  on  that  city,  resolved  to  take  his  forces  back 
at  once;  and  though  the  Sicilian  ships,  which  had  been 
recalled  from  Ionia  at  the  approach  of  war  with  Carthage, 
appeared  off  Himera,  the  town  was  unable  to  hold  out 
longer.  A  considerable  number  of  the  women  and  children 
were  carried  away  by  these  ships  to  a  place  of  security,  but 
before  the  whole  population  could  be  thus  saved,  a  new 
breach  was  made  in  the  walls,  through  which  the  irresistible 
Iberians  in  Hannibal's  army  fought  their  way.  The  same 
indiscriminate  slaughter  began  as  at  Selinus,  but  Hannibal 
put  an  end  to  it :  he  wished  to  take  as  many  captives  as  he 
could.  The  houses  he  gave  up  to  the  soldiers  as  spoil ;  the 
temples  he  plundered  and  burnt,  the  city  he  razed  to  the 
ground,  the  women  and  children  he  placed  in  the  camps; 
but  the  men,  to  the  number  of  three  thousand,  he  "led  to 
the  place  where  Hamilcar  had  been  executed  by  Gelo,"  and 
there  put  them  to  death  with  torture  and  mutilation.1  He 
then  returned  in  triumph  to  Carthage  (409). 

5.  Since  his  exile,  Hermocrates  had  been  preparing  for  his 


1  aiKKrdfxfvos  icare  triage,  Diod.  xiii.  62.  According  to  the  Cartha- 
ginian story  (and  Herodotus)  Hamilcar  was  not  executed  by  Geio,  but 
Diodorus  follows  some  other  version  of  his  death  (Hdt.  vii.  165) 


I 


XI 1 1 .  5- ]  DEA  TH  OF  HERMO CRA  TES,  407. 


481 


return  to  Syracuse,  and  he  had  received  liberal  support  from 
Pharnabazus  towards  his  object.  He  was  now  (408)  at 
Messene,  where  he  built  himself  five  triremes,  and  took  into 
his  pay  a  force  of  a  thousand  hoplites.  With 

j  „  Return  of 

these,  and  as  many  more  of   the  fugitive  Hermocrates 
Himeraeans,  he  endeavoured  to  make  his  way  to  Sicily- 
into  Syracuse.   The  moment  seemed  favourable.    It  was  clear 
that  the  military  administration  had  not  been  improved  by 
the  recent  changes  in  the  city.    Diocles  had  accomplished 
nothing,  and  was  quite  incapable  of  meeting  Hannibal  in  the 
field ;  Hermocrates  was  known  to  be  an  able  commander. 
But  the  attempt  was  made  in  vain ;  the  opposition  was  still 
too  strong.    Hermocrates  then  marched  through  the  island 
to  Selinus,  rebuilt  a  portion  of  the  walls,  summoned  back 
the  inhabitants  who  could  be  collected,  and  made  the  town 
a  base  of  operations  against  the  Phoenicians.    He  laid  waste 
the  country  of  Motye  and  Panormus,  carrying  off  abundant 
spoils,  and  defeating  the  enemy  with  great  loss.    When  his 
success  became  known  at  Syracuse,  the  demos  were  more 
inclined  to  receive  him,  but  Diocles  was  still  able  to  prevent 
his  return.    To  gain  their  good  will  yet  more,  he  repaired  to 
Himera  (407),  and,  encamping  in  the  suburbs  of  the  ruined 
city,  collected  the  bones  of  the  Syracusans  who  had  fallen 
there.    These  he  placed  on  wagons  richly  adorned,  and 
sent  them  on  their  way  to  Syracuse.    As  an  exile  he  could 
not  enter  the  city,  but  the  arrival  of  the  wagons  caused  the 
outburst  of  faction  which  he  expected.    Diocles,  who  was 
responsible  for  abandoning  the  bodies  unburied  and  now 
opposed  the  reception  of  the  relics,  was  driven  into  exile, 
and  the  remains  of  the  dead  were  honoured  by  a  public  funeral. 
Even  after  this  service  Hermocrates  was  not  admitted  to 
the  city,  so  deeply  rooted  was  the  fear  that  he  would 
make  himself  tyrant.    He  retired  to  Selinus;  but  not  long 
afterwards,  on  the  invitation  of  friends,  he  came  again  to 
Syracuse,  and  forced  his  way  with  a  few  Death  of 
adherents  into  the  town.     He  had  reached  Hermocrates. 
the  market-place,  when  he  was  overpowered  and  cut  down. 
VOL.  III.  2  H 


482 


SIEGE  OF  A  GR1GENTUM,  4O6. 


[XIII.  6. 


Of  his  supporters,  a  few  owed  their  escape  to  the  belief  that 
they  were  slain,  and  among  these  was  Dionysius,1 

6.  The  Carthaginians,  encouraged  by  their  success,  and 
perhaps  irritated  by  the  action  of  Hermocrates,  resolved  to 
attempt  the  conquest  of  the  whole  of  Sicily.  Hannibal  was 
Hannibal  again  chosen  general,  and  when,  owing  to  his 
prepares  for  a  age,  he  begged  to  decline  the  office,  Himilco,  of 
new  campaign,  the  same  family,  was  appointed  to  support  him. 
Troops  were  collected  from  every  quarter,  allies  from  the 
Mauretanians  and  Nomads  as  far  as  the  borders  of  Cyrene, 
mercenaries  from  Iberia  and  Campania,  until  a  total  force  of  at 
least  120,000  was  reached.2  Forty  triremes,  which  were  sent 
on  in  advance,  were  defeated  with  a  loss  of  fifteen  vessels  off 
the  coast  of  Sicily ;  but,  in  spite  of  this  disaster,  Hannibal 
succeeded  in  carrying  over  his  army.  He  had  no  sooner 
arrived  in  Sicily  than  he  marched  upon  Agrigentum  3  (406). 

Agrigentum  was  the  second  city  of  Sicily.  It  was  strongly 
placed,  and  the  advantages  of  natural  position  had  been  in- 
Siege  and  creased  by  art.  The  country  round  was  fertile, 
capture  of  and  in  expectation  of  the  war,  large  quantities 
Agrigentum.  of  produce  had  been  conveyed  into  the  town. 
On  his  arrival,  Hannibal  made  two  divisions  of  his  army, 
as  he  had  done  at  Himera.  One  division  was  encamped  on 
the  adjacent  hills,  the  other  close  to  the  town.  He  then 
sent  envoys  to  the  city  asking  the  Agrigentines  to  become 
his  allies,  or  at  least  to  remain  neutral — requests  which  were 
rejected  at  once.  The  siege  began.  In  his  description  of  it, 
Diodorus,  our  only  authority,  gives  us  but  little  help  in 
regard  to  the  topography.  One  camp  of  the  Carthaginians, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  pitched  close  to  the  city,  and  we  may 
place  it  to  the  south-west,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Hypsas. 
On  this  side  of  the  city  walls  the  generals,  after  a  careful 


1  Diod.  xiii.  63,  75.    The  chronology  is  uncertain. 

2  Diod.  xiii.  80.  So  Timaeus,  but  here  again  Ephorus  gives  & 
larger  number— 300,000. 

3  Diod.  xiii.  80-85,  who  here  digresses  into  a  long  account  of 
Agrigentum. 


XIII.  6.] 


SYRACUSE  SENDS  HELP,  4O6. 


483 


examination,  directed  their  attack.  Two  wooden  towers 
were  constructed,  from  which  for  a  whole  day  the  Cartha- 
ginians carried  on  the  assault,  till  they  were  recalled  at 
nightfall  by  the  sound  of  a  trumpet.  Before  morning  the 
towers  had  been  burned  by  the  besieged.  Hannibal  now 
resolved  to  attack  the  wall  at  several  points,  and  in  order  to 
obtain  material  for  raising  mounds  against  it  from  Avhich  the 
besiegers  could  carry  on  operations  (x^/mra,  supra,  p.  137), 
he  gave  orders  for  the  destruction  of  the  tombs  which  lay 
outside  the  city.  His  orders  were  being  rapidly  carried  out 
when  the  work  received  a  sudden  check.  A  thunderbolt 
struck  the  monument  of  Thero  at  the  moment  when  it  was 
being  pulled  down,  and  the  soothsayers  forbade  any  further 
disturbance  of  the  sepulchre.  A  plague  also  broke  out  in 
the  camp,  causing  intense  suffering.  Hannibal  himself  was 
one  of  the  victims,  and  Himilco,  seeing  his  army  distressed 
with  superstitious  terrors,  not  only  countermanded  any 
further  destruction  of  the  tombs,  but  even  sacrificed  a  child 
to  Cronos  (Moloch)  after  the  Carthaginian  manner,  and 
plunged  victims  into  the  sea  to  propitiate  Poseidon.  He 
did  not,  however,  relax  his  efforts  in  the  siege,  but  completed 
the  mounds  with  the  help  of  other  materials,  and  placed  his 
engines  upon  them. 

The  Agrigentines  were  aided  by  Dexippus,  a  Lacedaemonian, 
at  the  head  of  1500  mercenaries,  and  by  800  Campanians, 
who  in  the  previous  campaign  had  been  in  Hannibal's  pay, 
but  had  left  him  in  disgust  at  the  close.  The  Syracusans, 
who  now  fully  recognised  the  danger  which  threatened  Sicily, 
sent  large  reinforcements,1  which  were  joined  on  the  way  by 
contingents  from  Camarina,  Gela,  and  elsewhere,  till  the 
whole  force  is  said  to  have  amounted  to  30,000  foot  and 
5000  horse,  and  they  were  supported  by  a  fleet  of  thirty  ships. 
The  army  had  crossed  the  Himeras,  when  it  was  met  by  a 
detachment  of  the  Carthaginians.    These  it  severely  defeated 


1  Agrigentum  had  refused  to  aid  Syracuse  against  Athens 
(supra,  p.  341). 


484 


FALL  OF  AGRLGENTUM,  4O6. 


[XIII.  6. 


and  pursued  towards  Agrigentum,  capturing  the  camp  on  the 
hills,  in  which  Daphnaeus,  the  Syracusan  general,  took  up 
his  quarters.  The  Agrigentines  were  eager  to  sally  out  and 
complete  the  destruction  of  the  enemy,  but  their  generals 
refused,  and  the  fugitives  found  safety  in  the  camp  by  the  city. 
When  the  Syracusan  soldiers  joined  those  in  the  city,  there 
were  loud  complaints  of  the  conduct  of  the  generals.  A 
meeting  was  called,  which  ended  in  a  tumult ;  four  of  the 
Agrigentine  generals  were  stoned  to  death,  the  fifth  being 
spared  on  account  of  his  youth.  Even  Dexippus  was 
suspected  of  treachery. 

Daphnaeus  now  contemplated  an  attack  on  the  camp  of  the 
Carthaginians,  and  for  a  time  succeeded  in  reducing  them  to 
such  distress  that  the  soldiers  were  on  the  eve  of  a  mutiny, 
when  Himilco,  bringing  up  ships  from  Motye  and  Panormus, 
fortunately  captured  a  Greek  fleet  laden  with  stores  for  the 
city.  The  situation  was  now  entirely  changed  :  the  Agrigen- 
tines had  consumed  their  stores  so  lavishly  that  there  was 
little  or  nothing  left ;  and  it  became  clear  to  the  auxiliaries 
that  there  was  no  hope  of  saving  the  city.  The  Campanians 
went  over  at  once  to  Himilco;  Dexippus  was  suspected  of 
bribery,  and  at  any  rate  refused  to  remain.  Agrigentum  was 
abandoned  to  its  fate.  After  the  departure  of  these  troops, 
the  Agrigentines,  leaving  the  infirm  and  aged  behind,  slipped 
away  to  Gela  under  cover  of  night,  in  terror  of  the  enemy,  in 
sorrow  for  their  friends  and  lost  homes,  in  utter  misery  and 
despair.  Himilco  seems  to  have  made  no  attempt  to  attack 
them;  he  was  satisfied  to  gain  the  city  without  the  risk 
and  loss  of  a  battle.  The  fugitives  were  allowed  by  the 
Syracusans  to  settle  at  Leontini.1 

When  Himilco  entered  Agrigentum  there  was  the  same 
ruthless  slaughter  of  the  helpless,  the  same  desecration 
and  destruction  of  temples  as  at  Selinus.  The  amount  of 
spoil  was  enormous :  Agrigentum  was  one  of  the  richest  of 
Greek  cities;  from  the  day  of  its  foundation  it  had  never 


1  Diod.  xiii.  89. 


XIII.  7-]  DIONYSIUS  A  GENERAL  AT  SYRACUSE,  406.  485 


been  captured,  and  the  inhabitants  took  a  pride  in  acquiring 
the  costliest  furniture  and  the  finest  works  of  art.  The 
choicest  pictures  and  statues  were  sent  to  Carthage,  among 
them  the  famous  bull  of  Phalaris.  The  siege  had  lasted 
eight  months,  and  came  to  an  end  in  December  406.  Himilco 
remained  in  the  city  for  the  rest  of  the  winter.1 

7.  The  fall  of  Agrigentum  created  the  greatest  consterna- 
tion throughout  Sicily.  The  inhabitants  of  the  country 
sought  shelter  in  Syracuse,  and  sent  their  The  rise  of 
families  and  their  goods  to  Italy.  The  Syra-  Dionysius. 
cusan  generals  were  severely  blamed  for  abandoning  the  city, 
but  no  measures  were  taken  and  merely  formal  accusations 
were  brought  against  them  by  the  Agrigentines  till  Dionysius, 
who  had  greatly  distinguished  himself  at  Agrigentum,  came 
forward  in  the  Assembly  and  attacked  them  as  traitors ; 
in  punishing  such  men,  he  said,  they  ought  not  to  wait  for 
the  legal  sentence  of  condemnation,  but  to  take  the  matter 
into  their  own  hands  at  once.  For  this  speech  Dionysius 
was  fined,  as  an  incendiary,  but  the  fine  was  at  once  paid 
by  Philistus,  the  famous  historian  of  his  country,  who 
urged  Dionysius  to  go  on  as  he  had  begun,  and  he  would 
pay  his  fines  the  whole  day  long,  if  necessary.  Dionysius 
then  charged  the  generals  with  receiving  bribes.  He  advised 
the  people  no  longer  to  choose  their  generals  from  the  rich, 
who  were  always  ready  to  increase  their  own  wealth  at  the 
expense  of  their  country,  but  from  the  poorer  citizens,  who 
could  be  trusted.  He  had  already  resolved  to  make  himself 
tyrant  of  Syracuse ;  and  after  the  feeble  and  disastrous  cam- 
paign which  had  just  closed,  it  was  not  difficult  to  persuade 
the  people  that  a  strong  hand  was  needed,  if  the  war  with 
Carthage  was  to  be  carried  on  with  success.  Daphnaeus  and 
his  colleagues  were  deposed,  and  other  generals  chosen,  among 
whom  was  Dionysius  himself.   But  he  refused  to  act  in  concert 

1  Diod.  xiii.  90.  The  bull  with  other  treasures  was  restored  to 
Agrigentum  by  Scipio  260  years  after  the  siege,  and  was  to  be  seen 
there  in  the  time  of  Diodorus.  Timaeus,  who  lived  in  the  interval 
doubted  its  existence. 


486 


DION  YS I  US  AS  TYRANT,  406.  [XI 1 1.  7. 


with  his  colleagues,  and  secretly  spread  reports  that  they 
were  in  communication  with  the  enemy.  To  strengthen  his 
position,  he  persuaded  the  Syracusans  to  recall  the  exiles — 
men  of  the  party  of  Hermocrates,  who  were  opposed  to  the 
democracy,  and  had  no  hope  of  regaining  their  position  while 
it  remained  in  power.  Among  these  he  would  find  friends 
as  long  as  he  could  satisfy  their  demands. 

His  schemes  were  aided  by  an  appeal  for  help  from 
Gela,  which  was  in  immediate  danger  of  attack  by  Himilco. 
Dionysius  The  city  was  under  the  command  of  Dexippus, 
at  Geia.  to  whose  support  Dionysius  was  sent  with  a 

moderate  force.  He  found  the  city  distracted  by  faction, 
and  at  once  joining  the  party  of  the  poor,  he  brought  the 
rich  to  trial,  got  them  condemned  and  their  property  con- 
fiscated. The  money  thus  obtained  he  spent  in  paying  the 
soldiers,  and  returned  to  Syracuse  the  idol  of  the  army. 
There  also  he  excited  the  poor  against  the  rich,  who,  he 
declared,  were  neglecting  the  protection  of  the  city  at  a  time 
of  the  greatest  danger.  One  plan,  and  one  only,  could  save 
them ;  as  in  the  days  of  Gelo  their  army  must  be  led  by  a 
general  with  full  powers.  The  people  assented,  and  he  was 
elected  to  the  office. 

He  had  still  much  to  fear.  His  opponents  were  many,  and 
the  city  began  to  be  suspicious.  He  knew  the  democratic 
instincts  of  the  Syracusan  people,  among  whom  it  was  not 
safe  openly  to  take  a  step  towards  tyranny.  As  general  he 
ordered  the  military  population,  under  forty  years  of  age,  to 
march  out  to  Leontini,  with  provisions  for  thirty  days. 
Leontini  at  this  time  was  full  of  fugitives  from  Agrigentum, 
of  exiles  and  strangers.  There  he  encamped,  and  in  the 
night  he  seized  the  Acropolis  of  the  city,  pretending  that  the 
step  was  necessary  to  protect  himself  against  assassination. 
Next  day  an  Assembly  was  called,  consisting  for  the  most 
part  of  soldiers  and  fugitives,  and  by  their  vote  he  was 
allowed  to  have  the  security  of  a  bodyguard  of  six  hundred 
men  of  his  own  selection.  With  this  support  he  was  able  to 
throw  off  the  mask  and  appear  as  tyrant.  He  got  his  rivals 


XIII.  8.] 


THE  FALL  OF  GELA,  405. 


487 


Daphnaeus  and  Damarchus  executed  ;  Dexippus  he  dis- 
missed to  Hellas,  as  he  found  him  unwilling  to  fall  in  with 
his  schemes.  He  also  strengthened  his  connection  with  the 
oligarchical  party  by  marrying  the  daughter  of  Hermocrates, 
and  giving  his  sister  in  marriage  to  Polyxenus,  the  brother 
of  Hermocrates.  By  this  means  Dionysius,  "  who  began  life 
as  a  scribe  and  a  common  citizen,  became  tyrant  of  the  greatest 
city  in  Greece,  a  position  which  he  retained  till  his  death 
thirty-eight  years  afterwards." 1 

8.  In  the  spring  (405),  Himilco,  after  destroying  what 
remained  of  the  carved  work  of  the  temples  at  Agrigentum, 
and  levelling  the  city  with  the  ground,  ad-  Himilco 
vanced  into  the  territory  of  Gela  and  Camarina.  attacks  Gela- 
After  devastating  the  territory,  he  sat  down  -before  Gela  in 
an  entrenched  camp,  and  began  his  attack  on  the  city.  The 
Geloans  defended  themselves  bravely,  and  Dionysius  came  to 
their  aid  with  a  large  force  from  Syracuse.2  At  first  he 
pitched  his  camp  near  the  sea,  and  attempted  to  cut  off  the 
enemy's  supplies ;  afterwards  he  divided  his  army  into  three 
sections,  and  delivered  an  attack.  Some  slight  success  was 
gained,  but  the  day  ended  in  disaster,  and  Dionysius  was 
driven  back  into  the  city  with  great  loss. 

A  council  was  held,  at  which  it  was  decided  that  Gela 
was  not  the  place  where  a  decisive  battle  could  be  fought. 
Dionysius  asked  for  a  truce  on  the  following 

/  Dionysius 

day  in  order  to  bury  the  dead,  but,  under  cover  fails  to 
of  night,  he  sent  the  people  out  of  the  city  relieveGela- 
early  in  the  night  to  Camarina,  and  afterwards  withdrew 
himself,  leaving  two  thousand  light-armed  to  kindle  fires, 
and  so  deceive  the  enemy  into  the  belief  that  the  city  was 
occupied.  These  troops  also  were  to  leave  at  dawn.  Gela 
was  abandoned  to  the  Carthaginians.  At  Camarina  he  com- 
pelled the  women  and  children  and  the  helpless  part  of  the 
population  to  retire  with  the  Geloans  at  once  to  Syracuse. 

1  Diod.  xiii.  96. 

2  Diod.  xiii.  109.  As  before,  the  numbers  are  differently  given  by 
different  historians. 


» 


488 


DIONYSIUS  SECURES  HIMSELF,  405. 


[XIII.  8. 


It  was  a  mournful  exodus.  The  fear  of  the  Carthaginians 
overpowered  every  other  feeling;  the  highborn  was  mingled 
with  the  meanest ;  the  maiden  was  forced  to  renounce  her 
retirement  and  travel  wearily  on  foot,  in  the  eyes  of  all 
men.  Some  left  all  they  had,  satisfied  if  they  could  save 
their  lives  ;  some,  under  the  burden  of  age  and  sickness,  were 
unable  to  go  at  all. 

Dionysius  was  now  as  thoroughly  hated  as  the  men  whom 
he  had  deposed  and  executed.  If  they  had  been  bribed, 
Exasperation  he  had  allowed  the  enemy  to  conquer  in  order 
at  Dionysms.  ^na(.  he  might  establish  his  power  over  the 
terrified  cities.  The  contingents  from  Italy  returned  home. 
The  cavalry,  on  finding  that  they  could  not  slay  Dionysius 
on  his  way  back  to  Syracuse,  owing  to  the  presence  of  his 
bodyguard,  not  one  of  whom,  it  was  observed,  had  perished 
in  the  battle,  rode  back  to  the  city,  and  revenged  themselves 
by  burning  his  house  and  ill-treating  his  wife  till  she  died. 
Dionysius,  who  suspected  what  was  taking  place,  got  to- 
gether a  few  troops,  on  whom  he  could  rely,  and  hastened 
home.  He  arrived  at  Achradina  in  the  night  and  found 
the  gates  closed  against  him.  These  he  burned,  and  rushed 
to  the  market-place,  where  his  mercenaries  shot  down  the 
knights  who  attempted  to  check  him.  He  lost  no  time  in 
executing  or  banishing  all  his  opponents,  and  thus  became 
master  of  the  city.  The  Geloans  and  Camarinaeans,  who 
suspected  his  action  towards  them,  joined  the  Agrigentines  at 
Leontini.1 

Though  victorious,  Himilco  was  unable  to  continue  the 
campaign.  He  had  lost  more  than  half  his  army  by  the 
Peace  with  plague,  and  could  no  longer  remain  in  his  camp. 
Carthage.  jje  offered,  terms  to  Dionysius,  which  were 
readily  accepted.  The  Carthaginians  were  to  retain  all  their 
old  colonies  ;  the  Sicanians,  Selinus,  Himera,  and  Agrigen- 
tum  were  to  be  given  up  to  them ;  Gela  and  Camarina  were 
to  pull  down  their  walls  and  pay  tribute.   Leontini,  Messene, 


1  Diod.  xiii.  112  ff. 


XIII.  8.]  PEACE  WITH  CARTHAGE,  405. 


489 


and  the  Sicels  were  to  be  independent,  Syracuse  was  to  be 
subject  to  Dionysius ;  the  captives  and  any  ships  which  had 
been  taken  on  either  side  were  to  be  restored.  Thus  the  war 
ended.  The  Carthaginians  returned  to  Carthage,  carrying 
the  plague  with  them,  which  raged  for  some  time  in  the  city 
and  among  the  allies,  till  the  state  was  brought  to  the  brink 
of  destruction.1  Sicily,  though  at  a  heavy  cost,  had  got  rid 
of  the  invading  host,  but  Syracuse  was  once  more  in  the 
hands  of  a  tyrant.  In  the  West,  as  in  the  East,  democracy 
had  been  found  unequal  to  the  task  imposed  upon  her.  . 


1  Diod.  xiii.  114.  See  Freeman,  Hist,  of  Sicily,  vol.  iii.  c.  9,  for  a 
minute  account  of  the  invasion.  Our  authority  is  Diodorus,  who 
perhaps  drew  from  Philistus — at  first  or  second  hand. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


LITERATURE,   ART,    SOCIETY,  ETC. 

I.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Fifth  Century,  lyric  poetry  was 
not  only  the  prevailing  mode  of  poetical  composition,  but,  in 
the  hands  of  two  great  masters,  it  was  attain- 
Simonides  ing  a  higher  development  than  at  any  previous 
and  Pindar.  period.  The  odes  of  Simonides  of  Ceos  (558- 
468)  and  Pindar  of  Thebes  (520-440)  were  the  acknowledged 
masterpieces  of  lyric  art.  Of  Simonides  we  have  unfor- 
tunately nothing  but  a  few  lyric  fragments,  and  short  elegiac 
poems,  commemorative  of  some  person  or  event,  but  even  in 
what  we  have  we  find  a  depth  of  feeling  and  a  felicity  of 
expression  unsurpassed  in  Greek  poetry.  Simonides  before 
all  things  knew  when  he  had  said  enough.  It  is  this  which 
makes  his  famous  couplet  on  the  Spartans  who  fell  at  Ther- 
mopylae so  unapproachable.1  With  Pindar  we  have  been 
more  fortunate,  at  least  in  regard  to  his  Epinician  odes.  Of 
these  a  considerable  number  has  come  down  to  us,  many  of 
which  rank  among  the  most  splendid  compositions  of  the 
kind.  It  is  indeed  difficult  to  realise  the  full  effect  of  the 
performance  of  one  of  these  wonderful  poems,  owing  to 
the  difficulty  of  the  language  and  our  ignorance  of  Greek 
metres  and  music.  As  the  Olympic  victor  was  raised  for  the 
moment  above  all  mortal  men,  so  was  his  victory  celebrated 
by  a  unique  combination  of  music  and  verse,  elaborated  with 
the  greatest  skill,  that  each  art  might  give  her  full  support 
to  the  other.2 

1  a>  dyyeWeiv  AaKeSai/zoinoiS1  on  177  Se 

Kei/xeda,  rois  neivatv  prjpacri  TreiOo/jLevoi. 
2  Pindar's  poems  are  dva£t<f)6pixiyyes  vp,voi.    However  intricate  the 
490 


XIV.  I.]  NO  L YRIC  POE TS  AT  A THENS. 


491 


Besides  these  two  poets,  there  were  others  of  lesser  note, 
such  as  Bacchylides,  the  nephew  of  Simonides,  of  whose 
poems  a  considerable  portion  has  recently  been  Decline  of 
discovered  ;  and  Timocreon  of  Ehodes,  already  lyric  P°etry- 
known  to  us  by  his  bitter  attack  on  Themistocles  (vol.  ii. 
287).  But  by  the  middle  of  the  century  the  day  of  lyric 
poetry  was  over.  The  spirit  of  the  time  required  something 
more  comprehensive.  Lyric  poetry  expresses  a  mood  or 
celebrates  an  event,  and,  though  Simonides  and  Pindar  intro- 
duced ethical  elements  into  their  poetry,  they  did  not  get 
further  than  detached  "gnomes"  or  thoughts;  they  never 
worked  out  an  ethical  situation.  There  were  also  other 
reasons  why  lyric  poetry  failed  to  satisfy  the  age.  It  was 
the  poetry  of  a  class — a  cultivated  and  generally  a  wealthy 
class — who  paid  the  great  lyric  poets  for  their  services.  The 
praises  of  the  rich  and  mighty  men,  which  we  find  in  Pindar, 
were  not  spontaneous ;  they  were  purchased,  and,  what  was 
worse,  purchased  by  an  individual.  But  after  the  Persian  war, 
class  feeling  was  discredited  at  Athens,  and  though  dramatic 
poets  were  rewarded  for  success,  it  was  one  thing  to  be  paid  by 
Hiero,  or  Arcesilaus,  or  Lampon,  and  quite  another  to  receive 
an  honorarium  from  the  people  for  providing  them  with  the  best 
of  entertainments.  In  the  Fifth  Century,  also,  Athens  became 
the  centre  of  literary  activity  in  Greece,  and  Athens,  amid 
all  her  literary  wealth,  could  never  boast  of  a  lyric  poet  of 
the  first  rank.  During  the  short  period  of  their  rule,  the 
tyrants  endeavoured  to  supply  the  deficiency  by  importing 
lyric  poets  from  other  cities,  but  the  style  never  took  root.1 
That  Athenian  poets  were  not  deficient  in  the  gift  of  lyric 
song  is  amply  proved  by  the  beautiful  odes  which  we  find  in 
the  tragedians  and  in  Aristophanes. 

music  and  metre,  the  words  rang  out  in  the  ears  of  the  audience.  It 
is  just  this  which  we  find  so  difficult  to  understand. 

1  Only  two  of  the  Epinician  odes  of  Pindar  are  in  honour  of 
Athenians,  and  they  are  but  meagre  specimens  of  his  art. — Pyth.  vii.  ; 
Nem.  ii.  The  fact  that  the  dithyramb  was  superseded  by  the  drama 
may  also  have  had  some  effect  on  lyric  poetry  at  Athens,  at  least  in 
the  fifth  century. 


492 


RISE  OF  THE  DRAMA. 


[XIV.  2. 


2.  However  this  may  be,  lyric  poetry  was  now  supplanted 
by  dramatic  poetry,  which,  though  it  had  its  origin  in  Dorian 
The  develop-  cities,  was  quickly  domiciled  at  Athens,  where 
mentofthe  it  rose  to  a  height  which  has  never  been  sur- 
drama.  passed.    Dramatic  performances  were  indeed 

no  novelty  in  the  city  at  the  beginning  of  the  Fifth  Century, 
when  Aeschylus  was  twenty-five  years  old.  In  the  time  of 
Pisistratus,  Thespis  had  brought  upon  himself  the  reproaches 
of  the  aged  Solon,  who  saw  in  his  "plays"  the  corruption  of 
the  Athenian  people  (vol.  i.  462).  Since  that  time  consider- 
able progress  had  been  made,  and  when  Phrynichus,  after 
the  fall  of  Miletus  in  494,  made  the  calamity  of  the  chief 
city  of  Ionia  and  colony  of  Athens  the  subject  of  a  drama,  the 
whole  audience  were  moved  to  tears — a  proof  of  the  power  of 
the  poet  and  the  susceptibility  of  the  people.  Phrynichus 
was  fined  for  his  too  successful  realism,  and  the  subject  was 
forbidden  for  the  future.  A  play  must  be  a  play,  and  deal 
with  themes  sufficiently  remote  and  general  to  touch  common 
chords  of  human  sympathy  only,  unless,  indeed,  the  drama 
were  used  to  celebrate  some  glorious  achievement  of  the 
sons  of  Hellas. 

For  us  the  founder  of  Greek  tragedy  is  Aeschylus  (525- 
460  ?),  in  whose  lifetime  the  drama  became  a  part  of  the 
public  Dionysiac  festivals,  and  the  arrange- 
ments for  the  competition  of  the  poets  (m/ra, 
p.  500),  the  awarding  of  the  prizes,  and  the  maintenance  and 
training  of  the  chorus  were  introduced.  From  the  plays  of 
Aeschylus  himself  we  can  see  what  progress  was  made  in 
dramatic  composition  in  the  first  forty  years  of  the  century. 
To  the  single  actor,  who  hitherto  had  been  allowed  to 
appear  in  dramas,  he  added  a  second,  by  this  means  making 
possible  the  conflict  of  two  opposing  forces,  irrespective 
of  the  chorus,  and  the  introduction  of  a  story,  in  which 
the  chorus  took  but  a  subordinate  part.  He  was  thus  able 
to  diminish  the  action  of  the  chorus,  and  depose  it  from 
the  prominent  position  which  it  occupied  in  older  dramas, 
and  in  his  own  Supplices.    Further  improvements  were  intro- 


XIV.  2.] 


AESCHYLUS. 


493 


duced  by  his  younger  contemporary  Sophocles,  of  which 
Aeschylus  did  not  hesitate  to  avail  himself,  such  as  the 
introduction  of  a  third  actor,  by  which  the  plot  became  more 
intricate,  and  the  interaction  of  characters  more  subtle.  But 
though  in  technique  he  moved  onwards  with  the  time,  he 
preserved  to  the  end  the  spirit  of  the  great  days  in  which  his 
early  manhood  was  passed,  for  he  took  a  personal  part  in  the 
battles  of  Marathon  and  Salamis.  The  fall  of  the  tyrants, 
the  calamities  which  overtook  Croesus  and  Xerxes,  left  a  deep 
impression  on  the  minds  of  the  Greeks,  leading  them  to 
reflect  profoundly  on  the  uncertainty  of  human  prosperity. 
That  justice  was  paramount  in  the  ordering  of  human  life, 
that  evil  overtook  the  wicked,  that  man  must  not  contend 
with  the  gods,  that  he  was  often  misled  by  some  "  power  not 
himself  "  into  the  commission  of  evil — these  were  moral  ideas 
which  had  slowly  accumulated  in  the  Greek  mind;  but  in 
the  age  of  Aeschylus  a  new  belief  was  gaining  ground,  the 
belief  that  even  without  the  commission  of  evil,  by  mere 
unalloyed  prosperity,  man  brought  upon  himself  the  wrath 
of  the  gods.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  "Nemesis,"  which 
appears  in  Pindar,  and  more  clearly  still  in  Herodotus,  who 
illustrates  it  by  the  famous  story  of  the  ring  of  Polycrates. 
Aeschylus  took  a  nobler  view ;  he  would  not  allow  that  the 
gods  were  envious;  "the  house  of  the  righteous  is  at  all 
times  happy  in  its  children";  but  prosperity  may  breed  a 
spirit  of  rebellion,  by  which  men  are  brought  within  the 
fatal  meshes  of  wrong-doing,  and  hence  evil  falls  upon  them. 
In  the  same  way  he  refined  upon  another  doctrine  familiar 
to  the  Greeks — the  doctrine  of  an  "inherited  curse."  A 
curse  pursues  a  family  from  generation  to  generation,  not 
by  mere  inheritance,  as  was  commonly  believed,  but  because 
one  generation  after  another  put  themselves  under  its  opera- 
tion. So  it  was  with  Eteocles,  who  cannot  be  restrained  from 
meeting  his  brother  at  the  gate  of  Thebes,  and  bringing 
upon  both  the  curse  of  Oedipus ;  and  so  it  was  with 
Agamemnon,  who  brought  upon  himself  the  curse  of  the 
House  of  Atreus  by  sacrificing  his  daughter.    From  in- 


494 


AESCHYLUS. 


[XIV.  3. 


stances  such  as  these  we  see  that  Aeschylus  took  a  lofty 
view  of  the  poet's  vocation,  and  by  the  re-creation  of  old 
myths  sought  to  bring  his  audience  face  to  face  with  the 
problems  of  his  age.  He  worked  on  broad  lines,  extending 
his  argument  through  the  three  plays  which  custom  de- 
manded that  the  poet  should  bring  out  at  the  same  time.1 
As  a  playwright,  that  is,  in  the  composition  of  his  plots,  he 
cannot  be  ranked  high.  In  the  Prometheus  Vinctus  there  can 
hardly  be  said  to  be  any  plot  at  all ;  Prometheus  is  a  fixed 
figure,  to  which  a  number  of  persons — the  chorus,  Oceanus,  Io 
— are  brought  without  any  good  reason  for  their  coming.  In 
the  Agamemnon  the  idea  of  the  beacon  service  between  Greece 
and  Asia,  an  idea  prominent  at  the  time  of  the  Persian  invasion,2 
is  worked  into  the  Homeric  situation,  on  which  the  play  is 
founded,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  create  extraordinary  con- 
fusion. And  to  the  last,  in  spite  of  the  improvements  which 
he  introduced,  Aeschylus  never  succeeded  in  reducing  the 
chorus  to  the  limits  required  for  the  best  development  of 
the  plot.  Yet,  in  spite  of  imperfections  in  technique,  the 
Prometheus  Vinctus  and  the  Agamemnon  will  always  retain 
a  place  among  the  grandest  efforts  of  human  genius.3 

3.  Sophocles  (495-405)  is  the  poet  of  the  Periclean  age — 
the  age  of  the  Parthenon  and  the  sculptures  of  Phidias. 

There  is  nothing  in  him  of  the  rugged  splendour 

Sophocles.  n   -i  •  j  ,  i  .  , 

01  his  predecessor,  nothing  superhuman  or 
daemonic;  we  move  within  narrower  limits,  in  which  all  is 
subdued  and  perfected  with  consummate  art.  In  some  respects 
Sophocles  loses  by  this  self-restraint ;  we  cannot,  for  instance, 
compare  his  conception  of  Clytemnestra  with  that  of  Aeschy- 
lus ;  but  what  he  loses  in  one  respect  he  gains  in  another ; 
his  plots,  at  least  in  some  of  his  plays,  are  admirable,  each 
scene  is  evolved  out  of  what  has  gone  before — in  this  respect 
the  Oedipus  Rex  is  a  masterpiece  of  dramatic  art — and  the 

1  The  history  of  the  "  trilogy  "  is  not  accurately  known,  but  it 
seems  doubtful  whether  any  poet  but  Aeschylus  composed  trilogies. 

2  Herod,  ix.  3. 

3  For  Greek  criticism  of  Aeschylus,  cp.  Aristoph.  Frogs,  768  ff. 


XIV.  -4.] 


SOPHOCLES. 


495 


chorus  and  the  "argument"  are  brought  into  the  proper 
relation  to  each  other.  So  also  are  the  characters  and  the 
"incidents."  It  is  an  artistic  rendering  of  particular  situa- 
tions which  he  presents  to  us,  and  often  no  answer  is  given 
to  the  graver  questions  which  arise.  Of  him  too  it  may 
be  said  with  the  greatest  truth,  that  he  "saw  life  steadily 
and  saw  it  whole."  It  was  in  his  boyhood  that  the  Persians 
were  driven  back  in  ruinous  defeat  from  the  shores  of  Greece ; 
he  watched  the  growth  of  the  Athenian  empire,  and  took 
a  part  in  establishing  it  as  a  general  in  the  Samian 
expedition;  and  as  his  days  were  protracted  almost  to 
the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  he  also  saw  Athens 
brought  low  by  the  Sicilian  disaster,  and  torn  by  faction 
at  the  Eevolution  of  the  Four  Hundred.  Through  these 
changes  he  preserved  a  serenity  and  cheerfulness  which  not 
only  endeared  him  to  his  countrymen,  but  left  him  peculiarly 
receptive  to  the  influence  of  art. 

Sophocles  wrote  no  trilogies.  Each  of  his  plays  was 
complete  in  itself,  and  even  when  he  composed  plays  on  the 
same  theme,  they  were  brought  out  at  different  times,  and 
were  not  always  consistent  with  each  other. 

4.  The  third  great  tragic  poet  of  the  century  is  Euripides 
(480-406),  about  whose  plays  opinions  greatly  differed  in  the 
poet's  lifetime,  and  have  differed  ever  since. 
It  is,  indeed,  difficult  to  write  about  him  with  Euripides- 
consistency,  for  he  is  inconsistent  with  himself.  He  was  the 
poet  of  the  new  movement  at  Athens,  dear  to  Socrates  and 
his  school,  the  prophet  of  the  enlightenment,  whose  verses 
were  listened  to  throughout  Greece  with  eager  attention; 
but  he  was  also  the  author  of  the  Bacchae,  in  which  he  pleads 
for  the  ritual  and  worship  of  Dionysus.  He  is  capable  of 
writing  scenes  of  touching  simplicity,  such  as  the  death  of 
Alcestis,  but  at  other  times  he  avails  himself  of  the  most 
wretched  resources  to  excite  compassion.  In  the  Helena 
Menelaus  is  brought  before  us  after  his  shipwreck  clad  in  a 
piece  of  sailcloth;  and  the  "rags  of  Telephus"  have  been 
rendered  notorious  by  Aristophanes.    His  language  is  often 


496 


EURIPIDES. 


[XIV.  4. 


of  extraordinary  beauty,  simple  or  splendid  as  suits  the 
context,  but  there  are  also  passages  of  misplaced  rhetoric, 
false  antithesis,  and  meaningless  repetitions.  And  as  fortune 
has  preserved  to  us  nearly  three  times  as  many  plays  of 
Euripides  as  of  his  predecessors,  there  is  in  his  case  wider 
scope  for  criticism ;  we  do  not  judge  of  him  merely  from  a 
choice  selection  of  his  best  plays. 

But  whether  we  like  him  or  dislike  him — whether  we 
follow  Aristophanes,  who  was  never  weary  of  exposing  his 
weaknesses,  or  see  in  him  the  poet  who,  whatever  may  be 
said  of  him  as  a  playwright,  is  certainly  a  master  in  creating 
tragic  situations,  it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  Euripides  took 
the  most  important  step  that  has  ever  been  taken  in  the  history 
of  tragedy.  It  is  human  nature  as  he  saw  it  round  him  and 
human  passion,  which,  under  thin  disguises,  are  the  motives 
of  his  tragedies.  He  interprets  the  old  myths  in  the  light  of 
his  own  time,  and  the  result  is  often  sadly  realistic.  The 
illusion  is  completely  swept  aside :  Apollo  is  the  meanest  of 
men;  Aphrodite  the  worst  of  women;  Agamemnon  and 
Menelaus  are  just  such  kings  of  Sparta  as  we  read  of  in 
Herodotus.  When  we  remember  the  Homeric  conception, 
the  new  presentment  jars  upon  us.  And  yet  it  is  a  step 
forwards;  poetry  is  brought  nearer  to  her  great  office  of 
holding  up  the  mirror  to  nature.  By  taking  this  step, 
Euripides  introduced  a  new  life  into  tragedy,  and  through 
his  plays  there  breathes  the  same  spirit  which  animated 
Shakespeare — the  same,  yet  different,  for  in  Euripides  there 
is  no  sense  of  humour,  and  no  Greek  was  a  comic  as  well  as 
a  tragic  poet. 

Besides  these  great  tragic  poets — all  of  whom,  it  must  be 
especially  noticed,  were  Athenians — there  were  numerous 
others ;  in  fact  by  the  end  of  the  century  Greece  swarmed 
with  fledgling  tragedians  whose  twitterings  were  heard  in 
the  intervals  of  nobler  strains.  The  most  eminent  was 
Agathon,  a  well-known  figure  in  the  Socratic  circle,  of 
whom  Aristophanes  gives  us  an  amusing  caricature  in  the 
Thesmophoriazusae.    He  is  there  represented  as  a  creator  of 


XIV.  5.] 


COMEDY:  EPICHARMUS. 


497 


effeminate  characters,  who  endeavours,  so  far  as  possible,  tc 
resemble  his  own  creations,  but  at  a  later  time  when  Agathon 
was  dead,  the  comedian  spoke  more  seriously,  describing 
him  as  a  "good  poet,  and  regretted  by  his  friends."1 

5.  More  characteristic  still  of  Athens,  of  city  life  and 
democratic  feeling,  was  the  rise  of  comedy.  This  was  said 
to  be  of  Dorian  origin,  as  was  perhaps  the  case  Comedy 
with  tragedy  also  in  the  last  resort,  but  this 
merely  means  that  the  Dorians  were  the  first  to  make  an 
artistic  use  of  elements  which  had  long  been  in  existence.2 
The  first  to  attain  greatness  in  comedy  was  Epicharmus,  who 
was  neither  an  Athenian,  nor  brought  out  plays  at  Athens, 
but  a  native  of  Cos,  who  in  his  childhood  was  carried  to  the 
Sicilian  Megara  and  thence  to  Syracuse  in  the  time  of  the 
tyrant  Gelo  (vol.  ii.  p.  441).  We  can  form  but  an  imperfect 
judgment  of  his  work,  for  only  fragments  remain — and  those 
very  short  and  disconnected.  Plato  speaks  of  him  as  the 
greatest  of  comic  poets — a  verdict  not  altogether  impartial, 
for  Epicharmus  was  a  philosopher  as  well  as  a  comedian. 
Living  in  the  days  of  the  tyrants,  he  could  not,  of  course, 
make  Sicilian  politics  the  theme  of  his  comedy ;  he  took  his 
subjects  partly  from  the  social  life  of  the  people  and  partly 
from  mythology,  which  he  burlesqued. 

The  series  of  great  comic  poets  at  Athens  begins  with 
Cratinus.  Only  fragments  of  his  works  remain,  but  we  have 
enough  to  prove  that  in  his  time  comedy  had  cratinus 
already  established  her  claim  to  deal  with  and  Eupoiis. 
persons  and  questions  of  the  day.  He  was  one  of  the 
fiercest  of  the  opponents  of  Pericles  and  Aspasia,  and  in  his 
Panoptae  he  ridiculed  the  sophists.    He  was  followed  by 

1  Aristoph.  Frogs,  84.  The  Symposium  of  Plato  is  supposed  to  take 
place  in  the  house  of  Agathon. 

2  The  origin  of  literary  comedy  can  hardly  be  traced,  or  of  tragedy 
either.  Aristotle  seems  to  know  nothing  of  Susarion  or  Thespis,  the 
reputed  authors  of  comedy  and  tragedy  respectively  in  Attica ;  he 
derives  the  first  from  the  phallic  soDgs,  of  which  we  have  a  sample 
in  the  Acharnians  of  Aristophanes  (235  ff.) ;  and  the  second  from  the 
dithyrambs. 

VOL.  III.  2  I 


498 


EUPOLIS  AND  ARISTOPHANES.  [XIV.  5. 


Eupolis,  Crates,  Phrynichus,  Pherecrates,  Hermippus,  Aristo- 
phanes, and  many  more.  The  plays  of  all  these  poets  but 
Aristophanes  have  perished,  an  irreparable  loss  to  the  student 
of  Athenian  manners  and  history.  Eupolis  especially,  so  far  as 
we  can  form  an  opinion  from  the  fragments,  appears  to  have 
taken  a  wide  and  statesmanlike  view  of  public  affairs ;  at  any 
rate  he  estimated  Pericles  more  accurately  than  Aristophanes, 
and  from  the  sketches  in  his  "  Cities  "  of  the  various  states 
which  composed  the  Athenian  empire,  we  glean  some- 
thing of  their  condition  and  relation  to  Athens.1  Of  the 
plays  of  Aristophanes  eleven  have  been  preserved,  some  of 
which  deal  with  politics,  others  with  more  general  subjects. 
In  the  Acharnians,  which  was  brought  out  in  425,  he  laughs 
at  the  war-party,  and  ventures  to  say  a  word 
Anstophanes.  ^  ^  Lacedaemonians ;  in  the  Knights  (424) 
he  ridicules  Cleon,  who  was  then  in  the  flush  of  his  triumph 
at  Pylus,  and  endeavours  to  diminish  his  influence  over  the 
Athenians ;  in  the  Wasps  (422)  he  attacks  the  system  of  the 
law-courts,  and  the  Athenian  love  of  litigation.  In  the  Peace 
(421)  he  hails  the  return  of  happier  days  with  hopes  which 
were  doomed  to  disappointment.  The  Lysistrata  also  (411) 
must  be  ranked  among  the  political  plays.  At  the  time 
when  this  play  was  acted,  owing  to  the  absence  of  the  fleet 
at  Samos,  Athens  may  be  said  to  have  been  left  in  the  charge 
of  the  women  and  old  men ;  and  on  this  situation  Aristo- 
phanes has  founded  his  plot,  in  which  the  women  seize  the 
Acropolis  and  insist  on  putting  an  end  to  the  war.  The 
boldness  with  which  the  extreme  oligarchy  are  here  and  there 
assailed  on  the  eve  of  the  revolution  is  creditable  to  the  poet. 
In  the  Clouds  (423)  Socrates  is  caricatured.  Whether 
Aristophanes  misjudged  him  to  the  extent  which  the  play 
implies  may  be  doubted,  but  to  a  comedian  all  was  grist  that 
came  to  his  mill,  and  Socrates  in  his  appearance  and  his  life 

1  There  were  also  earlier  comic  poets  at  Athens  than  Cratinus; 
Aristotle  {Poet.  5)  mentions  Chionides  and  Magnes.  Of  the  first  we 
know  hardly  anything,  of  the  second  there  is  a  criticism  in  Aristoph. 
Knights,  518  ff.    For  Cratinus,  see  ibid.  526 ;  for  Crates,  537  ft. 


V 


XIV.  6.]         THE  PLAYS  OF  ARISTOPHANES.       ,  499 


was  too  good  a  subject  to  be  lost  through  any  scruples  about 
justice  to  the  man.  The  subject  also  allowed  the  poet  to 
display  his  genuinely  Athenian  contempt  for  natural  science 
and  "materialistic  ontology."  In  the  Birds  (416)  there  is 
nothing  but  pure  fancy  and  delightful  far-away  echoes  of 
political  worries  "refined  away  to  fairy  music  in  the  enchanted 
air  "  of  Cloud  Cuckoo  Town.  In  the  Thesmophoriazusae  (410) 
he  directs  his  satire  against  Agathon  and  Euripides,  not  with- 
out smart  hits  at  the  murdered  Hyperbolus  and  the  baffled 
oligarchs.  After  the  battle  of  Arginusae  and  the  execution  of 
the  generals,  politics  were  no  longer  a  subject  for  comedy. 
The  Frogs  (405)  is  a  criticism  on  the  three  great  dramatic 
poets  of  the  century.  Sophocles  and  Euripides  being  both 
dead,  Dionysus  is  in  want  of  a  poet,  and  goes  in  search  of 
one  to  the  shades,  where  he  finds  a  contest  raging  between 
Euripides  and  Aeschylus  for  the  first  place.  Where  politics 
are  touched  it  is  in  a  grave  and  serious  tone,  as  in  the 
Lysistrata.  In  the  Ecclesiazusae  (392)  we  have  a  picture  of 
Athens  as  she  might  be  under  the  "  regiment "  of  women,  and 
a  thoroughgoing  socialism.  The  theme  of  the  Plutus  (388)  is 
the  old  story  of  the  blind  god  of  wealth,  and  his  restoration 
to  sight.  The  play  is  far  removed  in  subject  and  style  from 
the  Acharnians  of  425.  Greece  is  now  on  the  eve  of  the 
Peace  of  Antalcidas,  and  Athens,  though  prosperous  beyond 
her  hopes,  is  no  longer  the  great  city  of  the  previous  century. 
From  this  short  notice  of  his  existing  plays,  it  will  be  seen 
how  closely  Aristophanes  keeps  to  the  politics  and  society  of 
his  time.  Often  he  is  only  too  realistic,  but  in  spite  of  much 
that  startles  and  shocks  us,  the  incomparable  grace  of  perfect 
Attic  art  is  spread  over  his  compositions,  and  among  the 
songs  introduced  into  his  plays  are  some  which  are  unsur- 
passed in  Greek  lyric. 

6.  In  connecting  the  growth  of  the  drama  with  the  de- 
velopment of  democracy,  we  may  seem  to  have  forgotten  the 
lessons  of  modern  history.  England  was  not  a  democracy  in 
the  days  of  Elizabeth  and  James  I.,  nor  was  France  in  the 
days  pf  Louis  xry.    Yet  these  were  the  days  of  Shakespeare 


500 


DRAMATIC  CONTESTS  AT  ATHENS.      [XIV.  6. 


and  Moliere,  poets  who  owed  not  a  little  to  the  favour  of  their 
sovereigns.  But  the  Greek  drama — so  far  at  least  as  the 
representation  of  the  plays  went — was  altogether  different 
from  the  modern.  It  was  not  the  affair  of  a  company  of 
actors  and  playwrights  who  lived  by  the  stage,  and  brought 
forward  such  pieces  as  would  be  most  likely  to  attract  an 
audience.  The  Greek  plays  were  a  part  of  the  festival  of 
Representation  Dionysus,  and  were  acted  before  the  whole 
of  plays  at  population  of  Athens,  and  as  many  strangers  as 
Athens.  chose  to  visit  Athens  at  the  time.  Originally, 

tragedies  were  acted  only  at  the  Great  Dionysia  in  the  spring, 
and  they  were  brought  out  by  poets  who  competed  with  one 
another.  Each  of  the  three  poets  whose  plays  had  been 
thought  worthy  of  a  chorus  by  the  arch  on,  came  forward 
with  three  tragedies  and  a  satyric  drama,  and  their  dramas 
were  ranged  in  order  of  merit  by  judges  chosen  for  the  pur- 
pose. Comedies  were  brought  out,  not  only  at  the  Great 
Dionysia,  but  also  at  the  Lenaea,  in  the  winter,  and  here  also 
the  poets  competed,  but  with  one  drama  each  only.  For  this 
reason  the  drama  stood  in  a  far  closer  relation  to  the  people 
and  to  city  life  in  its  ancient  than  in  its  modern  form,  and  as 
the  tragedians  in  the  choruses  and  speeches  of  their  plays  often 
sought  to  correct  and  elevate  the  popular  notions  of  ethics  and 
religion,  so  the  comedian  was  permitted  in  the  peculiar  form 
of  chorus  known  as  the  parabasis  to  come  forward  and  tell  the 
audience  some  home  truths  about  himself  or  the  city.1 

The  poems  of  Homer  were  still  recited  at  the  Panathenaic 
festival,  but  just  for  the  reason  that  Homer  was  by  this  time 
established  as  the  epic  poet  of  Greece,  there  was  no  attempt 
to  compose  in  his  style.  The  epics  which  still  continued  to 
be  written  were  genealogical  or  descriptive,  such  as  the 
Heracleis  of  Panyasis  of  Halicarnassus,  a  relative  of  Hero- 
dotus, and  the  Founding  of  Elect  by  Xenophanes  (vol.  ii.  512  f.). 
Antimachus,  a  native  of  Colophon,  also  composed  a  Thebaid 
in  twenty-four  books. 


l  See  Haigh,  The  Attic  Theatre,  c.  1,  §  1 1  ff. ;  Aristoph.  Frogs,  1051  f. 


XIV.  7-]         PROSE  WRITING:  HECATAEUS. 


501 


7.  The  beginnings  of  prose  writing  in  Greece  do  not  appear 
to  go  back  beyond  the  Sixth  Century.  There  could  not,  of 
course,  be  prose  literature  of  any  extent  with-  proSe  writing 
out  facilities  for  writing,  and  though  this  art  in  Greece- 
had  probably  been  known  for  centuries  to  the  Greeks,  and  the 
Phoenicians,  from  whom  the  art  came,  could  readily  supply 
materials  for  writing— if  they  were  wanted,  for  bark  and  skins 
were  to  be  got  in  Greece  as  plentifully  as  elsewhere— the 
Greeks  do  not  seem  to  have  used  it  in  literature  till  a  com- 
paratively late  period.  The  sayings  of  the  "  wise  men  "  were 
expressed  in  a  brief,  sententious  form,  which  made  it  easy  to 
commit  them  to  memory,  and  in  philosophy  verse  was  the 
medium  for  anything  like  a  formal  treatise.  But  with  the  ex- 
pansion of  Greece,  the  development  of  commerce,  and  still  more 
perhaps  with  the  growth  of  national  feeling,  there  arose  the 
desire  to  record  travels  or  write  down  the  founding  and  early 
history  of  colonies.  Towards  the  end  of  the  Sixth  Century 
a  number  of  "Logographers,"  as  they  were  called,  had  en- 
deavoured to  describe,  even  to  the  making  of  a  map,  the  world 
as  they  conceived  or  knew  it,  and  to  reduce  to  some  kind  of 
order  the  confused  mass  of  legends  which  were  current  about 
the  past  history  of  the  cities  of  Greece.  Of 
these  men  Hecataeus  of  Miletus  was  the  most  Hecataeus- 
remarkable.  He  has  already  come  before  us  in  connection 
with  the  Ionic  revolt,  when,  unfortunately  for  themselves,  his 
countrymen  refused  to  be  guided  by  his  sagacious  counsels 
(vol.  ii.  51).  His  works  on  geography  and  history  attained 
the  widest  reputation — such  at  least  is  the  conclusion 
which  we  draw  from  the  constant  allusions  of  Herodotus  to 
" Ionian  writers."  In  one  point,  the  expulsion  of  the  Pelasgians 
from  the  city,  we  find  him  dealing  with  the  history  of  Athens. 
His  works  are  said  to  have  been  written  with  some  elegance 
of  style,  but  the  fragments  which  we  possess  do  not  allow  us 
to  form  any  precise  judgment  of  his  matter  or  his  manner.1 

1  See  Forbes,  Thuc.  1.,  xlv.  f.,  where  some  extracts  are  given; 
Miiller,  Frag.  Hist.  Grate.  1.,  ix.  ff.,  i  ff.  He  wrote  in  pure  Ionic;  and 
his  style  is  described  as  Ka6ap6s  nal  aacprjs,  iu  be  nai  Ka\  rjSvs  ov 


502 


HERODOTUS. 


[XIV.  8. 


8.  Herodotus  (485-426  ?),  like  Hecataeus,  was  an  Asiatic — 
a  Dorian  of  Halicarnassus,  but  Ionian  in  all  but  birth.  His 
work,  both  in  range  and  conception,  was  far  in 
advance  of  anything  which  preceded  it.  He 
is  the  historian  of  the  great  Persian  war,  or  rather  of  the 
great  Persian  invasion,  for  his  history  ends  at  the  siege  of 
Sestos  in  478 ;  but  the  history  of  the  war  is  only  a  portion 
of  his  work,  which  is  intended  to  save  from  oblivion  the 
great  and  wonderful  things  that  have  been  done  in  the 
world,  and  trace  from  its  origin  the  cause  of  the  long  conflict 
between  East  and  West.  In  his  youth  he  took  part  in  the 
politics  of  his  native  city,  aiding  in  the  expulsion  of  the 
tyrant  Lygdamis,  after  which  he  spent  his  time  in  travelling 
through  the  East.  The  closing  years  of  his  life  were  passed 
at  Thurii,  where  he  settled  with  the  Athenian  colonists ;  but 
from  the  legends  of  his  life,  which  are  confirmed  by  his  book, 
we  may  infer  that  he  continued  till  his  death  to  be  in  close 
connection  with  Athens.  In  structure  his  work  closely  re- 
sembles the  Odyssey ;  in  the  earlier  books  we  are  carried  to 
all  the  distant  regions  of  the  world — to  Babylonia,  Egypt, 
India,  Libya,  and  Scythia — but  after  the  fifth  book  the 
narrative  becomes  more  and  more  concentrated  on  the  duel 
between  Greece  and  Persia :  in  conception  it  belongs  to  the 
age  before  the  "sophists."  Not  that  Herodotus  is  wanting 
in  critical  power ;  he  is  often  led  by  his  own  observation  and 
thoughts  to  differ  from  the  opinions  current  in  his  time. 
He  is  moved  to  laughter  at  the  sight  of  the  Ionian  maps, 
in  which  the  earth  is  circular  as  "  if  turned  out  of  a 
lathe,"  and  surrounded  by  the  ocean  stream.  Reason  and 
research  have  convinced  him  that  such  a  theory  is  unten- 
able, and  that  the  river  Oceanus  does  not  exist.  Though 
a  deeply  religious  man,  who  sees  in  everything  the  touch  of 
a  superhuman  power,  a  firm  believer  in  retribution  (tutis) 

perpicos.  The  introduction  to  his  work  on  genealogies  ran  as  follows : 
'EKaralos  MiXrjcrujs  code  fxvOeirar  raSe  ypdcpco,  cos  [xoi  akrjOea  doKei 
eivai'  ol  yap  'EXkr/vcov  Xdyot  7roXXot  re  Kai  yeXoloi,  cos  e/xot  (paipoprai, 
elcriv. 


XIV.  9-]  HELLANICUS. 


503 


and  divine  envy  (veneris),  he  has  the  Ionian  interest  in  natural 
philosophy  •  he  regards  the  sun  as  a  mass  of  floating  vapour, 
blown  to  and  fro  by  the  winds ;  he  is  averse  to  mysticism ; 
he  will  not  accept  the  doctrine  of  a  future  life,  at  any  rate 
as  he  finds  it  current  in  Egypt  and  Thrace;  and  what  is 
more  remarkable  still,  he  seems  to  have  doubts  whether 
any  god  has  ever  assumed  a  human  form,  or  that  any  man 
is  the  descendant  of  a  god  and  a  human  mother.1  Of  all 
Greek  authors  he  is  the  one  of  whom  we  know  the  most ; 
wherever  he  goes  he  takes  us  with  him,  talking  as  it  were 
by  the  way,  and  bringing  before  us  the  thoughts,  beliefs, 
and  aspirations  of  his  age, 

9.  A  younger  contemporary  of  Herodotus  was  Hellanicus 
of  Mytilene,  whom  Thucydides  mentions  as  almost  the  only 
historian  who  had  treated  of  the  period  subse- 
quent to  the  Persian  wars.  Thucydides  blames  e  amcus* 
him  for  a  want  of  chronological  accuracy  in  his  arrangement 
of  events — a  criticism  which  is  the  more  important  because 
chronology  was  the  subject  to  which,  above  all  others, 
Hellanicus  devoted  his  powers.  Taking  the  list  of  the 
priestesses  at  the  Heraeum  in  Argolis  for  his  basis  (vol.  i. 
p.  237),  he  carried  his  dates  up  to  a  remote  past.  Thus  he 
fixed  the  accession  of  Cecrops  in  a  year  corresponding  to 
1606,  the  fall  of  Troy  at  1209,  and  the  Eeturn  of  the 
Heraclids  in  1149,  dates  which  continued  to  compete  with 
those  subsequently  founded  on  the  list  of  the  Spartan  kings.2 

Thucydides  also  may  be  called  the  younger  contemporary 
of  Herodotus,  though  the  difference  between  the  two  historians 


1  Thus  he  is  driven  to  believe  in  Heracles  the  god,  and  Heracles 
the  man,  the  son  of  Amphitryon  and  Alcmene,  and  though  he 
speaks  of  Perseus  as  the  son  of  Danae  and  Zeus  (vii.  61),  he  seems  to 
hesitate  to  accept  the  story  (vi.  53).  In  Egypt  no  god  had  appeared 
in  human  form  for  three  hundred  and  forty-five  generations.  On  the 
other  hand,  Hecataeus  traced  his  family  to  a  divine  ancestor  in  the 
sixteenth  generation  (ii.  143) ;  cp.  iv.  5,  where  Herodotus  refuses  to 
accept  the  statement  that  Targitaeus  was  the  son  of  Zeus  and  of  the 
daughter  of  the  Borysthenes. 

2  See  Brandis,  De  temp.  Graec.  antiq.  rationibus,  Bonn,  1857. 


504 


THUCYDIDES. 


[XIV.  9. 


tempts  us  to  assign  them  to  different  generations.  He  was 
an  Athenian,  and  his  work  bears  the  stamp  of  Athenian 
Thucydides  thought  as  strongly  as  that  of  Herodotus  bears 
the  stamp  of  Ionian  "enquiry."  The  curiosity 
of  the  traveller  whose  attention  is  distracted  by  any  strange 
custom  or  new  belief  is  replaced  by  an  intense  application 
to  the  great  subject  which  the  writer  has  chosen  as  the 
work  of  his  life.  Thucydides  is  the  historian  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war :  with  that  in  view  he  studied  the  early  history 
of  Greece;  with  that  in  view  he  availed  himself  of  every 
opportunity  of  ascertaining  the  precise  events  of  the  war, 
and  the  motives  which  weighed  with  the  belligerents.  On 
the  one  hand  he  estimates  the  effect  of  the  war  on  character 
in  Hellas,  and  on  the  other  he  shows  how  national  character- 
istics contributed  to  success  or  failure.  In  the  details  of 
their  criticism,  Herodotus  and  Thucydides  are  at  times  not 
unlike  each  other ;  both  have  a  distrust  of  the  poets ;  both 
are  guided  by  TeKprjpia  or  indications  in  forming  an  opinion 
on  the  events  of  past  history ;  but  in  the  general  principles 
which  they  follow  they  are  far  asunder.  In  the  place  of  the 
religious  feeling  which  dominates  the  earlier  historian  we  have 
in  Thucydides  the  economical  and  political  conception  of  life. 
It  is  not  rto-is  or  veneris  which  guides  him  in  his  interpre- 
tation of  events — such  a  phrase  as  XP1V  ^aKtos  yeveaOat 
would  be  impossible  in  his  mouth — but  the  power  of  wealth, 
which  enabled  cities  to  build  walls  and  ships  and  put  down 
piracy ;  the  ambition  which  seeks  to  acquire  empire,  and  the 
pride  which  defends  what  has  been  won  at  any  cost.  He 
does  not  wish  to  astonish  his  readers  by  descriptions  of  what 
is  vast  or  strange ;  he  does  not  measure  the  importance  of 
things  by  their  remoteness;  he  perceives  the  greatness  of 
the  events  which  are  taking  place  round  him,  and  seeks  to 
interpret  them  for  all  time.  In  his  eyes  the  task  of  the 
historian  is  not  only  to  tell  vvhat  has  happened — that  is,  to 
record  events  with  the  greatest  possible  accuracy — but  to 
explain  why  it  happened.  Herodotus  is  impressed  with  the 
mutability  of  things,  the  decline  of  the  great,  and  the  rise  of 


\ 


XIV.  io.] 


GROWTH  OF  ORATORY. 


505 


the  insignificant — and  this  is  the  inference  which  we  naturally 
draw  from  a  first  acquaintance  with  history.  Thucydides 
believes  that  the  motives  which  influence  mankind  are  at  all 
times  and  everywhere  much  the  same ;  and  thus  by  a  study 
of  the  past  and  present  we  may  advance  forearmed  to  the 
future.  From  this  point  of  view  he  is  the  first  and  perhaps 
the  greatest  of  historians,  and  as  History  moves  onward  in 
the  accomplishment  of  her  task,  she  will  follow  more  strictly 
in  his  footsteps.1 

10.  The  Greeks  were  at  all  times  keenly  sensitive  to  the 
power  of  eloquence ;  from  Homer  downwards  "  shapeliness  " 
of  words  never  failed  to  win  favour  with  a 
Greek  audience.  As  we  have  seen  (supra,  °ratory* 
p.  57),  a  great  development  of  the  art  of  oratory  took  plaee 
in  Sicily  about  the  middle  of  the  Fifth  Century ;  and  it  was 
not  long  ere  the  teachers  of  the  art  carried  their  skill  to  Old 
Greece,  where  it  received  a  ready  welcome.  It  was  mainly 
owing  to  his  eloquence  that  Pericles  maintained  his  ground 
at  Athens  so  long,  and  every  young  Athenian  who  wished  to 
come  forward  in  public  life  began  by  acquiring  skill  in  speech. 
Those  who  would  not  or  could  not  attend  the  new  masters 
became  jealous  of  those  who  did  attend  them,  and  perhaps 
this  is  one  reason  for  Cleon's  abuse  of  the  clever  speakers  of 
his  time.  Here,  as  everywhere,  native  force  and  acquired 
dexterity  were  in  conflict ;  and  "  What  is  it  that  you  young 
men  want  1 "  was  a  question  asked  at  Athens  as  well  as 
Syracuse.2  Yet  even  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  when  Anti- 
phon  defended  himself  in  a  speech  wThich  Thucydides  de- 
scribes as  the  best  of  its  kind  spoken  in  Athens  down  to 
that  time,  Athenian  oratory  was  immature,  and  it  was  not 
till  the  next  century  that  eloquence  was  raised  to  its  greatest 
height  in  the  speeches  of  Lysias  and  Demosthenes. 


1  See  Forbes,  Thuc.  i.  Introd.  Thucydides  may  be  attacked  in 
details:  he  omits  much  that  we  should  like  to  know;  he  is  not 
precise,  even  when  vivid,  in  his  descriptions,  etc.,  but  what  would 
we  not  give  for  a  Thucydides  in  the  great  periods  of  our  own 
history  ?  2  Thuc.  vi.  38. 


506 


IONIAN  PHILOSOPHY. 


[XIV.  ii. 


The  same  was  the  case  with  the  prose  of  science.  In  the 
Fifth  Century  no  writer  on  morals  or  physics  can  be  compared 
in  respect  of  style  with  Plato,  who  belongs  to  the  next 
generation.  But  this  must  not  blind  us  to  the  real  progress 
which  was  being  made  during  the  century  in  speculation  on 
the  nature  of  the  universe. 

II.  The  early  Ionian  philosophers  had  endeavoured  to 
explain  the  origin  of  the  world  by  assuming  some  primary 
Philosophy  element  from  which,  by  a  variety  of  changes, 
all  existing  phenomena  arose.  Thales  of 
Miletus  (vol.  i.  427)  fixed  on  water  as  this  primary 
element,  to  which  he  may  have  been  led  partly  by  observa- 
The  Milesian  tion,  and  partly  perhaps  by  the  example  of 
School.  older    cosmogonies,   in  which   Oceanus  and 

Tethys  were  the  parents  of  all  things.  However  this  may 
be,  by  assuming  as  his  basis  a  material  element,  changing 
apparently  by  some  innate  force  of  its  own,  Thales  separated 
himself  from  the  older  cosmologies,  in  which  the  world  was 
created  by  divine  agencies,  and  with  him  begins  the  series 
of  Greek  philosophers.  A  farther  step  was  taken  by 
Anaximander,  also  of  Miletus  (611-545),  who  was  otherwise 
famous  as  the  constructor  of  the  first  map.  He  assumed  as 
the  primary  element  an  aveipov  or  "illimitable,"  something 
unlimited  in  extent  and  imperishable,  out  of  which  all  things, 
plants,  animals,  and  men,  were  developed  through  a  series  of 
gradations.  This  theory  had  the  advantage  over  that  of  Thales 
in  so  far  as  the  anupov  was  abstract  rather  than  concrete,  and 
therefore  more  easily  conceived  as  assuming  different  forms.1 

As  the  power  of  thought  deepened,  these  attempts  at  an 
explanation  of  the  universe  were  found  unsatisfactory.  It 
was  difficult  by  such  means  to  explain  the  qualities  found  in 
things,  and  no  account  was  given  of  the*  cause  of  the  changes 
which  were  assumed.  By  degrees  also  it  became  clear  that 
there  was  a  contrast  between  the  universal  and  the  particular, 


1  See  Windelband  in  Iwan  Muller's  Handbuch,  v.  1  ;  Zeller,  Out- 
lines of  Greek  Philosophy  j  Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philosophy. 


\ 


XIV.  ii.] 


MOTION  AND  REST. 


507 


between  reality  as  conceived  by  the  mind,  and  actuality  as 
apprehended  by  the  senses.  The  one  led  to  unity,  the  other 
to  change.  So  physical  inquiries  passed  into  metaphysical, 
and  two  great  schools  arose,  the  school  of  the  Eleatics  and  the 
school  of  the  Heracliteans. 

The  founder  of  the  Eleatic  school  was  Xenophanes  (c.  590- 
500),  who  emigrated  from  Colophon  to  the  west,  and  finally 
settled  at  Elea  (vol.  ii.  p.  512).    With  him  the  The  Eleatic 
principle  of  change,  so  necessary  in  the  Milesian  School, 
philosophy,  disappeared.    The  world  was  One,  Xen°Phanes- 
was  God,  without  beginning,  without  change,  without  end. 
From  such  a  principle  the  variety  of  the  existing  world  could 
not  of  course  be  explained,  but  in  regard  to  physical 
phenomena  Xenophanes  seems  to  have  taken  over,  with 
some  inconsistency,  the  views  of  Anaximander.1    Thus  the 
principle  of  unity  was  brought  forward  and  held  a  place 
beside  the  early  principle  of  change,  without  any  attempt  at 
reconciliation.    The  philosophers  who  came  after  Xenophanes 
adopted  one  or  other  of  these  principles  without  regard  to 
the  opposite.    Heraclitus  of  Ephesus  (540-470)  H  rt 
maintained  the  principle  of  ceaseless  change ; 
his  philosophy  was  expressed  in  the  phrase  irdvra  pel.  He 
disregarded  altogether  the  unchangeable  principle  which 
Xenophanes  had  introduced  into  philosophy,  for  neither  in 
the  created  world  nor  beyond  it  could  he  find  a  trace  of  such 
a  principle.     Yet  he  does  not,  like  the  Milesians,  merely 
assume  a  primary  substance,  which  changes  into  created 
things ;  and  if  he  chooses  fire  as  a  symbol  of  his  principle,  it  is 
not  "real  fire  that  crackles  and  burns,"2  but  fire  as  a  process  in 
which  change  is  always  going  on.  Parmenides 
(515-440  ?)  took  up  the  opposite  principle.    armem  es' 
What  Xenophanes  had  expressed  vaguely  and  in  language 
half  theological  he  developed  into  a  metaphysical  theory. 
"Being"  alone  exists,  for  it  alone  is  the  object  of  thought, 
and  being  is  unchangeable  in  quality  and  time.     In  the 


1  See  Windelband,  I.e.  p.  146. 


2  See,  however,  Burnet,  l.e. 


508 


EMPEDOCLES  AND  ANAXAGORAS.       [XIV.  12. 


hands  of  Zeno,  the  friend  and  pupil  of  Parmenides,1  the 
difficulties  and  contradictions  to  which  the  ordinary  opinions 
of  the  plurality  and  changeability  of  things  give  rise  were 
stated  from  a  purely  logical  point  of  view.  Motion  for 
instance  was  disproved  by  the  infinitesimal  division  of  time 
and  space — just  as  an  instantaneous  photograph  represents  a 
rapidly  moving  wheel  at  rest.  These  logical  paradoxes 
became  the  admiration  of  the  Greeks,  and  as  "dialectic" 
Zeno's  method  was  a  powerful  instrument  of  discussion.2 

12.  On  the  principles  of  Parmenides  and  Heraclitus 
physical  philosophy  could  hardly  continue  to  exist.  Some 
via  media  must  be  found  by  which  the  world  of  phenomena 
could  be  brought  into  relation  to  the  world  of  thought. 
Hence  the  philosopher  who  in  his  teaching,  if  not  in  his 
date  (for  he  was  slightly  the  older  man  of  the  two),  came  after 
Empedocles  of  Agrigentum  (vol.  ii.  p.  465),  Anaxagoras  of 
Clazomenae  (500-428,  supra,  p.  57),  and  the  atomists  Leucippus 
and  Democritus  of  Abdera,  attempted  in  various  ways  to  com- 
bine the  principle  of  unity  with  the  principle  of  change. 
The  great  Sicilian  had  explained  the  universe  on  mechanical 
principles.  All  matter  consisted  of  the  four  elements,  earth, 
water,  air,  fire,  which  were  set  in  motion  by  two  opposing 
Empedocles  powers,  Love  and  Hatred  (attraction  and  re- 
pulsion). These  elements  were  mixed  together 
in  a  vast  orb  or  sphere,  which  was  whirled  round  by  the 
energy  of  the  contending  powers.    By  attraction  air  and  fire 


1  From  the  first  those  who  devoted  themselves  to  science  or  philo- 
sophy seem  to  have  gathered  as  pupils  round  some  eminent  teacher, 
and  formed  a  school.  And  so  we  can  speak  of  the  schools  of  Miletus, 
Elea,  and  Abdera.  This  had  always  been  the  case  in  medicine,  and 
we  observe  it  in  poetry  and  art  also.  It  was  a  feature  of  Greek  life  to 
unite  into  diaaoi.  See  Windelband,  I.e.  p.  132.  Burnet,  Early 
Greek  Philosophy,  p.  28. 

2  For  Heraclitus  and  Parmenides,  see  Grote's  Plato,  vol.  i.  c.  1  ; 
also  Zeller's  Pre-Socratic  Philosophy.  Specimens  of  the  Zenonian 
dialectic  will  be  found  in  Grote,  I.e.  i.  p.  94  ff.  (ed.  1888).  It  was  the 
same  instrument  which  proved  so  powerful  in  the  hands  of  Socrates. 
The  influence  of  the  two  great  lines  of  thought  is  shown  in  an 
interesting  manner  in  Pater's  Plato  and  Platonism,  cc.  i.  ii. 


\ 


XIV.  12.]         LEUCIPPUS  AND  DEMOCRITUS. 


509 


were  drawn  into  the  outer  parts  of  the  sphere,  and  formed 
the  atmosphere  and  the  luminaries ;  earth  and  water  sank  to 
the  middle.  Anaxagoras  improved  upon  this  system;  in- 
stead of  four  elements  he  assumed  the  existence  of  "  things  " 
(xprj^aTa),  equal  in  number  to  the  qualities  of  which  we  have 
perception;  and  by  the  union  and  separation  of  these  the 
objects  of  sense  came  into  being.  In  everything  there  was 
a  portion  of  everything,  but  not  of  course  an  equal  portion, 
and  hence  arises  the  difference  between  one  thing  and  another 
— between  flesh  and  blood,  earth  and  water,  etc.  In  order  to 
account  for  this  union  and  separation,  Anaxagoras  assumed  a 
moving  and  directing  "Mind,"  which  was  of  a 
nature  separate  and  distinct  from  everything  Anaxagoras- 
else ;  by  the  action  of  "  Mind  "  the  original  mass  or  mixture 
was  separated  and  arranged.  Yet  Anaxagoras  did  not 
succeed  in  escaping  from  the  difficulties  which  beset  his  pre- 
decessor. Just  as  in  Empedocles  the  existence  of  "  Love  "  and 
"  Hate  "  is  a  mere  assumption  made  to  explain  the  world,  so 
it  is  with  the  "  Mind  "  of  Anaxagoras  :  he  required  a  motive 
power  for  the  creation  of  objects  of  sense,  and  therefore 
assumed  the  existence  of  a  cause,  the  origin  and  nature  of 
which  he  cannot  explain.  Other  difficulties  arose  from  the 
qualitative  nature  of  the  elements  assumed  by  Anaxagoras. 
Democritus  following  in  the  steps  of  Leucippus,  his  master 
at  Abdera,  sought  to  give  a  still  more  simple,  and  more  purely 
mechanical,  account  of  the  origin  of  the  universe. 
He  discarded  the  qualitative  difference  of  the  The  atomists* 
elements  or  "  atoms,"  which  were,  however,  of  various  shapes 
and  sizes,  and  indivisible.  Moving  downward  through  the 
"void,"  these  atoms  impinged  on  each  other,  and  thus 
becoming  entangled  formed  masses  larger  or  smaller,  more  or 
less  dense  or  rough.  From  these  primary  qualities  arose 
the  secondary  qualities  of  taste,  smell,  etc.  Besides  atoms 
and  "void"  there  was  nothing;  by  them  and  them  only 
was  explained  the  whole  world  of  matter  and  mind.  Such 
was  the  great  physical  system  of  Democritus ;  in  his  own 
age  it  was  disregarded,  at  any  rate  at  Athens ;  Socrates 


510  THE  PYTHAGOREANS:  PHILOLAUS.     [XIV.  12. 


turned  away  from  it  to  his  dialectic,  Plato  to  his  "ideas." 
More  than  a  century  afterwards,  Epicurus  made  it  the 
foundation  of  his  philosophy;  and  in  modern  times  it  has 
been  adopted  in  a  slightly  different  form  as  the  basis  of 
natural  science.1 

Finally  the  Pythagoreans,  some  of  whom,  after  the  disper- 
sion of  the  societies  in  Magna  Graecia  (vol.  ii.  p.  488),  found 
The  Pytha-  a  home  at  Thebes,  brought  their  theory  of 
goreans.  numbers  to  bear  upon  the  difficulty  of  unity  and 

change.  The  leader  of  the  school  was  Philolaus,  who  published 
his  views  in  a  treatise,  of  which  fragments  remain.  "  All  is 
number,"  they  maintained  ;  for  in  all  things  number  exists  as 
a  defining  principle.  Numbers  were  the  original  forms  of 
which  things  were  copies.  The  odd  and  even  were  identified 
with  the  limited  and  unlimited,  and  all  things  could  thus  be 
arranged  into  two  great  categories,  which,  however,  run  up 
into  the  one,  a  number  both  odd  and  even.  In  this  way 
paths  were  projected  through  the  multiplicity  of  objects,  and 
the  contrast  of  change  and  unity  reconciled  in  a  higher 
harmony.2 

13.  Such  speculations  were  little  appreciated  at  Athens. 
Anaxagoras  was  thrown  into  prison,  the  books  of  Protagoras 
were  burnt,  and  though  Democritus  paid  a  visit  to  the 
city,  his  teaching  was  disregarded.  The  feeling  of  the  older 
citizens  strongly  condemned  the  sophists  and  all  their  works. 
Yet  of  some  of  these  writers  it  must  be  said  that  they  made 
greater  contributions  to  moral  science  than  Plato  himself. 
The  "sophists"  were  among  the  first  to  protest  against 
slavery,  an  honour  which  Euripides  shares  with  them,  and 

Protagoras        *°  ^>rotaSoras  we  owe  tne  -wise  saying  that 
punishment  is  inflicted  for  the  reformation  of 
the  offender,  not  for  the  satisfaction  of  revenge  or  the  adjust- 


1  See  Grote,  I.e.  vol.  i.  67  ff. ;  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii. ; 
Windelband,  I.e.  205  ff.  Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philosophy.  Leucippus 
is  in  other  accounts  a  native  of  Elea  or  of  Miletus  ;  but  in  any  case 
he  must  be  considered  the  master  of  Democritus. 

2  (See  Grote,  I.e.  i.  p.  9  f . ;  Pater,  l.c,  c,  iii, 


\ 


XIV.  13. ]    ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY:  DEMOCRITUS.  511 


ment  of  the  balance  of  fault  and  retribution.  In  other 
respects,  we  must  allow,  the  views  of  Protagoras  were  less 
advanced :  he  maintained  that  might  was  right,  which  was 
inconsistent  even  with  his  own  condemnation  of  slavery. 
His  most  famous  doctrine  was  expressed  in  the  words, 
"  Man  is  the  measure  of  all  things  " — which,  if  it  meant  that 
there  was  no  knowledge  outside  the  human  mind,  was  true 
enough,  but  far  from  true  if  it  implied  that  every  man  was 
entitled  to  have  his  own  rule  of  right  and  wrong.  He  refused 
to  enter  into  any  arguments  about  the  existence  or  nature  of 
the  gods  on  the  ground  that  the  human  faculties  were 
inadequate,  and  human  life  too  short  for  such  discussions, 
views  which  naturally  brought  him  into  disrepute  as  an 
atheist.  In  his  metaphysical  speculations  he  seems  to  have 
been  a  follower  of  Heraclitus  {supra,  p.  507),  and,  in  fact,  his 
teaching  on  the  nature  of  knowledge  implies  a  theory  in  which 
all  things  are  in  constant  change.1  Of  the  ethical 
teaching  of  Democritus,  the  greatest  representa-  Democntus- 
tive  of  the  school  of  Abdera,  we  have  many  interesting  frag- 
ments. Sometimes  he  speaks  as  a  utilitarian :  "  Pleasure 
and  disgust  are  the  criteria  of  good  and  evil "  ;  which  is, 
however,  but  another  way  of  saying  that  a  properly  trained 
nature  will  hate  evil  and  love  good.  The  highest  virtue  is 
to  fulfil  all  duty  to  the  state — it  is  in  the  state  that  a  man's 
nature  becomes  realised,  and  he  shows  his  qualities,  good  or 
bad.  Duty  must  be  done  for  its  own  sake,  without  thought 
of  the  gods  or  of  a  future  existence,  for  which  indeed  there  is 
no  room  in  the  system  of  Democritus.  From  the  conscious- 
ness of  duty  fulfilled  arises  that  peace  of  mind  which  is  the 
true  human  felicity.  This  peace  is  neither  the  rapture  of  the 
mystic  nor  the  dream  of  the  idealist ;  it  is  the  calm  satis- 
faction of  the  man  who  does  not  seek  his  pleasures  in  what 
is  mortal,  or  undertake  tasks  which  are  too  high  for  him, 
for  the  old  sayings  fxr)8ev  ayav,  yv(o6i  creavrov  are  still  among 
the  best  guides  in  life.    The  greatest  help  towards  attaining 


1  See  Protagoras  in  Pauly's  Real- Encyclopaedic 


512 


POLITICAL  SCIENCE:  HIPPODAMUS.     [XIV.  14. 


this  peace  is  education,  of  which  Democritus  nobly  says, 
that  it  is  an  ornament  to  the  prosperous  and  a  refuge  to  the 
unfortunate.  There  is  also  no  greater  pleasure  for  a  man 
than  the  contemplation  of  great  actions  and  the  investiga- 
tion of  truth  ;  and  for  his  own  part,  Democritus  would  rather 
be  the  discoverer  of  a  single  new  truth  than  sit  on  the 
throne  of  the  Great  King.  The  soul  is  the  home  of  the 
genius  which  shapes  our  lives,  and  chance  is  but  a  phantom 
invented  by  mankind  to  excuse  their  own  folly.1 

14.  The  beginnings  of  political  science  also  go  back  to  the 
Sixth  Century.  The  Pythagorean  societies  had  drawn  upon 
Political  themselves  the  hatred  of  the  cities  in  which 

science.  they  were  formed   because  their  principles 

seemed  hostile  to  civic  life.  In  other  cases,  we  find  philo- 
sophers taking  a  leading  part  in  the  political  movements  of 
their  cities.  Empedocles  and  Parmenides  were  remembered 
with  honour  at  Agrigentum  and  Elea.  As  time  went  on,  the 
various  constitutions  were  classified,  and  their  merits  discussed ; 
in  the  time  of  Herodotus  there  were  already  three  types — 
monarchy,  oligarchy,  and  democracy — though  he  strangely 
places  the  discussion  of  them  in  the  mouths  of  the  Persian 
conspirators.2  A  further  step  was  taken  when  men  who 
were  in  no  way  connected  with  practical  politics  drew  up 
ideal  constitutions.  The  first  to  do  this  was  Hippodamus  of 
Miletus  (supra,  p.  19),  who  wished  to  introduce  something  like 
mathematical  precision  into  his  state,  and,  led  perhaps  by 
some  knowledge  of  Athenian  juries,  wished  that  the  sentences 
of  the  popular  juries  should  be  revised  by  a  supreme  court. 
The  sophists,  of  course,  gave  much  attention  to  such  subjects. 
Protagoras  was  inclined  to  maintain  the  authority  of  the 
state ;  he  regarded  justice  as  the  uniting  principle  in  politics, 
and  a  knowledge  of  justice,  he  said,  comes  insensibly  to  any 
one  who  has  been  bred  in  a  civilised  state — a  common-sense 
doctrine  which  does  credit  to  the  "  sophist."    Other  teachers 

1  See  Beloch,  Griech.  Gesch.  i.  626  f.,  and  the  quotations  there 
given  from  Democritus. 

2  Herod,  iii.  80  f. 


XIV.  T5-]    THE  PHILOSOPHER  AND  THE  CITIZEN. 


513 


held  more  dangerous  doctrines.  Much  was  made  of  the 
difference  between  convention  and  nature.  Thrasymachus  in 
the  Republic  of  Plato  regards  justice  as  the  outcome  of  a 
social  compact  which  limits  the  natural  rights  of  man. 
Hippias  considered  those  laws  only  as  divine  which  were  uni- 
versal. But  what  is  to  become  of  the  state  if  "nature"  is 
only  another  name  for  "force" — especially  as  it  became 
more  and  more  clear,  in  the  transformation  of  Greek  politics, 
"  that  the  government  of  a  state  must  have  force  at  its  back  "  % 
During  the  later  period  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  the  opposi- 
tion of  oligarchy  and  democracy  became  an  all-absorbing 
interest,  and  as  Sparta  gained  in  the  contest,  her  institutions 
attracted  more  attention,  and  greatly  influenced  the  political 
speculation  of  the  time.1 

15.  The  views  of  the  philosophers,  if  they  had  become 
popular,  would  have  destroyed  the  orthodox  religion.  In  the 
system  of  Democritus  the  gods  were  allowed  philosophy 
to  exist,  but  only  as  spirits  who  took  no  part  and  relision- 
in  the  ordering  of  the  world ;  Anaxagoras  put  intellect  in 
the  place  of  divine  power,  and  Protagoras  was  an  "  agnostic." 
It  was  only  in  the  teaching  of  the  Pythagoreans  that  re- 
ligion maintained  a  place,  and  their  religion  was  not  that  of 
the  common  people.  There  was  also  an  opposition  between 
the  philosopher  and  the  citizen ;  the  man  who,  as  a  rule, 
was  without  family  ties,  who  wandered  from  his  native  city, 
or  did  not  hesitate  to  criticise  her  institutions,  was  regarded 
with  suspicion  by  the  citizen  whose  life  was  passed  within 
his  native  walls,  and  who  thought  it  the  highest  virtue  to 
have  the  same  friends  and  the  same  enemies  as  his  state. 
But  the  Greeks  were  not  readers,  though  it  is  probable  that 
almost  every  Athenian  could  read,  and  for  a  long  time  the 
speculations  of  philosophy  were  either  written  down  in  books, 
or  discussed  in  narrow  circles.  In  Athens,  at  any  rate, 
philosophy  and  religion  did  not  diverge  so  widely  as  among 
the  bolder  thinkers  of  Ionia  and  Thrace.    This  was  due,  in  a 


1  See  Newman,  Politics  of  Aristotle,  vol.  i.  In  trod.  p.  380  ff. 
VOL.  III.  2  K 


514 


SOCRATES. 


[XIV.  15. 


great  measure,  to  the  influence  of  Socrates,  the  son  of  So- 
phroniscus  (469-399),  who,  discarding  physical  inquiries  alto- 
gether, devoted  himself  to  moral  and  mental 
speculation  and  criticism.  He  was  an  Athenian 
of  the  Athenians,  so  great  a  lover  of  his  city  that  he  never 
left  it  except  to  serve  in  the  battlefield,  and  when  condemned 
to  death,  refused  to  save  his  life  by  disobedience  to  the  laws 
under  which  he  suffered ;  a  man  of  so  religious  a  nature  that 
he  claimed  to  be  guided  in  all  his  actions  by  a  divine 
voice.  He  took  up  the  questions  opened  by  the  wandering 
sophists,  so  far  as  they  related  to  ethics  or  politics,  and 
endeavoured  to  find  answers  to  them  based  on  deeper  inves- 
tigation. A  sculptor  by  trade,  he  was  satisfied  with  the 
barest  pittance  of  wages,  and  spent  his  time  in  talking  to  any 
one  whom  he  could  find  ready  to  enter  into  discussion  with 
him.  Asking  no  fee  for  his  instruction^— if  instruction  it 
could  be  called  when  he  always  insisted  that  he  was  the  most 
ignorant  of  the  company — he  associated  with  rich  and  poor, 
till  he  gathered  round  him  a  band  of  disciples,  who  shaped 
the  philosophy  of  the  next  century.  He  wrote  nothing,  nor 
did  he  attempt  to  frame  any  system  of  ethics,  or  to  teach 
in  any  regular  course.  His  power  lay  in  conversation  ;  by  a 
series  of  subtly  contrived  questions,  he  led  the  discussion 
this  way  and  that,  till  his  opponent  had  become  involved  in 
inextricable  difficulties,  or  downright  contradictions.  Pro- 
fessing to  know  nothing  himself,  he  was  always  convincing 
others  of  their  ignorance,  and  at  the  same  time  stimulated 
them  to  a  sure  foundation  of  knowledge  and  virtue.  Among 
those  who  listened  to  him  was  Xenophon,  who,  in  the  simple 
memorials  which  he  has  written  down  of  his  master's  conver- 
sation, has  given  us  an  accurate  picture  of  Socrates  as  he 
might  be  seen  in  the  market-place  of  Athens,  or  at  a  barber's 
shop,  or  in  the  house  of  a  friend,  day  by  day,  asking  ques- 
tions and  tearing  to  pieces  the  answers  which  he  received, 
till  he  exposed  their  superficiality,  if  he  did  not  attain  to  the 
truth  beyond  them.  Plato,  also  a  disciple,  made  the  conver- 
sations of  Socrates  the  basis  of  his  dialogues.    Through  his 


\ 


XIV.  i6.] 


PHYSICAL  SCIENCE. 


515 


genius,  Socrates  has  become  the  best-known  figure  among 
the  philosophers  of  the  world,  and  the  account  which  he 
has  given  of  his  master's  closing  days  is  little  less  than  a 
canonisation.  For  Socrates,  whose  whole  life  was  passed  in 
the  performance  of  duty,  fell  a  victim  to  the  religious  and 
political  susceptibilities  of  the  Athenians ;  he  was  accused 
of  atheism,  and  of  perverting  the  young  men  with  whom  he 
associated,  and,  when  more  than  seventy  years  of  age,  he 
was  condemned  to  death  (399). 

l6.  Through  Socrates,  Athens  became  a  centre  of  philo- 
sophy, so  far  as  it  concerned  ethics  and  politics.  In  the 
department  of  science  she  had,  as  we  have 
said,  but  little  share.  Hippocrates,  the  great  e  lcme" 
physician  of  the  century,  was  a  native  of  Cos,  and  what 
may  be  called  the  medical  schools  of  the  time  were  to  be 
found  in  that  island  and  at  Epidaurus,  Cnidus,  and  Croton. 
To  Croton  also  belonged  Democedes  (vol.  ii.  38),  and  in  the 
next  generation  Alcmaeon,  who  was  the  founder  of  anatomy. 
From  Cnidus  came  Euryphon,  and  Ctesias,  who  was  physi- 
cian to  Artaxerxes  Mnemon  at  the  close  of  the  century. 
The  writings  of  Hippocrates  were  the  "  classics  "  of  the  art. 
Disease  was  no  longer  regarded  as  due  to  supernatural 
influence,  and  to  be  cured  by  charms  and  incantations,  or  by 
dreams  in  the  temple  of  Asclepius.  Hippocrates  maintained 
that  all  diseases  have  a  natural  cause,  and  natural  means 
must  be  taken  for  their  cure.  Nature  must  be  aided  where 
possible,  and  when  she  cannot  be  aided,  she  must  be  left  to 
herself.  "What  drugs  cannot  cure,  the  knife  must  heal; 
where  the  knife  fails,  fire  must  be  tried;  and  if  fire  fails, 
there  is  no  cure."1 

In  the  kindred  sciences  of  botany  and  biology  little  was 
done,  though  Democritus  laid  a  foundation  for  future  studies 
in  his  treatises  on  the  causes  of  seeds,  plants,  and  fruits,  and 
on  the  structure  of  animals.     More  attention  was  paid  to 

1  See  Beloch,  Gr.  Gesch.  i.  605;  Pauly,  Real-Encycl.  Hippocrates. 
The  treatise,  Be  acre  et  aquis,  is  still  valuable  for  the  acute  observa- 
tions recorded  in  it  of  the  influence  of  climate  on  health. 


516  MATHEMATICS:  GEOGRAPHY.  [XIV.  16. 


mathematics  ;  in  the  Platonic  system  they  occupied  the  fore- 
most place  among  studies  preparatory  to  philosophy — a 
Mathematics  P03ition  due  not  so  much  to  the  teaching  of 
Socrates  as  to  Plato's  sympathy  with  exactness 
of  thought.  Yet  no  Athenian  seems  to  have  attained  great 
eminence  as  a  mathematician,  except  perhaps  Meton,  who 
arranged  the  calendar  on  a  new  and  more  accurate  system 
(432),  based  on  a  cycle  of  nineteen  years,  by  which  the  solar 
and  lunar  years  were  brought  into  closer  connection  with 
each  other.  Other  mathematicians  and  astronomers  of  the 
Periclean  age  were  Oenopides  of  Chios,  Hippocrates  also  of 
Chios,  Anaxagoras,  Hippodamus  of  Miletus,  and  Theodoras 
of  Cyrene.1 

In  geography,  both  scientific  and  descriptive,  the  Greeks 
took  the  liveliest  interest.  In  his  Prometheus  Vinctus  the 
Geography  Poet  Aeschylus  makes  an  opportunity  to  give 
his  audience  a  sketch  of  the  wanderings  of  Io ; 
and,  as  we  have  seen,  geographical  works  were  among  the 
first  efforts  in  prose.  The  Pythagoreans  advanced  so  far  as 
to  conceive  of  the  earth  as  a  cone,  and  Parmenides,  following 
this  up,  invented  a  theory  of  zones ;  but  the  current  view  in 
the  Fifth  Century  was  still  that  of  the  Ionians,  who  regarded 
the  earth  as  a  flat  plate  floating  on  air  in  the  middle  of  the 
universe.  This  view  seems  also  to  have  been  held  by 
Herodotus,  though  he  discards  the  notion  of  an  ocean  stream 
and  of  a  circular  earth.  The  general  form  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean was  pretty  well  known,  but  measurements  were 
inaccurate,  and  therefore  conflicting.  Whether  Libya  was 
surrounded  by  the  sea,  or  the  Caspian  closed  at  the  northern 
end  were  still  open  questions.  Little  or  nothing  was  known  of 
the  west  or  north  of  Europe — for  what  the  Phoenician  traders 
had  discovered  they  kept  as  a  trade  secret — or  of  India,  in 
spite  of  the  voyage  of  Scylax.2 


1  For  Meton's  cycle  see  Pauly,  I.e.  iii.  141  f.  Anaxagoras  is 
said  to  have  occupied  himself  when  in  prison  with  the  quadrature  of 
the  circle.    Windelband,  I.e.  130;  Burnet,  I.e.  281. 

2  Herod,  iv.  44. 


\ 


XIV.  i7- ] 


FINE  ARTS:  PAINTING. 


517 


17.  In  all  the  departments  of  fine  art,  though  not  equally 
in  all,  a  new  impulse  seems  to  have  stimulated  Greece  in  the 
Fifth  Century.  The  art  of  painting  had  long 
been  employed  in  a  subordinate  manner  for  the  Paintin& 
decoration  of  houses  and  of  marble  tombs,  and  on  a  smaller 
scale  for  the  decoration  of  vases.  Of  pictures  in  the  modern 
sense— pictures  on  wood — we  hear  of  one  executed  at  the 
command  of  Mandrocles,  of  the  bridge  built  by  him  over  the 
Bosphorus,  and  placed  in  the  Heraeum  at  Samos.  There  is 
also  the  legend  of  the  picture  of  the  battle  with  the  Magnetes 
painted  by  Bularchus  for  Candaules  of  Lydia,  who  paid  for  it 
with  its  weight  in  gold.1  At  the  end  of  the  Sixth  and  begin- 
ning of  the  Fifth  Century  there  was  a  remarkable  develop- 
ment in  vase  painting,  the  black  figures  which  had  long  been 
in  use  being  discarded  for  red.  But  the  creator  of  painting 
as  a  fine  art  was  Polygnotus  of  Thasos,  who,  in 
Cirnon's  time,  decorated  the  walls  of  the  Painted  Polygnotus- 
Porch  at  Athens.  The  most  famous  of  his  works  were  the 
paintings  in  the  porch  of  the  Cnidians  at  Delphi,  in  which  he 
depicted  the  underworld  and  the  destruction  of  Troy,  of 
which,  fortunately,  Pausanias  has  given  us  a  minute  descrip- 
tion.2 The  skill  of  Polygnotus  was  shown,  not  so  much  in 
his  colouring,  as  in  the  expression  which  he  gave  to  the  face 
and  figure,  and  in  the  composition  of  his  pictures.  "He 
knew  how  to  breathe  into  the  old  forms  and  rules  a  higher 
intellectual  life,  and  develop  from  them  a  higher  artistic 
beauty."  3 

A  painter  who  did  much  to  improve  the  decoration  of  the 
stage  was  Agatharchus  of  Samos,  the  younger  contemporary 
of  Polygnotus,  and  as  a  good  scene  could  hardly  be  painted 
without  some  knowledge  of  perspective,  we  may  suppose  that 
Agatharchus  made  this  his  study.4    But  the  greatest  of 

1  Herod,  iv.  88 ;  Plin.  N.  II.  vii.  126 ;  xxxv.  55. 

2  Paus.  x.  25-31. 

3  Brunn.     See  the  article  "Malerei"  in  Baumeister,  Denhmdler 
vol.  ii.,  by  Von  Rohden. 

4  It  was  Agatharchus  whom  Alcibiades  compelled  to  paint  his 


513 


FINE  ARTS:  SCULPTURE. 


[XIV.  18. 


Greek  painters  were  Zeuxis  of  Heraclea  and  Parrhasius  of 
Ephesus,  who  belong  to  the  end  of  the  century.  Of  the  works 
Zeuxis  and  of  Zeuxis  we  have  no  details,  with  the  excep- 
Parrhasius.  tion  of  his  Centaur  Family,  which  is  described 
by  Lucian.  In  the  Acharnians  of  Aristophanes  there  is  an 
allusion  to  the  Eros  which  he  painted  in  the  temple  of 
Aphrodite  at  Athens — "a  beautiful  boy  crowned  with  roses." 
Aristotle  says  of  him  that  his  art  was  such  that  he  could 
make  even  the  impossible  credible,  but  his  paintings  were 
deficient  in  the  expression  of  character,  being  in  this  respect 
the  reverse  of  those  of  Polygnotus.1  Parrhasius  was  the  con- 
temporary and  rival  of  Zeuxis.  About  twenty  of  his  paintings 
are  mentioned :  among  them  the  Healing  of  Telejphus,  the 
Madness  of  Odysseus,  Philodetes  on  Lemnos,  and  Prometheus, 
which  show  an  inclination  towards  subjects  in  which  strong 
emotion  was  expressed  without  loss  of  dignity.  The  story 
of  the  contest  between  Zeuxis  and  Parrhasius  is  well  known. 
Zeuxis  painted  grapes  with  such  fidelity  that  the  birds  came 
to  pluck  them.  Confident  of  success,  he  went  to  the  studio 
of  Parrhasius,  and  seeing  his  picture,  bade  him  draw  the 
curtain  which  concealed  it.  But  the  curtain  was  the  picture, 
and  Zeuxis  acknowledged  that  Parrhasius  had  won. 

18.  In  sculpture,  the  artists  of  the  Fifth  Century  attained 
an  eminence  which  has  never  been  surpassed.  By  what 
inspiration  of  genius  and  sleight  of  hand  they 
Sculpture.  were  able  to  pass  at  once  from  the  heavy,  insipid 
forms  of  the  previous  century,  so  rigid  in  their  attitude,  so 
vacant  in  expression,  so  coarse  in  the  colouring,  to  the  grace- 
ful and  animated  perfection  of  the  age  of  Pericles,  cannot  be 
explained.  As  it  was  in  the  drama,  so  it  was  in  sculpture ; 
great  masters  appeared  who  carried  the  art  forward  with 
astonishing  rapidity.     The  progress  was  not  confined  to 


house  by  shutting  him  up  in  it,  and  bidding  him  either  finish  the 
work  and  come  out  with  a  handsome  payment,  or  break  out  as  best 
he  could. 

1  Luc.  Zeuxis.  Arist.  Ach.  955 ;  Arist.  Poet.  6.  See  the  article 
on  Zeuxis  in  Pauly's  Real- Ency clop. 


\ 


XIV.  i8.]    SCULPTORS  OF  THE  FIFTH  CENTURY. 


519 


Athens,  but  spread  through  the  cities  round  the  Saronic 
gulf,  with  the  exception  of  Corinth.  Canachus  of  Sicyon,  and 
Hageladas  of  Argos  were  widely  known  quite  early  in  the 
century ;  the  first  was  pre-eminent  in  working  in  bronze,  and 
his  success  in  this  material  greatly  influenced  the  work  in 
stone.  He  also  made  a  statue  of  Aphrodite  in  ivory  and 
gold  for  her  temple  in  Sicyon.  At  Aegina  the  sculptures  of 
the  temple  of  Athena  belong  to  this  period ;  the  chief  master 
here  was  Onatas,  whose  works  were  thought  equal  to  those  of 
the  greatest  sculptors  of  the  Attic  school.1  In  Athens,  soon 
after  the  Persian  war,  Critius  and  Nesiotes  executed  statues 
of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton,  to  replace  those  which  Xerxes 
had  carried  off  to  Susa.2  These  artists  were  followed  by 
Calamis  and  Myron,  whose  bronze  figures  of  animals  were 
among  the  finest  efforts  of  Greek  plastic  art.  Greater  still  was 
Phidias,  in  whose  hands  the  human  form  was 
rendered  with  a  dignity  and  perfection  which  Phldias" 
is  still  the  wonder  and  despair  of  the  sculptor.  His  material 
was  generally  marble;  the  figures  in  the  pediments  of  the 
Parthenon,  by  which  his  style  is  best  known,  were  necessarily 
of  this  material,  but  he  also  wrought  in  bronze,  and,  in  his 
finest  efforts,  in  gold  and  ivory.  The  statue  of  Zeus  at 
Olympia,  which  was  regarded  in  antiquity  as  something  almost 
superhuman,  and  the  statue  of  Athena  in  the  Parthenon,  were 
executed  in  these  materials.  In  estimating  the  effect  of  such 
statues,  we  must  remember  that  they  were  placed  in  the 
dimly  lighted  cellae  of  temples,  where  the  brilliance  of  the 
colouring  would  be  much  subdued.3  After  the  death  of 
Phidias  the  primacy  in  art  passes  from  Athens 
to  Argos,  where  Polyclitus  executed  work  only  Polyclltus' 
second,  and  not  in  all  respects  second,  to  the  Athenian 

1  See  Pauly,  .Real-Encycl.  Onatas,  and  Paus.  viii.  42.  7 ;  v.  25  ad 
fin. 

2  Lucian,  Philosoph.  c.  18;  Paus.  i.  8.  5,  who  ascribes  the  statues 
to  Critius  only. 

3  See  Beloch,  G.  G.  i.  586,  who  compares  the  use  of  gold  mosaics  in 
basilicae.  Myron  was  a  native  of  Boeotia,  but  naturalised  at  Athens  j 
both  he  and  Phidias  were  pupils  of  the  Argive  Hageladas. 


520 


STYLES  OF  ARCHITECTURE.  [XIV.  19. 


master.  The  Argive  Hera  was  thought  worthy  to  rank  with 
the  Olympian  Zeus,  and  in  his  Amazon  Polyclitus  carried  off 
the  prize  from  his  rival.  Other  very  famous  statues  were  the 
Diadumenus — a  youth  binding  the  chaplet  of  victory  on  his 
brow,  of  which  a  copy  still  exists  in  the  Villa  Farnese — the 
Doryphorus,  and  the  Apoxyomenus. 

19.  In  architecture  the  advance  was  not  so  great  as  in  sculp- 
ture, though  here  also  the  finest  efforts  of  the  art  belong  to  this 
century  and  were  to  be  found  at  Athens.  To 
the  two  styles  already  in  use — the  Doric  and 
the  Ionic,  of  which  the  Doric  was  employed  in  Old  Greece, 
the  Ionic  in  Asia, — a  third,  the  Corinthian,  was  added  with 
its  richly  carved  capital,  but  the  innovation  was  not  re- 
ceived with  much  favour.  It  was  even  a  departure  from  the 
severer  styles  which  had  hitherto  prevailed,  when  the  Erech- 
theum  was  rebuilt  on  the  Acropolis,  towards  the  end  of  the 
century,  with  Ionic  pillars  and  Caryatids.  The  great  temples 
were  all  Doric :  the  Parthenon,  the  Theseum,  so-called,  the 
best-preserved  piece  of  Athenian  architecture,  the  temple  at 
t  Bassae,  the  temples  of  Aegina  and  Olympia,  of 

cmp  Ca  Agrigentum  and  Selinus,  though  varying  in 

detail,  are  all  of  this  style.  The  great  architect  of  the  age  was 
Ictinus,  the  builder  of  the  Parthenon  (completed  in  438),  and 
of  the  temple  of  Apollo  Epicurius  at  Bassae  (see  supra,  p.  127), 
but  he  was  ably  supported  by  others — by  Callicrates,  who 
was  joined  with  him  in  building  the  Parthenon,  and  Mnesicles, 
the  architect  of  the  Propylaea  (437-432).  Athens  now  be- 
came incomparably  the  most  beautiful  city  of  Greece,  a  city 
which  every  one  wished  to  see,  and  which  those  who  had 
seen  wished  to  see  again.  In  other  parts  of  Attica  also, 
temples  arose  at  the  bidding  of  Pericles — at  Eleusis,  where 
the  temple  of  the  Holy  Goddesses  was  rebuilt  on  a  much 
larger  scale;  at  Sunium,  which  is  still  crowned  by  the 
columns  of  the  ruined  temple  of  Athena ;  and  at  Rhamnus, 
where  the  temple  to  Nemesis  was  rebuilt.  In  Sicily,  also, 
Hiero  of  Syracuse  and  Thero  of  Agrigentum  vied  with  each 
other  in  building  great  temples  to  celebrate  the  deliverance 


XIV.  i9.] 


BUILDINGS  OF  PERICLES. 


521 


of  Sicily  from  the  attack  of  the  barbarians.  Agrigentum  now 
became,  owing  to  its  wealth  and  prosperity  (see  supra,  p.  484), 
the  "fairest  of  the  cities  of  men";  and  among  the  many 
temples  which  adorned  the  town,  the  temple  of  Olympian 
Zeus  rose  conspicuous,  "  surpassed  in  magnitude  by  no  Grecian 
building  of  the  kind,  except  that  of  Diana  at  Ephesus."  1  At 
Selinus,  also,  temples,  hardly  less  splendid,  were  erected,  and 
in  both  cases  the  work  seems  to  have  been  interrupted  by  the 
Carthaginian  invasion  (c.  xiii.).  At  Segesta,  too,  are  the 
remains  of  a  temple — "  one  of  the  most  perfect  and  striking 
ruins  in  Sicily  " — which  appears  to  have  been  left  unfinished. 

At  Athens,  Pericles  did  not  occupy  himself  with  temples 
only.  To  the  south  of  the  Acropolis,  a  little  eastward  of  the 
theatre  of  Dionysus,  he  built  an  Odeum  or  other 
music-hall,  for  the  performance  of  musical  con-  buildings, 
tests,  a  detached  circular  building  with  a  dome-shaped  roof, 
supported  by  numerous  pillars  in  the  interior,  a  copy  it  was 
said  of  the  tent  of  Xerxes.2  With  the  help  of  Hippodamus, 
he  laid  out  the  Peiraeus  in  the  approved  mode  of  straight 
streets  crossing  each  other  at  right  angles,  and  the  work  of 
Hippodamus  was  commemorated  by  the  market-place  which 
bore  his  name.3  More  important  by  far  was  the  addition  of  the 
second  of  the  Long  Walls  which  connected  Athens  and  Peiraeus. 
It  ran  parallel  to  the  wall  already  built  (vol.  ii.  p.  327),  to 
the  south  of  it,  and  was  apparently  erected  soon  after  the 
ostracism  of  Thucydides,  when  Pericles  ruled  without  a  rival. 
When  this  wall  was  completed,  that  joining  Athens  and 
Phalerum  became  of  little  use,  and  was  allowed  to  fall 
into  decay.4 

20.  Yet  in  spite  of  this  great  expenditure  in  temples  and 


1  See  Bunbury  in  Smith's  Diet,  of  Geog.  sub  voc.  Agrigentum. 

2  Plut.  Per.  13.  The  building  seems  to  have  attracted  attention: 
the  comedians  compared  it  to  the  peculiarly  shaped  head  of  Pericles, 
Paus.  i.  20.  4  :  In  Theophrastus,  Charact.,  the  dooXeV^s  asks :  iroaoi 
elori  Kiopes  tov  'iiSei'ou  ; 

3  See  Baumeister,  Denkrnaler,  Peiraeus,  1198  a. 

4  Plut.  Per.  13  ;  Plato,  Gorg.  455  E. 


522 


THE  CITY  OF  A  THENS. 


[XIV.  20. 


public  buildings,  little  was  done  for  the  comfort  and  con- 
venience of  the  residents  in  the  city.  We  can  hardly  be 
Condition  of  wrong  in  supposing  that  Athens  was  better  cared 
Athens.  for  than  most  Greek  towns  ;  yet  what  a  picture 

do  we  get  of  the  streets  from  the  comedians  and  the  orators ! 
The  old  men  who  visit  their  fellow-juror  in  the  early  morning, 
in  the  Wasps  of  Aristophanes,  grope  their  way  through  the 
gloom  by  the  light  of  a  few  lanterns  carried  by  boys.  "  Hold 
the  lantern  lower,"  cries  one,  "  that  we  may  not  do  ourselves 
a  mischief  on  a  stone."  "Take  care,"  replies  the  boy,  "and 
step  clear  of  the  mud."  Conscious  of  their  own  danger, 
they  imagine  that  their  friend  is  unable  to  join  them  because 
he  is  suffering  from  some  accident  of  this  kind.  Water  used 
in  the  house  was  thrown  into  the  street  at  evening  without 
ceremony,  a  cry  of  warning  being  thought  enough  for  the 
protection  of  the  passers-by.  From  a  scene  in  the  Ecclesia- 
zusae  it  is  clear  that  no  rules  of  decency  were  observed  in 
the  streets  at  night.1  To  these  natural  dangers  and  disgusts 
were  added  others  arising  from  a  love  of  practical  jokes,  or 
the  wildness  of  Athenian  youth.  The  mutilation  of  the 
Hermae  is  a  notorious  instance  of  the  outrages  which  could 
be  perpetrated  in  the  public  streets  with  little  fear  of  detec- 
tion ;  and  Lysias  gives  us  a  graphic  description  of  a  disreput- 
able street  row,  which  only  came  to  an  end  when  every  one 
engaged  had  got  a  broken  head.2  Bands  of  young  men 
roamed  the  street — Triballi  or  Autolekythi,  or  whatever  the 
name  of  the  society  might  be — and  any  one  who  fell  into 
their  hands  had  reason  to  remember  his  misfortune.  Or  at 
the  breaking  up  of  an  entertainment,  the  more  excited  of  the 
party  would  burst  open  the  doors  of  a  mistress  or  a  companion 
and  bring  the  night  to  a  close  there.  The  less  frequented 
parts  of  the  town  were  the  resorts  of  the  worst  characters, 
and  no  one  could  be  found  there  without  some  risk  to  his 
reputation.  The  astynomi,  who  were  in  charge  of  the  city, 
do  not  seem  to  have  taken  any  measures  for  the  preservation 


Wasps,  246  ff.  ;  Acharn.  590  f.  ;  Eccl.  321  f.  2  In  Simon. 


\ 


XIV.  21.] 


GREEK  RELIGION. 


523 


of  order,  at  least  we  never  hear  of  any  organised  ni^ht  police 
or  watchmen.  The  only  remedy  for  outrage  was  the  law- 
courts,  in  which  a  victory  might  be  worse  than  Cadmean  if 
obtained  by  the  poor  man  against  the  rich. 

21.  We  have  already  seen  {supra,  p.  55)  how  sensitive  the 
Greeks  were  to  any  innovations  in  religious  teaching,  and 
this  was  peculiarly  the  case  at  Athens.  There  Qreek  religion 
were,  no  doubt,  some  who  had  their  doubts 
and  their  heresies,  but  as  a  whole  the  people  wished  to 
worship  the  gods  as  their  fathers  had  done,  and  regarded 
them  from  the  traditional  point  of  view.  The  Greek  deities 
were  originally  personifications  of  natural  forces  and  pheno- 
mena, and,  to  the  last,  traces  of  their  origin  clung  about  them. 
Zeus  was  lord  of  the  sky,  and  Poseidon  ruled  the  sea.  But 
impulses  and  emotions  also  gained  a  place  among  divine 
powers,  and  the  gods  themselves  were  swayed  by  them. 
There  were  also  numerous  local  deities,  and  spirits  without 
any  special  name,  who  influenced  men  for  good  and  evil. 
From  the  first,  too,  there  was  an  ethical  element  in  Greek 
religion,  as  may  be  seen,  for  instance,  from  the  fact  that 
oaths  were  placed  under  divine  sanction,  and  Ethical 
however  great  the  resistance  which  faith  offered  Pr°sress. 
to  philosophy,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  higher  minds 
should  from  time  to  time  find  something  to  criticise  in  the 
beliefs  of  older  generations.  We  have  seen  how  Xenophanes 
attacked  the  current  ideas  of  the  deities,  and  insisted  on  a 
higher  conception  of  their  moral  nature  (vol.  ii.  p.  514). 
How  difficult  it  was  to  take  such  a  step  is  clear  from  the 
example  of  Pindar  and  Aeschylus,  who,  great  poets  though 
they  were,  and  filled  with  noble  conceptions  of  the  divine 
nature,  yet  accepted  the  ordinary  mythology  so  far  as  to 
ascribe  the  worst  vices  to  the  srpreme  Deity.  The  old  ideas 
and  the  new  continued  to  exist  side  by  side;  and,  indeed, 
such  inconsistencies  seem  inseparable  from  the  history  of 
religion. 

Still,  much  was  gained,  and  this  was  not  the  only  point  in 
which  progress  was  made.    By  slow  degrees  the  idea  of  one 


524  THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW.  [XIV.  21. 


deity  began  to  prevail  over  Polytheism.  Not  only  did  Zeus 
rise  above  the  rest  of  the  deities — that  conception  is  as  old 
The  mono.  as  Homer — but  he  becomes  almost  the  only 
theistic  idea.  object  of  veneration — at  least  to  the  noblest 
minds,  such  as  Aeschylus.1  And  besides  the  Oeot  of  popular 
belief,  the  divine  power,  regarded  as  the  operation  of  divine 
beings  apart  from  the  intervention  of  a  personal  deity,  is 
denoted  by  the  abstract  and  impersonal  expression,  to  ddov. 
That  this  tendency  did  not,  however,  shake  the  public  faith 
in  polytheism,  is  shown,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  numerous 
temples  which  were  erected  in  the  Fifth  Century,  and  on  the 
other,  by  the  last  acts  of  Socrates,  who  was  careful  before  he 
left  the  world  to  compose  poetry  in  obedience  to  the  oracle, 
and  pay  his  offering  to  Asclepius ;  and  by  the  last  play  of 
Euripides,  who  atoned  for  the  rationalism  of  earlier  years  by 
writing  the  Bacchael  Nor  was  the  grossness  of  the  old 
conceptions  purged  away.  The  attitude  of  the  comedians 
towards  the  deity  shows  that  in  their  opinion  at  any  rate  the 
"gods  love  a  joke,"  without  much  caring  whether  it  was 
indecent  and  made  at  their  own  expense  or  not.2  It  is 
significant,  also,  that  Aristotle  in  the  next  century  speaks  of 
the  temples  as  places  where  pictures  may  still  be  seen  which 
it  is  not  good  for  the  young  to  see.3  There  was  a  sacredness 
about  such  primitive  representations  which  sank  deep  into  the 
popular  mind.  We  need  only  remember  the  intense  excite- 
ment caused  at  Athens  by  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermae. 

Two  other  movements  characteristic  of  Greek  religion  may 
be  noticed  in  the  Fifth  Century :  the  growing  popularity  of 
mystic  rites,  and  especially  of  the  mysteries  of  Eleusis,  and 
the  introduction  of  foreign  rites  into  Greece. 

(1.)  In  mysticism  religion  cleared  itself  to  some  degree  of  the 
polytheism  of  the  poets  and  cosmographers.4    Not  only  was 


1  Agam.  74  f.,  Zrjva  de  tis  rrpocppovcos  imviKia  Kkafav  rcvf-erai 
(ppevwv  to  nav.    Cp.  Suppl.  90  f.,  524  ff. 

2  Plato,  Grat.  406  0. :  (pikonaiauoves  yap  ml  oi  BeoL 

3  Arist.  Pol.  vii.  17.  Io=1336  b. 
*  See  Windelbatid,  l.C.  p.  134. 


XIV.  21.]      MYSTERIES  AND  FOREIGN  RITES. 


525 


the  circle  of  the  mystic  deities  very  limited,  but  it  was  the 
individual  soul  and  its  fortunes  in  the  future  life  with  which 
the  rites  were  concerned.  The  ethical  element 
might  at  least  become  predominant ;  for  what-  e  mystenes- 
ever  the  nature  of  the  ritual,  there  was  at  least  some  idea  of 
guilt  and  retribution  accompanying  it.  In  some  way  or  other 
it  was  well  with  those  who  had  been  initiated,  and  so  widely 
was  this  belief  diffused  that  the  ordinary  Greek  would  not 
willingly  die  without  the  rite.1  The  attempt  of  Pericles  to 
make  the  mysteries  a  centre  of  Greek  religious  life,  and  the 
necessity  of  rebuilding  the  temple  of  Eleusis  on  a  larger 
scale,  are  evidence  of  the  increasing  numbers  which  nocked 
to  the  annual  commemoration.2 

(2.)  The  Greeks  who  settled  on  foreign  shores  were  always 
hospitable  to  the  deities  whom  they  found  in  their  new 
abodes ;  and  in  their  own  country  they  allowed 
the  slaves  who  were  imported  in  great  numbers  Foreign  ntes* 
from  the  north  and  east  to  practise  the  ceremonies  and 
ritual  which  they  brought  with  them.  By  degrees  the  more 
important  of  these,  which  naturally  appealed  to  the  curiosity 
of  the  Greeks,  were  recognised  by  the  state.  Soon  after  the 
Persian  war,  a  shrine  was  built  in  the  market-place  at  Athens 
for  the  Magna  Mater  of  Phrygia.3  From  Phrygia  also  came 
the  wine-god  Sabazius,  who  is  mentioned  in  the  Wasps  of 
Aristophanes,  and  in  a  few  years  became  a  popular  deity, 
as  might  be  expected  from  his  nature.4  The  Thracian  god- 
dess Bendis  had  a  temple  in  the  Peiraeus  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  Ammon  was  by  that  time  wor- 
shipped in  Laconia;  and  Lysander,  when  checked  by  Pausanias 
at  Athens,  went  to  consult  his  oracle  in  Libya.  Among  the 
women  of  Athens  the  worship  of  Adonis,  an  importation 

1  Aristoph.  Pax,  370.  I. 

2  Supra,  p.  25.  The  mysteries  of  Samothrace  were  also  becoming 
more  popular,  but  initiation  in  them  was  the  exception  rather  than 
the  rule :  cp.  Aristoph.  Pax,  277  f.  :  dXX*  et  ris  vpcbv  iv  SafioBpaKy 
rvyxavei  pep.vrjp.evos,  k.t.A. 

3  See  Beloch,  G.  G.  ii.  5,  n.  3. 

4  Aristoph,  Wasps,  9,  10  ;  Lysistr.  388  :  ol  nvKvol  2aj3d£ioi. 


5?G 


TRADE  AND  COMMERCE. 


[XIV.  22. 


from  Cyprus,  was  much  in  vogue;  at  the  time  when  the 
expedition  to  Sicily  was  being  discussed,  the  ominous  cry 
of  the  lament  for  Adonis  was  heard  in  the  Assembly.1 
Other  rites,  introduced  from  Phrygia  or  Thrace,  were  of  a 
kind  which  appealed  to  the  dregs  of  the  people.  Noisy 
processions  rushed  along  the  streets  to  the  sound  of  fife  and 
drum  ;  while  at  night  the  faithful  gathered  together  for  the 
initiation  of  some  neophyte,  and  availed  themselves  of  the 
opportunity  to  indulge  in  excesses  of  every  kind.2 

Thus  at  the  time  when  in  one  direction  religious  feeling  in 
Greece  was  struggling  upwards  to  a  higher  conception  of  the 
deity,  it  was  sinking  in  another  into  the  utter  degradation 
which  for  centuries  to  come  left  its  mark  on  the  nation.3 

22.  Down  to  the  time  of  their  disastrous  revolt,  the 
Ionian  cities  of  Asia  were  the  centres  of  Greek  trade.  The 
ships  of  Miletus  were  known  from  the  Cim- 

Effectsofthe  r  .    .  , 

Ionian  revolt  merian  Bosphorus  to  Naucratis  m  Egypt ;  the 
on  trade.  cjfcy  wag  on  frjen£Qy  terms  with  Eretria  in 

Euboea,  and  with  Sybaris  in  Italy.  The  Phocaeans  opened 
the  trade  to  the  far  west;  the  Samians  were  known  at 
Cyrene ;  the  Dorian  city  of  Cnidus  was  in  close  relations  with 
Croton.  Through  these  Ionian  cities  the  products  and  wares 
of  the  interior  of  Asia  were  shipped  to  Greece.  After  the 
suppression  of  the  revolt  and  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
between  Persia  and  Old  Greece  all  this  was  at  an  end.  For 
twenty  years  (500-480)  Grecian  ships  were  excluded  from 
the  eastern  Aegean,  and  "  all  beyond  Delos  seemed  as  far  off 
as  the  pillars  of  Hercules."  The  altered  relations  with  Persia 
would  doubtless  check  the  trade  with  the  interior,  at  least 
for  a  time,  and,  their  power  and  prosperity  lost,  the  cities  fell 
into  the  second  rank. 

Much  of  the  trade  which  they  lost  passed  into  the  hands 
of  Athens.    At  the  time  when  Xerxes  crossed  the  Helles- 


1  Aristoph.  Lysistr.  389  f.   Supra,  p.  305. 

2  See  the  lively  description  in  Beloch,  G.  G.  ii.  7. 

3  On  Greek  religion  as  represented  in  literature,  see  Professor 
Campbell's  Religion  in  Greek  Literature. 


XIV.  22.] 


AGRICULTURE.  527 


pont  she  was  importing  corn  from  the  Euxine;  and  after 
the  liberation  of  Ionia  and  the  Hellespont,  trade  would 
be  free  to  follow  the  natural  channels,  and  Trade  ox 
gather  round  the  city  which  now  became  the  Athens- 
centre  of  the  Greek  world.     Under  the  shadow  of  the 
Delian  League,  the  trade  of  Athens  became  firmly  rooted. 
She  not  only  entered  into  treaties  with  numerous  emporia  In 
the  Aegean- even  in  the  far  east— but  she  felt  herself  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  impose  "  navigation  laws  "  on  many  cities 
which  traded  with  her.    In  the  importation  of  corn,  more 
especially,  the  most  stringent  precautions  were  taken  to 
secure  an  ample  supply  at  a  moderate  price.    By  the  con- 
quest and  final  destruction  of  Aegina.  she  got  rid  of  a 
powerful  rival ;  and  though  the  trade  with  the  west  still 
remained  chiefly  in  the  hands  of  Corinth,  the  commerce  of 
Athens  was  so  firmly  established  that  even  the  capture  of 
the  city  by  Lysander  failed  to  destroy  it. 

It  was  otherwise  with  agriculture.    From  the  days  of 
Pisistratus  till  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  with  the  exception 
of  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  Attica  had  enjoyed  AgriculturCt 
unbroken  security.     The  land  was  not  only 
tilled  wherever  tillage  was  possible— and  used  as  pasture  in 
the  wilder  parts— but  the  owners  of  the  soil  lived  on  their 
farms,  built  themselves  handsome  houses,  and  enjoyed  to  the 
full  the  quiet  and  independence  of  a  country  life.  All  this 
was  changed  by  the  Peloponnesian  war.    Those  who  had 
lived  in  comfort  and  abundance  were  driven  into  Athens  to 
find  shelter  where  they  could,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  war, 
most  of  them  were  ruined.    Of  the  straits  to  which  they 
were  reduced  we  have  melancholy  proof  in  the  Memorabilia  of 
Xenophon.  In  the  Plutus  of  Aristophanes  also,  which  belongs 
to  the  period  after  the  war,  we  get  a  picture  of  dire  poverty. 
In  the  earlier  plays  the  poor  man  complains  of  the  aggres- 
sion of  the  rich,  and  of  their  monopoly  of  the  good  things  of 
the  state,  but  it  is  not  wealth  which  he  covets  so  much  as 
power.    He  is  happy  enough  on  three  obols  a  day  if  only  he 
can  show  his  contempt  for  the  rich.    To  have  the  great  man 


528 


SOCIETY:  SLAVERY, 


[XIV.  23. 


at  an  advantage,  to  make  him  cringe  and  cog — this  is  marrow 
to  the  juryman  who  se*6  highly  paid  offices  going  into  the 
hands  of  the  "  son  of  Coesyra."  1 

23.  When  we  attempt  to  form  any  general  conception  of 
the  social  life  and  character  of  the  Greeks,  we  are  met  at  the 
outset  by  some  facts  of  the  first  importance.  The  institution 
of  slavery  divided  every  city  and  every  household  into  two 
sections,  of  which  one  was  supposed  to  exist  for  the  comfort 
and  convenience  of  the  other.  It  may  be  true  that  slaves 
were  kindly  treated  in  daily  life  by  the  Greeks,  but  their 
legal  position  was  intolerable  :  in  his  own  bouse  every  man 
was  a  tyrant,  with  more  than  a  tyrant's  power  over  those 
around  him.  The  moral  dangers  of  such  relations  are  obvious, 
and  they  must  also  have  been  fatal  to  a  great  extent  to 
elevation  of  character.  The  slave-owner  alternated  between 
a  self-sufficient  pride  when  he  compared  himself  with  the 
"  living  tool "  which  he  employed,  and  an  ever-present 
apprehension  that  his  tools  might  combine 
Society.  against  him.     Society  was  on   an  insecure 

basis,  and  though  the  difficulties  which  attend  the  opposi- 
tion of  labour  and  capital  were  avoided,  even  trade  and 
industry  were  greatly  injured  by  the  system.  Again,  there 
were  no  professions  in  Greece,  and  even  if  their  place  may- 
have  been  taken  to  some  slight  extent  by  the  various 
societies  so  popular  among  the  Greeks,  the  profound  influ- 
ence which  professions  now  exercise  on  character  was  not 
brought  to  bear  in  shaping  the  life  of  the  Greek.2  Once 
more,  as  we  have  seen,  women  were  not  admitted  into 
society  at  Athens,  and  though  in  some  other  cities,  as  at 
Sparta,  they  were  not  so  strictly  secluded,  social  life  in  the 
modern  sense  did  not  exist. 

1  Aristoph.  Pint.  535  ff.  ;  cp.  Wasps,  546  ff.,  whpre  the  juror  ends 
the  description  of  his  office  with  the  words :  up'  ov  fxeyaKrj  tovt1  ear 

apxh  K(*i  T°v  ttXovtov  Karaxhvil' 

2  Perhaps  an  exception  ought  to  be  made  in  favour  of  medicine, 
but  even  this  art  was  largely  practised  by  slaves.  The  army  at 
Sparta,  and  the  navy  at  Athens,  were  also  useful  in  bringing  men 
together,  and  diffusing  an  esprit  de  corps  among  them. 


XIV.  23.] 


TYPES  OF  CHARACTER. 


529 


The  Greeks  were  proudly  conscious  of  certain  broad  dis- 
tinctions which  separated  them  from  the  "barbarians"  (vol.  ii. 
p.  25),  but  they  were  not  less  conscious  of  the  endless  variety 
of  types  to  be  found  in  their  different  cities.  Not  only  did 
Ionian  differ  from  Dorian,  but  each  city,  and  almost  each 
village,  had  its  characteristics.  The  Argives  were  sots  and 
thieves;  the  Tirynthians  were  given  to  incontrollable 
laughter ;  the  Boeotians,  as  a  nation,  were  dull,  but  while 
Thebes  was  the  home  of  "insolence,"  Tanagra  was  a  very 
pleasant  place  for  a  stranger  to  visit.  The  bearded  Carystian 
was  regarded  as  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  families.  Even 
in  Attica  a  distinction  was  drawn  between  the  Attici  and 
the  Athenians ;  the  first  were  meddlesome,  prying  syco- 
phants ;  the  second  of  a  noble,  generous  nature.1  If 
we  confine  ourselves  to  Athens,  we  find  in  the  plays  of 
Aristophanes  "  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  "  :  the  coarse 
countryman  who  hates  the  sophist-taught  citizen,  the 
carefully  nurtured  and  educated  boy,  the  dissolute  youth 
who  has  discarded  the  old  teaching  for  the  new  (supra,  p.  59). 
We  conclude  that  there  was  much  that  was  good,  and  much 
that  was  bad  ;  and,  in  the  fearlessly  outspoken  language  of 
comedy,  the  bad  seems  to  predominate.  Yet  there  is  some- 
thing of  an  ideal  beauty  about  the  fine  conception  of  youth 
which  Aristophanes  has  sketched  in  the  Clouds,  and  even  in 
his  Trygaeus  and  Dicaeopolis  there  is  a  soundness  which  re- 
deems the  coarser  elements.  Of  Athenian  women  it  would  be 
monstrous  to  take  our  opinions  from  the  comedians,  though 
rn  Aristophanes,  even  in  the  Lysistrata  and  Thesmophoriazusae, 
there  are  some  pleasant  glimpses  of  domestic  life.  And  if 
in  the  Fifth  Century  Greece  declined  somewhat  from  that 
wonderful  age  in  which  Arete  and  Nausicaa,  Penelope  and 
Andromache  had  their  birth,  Athens  was  at  least  still  capable 
of  admiring  an  Alcestis  and  an  Antigone. 

1  See  Pseudo-Dicaearchus  in  Mliller,  F.  H.  G,  ii.  255  (Frazer, 
Paus.  i.  xliii.) ;  Theophrastus,  ap.  A  then.  vi.  261,  d. 


VOL.  III. 


2L 


APPENDIX  I. 


EXPENDITURE  ON  THE  WAR. 

It  is  impossible,  with  the  evidence  at  our  command,  to  give  any 
accurate  account  of  the  cost  of  the  Peloponnesian  war,  though  the 
attempt  has  been  made  more  than  once.  The  statements  about  the 
income  of  Athens  are  vague  and  inconsistent,  the  accouut  of  ex- 
penditure incomplete. 

1.  Xenophon  asserts  that  the  total  income  of  Athens  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  amounted  to  1000  talents  ;  Aristophanes,  in  422, 
puts  it  at  2000 1 ;  Thucydides  gives  no  annual  total,  but  informs  us 
that  the  Athenians  had  a  reserve  of  6000  talents  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  and  that  the  annual  income  from  the  allies  was  600 
talents.  From  inscriptions  we  learn  that  the  Athenians  borrowed 
4730  talents  in  the  seven  years  between  433-427  from  the  sacred 
treasury  of  Athena 2 ;  but  whether  this  sum  is  wholly  included  in  the 
6000  talents  of  reserve,  is  not  clear. 

2.  Confining  ourselves  to  Thucydides,  we  find  that  the  Athenians 
set  apart  1000  talents  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  leaving  a  sum  of 
5000  available  for  expenditure.  From  this  we  may  perhaps  deduct 
another  thousand  for  the  expense  of  Potidaea,  after  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  To  the  4000  thus  remaining  we  have  to  add,  in  the  autumn 
of  428,  the  income  for  three  and  a  half  years,  which,  at  600  talents 
a  year,  would  amount  to  2100  talents.  Yet  these  resources  were  so 
far  diminished  that  an  extra  tax  was  then  found  necessary.  We  need 
not  of  course  assume  that  the  treasury  was  bankrupt  in  428,  but  if  a 
year's  income  (600  t.)  was  in  hand,  the  expenditure  had  amounted  to 
no  less  than  5500  talents  in  three  and  a  half  years,  supposing  that 
the  ordinary  income  of  Athens  covered  her  ordinary  expenditure. 
At  this  rate  the  average  expense  of  the  war  was  about  1600  talents 
a  year.  It  is  clear  from  Thucydides  that  the  Athenians  began  by 
paying  their  soldiers  at  an  extravagant  rate,  which  they  were  unable 
to  maintain,  and  even  in  425  the  war  was  regarded  as  a  fruitful 

1  Arist.  Wasps,  660 ;  Xen.  Anab.  vii.  1.  27. 
*  C.L  A.L  193. 

630 


App.  I.] 


EXPENDITURE  ON  THE  WAR, 


531 


source  of  income  to  those  who  took  service  in  it.  Envoys  and 
generals  are  particularly  mentioned  for  the  high  pay  which  they 
drew.  And  we  are  perhaps  justified  in  regarding  the  extravagant 
expenditure  as  a  cause  of  the  popularity  of  the  war.1  But  the 
immediate  reason  for  the  imposition  of  the  war-tax  at  the  time  of 
the  revolt  at  Mytilene  was  probably  the  prospect  of  a  siege  which 
experience  had  proved  so  costly,  and  the  danger  of  further  revolt. 
And  Cleon,  who  was  now  a  power  in  the  state,  might  take  advantage 
of  this  to  throw  an  extra  burden  on  the  rich. 

3.  Once  more,  if  we  ask  how  Athens,  if  her  reserve  was  so  nearly 
exhausted  in  428,  was  able  to  continue  the  war,  the  reply  seems  to 
be  :  (1)  that  the  war-tax  was  continued,  and  this,  with  the  income 
of  the  allies,  would  produce  about  800  talents  per  annum  in  addition 
to  the  ordinary  income  ;  (2)  that  in  427  and  426  operations  were 
not  carried  on  on  any  great  scale  ;  (3)  and  that  in  and  after  425  the 
tribute  was  raised,2  till  the  yearly  amount  reached  1200  talents. 


1  This  is  clearly  the  view  of  Aristophanes  in  the  Acharnians. 

2  On  this  subject,  see  Jowett,  Thuc.  i.  p.  lxviii.  ff.  ;  Kirchhoff,  Zur 
Gesch.  des  Athen.  Staatsschatzes,  Abh.  der  Berl.  Akad.  1876,  p.  54  f. ; 
also  Beloch,  Rhein.  Mus.,  Bd.  38  ;  Boeckh,  Staatsh.  p.  360,  ed.  3,  and 
Frankel,  note  471.  I  have  left  out  of  the  calculation  the  ordinary 
receipts  of  the  city,  say  400  talents,  and  the  ordinary  expenditure ; 
and  anything  which  might  be  borrowed  from  the  revenues  of  the 
temples,  an  amount  which  cannot  be  calculated  with  any  accuracy. 
The  average  yearly  sum  of  1600  talents  for  expenditure  is,  I  think,  as 
low  as  can  be  reckoned  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  But  we  must 
admit  that  our  ignorance  of  the  relation  in  which  the  sums  borrowed 
from  the  treasurers  of  Athena  (C.  /.  A.  i.  193)  stand  to  the  5000 
talents  of  reserve,  introduces  an  element  of  uncertainty  into  the 
whole  calculation.  The  question  of  the  raising  of  the  tribute  is 
discussed  by  Jowett,  I.e.  p.  xliv.  ff.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  the  amount  of  tribute  received  after  425  was  much  larger  than 
before,  and  it  may  by  degrees  have  reached  1200  talents,  the  sum 
mentioned  by  Andocides  (De  Pac.  9),  and  Aeschines  {F.  L.  186). 
The  rise  was  probably  due  to  Cleon  ;  it  certainly  was  not  due  to 
Alcibiades,  as  Andocides  {in  Alcib.  11)  says,  if  made  in  425,  for 
Alcibiades  had  not  then  come  forward  in  public  affairs.  Cp.  also 
Forbes,  Thuc.  I.  lxxxvii.  lxxxviii. 


APPENDIX  II. 


THE  REVOLUTION  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED. 

1.  We  learn  from  Thucydides  that  the  movement  which  ended  in 
the  establishment  of  the  Four  Hundred  began  in  the  Athenian  camp 
at  Samos,  and  had  its  origin  partly  in  the  feeling  of  the  trierarchs 
and  leading  men  in  the  fleet,  who  were  dissatisfied  with  the  existing 
form  of  government — under  which  the  heaviest  burdens  fell  on  them, 
as  wealthy  men — and  partly  in  the  overtures  of  Alcibiades,  who  let  it 
be  known  that  he  would  be  glad  to  return  and  make  Tissaphernes  the 
friend  of  Athens,  but  this  was  possible  on  one  condition  only  :  "  they 
must  establish  an  oligarchy  and  abolish  the  villainous  democracy 
which  had  driven  him  out "  (viii.  47,  48). 

From  the  camp  at  Samos  the  matter  was  introduced  at  Athens  by 
Pisander  and  his  fellow-envoys,  who  were  sent  by  the  conspirators 
to  the  city  to  get  Alcibiades  recalled  and  the  democracy  suppressed, 
and  finally  to  make  Tissaphernes  a  friend  of  the  Athenians 
(supra,  p.  394). 

Of  all  this  there  is  not  a  word  in  the  Athenaion  Politeia.  The 
author  never  mentions  Samos  or  Alcibiades.  He  merely  says,  c.  29, 
"when  the  Lacedaemonians  had  gained  the  upper  hand  through 
their  alliance  with  the  King  of  Persia,  the  Athenians  were  compelled 
to  abolish  the  democracy,  and  establish  in  its  place  the  constitution 
of  the  Four  Hundred" — and  at  once  goes  on  to  give  an  account  of 
the  meeting  at  which  the  change  was  proposed.  He  adds:  "The 
real  argument  which  persuaded  the  majority  was  the  belief  thnt*the 
King  of  Persia  was  more  likely  to  form  an  alliance  with  them,  if  they 
should  establish  an  oligarchy  " — (Kenyon's  translation). 

2.  In  the  account  of  Thucydides  the  change  in  the  constitution 
was  first  proposed  at  Athens  by  Pisander  and  the  envoys  on  their 
arrival  from  Samos.  See  the  graphic  description  in  viii.  cc.  53,  54 
(supra,  I.e.),  in  which  we  notice  the  following  points  : — 

1.  The  opening  speech  of  Pisander. 

2.  The  furious  opposition. 

532 


App.  II.] 


THUCYDIDES  AND  ARISTOTLE. 


53S 


3.  The  pertinent  question  of  Pisander  put  to  individual  citizens. 

4.  His  final  declaration,  "after  which,  partly  in  fear  and.  partly 

in  hope  that  it  might  be  hereafter  changed,"  the  people 
gave  way. 

5.  The  passing  of  the  decree  that  Pisander  should  go  to  Samos 

with  ten  others  and  negotiate  with  Tissaphernes  and 
Alcibiades. 

6.  The  deposition  of  Phrynichus  and  Scironides  from  their  office 

as  generals,  and  the  sending  out  of  Leon  and  Diomedon  to 
take  their  places. 

7.  The  visit  of  Pisander  to  the  clubs,  "one  after  the  other," 

which  he  exhorts  to  unite  and  put  down  the  democracy. 

The  author  of  the  Politeia  ignores  these  details.  He  begins  his 
account  of  the  change  with  a  description  of  a  meeting  held  at  Athens, 
which  is  quite  distinct  from  the  meeting  convened  to  hear  Pisander 
and  the  envoys.  "The  speech  recommending  the  change  before  the 
vote  was  made  by  Melobius,  and  the  motion  was  drawn  up  by 
Pythodorus  (but  the  majority  were  persuaded  by  the  belief  that  the 
King  would  be  more  likely  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  an  oligarchy). 
The  motion  was  to  the  following  effect :  4  The  popular  Assembly 
was  to  elect  twenty  persons  over  forty  years  of  age,  who,  in  con- 
junction with  the  existing  ten  members  of  the  Committee  of  Public 
Safety,  should  take  an  oath  that  they  would  frame  such  proposals  as 
they  thought  best  for  the  state,  and  should  then  draw  up  proposals 
for  the  public  safety.  In  addition,  any  other  person  was  to  be  free  to 
make  any  proposition  he  liked,  so  that  the  people  might  be  able  to 
choose  the  best  of  all  the  courses  suggested  to  them.'  Clitophon 
concurred  with  the  motion  of  Pythodorus ;  but  proposed  that  the 
committee  should  also  investigate  the  ancient  laws  drawn  up  by 
Olisthenes  when  he  created  the  democracy,  in  order  that  they  might 
have  these  too  before  them  in  deciding  on  what  was  the  best ;  his 
suggestion  being  that  the  constitution  of  Clisthenes  was  not  really 
democratical,  but  closely  akin  to  that  of  Solon,"  c.  29,  K.1 

Not  one  of  these  three  names  is  mentioned  by  Thucydides  in  con- 
nection with  the  Four  Hundred,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  by  the  time 


1  Melobius  is  mentioned  as  one  of  the  Thirty  in  Lysias  12.  12,  and 
this  is  no  doubt  the  same  person.  Pythodorus  is  mentioned  as  one 
of  the  Four  Hundred  by  Diogenes  Laertius,  ix.  8.  54.  He  may  be 
the  same  Pythodorus  who  in  414  landed  on  the  coast  of  Laconia. 
For  Clitophon  see  Aristoph.  Frogs,  967,  where  Euripides  claims  him 
as  a  pupil  along  with  Theramenes. 


534       REVOLUTION  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED.    [App.  II. 


that  the  commissioners  were  appointed  to  report  on  the  constitution, 
it  was  impossible  to  hope  for  alliance  with  Persia. 

3.  Thucydides  informs  us  that  Pisander  and  his  colleagues  were 
compelled  to  break  with  Alcibiades  and  Tissaphernes  on  their  return 
to  the  East.  But  though  they  lost  the  hope  of  help  from  Persia, 
they  determined  to  go  on  with  the  revolution.  (Thuc.  viii.  63  ; 
supra,  p.  400.)  So  Pisander  and  half  the  envoys  were  sent  back  to 
Athens  to  carry  out  the  scheme  (which  was  also  extended  to  the 
subject  cities).  On  their  arrival  they  found  the  revolution  more 
than  half  accomplished  by  the  oligarchical  clubs,  who  had  created 
a  Keign  of  Terror.  And  meanwhile  a  public  programme  had  been 
put  forward  : 

1.  That  no  one  ought  to  receive  pay  who  was  not  on  military 

service. 

2.  That  not  more  than  five  thousand  should  have  a  share  in  the 

government — those  namely  who  were  best  able  to  serve  the 
state  in  person  and  with  their  money  (supra,  p.  402). 
In  the  Politeia  the  two  points  mentioned  in  the  "programme"  are 
included  in  the  recommendations  of  the  commissioners  appointed  under 
the  proposal  of  Pythodorus.    Beyond  this  not  a  word  is  said  of  the 
means  by  which  the  oligarchs  went  to  work  to  secure  their  object. 

4.  From  Thucydides  we  learn  that  when  Pisander  and  his  col- 
leagues arrived  at  Athens  (this  was,  of  course,  his  second  visit),  they 
"  at  once  set  to  work  and  prepared  to  strike  the  final  blow."  They 
began  by  calling  an  Assembly  and  proposing  the  election  of  ten  com- 
missioners, who  should  have  full  powers  to  frame  for  the  city  the 
best  constitution  they  could,  and  were  to  report  to  the  people  by  a 
given  day  (viii.  67,  supra,  p.  402). 

As  we  have  seen,  the  nomination  of  commissioners  is  said  in  the 
Politeia  to  have  taken  place  at  the  first  meeting  convened  to  dis- 
cuss the  subject — at  any  rate  no  previous  meeting  is  mentioned  or 
suggested.1 

5.  When  the  day  arrived  which  had  been  fixed  for  the  report,  so 
Thucydides  continues,  Pisander  and  his  party  convened  an  Assembly 
at  Colonus,  but  the  commissioners  merely  moved  that  any  Athenian 


1  The  number  of  commissioners  in  the  Politeia  is  thirty  j  in  Thucy- 
dides ten.  The  Politeia  is  supported  by  Androtion  and  Philochorus, 
cp.  Harpocration,  s.v.  avyypafa'Ls,  who  notices  the  contradiction  and 
identities  the  ten  commissioners  mentioned  by  Thucydides  with  the 
ten  Probuli.  Thucydides  may  be  right  ;  it  was  easy  for  later 
authors  to  confuse  these  commissioners  with  the  Thirty  tyrants. 


\ 


App.  II.]  THUCYDIDES  AND  ARISTOTLE. 


535 


should  be  allowed  to  make  any  proposal  that  he  pleased,  and 
threatened  with  severe  penalties  any  one  who  indicted  the  proposer 
for  unconstitutional  action  (supra,  p.  403). 

In  the  Politeia  we  are  told  that  the  commissioners  made  two  pre- 
liminary proposals : 

1.  The  Prytanes  were  to  be  compelled  to  put  to  the  vote  any 

motion  offered  on  behalf  of  the  public  safety. 

2.  All  indictments  for  illegal  proposals  were  abolished,  all  im- 

peachments and  public  prosecutions,  in  order  that  every 
Athenian  should  be  free  to  give  his  counsel  on  the  situation, 
if  he  chose ;  and  they  decreed  that  if  any  person  imposed 
a  fine  on  any  other  for  his  acts  in  this  respect,  or  prosecuted 
him,  or  summoned  him  before  the  courts,  he  should,  on  an 
information  being  laid  against  him,  be  summarily  arrested 
and  brought  before  the  generals,  who  should  deliver  him  to 
the  Eleven  to  be  put  to  death. 
They  then  drew  up  the  constitution  in  the  following  manner : 

1.  The  revenues  of  the  state  were  not  to  be  spent  on  any  purpose 

but  the  war. 

2.  All  magistrates  should  serve  without  remuneration  as  long  as 

the  war  should  last,  except  the  Nine  Archons  and  the 
Prytanes  for  the  time  being,  who  should  each  receive  three 
obols  a  day. 

3.  The  general  franchise  was  to  be  restricted,  so  long  as  the 

war  should  last,  to  all  Athenians  who  were  most  capable  of 
serving  the  state  personally  or  pecuniarily,  to  the  number 
of  not  less  than  Five  Thousand. 

4.  The  Five  Thousand  to  have  full  powers,  even  of  making 

treaties  with  whomsoever  they  willed. 

5.  Ten  men,  over  forty  years  of  age,  were  to  be  elected  out  of 

each  tribe  to  draw  up  the  list  (KaraXegovo-i)  of  the  Five 
Thousand  (c.  29,  E.). 

In  this  account  Thucydides  and  the  Politeia  agree  so  far  as  the 
"preliminary"  measures  are  concerned,  but  while  in  the  Politeia  the 
rest  of  the  measures  proposed  are  all  said  to  be  the  work  of  the  com- 
missioners ("these  were  the  proposals  put  forward  by  the  Com- 
mittee," c.  30),  Thucydides  draws  a  distinction  between  the  proposals 
of  the  Commissioners  and  the  decrees  of  the  Assembly.  After  de- 
scribing the  proposals  of  the  commissioners  as  given  above  he  goes  on  : 

"  The  whole  scheme  now  came  to  light.  A  motion  was  made  by 
Pisander  (Thuc.  viii.  68). 


536       REVOLUTION  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED.    [App.  II. 


"  1.  To  abolish  all  the  existing  magistracies  and  the  payment 
of  magistrates. 

"2.  To  choose  a  presiding  board  of  five;  these  five  to  choose 
one  hundred ;  and  each  of  the  hundred  to  co-opt  three 
others. 

"3.  The  Four  Hundred  thus  chosen  to  meet  in  the  Council 
chamber;  to  have  absolute  authority  to  govern  as  they 
thought  best. 

"4.  The  Five  Thousand  to  be  summoned  by  them  whenever 
they  chose  (viii.  6V)." 
6.  In  the  Politeia  we  are  informed  that  after  the  proposals  of  the 
Committee  had  been  ratified,  the  Five  Thousand  (who  must  ther  efore 
have  been  enrolled1)  elected  a  hundred  commissioners  from  their 
own  numbers  to  draw  up  the  constitution.  These  framed  two  con- 
stitutions, one  for  the  future,  in  which  there  is  not  a  word  about 
a  Council  of  Four  Hundred,  and  another  for  the  present.  In  this 
last  there  was  to  be  a  Council  of  Four  Hundred,  as  in  the  ancient 
constitution,  forty  from  each  tribe,  chosen  out  of  candidates  of  more 
than  thirty  years  of  age,  selected  by  the  members  of  the  tribes.  This 
Council  was  to  appoint  the  magistrates,  and  draw  up  the  form  of 
oath  which  they  were  to  take  ;  and  in  all  that  concerned  the  laws, 
in  the  examination  of  official  accounts,  and  in  other  matters 
generally,  it  might  act  according  to  its  discretion.  It  must, 
however,  observe  the  laws  that  might  be  enacted  with  reference 
to  the  constitution  of  the  state,  and  had  no  power  to  alter  them  or 
to  pass  others. 

The  generals  were  to  be  provisionally  elected  from  the  whole  body 
of  the  Five  Thousand,  but  so  soon  as  the  Council  came  into  existence 
it  was  to  hold  an  examination  of  military  equipments,  and  thereon 
elect  ten  persons,  together  with  a  secretary,  and  the  persons  thus 
elected  should  hold  office  during  the  coming  year  with  full  powers, 
and  should  have  the  right,  whenever  they  desired  it,  of  joining  in 
the  deliberations  of  the  Council. 

The  Five  Thousand  were  also  to  elect  a  single  Hipparch  and  ten 
Phylarchs  ;  but  for  the  future  the  Council  was  to  elect  these  officers 
according  to  the  regulations  above  laid  down  (c.  31,  K.). 

1  Cp.  Lysias,  Orat.  20,  which  is  in  defence  of  Polystratus,  one  of 
the  KarakoyeU.  Polystratus  claims  to  have  put  nine  thousand  citizens 
on  the  list  in  eight  days,  after  which  he  left  for  Eretria  to  take  part 
in  the  battle.  This  implies  that  the  selection  of  the  Five  Thousand 
was  one  of  the  last,  not  one  of  the  first,  acts  of  the  Four  Hundred. 


\ 


App.  II.] 


THUCYDIDES  AND  ARISTOTLE. 


537 


No  office  might  be  held  more  than  once,  except  that  of  councillor 
and  general. 

Comparing  this  account  with  Thucydides  we  see  that  there  is  a 
discrepancy  (a)  in  the  account  of  the  Five  Thousand,  who  in 
Thucydides  are  only  to  be  summoned  when  the  Four  Hundred  shall 
think  fit,  and  in  the  Politeia  are  definitely  chosen,  and  in  turn  choose 
the  commissioners  under  whose  arrangements  the  Four  Hundred 
come  into  power  ;  (b)  in  the  account  of  the  election  of  the  Four 
Hundred.  In  the  Politeia  it  is  not  stated  by  whom  the  Four 
Hundred  are  chosen,  but  they  are  chosen  equally  from  the  ten 
tribes,  out  of  candidates  previously  selected  by  the  tribes.  In  Thucy- 
dides they  are  chosen  by  co-optation — and  practically  five  men  are 
responsible  for  the  whole  Four  Hundred. 

7.  From  Thucydides  we  learn  that  after  the  assembly  at  Colon  us, 
the  Four  Hundred  were  installed  in  the  Council-Chamber.  Of  this 
he  gives  a  full  and  graphic  account  (supra,  p.  404). 

In  the  Politeia  we  are  told  that  when  the  constitution  as  just 
stated  had  been  drawn  up  by  the  Commissioners,  and  had  been 
ratified  by  the  general  voice,  the  existing  Council  was  dissolved 
before  it  had  completed  its  term  of  office.  It  was  dissolved  on  the 
fourteenth  day  of  the  month  Thargelion,  in  the  archonship  of 
Callias  (May  411),  and  the  Four  Hundred  entered  into  office  on 
the  twenty-first  (c.  32,  EL). 

8.  Finally,  we  are  told  in  the  Politeia  that  when  the  constitution 
had  been  established,  the  Five  Thousand  were  only  nominally  selected, 
and  the  Four  Hundred,  together  with  the  ten  officers  on  whom  full 
powers  had  been  conferred,  occupied  the  Council-Chamber,  and 
really  administered  the  government.  They  began  by  sending 
ambassadors  to  the  Lacedaemonians,  proposing  a  cessation  of  the 
war  on  the  terms  of  the  status  quo,  but  as  the  Lacedaemonians 
refused  to  listen  to  them  unless  they  would  also  abandon  their 
maritime  empire,  they  dropped  the  negotiations  (c.  32  K.j. 

Thucydides  informs  us  that  when  the  Four  Hundred  had  installed 
themselves  in  the  Council-Chamber,  they  elected  Prytanes  by  lot 
of  their  own  number,  and  did  all  that  was  customary  in  the  way  of 
prayers  and  sacrifices  to  the  gods  at  their  entrance  into  office,  but 
in  a  short  time  they  wholly  changed  the  democratic  system,  and 
governed  the  city  with  a  high  hand.  They  also  sent  heralds  to  Agis 
at  Decelea,  wishing  to  conclude  peace  with  him— and  finally,  on  his 
advice,  to  Lacedaemon,  but  without  effect.  Thus,  at  the  cost  of 
contradicting  himself  about  the  Five  Thousand,  who  he  now  says 


538       REVOLUTION  OF  THE  FOUR  HUNDRED.    [App.  II. 


were  only  nominally  selected,  whereas  they  have  hitherto  been  a 
working  part  of  the  constitution,  the  author  of  the  Politeia  comes 
into  agreement  with  Thucydides.  Both  authors  also  agree  that 
the  leading  spirits  in  the  oligarchical  revolution  were  Antiphon, 
Pisander,  and  Theramenes,  but  Phrynichus  is  not  mentioned  in  the 
Politeia. 

Of  the  reaction  by  which  the  government  of  the  Four  Hundred 
was  suppressed,  we  have  a  full  and  graphic  account  in  Thucydides. 
Here  also  the  movement  begins  in  Samos,  and  the  democratic  party 
go  back  to  the  point  where  the  oligarchs  had  begun,  the  recall  of 
Alcibiades  and  alliance  with  the  Great  King  (Thuc.  viii.  73  and  74). 
Thucydides  traces  the  return  to  democracy  step  by  step,  and  shows 
us  how  the  counter-revolution  was  rendered  possible  and  accom- 
plished.   His  chief  points  are  : 

1.  The  Four  Hundred  send  ten  commissioners  to  Samos,  who, 

however,  on  hearing  of  the  reaction  there,  advance  no 
further  than  Delos  (viii.  72). 

2.  The  oligarchy  at  Samos  is  overthrown,  mainly  owing  to  the 

exertions  of  Thrasybulus  and  Thrasyllus,  Leon,  and 
Diomedon.  The  Samians  and  Athenians  unite,  after 
hearing  the  exaggerated  reports  of  Chaereas,  and  resolve 
to  oppose  oligarchy  and  carry  on  the  war  (viii.  74,  75). 

3.  Alcibiades  is  recalled,  and  elected  general  (viii.  82). 

4.  The  envoys  from  Athens  now  go  on  to  Samos.    They  declare 

that  all  the  citizens  are  in  turn  to  be  members  of  the  Five 
Thousand,  and  make  other  explanations  (viii.  86). 

5.  Message  of  Alcibiades  to  the  Four  Hundred  (ibid.). 

6.  Return  of  the  Commissioners  to  Athens.    The  message  of 

Alcibiades  stimulates  the  moderate  oligarchs,  led  by  Thera- 
menes and  Aristocrates.  They  maintain  that  the  Five 
Thousand  should  be  established  in  reality  and  not  in  name, 
and  the  constitution  made  more  equal.  They  are  afraid  (a) 
of  Alcibiades,  (6)  of  their  extreme  colleagues,  who  were 
sending  envoys  to  Lacedaemon.  These  were  Antiphon, 
Phrynichus,  Aristarchus,  and  Pisander  (viii.  89,  90). 

7.  The  extremists  fortify  Eetionea,  and  negotiate  with  Lacedae- 

mon (viii.  90). 

8.  The  moderate  party  alarmed.    Theramenes  takes  the  lead. 

Assassination  of  Phrynichus,  and  demolition  of  Eetionea. 
"  Let  the  Five  Thousand  rule."  (The  popular  party  feared 
that  the  Five  Thousand  might  actually  exist.  The  Four 


App.  II.] 


THUCYDIDES  AND  ARISTOTLE. 


539 


Hundred  did  not  wish  the  Five  Thousand  to  exist,  or  to 
be  known  not  to  exist,  viii.  92.) 
9.  Negotiations  between  the  popular  party  and  the  Four 
Hundred,  who  promise  that  they  will  publish  the  names 
of  the  Five  Thousand,  and  that  the  Four  Hundred  shall 
be  elected  out  of  those  in  turn  in  such  a  manner  as  the  Five 
Thousand  may  think  fit  (viii.  93).1 

10.  The  approach  of  the  Lacedaemonians  puts  an  end  to  nego- 

tiations.   Battle  of  Eretria  (viii.  94,  95). 

11.  On  the  news  of  the  loss  of  Euboea  the  Four  Hundred  are 

deposed,  and  the  constitution  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
Five  Thousand.    "This  number  was  to  include  all  who 
could  furnish  themselves  with  arms.    No  one  was  to  re- 
ceive pay  for  holding  any  office,  on  pain  of  falling  under  a 
curse.    This  government,  during  its  early  days,  was  the 
best  which  the  Athenians  ever  enjoyed  within  my  memory," 
viii.  97  (cp.  supra,  p.  418). 
To  compare  with  this  vivid  account  we  have  in  the  Politeia  no 
more  than  the  following  meagre  statement :— "  After  the  loss  of  the 
naval  battle  of  Eretria  (when  the  Four  Hundred  had  been  in  office 
about  four  months),  and  the  revolt  of  the  whole  of  Euboea  except 
Oreus,  the  indignation  of  the  people  was  greater  than  at  any  of  the 
earlier  disasters,  since  they  drew  far  more  supplies  at  this  time  from 
Euboea  than  from  Attica  itself.     Accordingly  they  deposed  the 
Four  Hundred,  and  committed  the  management  of  affairs  to  the 
Five  Thousand,  who  consisted  of  persons  possessing  a  military 
equipment.    At  the  same  time  they  voted  that  pay  should  not  be 
given  for  any  public  office.    The  persons  chiefly  responsible  for  the 
revolution  were  Aristocrates  and  Theramenes,  who  disapproved  of 
the  action  of  the  Four  Hundred  in  retaining  the  direction  of  affairs 
entirely  in  their  own  hands,  and  referring  nothing  to  the  Five 
Thousand.    The  constitution  of  the  state  seems  to  have  been  admir- 
able during  this  period,  since  it  was  a  time  of  war,  and  the  franchise 
was  in  the  hands  of  those  who  possessed  a  military  equipment " 
(c.  33,  K.). 

When  we  compare  these  two  authorities,  we  cannot  doubt  that 
in  the  history  of  Thucydides  we  have  the  account  of  a  contemporary 
who  had  studied  the  movement  thoroughly  in  its  rise  and  fall,  and 

1  Is  this  the  basis  of  the  constitution  "for  the  future"  friven  in 
Ath.  Pol.  c.  30?  8 


540 


THUCYDIDES  AND  ARISTOTLE. 


[App.  II. 


accounted  for  every  step.  In  the  Politeia  we  have  details  which 
are  partly  confused,  and  partly,  so  far  as  we  can  tell,  mere  proposi- 
tions which  were  never  carried  out.  The  meeting  at  which  Melobius 
spoke  may  have  taken  place  in  the  interval  between  the  first  and 
second  visits  of  Pisander,  but  it  is  confused  in  part  with  the  meeting 
held  after  his  second  arrival.  The  Five  Thousand  are  spoken  of 
as  the  Four  Hundred  may  have  spoken  of  them  "when  they  wished 
them  neither  to  exist  nor  to  be  known  not  to  exist."  In  two  points 
there  is  a  direct  conflict  of  testimony  :  in  Thucyd  des  we  have  ten 
Commissioners,  in  the  Politeia  thirty  ;  and  the  election  of  the  Four 
Hundred  is  quite  different  in  the  two  accounts.  In  both  points  I 
am  inclined  to  think  Thucydides  the  safer  guide. 

The  differences  between  the  account  of  the  Thirty  Tyrants  in  the 
Politeia  and  in  Xenophon  are  noticed  in  the  notes  to  the  text.  We 
cannot,  of  course,  give  the  same  weight  to  Xenophon  as  we  do  to 
Thucydides. 


\ 


INDEX. 


(The  references  are  to  Chapter  and  Section 
of  the  event  i 

A 

Acanthus,  receives  Brasidas  (424),  viii.  5. 
Acarnania,  alliance  of  Athens  with,  i.  22; 

organised  attack  on,  by  the  Ambraciots  and 

Lacedaemonians  (429),  v  15. 
Acarnanians,  their  quarrel  with  Demosthenes, 

vii.  8  ;  aid  the  Argives  against  the  Am- 
braciots (426),  vii  4. 

Acbaea,  brought  into  alliance  with  Sparta  and 

made  more  oligarchical  (418),  ix.  12. 
Actium,  battle  of  (435),  iii.  3. 
Adimantus,  appointed  Athenian  general  (406), 

xii.  17  ;  and  Lysander  (405),  xii.  20. 
Adonis,  festival  of,  at  Athens  on  the  day 

when  the  expedition  to  Sicily  was  finally 

decreed  (415),  x.  6. 
Adramyttium,  the  Delians  settled  at  (422), 

viii.  13. 

Aegina,  inhabitants  expelled  from  (431),  v.  6 ; 
fame  of  the  island,  Herodotus'  feeling  to- 
wards the  Aeginetans,  Pindar's  praises  of 
them,  viii.  1. 

Aeginetans,  massacre  of  the  (424),  viii.  1. 

Aegitiuni,  Demosthenes  defeated  at  (426),  vii.  3. 

Aegospotami,  battle  of  (405),  xii.  19. 

Aeschylus,  xiv.  2. 

Aetolia,  invasion  of,  by  Demosthenes  (426), 
vii.  3;  the  Aetolian  tribes  described,  ibid. ; 
their  territory,  ibid. 

Agatharchus,  a  Syracusan  general  (413),  x. 
81. 

Agatharchus  of  Samos,  xiv.  17. 

Agathon,  the  tragedian,  xiv.  4. 

Agis,  succeeds  Archidamus  as  King  of  Sparta 
(427),  vii.  1 ;  leads  out  the  Peloponnesian 
troops,  "no  one  knows  whither"  (419),  ix. 
8 ;  invades  Argolis  (418),  ix.  9 ;  concludes 


;  the  numbers  in  parentheses  give  the  date 

mentioned.) 

peace  with  the  Argives,  ibid.  ;  censured  for 
his  conduct  in  the  Argive  campaign,  ix.  10; 
ten  commissioners  sent  out  with,  ibid. ;  at 
Argos,  destroys  the  unfinished  Long  Walls 
(417),  ix.  14;  invades  Attica  (413),  x.  22; 
fortifies  Decelea,  ibid. ;  at  Decelea,  marches 
ag  inst  the  Oetaeans  and  neighbouring 
tribes,  xi.  2;  negotiates  with  Euboea  and 
Lesbos,  ibid.  ;  advances  on  Athens  (411), 
xi.  16;  (405),  xii.  21. 
Agriculture,  i.  14;  xiv.  22. 
Agrigentum,  refuses  aid  to  Syracuse  (413),  x. 
24;  Diocles  at  (409),  xiii.  3  ;  escape  of  the 
Selinuntians  to,  ibid.  ;  siege  of  (406),  xiii.  6  ; 
abandoned  to  the  Syracusans,  ibid. ;  destruc- 
tion of  the  city,  ibid. ;  given  up  to  Carthage 
at  che  peace  in  405,  xiii.  8 ;  temples  at,  xiv. 
19. 

'Aiepaiov  Aen-a?,  the,  in  Sicily,  x.  33,  note. 
Alcamenes,  appointed  "harmost"  of  Lesbos 

(413),  xi.  2  ;  slain,  xi.  3. 
Alcetas,  son  of  Alexander,  i.  19. 
Alcibiades,  and  Pericles,  iii.  1 ;  comes  to  the 
front  at  Athens,  ix.  5  ;  his  hereditary  friend- 
ship with  Sparta,  ibid.  ;  negotiates  with 
Argos,  ibid.;  outwits  Nicias,  ix.  3;  general 
in  419,  ix.  8  ;  in  Achaea,  ibid.  ;  in  Epidauria, 
ibid. ;  p  rsuades  the  Argives  to  renew  the 
war  with  Sparta,  ix.  10  ;  after  Man  tinea, 

ix.  13;  at  Argos  (416),  ix.  14;  eagerly  sup- 
ports the  expedition  to  Sicily,  x  3  ;  ap- 
pointed one  of  the  generals  to  Sicily  (415), 
ibid.  ;  his  speech  on  the  Sicilian  expedition, 

x.  5 ;  his  extravagance  and  success  at 
Olympia,  ibid.  ;  no  evidence  to  prove  that 
he  was  connected  with  the  affair  of  the 
Hermae,  x.  7  ;  guilty  of  profanation  of  the 
mysteries,  ibid.,  see  note  ;  demands  to  be  put 

541 


542 


INDEX. 


on  his  trial  before  leaving  for  Sicily  (415), 
ibid.;  he  is  allowed  to  go.  ibid.;  endeavours 
to  gain  Messene,  x.  10 ;  his  plan  of  campaign 
in  415,  ibid.;  plot  of  his  enemies  at  Athens, 

x.  11 ;  the  Salaminia  sent  to  Sicily  to  bring 
him  home,  ibid. ;  he  escapes  at  Thurii.  ibid. ; 
at  Sparta  (414).  x.  13 ;  his  advice  to  the 
Spartans,  ibid. ;  his  influence  at  Sparta,  and 
with  Endius  (412).  xi.  3 ;  sails  to  Ionia  (412), 

xi.  4 ;  revolt  of  Chios,  Erythrae,.  Clazo- 
menae,  ibid. ;  at  Chios,  ibid. ;  sails  to  Mil- 
etus, and  causes  the  city  to  revolt  (412), 
ibid.  ;  estranged  from  Spartans,  xi.  11 ; 
escapes  to  Tissaphernes(411),i&MZ. ;  intrigues 
for  his  return  to  Athens,  xi.  12;  proposes 
an  oligarchical  revolution  in  Athens,  ibid. ; 
approached  by  Athenians  at  Samos  (411), 

xi.  19;  elected  general,  ibid. ;  reply  to  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Pour  Hundred,  xi. 
20;  decree  passed  for  his  recall,  xii.  2; 
dealings  with  Tissaphernes,  xii.  3,  5  ;  at  the 
battle  of  Cyzicus  (410),  xii.  5 ;  collects  sup- 
plies for  the  Athenians,  ibid.  ;  invests 
Chalcedon  (409),  xii.  9  ;  ratifies  convention 
with  Pharnabazus,  ibid. ;  besieges  Byzan- 
tium, ibid.;  returns  to  Athens  (408),  xii. 
10;  sails  to  Samos  with  a  large  force  (408), 

xii.  11 ;  deposed  from  his  command  by 
Athenians  (407),  xii.  12;  returns  to  the 
Chersonese,  ibid. ;  his  advice  to  the  Athen- 
ians at  Aegospotami,  xii.  19;  leaves  the 
Chersonese  for  the  court  of  Pharnabazus 
(404),  xii.  23  ;  assassinated,  ibid. 

Alcidas,  a  Spartan  admiral  (428-427),  iv.  3  ;  in 
the  Aegean,  vi.  6,  7  ;  his  cowardice  and 
cruelty,  vi.  7;  his  return  from  the  Aegean, 
ibid.  ;  at  Corcyra  (427),  vi.  15. 

Alcinous,  sacred  wood  of.  at  Corcyra,  vi.  13. 

Alciphron,  an  Argive,  proxenus  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians, ix.  9. 

Alexander  of  Macedon,  i.  18  ;  his  sons,  i.  19. 

Allies,  Athenian,  compelled  to  destroy  their 
walls,  i.  17;  "who  tax  themselves,"  or  have 
been  "enrolled  by  private  citizens,"  i.  20  ; 
of  Sparta,  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  iv.  4  ; 
of  Athens,  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  H  id. ; 
Athenian,  revolt  of,  after  the  Sicilian  expe- 
dition (413),  xi.  2  f. 

Ambraciots,  the,  seize  Amphilochian  Argos, 
driven  out  by  Phormio,  i.  22 ;  organise  an 
attack  on  Amimilochian  Argos  (430),  v.  11  ; 
invade  Amphilochian  Argos  (426),  vii.  4; 
great  slaughter  of  the,  at  Idomene,  vii.  5. 

Ammon,  xiv.  21. 

Amorges,  son  of  Pissuthnes,  xi.  2. 


Amphipolis  foundation  of  (437),  i.  20  ;  and 
Argilus,  taken  by  Brasidas  (424),  viii.  5 ;  is 
not  surrendered  by  Clearidas  after  421, 
ix.  1. 

Amyntas,  son  of  Philip  of  Macedonia,  v.  20. 

Anactorium,  betrayed  to  Corinth,  iii.  6  ; 
Acquired  by  the  Athenians  (425),  vii.  14. 

Anaea,  Samian  oligarchs  at  (439),  i.  16 ;  attack 
Lysicles  (428),  vi.  5;  remonstrate  with 
Alcidas,  vi.  7. 

Anaxagoras,  and  Aspasia,  ii.  3;  and  Pericles, 
ii.  4 ;  and  Lampon,  ibid.  ;  attack  on,  he  is 
imprisoned,  but  escapes,  ii.  8 ;  his  philo- 
sophy, xiv.  12. 

Anaximander  of  Miletus,  xiv.  11. 

Andocides,  sent  to  Corcyra  (433),  iii.  5 ;  his 
oration  on  the  mysteries,  x.  11. 

Androcles,  the  leading  democrat  in  415,  op- 
posed to  Alcibiades,  x.  7. 

Angites,  valley  of  the,  i.  20. 

Antandrus,  Lesbian  exiles  at,  viii.  3. 

Anticles,  general  at  Samos,  i.  16. 

Antimachus  of  Colophon,  an  epic  poet, 
xiv.  6. 

Antiphon,  arrested  and  put  to  death  (411),  xi. 
23  ;  his  oratory  and  character,  ibid. 

Apaturia,  the  festival  of,  xii.  15. 

Apodoti,  the,  an  Aetolian  tribe,  vii.  3. 

Apollo  Maloeis,  temple  of,  at  My tilene,  vi.  1 ; 
Pythaeus,  temple  of,  at  Argos,  ix.  8. 

Arbitration,  the  Athenians  ask  for,  before 
going  to  war,  iii.  12  ;  cf.  iii.  10. 

Arcadia,  Plistoanax  in,  ix.  4. 

Archidamus,  king  of  Sparta,  his  speech  on 
the  war,  iii.  10  ;  attempts  further  negotia- 
tions before  invading  Attica,  v.  3  ;  invades 
Attica  in  June  431,  v.  4;  at  Oenoe,  ibid.; 
repulsed,  ibid.  ;  at  Acharnae,  ibid.  ;  at 
Plataea  (429),  v.  13  ;  his^  death,  vii.  1. 

Architecture,  xiv.  19. 

Argilus,  discontent  at,  owing  to  the  founda- 
tion of  Amphipolis,  viii.  5. 

Arginusae,  battle  of  (406),  xii.  14  ;  loss  of 
Athenian  crews  at,  ibid. 

Argives,  invade  Epidauria (419),  ix.  8 ;  maintain 
the  same  clay  in  the  calendar,  ibid.  ;  take  the 
field  against  Agis  (418),  ix.  9  ;  come  to  terms 
with  Agis,  ibid. ;  persuaded  by  Alcibiades 
to  renew  the  war  with  Sparta  (418),  ix.  10; 
the  Select  Thousand  in  their  army  at  Man- 
tinea,  ibid. ;  the,  at  Miletus  as  auxiliaries  of 
Athens  (412),  xi.  8  ;  they  return  home, 
ibid. 

Argolis,  coast  of,  attacked  by  the  Athenians 
(430),  v.  8. 


\ 


INDEX. 


543 


Argos,  Select  Thousand  in  the  army,  iv.  5, 
iX.  2;  her  attitude  to  Sparta  in  422,  viii. 
16 ;  flourishing  condition  of  in  421,  ix. 
2;  urged  by  the  Corinthians  to  take  the 
lead  in  the  Peloponnese,  ibid. ;  a  demo- 
cracy, ibid. ;  forms  alliance  with  Mantinea, 
Elis,  Corinth,  and  Chalcidice  in  421,  ix. 
3;  and  Boeotia,  unsuccessful  negotiations 
between  (421),  ix.  4;  and  Sparta  in  nego- 
tiation (420),  ix.  5;  Alcibiades  negotiates 
with,  ibid.;  and  Athens  (420),  ix.  6  ;  alliance 
between  Argos,  Elis,  Mantinea,  and  Athens, 
ibid.  ;  and  Epidaurus,  quarrel  between 
(419),  ix.  8 ;  and  Sparta  in  418,  ix.  9,  10  ; 
and  Sparta,  alliance  between  (after  Man- 
tinea), ix.  12;  renounces  her  alliance  with 
Athens,  Mantinea,  and  Elis,  ibid. ;  the 
oligarchs  put  down  the  democracy  (418), 
ibid.  ;  evacuates  Epidauria,  ix.  13  ;  the 
democratic  party  aided  by  Athens  renounces 
the  Spartan  alliance  (417),  ix.  14  ;  Alci- 
biades at  (416);  he  seizes  a  number  of  the 
oligarchical  party,  ibid. ;  supplies  troops  to 
Athens  (413),  x.  22. 

Argos,  Amphilochian,  i.  22  ;  at  war  with 
Ambracia,  ibid.  ;  attack  on  (430),  v.  11 ; 
invasion  of  (426),  vii.  4. 

Ariapithes,  king  of  Scythia,  i.  19;  murdered 
by  Spargapithes,  i.  21 ;  his  sons,  ibid. 

Aristarchus,  an  Athenian  general  (411),  xi.  23. 

Aristeus,  of  Corinth,  takes  help  to  the  Poti- 
daeans,  iii.  7 ;  escapes  from  the  city,  ibid.  ; 
seized  by  Sitalces  and  given  up  to  the 
Athenians  (430),  v.  12. 

Aristophanes,  his  caricature  of  the  sophistic 
teaching,  ii.  6 ;  his  view  of  the  causes  of 
the  war,  iii.  1 ;  his  view  of  the  orators  at 
Athens,  vi.  9 ;  his  advice  to  the  Athenians 
after  Arginusae,  xii.  17  ;  views  upon  Thera- 
menes,  Cleophon,  and  Alcibiades,  ibid. ; 
remarks  upon  the  new  coinage,  ibid.  ;  his 
plays,  xiv.  5. 

Army,  decline  of  the  Athenian,  i.  2,  viii.  4 ; 
of  Athens,  iv.  4  ;  of  the  Peloponnesian  con- 
federacy, ibid. ;  the  Argive,  a  standing  force 
of  a  thousand  men,  ix.  2. 

Arnae,  a  town  in  Chalcidice,  viii.  5. 

Arrhibaeus,  Brasidas  comes  to  terms  with, 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  Perdiccas,  viii. 
5. 

Artaphernes,  a  Persian  envoy,  arrested  (425), 
vii.  14. 

Artas,  chief  of  the  Messapians  (413),  x.  26. 
Artaxerxes,  death  of  (425),  vii.  14. 
Artemon  of  Clazomenae,  i.  16,  note. 


Asopius,  in  Western  Greece  (428),  vi.  5 ;  his 
death,  ibid. 

Aspasia,  ii.  3;  and  the  Sophists,  ii.  7; 
attacked  by  Hermippus,  the  comedian, 

ii.  8;  her  fugitive  slaves  received  by  the 
Megarians,  iii.  1. 

Assembly,  Athenian,  a  source  of  difficulty  in 
the  management  of  the  Empire,  iv.  2 ; 
and  generals,  ibid. ;  reopening  of  a  subject 
already  discussed,  vi.  8,  x.  4  ;  cf.  Mytilene. 

Assinaria,  the,  a  festival  at  Syracuse,  x.  34. 

Assinarus,  Nicias  reaches  the  river,  x.  34. 

Astacus,  v.  5. 

Astyochus,  the  Spartan  admiral,  at  Lesbos, 
xi.  7;  arrives  at  Chios,  ibid.;  attacks 
Pteleum  and  Clazomenae  (412),  xi.  9 ;  sug- 
gests an  expedition  to  Lesbos,  ibid.;  quarrels 
with  Pedaritus,  and  returns  to  Miletus, 
ibid. ;  engagement  with  Athenians,  xi.  10 ; 
sails  to  Chios  (411),  xi.  15;  and  Pharna- 
bazus,  xii.  3 ;  returns  to  Sparta,  ibid. 

Atalanta  fortified  by  the  Athenians  (431) 
v.  5. 

Athena,  of  the  Brazen  House,  the  ourse  of, 

iii.  12. 

Athenagoras,  leader  of  the  democrats  at 
Syracuse,  in  415,  denies  that  the  Athenians 
will  come,  x.  9. 

Athenian,  empire,  destruction  of  the  walls 
of  the  allied  cities,  i.  17;  the  Carian  and 
Ionian  district  divided  in  442,  reunited 
in  436,  ibid. ;  changes  in  the  "Thracian 
district,"  i.  20;  fleet,  movements  of,  in 
431,  v.  5  ;  in  the  Euripus,  ibid.  ;  sent  round 
the  Peloponnesus  (430),  v.  8;  empire,  a 
tyranny  (Pericles),  v.  9 ;  Mytilenaean  view 
of,  vi.  3 ;  fleet,  at  Pylus  (425),  vii.  10;  attacks 
the  Peloponnesian,  at  Pylus,  ibid.  ;  part  of 
their  forces  too  late  for  Mantinea,  ix.  13  ; 
besiege  Epidaurus,  ibid. ;  envoys  visit 
Segesta  (416),  x.  3;  deception  practised 
upon,  ibid. ;  fleet,  in  Sicily,  at  Naxos,  Catana, 
and  Syracuse,  x.  10  ;  sails  into  the  Great 
Harbour  of  Syracuse  (414),  x.  16  ;  opposes 
the  Four  Hundred  (411),  xi.  18;  unites 
with  Samians  (411),  ibid.;  generals,  trial 
of  (406),  xii.  15 ;  condemned,  ibid.  ;  demo- 
cracy, liable  to  sudden  passion,  ibid. ;  fleet, 
leaves  Chios  (405),  xii.  19;  captured  at 
Aegospotami,  ibid.  ;  generals,  gross  incom- 
petency of,  xii.  20.   See  Empire. 

Athenians,  the,  superstitious,  ii.  4 ;  at  war 
with  Perdiccas,  iii.  7 ;  their  reply  to  the 
charges  of  Corinth  at  Sparta,  iii.  9  ;  defence 
of  their  empire,  ibid. ;  character  of  the, 


544 


INDEX. 


iv.  1 ;  leave  the  country  for  the  town  (431), 
V.  3;  their  exasperation  at  the  invasion, 

v.  4;  occupy  Aegina,  v.  6;  their  dissatis- 
faction with  Pericles  (430),  v.  9;  arrange 
with  Sitalces  to  make  an  attack  on  the 
Chalcidic  cities,  but  fail  to  keep  their 
appointment  (429),  v.  20  ;  action  on  hearing 
of  the  revolt  of  Lesbos,  vi.  1 ;  at  Mytilene, 

vi.  2  ;  their  energy  in  428,  vi.  4 ;  their 
finances,  vi.  5,  see  Appendix  1 ;  their 
cruelty,  vi.  8;  sail  to  Sicily  (427),  vi. 
17 ;  inconvenient  neighbours,  vii.  5,  see 
Heraclea ;  the,  resolve  to  send  a  large 
fleet  to  Sicily,  in  426,  vii.  6;  their  du- 
plicity in  regard  to  the  Spartan  fleet,  vii. 
10  f. ;  the,  in  Sicily  (425),  vii.  15  ;  the, 
capture  Nisaea  (424),  viii.  2;  attempt  on 
Megara  foiled  by  Brasidas,  ibid.  ;  the, 
leave  Sicily  (424),  viii.  3;  the,  defeated 
at  Delium  (424),  viii.  4;  their  anger  at 
Scione,  viii.  9 ;  viewof  their  empire  expressed 
in  the  Melean  dialogue,  ix.  15 ;  in  Sicily, 
advance  from  Catana  to  the  shore  of  the 
Great  Harbour  of  Syracuse,  x.  12;  the, 
encamp  on  the  shore  of  the  Great  Harbour 
of  Syracuse  (415),  ibid. ;  their  first  engage- 
ment with  the  enemy,  ibid. ;  their  fear  of 
the  Syracusan  cavalry,  ibid. ;  retire  from 
Syracuse  to  Catana,  for  the  winter  of 
415,  ibid. ;  send  to  Athens  for  horsemen 
and  money,  ibid. ;  the,  in  Sicily,  visit 
Messene,  x.  14;  leave  Catana  for  Naxos, 
ibid.  ;  the,  at  Camarina,  ibid. ;  negotiates 
with  Sicily  (415-414),  ibid. ;  the,  send 
envoys  to  Carthage  and  Etruria,  ibid. ;  at 
Syracuse,  first  year,  ibid.  ;  arrival  of  rein- 
forcements from  Athens  (414),  x.  15 ; 
obtain  cavalry  from  Athens  and  Segesta, 
ibid. ;  the,  destroy  the  first  Syracusan 
counter-wall  (414),  x.  16;  the,  destroy  the 
second  counter- wall  of  the  Syracusans, 
ibid.  ;  at  Syracuse,  their  prosperous  condi- 
tion (414),  x.  17 ;  their  fortunes  at  Syracuse 
begin  to  sink,  x.  18  ;  a  trireme  captured  by 
the  Syracusans,  ibid. ;  their  miserable  con- 
dition at  Syracuse  (414),  x.  20;  the,  resolvj 
to  send  a  second  expedition  to  Syracuse 
(414),  x.  21 ;  the  second  expedition  to 
Syracuse  delayed,  x.  22 ;  suffer  greatly  by 
the  occupation  of  Decelea,  ibid. ;  their 
first  battle  in  the  Great  Harbour  of  Syra- 
cuse (413),  x.  24 ;  lose  Plemmyrium,  ibid  ; 
their  transports  captured,  ibid.  ;  second 
engagement  in  the  Great  Harbour  of 
Syracuse ;  they  are  defeated  (413),  x.  25 ; 


engage  with  the  Corinthians  off  Brineum 
(413),  x.  26;  their  reinforcements  arrive 
under  Demosthenes,  ibid. ,  their  third 
engagement  with  the  Syracusans  in  the 
Great  Harbour  (413),  x.  29 ;  their  defeat, 
ibid.  ;  last  engagement  in  the  Great 
Harbour  (413),  x.  30,  31 ;  the,  refuse  to  go 
on  board  their  ships  after  their  last  defeat, 
x.  32 ;  their  retreat  from  Syracuse  (413), 
x.  33  f. ;  number  of  those  who  retreated, 
ibid. ;  number  of  the  prisoners  taken  at 
Syracuse  (413),  x.  34  ;  their  fate,  x.  35 ; 
the,  incredulous  of  the  result  of  the 
Sicilian  expedition,  xi.  1  ;  the  measures 
then  taken,  ibid.  ;  the,  discover  the  plans 
for  revolt  among  their  allies  (412),  xi.  3 ; 
the,  send  ships  to  Asia,  xi.  4 ;  the,  at 
Miletus,  xi.  8 ;  their  fleet  assembled  at 
Samos,  ibid.  ;  moves  to  Miletus,  and 
then  returns  to  Samos,  ibid. ;  agree  to  an 
oligarchical  constitution  (411),  xi.  13  ;  sub- 
mit to  the  Government  of  the  Four 
Hundred  (411),  xi.  16 ;  their  courage  after 
Aegospotami  (405),  xii.  21 ;  the,  religion,  xiv. 
15 ;  disregarded  physical  science,  xiv.  12, 
15,  16. 

Athens,  change  of  policy  at,  i.  2 ;  and  her 
allies,  ibid.  ;  parties  at,  after  445,  i.  4 ; 
ruled  by  right  of  superiority,  i.  8;  and  the 
West,  i.  9 ;  and  the  Messapians,  i.  12 ;  and 
Neapolis,  ibid.  ;  and  the  North,  i.  18  ff.  ; 
and  Macedon,  ibid. ;  her  policy  towards 
Perdiccas  and  Sitalces,  i.  21  :  supports 
Philip,  endeavours  to  gain  the  friendship 
of  Sitalces,  ibid.  ;  forms  an  alliance  with 
Perdiccas,  ibid. ;  and  Western  Greece, 
AmpMlochian  Argos,  i.  22;  makes  an 
alliance  with  Acarnania,  ibid.  ;  and 
Corinth,  ibid.  ;  parties  in,  after  445,  ii.  1; 
religion  at,  ii.  4;  sophists  and  sophistic 
teaching  at,  ii.  6  ;  at  variance  with 
Meg.ira,  iii.  1 ;  and  Corinth,  iii.  2 ;  envoys 
from  Corcyra  and  Corinth,  at,  iii.  4;  her 
policy  towards  Corcyra,  iii.  4,  5 ;  enters 
into  a  defensive  alliance  with,  iii.  5;  sends 
ten  and  afterwards  twenty  ships  to  protect 
her,  ibid. ;  her  ships  at  the  battle  of 
Sybota,  iii.  6 ;  they  prevent  a  second 
engagement,  ibid.  ;  insists  that  Potidaea 
shall  raze  her  wall,  iii.  7 ;  and  Sparta  con- 
trasted, iv.  1  f.  ;  her  fleet  in  431,  iv.  4 ; 
her  army,  ibid.  ;  financial  position  of,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  iv.  6 ;  and 
Plataea,  vi.  11 ;  concludes  a  truce  with 
Sparta  for  a  year  (423),  viii.  8 ;  and  Sparta, 


INDEX. 


545 


alliance  between,  in  421,  ix.  1 ;  and  Argos 
(420),  ix.  6;  in  alliance  with  Mantinea 
and  Elis,  ibid.  ;  sends  forces  to  aid  the 
Argives  in  Epidauria  (419),  ix.  8 :  politics 
at,  after  Mantinea,  ix.  13;  aids  the  demo- 
cratic party  in  Argos,  ix.  14  ;  her  attempt 
to  gain  a  footing  in  Sicily,  in  422,  a  failure, 
x.  2;  prosperity  of,  after  the  peace  of 
Nicias,  x.  3;  an  ally  of  Segesta,  ibid.; 
visited  by  envoys  from,  ibid. ;  fear  of  con- 
spiracy at,  in  415,  x.  11 ;  alarm  at,  on  the 
revolt  of  Chios  (412),  xi.  4;  the  reserve 
fund  now  employed,  ibid. ;  in  danger  from 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  xi.  23  ;  siege  of,  by 
Lysander  (405-404),  xii.  21 ;  surrender  of, 
to  Sparta  (404),  xii.  22 ;  state  of  the  city, 
xiv.  20  ;  trade  of,  xiv.  22  ;  Pericles'  ideal  of, 
see  Funeral  speech. 
Atomists,  the,  xiv.  12. 

Attica,  Pericles'  measures  for  the  security  of, 

v.  5  ;  invaded  (431),  v.  4 ;  (430),  v.  8 ;  (428), 

vi.  1 ;  proposed  second  invasion  in  the 
same  year,  vi.  4;  invaded  (427),  vi.  6; 
(425),  i.8. 


B 

Bacchylides,  xiv.  1. 
Bacis,  ii.  4. 

Bassae,  temple  of  Apollo  at,  xiv.  19. 

Bendis,  a  Thracian  deity,  xiv.  21.  ! 

Biology,  xiv.  16. 

Bisaltia  annexed  by  Macedon,  i.  18. 

Boeotia,  popular  movement,  and  organisation 
of  a  rising  (424),  viii.  4 ;  and  Corinth,  in  421, 
ix.  4 ;  forms  an  alliance  with  Sparta,  ibid. 

Boeotians,  have  a  truce  terminable  at  ten 
days'  notice  with  Athens  in  421,  ix.  1 ;  un- 
willing to  join  Argos  in  421,  ix.  3. 

Bosphorus,  importance  of  corn-supplies  from, 
xii.  18. 

Botany,  xiv.  16. 

Bottiaeans,  the,  aid  the  Potidaeans,  iii.  7. 

Brasidas,  opposition  to  his  policy,  iv.  3 ;  at 
Methone,  v.  5;  with  Cnemus  in  the  Corin- 
thian gulf,  v.  17;  adviser  of  Alcidas,  vi.  15 ; 
at  Pylus,  vii.  9;  appointed  to  Thrace,  viii. 
2  ;  in  the  Megarid  (424),  ibid.  ;  inarches  to 
Chalcidice,  viii.  5  ;  and  Perdiccas,  ibid. ;  at 
Acanthus,  ibid.;  at  Amphipolis,  ibid. ;  his 
policy  in  Thrace,  viii.  6  ;  sends  to  Sparta  for 
reinforcements,  and  begins  building  ships  on 
the  Strymon  (424),  viii.  7;  at  Torone,  ibid. ; 
at  Scione,  viii.  9 ;  he  refuses  to  give  up  the 
VOL.  III. 


city,  ibid. ;  receives  Msnde  (423),  ibid. ;  his 
mistake  on  leaving  Chalcidice  to  invade 
Lyncestis,  ibid.  ;  joins  Perdiccas  in  the  in- 
vasion of  Lyncestis,  his  retreat,  and  breach 
with  Perdiccas,  viii.  10 ;  commissioners  sent 
to  (423),  viii.  11 ;  unsuccessfully  attempts 
Potidaea  (423),  viii.  12;  why  absent  from 
Torone  when  Cleon  arrived  ?  viii.  13  ;  defeats 
Cleon  at  Amphipolis  (422),  viii.  14;  his  death 
and  the  honours  paid  to  him,  ibid. ;  his 
strategy,  viii.  15  ;  the  helots  who  served  in 
his  army,  settled  at  Lepreum  (421),  ix.  4  ; 
present  at  the  battle  of  Mantinea,  ix.  10. 

Bricinniae,  a  fortress  in  the  Leontine  territory 
visited  by  Phaeax  (422),  x.  2. 

Budorum,  a  fort  on  Salamis,  v.  19. 

Byzantium,  revolts  from  Athens  (440),  i.  15  ; 
returns  to  her  allegiance,  i.  17 ;  joins  the 
Peloponnesians  (411),  xii.  3  ;  besieged  by  the 
Athenians  (409),  xii.  9 ;  captured  by  them, 
ibid. ;  taken  by  Lysander  (405),  xii.  21. 


0 

Cacyparis,  Nicias  reaches  the  river,  x.  33. 
Calamis,  an  Athenian  sculptor,  xiv.  8. 
Calendar,  Greek,  ix.  8. 

Callias,  an  Athenian  general  at  Potidaea, 

iii.  7. 
Callicrates,  xiv.  19. 

Callicratidas,  appointed  Spartan  admiral (406), 
xii.  13;  his  relations  with  Lysander  and 
Cyrus,  ibid. ;  his  humane  treatment  of 
Greek  captives,  ibid.;  drowned  at  Arginusae 
(406),  xii.  14. 

Callistratus,  an  Athenian  hipparch  at  Syra- 
cuse, x.  34.  , 

Callixenus,  xii.  15. 

Carnarina,  plot  to  betray  the  city  to  Syracuse 
(425),  vii.  15  ;  and  Gela  (424),  viii.  3  ;  visited 
by  the  Athenian  fleet  (415),  x.  10 ;  Hermo- 
erates  at  (415),  x.  14;  the  Athenians  at, 
ibid.  ;  sends  aid  to  Syracuse  (413),  x.  24 ; 
abandoned  to  the  Carthaginians  (405),  xiii.  8. 

Canachus  of  Sicyon,  xiv.  18. 

Cannonus,  decree  of,  xii.  15. 

Carian  district,  i.  2 ;  defection  of  allies  in, 
i.  15  ;  defections  in  441-436,  i.  17. 

Carthage,  Athenians  contemplate  an  attack 
on  (?),  x.  13  ;  the  Athenians  send  envoys  to 
(415-414;,  x.  14;  and  Segesta,  xiii.  2;  con- 
cludes peace  with  Dionysius  (405),  xiii.  8; 
terms  of  the  peace,  ibid. ;  plague  at,  ibid. 

2  M 


546 


INDEX. 


Carthaginians  in  Sicily  (409),  xiii.  3  ;  their  | 

brutality  at  Selinus,  ibid.  ;  Carthaginian  j 

invasion  of  Sicily  (406),  xiii.  6. 
Catana,  the  Athenian  fleet  sails  to,  x.  10  ;  the 

Athenian  army  returns  to,  in  415,  x.  12 ; 

the  Athenians  return  to,  from  Naxos,  x. 

14 ;  the  Athenian  army  leaves  for  Epipolae, 

x.  15. 

Centoripa,  acquired  by  the  Athenians,  x.  15. 
Cephallenia,  becomes  an  ally  of  Athens,  v.  5. 
Ceramicus,  Athenians  buried  in  the,  v.  7. 
Cercinitis,  Lacus,  i.  20. 

Chaeronea,  a  rising  contemplated  at  (420), 
viii.  4. 

Chalce,  Athenian  fleet  at  (411),  xi.  14. 

Chalcedon,  siege  of  (409),  xii.  9  ;  convention 
at,  ibid.;  occupied  by  Lysander  (405),  xii.  21. 

Chalcideus,  a  Spartan  commander  (-113),  xi.  2  ; 
appointed  to  command  at  Chios,  xi.  3 ;  at 
Teos,  xi.  4 ;  at  Chios,  ibid. ;  sails  to  Iouia,  | 
ibid.;  his  alliance  with  Tissaphernes,  xi.  5.  ] 

Chalcidians,  the,  become  allies  of  Argos  in  j 
421,  ix.  3 ;  terms  respecting,  in  the  peace  , 
of  421,  viii.  17. 

Chalcidice,  threatened  by  Sitalces  (429),  v. 
20;  application  to  Sparta  for  help  (424), 
viii.  2  ;  Brasidas  marches  to  (424),  viii.  5 ; 
success  of  Brasidas  in,  and  weak  defence  of 
the  Athenians,  ibid,  and  ff. ;  Cleon  in 
(423-422),  viii.  13  f. 

Chaonians,  aid  in  attacking  Amphilochian 
Argos  (430),  v.  11 ;  aid  Cnemus  in  attacking 
Acarnania,  v.  15;  their  defeat  at  Stratus, 
ibid. 

Charicles,  a  member  of  the  commission  to 
investigate  sacrilege  (415),  x.  7 ;  general  with 
Demosthenes  (413),  x.  22;  collects  troops 
at  Argos,  ibid. 

Chians,  the,  compelled  to  pull  down  their 
walls  (425),  vii.  14  ;  send  to  Sparta  wishing 
to  revolt  (413).  xi.  2  ;  supply  seven  ships  to 
Athens,  ix.  13  f.  ;  their  revolt  delayed, 
ibid.  ;  activity  of,  xi.  5  ;  they  bring  over 
Lebedos  and  Brae,  ibid. ;  attempt  to  bring 
over  Lesbos  to  Sparta  (412),  xi.  7. 

Chios  sends  ships  against  Samos,  i.  16;  and 
Lesbos,  send  fifty  ships  to  the  Athenian 
fleet  (430),  v.  8 ;  Chalcideus  appointed  to  the 
command  in,  xi.  3 ;  revolts  from  Athens 
(412),  xi.  4  ;  devastation  of,  by  the  Athenians 
(412),  xi.  7  ;  great  prosperity  of  the  island 
down  to  this  time,  ibid. ;  their  mistake  as 
to  the  power  of  Athens,  ibid. ;  under 
Pedaritus,  xi.  9 ;  desperate  condition  of, 
during  Athenian  occupation,  xi.  10;  com- 


pletely invested  by  the  Athenians  (411),  xi. 
14;  conspiracy  among  Peloponnesian  fleet 
at  (406),  xii.  16. 
Chrjsopolis,  xii.  5. 

Cimon,  change  in  Athenian  policy  after  his 

death,  i.  2;  his  liberality,  ii.  1. 
"  Circle,"  the,  on  Epipolae,  x.  15;  attacked  by 

the  Syracusans,  and  barely  saved  by  Nicias, 

x.  16. 

Clazomenae,  revolts  from  Athens  (412),  xi.  4 ; 

returns  to  its  allegiance,  xi.  7. 
Cleandridas  at  Thurii,  i.  12. 
Clearchus,  appointed  to  the  command  of  the 

Hellespont  (413),  xi.  3  ;  at  Byzantium  (410), 

xii.  7. 

Clearidas,  established  in  Amphipolis  (423), 
viii.  11  ;  refuses  to  give  up  Amphipolis,  in 
421,  ix.  1 ;  he  is  recalled  home,  ibid. 

Cleomenes,  regent  for  Pausanias,  leads  the 
invasion  into  Attica  (427),  vi.  6. 

Cleon,  chief  of  the  demagogues  at  Athens,  ii. 
7  ;  supports  Pericles  in  his  war  policy,  ibid. ; 
said  to  have  attacked  Anaxagoras,  ii.  8 ;  sup- 
ports the  war  party,  ii.  9  ;  his  proposal  about 
the  Mytilenaeans  (427),  vi.  8  ;  his  speech, 
ibid. ;  his  view  of  the  Athenian  empire,  ibid. ; 
his  view  of  the  "  orators  "  at  Athens,  vi.  9  ; 
attacks  Paches,  vi.  10  ;  his  extravagant  de- 
mands after  the  seizure  of  Pylus,  vii.  10;  his 
attack  on  the  generals  about  Pylus,  vii.  11 ; 
he  is  sent  there,  ibid. ;  and  Demosthenes 
(425),  vii.  12  ;  his  conduct  at  Pylus,  vii.  13  ; 
sails  to  Chalcidice  (423),  viii.  13  ;  he  takes 
Torone,  ibid.  ;  his  ability  as  a  general  shown 
at  the  capture  of  Torone,  ibid.  ;  at  Eion, 
viii.  14  ;  captures  Galepsus,  ibid.  ;  marches 
on  Amphipolis  (422),  ibid.  ;  discontent  of 
his  army  at,  viii.  14,  15  ;  his  defeat  and 
death,  viii.  14  ;  his  conduct  at  Amphipolis 
examined,  viii.  15. 

Cleophon,  leader  of  the  extreme  democratic 
party  at  Athens,  xii.  2  ;  opposes  ppace  with 
Sparta  (410),  xii.  6 ;  opp  'ses  peace  with 
Sparta  alter  Arginusae  (406),  xii.  16  ;  views 
of  Aristophanes  on  his  character,  xii.  17  ; 
again  resists  proposals  for  peace  with 
Sparta,  xii.  22  ;  brought  to  trial  and  ex- 
ecuted, ibid. 

"  Cleruchs"  at  Lesbos,  vi.  10. 

Clouds  (of  Aristophanes),  scene  from,  ii.  6. 

Clubs  at  Athens,  their  nature  and  aims,  xi.  14. 

Cnemus,  a  Spartan  admiral  (430),  iv.  3;  in  Acar- 
nania (429),  v.  15;  defeated  by  Phormio 
(429),  v.  17,  18  ;  his  proposed  attack  on  the 
Peiraeus,  v.  19. 


\ 


INDEX. 


547 


Cnidus,  expedition  to,  by  Hippocrates  (412), 
xi.  9  ;  a  school  of  medicine  at,  xiv.  16. 

Coinage,  new,  at  Athens  (407),  xii.  17. 

Colonus,  meeting  of  Athenian  assembly  at 
(411),  xi.  16. 

Colophon,  revolution  at  (430),  v.  12 ;  in  the 
hands  of  the  Persians,  vi.  7. 

Comedy,  xiv.  5. 

Congress  (proposed)  of  the  Greeks,  i.  13. 

Conon,  stationed  at  Naupactus  (413),  x.  26; 
one  of  the  ten  generals  (406),  xii.  12  ;  block- 
aded at  Mytilene,  xii.  13. 

Corcyra,  and  Corinth,  iii.  2  ;  navy  of  the  Cor- 
cyraeans,  ibid.  ;  her  action  in  the  Persian 
war,  ibid. ;  her  colony  at  Epidamnus,  iii.  3  ; 
defeats  Corinth  at  sea  (435),  ibid.  ;  the  oli- 
garchs of  Epidamnus  appeal  to  and  are 
received,  ibid. ;  the  Corcyraeans  besiege 
Epidamnus,  ibid.  ;  sends  envoys  to  Athens, 
ibid.  ;  defeated  at  Sybota,  iii.  6  ;  but  saved 
from  further  disaster  by  the  Athenians, 
ibid. ;  sends  fifty  ships  to  Athens  (431),  v.  5 ; 
change  in  hei  attitude  to  Athens,  vi.  13 ; 
envoys  sent  to  Athens,  ibid.  ;  sedition  at,  vi. 
13, 14 ;  after  433,  ibid.  ;  help  sent  to  Athens, 
ibid.  ;  end  of  the  sedition  (425),  vi.  16  ;  the 
rendezvous  of  the  Sicilian  expedition  in 
415,  x,  8. 

Corinth,  her  relations  with  Athens,  iii.  2 ; 
with  Corcyra,  ibid. ;  adopts  Epidamnus  as 
her  colony  and  sends  aid,  iii.  3 ;  prepara- 
tions for  war  with  Corcyra,  ibid. ;  battle  off' 
the  Ambracian  gulf,  and  defeat  of  the  Cor- 
inthians, ibid. ;  sends  envoys  to  Athens, 
iii.  4 ;  her  war  with  Corcyra  a  mistake,  iii. 
5  ;  prepares  for  a  second  conflict,  iii,  6 ;  the 
battle  of  Sybota,  ibid. ;  defeats  Corcyra  at 
Sybota,  and  takes  many  captives,  ibid. ; 
excitement  at,  owing  to  the  affairs  of  Poti- 
daea,  iii.  8;  complains  of  the  conduct  of 
Athens  at  Sparta,  ibid. ;  and  Boeotia  in 
421,  ix.  4  ;  unable  to  take  a  leading  part  in 
the  Peloponnesus,  ix.  14 ;  Syracusan  en- 
voys at  (415),  x.  13 ;  proposes  destruction 
of  Athens  to  Sparta  (404),  xii.  22. 

Corinthia,  Nicias  makes  a  descent  on  (Solygea) 
(425),  vii.  14. 

Corinthian  war,  the,  iii.  3  f. ;  fleet,  movement 
of,  in  431,  v.  5 ;  ships,  arrive  at  Syracuse 
(414),  x.  18. 

Corinthians,  their  action  at  the  time  of  the 
Samian  revolt,  i.  16;  their  view  of  the 
Athenians,  iii.  8 ;  threaten  to  seek  a  new 
alliance  if  Sparta  will  not  help  them,  ibid.; 
speech  before  the  allies  at  Sparta  on  the 


war,  iii.  11 ;  their  skill  in  adapting  their 
navy  to  new  conditions,  iv.  5 ;  refuse  to 
accept  the  peace  of  421,  viii.  16;  urge 
Argos  to  take  the  lead  in  the  Peloponnesus, 

ix.  2  f. ;  become  allies  of  Argos,  in  421,  ix. 
3  ;  wish  to  be  on  a  truce  with  Athens  ter- 
minable at  ten  days'  notice,  Athens  refuses, 
ibid.  ;  refuse  to  join  in  the  alliance  with  the 
Athenians  (420),  ix.  6;  their  naval  engage- 
ment with  the  Athenians  off  Erineum  (413), 

x.  26;  wait  for  the  Isthmian  games  before 
sailing  (413),  xi.  3. 

Covonta,  Phormio  at  (429),  v.  19. 
Cos,  a  school  of  medicine,  xiv.  16, 
Cratinus,  xiv.  5. 

Crestonice,  annexed  by  Macedon,  i.  18. 

Critias,  his  life  in  exile,  xii.  23  ;  returns  to 
Athens  (404),  ibid.  ;  his  work  as  member  of 
the  Thirty,  xii.  25 ;  brings  about  the  execu- 
tion of  Theramenes,  ibid.  ;  death  of  (403), 
xii.  26. 

Critius,  an  Athenian  sculptor,  xiv.  18. 
Crotona,  unfriendly  to  Athens  (413),  x.  26. 
Cuneiform  alphabet,  the,  Persian  despatches 

written  in,  vii.  14. 
Cynossema,  battle  of  (411),  xii.  4. 
Cyrus,  sent  to  take  command  on  the  coast 

and  to  aid  the  Lacedaemonians  (408),  xii. 

10 ;  and  Lysander,  xii.  11 ;  supplies  Ly- 

sander  with  resources  (405),  xii.  17  ;  leaves 

Sardis  (405),  xii.  18 ;  makes  Lysander  his 

vice-regent,  ibid. 
Cythera,  capture  of,  by  Nicias  (424),  viii.  1 ; 

restored  by  the  Athenians  in  421,  ix.  1. 
Cyzicus,  recovered  by  the  Athenian  fleet,  xii. 

4 ;  battle  of  (410),  xii.  5. 


D 

Damarchus,  a  Syracusan  general,  executed 
(406),  xiii.  7. 

Damon,  his  advice  to  Pericles,  ii.  2;  ostra- 
cised, ii.  8. 

Daphnaeus,  a  Syracusan  general  at  Agri- 

gentum  (406),  xiii.   6 ;  deposed,  xiii.  7 ; 

executed,  ibid. 
Daphnus,  the  Athenians  from  Clazomenae 

take  refuge  in,  xi.  7. 
Dascon,  a  promontory  on  the  shore  of  the 

Great  Harbour  of  Syracuse,  x.  12. 
Decelea,  Alcibiades  advises  the  occupation 

of,  x.  13 ;  eff  ect  of  the  occupation  on  Athens, 

x.  22, 


548 


INDEX. 


Delians,  the,  expelled  from  their  island  and 
settled  by  Pharnaces  at  Adramyttium 
(422),  viii.  13;  restored  to  their  island  in 
421,  ix.  3. 

Delium,  the  Athenians  fortify  the  temple  (424), 

viii.  4 ;  the  battle  of,  ibid.  ;  the  temple  cap- 
tured, ibid. 

Delos,  earthquakes  at,  v.  3  ;  purification  of 
the  island  and  restoration  of  the  games 
(426),  vii.  7. 

Delphi,  the  oracle  and  Thurii,  i.  10,  12; 
attitude  of  the  oracle  towards  Sparta  about 
the  war,  iii.  11 ;  funds  at,  iv.  6  ;  stipula- 
tions about,  in  the  truce  of  423,  viii.  8  ;  the 
temple  not  impartial,  ibid.,  note  ;  terms  re- 
specting, in  the  peace  of  421,  viii.  17. 

Delphinium,  fortress  in  Chios  seized  by 
Athenians  (412),  xi.  9. 

Demeter  Thesmophoros,  i.  14. 

Democracy,  supported  by  Athens,  i.  8  ;  estab- 
lished at  Samos  (439  ?),  i.  16,  note  ;  at  Argos, 

ix.  2 ;  and  Mantinea,  ix.  3  ;  on  its  trial  at 
Athens  (413),  xi.  1 ;  established  at  Samos 
in  412,  xi.  6 ;  destroyed  in  Greece  (404),  xii. 
24;  at  Syracuse,  xiii.  1;  and  the  drama, 
xiv.  5,  6. 

Democritus,  his  physical  philosophy,  xiv.  12 ; 
his  ethical  philosophy,  xiv.  13. 

Demosthenes,  son  of  Alcisthenes,  in  Leu- 
cadia,  vii.  3 ;  in  Aetolia,  ibid. ;  he  is 
defeated,  ibid.  ;  contemplates  an  invasion 
of  Boeotia  (426),  ibid.  ;  unwilling  to  re- 
turn to  Athens  after  his  defeat,  ibid.  ;  at 
Olpae  (426),  vii.  4 ;  his  strategy,  ibid.  ; 
at  Idomene,  vii.  5 ;  returns  to  Athens, 
and  accompanies  the  fleet  (425),  vii.  8 ; 
and  Cleon  (425),  vii.  12  ;  employs  light- 
armed  troops  on  Sphacteria,  ibid.  ;  his  con- 
duct atPylus,  vii.  13  ;  in  the  Megarid  (424), 
viii.  2  ;  sent  to  Naupactus  to  arrange  for  an 
attack  on  Siphae,  viii.  4  ;  sent  to  Epidaurus 
to  bring  the  Athenian  troops  away  (418),  ix. 
13 ;  appointed  to  command  in  Sicily,  x.  21 ; 
and  Charicles  erect  a  fort  in  Laconia  (413), 

x.  22  ;  his  voyage  to  Syracuse  (413),  x.  26 ; 
his  arrival  at  Syracuse,  x.  27 ;  he  at- 
tempts the  counter-wall  of  the  Syracusans, 
ibid.  ;  his  attack  by  night  on  Epipolae, 
ibid. ;  wishes  to  carry  the  Athenian  forces 
back  to  Athens,  x.  28 ;  or  to  move  to 
Thapsus  and  Catana,  ibid.  ;  his  proposal 
after  the  last  defeat  of  the  Athenians 
(413),  x.  32 ;  surrender  of  his  army,  x.  34  ; 
attempts  his  own  life,  ibid.,  note;  cp.  note 
to  x.  35  ;  put  to  death  at  Syracuse,  x.  35. 


Demostratus,  urges  Nicias  to  fix  the  amount 
of  troops  needed  for  Sicily,  x.  6,  and  note. 

Derc\llidas,  a  Spartan,  xi.  15. 

Derdas,  nephew  of  Alexander,  king  of  the 
Elimiotae,  i.  19. 

Dexippus,  a  Lacedaemonian  at  Agrigentum 
(406),  xiii.  6  ;  dismissed  from  Sicily,  xiii.  7. 

Diitrephes,  conducts  Thracian  mercenaries 
from  Athens  (413),  x.  23. 

Diobelia,  paid  out  of  state  funds,  xii.  2. 

Diocles,  the  democratic  leader  at  Syracuse, 
xiii.  1,  and  note  ;  sent  to  relieve  Selinus 
(409),  xiii.  3;  aids  the  Himeraeans,  xiii.  4. 

Dioclides,  gives  information  about  the  pro- 
fanation of  the  mysteries,  x.  11. 

Diodotus,  opposed  to  Cleon,  vi.  9. 

Diognetus,  a  member  of  the  commission  to 
investigate  sacrilege  (411),  x.  7. 

Diomedou,  recovers  Teos  in  part  for  Athen3, 
xi.  5. 

Dionysius,i;he  "  copper"  at  Thurii,  i.  10. 

  of  Syracuse,   attacks  the  Syracusan 

generals  for  their  conduct  at  Agrigentum 

(406)  ,  xiii.  7  ;  at  Gela,  ibid.  ;  elected  general 
with  full  powers,  ibid. ;  at  Leontini,  ibid. ; 
allowed  to  have  a  bodyguard,  ibid. ;  marries 
the  daughter  of  Hermocrates,  and  becomes 
tyrant  of  Syracuse,  ibid.  ;  recognised  as 
tyrant  of  Carthage  (405),  xiii.  8 ;  attempts 
to  relieve  Gela,  but  fads,  ibid. ; .  hatred  of, 
owing  to  his  failure  at  Gela,  ibid. ;  ill- 
treatment  of  his  wife,  ibid.  ;  his  return  to 
Syracuse,  ibid.  ;  he  concludes  peace  with 
Carthage  (405),  ibid. 

Diopithes,  attacks  Anaxagoras,  ii.  8. 
Diotimus,  at  Neapolis,  i.  12. 
Dorians,  at  Thurii,  i.  12  ;  and  Ionians,  iv.  1. 
Dorieus  of  Rhodes,  leads  Thurian  vessels  to 
Cnidus  (412),  xi.  9;  captured  by  Athenians 

(407)  ,  xii.  12  ;  liberated  by  them,  ibid. 
Dracontides,  attacks  Pericles,  ii.  9 ;(?)  proposes 

election  of  the  Thirty  at  Athens,  xii.  24. 
Drama,  development  of  the,  xiv.  2  ;  the,  its 
connection  with  democracy,  xiv.  5,  6. 

E 

Earthquakes  in  426,  vii.  1. 

Eclipse  of  the  moon,  the  Athenians  deterred 

by,  from  leaving  Syracuse  (413),  x.  28. 
Eetionea,  fortification  of,  xi.  21 ;  destruction 

of  the  fortification  (411),  xi.  22. 
Eion,  saved  from  Brasidas  by  Thucydides 

(424),  viii.  5. 


INDEX. 


549 


Eleans,  the,  refuse  to  accept  the  terms  of  the 
peace  of  421,  viii.  16  ;  withdraw  from  the 
allied  army  (418),  ix.  10. 

Eleatics,  the,  xiv.  11. 

Eleusis,  i.  14;  the  Greeks  invited  to  bring 
offerings  to,  ibid. ;  seized  by  the  Thirty 
(403),  xii.  26;  established  as  independent 
(403-401),  ibid. 

Elis,  joins  the  alliance  with  Argos,  ix.  3  ; 
quarrels  with  Sparta,  ibid.  ;  and  Athens 
in  alliance  (420),  ix.  6  ;  and  Lepreum,  ix.  7  ; 
sends  troops  to  Mantinea  which  arrive  too 
late  and  take  part  in  the  siege  of  Epidaurus 
(418),  ix.  13. 

Ellomenus  in  Leucadia,  vii.  3. 

Elpinice,  and  Pericles,  i.  17. 

Empedocles,  xiv.  12. 

Empire,  the  Athenian,  i.  6 ;  it  ensured  the 
safety  of  the  Aegean,  i.  7;  and  diffused 
civilisation,  ibid. ;  a  tyranny  which  failed 
to  satisfy  Greek  feeling,  i.  6-8 ;  the  rule  of 
the  superior,  i.  8  ;  supported  democracy, 
ibid.  ;  defence  of,  iii.  9  ;  its  extent,  a  source 
of  difficulty,  iv.  2  ;  managed  through  the 
Assembly,  ibid. ;  want  of  consistent  policy, 
ibid.  ;  a  tyranny,  vi.  8 ;  view  of,  ix.  15 ; 
defence  of,atCamarina,  x.  14.  See  Athenian. 

Endius,  eplior  at  Sparta  (413),  xi.  2  ;  and  Alei- 
biades,  xi.  3  ;  envoy  from  Sparta  to  Athens 
(410),  xii.  6. 

Ephors,  the  Spartan,  visit  Pylus  (425),  vii. 
10  ;  at  Athens  (404),  xii.  23. 

Ephorus,  his  account  of  the  origin  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  iii.  1. 

Epic  poetry  in  the  fifth  century,  xiv.  6. 

Epicharmus  of  Cos,  xiv.  5. 

Epidamnus,  applies  for  help  to  Corcyra,  iii. 
3;  asks  advice  at  Delphi,  ibid.  ;  applies  to 
Corinth,  ibid.  ;  a  colony  of  Corcyra,  ibid.  ; 
government  of,  ibid.  ;  factions  at,  ibid;  be- 
sieged by  the  Corcyraeans,  ibid. ;  capitulates, 
ibid. 

Epidaurus,  and  Argos,  quarrel  between  (419), 

ix.  8  ;  siege  of  (418),  ix.  13 ;  a  school  of 

medicine,  xiv.  16. 
Epidaurus  Limera,  ravaged  by  the  Athenians 

(414),  x.  21,  22. 
Epipolae,  seized  by  the  Athenians  (414),  x. 

15  ;  attack  of  the  Athenians  on  (413),  x.  27. 
Epitadas,  commander  -of  the  Spartans  in 

Sphacteria,  vii.  9,  and  vii.  12. 
e7n.Te1x10-ju.65.    See  Heraclea,  Decelea,  Pylus, 

Minoa. 

Erae,  revolts  from  Athens  (412),  xi.  5. 
Eretria,  battle  of  (411),  xi.  22. 


Erineum,  battle  off  (413),  x.  26. 
Erineus,  Nicias  reaches  the  river,  x.  34. 
Erj  thrae,  revolts  from  Athens  (412),  xi.  4. 
Eteonicus,  escapes  from  Mytilene  (406),  xii. 

14  ;  suppresses  a  conspiracy  at  Chios  (406), 

xii.  16. 

Etruria,  the  Athenians  send  envoys  to  (415- 

414),  x.  14:   three  ships  from,  come  to 

Syracuse  (414),  x.  17. 
Euboea,  sends  to  Agis  wishing  to  revolt  (4 13), 

xi.  2  ;  revolts  from  the  Athenians  (411),  xi. 

22. 

Eucles,  an  Athenian  general  at  Amphipolis 

(424)  ,  viii.  5. 

Euphemus,  his  speech  at  Camarina  (415),  x.  14. 
Eupolis,  the  comedian,  his  remark  on  Pericles, 

ii.  2  ;  xiv.  5. 
Euripides,  popularity  of,  in  Sicily,  x.  35,  xiv. 

4  ;  condemns  slavery,  xiv.  13. 
Euryelus,  on  Epipolae,  x.  15. 
Eurylochus,  a  Spartan  general  (426),  vii.  3; 

in  Acarnania  and  Amphilochian  Argos, 

vii.  4. 

Euryinedon,  an  Athenian  general  at  Corcyra 

(425)  ,  vi.  16 ;  at  Pylus,  vii.  8 ;  in  Sicily,  vii. 
15,  viii.  3 ;  fined,  ibid.  ;  appointed  to  com- 
mand in  Sicily,  x.  21 ;  sent  to  Sicily  (414), 
ibid. 

Eurytanes,  the,  an  Aetolian  tribe,  vii.  3. 
Euthydemus,  chosen  to  support  Nicias,  x.  21. 
Evarchus,  tyrant  of  Astacus,  v.  5. 

F 

"  Festival-money,"  the,  ii.  2. 

Finance,  at  Athens,  iv.  6,  vi.  5,  see  App.  1 ; 

drain  of  the  Athenian  finances  (414-413),  x. 

22,  23  ;  measures  for  economy  at  Athens 

after  the  Sicilian  expedition,  xi.  1. 
Fire-signals,  at  Salamis,  v.  19;  at  Plataea, 

vi.  5. 

Five  Thousand*  the,  establishment  of  (411), 
xi.  23. 

Fleet,  Athenian,  at  Samos,  amounts  to  more 
than  two  hundred  ships,  i.  16 ;  of  Athens, 
iv.  4  ;  of  Sparta,  ibid.  ;  of  Sparta,  acquired 
by  the  Athenians,  vii.  10. 

Four  Hundred,  the,  establishment  of  (411), 
xi.  16  ;  nature  of  their  rule,  ibid. ;  intrigues 
with  Agis,  xi.  16;  send  commissioners  to 
Samos,  xi.  20  ;  divisions  among  them,  xi. 
21  ;  send  embassy  to  Sparta,  ibid.  ;  are 
deposed,  xi.  23. 

Funeral  speech  of  Pericles,  v.  7. 


\ 


550 


INDEX. 


G 

Galepsus,  captured  by  Cleon  (422),  viii.  14. 
Gela,  and  Camarina  (424),  viii.  3 ;  the  congress 

of,  ibid. ;  sends  aid  to  Syracuse  (413),  x.  24 ; 

abandoned  to  the  Carthaginians,  xiii.  8; 

besieged  by  Himilco  (405),  ibid. 
General,  relation  of,  to  the  Assembly,  iv.  2. 
Generals,  afraid  of  sacrificing  the  lives  of  the 

citizens,  iv.  2 ;  at  Syracuse  the  number 

reduced  to  three,  x.  13. 
Geography,  scientific  and  descriptive,  xiv. 

16. 

Glanis,  "  the  elder  brother  of  Bacis,"  ii.  4. 

Glaucon,  sent  to  Corcyra,  iii.  5. 

Gongylus,  a  Corinthian  commander,  brings  the 

news  of  the  coming  of  Gylippus  to  Syracuse, 

x.  18. 

Gorgias,  comes  to  Athens  as  an  envoy,  vi.  17. 
Grapnels  in  the  Athenian  ships  at  Syracuse, 
x.  30. 

Great  King,  envoys  to,  from  Lacedaemon,  vii. 
14 ;  from  Athens,  ibid. ;  from  Persia  to 
Sparta,  ibid.   See  Persia. 

Greece,  divided  by  the  peace  of  445,  i.  3 ;  in 
421-415,  ix.  14 ;  feeling  in,  after  the  Sicilian 
expedition,  xi.  2. 

Greek  character,  varieties  of,  xiv.  23. 

Grundy,  G.  B.,  his  view  of  the  geography  of 
Pylus,  vii.  10,  note. 

Gylippus,  appointed  to  take  the  command  in 
Sicily  (415),  x.  13;  at  Leucas,  x.  17;  his 
voyage  to  the  west,  ibid. ;  collects  forces 
at  Himera,  and  marches  on  Syracuse  (414), 
ibid. ;  ascends  Epipolae,  his  ultimatum  to 
the  Athenians,  x.  18 ;  captures  Labdalum, 
ibid. ;  sets  out  to  collect  reinforcements, 
x.  20;  captures  Plemmyriuin,  x.  24;  brings 
reinforcements  to  Syracuse  (413),  ibid. ; 
brings  reinforcements  to  Syracuse,  x.  28; 
his  address  to  his  men  before  the  final  battle 
in  the  Harbour,  x.  30. 

H 

Hageladas  of  Argos,  xiv.  18. 

Hagnon,  general  at  Samos,  i.  16;  founds 
Amphipolis,  i.  20;  his  proposal  about 
Pericles,  ii.  9 ;  and  Sitalces,  v.  20. 

Halieis,  Athenian  attack  on  (430),  v.  8. 

Hannibal,  grandson  of  Hamilcar,  appointed 
Carthaginian  general,  xiii.  2  ;  sends  envoys 
co  Syracuse,  ibid.  J  lands  in  Sicily  (409),  xiii. 


3;  destroys  Selinus,  ibid.  ;  destroys  Himera, 
xiii.  4  ;  returns  to  Carthage,  ibid. ;  invades 
Sicily  for  the  second  time  (406),  xiii.  6 ;  be- 
sieges Agrigentum,  ibid. ;  dies  of  the 
plague,  ibid. 
"Harmost,"  the  title  first  mentioned  in  413, 
xi.  2. 

Hecataeus  of  Miletus,  xiv.  7. 
Hellanicus,  xiv.  9. 

Hellas,  feeling  in  favour  of  Sparta  in  the  war, 
v.  3 ;  opinion  that  it  would  be  ended  in  two 
or  three  years,  ibid. 

Hellenism,  destroyed  by  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  v.  21. 

Hellespont,  the,  Clearchus  appointed  com- 
mander to,  xi.  3  ;  recovered  by  the  Athen- 
ians (408),  xii.  10. 

Helots,  Lacedaemonian  dread  of,  vii.  13  ;  the 
Spartan  fear  of,  viii.  2  ;  iniquitous  massacre 
of  the,  ibid. 

Heraclea,  founded  by  Sparta  (426),  vii.  1; 
seized  by  the  Boeotians  (420),  ix.  7. 

Heraclitus  of  Ephesus,  xiv.  11. 

Hermae,  the  mutilation  of  the,  at  Athens 
(415),  x.  7 ;  possible  explanations  of,  ibid. 

Hermaeondas  of  Thebes,  at  Mytilene,  vi.  2. 

Hermione,  Athenian  attack  on  (430),  v.  8. 

Hermippus,  attacks  Aspasia,  ii.  8. 

Hermocrates  of  Syracuse,  his  speech  at  Gela 
(424),  viii.  3;  has  information  of  the  coining 
of  the  Athenian  fleet,  x.  9 ;  he  proposes  to 
go  to  meet  them,  ibid. ;  chosen  general  at 
Syracuse,  x.  13  ;  deposed  by  the  Syracusans 
(414),  x.  17 ;  deceives  Nicias,  and  secures 
the  roads  and  passes  near  Syracuse  (413), 
x.  32;  and  Tissaphernes,  xi.  8;  arrives 
at  Miletus  from  Sicily,  ibid.  ;  goes  as  envoy 
to  Sparta  (411),  xii.  3;  banished  by  the 
Syracusans  (410),  xii.  7 ;  repairs  to  Pharna- 
bazus,  ibid. ;  returns  to  Sicily  (408),  xiii. 
5  ;  at  Himera  (407),  ibid.  ;  attempts  to  return 
to  Syracuse  and  is  slain,  ibid. 

Herodotus,  xiv.  8. 

Hesiod,  his  death,  vii.  3. 

Himera,  Athenians  not  received  at  (415),  x. 
12 ;  Gylippus  at  (414),  x.  17 ;  Hannibal  at, 
xiii.  4 ;  destruction  of,  ibid. 

Himilco,  general  with  Hannibal  (406),  xiii. 
6 ;  at  Agrigentum,  ibid. ;  attacks  Gela  (405), 

xiii.  8. 

Hippias,  (1)  of  Notium,  vi.  7;  (2)  the  sophist, 

xiv.  14. 

Hippocrates,  an  Athenian  general  in  the 
Megarid  (421),  viii.  2;  in  Boeotia,  viii.  4; 
defeated  at  Delium,  ibid. 


INDEX. 


551 


Hippocrates,  the  physician,  xiv.  16. 
Hippodamus,  architect  of  Thurii,  i.  10 ;  and 

of  the  Peiraeus,  ibid.,  xiv.  14. 
Hipponicus,  his  wife  married  to  Pericles, 

ii.  3. 

Hybla  Galeatis,  attacked  unsuccessfully  by 

the  Athenians  (415),  x.  12. 
Hyccara,  captured  by  the  Athenians  (415), 

x.  12  ;  sale  of  the  slaves  taken  at,  ibid. 
Hyperbolus,  ostracised,  ix.  13;  assassinated 

at  Samos  (411),  xi.  17. 


I 

Ialysus,  refuses  tribute  in  440  (?),  i.  17. 
Iasus,  captured  by  the  Peloponnesians  (412), 
xi.  8. 

Iberians,  in  Hannibal's  army,  xiii.  4. 
Ictinus,  xiv.  19. 
Idomene,  battle  of  (426),  vii.  5. 
Ulyrians,  their  attack  on  Brasidas  (423),  viii. 
10. 

Imbrian,    the,    "cleruchs"    serve   in  the 

Athenian  army,  vii.  11. 
Impiety,  charges  of,  against  Phidias,  Anax- 

agoras,  and  Aspasia,  ii.  8. 
Independence,  Greek  desire  of,  vi.  11. 
"Ionia  unfortified,"  i.  17. 
Ionian,  district,  i.  2;  philosophy,  ii.  5. 
Ionians,  and  Dorians,  iv.  1 ;  Athenians  and 

Asiatic  Ionians,  ibid. 
Italy,  attitude  of  the  cities  in,  to  the  Sicilian 

expedition  (415),  x.  8. 

K 

Kings,  Spartan,  did  not  command  the  fleet, 
iv.  3 ;  both  the,  leave  Sparta  at  the  same 
time,  ix.  10,  11. 

Knights,  the  Athenian,  unwilling  to  serve 
under  Cleon  in  Chalcidice  (422),  viii.  15. 


L 

Labdalum,  a  fort  built  by  the  Athenians  on 
Epipolae  (414),  x.  15 ;  captured  byGylippus, 
x  18. 

Lacedaemonians,  arrange  to  send  forty  ships 
to  Lesbos,  vi.  4;  determine  to  increase  their 
navy  (427),  vi.  15  ;  colonise  Heraclea  (426), 
vii.  1 ;  treachery  of,  after  the  defeat  of 
Olpae,  vii.  4  ;  their  retreat,  ibid. ;  at  Pylus 


(425),  vii.  9;  refuse  to  aid  the  Aeginelans 
(424),  viii.  1  ;  send  forces  to  aid  the  Epi- 
daurians  (419),  ix.  8  ;  also  send  forces  by 
sea,  which  is  regarded  as  a  breach  of  the 
treaty,  ibid.  ;  the  Athenian  view  of  their 
policy,  ix.  15  ;  resolve  to  build  a  fleet  (413), 
xi.  2.  See  Sparta  and  Spartans. 

Lacedaemonius,  son  of  Cimon,  sent  to  Corcyra 
with  ten  ships  (433),  iii.  5. 

Laches,  an  Athenian  general,  sent  to  Sicily 
(427),  vi.  17  ;  recalled  from  Sicily,  and  put 
on  his  trial,  vii.  6  ;  proposes  that  the  terms 
of  the  truce  be  accepted  in  423,  viii.  8 ; 
slain  at  Mantinea  (418),  ix.  11. 

Laconia,  the  Athenians  land  on,  contrary  to 
the  terms  of  the  peace  (414),  x.  21 ;  the 
Athenians  erect  a  fortress  in  (413),  x.  22. 

Lamachus,  appointed  one  of  the  generals  to 
Sicily  (415),  x.  3  ;  his  plan  of  campaign  in 
415,  x.  10  ;  slain  in  battle  at  Syracuse,  x. 
16. 

Lampon,  takes  part  in  the  founding  of  Thurii, 

i.  10;  his  report  on  Eleusis,  i.  14;  and 

Anaxagoras,  ii.  4. 
Lampsacus,  taken  by  Lysander  (405),  xii.  19. 
Lebedos,  revolts  from  Athens  (412),  xi.  5. 
Lecythus,  at   Torone,  viii.  7;    taken  by 

Brasidas, ibid. 
Lemnian,  the,  cleruchs  serve  in  the  Athenian 

army,  vii.  11. 
Leon,  an  Athenian  general  (412),  xi.  7. 
Leontini,  at  war  with  Syracuse  (427),  vi.  17 ; 

factions  at,  x.  1 ;  the  oligarchs  seek  the  aid 

of  Syracuse,  ibid.;  the  city  broken  up,  ibid. ; 

two  fortresses  occupied  on  the  territory 

of,  ibid.  ;  recognised  as  independent  at  the 

peace  in  405,  xiii.  8. 
Lepreum,    Neodamodes   settled  at,  ix.  4 ; 

quarrel  between  Elis  and  Sparta  about, 

ix.  7. 

Lesbian,  the,  exiles  settle  at  Antandrus, 
viii.  3. 

Lesbos,  sends  ships  against  Samos,  i.  16  ;  and 
Chios  send  fifty  ships  to  the  Athenian  fleet 
(430),  v.  8 ;  revolt  of  (428),  vi.  1 ;  received 
into  the  Peloponnesian  alliance,  vi.  4; 
divided  into  lots  and  occupied  by  Athenian 
cleruchs,  vi.  10 ;  sends  to  Agis  wishing  to 
revolt  (413),  xi.  2;  the  Chians  attempt  to 
bring  the  island  over  to  Athens,  xi.  7 ; 
remains  Athenian,  ibid. ;  treatment  of,  by 
Lysander,  xii.  21. 

Leucadia,  Demosthenes  in  (426),  vii.  S. 

Leucas,  attack  on  (428),  vi.  5 

Leucippus,  xiv.  12. 


552 


INDEX. 


Liohas,  sent  as  commissioner  to  investigate 
conduct  of  Astyochus  (412),  xi.  10  ;  quarrels 
with  Tissaphernes,  ibid. 

Light-armed  troops,  their  value  recognised  in 
the  course  of  the  war,  iv.  5 ;  at  Spartolus, 

v.  14;  their  mode  of  fighting,  vii.  3;  em- 
ployed on  Sphacteria,  vii.  12. 

Lindus,  refuses  tribute  in  440  (?),  i.  17. 
Liparaean  islands,  Athenian  attack  on  (427), 

vi.  17. 

Locri,  opposed  to  the  Athenians  in  415,  x.  8  ; 

Gylippus  at,  x.  17. 
Locrians,  the,  at  Messene,  x.  1  ;  revolt  among 

the  colonies  of  Locri,  ibid. 
Logographers,  the,  xiv.  7. 
Long  Walls  at  Athens,  destroyed  by  Lysander 

(404)  ,  xii.  22. 

Lucanians,  the,  destroy  the  Sybarites,  i.  12. 
Lyncestis,  invaded  by  Perdiccas  and  Brasidas 

(423),  viii.  9,  10. 
Lyric  poetry,  did  not  flourish  at  Athens, 

xiv.  1. 

Lysander,  appointed  admiral  by  Sparta  (408), 
xii.  11  ;  his  relations  with  Cyrus,  ibid.  ; 
succeeded  as  admiral  by  Callicratidas  (406), 
xii.  13  ;  sent  out  as  lieutenant  of  the  fleet 

(405)  ,  xii.  17  ;  at  Ephesus,  ibid.  ;  made  vice- 
regent  by  Cyrus  (405),  xii.  18  ;  his  attitude 
to  democracy  aud  Athenian  empire,  ibid. ; 
destroys  democrats  at  Miletus,  ibid.  ;  sails 
to  Aegina  and  Attica,  ibid.  ;  returns  to 
Abydus,  ibid.  ;  takes  Lampsacus  (405),  xii. 
19  ;  captures  Atheiran  fleet  at  Aegospotami, 
ibid.;  massacres  all  Athenian  prisoners  after 
Aegospotami,  xii.  20;  takes  cities  in  the  Bos- 
phorus  and  Hellespont,  xii.  21 ;  at  Lesbos 
ibid.  ;  advances  upon  Athens  and  blockades 
the  Peiraeus,  ibid.  ;  destroys  the  Long  Walls 
(404),  xii.  22  ;  sails  to  Samos  and  restores 
the  oligarchy,  xii.  23  ;  returns  to  Laconia, 
ibid.  ;  assists  in  the  establishment  of  the 
Thirty  (403),  xii.  24  ;  goes  to  Athens  as  har- 
most,  xii.  26;  decline  of  his  influence  at 
Sparta,  ibid. 

Lysicles,  sent  to  collect  money  in  Caria  (428), 
Vi.  5 ;  his  death,  ibid. 


M 


Macedonia,  history  of,  after  the  Persian 
wars,  i.  18  ;  partition  of  the  kingdom,  i.  19  ; 
invaded  by  Sitalces  (429),  v.  20 

Magna  Graecia,  Themistouleo'  views  on,  i.  9. 

Malea,  a  promontory  on  Lesbos,  vi.  2. 


Mantinea,  at  war  with  Tegea  (423),  viii,  12  ; 
alliance  with  Athens  (420),  ix.  6 ;  battle  of 
(418),  ix.  10,  11 ;  rejoins  the  Spartan  con- 
federacy, and  concludes  a  peace  for  thirty 
years,  abandoning  her  claim  to  supremacy 
in  Arcadia,  ix.  12. 

Mautineans,  the,  at  Olpae,  vii.  4 ;  join  Argos 
in  421,  ix.  3  ;  their  aggression  in  Arcadia 
checked  by  the  Spartans  (421).  ix.  4. 

Massacres  at  Corcyra  (427),  vi.  14,  15. 

Mathematics,  xiv.  16. 

Medicine,  xiv.  16. 

Megara,  invaded  by  the  Athenians  (431),  v.  6  J 
Megarian  oligarchs  at  Pegae,  viii.  2 ; 
popular  party  negotiates  with  Athens  (424), 

ibid. 

Megarian,  exiles  allowed  to  live  at  Plataea, 

vi.  12 ;  decree,  the,  a  cause  of  the  war,  iii. 
1 ;  to  what  was  it  due  ?  ibid. 

Megarians,  their  complaints  at  Sparta  of  the 
conduct  of  Athens,  iii.  8 ;  their  exclusion 
from  the  trade  of  Athens,  iii.  12;  have 
forty  ships  at  Nisaea,  v.  19 ;  refuse  to 
accept  the  peace  of  421,  viii.  16. 

Megarid,  the,  invaded  by  the  Athenians, 
iii.  1. 

Melancridas,  a  Spartan  admiral  (413),  xi.  2. 
Meleas  of  Lacedaemon,  at  Mytilene,  vi.  2. 
Melesander,  sent  to  collect  tribute  in  Lycia 

(430),  v.  11 ;  his  death,  ibid. 
Melissus,  commander  of  the  Samians,  i.  17. 
Melos,  attacked  by   the   Athenians  (426), 

vii.  2;  assessed  by  Athens  in  425,  ix.  15; 
conference  between  the  Melians  and  the 
Athenians,  ibid.  ;  attack  of  the  Athenians 
on  (416),  ibid.  ;  massacre  of  the  inhabitants, 
ibid. 

Menander,  chosen  to  support  Nicias,  x.  21. 

Mende,  revolts  to  Brasidas  (423),  viii.  9; 
recovered  by  the  Athenians,  viii.  11. 

Menedaeus,  a  Spartan  general,  vii.  4. 

Menelaus,  son  of  Alexander,  i.  19. 

Mercenaries,  from  Peloponnesus,  viii.  3,  4; 
Thracian,  at  Athens,  x.  23. 

Messapians,  and  Athenians,  i.  12  ;  friendly  to 
the  Athenians,  x.  26. 

Messene,  taken  by  the  Athenians,  vii.  6; 
lost  to  Athens  (425),  vii.  15;  factions  at, 
x.  1  ;  Alcibiades  visits  (415),  x.  10  ;  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  win,  by  the  Athenians, 
x.  14. 

Messenian  troops,  the,  at  Sphacteria,  vii. 

12  ;  established  at  Pylus  (425),  vii.  13. 
Messenians  of  Naupaci us,  propose  an  invasion 

of  Aetolia  (426),  vii.  3. 


INDEX. 


553 


Methana,  Nicias  at  (425),  vii.  14. 

Methone,  attack  on,  by  Athenian  fleet  (431), 
v.  5  ;  repulsed  by  Brasidas,  ibid. 

Methymna,  remains  loyal  to  Athens,  at  the 
revolt  of  Lesbos  (428),  vi.  1 ;  attacked  by 
Mytilene,  vi.  4;  taken  by  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  (406),  xii.  13. 

Meton,  the  Athenian  mathematician,  xiv.  16 ; 
his  cycle,  ibid. 

Miletus,  quarrels  with  Samos  (440),  i.  15  ; 
applies  to  Athens,  ibid.  ;  revolts  from 
Athens,  xi.  4;  battle  o*(412),  xi.  8  ;  oligarchy 
at  (411),  xi.  15  ;  joins  the  Lacedaemonians, 
ibid. ;  the  Milesian  school  of  philosophers, 
xiv.  11.' 

Mindarus,  succeeds  Astyochus  as  Spartan 
admiral  (411),  xii.  3  ;  takes  the  fleet  to  the 
Hellespont,  ibid. 

Minoa,  occupied  by  Nicias  (427),  vi.  17. 

Mnesicles,  xiv.  19. 

Mycalessiis,  attack  on,  by  Thracians,  x.  23. 
Myron,  xiv.  18. 

Mysteries,  popularity  of,  i.  14;  profanation 
of,  by  Alcibiadesand  others,  x.  7  ;  informa- 
tion about  the  profanation  of,  x.  11. 

Mysticism  at  Athens,  xiv.  21. 

Mytilenaeans,  revolt  from  Athens  and 
organise  Lesbos,  vi.  1;  defeated  by  the 
Athenians,  and  conclude  an  armistice  to 
send  envoys  to  Athens,  vi.  2 ;  also  send  to 
Lacedaemon,  ibid. ;  at  Olympia,  vi.  3 ;  re- 
ceived into  the  Peloponnesian  alliance,vi.  4; 
attack  Methymna,  ibid. ;  Paches  sent  to 
Mytilene,  ibid.  ;  discussion  of  their  fate  at 
Athens,  vi.  8  ;  the  Athenians  cancel  their 
severe  decree,  vi.  10;  massacre  of  ibid. 


N 

Naupactus,  Phormio  sent  to  (429),  v.  11; 

Phormio  defeats  the  Peloponnesians  off, 

v.  18 ;  the  A.etolians  wish  to  attack  (426), 

vii.    3 ;    saved  by   Demosthenes,  ibid.  ; 

twenty  ships  sent  to  (414),  x.  21. 
Naxos  (in  Sicily),  attack  on  (425),  vii.  15  ;  the 

Athenian  fleet  sails  to  (415),  x.  10;  the 

Athenians  encamp  at,  x.  14. 
Neapolis  and  Athens,  i.  12. 
Neodamodes,  the,  settled  at  Lepreum  (421), 

ix.  4  ;  at  the  battle  of  Mantinea  (418),  ix.  10. 
Nesiotes,  an  Athenian  sculptor,  xiv.  18. 
Nicias,  opposed  to  war,  ii.  9;   of  Gortys, 

v.  17,  note;  occupies  Menoa  (427),  vi.  17; 

at  Melos,  vii.  2  ;  at  Tanagra  (42b),  ibid. 


and  Cleon.  in  425,  vii.  11;  criticism  of  his 
conduct  in  the  matter  of  Pylus,  vii.  13  ;  at 
Solygea  (425),  vii.  14 ;  at  Methana,  ibid.  ; 
captures  Cythera  (424),  viii.  1 ;  at  Mende 
and  Scione,  viii.  11;  eager  for  peace  in 
422,  viii.  16  ;  his  caution,  and  desire  to  be 
a  safe  general,  ibid.  ;  outwitted  by  Alci- 
biades,  ix.  6;   after   Mantinea,  ix.  13; 
blockades  the  ports  of  Perdiccas  (416), 
ix.  14;  appointed  one  of  the  generals  to 
Sicily  (415),  x.  3  ;  his  speech  about  the  ex- 
pedition to  Sicily,  x.  4 ;  his  plan  of  cam- 
paign in  415,  x.  10  ;  divides  the  forces  with 
Lamachus,  after  the  departure  of  Alci- 
biades,  x.  12  ;  his  excessive  caution,  ibid. ; 
breaks  up  from  Catana,  and  wins  Epipolae 
(414),  x.  15 ;  his  dangerous  position  in  the 
"circle,"  x.  16;  vainly  attempts  to  inter- 
cept Gylippus,  x.  17  ;  his  want  of  energy 
in  the  conduct  of  the  siege,  x.  18,  note ; 
begins  to  make  use  of  the  Athenian  fleet 
(414),  x.  19 ;  seizes  Plemmyrinm,  ibid. ; 
endeavours  to   intercept  the  Corinthian 
contingent,    ibid.  ;    sends    a    letter  to 
Athens  (414),  x.  20  ;  refuses  to  return  to 
Athens  after  the  failure  of  the  attack  on 
Epipolae,  x.  28  ;  or  to  go  to  Thapsus,  ibid. ; 
deterred  by  an  eclipse  from  leaving  Syra- 
cuse (413),  ibid.  ;  his  address  to  his  m«n 
before  the  final  battle  in  the  Harbour, 
x.   3') ;   deceived   by    Hermocrates  into 
wasting  time  at  Syracuse  (413),  x.  32;  his 
heroism  in  encouraging  the  Athenians  in 
their  retreat,  x.  33  ;  reaches  the  Cacyparis, 
ibid.  ;  the  Erineus,  x.  34 ;  the  Assinarus, 
ibid. ;  surrenders,  ibid. ;  put  to  Jdeath  at 
Syracuse,  x.  35. 
Nicostratus,  an  Athenian   commander,  at 
Naupactus,  vi.  13  ;  at  Corcyra,  vi.  14 ;  at 
Mende  and  Scione,  viii.  11  *,  slain  at  Man- 
tinea, ix.  11. 
Nine  Ways,  the,  i.  20,  note. 
~is  isaea,  capture  of,  by  the  Athenians  (424), 
viii.  2 ;  retained  by  the  Athenians  in  421, 
vii.  17 ;  recovered  bythe  Megarians (410-409), 
xii.  8. 

Nomothetae,  appointed  to  revise  the  laws, 
after  deposition  of  the  Four  Hundred  (411) 

'  at  Athens,  xi.  23,  xii.  1. 

Notfum,  factions  at,  vi.  7;  Paches  visits, 
ibid. ;  defeat  of  Athenian  fleet  at  (407), 
xii.  12. 

Nymphodorus  of  Abdera,  brother-in-law  of 
Sitalces,  i.  21;  invited  to  Athens  (431), 
v.  6. 


554 


INDEX. 


o 

Octamasades,  son  of  Ariapithes,  i.  21. 

Odeum,  the,  at  Athens,  xiv.  19. 

Odrysian   empire,    growth    of   the,  i.   19 ; 

under  Sitalces,    i.  21;    its    extent  and 

revenues,  ibid. 
Oeniadae,  saved  by  floods  from  attack,  v. 

19  ;  Asopius  attacks,  vi.  5. 
Oeneon,  Demosthenes  at,  vii.  3. 
Oenoe,  Archidamus  repulsed  at  (431),  v.  4; 

captured  by  the  Boeotians  (411),  xi.  23. 
Oetaeans,  ravage  the  Trachinian  territory, 

vii.  1. 

Oligarchies,  establishment  of,  by  Pisander, 
xi.  16. 

Oligarchs  at  Corcyra  (431-427),  vi.  13;  escape 
to  the  mainland,  vi.  15  ;  final  massacre  (425), 
vi.  16. 

Oligarchy,  at  Samos,  i.  15  ;  suppressed  by 
Athens,  ibid. ;  restored,  ibid.  ;  spread  of, 
after  the  battle  of  Mantinea,  ix.  12;  Nicias 
apprehends  dangers  from,  x.  4 ;  established 
by  Ly sander  (405),  xii.  18. 

Olpae,  seized  by  the  Ambraciots  (426),  vii.  4 ; 
battle  of,  ibid. 

Olympia,  funds  at,  iv.  6;  the  Mytilenaeans 
at  (428),  vi.  3. 

Olympian  festival  (420),  Spartans  excluded 
from,  ix.  7. 

Olympieum,  a  temple  near  the  shore  of  the 
Great  Harbour  of  Syracuse,  x.  12 ;  the 
Athenians  encamped  near,  but  leave  it  un- 

•   touched,  ibid. 

Olynthus,  becomes  a  common  centre  for  the 

Chalcidian  Greeks,  iii.  7. 
Onatas  of  Aegina,  xiv.  18. 
Ophioneis,  the,  an  Aetolian  tribe,  vii.  3. 
Oracles,   constant   appeal   to,  even  about 

trifles,  ii.  4. 
Orator    aud    general,   iv.   2;   orators  at 

Athens,  vi.  9. 
Oratory,  growth  of,  xiv.  10. 
Orchoinenus,  surrenders  to  Argos  (418),  ix. 

10. 

Ostracism  of  Hyperbolus  (417  ?),  ix.  13. 


P 

Paches,  sent  to  Mytilene  (428),  vi.  4;  at 
Mytilene,  vi.  6,  7 ;  his  treachery  at 
Notium,  vi.  7 ;  brought  to  trial,  slays  him- 
self in  the  court,  vi.  10. 


Pagondas,  a  Boeotian  general  (Boeotarch), 
viii.  4. 

Painting,  the  art  of,  xiv.  17. 
Panactum  destroyed,  ix.  4. 
Pangaeus,  Mount,  i.  20. 
Panhellenic  schemes  of  Pericles,  i.  13. 
Panoptae,  the,  a  play  of  Cratinus,  xiv.  5. 
Panyasis  of  Halicarnassus,  an  epic  poet, 
xiv.  6. 

Paralus,  son  of  Pericles,  ii.  3 ;  carried  off  by 

the  plague  (430),  v.  10. 
Paralus,  the,  escapes  from  Aegospotami  (405), 

xii.  19. 
Parmenides,  xiv.  11. 

Parrhasians,  the,  rescued  from  the  Man- 

tineans  by  PHsloanax,  ix.  4. 
Parrhasius,  xiv.  17. 
Parthenon,  the,  ii.  2,  xiv.  18,  19. 
Paities,  in  Athens  after  445,  ii.  1 ;  later,  ii.  9. 
Pasitelidas,  established  in  Torone  (423),  viii. 

11 ;  unable  to  maintain  Torone  for  Brasidas, 

viii.  13. 

Patrae,   Alcibiades  causes  the  building  of 

long  Avails  at  (419),  ix.  8. 
Pausanias,   king  of  Sparta,   marches  upon 

Athens  (405),  xii.  21 ;  leads  a  force  to 

Athens  (403),  xii.  26;  dealings  with  Ly- 

sander,  ibid. 
Payment  of  officers  at  Athens,  abolition  of 

(411),  xi.  16. 
Peace,  of  445,  i.  1 ;  envoys  sent  from  Athens 

to  Sparta  about,  but  without  result  (430),  v. 

9  ;  proposals  for,  by  the  Spartans  in  425, 

vii.  10  ;  feeling  at  Athens  in  favour  of  (424), 

viii.  8  ;  desire  for,  in  422,  viii.  16  ;  negotia- 
tions for  (422-421),  ibid. ;  the  majority  of  the 
Spartan  allies  accept  it,  ibid. ;  of  421,  terms 
of,  viii.  17  ;  of  421,  unsatisfactory  to  both 
sides,  and  could  not  be  lasting,  ibid.,  ix.  1 ; 
of  421,  infringement  of,  by  the  Lacedae- 
monians (419),  ix.  8  ;  the  terms  of,  infringed 
by  Athens  (414),  x.  21 ;  terms  of  surrender 
in  404,  xii.  22.   See  Cyzicus,  Arginusae. 

Pedaritus,  governor  of  Chios  (412),  xi.  9; 

quarrels  with  the  admiral  Astyochus,  ibid. ; 

killed  at  Chios  (411),  xi.  14. 
Pegae,  party  of  Megarian  oligarchs  at,  viii.  2. 
Peiraeum,  the  Peloponnesian  ships  driven  on 

shore  at  (412),  xi.  3 ;  the  Peloponnesian 

ships  break  out  from,  xi.  5. 
Peiraeus,  proposed  attack  on  the  (429),  v.  19 ; 

architecture  of,  xiv.  19. 
Peithias  of  Corcyra,  vi.  13. 
Pellene,  a  city  of  Achaea,  on  the  side  of 

Sparta,  iv.  4,  ix.  12. 


INDEX, 


555 


PelopoDnesian,  confederacy,  the  allies  invited 
to  Sparta,  iii.  8  ;  confederacy,  the  allies 
formally  summoned  to  discuss  the  question 
of  war,  iii.  11 ;  speech  of  the  Corinthians, 
ibid.  ;  confederacy,  in  favour  of  war,  ibid. ; 
slowness  and  inactivity  of,  ibid.  ;  war,  plans 
of  campaign,  iv.  7  ;  criticism  of  the  plan 
of  Pericles,  iv.  8 ;  war,  excitement  at  the 
outbreak  of,  v.  3  ;  signs  and  wonders,  ibid.; 
war,  the  first  year  (431),  v.  4-7  ;  second 
year  (430),  v.  8-12  ;  fleet,  sent  against 
Zacynthus  (430),  v.  11 ;  war,  third  year 
-(429),  v.  13  to  end ;  fleet,  in  429,  v.  16-18; 
war  (428),  vi.  1-5 ;  war  (427),  vi.  6-17  ;  war 
(426),  vii.  1-7 ;  war  (426-425),  vii.  8-15  ;  fleet, 
acquired  by  the  Athenians  (425),  vii.  10 ; 
fleet,  given  up  to  Athens,  ibid. ;  ships  return 
from  Sicily  (412),  xi.  3;  war  (413-412), 
xi.  1-10 ;  fleet  to  sail  to  Chios,  Lesbos,  and 
the  Hellespont,  xi.  3 ;  at  Peiraeum,  ibid. 
and  5  ;  in  Ionia,  xi.  3  f.,  see  Chalcideus ; 
first  treaty  with  Persia,  xi.  5  ;  fleet,  at 
Lesbos,  xi.  7,  see  Astyochus ;  at  Miletus, 
xi.  9 ;  becond  treaty  with  Persia,  ibid.  ; 
fleet,  at  Cuidus,  xi.  10;  at  Rhodes,  ibid. ; 
war  (411),  xi.  11-23,  xii.  4;  fleet  returns  to 
Miletus,  xi.  15 ;  third  treaty  with  Persia, 
ibid. ;  fleet  off  Euboea,  xi.  22  ;  mutiny  at 
Miletus,  xii.  3  ;  fleet  in  the  Hellespont,  | 
seeMindarus,  xii.  3  ;  defeated  at  Cynossema  * 
(411),  xii.  4 ;  and  at  Cyzicus  (410),  xii.  5 ; 
recover  Pylus,  xii.  8 ;  fleet,  victorious  at 
Notiura,  xii.  2,  see  Lysander,  defeated  at 
Arginusae  (406),  xii.  14  ;  victorious  at  Aegos- 
potami  (405),  xii.  18,  19  ;  war  (410),  xii.  5-8 ; 
(409),  xii.  9;  (408),  xii.  12;  (407),  ibid.; 
(406),  xii.  13-17  ;  (405),  xii.  17-21 ;  (404),  xii. 
21-25. 

Perdiccas,  son  of  Alexander,  i.  19  ;  becomes 
an  ally  of  Athens,  i.  21 ;  expels  his  brother 
Philip,  ibid. ;  supports  the  Potidaeans  in 
their  revolt,  iii.  7;  at  war  with  Athens, 
ibid.  ;  becomes  an  ally  of  the  Athenians 
(431),  v.  6 ;  sends  troops  to  aid  Cnemus  in 
Acarnania,  v.  15 ;  and  Sitalces  (429),  v.  20 ; 
applies  to  Sparta  for  help  (424),  viii.  2 ;  and 
Brasidas,  viii.  5  ;  visits  Brasidas  after  the 
capture  of  Amphipolis  (424).  viii.  7  ;  invades 
Lyncestis,  with  the  support  of  Brasidas 
(423),  viii.  9,  10 ;  his  retreat,  ibid. ;  comes  to 
terms  with  the  Athenians  (423),  viii.  11; 
prevents  reinforcements  from  reaching 
Brasidas,  ibid.  ;  friendly  with  Thessaly, 
ibid.;  declared  an  enemy  (416),  ix.  14. 

Pericles,  secures  empire  by  the  peace  of  445, 


i.  2  ;  supreme  at  Athens,  i.  5 ;  his  imperifl 
policy,  i.  6  ;  his  Panhellenic  schemes,  i. 
13,  14 ;  at  Samos,  i.  15,  16 ;  his  conduct  of 
the  war  at  Samos,  i.  17  ;  his  funeral  speech 
after  the  Samian  war,  ibid. ;  his  retort  to 
Elpinice,  ibid,  note  ;  his  use  of  the  money 
of  the  allies,  ii.  2  ;  introduces  payment  for 
service,  ibid.  ;  saves  largely  from  the 
revenues,  ibid. ;  his  aim  in  paying  the 
law-courts,  ibid. ;  result  of  the  payment, 
ibid.;  ruler  of  Athens,  ibid.;  elected  general 
year  after  year,  ibid. ;  change  of  the  people 
towards,  ii.  3  ;  his  wife  and  children,  ibid.; 
his  connection  with  Aspasia,  ibid. ;  and  the 
new  philosophy,  ii.  4;  and  the  sophists,  ii. 
7  ;  his  argument  with  Protagoras,  ibid.  ; 
becomes  unpopular,  ibid.  ;  his  attitude 
towards  the  demagogues,  ibid. ;  attacked 
through  his  friends,  ii.  8 ;  defends  Aspasia, 
ibid. :  charges  brought  against  him,  ii.  9 ; 
prepares  for  war,  ibid.  ;  his  pecuniary 
difficulties  a  cause  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  iii.  1 ;  could  only  govern  Athens 
through  the  Assembly,  iv.  2 ;  his  plan  of 
campaign  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  iv.  7  ; 
was  his  plan  the  best?  iv.  8;  rejects  over- 
tures from  the  Lacaedemonians  when  they 
are  in  the  field,  v.  3  ;  neglects  to  make  proper 
arrangements  for  the  countrymen  in  the 
city,  ibid. ;  prevents  the  people  from  meet- 
ing, v.  4 ;  maintains  his  policy,  v.  5 ;  takes 
measures  for  the  security  of  Attica,  ibid. ; 
bis  funeral  speech  (431),  v.  7 ;  the  Athenians 
exasperated  against  (430),  v.  9 ;  his  speech 
to  them,  ibid. ;  he  is  deposed,  and  fined, 
v.  10 ;  his  sons,  Xanthippus  and  Paralus, 
carried  off  by  the  plague,  ibid. ;  his  son  by 
Aspasia  made  legitimate  (430),  ibid.  ;  re- 
elected general  (429),  v.  14  ;  the  death  of 
(429),  v.  21  ;  effect  of  this  at  Athens,  ibid.  ; 
ideals  of,  ibid.  ;  he  left  no  successor, 
ibid. 

Pericles,  the  younger,  son  of  Pericles,  il.  3, 
note ;  made  an  Athenian  citizen  (430),  v.  10. 

Persians,  war  with,  discontinued,  i.  2;  treaty 
with  Sparta,  xi.  15 ;  second  treaty  with 
Peloponnesians  (412),  xi.  9 ;  estrangement 
from  Spartans,  xi.  10 ;  third  treaty  with  the 
Peloponnesians  (411),  xi.  15. 

Phaeax,  sent  to  Sicily  (422),  x.  2 ;  at  Locrl, 
Camarina,  Agrigentum,  and  Gela,  his 
mission  a  failure,  ibid. 

Phalaris,  the  bull  of,  sent  to  Carthage, 
xiii.  6. 

Pharnabazus,  sends  envoys  to  Sparta  (413), 


556 


INDEX. 


xi.  2  ;  induces  the  Peloponnesians  to  sail  to 
the  Hellespont  (411),  xii.  3 ;  supports  the 
Peloponnesians  after  Cyzicus,  xii.  6  ;  makes 
an  agreement  with  Athenians  at  Chalcedon,  I 
(409),  xii.  9. 

Pharnaces,  the  Persian  satrap  of  Phrygia, 
(422),  viii.  13. 

Phaselis  in  Lycia,  a  centre  of  trade,  v.  XI.  I 

Phea,  the  Athenian  fleet  at,  v.  5. 

Phidias,  attack  on,  he  is  thrown  into  prison, 
where  he  dies,  ii.  8 ;   his  peculations  a  ] 
cause  of  the  Pelopounesian  war,  iii.  1,  xiv. 
18. 

Phigalea,  the  plague  at,  v.  8  ;  the  temple  at, 
ibid. 

Philip,  son  of  Alexander,  i.  19  ;  expelled  by 
Perdiccas,  takes  refuge  with  Derdas,  i.  21  ; 
supported  by  Athens,  ibid.;  brother  of  Per- 
diccas, an  ally  of  the  Athenians,  iii.  7. 

Philistus,  the  historian  of  Syracuse,  x.  34,  35, 
notes  ;  supports  Dionysius,  xiii.  7. 

Philocles,  appointed  Athenian  general  (406), 
xii.  17;  his  dealings  with  captives  (405), 
xii.  20  ;  executed  by  Lysander,  ibid. 

Philosophers  and  sophists,  ii.  5. 

Philosophy,  physical,  disliked  at  Athens,  ii. 
4;  of  Ionia,  ii.  5;  development  of,  xiv. 
11  f. ;  and  religion,  xiv.  15. 

Phoenician  fleet,  expected  at  Samos,  i.  16. 

Phormio,  general  at  Samos,  i.  16;  at  Amph^- 
lochian  Argos,  i.  22  ;  helps  to  blockade 
Potidaea,  iii.  7  ;  sent  against  the  Chal- 
cidians,  v.  6 ;  sent  to  Naupactus  (430),  v. 
11 ;  reinforcements  sent  to,  but  ordered  to 
go  to  Crete,  v.  17  ;  his  victories  in  the 
Corinthian  gulf  (429),  v.  16-18  ;  at  Astacus, 
Stratus,  and  Coronta,  v.  19;  returns  to 
Athens  (428),  ibid.;  his  death  (?),  ibid. 

Phrynichus,  his  opposition  to  Alcibiudes,  and 
intrigues  with  Astyochus,  xi.  12,  13 ;  re- 
moved from  his  command  (411),  xi.  13 ; 
envoy  to  Sparta  (411),  xi.  21 ;  assassinated, 
ibid. 

 the  tragedian,  xiv.  2. 

Phyllis,  i.  20,  note. 
Pictures,  famous,  xiv.  17. 
Pindar,  xiv.  1. 

Piracy  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  (430), 
v.  11. 

Pisander,  a  member  of  the  commission  to 
investigate  impiety,  x.  7  ;  advocates  olig- 
archical revolution  in  Athens,  and  return 
of  Alcibiades  (411),  xi.  13;  iutrigues  with 
political  clubs,  xi.  14  ;  negotiations  with  i 
Tissaphernes  and  Alcibiaies  (411),  ibid.  ;  \ 


returns  from  Samos  to  Athens  (411),  xi.  16 ; 
proposes  the  government  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred, ibid. 

Pissuthnes,  satrap  of  Sardis,  aids  Samos  in 
revolt,  i.  16;  aids  the  Persian  party  in 
Notium  (427),  vi.  7 ;  his  rebellion  sup- 
pressed by  Tissaphernes,  xi.  2. 
Plague,  the,  at  Athens  (430),  v.  8 ;  reappears 
at  Athens  (427),  vi.  17  ;  in  the  Carthaginian 
camp  at  Agrigentum,  xiii.  6. 
Plataea,  and  Thebes,  v.  1 ;  seized  by  a  party 
of  Thebans  (431),  v.  2  ;  the  attack  repulsed, 
ibid.  ;  the  Theban  prisoners  put  to  death, 
ibid.  ;   perfidy  of  the    Plataeans,  ibid.  ; 
the  Peloponnesians  at  (429),  v.  13  ;  the 
territory  inviolable  (?),  ibid.  ;   wall  built 
round  at,  ibid.  ;  escape  of  part  of  the  gar- 
rison (428),  vi.  5  ;.  surrender  of  (427),  vi.  11 ; 
trial  of  the  Plataeans  by  the  Spartans,  ibid.  ; 
position  of,  to  Thebes  and  Sparta,  ibid. ; 
their  appeal  to  Sparta,  ibid. ;  retained  by 
Thebes  in  421,  viii.  17. 
Plataeans,  massacre  of  the,  vi.  12 ;  the  sur- 
vivors live  at  Athens  and  Scione,  ibid. 
Plays,  how  represented  at  Athens,  xiv.  6. 
Plemmyrium,  captured  by  Nicias  (414),  x. 

19  ;  captured  by  Gylippus  (413),  x.  24. 
Plistoanax,  his  return  from  exile,  vii.  1  ;  king 
of  Sparta,  in  favour  of  peace  (422),  viii.  16  ; 
in  Arcadia,  rescues  the  Parrhasians,  anil 
puts  an  end  to  the  aggression  of  the  Man- 
tineans  (421),  ix.  4  ;  marches  out  to  Tegea, 
at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Mantinea  (418), 
ix  11. 

Polemarchs,  insubordination  of,  at  the  battle 

of  Mantinea,  ix.  11. 
Political,  parties  at  Athens  after  the  war,  xii. 
23  ;  parties  at  Athens,  their  reconciliation 
I     after  the  Thirty,  xii.  26  ;  science,  in  Greece, 
xiv.  14. 
Polyclitus,  xiv.  18. 

Polydamidas,  a  Lacedaemonian,  commander 

of  the  garrison  at  Mende,  viii.  11. 
Polygnotus  of  Thasos,  xiv.  17. 
Portents,  how  interpreted  (the  one-horned 
ram),  ii.  4. 

Potidaea,  the  revolt  of,  a  cause  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war,  iii.  7  ;  a  Corinthian  colony, 
and  governed  by  officers  from  Corinth,  but 
a  subject  ally  of  Athens,  ibid.  ;  applies 
to  Lacedaemon  for  help,  ibid.;  Aristeus  at, 
ibid. ;  battle  of,  ibid. ;  blockaded,  ibid.  ; 
siege  of  (431),  v.  6  ;  surrender  of  (430),  v.  12  ; 
j  Brasidas  makes  an  unsuccessful  attack  on 
I     (423),  viii.  12. 


INDEX. 


557 


Prasiae,  Athenian  attack  on  (430),  v.  8 ; 
ravaged  by  the  Athenians  (414),  x.  21. 

Priene,  cause  of  a  quarrel  between  Samos  and 
Miletus,  i.  15. 

Probuli,  a  board  of  ten,  established  at  Athens 
(413),  xi.  1. 

Professions,  absence  of,  in  Greece,  xiv.  23. 

Property -tax,  iv.  6;  at  Athens  imposed  for 
the  first  time  in  428,  vi.  5. 

Propylaea,  the,  ii.  2. 

Prose  writing  in  Greece,  xiv.  7. 

Protagoras,  at  Athens,  ii.  6;  his  argument 
with  Pericles,  ii.  7 ;  banished  from  Athens, 
ii.  8,  xiv.  13. 

Protagoras  of  Plato,  scene  from,  ii.  6. 

Ptychia,  an  island  near  Corcyra,  vi.  16. 

Pydna,  acquired  by  Macedon,  i.  18. 

Pylus,  seized  and  fortified  by  the  Athenian 
fleet  (425),  vii.  8 ;  the  Lacedaemonians  are 
unable  to  dislodge  the  Athenians,  vii.  9; 
the  Athenians  at,  ibid. ;  the  Spartan  ephors 
visit,  vii.  10  ;  armistice  agreed  upon,  ibid. ; 
long  delay  in  the  operations*  vii.  11 ;  criti- 
cism of  the  account  of,  vii.  13;  Athens 
refuses  to  give  up,  in  421,  ix.  1 ;  the  Athen- 
ians agree  to  withdraw  the  Messenians  and 
Helots  from  (421),  ix.  4;  recovered  by 
Lacedaemonians  (410-409),  xii.  8. 

Pyrrha,  in  Lesbos,  acquired  by  Athens,  vi.  8. 

Pythagoreans,  the,  xiv.  12. 

Pythen,  the  Corinthian  commander,  sails  with 
Gylippus,  x.  17  ;  at  Syracuse  (413),  x.  31. 

Pythodorus,  sent  to  Sicily  (426),  vii.  6 :  in 
Sicily,  ibid.,  viii.  3  ;  is  exiled  on  his  return 
to  Athens,  viii.  3 ;  lands  in  Laconia  (414), 
x.  21. 

R 

Religion,  at  Athens,  ii.  4 ;  and  philosophy, 
xiv.  15;  ethical  progress  in,  xiv.  21 ;  mono- 
theism, Hid.  ;  mysticism,  ibid.  ;  foreign 
rites,  ibid. 

Reserve  fund  of  a  thousand  talents  at  Athens 
(431),  v.  5 ;  used  after  the  revolt  of  Chios 
(412),  xi.  4. 

Responsibility  at  Athens,  iv.  2,  vi.  9. 

Revenues  of  Athens,  large  savings  from,  ii.  2 ; 
after  the  peace  of  Nicias,  x.  3. 

Rhegium,  gives  little  support  to  the  Athen- 
ians in  415,  x.  8;  the  Athenian  generals 
discuss  their  plans  of  campaign  at,  x.  10 ; 
the  Athenian  fleet  at,  ibid.  ;  the  ships  sent 
to  make  inquiries  at  Segesta,  return  to, 
ibid. 


Rhetoric  in  Sicily,  ii.  5. 

Rhodes,  joins  the  Peloponnesian  alliance  (412), 
xi.  10;  harbours  Peloponnesian  fleet  (411), 
ibid. 

Rhoeteum,  viii.  3. 

s 

Sabazius,  a  Phrygian  deity,  xiv.  21. 
Sacrilege  at  Athens,  commission  to  investi- 
gate, x.  7. 

Sadocus,  son  of  Sitalces,  becomes  an  Athen- 
ian citizen  (431),  v.  6. 

Salaethus,  a  Lacedaemonian  envoy  at  Myti- 
lene,  vi.  5;  gives  arms  to  the  populace  of 
Mytilene,  vi.  6;  put  to  death,  vi.  8. 

Salaminia,  the,  sent  to  Sicily  to  bring  home 
Alcibiades,  x.  11. 

Salamis  overrun  by  the  Peloponnesians,  v. 
19. 

Samos,  internal  factions  at,  i.  15;  quarrel 
with  Miletus  (440),  ibid. ;  Pericles  at,  ibid.  ; 
democracy  established,  ibid.  ;  reaction  and 
revolt,  ibid.  ;  the  Samians  defeated  by 
Pericles,  i.  16 ;  capitulates,  ibid. ;  terms  of 
capitulation,  ibid. ;  was  a  democracy  estab- 
lished? ibid.  ;  cost  of  the  siege,  ibid.  ; 
importance  of  the  island  to  Athens  (412),' 
xi.  6 ;  popular  revolt  at,  ibid.  ;  the  island 
allowed  to  be  independent,  ibid*  ■  becomes 
the  Athenian  headquarters  in  Ionia  (412),  xi. 
8  ;  attempted  oligarchical  revolution  at(411), 

xi.  15  ;  overthrow  of  attempted  oligarchical 
government  (411),  xi.  17;  attitude  to  the 
Four  Hundred,  xi.  18 ;  alone  remains  faith- 
ful to  Athens  after  Aegospotami  (405) 

xii.  21. 
Satyrus,  xii.  25. 

Scione,  revolts  to  Brasidas  after  the  truce  is 
signed  (423),  viii.  9;  blockaded  by  the 
Athenians  (423),  viii.  11 ;  capture  of,  and 
massacre  of  the  inhabitants  (421),  ix.  3. 

Sciritae,  the,  in  the  army  at  Man  tinea,  ix.  10. 

Scu'pture,  xiv.  18. 

Scyles,  son  of  Ariapithes,  i.  21 ;  his  love  of 
Greek  customs,  ibid.  ;  he  is  initiated  in  the 
Dionysiac  rites,  ibid. ;  deposed,  ibid. ;  put 
to  death  by  Octamasades,  ibid. 

Sea,  the,  regarded  as  the  territory  of  the 
Athenians,  ix.  8. 

Segesta,  envoys  from,  at  Athens,  i.  9;  her 
quarrel  with  Selinus  in  416,  x.  3 ;  her  alii- 
ance  with  Athens,  ibid.  ;  seeks  the  aid  of 
Athens,  ibid. ;  Athenian  envoys  visit,  and 
report  upon,  ibid.  ;   deception  practised 


558 


INDEX. 


upon  them,  ibid. ;  discovery  of  the  fraud 
practised  on  the  Athenian  envoys  at,  x.  10  ; 
the  Athenian  fleet  sails  to  (415),  x.  12 ;  a 
body  of  horse  from,  joins  the  Athenians, 
x.  15 ;  and  Selinus,  xiii.  2 ;  and  Carthage, 
ibid. 

Selinuntians,  the,  defeat  of,  xiii.  2. 
Selinus  her  quarrel  with  Segesta  in  416,  x.  3  ; 
seeks  the  aid  of  Syracuse,  ibid.  ;  and  Segesta, 
xiii.  2  ;  destruction  of  (409),  xiii.  3. 
Sestos,  taken  by  Lysander  (405),  xii.  21. 
Seuthes,  the   nephew  of  Sitalces,  marries 

Stratonice,  sister  of  Perdiccas,  v.  20. 
Sicanus,  a  Syracusan  general  (413),  x.  81. 
Sicels,  the  Athenians  negotiate  with  (415-414), 
x.  14 ;  destroy  a  body  of  reinforcements  on 
their  way  to  Syracuse  (413),  x.  24. 
Sicilian,  fleet,  vii.  15  ;  expedition,  causes  of 

the  failure  of,  x.  21. 
Sicily  Athenian  passion  for,  i.  3  ;  growth  of 
rhetoric  in,  ii.  5  ;  the  Athenians  send  ships 
to  (427),  vi.  17 ;  affairs  in,  in  426,  vn.  6  ; 
ships  sent  to,  in  425,  detained  at  Pylus, 
vii  8-10 ;  affairs  in,  in  425,  vii.  15 ;  affairs 
in  424,  the  congress  of  Gela,  viii.  3 ;  after 
the  congress  of  Gela,  x.  1 ;  attempt  of  the 
Athenians  to  gain  a  footing  in,  in  422,  x  2  ; 
Athenian  interest  in  the  island,  x.  3 ;  the 
Athenians  resolve  to  send  an  expedition  to 
Sicily  (415),  ibid. ;  Nicias,  Alcibiades,  and 
Lamachus  appointed  generals,  ibid.  ;  first 
armament  sent  to  (415),  x.  6 ;  depart  ure  of  the 
great  expedition,  x.  8  ;  reinforcements  sent 
to  from  Peloponnesus  and  Boeotia,  x.  22  ; 
from  Athens,  x.  26  ;  effect  of  the  disaster  in, 
at  Athens  (413),  si.  1 ;  return  of  thePelopon- 
nesian  ships  from  Sicily  (412),  xi.  3. 
Sicyon,  the   constitution  rearranged  on  a 

more  oligarchical  basis  (418),  ix.  12. 
Siege,  of  Plataea  (430),  v.  13  ;  engines  used  at 

Samos  (?),  i.  16,  note;  at  Plataea,  v.  13. 
Simonides,  xiv.  1. 

Siphae,  a  rising  contemplated  at  (424),  rm.  4. 

Sitalces,  son  of  Teres,  i.  19 ;  the  kingdom  of 
the  Odrysians  united  in  his  hands,  i.  21 ; 
receives  Scyles,  and  exchanges  him  for 
Sparadocus,  ibid. ;  Athens  wishes  to  form 
an  alliance  with,  ibid. ;  alliance  with  (431), 
v.  6;  arrests  the  Peloponnesian  envoys  on 
their  way  to  the  Great  King,  and  gives  them 
up  to  Athens  (430),  v.  12 ;  invades  Mace- 
donia (429),  v.  20 ;  his  levy,  ibid. 
Slavery,  condemned  by  the  sophists,  xiv.  23  ; 

iu  Greece,  ityd. 
Slaves,  the,  at  Athens,  desert  to  Decelea,  x. 


22 ;  number  of,  in  Sicily  after  the  defeat  of 
the  Athenians,  x.  35. 
Society,  at  Athens,  ii.  3 ;  in  Greece,  xiv.  23. 
Socrates,  and  Aspasia,  ii.  3  ;  his  views  on  the 
decline  of  the  Athenian  character,  xn.  12 ; 
his  conduct  as  one  of  the  prytanes,  xii.  15, 
xiv.  15 ;  his  death,  ibid. 
Sollium,  capture  of,  by  Athens,  v.  5. 
Solygea,  Nicias  at  (425),  vii.  14. 
Sophists,   and  philosophers,   ii.   5;  their 
wandering  life,  ibid. ;   their  teaching  at 
Athens,  ii.  6  ;  disliked  at  Athens,  ii.  7  ;  the, 
xiv.  13. 

Sophocles,  an  Athenian  general,  at  Corcyra 
(425),  vi.  16;  at  Pylus,  vii.  8;  m  Sicily 
(425),  vii.  15,  viii.  3  ;  exiled  on  his  return  to 
Athens,  ibid.,  xiv.  3. 
Sparadocus,  son  of  Teres,  expelled  by  Sitalces, 
takes  refuge  in  Scythia,  given  up  to  Sitalces, 

i.  21.  .  .  * 

Spargapithes,  king  of  the  Agathyrsi,  i.  21. 
Sparta,  her  conduct  in  446,  i.  1 ;  decision  of 
the  Assembly  about  the  war,  iii.  10  ;  negotia- 
tions with  Athens  in  the  hope  of  avoiding 
war    iii.  12;  her  demands,  ibid.;  and 
Athens  contrasted,  iv.  1  f. ;  her  fleet  in 
431  iv.  4 ;  her  army,  ibid. ;  without  any 
well-defined casusbdli in 431,  v.  3 ;  assembles 
her  troops  at  the  Isthmus,  ibid. ;  and  Lesbos, 
vi.  2  ;  bids  the  Mytilenaean  envoys  appear 
at  Olympia,  vi.  3  ;  proposes  peace  after  the 
seizure  of  Pylus,  vii.  10;  concludes  a  truce 
with  Athens  for  a  year  (423),  viii.  8 ;  short- 
sighted policy  of,  in  423,  ibid. ;  her  attitude 
to  Argos  in  422,  viii.  16 ;  her  indifference  to 
the  interests  of  her  allies  in  the  peace  of 
421,  viii  17;  and  Athens,  alliance  between 
(421),  ix.  1    her  position  as  head  of  the 
Peloponnesian  league  severely  shaken  by 
the  peace  of  421,  ix.  2  ff .  ;  forms  an 
alliance  with  Boeotia  (421),  ix.  4;  and 
Argos  (420),  ix.  5  ;  her  citizens  excluded 
from  the  Olympian  festival  (420),  ix.  7 ; 
and  Argos,  in  418,  ix.  9,  10;  and  Argos, 
alliance  between  (after  Mantinea),  ix.  12 ; 
short  duration  of  her  alliance  with  Argos, 
ix  14;  Syracusan  envoys  at  (415),  x.  13; 
the  Chians  and  Erythraeans  send  to,  pro- 
posing to  revolt,  xi.  2;  the  Spartans  in- 
clined to  abandon  the  Athenian  allies  (412>, 

xi.  3 ;  overtures  to,  by  the  Four  Hundred 
(411),  xi.  21 ;  magnanimity  towards  Athens, 

xii.  22. 

Spartan,  confederacy,  difficulties  m  the  way 
of  action,  iv.  8 ;  jealousies  and  enmities, 


INDEX,  55& 


ibid.  ;  confederacy,  financial  position  of,  iv. 
6 ;  pay  a  contribution  but  have  no  public 
funds,  ibid. 
Spartans,  characteristics  of,  slowness  and 
deliberation,  iii.  10;  the  common  Greek 
opinion  of,  iv.  1,  note ;  retained  even  incom- 
petent officers  in  command,  iv.  3 ;  send 
commissioners  to  Cnemus,  v.  17,  see  Bra- 
sidas ;  cut  off  in  Sphacteria,  vii.  9  ;  send 
envoys  to  Athens  to  treat  for  peace  (425), 
vii.  10 ;  on  Sphacteria,  surrender,  vii.  12 ; 
astonishment  of  Greece  at  this,  vii.  13  ; 
carried  captive  to  Athens  from  Pylus,  ibid.- 
their  fear  of  the  Helots,  viii.  2 ;  iniquitous 
massacre  of  the  Helots,  ibid.  ;  their  de- 
spondency in  consequence  of  defeat  (424), 
establish  a  force  of  cavalry,  and  send  out 
garrisons  into  various  parts  of  the  country, 
ibid. ;  obtain  a  clear  casus  belli  against  the 
Athenians  (414),  x.  21 ;  invade  Attica  (413), 

x.  22 ;  propose"  peace  after  the  battle  of 
Cyzicus  (410),  xii.  6 ;  after  Arginusae  (406), 
xii.  16. 

Spartolus,  defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  (429), 
v.  14. 

Sphacteria,  the  island  of,  vii.  9 ;  geographical  i 

difficulties  connected  with,  vii.  10  ;  blockade 

of,  vii.  10,  11 ;  attack  on  the  island,  vii.  12  ; 

the  captives  taken  at,  restored  by  Athens 

in  421,  ix.  1. 
Spindle,  the=arrow,  vii.  13. 
Sthenelaidas,  ephor  of  Sparta,  his  speech  on 

the  war,  iii.  10. 
Stone  quarries,  the,  at  Syracuse,  the  Athenians 

placed  in,  x.  35. 
Stratus,  defeat  of  the  Chaonians  at  (429), 

v.  15. 

Strombichides,  an  Athenian  general  (412), 

xi.  4. 

Strymon,  geography  of  the  lower,  i.  20. 
Styplion,    commander   of  the   troops  on 

Sphacteria,  vii.  12. 
Superstition,  of  the  Athenians,  ii.  4 ;  fear  of 

eclipses,  x.  28. 
Sybaris,  refounded  and  destroyed  by  Croton, 

i.  20. 

Sybarites,  the  remnant  destroyed   by  the 
Lucanians,  i.  12. 

Sybota,  battle  of,  iii.  6. 

Syke,  the,  on  Epipolae,  x.  15. 

Syracusans,  outwitted  by  the  Athenians,  who  • 
are  able  to  transfer  their  fleet  from  Catana 
to  the  Great  Harbour,  x.  12;  exhibit  con- 
tempt for  the  Athenians,  ibid. ;  their  first 
engagement  with  the  Athenians  on  the 


shore  of  the  Great  Harbour  (415),  ibid.  ;  ex- 
cellence of  their  cavalry,  ibid.  ;  their  pre- 
parations in  the  winter  of  415,  x.  13  ;  send 
envoys  to  Corinth  and  Lacedaemon,  ibid.  ; 
enclose  the  Temenites  (415),  x.  14;  place 
garrisons  in  the  Olympieum  and  Megara, 
ibid. ;  their  first  counter-wall  (414),  x.  16 ; 
destroyed  by  the  Athenians,  ibid. ;  their 
second  counter-wall,  ibid. ;  destroyed  by 
the  Athenians,  ibid. ;  despondency  of,  x. 
17;  depose  Hermocrates,  ibid. ;  contemplate 
surrendering  (414),  x.  18  ;  prevented  by  the 
arrival  of  Gongylus,  ibid.  ;  their  third  wall, 
ibid. ;  under  Gylippus,  defeated,  but  after- 
wards victorious  and  carry  their  third  wall 
past  the  Athenian  line,  x.  19;  resolve  to 
attack  the  Athenians  at  sea,  x.  24 ;  the  first 
engagement  (413),  ibid. ;  capture  Athenian 
transports,  ibid. ;  their  second  engagement 
in  the  Great  Harbour,  they  are  victorious 
(413),  x.  25 ;  their  third  naval  engagement 
with  the  Athenians  (413),  x.  29;  their 
victory,  ibid. ;  dangerous  enemies  to  the 
Athenians  because  like  them,  x.  29 ;  close 
the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour  (413),  x. 
i  30 ;  last  engagement  in  the  Harbour,  x.  30, 
31 ;  their  triumphant  return  from  the 
Assinarus  to  the  city  (413),  x.  34;  their 
treatment  of  the  Athenian  prisoners,  x.  35. 
Syracuse,  at  war  with  Leontini  (427),  vi.  17; 
aid  of,  sought  by  Leontini,  x.  1 ;  news  of 
the  Athenian  expedition  carried  to,  x.  9  ;  a 
general  dismisses  the  Assembly,  ibid.  ;  the 
Athenians  send  ten  slaps  into  (*15),  x.  10  ; 
ten  Ath  enian  ships  enter  the  Great  Harbour, 
ibid.  ;  the  whole  Athenian  fleet  enters,  x. 
12  ;  the  army  encamps  on  the  shore,  ibid. ; 
Alcibiades  advises  help  to  be  sent  to,  x.  13  ; 
the  Athenian  fleet  sails  into  the  Great  Har- 
bour (414),  x.  16;  arrival  of  the  Corinthian 
ships  at,  x.  19  ;  retreat  of  the  Athenians 
from,  X.  33  f. 

T 

Taenarus,  the  curse  of,  iii.  12. 
Tanagra,  attacked  by  Nicias  (426),  vii.  2. 
Tegea,  at  war  with  Mantinea  (423),  viii.  12; 
refuses  to  join  Argos,  ix.  3 ;  the  allied 
armies  propose  to  attack  (418),  ix.  10; 
Agis  marches  to  the  relief  of,  ibid.  ;  and 
Mantinea,  quarrel  about  the  water,  ix.  10. 
Temples,  built  in  the  fifth  century,  xiv.  19. 
Teuedos,  hostile  to  Mytilene,  vi.  1. 


560 


INDEX. 


Teos,  revolts  from  Athens  (412),  xi.  4; 
Diomedon  partially  recovers,  for  Athens, 

xi.  5. 

Terentum,  opposed  to  the  Athenians  in  415, 
x.  8. 

Teres,  king  of  the  Odrysians,  i.  19  ;  death  of, 
ibid. ;  his  sons,  ibid. 

Teucer,  gives  information  about  the  profana- 
tion of  the  mysteries,  x.  11. 

Teutiaplus  of  Elis,  his  advice  to  Alcidas, 
vi.  7. 

Thales  of  Miletus,  xiv.  11. 

Theban  tactics,  a  line  twenty-five  deep,  at 
Delium,  viii.  4. 

Thebans,  their  conduct  in  the  Persian  war, 
vi.  11,  12  ;  their  relations  to  Plataea,  v.  1  ff, 
vi.  12  ;  insist  on  the  destruction  of  the  walls 
of  Thespiae  (423),  viii.  12  ;  see  Plataea. 

Thebes,  wealth  of,  iv.  6 ;  and  Plataea,  v.  1  ; 
proposes  destruction  of  Athens  to  Sparta, 

xii.  22. 

Themistocles,  and  Magna  Graecia,  i.  9. 
Theodoras  of  Cyrene,  a  mathematician,  xiv. 
16. 

Thera,  pays  tribute,  iv.  4,  note. 
Theramenes,   the   Spartan,   makes  second 

treaty  with  Persians  (412),  xi.  9;  lost  at 

sea,  ibid. 

  son  of  Hagnon,  his   position  in  the 

Four  Hundred,  xi.  21 ;  breaks  with  the 
Four  Hundred  (411),  xi.  22;  at  Arginusae, 
xii.  14;  accuses  the  generals  at  Arginusae 
(406),  xii.  15 ;  views  of  Aristophanes  upon 
him,  xii.  17  ;  visits  Lysander  (404),  xii.  22  ; 
sent  as  envoy  to  Sparta,  ibid.  ;  proposes 
return  of  the  exiles,  xii.  23 ;  his  part  in  the 
election  of  the  Thirty,  xii.  24 ;  his  policy, 
ibid.  ;  opposes  the  conduct  of  the  Thirty, 
xii.  25  ;  attacked  by  Critias  and  executed 
(404),  ibid. 

Therma,  acquired  by  Macedon,  i.  18  ;  restored 

to  Perdiccas  (431),  v.  6. 
Thero,  monument  of,  at  Agrigentum,  xiii.  6. 
Thespiae, the  walls  pulled  down  by  theThebans 

(423V  viii.  12. 
Thespians,  the,  arrive  at  Syracuse  (413),  x. 

24;  on  Epipolae,  x.  27. 
Thessalians,  allies  of  the  Athenians,  v.  4. 
Thessalus,  refouuds  Sybaris(?),  i.  10;  son  of 

Cimon,  impeaches  Alcibiades  for  profaning 

the  mysteries,  x.  11. 
Thessaly,  political  feeling  in  the  country, 

viii.  5  ;  on  friendly  terms  with  Perdiccas, 

viii.  11. 

Thirty,  the,  election  of,  at  Athens  (404),  xii. 


24;  character  of  their  government,  xii.  25; 

apply  for  Spartan  garrison  (404),  ibid. ; 

seize  Eleusis  (403),  xii.  26;  defeated  by 

Thrasybulus,  ibid. ;  deposed,  ibid. 
Thrace,  growth  of  the  Odrysian  empire,  i.  19. 
Thracian,  "district,"  i.  2;  changes  in,  i.  18; 

from  437,  i.  20;  mercenaries,  at  Athens 

(413),  x.  23. 

Thrasybulus,  general  of  Athenian  fleet,  xi.  18; 
at  Arginusae,  xii.  14;  makes  terms  with 
oligarchs  (403),  xii.  26 ;  attacks  the  Thirty 
from  Phyle,  ibid.  ;  marches  to  Peiraeus, 
ibid. 

Thrasyllus,  an  Argive  general  (418),  ix.  9  ;  at 
the  battle  of  Cynossema  (411),  xii.  4;  sent 
to  Athens,  ibid.  ;  raises  a  force  at  Athens 
(410),  xii.  7  ;  defeated  at  Ephesus  (410),  xii. 
8  ;  in  the  Hellespont,  ibid. 

Thrasymachus,  the  sophist,  xiv.  14. 

Thronium,  captured  by  the  Athenians  (431), 
v.  5. 

Thucydides,  the  son  of  Melesias,  ostracism 
of,  i.  4;  general  at  Samos,  i.  16;  said  to 
have  accused  Anaxagoras  of  treason,  ii.  8. 

 the  historian,  a  general  (424),  at  Thasos, 

viii.  5  ;  fails  to  relieve  Ainphipolis,  ibid,. ; 
an  exile  from  Athens,  viii.  6 ;  his  remarks 
on  the  Sicilian  expedition,  x.  21 ;  his 
opinion  as  to  the  best  Athenian  govern- 
ment, xi.  23 ;  his  judgment  on  Antiphon 
ibid.,  xiv.  9. 

Thurii,  foundation  of,  i.  10 ;  construction  of 
the  town,  ibid.  ;  dissensions  at,  i.  11 ;  fresh 
colonists  invited,  ibid. ;  date  of  the  founda- 
tion, ibid.,  note;  Cleandridas  at,  i.  12; 
becomes  Dorian  and  secedes  from  Athens, 
ibid. ;  refuses  to  join  Gylippus,  x.  17  ;  the 
Thurians  become  allies  of  the  Athenians 
(413),  x.  26. 

Thyreatis,  Ageinetans  settled  in  the,  v.  6, 
viii.  1. 

Timocreon  of  Rhodes,  xiv.  1. 

Tissaphernes,  sends  an  envoy  to  Sparta  (413), 
xi.  2;  his  alliance  with  Chalcideus,  xi.  5; 
obtains  possession  of  Amorges,  xi.  8 ;  pro- 
vides pay  for  the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  ibid. ; 
makes  second  treaty  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  (412),  xi.  9;  quarrels  with  Lichas, 
xi.  10;  receives  Alcibiades  (411),  xi.  11; 
reduces  pay  of  Peloponnesian  fleet,  ibid. ; 
concludes  a  third  treaty  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  (411),  xi.  15  ;  follows  Peloponnesians 
to  the  Hellespont,  xii.  4  ;  arrests  Alcibiades 
(410),  xii.  5. 

Tlupoleinus,  general  at  Samos,  i.  16. 


INDEX. 


561 


Torone,  captured  by  Brasidas  (424),  viii.  7; 
recovered  for  Athens  by  Cleon  (422),  viii. 
13. 

Trachinians,  their  country  ravaged  by  the 

Oetaeans,  vii.  1. 
Trade,  effect  of  the  Ionian  revolt  on,  xiv.  22  ; 

of  Athens,  ibid. 
Tragia,  battle  of,  i.  16. 

Tribute,  diminution  of,  in  450-440,  i.  2  ;  of  the 
allies  in  Caria,  i.  15;  collected  in  Lycia 
(430),  v.  11 ;  raising  of  the,  by  Athens 
in  425,  vii.  16  ;  see  App.  1 ;  of  the  Asiatic 
cities,  reckoned  as  due  to  the  Great  King, 
xi.  2. 

Triremes,  a  hundred  set  apart  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  v.  5. 

Troezen,  Athenians  attack,  in  430,  v.  8. 

Tyrrhenians,  in  the  Athenian  army  at  Syra- 
cuse (413),  x.  29. 


V 

Vase-painting,  xiv.  17. 

w 

War,  parties  for  and  against,  at  Athens,  ii.  9  ; 
causes  of  the  Peloponnesian,  Thucydides' 


views,  iii  1 ;  the  Megarian  decree,  ibid. ; 
the  peculations  of  Phidias,  ibid.  ;  the 
Peloponnesian,  due  to  the  peculations  of 
Pericles,  ibid.  ;  the  cost  of,  iv.  6  ;  largely 
met  by  private  expenditure,  ibid.  ;  savage 
nature  of  the  Peloponnesian,  even  in  430, 
v.  12. 

Warfare,  mode  of,  among  the  Athenians  and 
Spartans,  contrasted,  iv.  5  ;  difficulties  of, 
ibid. 

West,  the,  and  Athens,  i.  9;  Athenian  view 

of  conquest  in,  x.  13. 
Women,  their  life  at  Athens,  ii.  3 ;  at  Athens, 

xiv.  23. 


X 

Xanthippus,  son  of  Pericles,  ii.  3 ;  carried  off 

by  the  plague  (430),  v.  10. 
Xenocritus,  takes  part  in  the  founding  of 

Thurii,  i.  10. 
Xcnophanes  of  Blea,  xiv.  11. 

z 

Zacynthus,  attack  on  (430),  V.  11. 
Zeno,  xiv.  11. 
Zeuxis,  xiv.  It. 


